

### Question 1

Consider the following variation of the Merkle-Damgard transform:

Let  $(\text{Gen}, h)$  be a compression function with input messages of length  $2n$  and output of length  $n$ . Construct a hash function as follows:

- Gen: Same as in compression function  $(\text{Gen}, h)$
- H: on input a key  $s$  and a string  $x \in \{0,1\}^*$  do the following
  - append a 1 to  $x$ , followed by enough zeroes so that the length of the resulting string is a multiple of  $n$ . Parse the resulting string as the sequence of  $n$ -bit blocks  $z_0, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_B$
  - for  $i=1, 2, \dots, B$  compute  $z_i = h^s(z_{i-1} || x_i)$
  - output  $z_B$  as the has value of  $z$

Find a collision in this hash function. That is, find  $x \neq x'$  such that  $H^s(x) = H^s(x')$

Answer

This hash function is vulnerable because the adversary is able to set  $z_0$  instead of having it set as a randomized IV.

For  $n$ , and any message where  $|m| \geq n$ , a collision can be found when the the second-last output of the hash function,  $z_{B-1}$  is used as the input message, concatenated to the last block of the original resulting block sequence, ie.  $H^s(z_{B-1}^m || x_B^m) = H^s(m)$ .

Example:

For  $n=3$ , the adversary picks value  $m_1 = (000 \ 000)$ . This is turned into the block sequence  $z_0 || x_1 || x_2 = (000 \ 000 \ 100)$ . This creates the hash results  $z_0^1 = 000$ ,  $z_1^1 = h^s(z_0^1 || x_1^1)$  and  $z_2^1 = h^s(z_1^1 || x_2^1) = z_B^1$ . The adversary picks the second message  $m_2 = z_1^1$ . This is then turned into the block sequence  $z_1^1 || 100 = z_1^1 || x_2^1 = z_1^1 || x_2^2$ . Note that  $x_2^1 = x_2^2$ . The hash result is  $z_1^2 = h^s(z_1^1 || x_2^1) = z_B^2$ .

Since  $z_B^1 = z_B^2$ , we have a hash collision.

## Question 2

Alice publishes her public key for RSA encryption as follows: modulus  $n = 133$  and (encryption) exponent  $e = 7$

1. Bob wants to send alice the message  $m=3$ . What ciphertext does bob send to alice?
2. Compute the decryption exponent  $d$  for alice
3. Suppose alice receives the ciphertext  $c=2$  from bob. What is the plaintext?

1: encrypt  $m=3$

$$n = pq = 133, e=7$$

$$\text{ciphertext is } c = m^e = 3^7 \pmod{133} = 3^5 * 3^2 \pmod{133} = 243 * 3^2 \pmod{133} = 110 * 3^2 \pmod{133} = 330 * 3 \pmod{133} = 64 * 3 \pmod{133} = 59$$

2: compute decryption exponent

decryption exponent  $d$  is the inverse of  $e$ .

to compute  $d$ , first need  $\phi(n) = (q-1)(p-1)$ . The prime factors of 133 are 7 and 19, and so  $\phi(n) = (q-1)(p-1) = 6 \cdot 18 = 108$ . It is acceptable to assume that the prime factors are known, since in reality,  $n$  would have been calculated from them, and not the other way around. Using extended Euclidean algorithm, find  $d = 7^{-1} \pmod{108}$

Euclidian algorithm:

$$108 = 15 \cdot 7 + 3$$

$$7 = 2 \cdot 3 + 1$$

$$3 = 2 \cdot 1 + 1$$

$$1 = 1 \cdot 1 + 0$$

j	0	1	2	3	4
qi	-	15	2	2	1
ti	0	1	-15	31	-77

So  $(-77)(7) = (31)(7) = 1 \pmod{108}$ . So  $d = 31$

3. Compute plaintext from ciphertext  $c = 2$

$$m = c^d \pmod{n} = 2^{31} \pmod{133} = 79$$

### Question 3

in RSA, the modulus value  $n = pq$  is public but  $\phi(n)$  is private. Show how an adversary could determine  $p$  and  $q$  if they had  $\phi(n)$ .

The value of  $n$  is public, so

$$(p-1)(q-1) = \phi(n) \quad \text{and} \quad pq = n$$

Find values  $p$  and  $q$  such that  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = pq - q - p + 1 = n - q - p + 1$ .

Combining this with  $pq = n$ , we can obtain the quadratics:

$$\phi(n) = n - \frac{n}{p} - p + 1 \Rightarrow 0 = -p^2 + p(n+1-\phi) - n \quad \text{and} \quad 0 = -q^2 + q(n+1-\phi) - n$$

The two quadratics are the same, and applying the quadratic formula will give two solutions, which are the values of  $p$  and  $q$ .

For example, for the previous question  $\phi(n) = 108, n = 133$ . Applying the quadratic formula to the roots of the polynomial  $y = -x^2 + x(133+1-108) - 133 = -x^2 + x(26) - 133$  gives the solutions  $x=7, 19$ , which are the primes given in question 2.

Quadratic formula calculations omitted because this isn't high school.

#### Question 4.

For the ElGamal digital signature scheme, suppose prime  $p = 6961$ , generator  $g = 437$ , signing exponent  $s = 6104$

What is the value of  $v$ ?

Assuming that  $v$  is equivalent to  $\beta$  in the lecture notes, then  

$$v = g^s \pmod{p} = 437^{6104} \pmod{6961}$$

Using the efficient exponentiation algorithm:

The exponent 6104 can be written as  $(1011111011000)_2$

The exponentiation calculation was done on libreoffice calc:

I	ki	Z (mod 6961)	
			1
	12	1	437
	11	0	3022
	10	1	1066
	9	1	3754
	8	1	4948
	7	1	2985
	6	1	716
	5	0	4503
	4	1	6217
	3	1	482
	2	0	2611
	1	0	2502
	0	0	2065

So the final value of  $v$  is 2065.

What is the signature  $(S_1, S_2)$  for the message  $m = 5584$  when the secret random value for  $e$  is  $e = 4451$ .

$$Enc_K(x, k) = (y_1, y_2) = (g^k \pmod{p}, x\beta^k \pmod{p})$$

Using the notation used in this assignment,

$$(S_1, S_2) = (g^e \pmod{p}, m v^e) = (437^{4451} \pmod{p}, 5584 \times 2065^{4451} \pmod{p})$$

Extending the formulas in libreoffice allows this to be easily calculated. The binary representation of exponent 4451 is 1000101100011.

Calculating S1, which has base 437:

I	ki	Z (mod 6961)	
			1
	12	1	437
	11	0	3022
	10	0	6613
	9	0	2767
	8	1	604
	7	0	2844
	6	1	1940
	5	1	3808
	4	0	1101
	3	0	987
	2	0	6590
	1	1	6077
	0	1	3534

Calculating S2 which has base 2065:

I	ki	Z (mod 6961)	
			1
	12	1	2065
	11	0	4093
	10	0	4483
	9	0	882
	8	1	2207
	7	0	5110
	6	1	353
	5	1	4220
	4	0	2162
	3	0	3413
	2	0	2816
	1	1	5747
	0	1	4735
		5584	2362

And so the signature is (3534, 2362)

Question 5.

Show that there exists a message  $m$  such that an adversary can forge a signature  $(S_1, S_2)$  using only public information if it also knows that  $s=e$ .

Want to find a message from which the values  $S_1 = g^s \pmod{p}$  and  $S_2 = m v^s \pmod{p}$  can be calculated without directly knowing  $p$ . Since we know that  $s=e$ , and  $v$  is calculated using  $s$ , we should use  $v$  in our calculations somehow.

Forging  $S_1$  is trivial, since  $S_1 = g^e \pmod{p} = g^e \pmod{p} = v$  which is part of the public key.

For any message  $m$ , forging  $S_2 = m v^s \pmod{p}$  is not trivial, however for the message  $m=0$ , the equation becomes  $S_2 = 0 v^s \pmod{p} = 0$ .

Therefore, for  $m=0$ , the signature can be forged as  $(S_1, S_2) = (v, 0)$ .

Question 6.

Show that alice and bob output the same key.

$$w \oplus t = (u \oplus r) \oplus t = (s \oplus t) \oplus r \oplus t = (k \oplus r) \oplus t \oplus r \oplus t = k$$

What messages are public?

The messages  $s$ ,  $u$  and  $w$  are public.

Since  $s = k \oplus r$ ,  $k = s \oplus r$

Since  $w = u \oplus r$ ,  $r = w \oplus u$

Therefore  $k = s \oplus w \oplus u$