1)

For security param n, consider the MAC for messages of length n using a pseudorandom function  $F:\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^n\Rightarrow\{0,1\}$  defined as follows: On input k and message  $m=m_1m_2...m_n$ , the algorithm  $MAC_k(\cdot)$  is defined by  $MAC_k(m)=F_k(1||m_1m_2...m_{n-1})\oplus F_k(0||m_2m_3...m_n)$ .

The algorithm Vrfy can be defined using canonical verification.

Is this a secure MAC?

This is not a secure MAC. Prove that there exists a PPT adversary such that for any negligible function negl the following does not hold:  $Pr[Mac-forge_{A,\Pi}(n)=1] \leq negl(n)$ .

Let A be an adversary that selects any string  $x \in \{0,1\}^{n-2}$  and outputs messages  $m_1 = 0 ||x|| 0$ ,  $m_2 = 0 ||x|| 1$ , and  $m_3 = 1 ||x|| 0$ . It uses the oracle  $MAC_k(\cdot)$  to generate the following tags:

$$t_1 = MAC_k(m_1) = F_k(1||0||x) \oplus F_k(0||x||0)$$

$$t_2 = MAC_k(m_2) = F_k(1||0||x) \oplus F_k(0||x||1)$$

$$t_3 = MAC_k(m_3) = F_k(1||1||x) \oplus F_k(0||x||0)$$

Let 
$$A = F_k(1||0||x)$$
,  $B = F_k(0||x||0)$ ,  $C = F_k(0||x||1)$ , and  $D = F_k(1||1||x)$ .

A outputs the pair  $(m=1||x||1, t=t_1 \oplus t_2 \oplus t_3)$ .

How often is the adversary correct?

$$t = MAC_k(m) = F_k(1||1||x|) \oplus F_k(0||x||1) = D \oplus C$$

$$t_1 \oplus t_2 \oplus t_3 = (A \oplus B) \oplus (A \oplus C) \oplus (D \oplus B) = A \oplus A \oplus B \oplus B \oplus D \oplus C = D \oplus C$$

Therefore the adversary is always correct, and  $Pr[Mac-forge_{A,\Pi}(n)=1]=1>negl(n)$ .

Therefore this MAC is not secure.

Prove that CBC-MAC is not secure if it outputs every generated t instead of just the last.

For any security parameter n, let A be an adversary that picks any  $m_1=a\|0^n$  where  $a\in\{0,1\}^n$ . The adversary uses the oracle to generate the  $m_1$  tags  $t_1^1=F_k(0^n\oplus a)=A$  and  $t_2^1=F_k(A\oplus 0^n)=B$ . Let  $m_2=B\|0^n$ . The adversary uses the oracle to generate the  $m_2$  tags  $t_1^2=F_k(0^n\oplus B)=C$  and  $t_2=F_k(C\oplus 0^n)=D$ . The adversary then outputs  $(m=A\|0^n,t=(B,C))$ .

How often is the adversary correct?

The tags for  $m = A || 0^n$  are:

$$t = F_k(0^n \oplus A) = B$$

$$t = F_k(B \oplus 0^n) = C$$

Since this MAC outputs all generated tags, the complete tag for m is (B,C).

Therefore the adversary is always right, and  $Pr[Mac-forge_{A,\Pi}(n)=1]=1>negl(n)$  and the modified CBC-MAC is not secure.