# **DUAL SELECTION GAMES**

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ABSTRACT. Often, selection games have dual games for which a winning strategy for a player in one game may be used to create a winning strategy For example, the Rothberger selection game involving open covers is dual to the point-open game. This extends to a general theorem: if  $\{\text{range}(f): f \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})\}$ is coinitial in  $\mathcal{A}$  with respect to  $\subseteq$ , where  $\mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R}) = \{ f \in (\bigcup \mathcal{R})^{\mathcal{R}} : R \in \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow (\bigcup \mathcal{R})^{\mathcal{R} : R \to \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow (\bigcup \mathcal{R})^{\mathcal{R}} : R \to \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow (\bigcup \mathcal$  $f(R) \in R$  collects the choice functions on the set  $\mathcal{R}$ , then  $G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  and  $G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$  are dual selection games.

### 1. Introduction

**Definition 1.** The selection game  $G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  is an  $\omega$ -length game involving Players I and II. During round n, I chooses  $A_n \in \mathcal{A}$ , followed by II choosing  $B_n \in A_n$ . Player II wins in the case that  $\{B_n : n < \omega\} \in \mathcal{B}$ , and Player I wins otherwise.

For brevity, let

$$G_1(\mathcal{A}, \neg \mathcal{B}) = G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}\left(\bigcup \mathcal{A}\right) \setminus \mathcal{B}).$$

That is, II wins in the case that  $\{B_n : n < \omega\} \notin \mathcal{B}$ , and I wins otherwise.

**Definition 2.** For a set X, let  $C(X) = \{ f \in (\bigcup X)^X : x \in X \Rightarrow f(x) \in x \}$  be the collection of all choice functions on X.

**Definition 3.** Write  $X \leq Y$  if X is coinitial in Y with respect to  $\subseteq$ ; that is,  $X \subseteq Y$ , and for all  $y \in Y$ , there exists  $x \in X$  such that  $x \subseteq y$ .

**Definition 4.** The set  $\mathcal{R}$  is said to be a reflection of the set  $\mathcal{A}$  if

$${\operatorname{range}(f): f \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})} \preceq \mathcal{A}.$$

As we will see, reflections of selection sets are used frequently (but implicitly) throughout the literature to define dual selection games.

#### 2. Main Results

The following four theorems demonstrate that reflections characterize dual selection games for both perfect information strategies and certain limited information strategies.

**Definition 5.** A pair of games G(X), H(X) are Markov information dual if both of the following hold.

- $I \uparrow G(X)$  if and only if  $II \uparrow H(X)$ .  $II \uparrow G(X)$  if and only if  $I \uparrow H(X)$ .

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**Theorem 6.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a reflection of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Then  $I \uparrow_{pre} G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  if and only if  $II \uparrow_{mark} G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

Proof. Let  $\sigma$  witness I  $\uparrow$   $G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ . Since  $\sigma(n) \in \mathcal{A}$ , range $(f_n) \subseteq \sigma(n)$  for some  $f_n \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$ . So let  $\tau(R, n) = f_n(R)$  for all  $R \in \mathcal{R}$  and  $n < \omega$ . Suppose  $R_n \in \mathcal{R}$  for all  $n < \omega$ . Note that since  $\sigma$  is winning and  $\tau(R_n, n) = f_n(R_n) \in \mathrm{range}(f_n) \subseteq \sigma(n)$ ,  $\{\tau(R_n, n) : n < \omega\} \notin \mathcal{B}$ . Thus  $\tau$  witnesses II  $\uparrow$   $G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

 $\{\tau(R_n,n):n<\omega\}\not\in\mathcal{B}.$  Thus  $\tau$  witnesses II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R},\neg\mathcal{B}).$ Now let  $\sigma$  witness II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R},\neg\mathcal{B}).$  Let  $f_n\in\mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$  be defined by  $f_n(R)=\sigma(R,n)$ , and let  $\tau(n)=\mathrm{range}(f_n)\in\mathcal{A}.$  Suppose that  $B_n\in\tau(n)=\mathrm{range}(f_n)$  for all  $n<\omega.$  Choose  $R_n\in\mathcal{R}$  such that  $B_n=f_n(R_n)=\sigma(R_n,n).$  Since  $\sigma$  is winning,  $\{B_n:n<\omega\}\not\in\mathcal{B}.$  Thus  $\tau$  witnesses I  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{B}).$ 

**Theorem 7.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a reflection of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Then II  $\uparrow_{mark} G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  if and only if I  $\uparrow_{pre} G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

*Proof.* Let  $\sigma$  witness II  $\uparrow_{\text{mark}} G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ . Let  $n < \omega$ . Suppose that for each  $R \in \mathcal{R}$ , there was  $g(R) \in R$  such that for all  $A \in \mathcal{A}$ ,  $\sigma(A, n) \neq g(R)$ . Then  $g \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$ , and  $\sigma(\text{range}(g), n) \neq g(R)$  for all  $R \in \mathcal{R}$ , a contradiction.

So choose  $\tau(n) \in \mathcal{R}$  such that for all  $r \in \tau(n)$  there exists  $A_{r,n} \in \mathcal{A}$  such that  $\sigma(A_{r,n},n) = r$ . It follows that when  $r_n \in \tau(n)$  for  $n < \omega$ ,  $\{r_n : n < \omega\} = \{\sigma(A_{r_n,n}) : n < \omega\} \in B$ , so  $\tau$  witnesses  $I \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

 $\{\sigma(A_{r_n,n}): n < \omega\} \in B, \text{ so } \tau \text{ witnesses I} \underset{\text{pre}}{\uparrow} G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B}).$ Now let  $\sigma$  witness I  $\underset{\text{pre}}{\uparrow} G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ . Then  $\sigma(n) \in \mathcal{R}$ , so for  $A \in \mathcal{A}$ , let  $f_A \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$  satisfy  $A = \text{range}(f_A)$ , and let  $\tau(A, n) = f_A(\sigma(n))$ . Then if  $A_n \in \mathcal{A}$  for  $n < \omega$ ,  $\tau(A_n, n) \in \sigma(n)$ , so  $\{\tau(A_n, n): n < \omega\} \in \mathcal{B}$ . Thus  $\tau$  witnesses II  $\underset{\text{mark}}{\uparrow} G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ .  $\square$ 

**Definition 8.** A pair of games G(X), H(X) are perfect information dual if both of the following hold.

- $I \uparrow G(X)$  if and only if  $II \uparrow H(X)$ .
- $II \uparrow G(X)$  if and only if  $I \uparrow H(X)$ .

**Theorem 9.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a reflection of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Then  $I \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  if and only if  $II \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

Proof. Let  $\sigma$  witness  $I \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ . Let  $c(\emptyset) = \emptyset$ . Suppose  $c(s) \in (\bigcup A)^{<\omega} = (\bigcup R)^{<\omega}$  is defined for  $s \in \mathcal{R}^{<\omega}$ . Since  $\sigma(c(s)) \in \mathcal{A}$ , let  $f_s \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$  satisfy  $\sigma(c(s)) = \operatorname{range}(f_s)$ , and let  $c(s \cap \langle R \rangle) = c(s) \cap \langle f_s(R) \rangle$ . Then let  $c(\alpha) = \bigcup \{c(\alpha \upharpoonright n) : n < \omega\}$  for  $\alpha \in \mathcal{R}^{\omega}$ , so

$$c(\alpha)(n) = f_{\alpha \upharpoonright n}(\alpha(n)) \in \text{range}(f_{\alpha \upharpoonright n}) = \sigma(c(\alpha \upharpoonright n))$$

demonstrating that  $c(\alpha)$  is a legal attack against  $\sigma$ .

Let  $\tau(s \cap \langle R \rangle) = f_s(R)$ . Consider the attack  $\alpha \in \mathcal{R}^{\omega}$  against  $\tau$ . Then since  $\sigma$  is winning and  $\tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1) = f_{\alpha \upharpoonright n}(\alpha(n)) \in \operatorname{range}(f_{\alpha \upharpoonright n}) = \sigma(c(\alpha \upharpoonright n))$ , it follows that  $\{\tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1) : n < \omega\} \notin \mathcal{B}$ . Thus  $\tau$  witnesses II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

Now let  $\sigma$  witness II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ . For  $s \in \mathcal{R}^{<\omega}$ , define  $f_s \in \mathbf{C}(\mathcal{R})$  by  $f_s(R) = \sigma(s \cap \langle R \rangle)$ . Let  $\tau(\emptyset) = \operatorname{range}(f_{\emptyset})$ , and for  $x \in \tau(\emptyset)$ , choose  $R_{\langle x \rangle} \in \mathcal{R}$  such that  $x = f_{\emptyset}(R_{\langle x \rangle})$  (for other  $x \in \bigcup A$ , choose  $R_{\langle x \rangle}$  arbitrarily as it won't be used). Now

let  $s \in (\bigcup A)^{<\omega} \setminus \emptyset$ , and suppose  $\tau(s \upharpoonright n) \in \mathcal{A}$  and  $R_{s \upharpoonright n+1} \in \mathcal{R}$  have been defined for n < |s|. Then let  $\tau(s) = \operatorname{range}(f_{\langle R_{s \upharpoonright 0}, \dots, R_s \rangle})$  and for  $x \in \tau(s)$  choose  $R_{s \frown \langle x \rangle}$  such that  $x = f_{\langle R_{s \upharpoonright 0}, \dots, R_s \rangle}(R_{s \frown \langle x \rangle})$  (and again, choose  $R_{s \frown \langle x \rangle}$  arbitrarily for other  $x \in \bigcup \mathcal{A}$  as it won't be used).

Then let  $\alpha$  attack  $\tau$ , so  $\alpha(n) \in \tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n)$  and thus  $\alpha(n) = f_{\langle R_{\alpha \upharpoonright 0}, \dots, R_{\alpha \upharpoonright n} \rangle}(R_{\alpha \upharpoonright n+1}) = \sigma(\langle R_{\alpha \upharpoonright 0}, \dots, R_{\alpha \upharpoonright n+1} \rangle)$ . Since  $\sigma$  is winning,  $\{\sigma(\langle R_{\alpha \upharpoonright 0}, \dots, R_{\alpha \upharpoonright n+1} \rangle) : n < \omega\} = \{\alpha(n) : n < \omega\} \notin \mathcal{B}$ . Thus  $\tau$  witnesses  $I \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ .

**Theorem 10.** Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be a reflection of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Then II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  if and only if I  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

Proof. Let  $\sigma$  witness II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{B})$ . Let  $s \in (\bigcup R)^{<\omega}$  and assume  $a(s) \in \mathcal{A}^{|s|}$  is defined (of course,  $a(\emptyset) = \emptyset$ ). Suppose for all  $R \in \mathcal{R}$  there existed  $f(R) \in R$  such that for all  $A \in \mathcal{A}$ ,  $\sigma(a(s)^{\frown}\langle A \rangle) \neq f(R)$ . Then  $\sigma(a(s)^{\frown}\langle \operatorname{range}(f) \rangle) \neq f(R)$  for all  $R \in \mathcal{R}$ , a contradiction. So let  $\tau(s) \in \mathcal{R}$  satisfy for all  $x \in \tau(s)$  there exists  $a(s^{\frown}\langle x \rangle) \in \mathcal{A}^{|s|+1}$  extending a(s) such that  $x = \sigma(a(s^{\frown}\langle x \rangle))$ .

If  $\tau$  is attacked by  $\alpha \in (\bigcup R)^{\omega}$ , then  $\alpha(n) \in \tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n)$ . So  $\alpha(n) = \sigma(a(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1))$ , and since  $\sigma$  is winning,  $\{\sigma(a(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1)) : n < \omega\} = \{\alpha(n) : n < \omega\} \in \mathcal{B}$ . Therefore  $\tau$  witnesses  $I \uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ .

Now let  $\sigma$  witness I  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$ . Let  $s \in \mathcal{A}^{<\omega}$ , and suppose  $c(s) \in (\bigcup \mathcal{R})^{|s|}$  is defined (again,  $c(\emptyset) = \emptyset$ ). Let  $\tau(s \cap \langle \operatorname{range}(f) \rangle) = f(\sigma(c(s)))$ , and let  $c(s \cap \langle \operatorname{range}(f) \rangle)$  extend c(s) by letting  $c(s \cap \langle \operatorname{range}(f) \rangle)(|s|) = \tau(s \cap \langle \operatorname{range}(f) \rangle)$ .

If  $\tau$  is attacked by  $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}^{\omega}$ , where  $\alpha(n) = \operatorname{range}(f_n)$  for  $n < \omega$ , then since  $\tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1) \in \sigma(c(\alpha \upharpoonright n))$  and  $\sigma$  is winning, we conclude that  $\{\tau(\alpha \upharpoonright n+1) : n < \omega\} \in \mathcal{B}$ . Therefore  $\tau$  witnesses II  $\uparrow G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$ .

**Corollary 11.** If  $\mathcal{R}$  is a reflection of  $\mathcal{A}$ , then  $G_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B})$  and  $G_1(\mathcal{R}, \neg \mathcal{B})$  are both perfect information dual and Markov information dual.

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# REFERENCES

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