BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE MANUAL 13-1 AIR OPERATIONS CENTER VOLUME 3

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Nuclear, Space, Missile, or Command and Control Operations

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES-AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC)/OPERATIONS CENTER (OC)

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This Air Force Manual (AFMAN) implements guidance in Department of the Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) 13-1, *Command and Control (C2) Enterprise*. It provides guidance to the Air Operations Center (AOC) Weapon System (WS) or Operations Center (OC) that is provided by the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) when supporting Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) or when executing air, space, cyberspace (Department of the Air Force (DAF) computers and networks) operations, and Information Warfare (IW). This document describes the processes used by the AOC during normal and contingency operations. This manual applies to all civilian and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard aligned to AOC/OC units. Air Reserve Component (ARC) units may combine their local operating procedures with their aligned AOC/OC. This AFMAN does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. AOC/OC units may publish local operating procedures (see **Chapter 10** for instructions) as a supplement to this Air Force Manual (AFMAN), as required. Should AOC/OC structures or procedures differ from this AFMAN, the applicable command shall write a supplement describing their procedures **(T-1)**. Units producing a local supplement will forward copies to their parent major command (MAJCOM) for approval and

publication in accordance with Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*. **(T-2)** Parent MAJCOMs will then forward to Air Combat Command (ACC) Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) (ACC/A3C) and Air Force, Exercises and Training Division (AF/A3TE) for posting to applicable AOC/OC and Headquarters Air Force websites. **(T-1)** Differences identified in an AOC/OC supplement will only apply to that AOC/OC and any aligned or associated Air Reserve Component (ARC) AOC/OC unit. Waiver authority for requirements of this volume is in accordance with DAFMAN 90-161. The authorities to waive wing or unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate tier waiver approval authority or alternately to the requestor's commander for non-tiered compliance items. Commanders of the unit seeking relief from compliance, must send waiver requests through the command chain up to the appropriate tier approval authority (Tier 0, 1, 2, 3). See DAFMAN 90-161, Table A10.1, for definition of Tier waiver authorities. Send waiver requests via email or memorandum and include information as outlined in DAFMAN 90-161, paragraph 9.2. Send copies of approved MAJCOM AOC/OC waivers to ACC/A3C as lead command OPR. ACC Director of Operations (ACC/A3) will send any waivers they approve to all AOC/OC MAJCOM counterparts. Additionally, AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2, *Standardization/Evaluation Program – Air Operations Center (AOC)/Operations Center (OC)* will outline Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) duties. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the DAF.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This manual is being converted to an AFMAN as part of the 13-1AOC series conversion from DAFMANs to AFMANs. It includes OC requirements for integrating aspects of C2 capabilities across geographic and global functional forces. It corrects office symbols for various organizations including the OPR, implements waiver authority (tiering) guidance in DAFMAN 90-161. Additionally, it changes AOC/OC operational processes and guidance. It clarifies the doctrinal and organizational role of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) as part of defensive counterair per Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats* and Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-01, *Counterair Operations*. This update includes new sections on joint data network operations, Common Tactical Picture (CTP) Management, and AOC/OC communications support and resources. It also adds network-enabled weapons to Air Tasking Order (ATO) discussions, network enabled weapons to Operational Tasking data Link (OPTASKLINK) discussions and enabling digitally aided Close Air Support (CAS).

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Genera2l. This document describes all organizationsc, positions, responsibilities, and processes used by the AOC/OC across the full spectrum of military operations with a primary emphasis on major contingency operations. Henceforth, this AFMAN uses the term "AOC" as a generic term for all AOCs and OCs. During smaller-scale contingencies or day-to-day operations, the AOC may not employ all the capabilities or teams described herein. The AOC described in this AFMAN is both an Air Force (AF) unit and a WS that the COMAFFOR may employ to exercise control of Air Force forces (AFFOR). It may form the core of a Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) or Combined AOC (CAOC) and be employed by the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC) to exercise control of joint or combined air forces when designated.

1.1.1. In addition, COMAFFORs may tailor the organizational construct of their AOC team as required to support CCDR specific missions. The AOC normally employs with joint or combined augmentation, under the command of a C/JFACC. The AOC organization and processes described here should define the essential elements of any JAOC/CAOC, regardless of the service or nationality of the leadership and subordinates involved.

1.1.2. Many AOC activities require higher level authorities/approvals. This AFMAN establishes general roles and responsibilities but does not provide that authority. For the purpose of this AFMAN, the terms COMAFFOR, Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), and AOC will be used only when addressing AF-specific AOC employment and C/JFACC and JAOC/CAOC when addressing broader, joint, or combined AOC employment.

1.1.3. AF doctrine recognizes that the AOC in joint or combined operations is a JAOC or CAOC. However, doctrine and this document simply use the term "AOC".

1.1.4. When necessary to distinguish a single AOC as a C2 center from the full AOC enterprise, this AFMAN uses the term AOC WS for the AOC enterprise.

1.1.5. This AFMAN applies to teams and processes employed during steady-state operations and throughout the competition continuum. In support of national security policy, the USAF provides the full range of capabilities to commanders at all levels.

1.1.5.1. The USAF uses the Air Task Force as the default unit of action and the eXpeditionary Air Base (XAB) as USAF contribution to Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) to run airbases, in accordance with DAFI 36-2670, *Total Force Development*. C2 and other force elements in each XAB are primarily sourced from a single base to the maximum extent possible. The USAF's offering of an XAB, when combined with assigned mission generation Force Elements or Demand Force Teams, is presented to JFCs as the USAF's expeditionary unit of action, the Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF). This framework presents the appropriate mix of ready forces and a means to C2 those forces.

1.1.5.2. The USAF will transition its C2 systems and processes across the competition continuum as outlined in JP 3-0. While joint and USAF doctrine state that one individual will normally be dual hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different. Normally, the COMAFFOR executes operational and administrative control

(ADCON) of assigned and attached USAF forces through the AFFOR staff. The JFACC executes tactical control of joint air component forces through an AOC.

1.1.6. Based on the tenet of centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution, the AOC, in coordination with the AFFOR staff, enables the JFACC to exercise operational-level C2 of air, and support to other domain forces.

1.1.6.1. Centralized command empowers the air component commander to respond to changes in the operational environment and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Centralized command maximizes the allocation and apportionment of limited assets against prioritized target sets, increasing the flexibility and effectiveness of airpower. The JFACC must advocate for effective use of airpower to include deliberate planning of, and dynamic execution of, on-call targets.

1.1.6.2. Distributed control increases C2 resiliency by distributing AOC manpower, functions and capabilities geographically. Distributed control also enables Agile Combat Employment through delegation of authorities and mission responsibilities to subordinate commanders.

1.1.6.3. Decentralized execution is the delegation of authority to designated lower-level commanders and other tactical-level decision makers to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative and tactical flexibility.

1.1.6.4. When combined or multinational operations are involved, the JFACC may have dual responsibilities as the CFACC. This AFMAN defers to JP 3-16 *Multinational Operations* and CCDR guidance on integration and information release to foreign (allied and coalition) partners within or as liaison to the CAOC. Finally, although this AFMAN briefly discusses COMAFFOR responsibilities and Component Headquarters organization, its focus is on the AOC.

1.2. C/JFACC Roles And Responsibilities.

1.2.1. Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC) Employment. When conducting combined and joint air, space, and cyberspace operations, the JFC normally designates a JFACC in accordance with JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*. During air operations, the COMAFFOR, if designated as the C/JFACC, will plan and execute through the AOC in the role of CAOC. The joint air tasking cycle will be used as the baseline process for the CAOC or Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC), which is initiated by JFC formal guidance to all functional component commands. This guidance is refined to weight of effort determination by the C/JFACC as a draft apportionment recommendation to the JFC, which drives air asset allocation to plan the ATO. The JFC approves the draft apportionment recommendation provided by the C/JFACC.

1.2.2. The C/JFACC executes responsibilities through the AOC to include, but not limited to, the following.:

1.2.2.1. Develop the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP).

1.2.2.2. Coordinate with other component commanders and then develop apportionment recommendation for the joint air effort.

1.2.2.3. Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities and forces made available.

1.2.2.4. Provide control, oversight, and guidance during the execution of joint air, space, and cyberspace operations.

1.2.2.5. Coordinate and integrate JAOP with the operations of other component commanders and forces.

1.2.2.6. Assess operational and tactical results of JAOP.

1.2.2.7. Function as supported and supporting commander as directed.

1.2.2.8. Produce the Air Operations Directive (AOD).

1.2.2.9. Produce the ATO, ATO Network-Enabled Weapon Supplement (ATONEWS), Airspace Control Plan (ACP), Airspace Control Order (ACO), and other plans and orders as required.

1.3. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Additional Responsibilities Supported by an AOC. Normally, the JFC assigns additional responsibilities associated with air operations to the JFACC, making the JFACC the supported commander for these functions. In addition to these delegated responsibilities, the JFACC may also be required to provide specialized support to other components.

1.3.1. ***Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)*** . Due to the inherent linkage of air operations and defensive counterair, the JFC normally designates the COMAFFOR as the JFACC and as the AADC to conduct defensive counterair for the joint force. The AADC has overall responsibility for air and missile defense of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) or Area Of Responsibility (AOR). The JFACC employs the AOC to coordinate with other components and develop the Area Air Defense Plan (AADP), which includes defensive counterair inputs from all sources for JFC approval. Once approved, the AOC plans, coordinates, and manages defensive counterair operations (ISO AADC) simultaneously to offensive counterair operations (ISO JFACC).

1.3.2. ***Airspace Control Authority (ACA)*** . The JFC normally designates the COMAFFOR as the ACA. The ACA has overall responsibility for planning and controlling the airspace in the AOR/JOA and operation of the Airspace Control System in the airspace control area. The ACA coordinates, develops, and issues the ACP and ACO, which provide guidance and procedures for use and control of airspace activities.

1.3.3. ***Collection Operations Management*** . In accordance with JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, collection operations management is the direction, scheduling, and control of specific collection operations and associated processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination resources. In accordance with JP 3-30, the JFACC will normally be the supported commander for the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort. The JFC will normally delegate collection operations management for joint airborne ISR to the JFACC to authoritatively direct, schedule, and control collection operations for use by the J-2 in associated processing, exploitation, and reporting.

1.3.4. ***Collection Requirements Management*** . The JFACC will also likely exercise collection requirements management of assigned units and receive collection requirements from other collection requirements management authorities. In accordance with JP 2-0, collection requirements management is the authoritative development and control of collection processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and/or reporting requirements. These

requirements normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the collection manager has authority, or the generation of tasking requests to the collection management authority at higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. See **Chapter 6** for an explanation of the ISR Division's (ISRD) roles, responsibilities, and processes.

1.3.5. ***Space Coordinating Authority (SCA)*** . The Joint Force Space Component Commander (JFSCC) is normally designated as SCA and is responsible for coordinating and integrating space capabilities. joint space operations, and integration of space capabilities and effects in support of the JFC. The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) and the space liaison element to the AOC normally support the SCA, who serves as the focal point for gathering space requirements in support of the JFC's campaign. These requirements include:

1.3.5.1. Requesting space capabilities to support joint warfighter functions and requests for space forces with specialized skills.

1.3.5.2. To ensure timely support, the Commander, US Space Command, will employ Joint Integrated Space Teams as operational liaisons to the supported Combatant Command(s).

1.3.5.3. Additionally, as allocated by US Space Force, a JFSCC may be established with the COMSPACEFOR designated as the SCA. In the absence of this force presentation, SECAF recommendations are that the COMAFFOR be designated as SCA in the absence of a USSF COMSPACEFOR. The designated Component Commander with joint force Space Coordinating Authority develops a recommended prioritized list of space requirements and capabilities based on JFC objectives and Commander, US Space Command's operational needs.

1.3.6. ***Electromagnetic Attack Control Authority*** . In accordance with JP 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations,* the Electronic Warfare (EW) Control Authority is the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of electronic attack assets in the JOA/AOR. This responsibility assumes the EW Control Authority can access the Joint Automated Communication-Electronics Operating Instructions System and Joint Restricted Frequency List, can analyze immediate jamming requests for frequency interference issues (to include harmonic interference), and can ensure positive C2 of jamming assets to start/stop jamming activity.

1.3.7. ***Supported Commander for Personnel Recovery*** . If the JFC designates the COMAFFOR as the supported commander for Personnel Recovery (PR), the COMAFFOR will integrate the Joint Personnel Recovery Center into the AOC in support of JFACC JAOP. The AOC must also retain a Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell capability to plan and conduct Personnel Recovery missions in support of USAF (i.e., COMAFFOR) operations.

1.3.8. Provision of a Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE):

1.3.8.1. The JFACC may establish and deploy a JACCE to service land, maritime, and special operations component commanders' headquarters (HQ) to integrate air with space, cyberspace, surface, and subsurface operations.

1.3.8.2. The JFACC may also establish and deploy a JACCE to the JFC or a Coalition Partner HQ to integrate air operations within the overall joint or combined force.

1.3.8.3. The JACCE will normally be sourced from the Air Force Component commander's AOC or AFFOR staff, augmentation units or air expeditionary center/Air Force Personnel Center-identified personnel as well as subject matter experts (SMEs) from each of the sister services as needed.

1.3.8.4. If possible, the COMAFFOR/JFACC should establish a working relationship with JACCE personnel before deployment and execution. The JACCE director acts as the JFACC's liaison and primary representative to the other commanders in the operation. The JACCE team facilitates interaction and communication between the respective staffs. The JACCE performs a liaison function and is responsible for understanding (and participating in, if possible) the JFC/JFACC's initial planning other commanders' plans. The JACCE team works with their respective counterparts in the AOC and AFFOR staff to provide the other HQs commander information on the best way to employ air power. This is a two-way relationship in that the JACCE only provides information flow to the JFACC but must also help ensure JFACC information is flowing to and understood by the JFC, Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, and/or Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander as applicable. JACCE will participate in training events and exercises with appropriate HQ organizations to maintain mission readiness.

1.4. AOC WS Program Responsibilities.

1.4.1. ***Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ)*** . SAF/AQ assigns the Program Executive Officer and designates the AOC WS Program Manager who leads the AOC WS Program Office for AOC systems development, integration, testing, fielding, sustainment, modernization, and certification to participate in the overall USAF C2 enterprise. Currently, the AOC WS Program Manager is Air Force Life Cycle Management Center /HBB and the Program Executive Officer is the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Battle Management. For specific Program Manager responsibilities, see Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.87, *Operation of the Software Acquisition Pathway* and DAFI 63-101/20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*. SAF/AQ will provide additional guidance as required.

1.4.2. ***Headquarters Air Force*** . AF/A3TE Exercises and Training Division provides policy, guidance, and advocacy for the AOC WS. This division is the Headquarters Air Force Functional Area Manager for the AOC WS. AF/A3TE is the responsible Headquarters Air Force Directorate for AOC functional areas to include organizational constructs, crew constructs, training, operations and maintenance (MX) funding, Unit Type Code approval, special experience identifier approval and other related issues. Other Headquarters Air Force staff agencies provide support as required. AOCs may request Air Force Operations Digital Enterprise (AF/A3X) participation in AOC WS forums. AF/A3X is responsible for establishing continuity standards for AOCs.

1.4.3. Air Combat Command (ACC). In addition to the guidance provided in this publication the Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC) will provide additional guidance as required.

1.4.3.1. ACC is the lead command for the AOC WS. In accordance with Department of the Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) 10-9, Lead Command/Lead Agent Designation

and Responsibilities for United States Air Force Weapon Systems, Non-weapon Systems, and Activities.

1.4.3.2. ACC/A3C, is the OPR for this AFMAN and the following:

1.4.3.2.1. AOC Concepts of Operation (CONOPs), fielding, operations, configuration control, training, test, and acceptance of operational risk to the AOC enterprise.

1.4.3.2.2. Force generation, Unit Type Code development oversight, special experience identifier management, and other manpower issues.

1.4.3.2.3. ACC/A3C, in coordination with other MAJCOM and ACC staff offices, is responsible for providing guidance for AOC personnel and crewmembers initial qualification training, mission qualification training, and continuation training.

1.4.3.2.4. Provides oversight for the AOC Formal Training Unit and additional AOC courses such as the Air Component Senior Leader Course.

1.4.3.2.5. Provides guidance and management of AOC tactics, techniques, and procedures, training task list development, standards and evaluation, and ACC AOC units MICT oversight, publication development, and other areas as determined by AF/A3X.

1.4.3.3. Air Combat Command Directorate of Plans, Programs, and Requirements (ACC/A5/8/9):

1.4.3.3.1. Air Combat Command, Air Operations Center Requirements Division (ACC/A5C), is the OPR for AOC WS requirements, sustainment, and modernization.

1.4.3.3.2. ACC/A5C is also responsible for coordinating with the AOC WS Program Office regarding AOC WS sustainment and fielding.

1.4.3.3.3. HQ ACC will coordinate IW program requirements with appropriate elements of 688 Cyberspace Wing, which provides IW reach-back support to Component Numbered Air Force (NAF)/Component Major Commands.

1.4.3.4. Air Combat Command Director of Intelligence (ACC/A2) is responsible for intelligence training issues and staffing.

1.4.3.5. For more lead command duties and responsibilities, see DAFPD 10-9.

1.4.4. Air Mobility Command (AMC), US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), AF Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and AF Special Operations Command (AFSOC):

1.4.4.1. MAJCOMs train all augmentees in AOC operations and processes to the maximum extent possible

1.4.4.2. Provide support and guidance in systems and configuration management. AMC, USAFE, PACAF, AFGSC, AFSOC and ACC ensure that the 505th Training Squadron (505 TRS) and the 435 TRS, as the AOC Formal Training Unit, train personnel in AOC tasks.

1.4.4.3. If required, MAJCOMs will ensure specific training, certification, and evaluation requirements for enabler personnel and Global AOCs under their direction are identified

in supplements to AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 1, *Ground Environment Training—Air Operations Center*, and AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2.

1.4.4.4. MAJCOMs will appoint MICT functional area managers for their respective AOC units to monitor and assist with any issues identified.

1.4.5. ARC (i.e., National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)):

1.4.5.1. The Global Force Management process aligns ARC units to AOCs. These units, considered essential first line associated forces for their respective AOC, will conduct regular training, theater visits, and collaborative planning with the aligned AOC.

1.4.5.2. NGB and AFRC provide headquarters oversight for all ARC units associated with AOCs.

1.4.5.3. If required, NGB and AFRC will ensure specific training and evaluation requirements for these units are identified in supplements to AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 1, *Ground Environment Training—Air Operations Center*, and AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2, *Air Operations Center Standardization/Evaluation Program—Organization and Administration*. The ARC units are a critical risk mitigation factor for AOC staffing, especially in operations over the competition continuum.

1.4.5.4. NGB and AFRC will appoint MICT functional area managers for their respective AOC units to monitor and assist with any issues identified.

1.4.6. ***USAF Warfare Center*** . The USAF Warfare Center-, through the 505th Command and Control Wing (505 CCW), supports the AOC WS in almost every aspect of training. The 505 CCW provides formal initial AOC operations training, as well as supports AOC unit continuation and exercise training. The 505 CCW also supports weapons system testing. Additionally, it provides support to the Operational Command Training Program operations managed by HQ USAF. The Operational Command Training Program's Senior Mentor and subject matter expert Observer/Trainers provide peer-level mentoring, training, and feedback to enhance skills at the operational-level of war for the COMAFFOR, JFACC, AFFOR Chief of Staff and Directors, the AOC Commander (AOC/CC), Division Chiefs, and team leads. ACC/A3 approves all formal AOC training developed by the 505 CCW.

Chapter 2

AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

2.1. Mission. An AOC is the COMAFFOR's C2 center and is under the Tactical Control (TACON) of the C/JFACC when the COMAFFOR has been designated as C/JFACC. The AOC operates as a fully integrated command center providing the C/JFACC the capability to plan, direct, and assess the activities of assigned and attached forces. AOCs do not work in isolation. They require appropriate connectivity to the AFFOR staff, higher headquarters (HHQ) operations centers (e.g., to the joint force headquarters for the operational branch, and to senior Air Force headquarters for the administrative branch), to other joint/coalition force components, to assigned and attached Air Force units, to Tactical C2 nodes and Wing Operations Centers, and to global and geographic AOCs as necessary. The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air, and coordinates space, cyberspace and IW to meet C/JFACC operational objectives and guidance. To efficiently and effectively plan and execute their missions, commanders must tailor geographic and global AOCs. The AOC planning effort is managed through a battle rhythm which can vary for each operation or contingency. The AOC schedule/battle rhythm is driven by C/JFACC and JFC battle rhythms. Although the USAF provides the core personnel for the AOC, other service and combined force components provide personnel in support of exercises and contingency operations. Actions at the joint/combined force level establish the requirements for the Theater Air Ground System (see **Paragraph 2.4**.). Requirements include the CCDR's guidance, perspective, and strategy for the AOR or if designated JOA, command organization and relationships, campaign plan, assignment of objectives, and apportionment of forces. The AOC will lead the air tasking cycle to:

2.1.1. Develop strategy and planning documents across the competition continuum (JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*) to integrate air, space, cyberspace, IW, ground, and maritime operations to meet JFACC objectives in support of CCDR or JFC Guidance. **(T-2)**

2.1.2. Plan, task, integrate, and execute air component operations; provide rapid reaction, positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment. **(T-2)**

2.1.3. Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information to support air operations planning, execution, and assessment. **(T-2)**

2.1.4. Issue airspace control procedures and coordinate airspace control activities for the ACA when the COMAFFOR is designated the ACA. **(T-2)**

2.1.5. Integrate space and cyberspace capabilities and coordinate space and cyberspace activities for the JFACC.**(T-2)**

2.1.6. Issue space operations procedures and coordinate space operations activities for space coordination authority, when the COMAFFOR is designated the Space Coordination Authority.**(T-2)**

2.1.7. When designated as the AADC, the C/JFACC will provide overall direction, through the AADP, for air and missile defense, including ballistic missile defense. **(T-2)**

2.1.8. Plan, task, and execute the theater airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, and integrate national technical means into JFACC planning and execution of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. **(T-2)**

2.1.9. Conduct operational and tactical assessment to evaluate progress of operations relative to established air campaign objectives and specified timelines. **(T-2)**

2.1.10. Produce and disseminate AOD, ATOs, ACOs, Special Instructions (SPINS), Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Annexes, Mission-Type Orders, and (as required) Operational Tasking Data Link (OPTASKLINK), and any associated changes. **(T-2)**

2.1.11. Plan, task, and direct execution of air mobility operations according to the theater priorities. **(T-2)**

2.1.12. Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3/3-1, *AOC Combat Fundamentals-Air Operations Center (AOC)*, offers tactics, techniques and procedures, and unit standard operating procedures detail specific functions of the AOC. See **Figure 2.1**.

Figure 2.1. Air Tasking Cycle.



2.2. Component Headquarters Organizations. AF components to Combatant Commands are designated a Component Major Command (C-MAJCOM, e.g., Pacific Air Forces), or a Component NAF (e.g., 12 AF, 16 AF). The AF Component Headquarters will include, at a minimum, the ability to exercise command and control (normally an AOC or OC) and an AFFOR staff. Component Headquarters will be properly structured, equipped, manned, and trained to execute C2 of air, space, and cyberspace operations assigned or attached to the AF component commander for day-to-day operations with the ability to accept additional forces for any increase in AF component mission tasking or direction. AF component functions will be integrated into existing MAJCOM and Numbered Air Force structures defined in AFI 38-101, *Manpower and Organization*, and AFI 13-103, *Air Component Headquarters AFFOR Staff Operations, Readiness and Structures*. **Figure 2.2** shows an example of a Component Major Command/ Component Numbered AF as a Component Headquarters.

2.2.1. ***AFFOR Staff*** . The AFFOR staff, in coordination with the AOC, supports USAF requirements and integrates air component capabilities into the CCDR's joint force planning. The AFFOR staff implements and establishes COMAFFOR policies and procedures (supplemental to CCDR policies and procedures) within the theater of operations. The AFFOR staff also plans, organizes, conducts and assesses campaign activities in support of the CCDR's campaign plan and conducts service, joint and multinational exercises. Refer to AFI 13-103, and Numbered Air Force Supplements.

Figure 2.2. Sample Component Headquarters Unit Structure.



Note: In a Component Major Command construct, the AOC may report directly to the A3 for ADCON. OPCON remains with the COMAFFOR and cannot be delegated. TACON of Joint and/or Coalition forces remains with the C/JFACC and can be delegated. DAFPD 13-1, *Command and Control (C2) Enterprise* provides additional guidance.

Note: When the AOC commands joint and coalition forces, whether in peacetime, a contingency, or exercise, it is a JAOC/CAOC respectively. As this is an Air Force Manual and Combined AOC is a designation, for ease of use, this publication uses the term AOC to represent CAOC/ JAOC/AOC.

Note: AOCs may use a Group/Center/Squadron organizational construct in place of the Center/Division construct for AOCs.

2.3. AOC Organization. The AOC organization includes an AOC/CC, five divisions (Strategy; Combat Plans; Combat Operations; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and Air Mobility), command staff and multiple specialty and support teams. Depending upon Combatant Command guidance, each AOC will configure appropriately and integrate numerous disciplines in a cross-functional team approach to monitor, assess, plan and execute (see **Figure 2.3**. AOC Organization and Functional Teams). Later chapters discuss the specific organization and processes for each AOC division. This volume lists only primary, recommended, personnel or crewmember AFSCs. The unit's Unit Type Code will codify additional and suitable substitute crew position AFSCs.

2.3.1. **Note:** Not all of the organizations and capabilities shown in **Figure 2.3** may exist in an AOC during peacetime and/or major contingency operations because of the specific scope or mission of that AOC in support of CCDR requirements.

2.3.2. **Note:** UMD A-prefixed positions are an authorized AFSC substitution for AOC positions, both rated and non-rated officers, based on higher headquarters guidance, MAJCOM, and AOC commander's approval.

Figure 2.3. AOC Organization and Functional Teams.



2.3.3. ***AOC Commander/Director*** . (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O6). The AOC/CC will conduct joint operations, coordinate space and cyberspace operations, and establish the AOC battle rhythm In Accordance With (IAW) JFC and JFACC guidance. The AOC/CC exercises G-series and ADCON authority over Air Force personnel assigned and attached to the AOC and is responsible for the effective and efficient operation of the AOC. The AOC commander's staff includes division chiefs, Weapons System Manager (WSM), the Configuration Manager (CM), site Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO), and ATO coordinators. The AOC Commander may also be designated as an AOC Director. The AOC Director exercises TACON authority and is charged with effectively conducting JAOP based on JFC/CFC and JFACC guidance, and in coordination with other senior USAF functional advisors. These senior officers assist with cyber, air mobility, and space integration with the AFFOR and AOC staffs. The AOC Director, through the AOC divisions, specialty, and support team chiefs, directs processes to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess air, space, and cyberspace operations in the JFC-designated AOR based on JFACC guidance and in

coordination with the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), DIRCYBERFOR, and DIRSPACEFOR. AOC Commanders will:

2.3.3.1. Supervise and direct USAF assigned personnel on the operations of the AOC, to include all periodic JFACC update briefings, crew changeover briefings, training, and orientation. Provide guidance and leadership to establish a daily AOC lead coordination meeting to ensure effective, coherent execution of the AOC. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.2. Coordinate support procedures with the Army Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE), Marine Liaison Element (MARLE), Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), Space Liaison Element (SPLE), allied nations, and any other support agencies. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.3. Establish and approve contingency plans and procedures for elements of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) that may be disabled or forced into performing autonomous or decentralized control operations. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.4. Ensure division, specialty, and support team chiefs develop, review and update positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists biannually. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.5. Maintain configuration control within AOC systems. Chair a site Configuration Review Board. Recommended Configuration Review Board membership should include representation from each AOC division. Configuration Review Board advisors will include the Air Communications Squadron (ACOMS) representative, Configuration Manager, WSM, site ISSO, and Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent (CJE), AOC WS Program Office, specialty, support, and other service liaison teams. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.6. Appoint a Configuration Manager in writing and forward a copy of the appointment letter to ACC/A3C. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.7. Ensure a site Configuration Management Plan (CMP) is developed, published, followed, and updated to maintain configuration control of their AOC WS as-built site baseline. The site CMP is subordinate to the AOC WS CMP and applicable lead command guidance. ACC and the AOC Program Office will approve the site CMP. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.8. Ensure development and MX of a Continuity of Operations plan and a Primary/Alternate/Contingency/Emergency plan to ensure continuation of mission-essential functions. A continuity of operations plan must address not only catastrophic failure or destruction of the WS, but also the full spectrum of contested/degraded operations. Coordinate with 700th Air Support Squadron (ASUS) and ACC/A3C on any weapons system outages. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.9. Act as the approval authority for prioritization of AOC essential communications. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10. AOC Directors will:

2.3.3.10.1. Provide expertise to Air Planning Group to assist in translating JFC and JFACC guidance into a coherent and integrated air, space, and cyberspace operations plan (JAOP, AADP, ACP, etc.). Provide updates to JAOP and supporting plans as required and oversee development of AOD. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.2. Oversee development of JFACC apportionment recommendation. Provide the JFACC a recommendation, developed by the SRD, that apportions joint air, space, and limited cyberspace capabilities, proposes allocation guidance, and prioritizes activities for accomplishing air, space, and cyberspace tasks, to include targeting. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.3. Translate JFC and JFACC guidance into appropriate resource allocation necessary to develop the Air Battle Plan (ABP). Express allocation as a weight of air, space, and cyberspace operations effort applied to accomplish air, space, and cyberspace operations tasks in support of joint objectives. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.4. In accordance with CCDR or JFC guidance and in relation to an adversary or potential adversary's use of information: ensure planning, execution, and assessment actions include consideration of the information environment; integrate employment of information-warfare capabilities; and ensure consistency of messages and actions. Integrate operations security into all plans and operations. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.5. Direct monitoring, evaluation, and adjustments needed to execute the ATONEWS to meet changing theater situations. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.6. As directed by JFACC, identify operational priorities and intelligence needs for appropriate intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination actions; coordinate information and display requirements necessary to support the AOC divisions. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.7. The JFC and JFACC battle rhythms will determine the AOC battle rhythm/tasking cycle. AOC Directors will ensure the development and MX of an AOC battle rhythm/air tasking cycle meets JFC and JFACC guidance. At any given time, there will be five ATOs in stages of planning, execution, and assessment. Timeline considerations associated with AOC battle rhythm development are depicted in **Figure 2.4**., Air Tasking Cycle Representative Timeline.

Figure 2.4. Air Tasking Cycle Representative Timeline.



2.3.3.10.8. Establish ATO coordinator teams to facilitate communication of JFACC intent through the entire air tasking cycle from strategy to assessment. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.9. Develop and publish a continuity of operations plan to ensure continuation of mission-essential functions during failure, destruction, and during contested/degraded operations. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.10. Appoint an AOC Knowledge Management (KM) Officer having responsibility for coordinating the flow and management of information throughout the AOC including control of processes linking sensors and discovery of knowledge to the AOC KM Plan (KMP). The KM Officer and associated KM team will work with the AOC/CC and divisions to ensure the Knowledge Management Plan meets the operational needs of the AOC. The KM and Communications Focal Point (CFP) will develop and disseminate, in coordination with all AOC divisions, a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) communications plan to ensure AOC products (JAOP, SPINS, AOD, ATO etc.) continue to be received by subordinate units. The KM

Officer in conjunction with the AFFOR KM and Combatant Command KM teams will document which knowledge management tools apply to knowledge management discovery and synchronize the Knowledge Management Plan with the AFFOR staff and Combatant Command KM and PACE Plans. **(T-2)**

2.3.3.10.11. Appoint an ISSO in writing and forward a copy of the appointment letter to ACC/A6O. **(T-2)**

2.3.4. ***Strategy Division*** . The SRD Chief and personnel concentrate on both long-range and near-term planning throughout the competition continuum of air, space, and cyberspace operations to achieve theater objectives by developing, refining, disseminating, and assessing the JFACC strategy guidance. The SRD, through collaboration with the Combat Plans Division Targeting Effects Team (TET), submits recommended draft apportionment to the JFACC. The JFACC presents the draft air apportionment recommendation to the C/JFC. Ideally, guidance and apportionment input will be reflected in C/JFC guidance, making AOD preparation more efficient. The SRD applies JAOP content, C/JFC guidance, JFACC interpretation, TET chief's targeting scheme, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and writes the AOD. The SRD works and coordinates with representatives from ISR, Non-Kinetic Operations (NKO), space, cyberspace, judge advocate (JA), and each service/functional component. The SRD, in coordination with the TET chief, recommends tactical tasks as required by the TET chief's targeting scheme for this ATO and prioritized IAW the existing JAOP prioritization. Next, components nominate targets matched to published objectives and tasks. Primary SRD activities produce the JAOP, AOD, and the operational assessment report. The SRD consists of three teams: strategy plans team (SPT), strategy guidance team (SGT), and operational assessment team (OAT). **Chapter 3** contains a more detailed discussion of SRD.

2.3.5. ***Combat Plans Division (CPD)*** . The CPD Chief and personnel have the responsibility for near-term AOC planning (within 48 hours prior to ATO execution). CPD consists of four teams: TET, Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) Team, ATO Production Team, and C2 Plans Team. The primary products of CPD processes are the ATO/ATONEWS, ACO, ACP, joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), SPINS, and inputs to operational tasking data link messages. See **Chapter 4** for an in-depth discussion on the CPD.

2.3.6. ***Combat Operations Division*** . The COD Chief and/or Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) (there may be more than one CCO, but only one division chief) and COD personnel concentrate on execution of the current ATO/ATONEWS and ACO (e.g., the 24-hour execution period of the ATO). The COD consists of four teams: Offensive Operations Team, Defensive Operations Team, Component Joint Data Network Team (Joint Data Network Team manages CTP), and the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) team. See **Chapter 5** for an in-depth discussion on the COD.

2.3.7. ***Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division*** . The Chief of ISRD (CISR) and ISR personnel are responsible for assessing and anticipating adversary activity in the operational environment, planning ISR operations, and developing dynamic target strategies to rapidly, discreetly and efficiently achieve the JFACC/JFC priority effects. The ISRD is comprised of three teams: Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team; Targets/Tactical Assessment (TGT/TA) Team; and ISR Operations Team. Additionally, as mission needs dictate, the ISRD integrates ISR personnel within other teams in the AOC. See **Chapter 6** for an in-depth discussion on the ISRD.

2.3.8. ***Air Mobility Division*** . The AMD plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes air mobility missions in accordance with the JFACC's guidance and intent. Airlift requirements are planned and executed in a parallel process managed by the AMD and integrated into the air tasking cycle. Theater movement validation authority is typically delegated by the C/JFC to the joint deployment and distribution operations center. The joint deployment and distribution operations center provides C/JFC prioritization guidance to the AMD and produces the joint integrated prioritized requirements list (JIPRL) in coordination with the AMD for intratheater movement planning. Additionally, the AMD coordinates intertheater air mobility missions with the 618 AOC, Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). The AMD consists of four teams: Airlift Control Team (ALCT), Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT), Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT), and Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT). Additionally, as mission needs dictate, the AMD will integrate personnel throughout other divisions. See **Chapter 7** for an in-depth discussion on the AMD.

2.3.9. ***Information Warfare (IW)*** . IAW CSAF signed USAF IW Strategy (July 2022), Air Force IW consists of six principal capabilities: cyberspace operations; electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO); information operations; public affairs (PA); intelligence; and weather (WX). There are numerous other information capabilities and organizations that inform and support the employment of these six capabilities. IW represents an overarching set of capabilities that must be integrated across all AOC divisions and teams.

2.3.9.1. IW involves the systematic consideration and coordination of all planned verbal, visual, and symbolic activities, employed at the operational and tactical levels, to convey themes, intentions, messages or meet behavior-related operational objectives. IW is a way to unify operational planning, and integrate all capabilities, in order to achieve desired objects or ends; do not consider it a non-kinetic capability.

2.3.9.2. Operational planners consider the use of tools, techniques, and operational activities employed across the information environment to create expected behavioral effects and operationally desirable conditions. Planners also assess the adversary's behaviors in response to the blue-force application of kinetic and/or non-kinetic capabilities and activities. Development of operational objectives, Measure(s) Of Effectiveness (MOEs), Measures(s) Of Performance (MOPs), and tasks will support the C/JFACC's IW concept of operations, and will be integrated throughout the JAOP, AOD, AADP, SPINs and MAAP.

2.3.10. AOC/CC's Staff.

2.3.10.1. Weapon System Manager (AFSC: 11/12/13B/14/17D/ Government Service/Contractor) (Rank O-3, O-4, or equivalent Government Service grade). The WSM is responsible to the AOC/CC and Division Chiefs for the setup and successful operation of all systems integrated into the AOC WS site baseline. The WSM should be an operator with extensive knowledge of the AOC operations, processes, and systems. The WSM liaises with the AOC/CC, ACC, the AOC WS Program Office, the ACOMS Commander, and the Configuration Manager to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements. The WSM works with all AOC divisions, teams, and other entities and agencies as required. The WSM works with the AOC WS Program Office to provide on-site engineering and technical support as needed. The WSM will manage the installation, configuration,

integration, and operation of AOC systems in a manner that meets operational needs and satisfies the site-specific engineering plan. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1. WSM Responsibilities. The WSM will:

2.3.10.1.1.1. Develop AOC floor plan in coordination with AOC division leads for AOC/CC approval. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.2. Develop AOC systems significant events calendar. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.3. Develop systems permissions matrices. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.4. Provide support to AOC configuration management team. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.5. Provide inputs to management of all systems in the AOC. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.6. Conduct comprehensive system validation testing. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.1.1.7. Support the Configuration Manager in maintaining the site-specific engineering plan to reflect the site operational baseline. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2. ***Configuration Manager*** . (AFSC: 17D/ Government Service/Contractor) (Rank O-3 or equivalent Government Service grade). The Configuration Manager shall ensure compliance with the AOC WS CMP, AOC WS Business Processes (AOCWS-ABP), MAJCOM and site CMPs, lead command guidance. The Configuration Manager will report compliance to the AOC/CC and the ACOMS/CC. The Configuration Manager administrates and facilitates AOC WS configuration management for the AOC. Configuration Manager administers the unit Configuration Review Board, and provides support to the AOC site ISSO, program office ISSO, and lead command ISSO and assists resolution of AOC site security and accreditation issues. The AOC Configuration Manager will maintain a level of configuration control and security consistent with the requirements established in AOC WS CMP and all applicable Department of Defense (DOD) and AF cyberspace security, assessment and authorization directives and instructions. The AOC site Configuration Manager will:

2.3.10.2.1. Report the implementation status of AOC WS Configuration Review Board-approved and released enterprise change notices to ACC and AOC Program Office. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.2. Develop the site CMP for AOC/CC's approval. Ensures the site CMP reflects current AOC WS and lead command guidance. Develops and maintains the site CMP and ensures changes are coordinated with the site Configuration Review Board chair. Posts the current site CMP to the AOC WS SharePoint site-specific documentation folder. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.3. Serve as the focal point and principal advisor for AOC configuration management decisions, site Configuration Review Board meetings, and any other duties and responsibilities assigned via site CMP. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.4. Maintain current as-built site configuration via the approved configuration management status accounting tool including the site CMP and operating command Configuration Review Board-approved variances. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.5. Establish and maintain strict control of master media and the documentation library. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.6. Host configuration meetings and assist with activities to include site activation task forces, site surveys, configuration management staff assistance visits, configuration management audits, and physical inventories. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.7. Coordinate with site users and develop procedures to prepare and submit AOC WS enterprise change requests via the configuration management status accounting tool in accordance with the AOC WS CMP, applicable commander's configuration management guidance and site CMP. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.8. Guidance on processing site requests for variances are in applicable operating command guidance and the site CMP. Ensure AOC/CC is aware and accepts all risk and operations and MX responsibilities associated with the variance. It is important to state that, while the AOC/CC cannot accept risk for the network, he/she can accept risk for the mission by using network-approved applications and systems, which are not a part of the AOC WS baseline.

2.3.10.2.9. Participate in AOC WS Working Group activities as requested. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.10. Establish a separate organizational e-mail account on Non-secure IP Router Network and Secret IP Router Network to facilitate communication on configuration management issues. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.11. Establish and conduct initial and annual configuration management training to brief/inform all AOC personnel of the site CMP and local configuration standards. Conduct initial training within six weeks of arrival of newly assigned AOC personnel and annually thereafter. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.12. Perform and document semi-annual configuration management audit. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.13. Keep site point of contact and shipping information current and posted in the appropriate site folder in the AOC site-specific document library. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.14. Post the approved site CMP in the appropriate site folder in the AOC site-specific document library. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.15. When triggered by site installation or change events, the Configuration Manager will coordinate via the site Configuration Review Board to ensure the site-specific engineering plan continuously reflects the site's current operational baseline. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.2.16. Use the AOC Intelink site as reference for the official list of approved baseline AOC equipment/systems. Equipment List. Site specific location can be found by contacting the lead MAJCOM AOC Programming Branch, ACC/A5C. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3. ***Information Security System Officer (ISSO)*** . (AFSC: 17D) (Rank O-3/equivalent Government Service grade/Contractor). The site ISSO is appointed by and responsible to the AOC/CC through the chief of AOC communications team for establishing, implementing, and maintaining the cyberspace security program of a DOD information system or organization. The ISSO will:

2.3.10.3.1. Acquire or develop protection and detection capabilities, which are consistent with the DOD Component-level information assurance architecture. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.2. Follow the Risk Management Framework (RMF) process to assess and authorize software, hardware, etc. for operation. **(T-0)**

2.3.10.3.3. Address cyberspace security in the management of the DOD information system configuration. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.4. Mitigate identified cyberspace security vulnerabilities and reporting and responding to cyberspace security violations and incidents. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.5. Ensure continuity of information technology and cyberspace security services. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.6. Track compliance with the cyberspace security controls applicable to the DOD information system and report cyberspace security management review items, and other-directed solutions. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.7. Serve as an advisor to the Configuration Review Board. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.8. Ensure each implementation of Cross Domain Solution has a separate Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group approval and Defense Information Services Agency authority to connect or interim authority to connect for each AOC location/site in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6211.02D, *Defense Information System Network (DISN) Responsibilities*. **(T-0)**

2.3.10.3.9. Ensure any secure wireless connection (e.g., SecNet-11 or SecNet-54) has separate Defense Information Systems Agency connection approval authority to operate for each implementation at each AOC location/site since these connections are a special case of Secret IP Router Network connection approvals per CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**

2.3.10.3.10. Ensure any instance of connection from the AOC to the Internet has a DOD Information Network waiver approval prior to implementation per CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**

2.3.10.3.11. Ensure separate approval of any foreign national presence or foreign software use. Additional guidance available in AFI 17-101, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) For Air Force Information Technology* and other Air Force Systems Security Instructions. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.12. Ensure reaccreditation of any major modification or changes to the security architecture, security configuration set up, or security posture that deviates from the system(s) as accredited, as provided in guidance from AFI 17-101 and DODI 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DOD Systems.*

2.3.10.3.13. Support WSM to maintain the site-specific engineering plan to reflect the site's operational baseline. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.14. Coordinate Joint World Wide Intelligence Communications Systems Certificate to Field and Approval to Operate with DOD Intelligence Information Systems site ISSO. **(T-2)**

2.3.10.3.15. Manage AOC firewall rules and policies. Execute firewall exemption requests with advisement from the WSM and defensive cyber operations team. **(T-2)**

2.4. Theater Air Ground System. The AOC plans and executes the ATO/ATONEWS, ACO, data link, guidance, etc., with inputs from numerous tactical air and ground C2 weapons systems from all services grouped under the name Theater Air Ground System. For further information on the Theater Air Ground System, recommend reading Air Land Sea Space Application Center Publication *Theater Air Ground System* (**https:/www.alssa.mil**).

2.4.1. Personnel assigned to or working with the Theater Air Ground System should understand the decision processes and problems associated with the operational and tactical levels of command. Armed with this knowledge, commanders and staffs will better understand how to receive or provide support.

2.4.2. The AOC is the senior element of the TACS, which along with the Army Air Ground Systems, Marine Air Command and Control System, Navy Tactical Air Control System, and the Special Operations Air Ground System comprise the Theater Air Ground System.

2.4.3. The TACS is composed of airborne and ground based C2 elements. Airborne elements of the TACS are the Airborne Warning and Control System and Battlefield Airborne Communications Node. The ground elements are the AOC, Control and Reporting Center, Air Support Operations Center to include Joint Air-Ground Integration Center support, Tactical Operations Center – Light, and Tactical Air Control Party.

2.4.4. To integrate the TACS elements effectively, the AOC develops and establishes theater wide C2 guidance of regular and irregular warfare, providing overarching direction to all the TACS elements.

2.4.5. For further information on the Theater Air Ground System/TACS, see MTTP 3-2.17, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems*, and AFTTP 3-3.TACS, *Theater Air Control System (TACS)* and other TACS WS tactics, techniques, and procedures.

2.5. Air Reserve Component (ARC). NGB and AFRC align selected units for dedicated AOC support via Global Force Management guidance. NGB/AFRC align each of these units to an Air Force Commander and their respective MAJCOMs. They provide integrated mission support during exercises and contingencies. In addition, they maintain Combat Mission Ready requirements in accordance with DAFMAN 13-1AOC, Volume 1 and AFMAN 13-1AOC, Volume 2, and are able to support additional Combatant Commands as required. ARC units are a critical risk mitigation factor for AOC manning, especially in operations that continue throughout the competition continuum.

Chapter 3

STRATEGY DIVISION

3.1. General. Strategy is the art and science of employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater and/or national objectives. The SRD leads joint air planning and the JFACC process of arranging ends, ways, means, and risk to define courses of action (COAs) to achieve an end state or end states. The division produces a set of COAs the JFACC can select or modify to achieve JFC and JFACC objectives. The SRD concentrates on joint planning of JAOP to achieve JFACC and JFC objectives. To support all phases of a JFC's campaign, the SRD develops, refines, disseminates, and assesses the JFACC's air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy. During joint planning, the SRD leads the Air Planning Group (APG) in the application of operational design and the joint planning process for air to conduct mission analysis (MA), course(s) of action development, analysis and selection, create a Concept of Operations for orders development, and ultimately produce a valid and feasible JAOP. The SRD works with higher HQ, AFFOR staff, and other service component staffs, to develop and integrate the air course of action and subsequent JAOP inputs. At least one ISR expert should be embedded into the SRD. Best practices have shown that embedding ensures full integration to meet JFC and mission requirements. During execution, the SRD will keep the strategy and planning current, produce and update the AOD, and provide operational assessment across the competition continuum. **(T-2)**

3.2. Major SRD Process Inputs. Key inputs include higher headquarters policy, planning directives, guidance and intent, tasking, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and ROE/Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). Inputs also include other service/global component planning documentation, as appropriate. Within the AOC, the SRD receives the target developers' target system analysis and TET's inputs for the apportionment recommendation to the JFACC. In addition, the SRD receives analytical, targeting, and collection management support from the ISRD; combat support status information on assigned and attached USAF forces from the AOC Logistics-Combat Support Team, AFFOR staff A4, and friendly force status from AFFOR staff and other component liaisons. For operational assessment, inputs will be designed in accordance with the operational assessment plan (OAP) and include tactical assessment and other appropriate reports and performance measurement summaries. Coordinate cyberspace operations portions of JFACC plans through the Combatant Command-level Joint Cyber Center (JCC) for offensive cyber operations and the 616 OC for defensive cyber operations.

3.3. SRD Processes. The SRD Chief and subordinate teams will develop, refine, disseminate, and assess the progress of the JFACC's strategy. The SRD will:

3.3.1. Develop the joint air estimate of the situation to produce a recommended JFC course of action. **(T-2)**

3.3.2. Translate strategic, JFC, and JFACC guidance into objectives, tasks, and assessment measures and indicators. **(T-2)**

3.3.3. Develop and coordinate the joint air estimate of the situation that recommends a course of action for the JFC. **(T-2)**

3.3.4. Lead the development of the approved JFACC course of action into a comprehensive JAOP or order with appropriate annexes. **(T-2)**

3.3.5. Liaise and integrate as required. Successful accomplishment of each of the above processes requires liaising with higher headquarters, other components and AFFOR staff. **(T-2)**

3.3.6. Develop alternative contingency plans, branches and sequels. **(T-2)**

3.3.7. Develop proposed changes to the ROE/RUF and JFACC delegation of authority plans. **(T-2)**

3.3.8. During execution, provide the JFACC a recommended air apportionment in each AOD. **(T-2)**

3.3.9. During execution and normally daily, direct, develop, coordinate, publish, and as necessary update the AOD. **(T-2)**

3.3.10. Integrate other component air requirements into the AOD. **(T-2)**

3.3.11. Monitor progress of the air plan and make an operational assessment in relation to achieving the JFC/JFACC objectives. **(T-2)**

3.3.12. Fully integrate NKO planning throughout entire planning process to produce a comprehensive JAOP, and subsequently, the AODs. **(T-2)**

3.4. Major Strategy Division (SRD) Process Outputs. Key outputs include the JAOP, AOD, JFACC apportionment recommendation, ROE/RUF changes, Commander Critical Information Requirements and operational assessment products. In addition, the SRD will develop branch plans, sequel plans, and special projects and studies as required. **(T-2)** A brief description of the key outputs follows.

3.4.1. JAOP. Joint air, space, IO, and cyberspace operations constitute an integral part of the JFC's plan of operations. The JFC normally assigns JFACC responsibility for joint air planning, for joint space planning when delegated Space Control Authority, and a supporting role in cyberspace planning. The JAOP documents the JFACC's plan to integrate and coordinate air, space, IO, and cyberspace operations across all the phases of the JFC's campaign. The SRD writes the JAOP based on the strategy-to-task methodology, which consists of objectives, effects, and tasks, along with appropriate assessment criteria that enable an assessment of progress toward achieving objectives and effects. Products developed in leading up to JAOP approval include the Mission Analysis Brief, COA Decision Brief, and the Commander's Estimate.

3.4.2. Air Apportionment Recommendation. The SRD formulates the air apportionment recommendation that the JFACC submits to the JFC for upcoming iterations of the joint tasking cycle. The JFC is the final approval authority for the air apportionment decision.

3.4.3. ROE/RUF: The SRD is responsible for developing the ROE/RUF. JA advising SRD are responsible to support development and modifications to the ROE/RUF. The JAG will make updates to the ROE/RUF recommended by the ROE/RUF cell and submit them for publication in a timely manner. An edited version of the ROE/RUF will be provided to the C2 Plans Team for publication in the SPINS. The ROE/RUF will be published in the JAOP.

3.4.4. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). SRD has the lead to develop and maintain JFACC CCIRs. Two key subcomponents of CCIRs are Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and friendly forces information requirements. SRD will coordinate JFACC CCIRs across the AOC. ISRD will have special interest in supporting JFACC priority

intelligence requirements. The SRD may coordinate JFACC CCIRs with the AFFOR staff; however, the staff should be developing a separate CCIR list to support COMAFFOR decision-making.

3.4.5. AOD. The AOD is JFACC's written guidance and forms the foundational direction for the air tasking cycle and ensures air operations effectively support the combined/JFC's objectives while retaining enough flexibility to adjust across the competition continuum. The AOD provides JFACC guidance and intent, concept of operations, prioritized operational objectives and tasks, as well as their measures of effectiveness / measures of performance and coordinating instructions for the ATO/ATONEWS execution.

3.4.6. Operational assessment products. Operational assessment is the process of relating tactical tasks to operational effects. Operational assessment products consist of operational assessment briefings and operational assessment reports, which normally contain MOE and MOP from the JAOP and the guidance provided from JFC to JFACC. These products evaluate the JFACC strategy, track progress toward operational and strategic objectives, and make recommendations for strategy adjustments and future action. Forward the completed operational assessment report based on JFC guidance to the JFC and designated Joint Force Assessment Board representative.

3.5. Strategy Division (SRD) Organization. The SRD Chief leads SRD and usually organizes it into three functionally oriented teams: SPT, SGT, and OAT (See **Figure 3.1**. SRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes). Although the AOC Commander may administratively assign the NKO Team to the SRD, it is a specialty team that provides functional expertise across all divisions within the AOC as discussed in **Chapter 8**.

Figure 3.1. Strategy Division (SRD) Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



3.5.1. ***Strategy Division Chief*** . (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-6). The SRD Chief reports to the AOC/CC for the development and assessment of air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy to support the JFC's objectives. While reporting through the AOC/CC, it is vital the SRD Chief has direct access to the JFACC. SRD Chiefs will ensure timely completion of the division's major processes and products. **(T-2)** In addition, the SRD Chief will:

3.5.1.1. Maintain an understanding of commanders' (JFC, JFACC, etc.) mission, intent, concept of operations, relevant theater plans, existing ROE/RUF, related policy documents; enemy capabilities and limitations as well as those of friendly forces. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.2. Establish appropriate contacts with JFC, Joint Task Force, and Component Headquarters to insure necessary access to higher and lateral headquarters policy, guidance, plans, and intent. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.3. Relay higher headquarters and other components' policy, guidance, plans, and intent to the AOC as appropriate. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.4. Integrate and coordinate SRD planning efforts with AFFOR staff, all AOC divisions and specialty/support teams to produce a coherent, executable plan that meets the commander's guidance and intent. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.5. Ensure the SRD battle rhythm is sufficient to accomplish JAOP development, branch and sequel planning, APG requirements, AOD development, operational assessment, and special projects, as required. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.6. Ensure each of the SRD outputs (e.g., JAOP, AOD, operational assessment products) correctly convey JFACC's guidance and intent. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.7. Establish procedures to secure the JFACC and/or AOC commander approval prior to publication/release, as appropriate. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.8. Ensure positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed by SRD teams, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate duty positions. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.9. File critical planning materials, such as draft and record documents, slides or briefing materials, minutes from meetings as determined by the KMP. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.10. Ensure SRD KMP is consistent with the larger AOC plan and meets requirements. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.11. Identify SRD manning requirements and fill positions with trained and qualified personnel. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.12. Ensure SRD facilities and equipment meet requirements. **(T-3)**

3.5.1.13. Consider ATO Coordinators a critical resource for conduct of the air tasking cycle. Involve ATO coordinators in near-term planning to improve common understanding of JFACC guidance and intent across the AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

3.5.2. ***Strategy Plans Team*** . The SPT consists of a small group of assigned members along with a tailored group of attached members. The SPT's primary focus is long-term planning (beyond 72 hours) or "future plans." The SPT will develop and maintain operational-level joint strategy, air plan, and associated branch and sequel plans that support the JFC and JFACC objectives. They lead the Air Planning Group and coordinate/support higher headquarters' Joint Planning Group, other components' planning groups, and AFFOR staff Operational Planning Group as appropriate for the JFACC during joint planning. SPT will write branch and sequel plans that support JFACC and JFC objectives. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.1. Strategy Plans Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O-5). (Advanced Studies Group [advanced air and space studies graduate or equivalent] highly desired). The SPT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and ensures the SPT successfully fulfills its responsibilities and the processes, as well as any other assignments by SRD Chief. SPT is the JFACC's focal point for joint planning (via the Air Planning Group) and serves as the primary interface with the Joint Planning Group and Operational Planning Group (if established).

3.5.2.2. SPT Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13). (Rank: O-4/O-5). The SPT Chief trains core members in wartime planning and its requirements. Additionally, SPT receives support from attached ISRD, special technical operations (STO), and NKO Team personnel. Other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition force components, and specialty functions such as space or cyberspace may augment SPT to support Joint Task Force or contingency operations.

3.5.2.3. SPT Responsibilities. The SPT's principal function is the development and MX of operational-level, long-range joint air plans, and associated branch and sequel plans that support the JFC and JFACC objectives. The SPT leads the AOC in the air estimate process and the associated development of the JAOP to include a prioritized, effects-based, targeting scheme. The JAOP is the air component's portion of the JFC's Operations Plan (OPLAN) or campaign plan. SPT must have a deliberate process for providing operational and tactical objectives, conditions, timeline, and priorities. Examples can include Strat-to-Task planning and/or phased air targeting scheme methodologies in coordination with TET. These inputs feed the development of the air apportionment recommendation. Because these long-range strategies and branch plans complement the JAOP, the SPT supports development of the AADP and ACP. During operations execution, the SPT operates beyond the 72-96 hour (ATO execution) period. The SPT integrates non-kinetic plans with overall air operation as directed by the JFACC. Under the Component Headquarters construct, the SPT may support the planning of global strike missions in conjunction with Geographic CCDRs and United States Strategic Command.

3.5.2.4. SPT Processes. The SPT will:

3.5.2.4.1. Liaise, support, coordinate, and integrate planning with higher headquarters Joint Planning Group, component Operational Planning Group, and AFFOR Operational Planning Group. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.2. Support Air Planning Group/ Joint Planning Group /component liaisons for air operations planning. Conduct operational design and problem framing activities with the JFC, JFACC and other components as required. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3. Lead the AOC in all aspects of joint planning process for air as required. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3.1. Develop JFACC's mission, intent, objectives, and concept of operations. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3.2. Develop and coordinate the JFACC air estimate of the situation that recommends a course of action for JFC approval. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3.3. Use strategy-to-task methodology to develop objectives and tasks, to include assessment measures, in conjunction with the OAT and TET. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3.4. Develop detailed phase plans. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.3.5. Coordinate the development of the approved JFACC course of action into a comprehensive JAOP or order with appropriate annexes. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.4. Develop air apportionment recommendations based on the phased air-targeting scheme from TET. Air apportionment is the daily recommended utilization of air assets in accordance with the approved JAOP. The planning for air apportionment

begins during pre-execution, as early as COA development, and continues as an iterative process during the development of the JAOP as well as branch planning. SPT continuously refines apportionment recommendations based on phasing, operational assessment reports, intelligence inputs, munition expenditures, JFC priorities, etc. and works with SGT to incorporate apportionment as well as commander's guidance into the AOD. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.5. Develop alternative contingency plans such as branch and sequel plans. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.6. Lead the ROE cell to develop recommended changes to the ROE/RUF. ROE cell composition will vary with each situation, but should include a member of the Judge Advocate (JA) team at a minimum. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.7. Lead the development and coordination of JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.8. Ensure consistency between the JAOP and other plans (e.g., the C2 Plans developed ACP and AADP). **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.9. Work with SGT and OAT to keep plans current. **(T-3)**

3.5.2.4.10. Anticipate changes in the battlespace to foresee the progress of the air operation and identify any potential problems to the JFACC. **(T-3)**

3.5.3. ***Strategy Guidance Team*** . The SGT normally consists of a small group of assigned members and has a near term focus (from 48-72 hours), or "future operations." SGT operates within the current phase of the operation and will develop, coordinate and disseminate the AOD, which contains the JFACC guidance for the ATO. SGT will ensure that AOD guidance reflects the latest guidance, concept of operations, priorities, and operational assessment. **(T-3)**

3.5.3.1. Strategy Guidance Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O-5). The SGT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and ensures the SGT accomplishes the team's responsibilities and processes. The SGT Chief should attend JFACC guidance meetings.

3.5.3.2. SGT Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14). (Rank O-4/O-5). The SGT Chief trains core members in wartime AOD development and its requirements. The SGT should ensure the AOD is disseminated with sufficient time to allow development of component target nominations and proactive mission planning by tasked units. Every effort should be made to produce the AOD within its planned time frame to enable subsequent joint air tasking cycle teams and processes. Additionally, SGT receives support from all other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition components, and specialty functions and teams as required.

3.5.3.3. SGT Responsibilities. As annotated above, the SGT operates within the current phase of the operation. Additionally, a SGT team member should attend the Joint Effects Collaboration Board to synchronize the AOD with the JFC's targeting scheme of maneuver.

3.5.3.4. SGT Processes. SGT synchronizes and integrates JFACC guidance and objectives throughout the Joint air tasking cycle. The SGT will:

3.5.3.4.1. Support SPT during joint planning as required. **(T-3)**

3.5.3.4.2. Conduct regular, scheduled meetings with AOC, AFFOR staff and liaison teams to develop and coordinate the near term guidance, concept of operations, priorities, weights of effort and other guidance for the AOD. **(T-3)**

3.5.3.4.3. Lead the AOD Working Group. One of the outputs is the prioritization for ATO execution based on the JAOP or SPT's planning guidance. Develop, coordinate, update and gain JFACC approval of the AOD and disseminate it when approved. **(T-3)**

3.5.3.4.4. Attend other AOC meetings (e.g., TET) as necessary/available to clarify guidance questions. **(T-3)**

3.5.4. ***Operational Assessment Team*** . The OAT normally consists of a small group of assigned members and has both a long and near term focus. The OAT will analyze the effectiveness of past and present JAOP, combine this analysis with a look at future plans and future operations, and recommend adjustments to plans and guidance to achieve the desired end state conditions. OAT will assess progress of operations relative to established objectives within the specified period. OAT should answer three basic questions: (1) Are we doing "things right?" (Accomplishing the tactical tasks as planned.) (2) Are we doing the "right things?" (Are the tactical tasks achieving the objectives/desired/planned effects?) (3) Are we "measuring" the right things? (Are the measures an accurate reflection of the JFACC's desired effects?) OAT works closely with other AOC and AFFOR staff teams, especially tactical assessment in the ISRD, to accomplish their processes and complete their products **(T-3)**.

3.5.4.1. Operational Assessment Team Chief. (AFSC:15AX). (Rank: O-4/O-5). The OAT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and leads the OAT. The OAT Chief is the JFACC's primary assessment interface with the JFC and other components. The OAT Chief is responsible for evaluating effectiveness of operational planning and execution to the SRD Chief. The OAT Chief interfaces with HHQs and other components on behalf of the JFACC.

3.5.4.2. Operational Assessment Team Members. (AFSC: 15AX) (Rank: O-3/O-4). The OAT Chief trains core members in operational assessment to support requirements. Additionally, OAT receives support from the ISRD and augmentation as required from other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition, components, and specialty functions such as cyberspace, special technical operations, space, and IO.

3.5.4.3. OAT Responsibilities. The OAT provides assessments that the JFACC requires to make informed decisions concerning the execution of air, space, information, and limited cyberspace operations strategy. The OAT reviews past events to identify and describe progress in meeting current objectives. The OAT then forecasts possible results and outcomes of current and future operations based on this historical analysis. The OAT organizes and exploits a constant flow of information from a wide variety of sources. The team identifies and evaluates the effectiveness of friendly operations, highlighting opportunities to influence adversary courses of action and evaluating effects achieved on the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity. The OAT is responsible to suggest changes to the AOD weight of effort based on the operational assessment.

3.5.4.4. OAT Processes. OAT supports identifying specified, implied, and essential tasks. They are also instrumental in developing the Strat-to-Task Matrix, and creating MOEs,

MOPs, and assessment information requirements (AIRs) to lead to an effects-based assessment plan. OAT will:

3.5.4.4.1. Support SPT during joint planning. **(T-3)**

3.5.4.4.2. Develop COA evaluation and assessment criteria (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance) to support the strategy-to-task methodology used in strategy development during joint planning process for air. **(T-3)**

3.5.4.4.3. Develop and coordinate the operational assessment plan, including measure(s) of effectiveness and measures(s) of performance. **(T-3)**

3.5.4.4.4. Conduct operational assessment to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and IO in achieving JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

3.5.4.4.5. Prepare operational assessment briefing and operational assessment reports and disseminate/coordinate as appropriate, including coordination with the JFC campaign assessment. **(T-3)**

Chapter 4

COMBAT PLANS DIVISION

4.1. General . The CPD will apply near-term operational planning and art to develop detailed execution plans for air, space, and limited cyberspace operations. Based on JFC objectives and apportionment, the AOD, forces made available for JFACC tasking, and the operational environment, these plans apply specific capabilities and assets to accomplish JFACC tasks to support campaign objectives. **(T-2)**

4.2. Major Process Inputs. Inputs include JFC and JFACC plans, directives and other guidance, target lists, allocation and air support requests, airspace requests, SPINS change requests, ISR products, summaries, plans and requirements, electronic warfare coordination and guidance, and formal/informal feedback. Specific inputs include:

4.2.1. JAOP

4.2.2. AOD

4.2.3. Air apportionment decision and other JFACC guidance

4.2.4. Changes to JFC's critical asset list

4.2.5. Joint Target List/No-Strike List /Restricted Target List

4.2.6. Daily component target nomination lists

4.2.7. Component allocation requests

4.2.8. Component air support requests (shells)

4.2.9. Requests for airspace coordinating measures

4.2.10. SPINS change requests

4.2.11. Enemy Order of Battle

4.2.12. Joint ISR collection requirements and synchronization matrix

4.2.13. RSTA Annex

4.2.14. Any draft ISR mission-type orders

4.2.15. Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instruction

4.2.16. Joint Restricted Frequency List

4.2.17. OARs

4.2.18. Feedback from AOC divisions

4.3. Combat Plans Division (CPD) Processes. CPD will:

4.3.1. Direct TET to coordinate with the Targets/Tactical Assessment team (ISRD) for target development to determine target sets to achieve tasks, to create desired effects, and produce the draft JIPTL. **(T-2)**

4.3.2. Direct MAAP Team to determine the optimal combination of target, platform, weapon, and timing to develop the MAAP and daily ATO/ATONEWS, for missions in the ATO. **(T-2)**

4.3.3. Ensure air, space, limited cyberspace operations, and IO planning and tasks are fully integrated and support the overall JFC campaign. **(T-2)**

4.3.4. Direct C2 Plans Team to produce and disseminate the ACO, current defense design guidance in the AADP and SPINS, C2 Communication plan, and publish change. **(T-2)**

4.3.5. Produce and disseminate the ACP. **(T-2)**

4.3.6. Produce and disseminate an operationally and tactically sound ATO, Operational Task Link (OPTASKLINK), and Tactical Operations Data messages. **(T-2)**

4.3.7. Generate SPINS, ACP, and ACO updates. **(T-2)**

4.4. Major Process Outputs. Outputs include the JFACC strategy update briefing, data inputs for the air apportionment recommendation, the draft JIPTL with selected joint desired points of impact for effects, Collateral Damage Estimate and collection requirements, ROE change recommendations, MAAP Decision Brief, MAAP, ATO, OPTASKLINK, ATONEWS, Special Instructions (SPINS), ACO, AADP, ACP; C2 communications plan, and C2 architecture plan. (Refer to other chapters for a complete list of responsibilities for other division-embedded personnel in the CPD).

4.5. Organization. The CPD Chief typically organizes the division into four functionally oriented teams: TET, MAAP Team, the C2 Plans Team, and the ATO Production Team. (See **Figure 4.1**. CPD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes).

Figure 4.1. Combat Plans Division (CPD) Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes. Produce draft JIPTL Input to Component Prioritized Collection List Input to target nomination list SPINs inputs Weaponeering



Note: Other teams and liaisons support CPD as required during operations: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, ATO Coordination Team, Weather Specialty Team (WST), Cyberspace Support Element, NKO Team, Army Air and Missile Defense Command, IAMD, MARLE, NALE, and coalition personnel.

Note: The C2 Plans Team may publish SPINS with the ATO or as a separate document. For further information, see AFTTP 3-3.AOC, *Combat Fundamentals – AOC.*

Note: Currently, C2 Battle Management and Communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an IAMD cell with joint personnel is located near, but not considered part of Combat Operations. It provides input to the Area Air Defense Plan, missile defense planning data and information to C2 Plans team as required.

4.5.1. ***Combat Plans Division (CPD) Chief*** . (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-6). The CPD Chief is directly responsible to the AOC/CC for the planning, allocation, and tasking of air, and coordination of space and cyberspace operations forces in accordance with JFACC guidance. Depending on the scenario and level of effort during operations, the CPD Chief may need several deputies to help monitor and supervise the extensive and complex planning tasks involved in the CPD. As an example, assign a deputy with a background in space operations to oversee the space and special technical operations activities within the division, while a pilot

or navigator with fighter/bomber or tanker experience could work the night shift and oversee the MAAP process. The CPD Chief will:

4.5.1.1. Review and understand relevant theater campaign plans, existing ROE/RUF, and related policy documents. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.2. Maintain a comprehensive understanding of current and forecast enemy capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.3. Review incoming message traffic and tasks and ensure proper distribution and tracking within the CPD. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.4. Coordinate JAOP and AOD planning and implementation issues with the SRD Chief. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.5. Arbitrate and resolve potential conflicts within the SPINS when contributing team chiefs cannot agree to a resolution. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.6. Establish the CPD battle rhythm for sustained execution planning and ATO/ATONEWS production. Ensure internal battle rhythm accounts for external processes including JFC battle rhythm, component planning cycles, JFACC's needs and required meetings, and briefings of other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.7. Ensure space, strategic communication (SC), IW, and cyber ops planning considerations are fully integrated throughout CPD processes and products. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.8. Ensure the production, revision, and dissemination of detailed execution plans required to develop, publish, and disseminate the ATO/ATONEWS and ACO. Detailed execution plans include but are not limited to the AOD, ACP, the AADP, the C2 Communications Plan, and supporting SPINS. Ensure backup procedures are developed in unit Standard Operating Procedures to allow ATO, ATONEWS, and ACO development and distribution if Tactical Battle Management Control System (TBMCS) is not available. These may be stand-alone plans, or annexes to the JAOP. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.9. Consult with the Chief of COD for a summary of significant problems encountered in implementing ATO/ACO to improve effectiveness of future taskings. Establish procedures to transfer responsibility for the published ATO, ATONEWS/ACO to the COD. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.10. Approve the draft JIPTL for submission. As necessary, arbitrate and resolve component conflicts resulting from the TET meeting. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.11. Review the developed MAAP and establish procedures to secure JFACC approval prior to ATO production. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.12. Ensure CPD core teams develop and transmit an executable ATO/ATONEWS in a timely manner. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.13. Ensure positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate CPD duty positions. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.14. Ensure division compliance with the KMP to include archiving critical planning materials and final versions of unpublished daily execution plans (such as the MAAP). Also ensure all published documents (to include detailed execution plans, the JIPTL, and

the ATO/ATONEW) are filed and stored for the historical record. Ensure division compliance with executing electronic data transfer (compressing files, minimizing pictures, using black/white, etc.). **(T-3)**

4.5.1.15. Coordinate with the AOC/CC, other AOC divisions, joint and coalition internal liaisons, specialty teams, and external liaison officers to incorporate requests for air, space, and cyberspace operations support and annotate and resolve ATO/ATONEWS implementation issues. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.16. Review products for adherence to JFC and JFACC guidance. **(T-3)**

4.5.1.17. Ensure CPD team chiefs adequately train augmentees assigned to the CPD. **(T-3)**

4.5.2. ***Targeting Effects Team*** . The TET mission is to prioritize and integrate component target nominations for a given execution period into a draft JIPTL. These should achieve desired lethal and non-lethal effects reflected in guidance from the AOD.

4.5.2.1. TET Process Inputs. Inputs to the TET include: AOD, JFACC guidance, JFC apportionment decision, combined and joint target lists, restricted target lists, no-strike list, joint desired point of impact servicing capability estimate, STO capability, cyberspace operations capability, space operations capability, Electronic Warfare Operations capability, weather forecast, current order of battle, intelligence situation update, previous target nominations status, unserved targets list, and measures and indicators relating to JFACC prioritized tasks.

4.5.2.2. TET Chief. (AFSC: 11/12). (Rank: O-5). The TET Chief will ensure assigned TET personnel are familiar with the JTT/theater applications in use. Establish procedures to ensure the TET provides complete, accurate, properly formatted and timely inputs using standard formats. Coordinate with JFC and component targeting cells directly or through joint air component coordination elements (JACCE). Coordinate with the MAAP and NKT to determine estimated joint desired point of impact. Oversee that theater-specific procedures are followed in conjunction with the Joint Fires Element. Develop a draft JIPTL and any associated approval briefings. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.3. TET Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14/17/51J/1N1/1N8) (Rank: O-4/O-5,E-7/8).

4.5.2.4. TET Responsibilities. The TET will select daily targets that reflect the guidance in the AOD. It produces the daily draft JIPTL, as well as makes inputs into the JFACC's Component Prioritized Collection List. The TET will ensure this strategy-to-task methodology exists for every target on the JIPTL. The effects on JIPTL targets will integrate kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The TET also provides inputs to the SPT/SGT for use in the initial development of the AOD. It also ensures lethal and non-lethal effects are included in all target development processes. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.5. TET Processes. TET will :

4.5.2.5.1. Develop/support development of draft JIPTL. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.5.2. Provide inputs to JFACC's Component Prioritized Collection List. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.5.3. Provide target strategy inputs and apportionment recommendations to SRD for AOD development. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.5.4. Participate in Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)/Joint Effects Collaboration Board process and associated working groups. **(T-3)**

4.5.2.5.5. Review current enemy disposition, proposed enemy and friendly course of action, daily AOD guidance, combat assessment, and operational assessment results. **(T-3)**

4.5.3. ***Master Air Attack Plan Team*** . The MAAP is the JFACC's time-phased air, space, and cyberspace operations scheme of maneuver for a given ATO period. It synthesizes JFACC guidance, desired effects, supported components' schemes of maneuver, available resources, and friendly/enemy capabilities. The MAAP Team will develop the daily MAAP and transform it into an electronic format to produce the ATO/ATONEWS. The MAAP Team uses the JIPTL and Joint Integrated Prioritized Collections List (JIPCL) and capabilities/forces made available to the C/JFACC for tasking to match assets to targets. Target planning and collection planning are consolidated in the ABP to produce the ATO, SPINS, RSTA Annex, and ISR synchronization matrix. Synchronization ensures selected targets are matched with collection requirements for prestrike verification/post-strike physical and functional assessment. The MAAP team must maintain clear lines of coordination and liaison with other CPD teams, AOC specialty teams, JFACC staff, component/service representatives, and host/coalition representatives. Based on this, the MAAP Chief will place individuals with the correct skill sets and experience in the appropriate job areas. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.1. MAAP Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O-5). The MAAP Chief should be mission commander qualified and is responsible to the CPD Chief for overall development of the daily MAAP and associated approval briefing. The MAAP Chief should be an experienced operational-level planner and have an in-depth knowledge of theater operations and plans (e.g., OPLANS/CONPLANS, JAOP). The MAAP Chief will develop the daily MAAP approval brief, organize team personnel to optimize contributions, develop procedures to ensure the team provides complete, accurate, properly formatted, and timely inputs to MAAP Tool Kit (MAAPTK) and TBMCS, establish a MAAP team schedule for sustained execution planning, develop team processes for timely generation of the MAAP, coordinate target priorities with the TET Chief, coordinate ATO planning with ATO Production Chief, consolidate SPINS inputs from cell chiefs and review for accuracy and completeness.

4.5.3.2. MAAP Team Members. (Rank: O-4/O-5). MAAP Team members come from all theater WS resources and are directly responsible to the MAAP Chief. Each member brings unique mission system knowledge and specialty skills to help plan and develop a daily MAAP to support daily ATO/ATONEWS development.

4.5.3.3. MAAP Team Responsibilities. The MAAP Team will develop the daily MAAP and MAAP briefing. The team transforms the MAAP product (MAAP Toolkit flat files) for import into the ABP. To develop the MAAP successfully, the team should maintain clear, two-way lines of coordination and liaison with other CPD teams, other AOC divisions, AFFOR staff, component/service/other government agencies personnel, coalition, and host nation representatives. The MAAP Team will conduct final quality control review of missions prior to export to TBMCS, develop and distribute external products to ATO coordinators, COD, wing operations centers (WOC), and all components of the joint force, direct changes to the MAAP in response to taskings from higher

authorities, maintain status/location awareness of forces available for use, provide accurate and complete SPINS inputs to the SPINS cell, coordinate unit employment of joint use assets, submit/approve standard conventional load changes, coordinate with the Joint Interface Control Cell (JICC) for Link 16 input. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4. MAAP Team Processes. The MAAP team will:

4.5.3.4.1. Develop MAAP. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.2. Provide SPINS inputs for the C2 Plans Team. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.3. Develop and deliver MAAP decision brief. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.4. Develop, arbitrate, and disseminate MAAP changes. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.5. Provide unserviced target list to TET chief. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.6. Interface with tanker, airlift, collection platforms, and other planners as needed. **(T-3)**

4.5.3.4.7. Document local procedures and maintain a thorough mission-ready training program. **(T-3)**

4.5.4. ***C2 Planning Team*** . The C2 Planning Team is composed of airspace management, C2 IAMD, C2 architecture, C2 communications planning, air support, and SPINS cells. The functions of these cells support the JFACC's roles as the ACA, AADC, and Space Coordinating Authority, when assigned. The airspace management-planning cell, which the AOC airspace specialty team supports, will develop the ACP, and produce the ACO. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.1. C2 Plans Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank O-4/O-5). The C2 Plans Chief will develop detailed execution plans for C2 of air, space, and limited cyberspace operations forces, including production or development support of the ACP, AADP, ACO, C2 communications plan, C2 architecture plan, SPINS, and air support C2 procedures. **(T-3)** The C2 Plans Chief should ensure C2 planning team personnel receive sufficient spin up training to include, but not limited to, ROE, JAOP, ACP, AADP, OPORDs, Time Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD), SPINS, and computer systems. As the AOC focal point for collection of spectrum/frequency requirements, coordinate with CFP, spectrum operations manager, EW coordination cell, and ISRD for frequency allocation/deconfliction, joint communications electronics operating instruction development and joint restricted frequency list, MX, and deconfliction. Assist the AOC WSM and supporting component in development of the communications plan. Coordinate with SRD to ensure ACP and AADP are incorporated as annexes to the JAOP. Coordinate with SRD ensuring AADC's intent, potential authority delegations, and changes to the AADP are included in the AOD.

4.5.4.2. C2 Plans Members:

4.5.4.2.1. C2 IAMD Planners. (AFSC: 11F/12F/13B) (Rank: O-4/O-5). IAMD Plans team should: Plan for defensive employment through the Theater Air Ground System. Develop, coordinate, and disseminate AADP and provide air defense inputs to supplemental ROE recommendations. Develop procedures to receive and disseminate Air Defense Warnings (ADW). Plan for defense against unmanned aerial vehicles of all group sizes using a layered and integrated response and all available assets.

Coordinate with airspace managers and develop procedures for transfer of control of air traffic between terminal/enroute control agencies and controlling agencies of the Theater Air Ground System to include scramble and recovery procedures. Develop, coordinate, and negotiate agency-to-agency agreements and maintain liaison with host nations, allies, and service components on matters relating to C2 and the employment of integrated air and missile defense forces. Assist the MAAP team with integrating air defense missions with available missile systems and air, land, and sea assets. Key to successful integration is identifying and relying on appropriate platform experts (e.g., AEGIS ballistic missile defense, US Army Air and Missile Defense Command [AAMDC], and host nation/coalition liaisons). Develop a deconflicted shot doctrine in support of the Defended Asset List (DAL). Ensure sufficient retrograde orbits and procedures are established. Develop and coordinate air defense procedures with interagency, component service, host nation and allied air defense forces for inclusion in the ACP, AADP, ACO, SPINS, and ATO that adequately support the JFC guidance.

4.5.4.2.2. C2 Architecture Planner. (AFSC: 13B/1C5) (Rank: Officer O-4/O-5, Enlisted E-6-E-8). C2 Architecture Planning cell should: Monitor radar elements and air control facilities' workload, adjust air defense regions, and assign surveillance areas for each system in SPINS. Plan and coordinate radio frequencies for IAMD C2 radio and data link and annotated in SPINS. Develop communications emission control procedures and publish in SPINS. Develop and coordinate PACE plans for communications and information-sharing.

4.5.4.2.3. Airspace Managers. (AFSC: 13M/13B/1C1/1C5) (Rank: Officer O-4/O--5, Enlisted E6-E-8). Airspace Management cell should: Develop the ACP and ACO to enable the ACA to establish broad airspace control guidance. JP 3-52, *Joint Airspace Control*, contains detailed instructions for creating an ACP and should contain all deconflicted Airspace Control Means (ACM) affecting the airspace system. Develop plans, policies and procedures for airspace control of military and civil air traffic within the designated joint/coalition force AO. Coordinate airspace requests and matters affecting military aircraft control with International Civil Aviation Organization and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), military units, foreign agencies, and federal agencies within the designated officer. Develop procedures for handoff of air traffic between terminal agencies, enroute and TACS controlling agencies, to include scramble and recovery procedures. Prepare airspace control instructions for inclusion in the ATO and/or SPINS. Review and approve the ACO on behalf of the ACA prior to dissemination.

4.5.4.2.4. C2 Communications Planners. (AFSC: 17D/1D7X) (Rank: Officer O-4/O-5, Enlisted E-6-E-8). C2 Communications Plans Team should: Provide spectrum management and communications to the TACS inputs to the AADP. Provide air-to-air, air-ground and ground-surface communications requirements to the AOC or AFFOR spectrum manager. Coordinate with the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) for theater datalink frequencies. Coordinate with all nodes of the C2 system on communication security requirements.

4.5.4.2.5. SPINS Cell. (AFSC: 11/12/13/1C5) (Rank: Officer O-4/O-5, Enlisted E-6-E-8). The SPINS cell should: In coordination with a senior offensive duty officer (SODO), develop standard operating procedures that delineate at what command level

SPINS approval resides. SPINS cell manager coordinates with spectrum manager to get SPINS frequencies. Establish SPINS and standard operating procedures IAW JFACC directives.

4.5.4.3. C2 Plans Responsibilities.

4.5.4.3.1. The C2 Plans Team is supported and augmented by other service and component liaisons. Service specialties include experience in Navy ballistic missile defense equipped AEGIS and E-2C/D Hawkeye, Army Patriot, Army Tactical Missile System, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and airspace experience to assist C2 architecture development and defensive counterair planning. It is essential that C2 plans be incorporated, if possible, into the joint planning process soonest to design command, control, communications, air and space architecture that form the execution framework of the overall ABP.

4.5.4.3.2. C2 planners take JFC/JFACC guidance and all available information in existing Operations Order/Operations Plan and capabilities (includes but is not limited to, satellite support capabilities, space support and theater C2 assets from the JFACC, service coalition, Partner Nation, and other government agencies partners), and design the JFACC's theater C2 structure. C2 Planners should also consider CCDR coordination required based on theater and adjacent Command Threats. Upon publication, the ACP and ACO describe theater airspace system, airspace users, C2 nodes, and delineate service and C2 responsibilities. Planners take operational considerations, safety, host nation/international agreements, and political issues into consideration during the development of the ACP. Additionally, airspace planners produce the ACO on a recurring basis using guidance from the ACP, an Operations Order, or to update missile engagement zones, surveillance and air defense sectors to the Defense Design.

4.5.4.3.3. The team manages the SPINS development process by coordinating with designated SPINS subject matter experts, who may reside in other cells and teams within the AOC. It is the responsibility of SPINS subject matter experts to arbitrate and validate inputs and deletions to the SPINS and provide them to the SPINS cell in C2 Plans for publication in the next SPINS release. The team also provides guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating the CPD portion of the AOC KMP.

4.5.4.4. C2 Plans Team Processes. C2 Plans will:

4.5.4.4.1. Develop and publish the ACP. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.2. Develop and publish the ACO. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.3. Develop the SPINS. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.4. Develop and publish the (AADP). **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.5. Provide inputs to the AOC C2 Communications Plan. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.6. Execute the Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instruction. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.7. Develop and publish the C2 architecture. **(T-3)**

4.5.4.4.8. Coordinate with CJE Team for C2 Architecture, operational tasking common tactical picture, and operational tasking data link and operational tasking data link network enabled weapons development and synchronization. **(T-3)**

4.5.5. ***ATO Production Team*** . The ATO Production Team will construct, publish, and disseminate the daily ATO/ATONEWS and applicable SPINS to appropriate joint forces. These documents task JFACC allocated air, space, and cyberspace operations capabilities and assets in accordance with the MAAP. After the MAAP is approved, the ATO production team will merge the air battle plan with AMD and other joint component and coalition plans to produce the ATO and provides input to the airspace management team in C2 Plans for production of the ACO. **(T-3)**.

4.5.5.1. ATO Production Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B/18) (Rank: O-4/O-5). The ATO Production Team Chief will produce and disseminate the daily ATO/ATONEWS and associated SPINS. The ATO Production Team Chief will task-organize ATO production team personnel, optimize contributions, ensure ATO production team personnel receive sufficient training to accomplish the mission, establish the ATO production team schedule for sustained ATO production IAW the AOC battle rhythm, ensure the Air Operations Data Base (AODB) manager creates and maintains accurate databases, ensure SPINS are imported, and ensure the team constructs and distributes necessary component ABP shells to the appropriate agencies that will be incorporated into the primary JFACC ABP shell. **(T-3)**.

4.5.5.2. ATO Production Team Members:

4.5.5.2.1. ATO Production non-commissioned officer in charge: (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank E-7/E-8) will support the ATO Production Chief by establishing ATO production procedures, processes, schedules, and supervises all enlisted team members.

4.5.5.2.2. ATO Technicians: (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: 3-E6) will be TBMCS/Triton application experts and may provide assistance to MAAP planners.

4.5.5.2.3. Air Operations Database Manager (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-5/E-6) will review, manage, and update Friendly Order of Battle and Tactical Information, and coordinate with JICC personnel for network enabled weapons (NEW), Link 16, and/or Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Combat Net Radio (CNR) information to be input in the system. The database manager will ensure data integrity and synchronization is maintained.

4.5.5.3. ATO Production Team Responsibilities. Team personnel will review current ROE, integrate detailed execution plans and supporting SPINS to produce the ATO/ATONEWS. They create and maintain accurate planning and operational databases that interface with various applications. The team creates and maintains a comprehensive address list of approved ATO/ATONEW recipients and coordinates with ACOMS to develop redundant procedures for timely ATO/ATONEWS dissemination.

4.5.5.4. ATO Production Team Processes. ATO Production will:

4.5.5.4.1. Set up, manage, and maintain databases to include Marine Corps Air Mission Planner (MCAMP), MAAPTK, and the AODB. Coordinates AODB resets and theater battle management core systems (TBMCS) reboots. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.2. Develop the ABP. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.3. Create ATO/ATONEWS. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.4. Provide ATO/ATONEWS quality control. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.5. Disseminate ATO/ATONEWS and obtain receipts for ATO/ATONEWS as required/able. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.6. Import SPINS from all locations if published with ATO/ATONEWS. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.7. Create and manage identification friend-or-foe/selective identification feature plan, as required. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.8. Manage connectivity with external systems. Set up Global Decision Support System (GDSS) import parameters, manage imports, and coordinate with the ACOMS C2 Systems to ensure system integration. Coordinate with MAAP Chief to ensure MAAP Toolkit database is current, and the data properly transfers to Marine Corps Air Mission Planner. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.9. Archive all ATO/ATONEWS database files for recovery and/or historical reference. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.10. Maintain and manage exercise, planning, and operational databases. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.11. Synchronize all ATO functions. Troubleshoot system issues from GDSS imports, airspace imports, target list imports, ATO shell manipulation, ATO/ATONEWS mission approval, and ATO/ATONEWS push. Coordinate with Airspace Management Planning Cell to deconflict current ATO airspace usage. **(T-3)**

4.5.5.4.12. Advise COD/CCO of significant issues encountered in ATO/ATONEWS production and dissemination to enhance Situational Awareness (SA) and mission execution. **(T-3)**

Chapter 5

COMBAT OPERATIONS DIVISION

5.1. General. The COD will direct the current ATO, ACO, and the AADP, and develop and implement the OPTASKLINK and OPTASKLINK NEWS. The COD will use the OPTASKLINK NEWS to support network-enabled weapons employment via Link 16 and Variable Message Format using UHF CNR. CNR are used primarily in support of Digitally Aided Close Air Support (CAS). The COD accomplishes these tasks through constant monitoring of the operational environment and leveraging subordinate C2 capabilities within the Theater Air Ground System elements, as well as other assets made available to the JFACC by components/allies/coalition partners on the current ATO. The COD will respond to battlespace dynamics by orchestrating offensive operations, defensive counterair operations, NKO, and by modifying the published ATO and ACO to facilitate changes in mission requirements. **(T-2)**.

5.2. Major COD Process Inputs. Inputs include JFC and JFACC plans, directives and other guidance, ATO and associated documents (ATO folder or football), environmental conditions, ISR reports, updates and requirements, target lists, and updates from other sources. Specific inputs include:

5.2.1. JAOP

5.2.2. AOD

5.2.3. ATO Folder

5.2.4. ATO/ATONEWS with SPINS

5.2.5. ACP

5.2.6. AADP

5.2.7. ACO

5.2.8. ROE/RUF

5.2.9. Time sensitive Target (TST) matrix

5.2.10. NK synchronization matrix

5.2.11. Friendly Order of Battle

5.2.12. Enemy Order of Battle

5.2.13. Restricted Target List, no strike list, JIPTL, Component Prioritized Collection List

5.2.14. JIPCL

5.2.15. RSTA Annex

5.2.16. Operational Tasking Common Operational Picture /Common Tactical Picture

5.2.17. Battlespace events

5.2.18. Weather

5.3. Major COD Processes. COD will:

5.3.1. Provide constant monitoring and support of air missions under tactical control of the COMAFFOR or, if so designated, the JFACC. **(T-2)**

5.3.2. Adjust the ATO as necessary in response to operational environment dynamics (e.g., assigned targets are no longer valid, detection of high priority targets, or enemy action threatens friendly forces). **(T-2)**

5.3.3. Coordinate and facilitate execution of emergency and immediate air support requests with the Air Support Operations Center. **(T-2)**

5.3.4. Execute AADP on behalf of the C/JFACC. **(T-2)**

5.3.5. Publish changes to the ATO and ACO and recommend updates to RSTA annex and coordinate with CPD to publish ATONEWS changes. **(T-2)**

5.3.6. Manage ballistic missile defense and/or theater missile-warning operations. **(T-2)**

5.3.7. Develop reports as required (COD inputs to situation report, passing of daily mission reports, etc.). **(T-2)**

5.3.8. Manage theater tactical data link interface control systems. **(T-2)**

5.3.9. Manage the Air and Space tactical portion of the CCDR/ Joint Task Force CTP. **(T-2)**

5.3.10. Conduct dynamic and time-sensitive targeting operations, to include deliberate planning of, and dynamic execution of, on-call targets. **(T-2)**

5.3.11. Monitor and execute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations directed by the RSTA Annex. **(T-2)**

5.3.12. Coordinate and execute changes to collection operations and processing, exploitation and dissemination in support of higher priority activities. **(T-2)**

5.3.13. Coordinate and monitor real-time space operations support when tasked. **(T-2)**

5.3.14. Conduct airspace management. **(T-2)**

5.3.15. Provide recommendations for non-kinetic operations planners and Cyberspace Support Element for desired cyberspace effects. **(T-2)**

5.3.16. Provide recommendations to CPD for changes to SPINS, Component Prioritized Collection List, and ATO scheme. **(T-2)**

5.3.17. Provide execution assessment data to SRD daily or as requested. **(T-2)**

5.4. Major COD Process Outputs. Outputs include: ATO, ACO, RSTA, OPTASKLINK, OPTASKLINK Network Enabled Weapons, annex changes and other subsequent orders to subordinate C2 agencies, assessment data, and consolidated reports to higher headquarters as required by established directives.

5.5. COD Organization. The CCO tailors COD to a specific contingency or operation. **Figure 5.1**. *COD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes* depicts the typical structure. The COD is normally task-organized into four functionally oriented core teams: offensive operations, defensive operations, CJE Team, and SIDO Team. Integrated specialty and support teams/cells, component/coalition/Partner Nation /combined/other government agency liaisons, and communications provide support.

Figure 5.1. COD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note: Other teams and liaisons support COD: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, ATO Coordination Team, WS Team, NKO Team, Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer, Army Air and Missile Defense Command, BCD, MARLE, NALE, SOLE, and Coalition.

Note: Currently, the C2 Battle Management and Communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Cell with joint personnel is located near AOC Operations (Ops floor) but not considered part of the Ops floor. It provides data and information to the CCO as required, and advises the Defensive Ops Team.

5.5.1. ***COD Chief and Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) (AFSC: 11/12/13B)***. (Rank: O-5/O-6). The COD Chief is directly responsible to the AOC/CC for the direction and supervision of combat operations. Normally, there is only one COD Chief but there can be numerous CCOs during increased operations. COD Chief and CCO will apply JFACC guidance to ensure current tactical air, space, and non-kinetic operations attain established objectives at the operational-level of war. **(T-2)** The CCO is responsible to the COD Chief and is the senior position on the COD operations floor. The CCO monitors the current situation and advises the AOC/CC of dynamic mission requirements and the status of resources. **Note:** There may be time-critical issues that require the CCO to interface directly with the JFACC, especially when changes are made to the ATO/ATONEWS that change (or appear to change) guidance from the JFACC. The primary considerations in the CCO's approval of any adjustment to the ATO/ATONEWS are battlespace dynamics and JFACC/JFC guidance. Continuous communication and timely coordination with JFACC, AFFOR staff, AOC/CC, and associated component staffs are essential to ensure combat support forces can generate and sustain combat operations. Although the following list may vary somewhat depending on theater specifics, the CCO will:

5.5.1.1. Maintain awareness of all theater air, space, and cyberspace operations including force bed-down, sortie rates, airspace procedures, communications, ROE/RUFs, munitions capabilities, and individual unit capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.2. Schedule and supervise all periodic JFACC update briefings and crew changeover briefings. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.3. Determine reporting responsibilities and establish procedures for preparing reports from the COD for the commander's situation report going to Joint Task Force Headquarters, lateral headquarters, and subordinate TACS elements. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.4. Develop procedural guidance for each duty position in the COD based on this manual, doctrine, WSs capabilities, and theater directives applicable to the actual contingency or exercise being supported. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.5. Develop COD communications requirements and recommend priorities for submission to communications operations personnel. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.6. Supervise the preparation and operation of the COD to include manning, systems requirements, and seating. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.7. Oversee development, dissemination, and implementation of AOC chat plan in coordination with KM. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.8. In coordination with the C2 Plans Team, determine subordinate TACS reporting responsibilities and determine delegation of authority desired for decentralized execution. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.9. Coordinate procedures with internal and external agencies concerning briefings, displays, information needs, and routing of immediate requests and threat alerts. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.10. Ensure that backup procedures are prepared and can be rapidly implemented if automated support systems fail. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.11. Coordinate applicable ROE/RUF changes with JAG, SPT, ATO Coordinators, C2 Plans Team, AOC/CC, JFACC, and JFC staff, as required. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.12. Ensure positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed and current for all appropriate combat operations duty positions. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.13. Develop ATO/ATONEWS and ACO change coordination and approval procedures. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.14. Advise CPD of significant problems encountered in implementing and managing the current ATO/ATONEWS to help improve the quality and effectiveness of future ATO/ATONEWS tasking. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15. Supervise execution of the ATO/ATONEWS /ACO. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15.1. Ensure situation and status displays are current and accurate. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15.2. Keep the AOC/CC informed on unanticipated developments, enemy initiatives or problems that might either impact planned operations or reduce the effectiveness of any TACS element or joint/coalition asset on the ATO or supporting it. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15.3. Be prepared to receive execution authority from the JFACC/AADC. (The JFACC/AADC may, by written or verbal order, delegate responsibility for selected authorities to the CCO or other TACS elements.) **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15.4. Recommend delegation of selected execution authorities to subordinate TACS elements when ROE/RUF allows and subordinate TACS elements are capable of conducting the mission. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.15.5. Approve ACO and ATO/ATONEWS changes as required. Additionally, ensure any ATO database changes and issues are coordinated and worked with CPD, air operations database management cell. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.16. Consult with the AOC/CC on the delegation of air and missile defense, CAS, and ACA to subordinate TACS units. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.17. Keep the AOC/CC and TACS informed of the latest mission objectives, priorities, and ROE/RUFs. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.18. Relay air defense warnings and threat alerts to subordinate units and other C2 agencies in a timely manner. **Note:** In some cases, make this notification directly to the JFACC with a back brief to the AOC/CC due to immediate needs. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.19. Through timely coordination with JFACC and AFFOR staffs and similar agencies, act to ensure that preventive MX, stand-downs, or other scheduled MX for ground TACS elements does not negatively affect effective ATO/ATONEWS execution and defense of friendly forces. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.20. Ensure communications changes or reprioritization affecting the AOC are coordinated and communicated with associated C2 units, applicable agencies, and the Chief AOC communications team. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.21. Direct the operations of the TACS. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.22. Maintain mission log summaries for appropriate teams that capture major actions taken during execution of the ATO. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.23. Provide guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating COD portion of the AOC KMP. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.24. Act as approving/disapproving authority for preventive MX, stand-downs, other scheduled MX, or alterations to the AOC Floor. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.25. Ensure all assigned or attached personnel are trained and equipped to perform assigned duties. **(T-3)**

5.5.1.26. Direct and ensure records generation and preservation of all lethal actions undertaken for potential legal reconstruction and review. **(T-3)**

5.5.2. ***Offensive Operations Team*** . The offensive operations team will monitor and adjust force application and support sorties/missions during ATO/ATONEWS execution. Team members work closely with specialty and support teams, component coalition/Partner Nation /other government agency liaisons, and others to ensure the most effective application of air and space operations power with JFACC guidance through the AOD. The offensive operations team will direct engagement of dynamic and time sensitive targets. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.1. Senior Offensive Duty Officer (SODO). (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-5). The SODO will direct and supervise all offensive operations on behalf of the CCO and may assist with CCO responsibilities. The SODO should be package mission commander qualified. The SODO supervises the activities of all offensive duty officers (ODOs), offensive duty technicians, dynamic targeting cell members, and ATO change technicians. The SODO will coordinate with the SADO to utilize multi-role assets effectively in support of CCO direction. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.2. SODO Technician. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-7/E-8). The SODO Technician is normally a senior non-commissioned officer with an in-depth knowledge of COD functions and responsibilities, as well as a comprehensive knowledge of C2 system operations. The SODO Technician is directly responsible to the SODO.

5.5.2.3. Offensive Duty Officer (ODO). (AFSC: 11/12/13B/14) (Rank: O-3-O-5). The offensive operations team consists of duty officers from various individual mission design series engaged in the theater of operations, and from cells organized by function (e.g., electronic warfare, CAS, interdiction, IO, Tanker, Space), or along other lines established by COD leadership (e.g., F-16, A-10, F-15E, C-130, KC-135 ODOs reporting directly to the SODO). During all periods of increased activity, applicable mission/capability experts should be on the COD floor. During periods of reduced activity, COD may share this responsibility with CPD; CPD and COD personnel should clearly understand this arrangement, in terms of when personnel “on loan” return to COD. ODOs should know the details of each mission/package, such as ordnance, primary target, secondary target, assigned pre-strike and post-strike tanker(s) orbits, off-load, required electronic warfare support, and mission results. ODOs should: Manage/monitor assets and assess how changes/deviations may affect the ATO. If changes are required, research options and recommend adjustments to the SODO/CCO. Ensure that any change to mission tasking is fully coordinated with all affected duty officers/technicians, component liaisons, controlling agencies, and WOCs. Coordinate with the SADO/Defensive Operations Team concerning notification process to WOCs for ADW/air and missile attacks. ODOs are also responsible for coordination with other AOC divisions, subordinate TACS units as

necessary, and passing critical information to/from their respective units (e.g., air defense warnings, significant battle damage, unexpected changes, diverted aircraft, and airfield status) as required.

5.5.2.4. Offensive Duty Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-3-E-6). The Offensive Duty Technicians provide critical continuity and technical expertise on the COD floor. Additionally, they understand and support setup, connectivity, and operation of applicable communication equipment, to include cryptographic keying and shutdown of the KY-68/99A/100 or RT-1830(P)/S, Secure Terminal Equipment, and other theater battle-management systems. If necessary, they also maintain and update situational awareness displays in the COD. Ensure the ATO/ACO is properly loaded into Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. Track the progress of striking JIPTL targets. Provide any needed support to ODOs as required.

5.5.2.5. Dynamic Targeting (DT) Cell. The DT Cell coordinates the dynamic targeting process by integrating inputs from COD and specialty teams, developing a strike package and gaining CCO or higher approval, as required by guidance in the AOD. The DT cell integrates and synchronizes assets for all targets of opportunity, to include emerging targets, TST, Component Critical Targets, and JFC critical targets, and contributes to deliberate planning and dynamic execution of on-call targets, as well as potential reattacks on planned targets, in accordance with JFACC guidance and the SIDO team. The cell typically consists of:

5.5.2.5.1. Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O-3-O-5) The Chief is the JFACC's Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. DT manager POC, responsible for the integration and synchronization of joint fires associated with dynamic targeting. DT cell chief uses time-constrained planning and coordination to prosecute dynamic targets effectively by using available joint or coalition force assets, while concurrently mitigating risk to friendly forces and non-combatants. The DTC chief will coordinate with the joint operations center, SIDO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations Duty Officer (ISRODO), Non-Kinetic Duty Officer (NKDO), ODOs, and other-component liaisons to identify possible ISR assets, determines available target effects, and ensures JFACC targeting guidance is followed. Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief will evaluate all reasonable courses of action and recommend the most suitable in accordance with all targeting guidance and the operational situation to SODO and CCO for engagement approval. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.5.2. Ground Track Coordinator (GTC). (AFSC: 1C5). As dynamic targets emerge, the GTC's primary responsibility is to land point/track generate based on information provided from the SIDO team. This position works closely with the CJE Team and BCD to incorporate all ground tracks into the CTP. The GTC also works closely with the Tactical Data Link Manager, track data coordinator, and the C2 Duty Officer, correlating tracks with them for any dynamic targeting inputs. The GTC will transmit DT Taskings, Enemy Order of Battle updates, status updates, and any other applicable mission information that needs to be transmitted to C2 nodes via Link 16. Additionally, the GTC will coordinate with SADO, SODO, C2 Duty Officer, JICO and other liaisons for the execution of digital control messages via the tactical data link to include dynamic target tasking. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.5.3. Attack Coordinator. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4). Position provides target prosecution analysis and coordinates effective target engagement solutions that integrate and synchronize survivable force packages that meet desired effects at acceptable risk levels to the Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief for evaluation.

5.5.2.5.4. Target Duty Officer (AFSC: 14N/1N8X1) (Rank: O-3, E-5/6). The SIDO may assign a Target Duty Officer to the Dynamic Targeting Cell. The Target Duty Officer provides targeting and weaponeering solutions that will meet desired effects while simultaneously identifying potential collateral damage concerns and then recommending/coordinating mitigation options such as delayed fusing or heading restrictions. The Target Duty Officer will conduct precise point mensuration or coordinate it through the ISRD targets/tactical assessment team for the employment of precision guided munitions. The Target Duty Officer will evaluate unit-submitted target mensuration only recommendations and conduct coordinate verification along with collateral damage estimate and weaponeering modifications as required. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.5.5. Target Duty Technician (TDT). (AFSC: 1N8X1) (Rank: E-3/E-5). Target Duty Technicians are directly responsible to the Target Duty Officer. TDTs typically reside within the Dynamic Targeting Cell but may be subordinate to the SIDO depending on theater and mission requirements. TDTs are responsible for providing the COD with adversary target and target system analysis, as well as the factors that will affect DT operations. The TDTs are technical and analytical experts who complete the targeting and weaponeering solutions that will meet desired effects while simultaneously identifying potential collateral damage concerns. They recommend mitigation options such as delayed fusing or heading restrictions. TDTs perform vetting measures to serve as the final targeting quality check to ensure that dynamic targets adhere to JFACC objectives, ROE, and engagement restrictions. TDTs are responsible for tracking all lethal and non-lethal targeting effects assigned to ATO targets in order to update target status and targeting databases.

5.5.2.6. ATO Change Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-3-E-5). The ATO Change Technicians input changes to the ATO as developed by ODOs and approved by SODO or CCO. The ATO Change Technician will coordinate with the Airlift Duty Officer and mobility air forces ATO integrator for external airlift missions to be incorporated into the ATO, with ATO production for any Friendly Order of Battle updates, with the COD airspace management cell to incorporate any airspace additions/changes into MCAMP, and with targeteers to incorporate any target additions/changes into MCAMP. The ATO Change Technicians may also provide computer-based TBMCS applications support to COD augmentees or wing operation center personnel, and maintain logs as required. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.7. Offensive Operations Team Responsibilities. Responsibilities include monitoring current air, space, and IO. The team also maintains situational awareness, recommends ATO/ATONEWS and ACO changes as required, maintains currency on applicable documents such as the AOD, keeps ATO coordinators apprised of changes as needed, provides assessment inputs, provides updates on available resources, coordinates with C2 agencies and other services, supports combat search and rescue operations, and assists subordinate units whenever needed.

5.5.2.8. Offensive Operations Team Processes. The Offensive Operations Team will:

5.5.2.8.1. Execute ATO/ATONEWS. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.8.2. Execute and monitors dynamic targeting/time sensitive targeting. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.8.3. Provide battle damage assessments and operations assessments. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.8.4. Change ATO/ATONEWS and executes re-roles. **(T-3)**

5.5.2.8.5. Scramble air assets when required. **(T-3)**

5.5.3. ***Defensive Operations Team*** . The defensive operations team has authority delegated from the AADC and/or JFACC through the CCO to execute C2 battle management within the theater. Using this authority, it will execute overall coordination of theater defensive counterair operations and if warranted, supports the global ballistic missile defense operations. The team directs attached and supporting tactical C2 and air and missile defense operations, monitors the status of associated assets, and assists the SODO as required. For air and missile defense within the theater, the AADC may establish regional air and missile defense commanders. In addition, sector air and missile defense commanders can be created to facilitate this process. The defensive operations team provides requirements to, and the Interface Control Cell supports the defensive operations team on issues concerning the recognized air picture. This effort facilitates rapid and timely decision-making processes required for the C2 of defensive air operations. The team directs attached units relative to air and missile defense operations and changes to air and missile defense warning-condition and weapons control status. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1. Senior Air Defense Officer (SADO). (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-5). Works directly for the CCO. acts as the leadership for the defensive operations team, and is the AADC representative charged with executing the area air and missile defense plan. When in joint operations, it is also possible to have a Navy Surface Warfare Officer (NOBC: 1110) with KA6 (AEGIS Qualification). The SADO will:

5.5.3.1.1. Direct/manage all theater defensive C2 assets, theater defensive counterair operations, and direct the efforts of the Senior Air Defense Officer technicians, defensive duty officers (DDOs), and technicians. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.2. Recommends changes to air defense warning; weapons control states, and delegation of battle management authorities to subordinate Regional Air and Missile Defense Centers/Sector Air and Missile Defense Centers. Coordinate with SODO to utilize multi-role assets effectively in support of CCO directions and to maximize offensive counterair opportunities. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.3. Will coordinate directly with all leadership and liaison positions on the combat operations floor to support the full spectrum of operations from defensive to offensive operations. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.4. Coordinates with the CCO on any event that may trigger a change in defensive posture (e.g., ballistic missile defense status, equipment outages). **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.5. Responsible for the timely prioritization of all in-flight TBM and cruise missile threats. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.6. Ensures adequate manning of Combat Air Patrol (CAP) through DDO, and communicates with controlling agencies to meet anticipated threats. The SADO adjusts

the status of ground alert assets. These include but are not limited to, fighter, tanker, surveillance and C2 aircraft, C2 agencies, radars, and air defense systems. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.7. Oversees execution/notification of missile warning, tracking, and engagement in conjunction with the IAMD cell and AAMDC. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.8. Manages C2/Defensive Counter Air (DCA) assets in coordination with internal/external agencies to enable them to destroy/neutralize the threat IAW ROE, SPINS, ACP and AADP. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.1.9. **Note:** See Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, para 8.d. (1) and (2). The development of upper tier and lower tier IAMD coordination and deconfliction guidance is a Joint responsibility, shared by JAOC SADO (upper tier) and BDE Air Defense Army Fire Controls Officer at each Regional and Sector Air Defense Centers (lower tier). It is a coordinated joint IAMD effort to integrate upper and lower tier defenses. The JTF HQ will promulgate the upper tier/lower tier laydown.

5.5.3.2. Senior Air Defense Technician. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-7/E-8). The Senior Air Defense Technician is responsible to the SADO and supervises performance of various functions of air and missile defense operations. The Senior Air Defense Technician supervises the duties and functions of all the enlisted defensive operations crewmembers, is the defensive operations team-equipment-outage point of contact, and maintains a logbook.

5.5.3.3. Defensive Operations Team Members.

5.5.3.3.1. Defense Duty Officers (DDOs). (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4). DDOs will provide operational direction to the defensive air battle. They are responsible to the SADO for the timely display of air and missile defense information and continuous evaluation of air and missile defense elements of the TACS. In the absence of a C2 Duty Officer, the DDO coordinates with the SODO on providing guidance and direction to C2 and strike assets for air to ground targeting. **(T-3)** DDOs should: Conduct force management by determining the need to intercept threats based on theater guidance, and communicate commits to the proper assets. Consider engagement zones, fuel status, and configuration of available assets. Analyze and anticipate possible defensive reactions. Announce leakers both verbally and in chat. A visual indicator on the CTP should be made to ensure the SADO has recognized the leaker. Support DT, PR, DCA and ADA efforts via coordination and asset allocation.

5.5.3.3.2. Defensive Duty Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-3-E-6). Defensive Duty Technicians assist the DDO, monitor defensive counterair fighters, alert and combat air patrol status, and coordinate with AAMDC/BCD. When scrambles are centralized, Defensive Duty Technicians send the scramble orders to wing operations centers. Defensive Duty Technicians should: Display and maintain air situational data for updating air base, flight facility, and TACS status. Perform communications checks with all sensors, databases, and units that provide status information and report outages and problems through the DDO to the Senior Air Defense Technician. Maintain defensive fighter status and other air defense information (e.g., ADW status, Patriot locations, ADA status, and ROE changes to subordinate units).

5.5.3.4. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Cell:

5.5.3.4.1. The IAMD Cell is responsible to the SADO for conducting IAMD operations in the AOR.

5.5.3.4.2. The cell comprises the IAMD Officer, integrated air and missile defense technicians, Air Defense Army Fire Controls Officer, and AEGIS Liaison Officers (LNO), as required. The AOC WS baseline does not include the system used for missile defense (C2BMC). Therefore, an IAMD Cell with joint personnel is located near the AOC ops floor but is not considered part of it.

5.5.3.4.3. It provides data and information to the CCO as required and advises the Defensive Ops Team. IAMD personnel must coordinate closely with the rest of COD for information flow. Additionally, ACOMS personnel may rely on agencies outside of ACOMS to provide technical support for C2BMC or other non-AOC systems.

5.5.3.4.4. The IAMD Cell provides data and information to the CCO and advises the defensive ops team concerning theater missile alerts, active and passive missile defense operations, warning dissemination, and the evaluation of areas of theater missile activity/interest. Other service and USAF specialties with missile defense training typically augment the IAMD cell. Additionally, integrated air and missile defense emphasizes the integration of offensive counterair attack operations, defensive counterair operations, and other capabilities to create the JFACC's /AADC's desired effects.

5.5.3.4.5. The team monitors the status of active air and missile defense assets and coordinates with the SIDO team to determine expected enemy air and missile attacks. It monitors the capability of the entire air and missile defense force to engage enemy missiles attacking or expected to attack defended assets and makes recommendations to the SADO for re-tasking of active air and missile defense assets. The IAMD Cell will monitor IAMD shooter status and data link engagement information transfer among surveillance, detection, and shooter platforms. Realign or retask shooter platforms to protect DAL assets. Maintaining effective communication between the IAMD cell, AADC, and the tactical shooters.

5.5.3.4.6. IAMD personnel also coordinate with global ballistic missile defense force representatives at higher and lower levels on long-range threats, which could affect other Combatant Commands operations. The AADC may establish a theater missile defense net for voice warning. IAMD personnel will serve as the primary coordinator with external, joint, and multinational air and missile defense organizations.

5.5.3.4.7. Within the AOC, the IAMD cell will coordinate and align procedures with applicable cells and organizations including, the AAMDC, AOC space support cell, CJE Team, and the offensive operations team. The team normally assists with development and coordination of the missile-warning grid to ensure applicability for the theater. Members should have a thorough knowledge of upper tier and lower tier engagements for effective missile-warning **(T-3)**.

5.5.3.4.7.1. IAMD Officer: (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4). The IAMD Officer is the primary point of contact within the AOC for air and missile defense current operations. The IAMD Officer will provide status and course of action recommendation for all active and passive missile defense operations to the SADO

and CCO for current and projected threats. The IAMD Officer will coordinate and synchronize inputs from external air and missile defense organizations and internally within the AOC from the IAMD Technician, Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer, ballistic missile defense weapons officer, AEGIS liaison officer, Space Specialty Team, and SIDOs to ensure accurate missile defense operations information is available to leadership. The IAMD Officer develops and coordinates the missile warning grid to ensure applicability for the theater, recommend changes to the Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status for each Region/Sector assigned to the Senior Air Defense Officer/CCO based on current indications and warnings. The IAMD Officer provides input for CPD/C2 Plans to consider during the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Board to reallocate air and missile defense assets **(T-3)**.

5.5.3.4.7.2. IAMD Technicians: (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-3-E--6). The IAMD Technicians will understand the air and missile defense framework and monitor missile-warning systems (Defense Support Program / Overhead Persistent Infrared) to provide warning to both the AOC operations floor and the upper/lower tier commands via the Theater Missile-Warning net. The technician, in conjunction with IAMD Officers, will assist with development and coordination of the missile-warning grid to ensure applicability for the theater. IAMD Technicians should: Coordinate with other teams/cells and LNOs on the combat operations floor. Monitor missile warning systems and assist with dissemination of theater missile warning internal/external to the AOC. Coordinate/deconflict warning notification procedures with SADO. Accomplish a configuration check of all Theater Event System (TES) equipment at the beginning of each shift. Synchronize the clocks on all equipment with the atomic clock once per shift. Coordinate with SODO to target missile launchers and with Regional and Sector Air Defense Centers and AAMDC for ADA platform status, engagement reports, and daily briefing of IAMD actions and results for JFACC/AADC. The IAMD Technicians are responsible for ensuring that the information systems required for air and missile defense are available to the maximum extent. The IAMD Technicians will maintain a log of relevant information to provide continuity for the cell. The IAMD Technicians will be knowledgeable of ballistic missile defense assets and will advise the IAMD Officers on current operations **(T-3)**.

5.5.3.5. C2 Duty Officer. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4). The C2 Duty Officer supports the SADO and/or SODO as the primary conduit for AOC communications to theater C2 assets. The C2 Duty Officer will have an in-depth knowledge of ROE/RUF, brevity code words, weapons capabilities, ground and air deconfliction measures, Personnel Recovery operations, and coordination procedures required for other key liaison officers (BCD, NALE, MARLE, SPLE, and SOLE). The C2 Duty Officer should: Transmit re-role, diverts, and TST mission information for execution. Obtain and relay in-flight reports. Monitor execution of ATO and advise coordinators/SODO/ SADO/SIDO of any aircraft that have not checked in with C2 assets. Advise C2 assets of changes to airspace control means, and when aircraft under their control have been tasked/retasked and pass contact/target information. Coordinate with ODOs/DDOs on C2 asset changes/asset reroles/tanker issues, and airspace issues and advise attack coordinator/SODO of effects

on offensive operations. Provide situation report to Combat Reports Team with updates and management of C2/defensive assets. The C2 Duty Officer may be required to assist the DDOs depending on the phase of the operations. The C2 Duty Officer supports transmitting targeting information to the appropriate tactical C2 node for air-to-surface targeting during dynamic targeting, CAS or interdiction operations **(T-3)**.

5.5.3.6. Defensive Operations Team Responsibilities. The Defensive Operations Team will:

5.5.3.6.1. Monitor current air, space, and IW. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.2. Maintain situational awareness. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.3. Recommend ATO/ACO changes as required. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.4. Maintain currency on applicable documents such as AADP and AOD. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.5. Keep ATO coordinators apprised of changes as needed. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.6. Provide assessment inputs. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.7. Provide updates on available resources. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.8. Coordinate with C2 agencies, other services, etc. as needed. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.9. Support Personnel Recovery operations. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.6.10. Assist subordinate units whenever needed. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7. Defensive Operations Team Processes. The Defensive Operations Team will:

5.5.3.7.1. Execute the ADDP. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7.2. Provide C2 battle management to include air and missile defense scrambles. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7.3. Monitor ATO and ACO execution. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7.4. Support dynamic targeting/time sensitive targeting execution. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7.5. Support Personnel Recovery. **(T-3)**

5.5.3.7.6. Relay battle damage assessment, in-flight reports, etc. to appropriate AOC teams and divisions. **(T-3)**

5.5.4. ***Senior Intelligence Duty Officer Team*** . The SIDO team is the focal point for ISR support to the COD.

5.5.4.1. SIDO. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank O-4/O-5) The SIDO leads a team of ISR personnel assigned to the COD who will provide situational awareness, predictive analysis, and targeting support. The SIDO works for the CCO and will coordinate current ISR operations activities with the SODO, Dynamic Targeting Cell, Senior Air Defense Officer, CJE, and the ISRD. The SIDO is responsible for overall execution of the ISR plan and retains the authority to make collection decisions, including Sensor Tasking Authority (STA) for ISR assets. The SIDO also retains the authority to adjudicate and define the intelligence picture of the battlespace and to adjudicate and determine ISR-derived target positive identification in the event of conflicting reporting. The SIDO is responsible for making intelligence gain loss assessments and resolving real-time issues with competing ISR priorities. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.2. SIDO Team Members. (AFSC: 14N/17D/1N). (Rank O-3/O-4 and E-4-E-7) The SIDO team may be comprised of any combination of the following roles: SIDO, intelligence duty officers (IDO), intelligence duty technician (IDT), ISRODO, ISR operations duty technician (ISRODT), target duty officers, TDTs, ISR platform duty officers/liaison officers, Processing Exploitation and Dissemination managers/liaison officers, imagery support element personnel, reconnaissance duty officers, national tactical integration element personnel, and others as available.

5.5.4.3. SIDO Team Responsibilities. The SIDO team will:

5.5.4.3.1. Provide threat warning, real-time situational and predictive analysis of the adversary, monitoring and supporting dynamic targeting and dynamic ISR operations. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.2. Conduct real-time collection management. The SIDO team is the focal point in the COD to receive, process, validate, and execute dynamic collection requirements. SIDO team should submit collection requests to the ISRODO/T to fill threat intelligence gaps that arise during execution. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.3. Act as the ISR focal point during ATO execution, and coordinate C2 decisions with the CCO to execute theater ISR in accordance with JFC and JFACC guidance. Monitor and adjusts ISR employment in support of the COD's ATO execution processes and is responsible for nominating emerging or factor threats as dynamic targets. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.4. Provide intelligence updates and real-time analysis on emerging threats. Collaborate with the ACF team to publish and provide real-time In-Flight Report (INFLTREP) data relating to threats, and ensuring threat-based dynamic target nominations, execution updates, and operational reconnaissance/tactical reconnaissance-derived reporting is incorporated into the overall battlespace situational awareness picture. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.5. Provide support to the TST and DT processes. Monitor targets based on TST matrix priorities. Targets not on the TST matrix will be identified as emerging targets. Vet all emerging threats against the TST matrix. Pass information on emerging threats and possible targets meeting TST requirements to the DTC. The TDO/Ts typically reside within the Dynamic Targeting Cell but may be subordinate to the SIDO depending on theater and mission. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.6. Support Personnel Recovery and troops in contact. The IDO/T will provide surface threat type and bearing/range from IP location. For information on ground forces, IDO/T will coordinate with BCD/SOLE/MARLE/SPLE. **(T-3)**

5.5.4.3.7. Work closely with all other team and process functions in the AOC. The SIDO team interacts extensively with the ISRD, who directly supports the SIDO team with timely and accurate analysis and intelligence products and services. **(T-3)**

5.5.5. ***Joint Data Network Operations*** . Per CJCSI 3151.01D, Reporting Requirements for Global Command and Control: Common Operational Picture, Common Tactical Picture, and Common Intelligence Picture; the Joint Data Network is comprised of several digital data networks, optimized to enable improved situational awareness and commander's decision

cycle. The Joint Data Network Operations Officer (JDNO) is responsible to the CJTF for integrating data from the supporting Joint Force Combatant Commander (JFCC) into a common database used to generate a Common Tactical Picture (CTP). The JDNO produces the CTP by managing data provided by subordinate C2 units, track producers, and Tactical Data Link (TDL) participants. The Common Operational Picture (COP) is a command-level operation and the CTP is the component portion of the COP. JDNO coordinates with the COD CTP manager for the air and space component input to the COP. Broad coordination and planning with MAJCOM level staff, JTF counterparts, other AOCs, AFFOR directorates, and subordinate units beyond the AOC chain of command is common. JDNO will follow Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 6120.01, *Joint Multi-TDL Operating Procedures*, using the following resources: MIL-STD-6016, *Link 16*; MIL-STD-6011, *Link 11A/B*; MIL-STD-3011, *JREAP*; MIL-STD 6020, *Data Forwarding*; CJCSM 6120.01H, *Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations*; and JTIDS network design library. The generation and display of a CTP within the Joint Task Force headquarters, shared with the JTF's component commanders, and forwarded to the CCDR as an input to the Common Operational Picture enables operational situational awareness. A CTP consists of a collection of air, space, land, and maritime tracks and units. A track is a single entity reported on a CTP such as an aircraft, ship, theater ballistic missile, or emitter location, which is then reported by each component up to the Joint Task Force where it is collated and fused to create the theater picture (**Figure 5.2**.).

Figure 5.2. Basic Common Tactical Picture Development.



Note: Figure 5.2 depicts the information exchanges in a single theater of operations among the Joint Task Force commander and component commanders for maritime, air/space, land, and special operations forces to form the CTP. Each component commander is responsible for the development of the tactical picture. The depicted CTP is a distributed data processing and exchange environment for developing and displaying a dynamic operational picture of the CCDR's AOR/JOA. The components portion of the CTP (maritime, land, air and space tactical picture) provides planning applications and theater-generated overlays and projections such as environmental, battle plans, force position projections that may include location of enemy, friendly, and neutral forces, assets, and reference points. The CTP displays accurate, relevant tactical data and meteorological information that integrates information from multiple operational environment components. CTP data comes from the service's data links, sensors, uninhabited aerial vehicles, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, satellites and other sources that provide a current depiction of the operational environment. CTP management is a continuous process of maintaining an accurate and current picture of the operational environment. This continuous process encompasses configuring and maintaining related Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP systems, establishing and managing communications and messaging services, and ensuring filters are set for the exchange of data. Within the AOC, the primary team supporting CTP is the CJE Team.

5.5.5.1. Component JDNO Equivalent (CJE): The CJE leads the team, which is comprised primarily of two cells; the Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP Track Management Cell, and the Interface Control Cell. Additionally, the CJE gets inputs from multiple other electronic sources internal and external to the AOC network. Performs theater Joint Interface Control Officer responsibilities on behalf of the C/JFACC.

5.5.5.1.1. CJE. (AFSC: 13B/ Government Service) (Rank: O-5 or equivalent Government Service grade). The CJE reports to the CCO. The CJE is also the senior expert in the AOC advising the AOC Commander and Component Major Command (JFACC/AADC) staff on service, joint and coalition interoperability issues. The CJE should serve as an advisor on the configuration review board. The CJE receives inputs from intelligence, operations, and communications teams to establish the JFACC's CTP architecture properly. In accordance with joint data network published OPTASKLINK CTP and other higher headquarter guidance, the CJE will provide an accurate and consolidated air and space tactical picture to all AOC divisions as well as the JFACC. The AOC CJE will also establish settings (per guidance) for the tactical management system, universal communications processor, and filters at appropriate levels of detail and coordinating with Common Operational Picture Correlation Sites and the Combatant Command Joint Data Network cell. Additionally, the CJE sets up and manages the AOC Global Command and Control System - Joint architecture and provides CTP subject matter expert support to AOC personnel. The CJE works with WSM and other AOC staff members to ensure feeds, tasked sensors, and reporting systems support AOC CTP requirements. The CJE ensures all CTP feeds correlate together to provide an accurate display of the battle space, ensures CTP data is distributed to subordinate TACS elements equipped with the appropriate Global Command and Control System - Joint client software, manages CTP permissions, and monitors and resolves connectivity and interoperability issues. The CTP also configures the pseudo identification feature, arbitrary electronic intelligence notation, and joint unit tables as required. The AOC CJE supports and coordinates with the JDNO to resolve CTP anomalies and interoperability issues and meet JOA Information Exchange Requirements (IERs). CJCSI 3151.01D tasks the CJE to coordinate with the Joint Data Network Officer and Air Support Operations Squadrons and Direct Air Support Center units to execute effective Digitally Aided CAS by developing machine-readable uniform resource names, IP and operating area parameters, via the CNR segment of the Operational Task Link and/or OPTASKLINK Network Enabled Weapons messages. The CJE will direct the JICO to plan the integration of network-enabled weapons via the OPTASKLINK and/or OPTASKLINK Net Enabled Weapons messages that include CNR. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.2. CTP Track Management Cell:

5.5.5.1.2.1. CTP Track Manager (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-7) will establish and maintain the air component Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP. Provides oversight and leadership of CTP track manager technicians. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.2.2. CTP Track Manager Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5/1N0) (Rank E-3-E-6) CTP Track Manager Technicians are responsible to the CTP Track Manager. CTP Track Manager Technicians utilize the Global Command and Control System - Joint integrated communication system framework client for displaying and

manipulating the AOC CTP air picture and are required to maintain constant vigilance of the air picture to ensure tracks are processed and updated in a timely manner. CTP Track Manager Technicians collect, index, and disseminate CTP track data and other related information throughout the AOC. This function should resolve naming conflicts using the processes of correlation (matching tracks plotted on the tactical display with the contacts they represent) and fusion (integrating correlated track data with amplifying information) on the CTP. CTP Track Management Cell will create, edit, delete, merge, monitor tracks, track groups, overlays, and routes. CTP Track Management Cell will resolve CTP track conflicts and anomalies (dual designations, duplicate tracks, false targets, runway tracks, identification, and category conflicts, etc.) and inputs appropriate track amplifications as required. Additionally, CTP Track Management Cell works closely with interface control, ACF team, ACOMS/CC, WS Manager, and Configuration Manager, to ensure compliance with Operational Task Link Common Operational Picture-CTP parameters, MX of intelligence feeds, and correlation of the ATO and other messages into the air picture displayed on the CTP. Intelligence personnel assigned to the SIDO team normally perform CTP management of intelligence tracks. This position would support the CJE for intelligence CTP management duties. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3. CTP Track Management Cell Processes. The CTP Track Management Cell will:

5.5.5.1.3.1. Manage AOC CTP architecture. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.2. Manage Global Command and Control System CTP Track data and associated tables. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.3. Implement and manage CTP track data filters. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.4. Create and manage CTP communication channels and associated client gateways. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.5. Correlate ATO with the air and space tactical picture. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.6. Maintain a complete, timely, and accurate CTP in accordance with the Joint Data Network Officer Operational Tasking CTP. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.7. Direct/supervise the resolution of track data anomalies (e.g., dual designations, duplicate tracks, false targets, runaway tracks, identification, and category conflicts). **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.8. Coordinate with JICC and Air Support Operations Squadrons/Direct Air Support Center for production of the CNR segment of the OPTASKLINK and OPTASKLINK Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.9. Manage overlays and tactical graphics. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.10. Manage CTP big screen display. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.11. Manage CTP machine-to-machine external interfaces. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.3.12. Manage CTP user profiles and permissions. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4. Interface Control Cell. The cell works for the CJE and supports multi-tactical data link network (MTN) inputs to the CTP supporting the CCDR's Common Operational Picture/CTP. One of the primary systems supporting the CTP is the MTN. The Interface Control Cell will manage the JFACC's and AOC's digital input to the MTN. Guidance provided by AFMAN 13-116, *Tactical Data Link Planning and Operations*, states a MTN should be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, timely, and secure. The exchange of tactical information between participants on a real-time or near-real-time basis with tactical data links supports the concept of joint combat operations. The exchange of real-time tactical information between C2 systems, WSs, and intelligence systems provides mutual support, allows coordinated action, and prevents interference between interfaced forces for the efficient and effective application of military force.

5.5.5.1.4.1. Interface Control Officer (ICO). (AFSC: 13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4). Responsible to the CCO for planning, managing, and executing the MTN architecture and monitoring/managing the CTP. The Interface Control Officer will:

5.5.5.1.4.1.1. Ensure that the current MTN includes planning, execution, management, and analysis. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.2. If tasked by the Joint Task Force, act as the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), the senior element in the MTN architecture. The JICO responds to IER of C2 systems and participants based on the changing nature of the battle. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.3. If designated the Joint Interface Control Officer, he/she may further delegate authority for control of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corp interface operations to the applicable component Regional Interface Control Officer cell, if available. Regional Interface Control Officers also could be assigned specific geographic and/or force specific area(s) of interest. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.4. Work closely with the C2 Plans Team in developing and updating operational tasking data link messages. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.5. Manage theater TDL interface control systems and other automated air displays. Act as net controller for data coordination net/track supervision net. Monitor and manage the TDL architecture. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.6. Ensure transfer and display of MTN information to link capable units, platforms, and agencies contributing to mission execution and/or have tactical/operational command-level decision-making authority. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.1.7. Establish a JFACC Connectivity Policy. Coordinate the connectivity policy with the C2 Plans Team, the ACT's Plans and Programs and Data Link Functions, and the A6 staff. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.2. Interface Control Watch Officer. (AFSC: 13B/1C5) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-7 or equivalent Government Service grade). The Interface Control Watch Officer will:

5.5.5.1.4.2.1. Conduct interface control operations and active management of MTN operations. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.2.2. Supervise the team during data link planning, management, and execution. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.2.3. Monitor the quality of the MTN and directs actions to rectify the problems as they occur. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.2.4. Conduct dynamic planning to adjust the MTN and interfaces to meet changing requirements and operations. Coordinate, brief and debrief subordinate MTN units daily or as necessary to ensure corrective action. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.2.5. When multiple regions or sectors are established, coordinates and has resolution authority to resolve cross-regional MTN issues with the Regional Interface Control Officer/Sector Interface Control Officers AOR/JOAs. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.4.3. Track Data Coordinator. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E-7). The Track Data Coordinator is responsible to the Interface Control Watch Officer for the accuracy, currency, and quality of the air, ground, maritime, and space picture. The Track Data Coordinator will monitor air, ground, and space track classification, identification, and track quality. The Track Data Coordinator facilitates the resolution of dual track designation and identification conflicts that are a result of system interoperability problems or operator error. The Track Data Coordinator should: Maintain complete, timely, and accurate TDL data through connectivity fidelity drills and active track data management. Coordinate changes in surveillance responsibilities as the tactical situation dictates. Load the ATO onto interface control systems that can auto correlate track identify friend or foe with mission call signs. Coordinate with CTP manager to ensure accurate display of applicable data on the CTP. Detect, coordinate and monitor critical track activity, such as downed aircraft and special missions. Maintain SA of critical class tracks and notifies the ICO of new critical class tracks (e.g., hostile, high-fast flyer). The Track Data Coordinator functionality is an integral component of the combat identification process and assists the theater identification authority in timely and accurate assessment of tracks of interest. When multiple regions and/or sectors are established, the Track Data Coordinator coordinates, and is the ultimate resolution authority to resolve cross-regional track management and identification issues **(T-3)**.

5.5.5.1.4.4. Tactical Data Link Manager. (AFSC: 1C5) (Ranks E-3-E-6). The Tactical Data Link Managers are responsible to the Interface Control Watch Officer and manage the technical aspects of the data link interfaces to provide an accurate and consolidated air picture to the JFACC, AOC, or others as required. Tactical Data Link Managers are responsible for the initiation, operations, and termination of data link interfaces and operations with respect to Link 11 A/B, Link 16, beyond line of site protocols and any future links initiated by the AOC. The Tactical Data Link Manager should: Monitor and resolve connectivity and interoperability issues via Near Real Time (NRT) track data coordination using TDL gateway systems and various communication mediums. Monitor interface unit performance and compliance with OPTASKLINK parameters. Monitor and confirm accurate data exchange of TDL messages. Ensure effective data flow supporting the CTP. Maintain intelligence feeds via Joint Air Defense System Integrator (JADSI) based

on theater security domain restrictions and information releasability requirements. Coordinate interface units entering/exiting the MTN. Recommend data-filtering changes to ICO and implement approved changes.

5.5.5.1.5. Interface Control Cell Processes. The Interface Control Cell will:

5.5.5.1.5.1. Manage assigned MTN and MTN architecture based on guidance provided in AFMAN 13-116.

5.5.5.1.5.2. Manage data and track coordination voice networks (Air Defense C2, Data Link Control, Track Synchronization, and Voice Product) as well as chat systems to ensure transfer and display of air and missile defense information. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.3. Support operational tasking data link development and execution based on guidance provided in AFMAN 13-116. **(T-2)**

5.5.5.1.5.4. Plan and implement, as required, contingency procedures for MTN and Cell interface systems. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.5. Manage data exchange for MTN to ensure accuracy. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.6. Manage theater digital datalink interface systems and displays. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.7. Request and coordinate MTN design and configuration changes. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.8. Review JFCs, JFACCs, AADCs, Joint Data Network Officer's, and other supported commander's plans and information exchange requests. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.9. Develop and review tactical data link requirements for the area of operations. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.10. Coordinate with CJE and CTP Manager for the development and dissemination of the CNR segment of the OPTASKLINK and/or OPTASKLINK Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.11. Cross-reference Link 16 and Combat Net Radios parameters in the ATONEWS and OPTASKLINK/OPTASKLINK Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**

5.5.5.1.5.12. Incorporate national technical means tracks into the MTN in coordination with Senior Air Defense Officer, SODO, and SIDO team's information exchange requirements. **(T-3)**

Chapter 6

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE DIVISION

6.1. General. The ISRD will provide the JFC, JFACC, AOC staff, and units with Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment and predictive battlespace awareness, target development, tactical assessment, and ISR operations that help drive the air tasking cycle. The ISRD accomplishes these tasks in support of JFC and JFACC objectives through constant monitoring of the operational environment and MX of a common threat, targeting, and ISR picture supporting theater-wide air, space, and cyberspace operations. ISRD personnel conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and integrated analysis and production, ISR planning, and targeting processes to shape decision-making and enable operations. ISRD personnel coordinate with the AOC, JFC, and component staffs and direct distributed and reach-back ISR processes that allow commanders to visualize the operational environment, prioritize operations, anticipate adversary actions, and respond more effectively to unanticipated developments. **(T-2)**

6.2. Major ISRD Process Inputs. Inputs include JFC and JFACC guidance, ISR preparation reports and requirements, target lists, and feedback. Specific inputs include:

6.2.1. CCMD/CJTF guidance

6.2.2. Higher headquarters (HHQ)/component reporting

6.2.3. Law of war/rules of engagement (ROE)

6.2.4. JAOP and associated plans

6.2.5. AOD

6.2.6. MAAP and MAAP briefing

6.2.7. ATO

6.2.8. ACO

6.2.9. SPINS

6.2.10. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

6.2.11. National and theater IPB/ Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment estimates, order of battle data

6.2.12. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and other components’ intelligence preparation of the operational environment products

6.2.13. All-source intelligence reporting

6.2.14. Target systems analysis products

6.2.15. Target materials

6.2.16. JIPTL, joint target list, no strike list, restricted target list, and daily component Target Nomination Lists

6.2.17. Component/joint ISR collection requirements

6.2.18. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements

6.2.19. ISR sensor/platform availability

6.2.20. Unit mission reports

6.2.21. STO activities

6.2.22. Weather

6.2.23. Intelligence Requests for Information (RFIs)

6.2.24. Feedback from AOC divisions.

6.3. Major ISRD Processes. ISRD will:

6.3.1. Synchronize JFACC ISR operations with joint air strategy, planning, and operations assessments. **(T-2)**

6.3.2. Manage PIRs in coordination with AFFOR A2 staff, manage RFIs, intelligence reporting, and analytical support from national, theater and component intelligence organizations. **(T-2)**

6.3.3. Develop target analysis and materials to support JFACC strategy and daily ATO execution. **(T-2)**

6.3.4. Produce and disseminate the RSTA Annex to the ATO and any mission-type orders required for focused collection operations. **(T-2)**

6.3.5. Provide constant monitoring of adversary actions, threat warning, and analytic products and services in support of all ATO missions. **(T-2)**

6.3.6. Coordinate and monitor collection and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination operations throughout the ATO period to support targeting and ISR missions. **(T-2)**

6.3.7. Develop assessments on adversary courses of action, ISR operations effectiveness, and targeting effects. **(T-2)**

6.3.8. Manage unit intelligence support (order of battle, target materials, operational reconnaissance, mission report coordination, target mensuration only guidance, Intelligence Reporting Directives, etc.). **(T-2)**

6.3.9. Coordinate reachback and federated architectures for order-of-battle, target development, Combat Assessment, fusion analysis, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination, and other intelligence reporting responsibilities and processes with the JFC, components, and other intelligence staffs as necessary. **(T-2)**

6.3.10. Coordinate ISRD responses to all requests for intelligence, information, and support. **(T-2)**

6.3.11. Provide guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating ISRD portion of the AOC Knowledge Management plan. **(T-2)**

6.4. Major ISRD Process Outputs. Major process outputs include, but are not limited to:

6.4.1. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products: adversary order of battle, geospatial intelligence/reference overlays, threat updates, and assessments.

6.4.2. Intelligence Summaries (INTSUM), Daily Intelligence Summaries (DISUM), mission summaries.

6.4.3. RFIs and RFI responses.

6.4.4. Targeting materials: Electronic target folders, standard and supplemental target materials, air component target nomination list, integrated target nomination list, JIPTL, weaponeering solutions, collateral damage estimate, sensitive target approval and review packages, and mensurated aimpoints.

6.4.5. ISR strategy, Component Prioritized Collection List, collection decks, ISR synchronization matrix, and RSTA annex, and other intelligence products and/or services

6.4.6. Battle damage assessments, ISR assessment reports, and assessment information requirements inputs to operational assessment.

6.4.7. Strategy-to-task recommendations.

6.4.8. AOC OB data, baselines, and updates.

6.5. ISRD Organization. The CISR is responsible for the following core teams: ACF, TGT/TA, and ISR Operations. These core teams provide intelligence products and services that support the entire AOC, the JFACC, air component units, other components, and joint, coalition, Partner Nation forces, and government agencies. ISRD core teams work closely with all AOC divisions and specialty and support teams such as JA, NKO, WST, and STO, and will embed or attach intelligence personnel as required to support AOC processes and battle rhythm based on division requests and resource availability. In addition to the ISRD core teams, two specialized ISRD organizations provide support to the ISRD and AOC: Imagery Support Element and the National Tactical Integration Element, both of which the CISR will task organize as required to support requirements throughout the AOC. Other division (e.g., AMD) and specialty team (e.g., NKO) intelligence personnel may also integrate with ISRD for easier access and synchronization of ISR activities. To facilitate analysis, targeting, and ISR operations, the ISRD may host liaisons from various national agencies, service centers, other components, and coalition/ Partner Nations. The ISRD coordinates regularly with various AOC liaisons (BCD, SOLE, etc.) JFC staff, component and coalition intelligence staffs, national intelligence agencies, and service production centers as required. **(T-3)** See **Figure 6.1**.

Figure 6.1. ISRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



6.5.1. ***Chief of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O-6)*** . The CISR has overall authority and responsibility for the ISR processes within the AOC. The CISR fully integrates intelligence personnel within the core ISRD teams and other AOC divisions as required. This symmetry ensures consistency of function and general alignment of responsibilities. Depending on the scenario and level of effort during operations, the CISR may need several deputies to help monitor and supervise the extensive and complex planning tasks involved in the ISRD's battle rhythm. The CISR reports to the AOC/CC and works closely with the AFFOR staff, JFC/J2, and other organizations as necessary. The CISR will:

6.5.1.1. Integrate ACF, TGT/TA, and ISR Operations Teams' processes, personnel, and support across all AOC divisions to ensure JFACC guidance, objectives, and tasks are executed in all planning, operational, and assessment phases. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.2. Establish JFACC and AOC intelligence requirements to ensure that national/theater ISR operations supplement/complement JFACC airborne ISR operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.3. Evaluate the adequacy of national/theater ISR systems supporting the JFC and JFACC strategies and advise the AOC/CC, JFACC, AFFOR staff A2, JFC/J2, and supporting Joint Intelligence Operations Center of any deficiencies or additional requirements. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.4. Coordinate with the JFC/J2, component intelligence directors, production centers, and other supporting agencies as required to establish reach-back and federated architectures for order-of-battle, target development, Combat Assessment/tactical assessment, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination, and other reporting and production responsibilities and processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.5. Review ISRD estimates, intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, and other ISRD products and services for release as required. Ensure all joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products reflect the most current adversary courses of action, and make them available to all appropriate customers. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.6. Ensure ISR systems support effective and efficient operations and are managed throughout the targeting and collection processes to optimize JFACC operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.7. Ensure all ISRD personnel, including augmentees, are trained and certified (if required) in assigned intelligence positions and have access to current positional guides, materials, and procedural checklists; support training and certification of intelligence personnel assigned to the COD SIDO team as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.8. Ensure national agency, AFCYBER, and other intelligence liaisons are supported and integrated into AOC ISR processes; deploy ISRD liaisons to non-AOC organizations as required/resources permit. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.9. Integrate Imagery Support Element and National Tactical Integration Element personnel, specialty team personnel, and other AOC elements into AOC ISR processes as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.10. Identify ISRD floor space, systems, equipment, and communications requirements, conform to the AOC WS baseline and CMP, and ensure they are consistent/compatible with theater intelligence architectures. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.11. Coordinate intelligence security requirements in accordance with Special Security Officer guidance and directives. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.12. In coordination with the AOC foreign disclosure officer, develop foreign disclosure office procedures and processes to accommodate coalition, Partner Nation, and other government operations as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.13. Coordinate duty positions requirements and access which support Special Access Program, Special Access required (SAR), STO, or other restricted access operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.14. Coordinate all support requests, system limitations, manpower shortfalls, and other operational deficiencies with the AOC/CC and AFFOR staff, MAJCOM staff, and other component staffs as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.15. Ensure adequate ISRD communication with and substantive intelligence support to all theater air units as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.1.16. In coordination with MAJCOM and Numbered Air Force A2 staffs, publish an ISRD Support Plan and Theater Guide as part of AFFOR A2 theater ISR support plan to describe theater supported/supporting ISR planning and execution responsibilities and provide planning considerations for tactical air units and AOC augmentation forces that deploy/employ within the theater. **(T-3)**

6.5.2. ***Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion Team*** . The ACF Team will conduct analysis, production, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and support unit intelligence requirements. The ACF team is typically comprised of an Analysis Cell and a Unit Support Cell and can be task organized to support ISRD intelligence requirements and to host other AOC division/team and external organizational personnel working intelligence issues within the AOC. The Analysis Cell conducts joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and develops assessments that provide the context for understanding adversary capabilities and intentions. The Unit Support Cell oversees theater intelligence reporting procedures, the ISRD request for information process, and unit support requirements. **Note:** depending on requirements and operations tempo, the CISR will subordinate the ISRD RFI Management Element to either the ACF Team or the ISR Operations Team. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1. ACF Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O-4-O-5). The ACF Team Chief is responsible to the CISR for overall analysis and production, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, theater intelligence reporting, intelligence RFI management, and unit intelligence support. ACF Team Chief will:

6.5.2.1.1. Provide guidance to the ACF Team and ensure all cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their mission (trained personnel, intelligence systems/connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISRD functions in support of or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.2. Direct the conduct of dynamic all-source analysis and production and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment to meet JFACC, AOC, air component unit, and joint intelligence gaps and requirements. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.3. Establish support procedures for unit intelligence requirements. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.4. Coordinate the production, review, and approval of the ACF Team's primary deliverables (intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, briefings, assessments, order of battle, etc.). **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.5. Direct the ACF Team efforts to characterize adversary activity in the AOC's/OC's CTP through analysis, correlation, and fusion of all-source information and data.

6.5.2.1.6. Oversee the development, publication, and MX of the JFACC Theater Intelligence Reporting Directive. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.7. Provide air component joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment requirements (IAMD system analysis, order of battle, etc.) to the JFC/J2, theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other components, and national agencies as requested. Rectify differences between air component joint intelligence preparation

of the operational environment assessments and JFC, theater, or national level joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.8. Establish a timely and responsive ISRD request for information process to satisfy both internal and external AOC RFIs. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.9. Coordinate ACF support requests from other AOC divisions, specialty teams, and other ISRD teams as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.1.10. Ensure adequate support for all liaison elements within the ACF Team workspaces. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.2. ACF Team Members**.** (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). ACF Team members include analysts, intelligence technicians, and unit intelligence experts. The ACF Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking. These may include, but are not limited to the following: Deputy ACF Team Chief (consider multiple deputies depending on battle rhythm and operations tempo), Analysis Cell Chief, Lead Analysts, order of battle Maintenance Officer(s), Reports Monitor(s), Production Chief, priority intelligence requirements Manager(s), ISRD Watch Officer(s), Unit Support Cell Chief, RFI Manager(s), and mission report Monitor(s). **(T-3)**

6.5.2.3. ACF Team Responsibilities. The ACF Team will provide all-source intelligence analysis and production while integrating national level agency (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.) predictive assessments that drive ISR operations and targeting. ACF Team focus is on identifying and depicting adversary capabilities to exploit centers of gravity and enemy vulnerabilities while identifying adversary signatures exploitable to collection, generation of collection requests, and incorporating collected data into AOC inputs and outputs (JAOP, AOD, ATO, etc.). The team oversees the development and MX of JFACC intelligence requirements, supporting information requirements, and the recommendation of priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information. The team will also manage theater intelligence reporting, mission report analysis, threat update dissemination, intelligence RFI management, and other unit support functions as required. The ACF team typically operates 24/7 and is responsible for continuous intelligence support to all AOC Divisions throughout the ATO planning, execution, and assessment phases. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.4. ACF Team Inputs. The ACF Team will coordinate and review: JFACC guidance in JAOP and AOD, JFACC PIRs and ISR strategy in JAOP and AOD, JIPTL, JIPCL, TET/MAAP briefs, blue force basing, ATO, airspace plan, RSTA annex, SPINS, theater/national agencies intelligence products, intelligence/information data links/feeds (e.g., Integrated Broadcast System; Ground Moving Target Indicator [GMTI]; TDL; and streaming video), DISUMS, INTSUMs, Tactical Reports, MISREPs; electronic intelligence reports, measurements and signals intelligence reports, photo interpretation reports, TA summaries; inflight reports, imagery; WS video, TSA, SIDO team RFIs and updates.

6.5.2.5. ACF Team Processes. The ACF Team will:

6.5.2.5.1. Develop and disseminate analysis and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products and services. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.2. Produce and maintain order of battle updates. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.3. Develop and maintain JFACC intelligence requirements and recommend priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.4. Collect, track, and resolve intelligence RFIs. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.5. Track, analyze, and disseminate mission reports and other unit reporting as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.6. Coordinate with and provide support to theater air units. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.7. Coordinate reach-back and federated processes for order-of-battle, fusion analysis, and other intelligence reporting responsibilities with the JTF HQ, components, and other intelligence staffs. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.5.8. Support other AOC division and team analytical requirements. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.6. ACF Team Outputs. RFIs, recommended PIRs, collection requirements, Updated adversary air, air defense, political military, space defense; missile defense; electronic, ground OB, INTSUMs/DISUMs, updates to the COP, and update codes to designate significant intelligence information with potential impact on tasked aircrews/airframes. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7. Analysis Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). The Analysis Cell is usually focused on the adversary IAMD system and theater ballistic missile forces, however the cell may task organize into any combination of analysis elements depending upon the operational environment, including, but not limited to adversary integrated air defense systems, theater ballistic missile, weapons of mass effect, special operations forces, political-military, economic, asymmetric threats, etc. The Analysis Cell also provides analytical support to ISR personnel attached or embedded in the SRD, CPD, and COD. Analysis Cell will:

6.5.2.7.1. Conduct all-source analysis of adversary kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, tactics, and courses of action in conjunction with joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment efforts of other components and appropriate reachback and federated intelligence organizations; analysis should feed directly into strategy, planning, execution, and assessment processes and meet overall AOC battle-rhythm requirements. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.2. Fuse all-source intelligence information (data, reports, etc.) into a common intelligence understanding of the operational environment which can be fed into the AOC's/OC's CTP and, using systems of record, disseminated throughout the theater via analysis products and services such as event templates, event matrices, intelligence summaries, Mission Summary briefings, or other products/services as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.3. Develop, maintain, and disseminate orders of battle which identify and depict adversary force locations, unit size, activity, etc., in accordance with theater intelligence databases, timelines, formats, and subordinate unit mission planning systems; coordinate and deconflict analysis within the AOC and with the JFC/J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center as appropriate. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.4. Develop, publish, and maintain JFACC intelligence requirements and supporting information requirements to JFACC priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information; monitor the operational environment for indications of such activities and, upon detection, validate and disseminate in accordance with AOC and theater procedures. Provide inputs from IPB and identify changes to the operating environment. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.5. Identify intelligence gaps relevant to JFACC operations strategy, planning, and execution, and prepare, submit, and monitor RFIs, collection requirements and/or production requirements to eliminate identified gaps; apprise air component senior leadership of these gaps. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.6. Create named areas of interest with associated indicators to focus ISR operations strategy and planning on those indicators, which can most efficiently confirm or refute specific adversary course(s) of action. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.7. To efficiently acquire and prosecute high pay-off targets, develop and maintain target areas of interest in conjunction with the TGT/TA Team. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.8. Review all-source incoming message traffic and data; ensure appropriate distribution and threat warning throughout the ACF, ISRD, SIDO, attached/embedded analysts in other AOC divisions, and all air component units. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.9. Coordinate with BCD, NALE, MARLE, SPLE, SOLE, Coalition/partner nation and government agency liaisons, and other AOC elements such as NKO Team, to monitor the battlespace, adversary actions, and operational effects. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.10. Assist ACF strategists, target strategists, and the OAT in development and MX of measure(s) of effectiveness, success indicators, and ACF report. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.11. Support special intelligence requirements for other AOC divisions, teams, and elements (AMD, STO, Space Operations Specialty Team, etc.) as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.7.12. Coordinate domain specific (IO, electronic warfare, cyberspace, space, etc.) assessments with the appropriate AOC specialty team. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8. Unit Support Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). The Unit Support Cell serves as the OPR for substantive intelligence requirements (INTREP/MISREPs) for units within the theater. The Unit Support Cell often acts as the entry point for unit intelligence requirements and ensures the appropriate ISRD team addresses requirements. The Unit Support Cell executes the ISRD's RFI Management processes and oversees theater intelligence reporting processes and products for all air component units. The cell will:

6.5.2.8.1. Coordinate with AFFOR staff A2, JFC/J2, theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center, and 16 AF/480 Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance Wing (ISRW)/70 ISRW/363 ISRW on the development of theater intelligence reporting directives and dissemination procedures to subordinate and supporting units. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.2. Receive, track, and validate unit intelligence reports and ensure timely distribution within the ISRD and to other AOC, JFC, and external organizations (e.g., reachback and federated partners) with valid requirements; provide constructive

feedback to units on format, content, and completeness of intelligence reports in accordance with theater reporting directives. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.3. Track mission reports (and associated weapons system video) for all ATO sorties and develop mission summaries, which identify adversary tactics and trends; disseminate relevant information to the TGT/TA Team, air component units, and others as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.4. Coordinate with the SIDO team and ACF Analysis Cell on establishment of threat update criteria and procedures for effective dissemination of threat update codes and other time-sensitive threat warning information to subordinate units in accordance with theater intelligence reporting directives. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.5. Develop and disseminate a production schedule of theater intelligence products to ensure all subordinate units are aware of available intelligence data and production timelines. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.6. Establish ISRD indoctrination and theater familiarization procedures for new air units arriving/operating in theater. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.7. The RFI Management Element will manage the ISRD RFI system for units, AOC divisions/teams, JFC/J2, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other components, and outside agencies with valid requirements. **Note:** the ISR Ops Team may also conduct RFI Management in accordance with CISR guidance:

6.5.2.8.7.1. Receive, validate, prioritize, process, and track ISRD RFIs for satisfaction with ACF, JFC, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other component, and reach-back and federated analysts as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.7.2. Coordinate required Collection Requests with the ISR Operations and ACF Teams to satisfy RFIs where no current data exists for a satisfactory response. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.7.3. Implement and maintain procedures for RFI submission, response dissemination, and theater-wide visibility (Community On-line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers, e-mail, web sites, etc.) in accordance with DAFMAN 14-401, *Intelligence Analysis And Targeting Tradecraft/Data Standards*, publish/update request for information procedures in the RSTA annex and on the Unit Support/ISR Operations web sites. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.7.4. Implement and maintain a formal customer feedback mechanism to determine RFI satisfaction and track RFI process feedback. **(T-3)**

6.5.2.8.8. Coordinate unit requirements with AFFOR staff A2 and MAJCOM staff A2 as required. Distribute unit INTREP/MISREPs to other AOC functions and outside agencies. **(T-3)**

6.5.3. ***TGT/TA Team*** . The TGT/TA team integrates all HHQ, air component, and other component-nominated targets into a proposed JIPTL for the TET process. The TET team then chairs a review with all component and specialty representatives and approves the draft JIPTL for CFACC approval prior to being presented at the JTCB for C/JFC approval. Team will conduct target development and battle damage assessment functions within the AOC. The team is responsible for managing the reachback and federated targeting-related architectures and for

integrating all targeting effects, including kinetic and non-kinetic, throughout the targeting cycle. The Target Development Cell evaluates, nominates, and supports the execution of potential adversary targets based on intended effects within the JAOP, AOD, and other AOC Division guidance. The Tactical Assessment (TA) Cell manages, conducts, and reports on physical damage/change assessments and functional damage/change assessments to measure JFACC and JFC effectiveness and objectives. As mission results are received, they are fed into the tactical assessments (TA) process. The master target database is updated by the ISRD's TA team. The TA process products are munitions effectiveness reports, battle damage assessments, combat assessments, and reattack recommendations. It also provides the SRD, CPD, and COD, as appropriate, with targeting intelligence support in the conduct of munitions effectiveness assessments and restrike recommendations. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.1. TGT/TA Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O-4-O--5). TGT/TA Team Chief will coordinate all JFACC targeting processes for the AOC, the JFC, and with the reachback and federated targeting enterprises. TGT/TA Team Chief will:

6.5.3.1.1. Lead, supervise, coordinate, and conduct the AOC targeting process in support of JFACC, JFC, and other component objectives. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.1.2. Provide guidance to the Target Development and TA Cells and ensure both cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their missions (trained personnel, intelligence systems/connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISRD functions in support of or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.1.3. Oversee the establishment of full-spectrum, effects-based targeting strategies, target development, weaponeering options, and Combat Assessment methodologies in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.1.4. Enforce target database and target material standards in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance; coordinate required support agreements for target materials and analysis with reach-back and federated targeting organizations as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.1.5. Establish and maintain the necessary training, processes, and organizational construct to ensure organizational and personnel certifications and readiness in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff targeting-related guidance. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.2. TGT/TA Team Members. (AFSC: 14N3/1N8X1) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). TGT/TA Team members include targeting analysts trained in all targeting skills-sets. The TGT/TA Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking, which may include but are not limited to the following: Deputy TGT/TA Team Chief, Target Systems Analysis Chief, Target Folder/Materials Chief, Analysts, battle damage assessment Chief, munitions effectiveness assessments Chief, Reports Monitor, and others as required. Typically, the TA cell is comprised primarily of target intelligence personnel, but other analysts and operations liaison officers may also augment the team. TGT/TA Team members may also serve in various attached or embedded capacities with other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.3. TGT/TA Team Responsibilities. The TGT/TA Team will integrate all targeting effects, including kinetic and non-kinetic, throughout the targeting cycle. The Target Development Cell is responsible for examining an adversary's target systems and effectively matching target nominations from all components to JFC/JFACC objectives to ensure a coherent targeting strategy. The TA Cell must be thoroughly familiar with JFACC objectives, the OPLAN, other component commanders' objectives, and target systems being analyzed. The TA Cell is responsible for determining the overall effectiveness of kinetic and non-kinetic tactical military operations in support of the AOC operational assessment processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4. TGT/TA Team Processes. TGT/TA will:

6.5.3.4.1. Develop, maintain, and manage target systems analysis processes and support. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.2. Develop and manage target nominations to meet JFC and JFACC objectives and guidance. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.3. Conduct Target Validation via analysis to ensure targets meet the CCMD/CJTF/JFACC's objectives and guidance. Target validation ensures all potential targets have been evaluated to ensure they are not in violation of law of war, ROE, or other guidance provided by the CCMD/CJTF/JFACC. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.4. Conduct and manage support for weaponeering, collateral damage estimation, target coordinate mensuration, and supplemental material development of executable target materials. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.5. Produce and maintain electronic target folders. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.6. Conduct and manage battle damage assessment physical and functional damage/change assessment processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.7. Coordinate target system assessments. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.8. Support AOC, JFACC, and JFC operational munitions effectiveness assessments and restrike recommendations processes with targeting intelligence. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.4.9. Establish, document, and manage reach-back and federated targeting partnerships. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5. Target Development Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1N8X1) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). The Target Development Cell conducts target development as part of the AOC's/OC's strategy-to-task process, which supports strategy development, TET and MAAP Team processes, and the JTCB. Target Development Cell will:

6.5.3.5.1. Review and assist in the development of JFACC objectives, strategy-to-task analysis, operations plans, and other component commander objectives to perform target development in conjunction with the JFC, AOC divisions, and other agencies as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.2. Perform target systems analysis by systematically evaluating elements of potential target systems to determine which critical and vulnerable nodes could or should be attacked or affected to achieve objectives. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.3. Maintain and update target databases and online electronic target folders; verify local target database updates to national database authorities in accordance with automated capabilities and theater policies. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.4. Identify potential high payoff targets and associated target areas of interest for inclusion in the Target Nomination List; coordinate target areas of interest with the ACF Team. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.5. Provide mensurated coordinates for selected aimpoint location assignments. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.6. Calculate and manage reach-back support of weaponeering solutions for nominated targets to achieve desired effects in support of JFACC tasks; provide the weaponeered JIPTL to the TET and MAAP Teams; ensure weaponeered scenarios are included within the electronic target folders and target database. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.7. Coordinate aimpoint and weaponeering requirements for specialized munitions such as the Tomahawk land attack missile, joint air-to-surface standoff missile, and conventional air launched cruise missile with appropriate agencies. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.8. Develop or coordinate for development with appropriate organization (Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, etc.) supplemental target materials needed to characterize the target (e.g., physical vulnerability graphics), analyze collateral effects due to the nature of the target (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazard prediction), and other products as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.9. Track target nominations and target data history for kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.10. Coordinate with AOC Specialty Team, ACF, and ISR Operations Teams to determine collection requirements and essential elements of information for deliberate and time-sensitive target development and nomination; establish standing collection requirements where appropriate. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.11. Maintain and disseminate/make accessible target materials (e.g., electronic target folders) and associated Geospatial Information and Services products in accordance with Service, theater procedures, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to units prior to mission tasking. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.12. Review, monitor, maintain, disseminate, and submit recommended changes to joint target list, restricted target list, and no strike list. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.13. Identify potential collateral damage concerns, conduct collateral damage estimate, and manage supporting reach-back and federated collateral damage estimation production activities; identify high collateral damage estimate or sensitive targets and coordinate for approval (e.g., sensitive target approval and review packages) in accordance with JFACC, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance for selected aimpoint location assignments and coordinate requirements for ‘target mensuration only’ with appropriate units. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.14. Coordinate with JA to ensure all potential targets comply with ROE, RUF, and law of war and with Public Affairs efforts to counter false/inaccurate claims and reports of collateral damage. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.15. Coordinate with SOLE/BCD and AOC specialty teams to deconflict nominated and time sensitive targets. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.16. Enforce component target nomination format and process standards for targets nominated for JFACC execution and tie component Target Nomination Lists to prioritized tactical tasks for specific ATO periods. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.17. Validate all nominated targets in accordance with theater and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to link every nominated target to specific/appropriate JFC and JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.18. Develop, maintain, and merge the air component Target Nomination List with all other component target nomination lists to form one integrated target nomination list (draft JIPTL); provide the integrated target nomination list with prioritized inputs to the TET. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.19. Incorporate TA Cell feedback, mission report reporting, ACF Team analysis, and Combat Assessment results from previously prosecuted ATOs into deliberate and time sensitive target nomination processes as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.5.20. Coordinate, document, and manage support from external targeting and analysis agencies (JFC/J2, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, 363 ISRW, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) to support establishment and sustainment of commonly understood reach-back and federated targeting architecture and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6. TA Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). The TA Cell conducts assessments in conjunction with the execution of the AOC's/OC's tasking orders. As such, the TA Cell should be thoroughly familiar with JFACC objectives, operations plans, other component commanders' objectives, ROE, RUF, and target systems being affected and should be involved in AOC processes related to strategy-to-task development, measures and indicators development, target selection, and target nomination. TA Cell will:

6.5.3.6.1. Review JFACC objectives, strategy-to-task analysis, operations plans, other component commanders' objectives, ROE, RUF, JIPTLs, target status, and attack results for incorporation into the Combat Assessment. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.2. Review intelligence reports/summaries, battle damage assessment reporting, and target system assessments to evaluate JFACC objective attainment. Coordinate analysis of non-kinetic missions with NKO Team personnel for inclusion into the AOC assessment process. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.3. Coordinate with the OAT and other AOC divisions and specialty teams to determine specific requirements (product information, formatting, timing, etc.) and assist in the development of the daily assessment briefing to the JFACC. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.4. Coordinate with the JFC/J2 in the development of the JFACC battle damage assessment Concept of Operations, including roles, duties, and communications architectures of the AOC, JFC, other components, reach-back organizations, and federated partners to support the battle damage assessment process. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.5. Identify and coordinate battle damage assessment collection, reporting requirements, and intended targeting and weapons effects to the ISR Operations and

ACF Teams, Imagery Support Element, National Tactical Integration Element, AOC specialty teams, etc., for application during post-strike collection/exploitation. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.6. Coordinate with the ACF Team and OAT to determine how friendly operations are affecting the enemy. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.7. Work with the ACF Unit Support Cell to include Combat Assessment data requirements in the Theater Intelligence Reporting Directive and ensure mission summaries, mission reports, and associated non-traditional ISR / operational reconnaissance collections (e.g., weapons system video or tactical electronic intelligence) are accessible in accordance with automated capabilities and theater policies. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.8. Manage local, reach-back, and federated physical damage/change assessment and functional damage/change assessment processes to include the preparation and dissemination of associated initial and supplemental reports as required by the JFACC and theater battle damage assessment concept of operations; update and verify reach-back and federated updates to the electronic target folders target database per initial and supplemental reporting. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.9. Conduct estimated damage analysis and include in battle damage assessment results as appropriate. Identify target categories appropriate and suitable for estimated damage analysis consideration in the AOD, pre-coordinate with the JFC, document in the JFACC battle damage assessment concept of operations and disseminate accordingly. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.10. Feed restrike recommendations to appropriate AOC teams for immediate action and future ATO planning as appropriate. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.11. Establish processes to use battle damage assessment reporting and ACF Team analysis in support of operational munitions effectiveness assessments (e.g., trend analysis of employed weapons and tactics). **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.12. Coordinate with JFC, JFACC, and AOC staffs to identify, collect, analyze, and submit recommended changes in targeting methodology, tactics, fusing or weapons selection to appropriate AOC teams (target developers, MAAP Team, SIDO team, etc.) and units to improve mission effectiveness. **(T-3)**

6.5.3.6.13. Compile a list of recommended targets that should have priority for munitions effectiveness assessments exploitation teams when friendly forces occupy enemy territory. Compile, verify and make available all related targeting intelligence data for each recommended target. **(T-3)**

6.5.4. ***ISR Operations Team*** . The ISR Operations Team uses air component and other CR to produce the JFACC's component-prioritized collection list. The C/JFC may establish a Joint Collection Management Board to monitor and update collection requirements and asset status and synchronize the theater collection plan. If formed, the Joint Collection Management Board receives collection target nominations from the components, validates and prioritizes these requirements into a JIPCL, and recommends the apportionment of organic ISR assets to meet collection requirements. The JFACC normally exercises collection operations management authority for the joint airborne ISR effort. Close coordination must occur during the

development of the JIPTL and JIPCL to ensure effective and efficient use of assets to address targets on both lists. To ensure this synchronization, ISR operations personnel, targeteers, and liaisons must coordinate their separate processes with the ISR synchronization matrix. The ISR Operations Team will manage theater airborne ISR collection requirements, theater airborne ISR operations and associated Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination and supports operational reconnaissance planning and operations. ISR Operations Team personnel support all AOC divisions to ensure ISR integration in the JAOP/AOD and daily air tasking cycle. The ISR Operations Team also coordinates continuously with JFC, component, and national intelligence collection managers to synchronize airborne ISR and operational reconnaissance operations with the theater's overall collection strategy. The ISR Operations Team is comprised of the Collection Management Cell and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination ISR Assessment Cell. At the CISR direction, the RFI Element may also be included within the ISR Operations Team. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1. ISR Operations Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O-4-O-5). The ISR Operations Team Chief is responsible to the CISR for the overall management of ISR operations processes in support of JFACC and JFC objectives. The Team Chief will represent the JFACC at various joint collection management boards/forums. ISR Operations Team Chief will:

6.5.4.1.1. Oversee ISR operations processes and support operational reconnaissance processes throughout the Air tasking cycle in support of JFACC and JFC objectives to ensure synchronization with the theater collection strategy. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.2. Provide guidance to the ISR Operations Team. Ensure all cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their missions (trained personnel, intelligence systems/connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISR Operations team members supporting or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.3. Coordinate with ISR operations strategists on the development of the JFACC ISR strategy and ISR operational assessment as part of the overall air operations strategy, JAOP, and AOD; ensure ISR Operations Team understanding of that strategy. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.4. Present the air component ISR strategy, plan, and requirements at the theater Joint Collections Working Group and, as required, represent the JFACC and/or CISR at the Joint Collection Management Board in the JIPCL approval process. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.5. Oversee the development of JFACC Component Prioritized Collection List. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.6. Develop, update, and publish asset cross cueing, mission-type orders, and other planning guidance for theater airborne ISR operations as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.7. Coordinate RSTA Annex approval by the JFACC. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.1.8. Coordinate with AOC, AFFOR staff, JFC staff, and other component staffs as required for additional ISR capabilities and architecture improvements. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.2. ISR Operations Team Members. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). ISR Ops Team members include ISR sensor experts, ISR assessment analysts, planners,

and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination experts. The ISR Operations Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking. These include, but are not limited to the following: Deputy ISR Ops Team Chief (multiple deputies should be considered depending on battle rhythm and operations tempo), Collection Management Cell Chief, Collection Requirements Manager(s), individual discipline "deck" planners, ISR Strategist(s), RSTA Production Manager, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell Chief, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Report/Product Manager(s), and platform, agency, and component liaison officers as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.3. ISR Operations Team Responsibilities. The ISR Operations Team will develop and integrate the theater airborne ISR strategy with the overall JFACC air campaign plan. Collection management authority is the responsibility of the JFC (unless the JFC delegates those responsibilities to the JFACC). The ISR Operations Team executes collection operations management and collection requirements management functions for the JFACC and JFACC-apportioned assets. The team develops the RSTA Annex to the ATO daily, which provides detailed tasking and specific guidance to JFACC-tasked ISR assets; including ISR platforms, sensors, and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination nodes/architecture for each ATO (at multiple classification levels as required). ISR Operations Team personnel support operational reconnaissance operations and planning requirements in other AOC divisions and ensure airborne component collection requirements are satisfied with adequate reporting and products. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4. ISR Operations Team Processes. ISR Operations Team will:

6.5.4.4.1. Develop the JFACC ISR strategy and ISR operational assessment(s) by synchronizing and integrating related ISR efforts at AOC and CCMD/CJTF levels. To develop the ISR strategy, the ISR Strategist provides various guidance products addressing JFACC theater airborne ISR assets and ISR operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.2. Develop the JFACC Component Prioritized Collection List and support the theater Joint Collections Working Group and Joint Collection Management Board. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.3. Develop and publish the RSTA Annex and the ISR Synchronization Matrix. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.4. Coordinate national intelligence requirements in accordance with theater processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.5. Coordinate dynamic ISR/Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination operational support. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.6. Coordinate requirements and products with reachback/distributed collection and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination organizations. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.7. Integrate operational reconnaissance capabilities into ISR strategy, collection plan, and dynamic ISR processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.4.8. Coordinate JFACC's priority lines of effort from the AOD with the 616 Operations Center (616 OC) for inclusion in the 16 AF Ops Directive. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5. Collection Management Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Collection Management Cell is responsible for ISR operations planning and requirements

management to generate executable ISR missions with optimal sensor collection to meet JFC, JFACC, and component intelligence requirements. Collection Management Cell will:

6.5.4.5.1. Coordinate ISR planning with appropriate AOC, theater, and external agencies to integrate theater airborne ISR into the air tasking cycle to synchronize the JFACC ISR strategy with the theater ISR strategy and meet JFACC and JFC objectives. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.2. In coordination with ISR operations strategists, assist the ACF team in managing priority intelligence requirements and refining essential elements of information. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.3. Maintain a collection requirements database and execute collection requirements management (if JFC has delegated that responsibility to the JFACC). **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.4. Build ISR and operational reconnaissance asset missions/sensor capacity for all air component assigned/allocated ISR assets in the collection management system. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.5. Build sensor collection decks for air component ISR assets into the RSTA Annex. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.6. Coordinate national collection requests with JFC collection managers and deconflict tasking for ISR assets with JFC and component collection managers. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.7. Prioritize the Air Component Prioritized Collection List and develop the JIPCL (if JFC has delegated that responsibility to JFACC); attend and represent JFACC priorities at the Joint Collections Working Group and Joint Collection Management Board. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.8. Coordinate with CPD on ISR and operational reconnaissance operations to develop the ISR synchronization matrix and ensure it meets AOD guidance and matches the ATO. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.9. Support ISR Ops planners during development/compilation of the RSTA Annex. Coordinate with the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination/ISR Assessment Cell, ISR operations strategists, and platform liaison officers. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.10. Coordinate ISR operations with the MAAP and SIDO Teams ISR planners/duty officers; recommend ISR aircraft track/mission adjustments. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.11. Monitor weather, MX, mission shifts, emerging targets/threats, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination nodes, or CPD changes that affect the ISR synchronization matrix and RSTA Annex. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.12. Coordinate with the SIDO Team, MAAP Team ISR Ops Planners to ensure adequate comprehension of daily ISR and operational reconnaissance tasking in the ATO/RSTA. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.13. Coordinate with ISR collection and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination units to ensure receipt and understanding of ATO/RSTA tasking. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.14. Support SIDO intelligence gain-loss assessments, and track ISR mission changes during ATO execution that may impact future ATO planning cycles. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.15. Coordinate with the TGT/TA Team to ensure ISR operations are supporting target development and the theater Combat Assessment plan. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.5.16. Recommend ISR strategy modifications based on posture/readiness, operational environment, JFC and JFACC objectives, and ISR effectiveness assessments. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O-2-O-4/E-4-E-7). The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell is the ISRD focal point for coordinating Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination operations for air component ISR missions with in-theater and distributed/federated architectures. The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination/ISR Assessment Cell will monitor and maintain situational awareness on Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination activities with air component, joint, coalition/Partner Nation, and national agency intelligence producers in support of JFACC ISR operations. In cases where the Distributed Common Ground System is responsible for providing Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination, the 480 ISRW manages the majority of the exploitation and dissemination process. Additionally, the AFSOC OC tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination management team executes C2 for ISR assets supporting special operations forces. The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination/ISR Assessment Cell also assesses Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination effectiveness. The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell will:

6.5.4.6.1. Confirm with collection managers and ISR operations planners whether Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination nodes can support the ISR and operational reconnaissance operations tempo reflected in the ISR synchronization matrix. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.2. Provide Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination guidance and recommendations to support development of the JAOP, AOD, and RSTA Annex; develop and present platform/sensor-to-target recommendations as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.3. Coordinate with theater and reachback Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination organizations (480 ISRWG, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, etc.) on Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order development and other tasking guidance as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.4. Implement and maintain a formal customer feedback mechanism that tracks collection requirements, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements, and exploitation request satisfaction. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.5. Monitor Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination node status. Alert ISR ops planners and collection managers of Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination impacts to ATO/Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order planning. Alert SIDO team of Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination impacts to ATO/Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order execution. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.6. Advise and coordinate with ISR Operations and SIDO Team personnel and platform liaison officers on immediate Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

issues (architecture issues, outages, etc.) affecting current or upcoming operational missions. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.7. Coordinate with ISRD teams, subordinate units, and JFC and other component staffs to ensure Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination processes are responsive and requested products, intelligence, and essential elements of information are available and disseminated in a timely manner. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.8. Support ISR Operations Team collection requirements analysis (satisfied/unsatisfied and why), ISR utilization trends, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination effectiveness/efficiency analysis, specific platform/sensor assessments, and target-set recommendations for measure(s) of effectiveness / measures(s) of performance development, and SRD strategy development and operational assessment efforts, as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.9. Provide Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination status and effectiveness assessments at the Joint Collections Working Group, Joint Collection Management Board, and other theater and reach-back ISR events as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.4.6.10. Coordinate Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination architecture issues, problems/solutions, and enhancements with AFFOR staff, JFC, component, and agency staffs as required. **(T-3)**

6.5.5. ***Imagery Support Element*** . (AFSC: 1N1X1A) (Rank: E-4-E-8). The Imagery Support Element directly supports the AOC with 1N1X1A Geospatial Analysts. Through trained, mission certified imagery analysts, the Imagery Support Element provides a focused, specialized skill set enabling elements of the ISRD and other AOC divisions to achieve JFACC objectives. The CISR assigns Imagery Support Element personnel as required within the AOC, to support mission tasking. Imagery Support Element will:

6.5.5.1. Provide 24/7 tailored analysis, production support, and exploitation for air component collection requirements for threat warning, ballistic missile defense, dynamic targeting, irregular warfare and other time-sensitive operations to support various teams within the AOC through the request for information process. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.2. Support ISR Operations Team planning and assessments of theater airborne ISR and operational reconnaissance operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.3. Monitor, assess, and exploit full-motion video and imagery products as required to support dynamic and time-sensitive operations and the ATO planning cycle. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.4. Support the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination/ISR Assessment Cell overseeing imagery tasking, collection, exploitation, and dissemination for Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination nodes tasked in the RSTA Annex to the ATO. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.5. Coordinate geospatial analysis, production, exploitation, and other imagery support element support with distributed/reach-back Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination units, including collocated Distributed Common Ground System or other Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination units if available. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.6. Confirm or deny intelligence obtained through other disciplines. **(T-3)**

6.5.5.7. Provide 24/7 access into the Distributed Common Ground System architecture and provides limited exploitation of imagery, non-traditional ISR, tactical reconnaissance and ground moving target indicator feeds within the AOC. **(T-3)**

6.5.6. ***National Tactical Integration Element: (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank O-2-O-4/E-4–E-8)*** . The National Tactical Integration Element typically consists of 16 AF signals intelligence analysts embedded in the ISRD with the capability to reach back to the national intelligence community to provide a national intelligence presence with releasability and declassification authority in support of ATO planning and execution. The National Tactical Integration Element is the primary source within the AOC ISRD for perishable national level intelligence data to support dynamic/time-sensitive operations and planning. National Tactical Integration Element will:

6.5.6.1. Provide robust intelligence reach-back to, and push-forward from, national/regional-focused intelligence organizations. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.2. Coordinate with the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination/ISR Assessment Cell to establish guidelines for national community reach-back, coordination, and dissemination; monitor the operational status and dissemination capabilities of national and theater intelligence systems. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.3. Relay AOC products (e.g., JAOP, AOD, MAAP, ATO, RSTA Annex) to national/regional-focused intelligence organizations to maximize responsive collection and reporting for air component operations. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.4. Provide intelligence-derived analytic input to ISRD analytical products, to include classification guidance and sanitization; assist the ISRD in development of priority intelligence requirements, essential elements of information, and named areas of interest indicators. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.5. Provide signals intelligence expertise to the TGT/TA Team for target development and Combat Assessment processes. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.6. Operate and exploit signals intelligence systems and databases as required to support ACF, SIDO, and other team/division requirements; assist the ISRD in consolidating, disseminating, and archiving intelligence data derived from national sources. **(T-3)**

6.5.6.7. Sanitize classified intelligence information to collateral-levels and push from compartmented systems to collateral-level AOC systems as required; develop procedures to disseminate compartmented information when sanitization is not authorized. **(T-3)**

6.6. ISRD Support to Other Divisions and AOC Teams. When manning permits, the CISR embeds or attaches ACF, TGT/TA, and ISR Operations Team personnel within the SRD, CPD, and COD during all phases of operations to ensure the best integration of ISR support to strategy, planning, execution, and assessment activities. ISRD personnel provide a conduit for the exchange of information between the ISRD and other AOC divisions. Embedded or attached personnel respond to the operational guidance of the respective division chiefs with functional guidance provided by the CISR. When individuals are not embedded or attached to other divisions due to manpower shortages, the CISR should put processes in place to provide required support.

6.6.1. Support to Strategy Division.

6.6.1.1. ACF Team will:

6.6.1.1.1. Provide all-source analysis of adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action in support of the Joint Operational Planning Process for Air during crisis planning and oversee the development of the adversary forces portion of the JAOP. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.1.2. Provide current and predictive briefings and assessments on the operational environment, adversary capabilities, tactics, centers of gravity, and courses of action relevant to strategy development, planning, and assessment; include an operational environment and adversary summary for the AOD. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.1.3. Support development of air component strategy-to-task, measures, and success indicators that convey JFC and JFACC objectives and desired effects. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.1.4. Identify intelligence gaps impacting strategy development, planning guidance, and operational assessment and, in coordination with ACF Team, generate, monitor, and update the status of RFIs, collection requirements, and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements to close gaps. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.1.5. Coordinate with ISR Ops and Targets/TA Strategists to develop and update commander's priority intelligence requirements. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.1.6. Provide analytical support to the OAT, including identification, understanding, and responses to appropriate assessment information requirements. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2. TGT/TA Team will:

6.6.1.2.1. Act as the primary liaison between the TGT/TA Team and the SRD for targeting and assessment related issues. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2.2. Assist SRD in defining air component objectives, tasks, and measures to meet JFC and JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2.3. Assist SRD in developing, evaluating, and refining JFC and JFACC targeting strategies and assessment methodologies; coordinate with ISR Operations Strategists to synchronize ISR and targeting strategies. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2.4. Provide targeting and assessment inputs to SRD briefings and operational assessment processes; participate in the AOD breakout session with TET leadership and ISRD targeteers. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2.5. Convey JFC and JFACC objectives and guidance to the TGT/TA Team. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.2.6. Coordinate with ACF Team to provide adversary target systems/center of gravity analysis and assessments for attack considerations and operational assessment. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.3. ISR Ops Team will:

6.6.1.3.1. Assist SRD in the development of the JAOP and AOD; coordinate the ISR strategy as part of the overall JFACC strategy for incorporation into the JAOP and

AOD; include ISR objectives and tasks, measure(s) of effectiveness, narrative ISR guidance, and JFACC priority intelligence requirements as required. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.3.2. Coordinate the JFACC ISR strategy with JFC collection managers through the Joint Collections Working Group to ensure synchronization with the overall theater ISR strategy in support of JFC objectives. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.3.3. Advise the SRD on ISR platform/sensor/Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.3.4. Consolidate SRD RFIs, collection requirements, and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements and submit to the ISR Operations and ACF Teams as required. **(T-3)**

6.6.1.3.5. Conduct ISR operations assessment and provide input to the operational assessment process. **(T-3)**

6.6.2. ACF Team will support the Combat Plans Division. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.1. ACF Team will:

6.6.2.1.1. Ensure CPD teams are aware of significant adversary activities within the operational environment affecting the ATO planning process; provide tailored and predictive intelligence estimates, briefings, and other products and/or services that support ATO and RSTA Annex development to the TET and MAAP Team. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.1.2. Coordinate named areas of interest and target areas of interest with the ISR Operations and TGT/TA Teams and CPD ISR operations planners. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.1.3. Assist CPD embedded target planners with target development/modification. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.1.4. Identify intelligence gaps affecting the ATO planning process, and, in coordination with the ACF Team, generate, monitor, and update the status of RFIs, collection requirements and PRs to close gaps. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2. TGT/TA Team will:

6.6.2.2.1. Act as the primary liaison between the TGT/TA Team and the CPD for targeting, weaponeering, and assessment related issues. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.2. Assist CPD planners in validating all targets and aimpoints on the draft JIPTL and MAAP in accordance with theater guidance. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.3. Assist the TET in prioritizing nominated targets on the draft JIPTL by their associated prioritized tasks and with an evaluation of target criticality to the overall joint campaign. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.4. Coordinate approval of potential high collateral damage or sensitive targets on the JIPTL in accordance with theater guidance. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.5. Provide weaponeering recommendations/options for achieving desired effects against nominated aim points/targets. Targets that require special weaponeering considerations, non-kinetic effects, high collateral damage assessment, Component

Critical Targets, should be highlighted IAW CJCSI 3160.01D. Sequencing recommendations should be developed. **(T-0)**

6.6.2.2.6. Coordinate force application for all targets, including those identified for non-lethal and special technical operations effects; coordinate with NKO Team and others as required to synchronize/deconflict non-lethal effects against JIPTL targets. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.7. Notify the Target Development Cell of any JIPTL targets that did not make it to the MAAP. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.8. Provide the completed MAAP to the TGT/TA and ISR Operations Teams. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.9. Submit targeting/Combat Assessment related collection requirements to ISR Operations Planners. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.2.10. Support the JTCB with draft JIPTL and other target planning issues. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3. ISR Operations Team will:

6.6.2.3.1. Receive draft RSTA Annex from ISR Operations Planners and complete it in conjunction with MAAP development/completion. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.2. Brief the MAAP Team on ISR collection requirements to include necessary sensor locations and collection timelines, as well as any ISR limitations that may affect planning and the overall air scheme of maneuver. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.3. Work with MAAP personnel and ISR platform liaison officers to coordinate air component ISR asset on-station times and planning/employment requirements (e.g., airspace, refueling, retrograde and threat warning procedures) to optimize collection operations. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.4. Identify CPD intelligence gaps affecting ISR planning and employment and, in coordination with ISR Operations Team, generate, monitor, and update the status of RFIs, collection requirements and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements to close gaps. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.5. Coordinate operational reconnaissance requirements with appropriate aircraft liaison officers and MAAP Team personnel to determine availability and feasibility of operational reconnaissance tasking. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.6. Work with target planners in the TET and MAAP Team to address appropriate collection requirements to include pre-strike collection and battle damage assessment associated with JIPTL/MAAP targets scheduled for strike. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.7. Coordinate with the Collection Management Cell, platform liaison officers, and appropriate MAAP Team personnel to develop the ISR Synchronization Matrix; ensure the ATO accurately reflects the intended scheduling and employment of ISR and operational reconnaissance assets as depicted on the ISR Synchronization Matrix. **(T-3)**

6.6.2.3.8. Ensure the ISR Operations and SIDO Teams understand the MAAP, air scheme of maneuver, ISR Synchronization Matrix, ISR/strike integration plan for pre-

strike collection and battle damage assessment, operational reconnaissance opportunities, and other planning considerations for the current ATO period. **(T-3)**

6.6.3. ***Support to Combat Operations Division*** . The SIDO Team is the permanent intelligence presence in the COD. ISRD personnel augment and support the SIDO and other COD teams as required, and the SIDO may task organize intelligence personnel (including augmentees) in the most effective way to support current operations. Inherent close coordination between the SIDO Team and ISRD teams is necessary to maximize SIDO effectiveness. **Chapter 5** of this AFMAN specifies SIDO Team responsibilities.

6.6.3.1. ACF Team will:

6.6.3.1.1. Monitor the operational environment and coordinate with the SIDO Team on adversary operations, threat warning, and other time-sensitive activity that necessitates dissemination outside of normal analytical production cycles. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.1.2. Disseminate time-sensitive mission report and other intelligence reporting to ensure the SIDO Team has the most current mission results, adversary tactics, and order of battle updates. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.1.3. Coordinate with the National Technical Integration Element, sanitize and coordinate compartmented threat warning with the SIDO Team. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.1.4. Generate, monitor, and update the status of SIDO Team RFIs, collection requirements, and production requirements to close gaps affecting ATO execution. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.1.5. Assist SIDO and COD embedded targeteers with intelligence support to dynamic targeting/time sensitive targeting operations. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.2. TGT/TA Team will:

6.6.3.2.1. Provide target intelligence materials, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation to the SIDO and ODOs Teams to support dynamic targeting. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.2.2. Coordinate any battle damage assessment results affecting current air tasking cycle operations with the SIDO Team. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.2.3. In coordination with the imagery support element, make all imagery support products required for dynamic targeting/time sensitive targeting, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination requirements, and other dynamic missions available to the SIDO Team. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.2.4. Monitor ATO execution and support dynamic targeting processes, including immediate reporting, strike assessment, and execution of re-role/restrike for dynamic targeting; provide feedback of ATO execution and dynamic targeting to TGT/TA team. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.2.5. Coordinate ad hoc collection requirements with ACF embedded personnel. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.3. ISR Ops Team will:

6.6.3.3.1. Assist SIDO Team in maintaining situational awareness on ISR and operational reconnaissance asset execution during the ATO period; develop and

coordinate any RSTA Annex changes and ISR Synchronization Matrix updates as required. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.3.2. Provide recommendations to the SIDO Team for dynamic ISR and operational reconnaissance operations in response to mission/priorities shifts, environmental factors, or emerging threats and targets as required. **(T-3)**

6.6.3.3.3. Coordinate with the SIDO Team to process ISR mission changes or any Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination node issues affecting future planning and air tasking cycles; disseminate planning changes to JFC collection planners. Adjust collection decks and tactical assessments to reflect current operations. **(T-3)**

6.6.4. ***AMD Support*** . The ISRD does not typically embed or attach personnel within the AMD. However, during contingency/exercise situations, it may become necessary to embed intelligence analysts in AMD to provide intelligence support for combat operations. Additionally, the imagery support element should be prepared to support Airdrop Damage Estimation Methodology with imagery support. AMD intelligence personnel coordinate specific intelligence requirements affecting theater mobility planning and mission execution with the ISRD. The ACF Unit Support Cell supports intra- and intertheater mobility mission requirements in accordance with normal Unit Support Cell tactics, techniques, and procedures.

6.6.5. ***Specialty Team Support*** . The ISRD provides support to all CFACC and AOC activities. Coordinate specific specialty team and other element intelligence requirements through the appropriate ISRD team or with the ISRD's RFI Manager. The ISRD coordinates with AOC LNO, such as the BCD, SOLE, NALE and SPLE. Validate, monitor and satisfy intelligence RFIs, collection requirements, and production requirements in accordance with overall ATO planning priorities.

6.6.6. ***Reach-back and Federated Support*** . The CISR should ensure ISRD functions integrate with distributed, reach-back, and federated support as required and appropriate rather than conducting all ISRD functions internally. Base relationships and assignments upon each organization's functional production capabilities (orders of battle, intelligence preparation of the environment, courses of action analysis, target systems analysis, battle damage assessment, etc.), expertise, and capacity. The intent of distributed, reach-back and federated operations is to leverage sufficient production resources and expertise to meet required operations tempos.

Chapter 7

AIR MOBILITY DIVISION

7.1. General. The AMD Chief works for the AOC/CC and will ensure the AMD works as an effective division of the AOC in operational planning and execution processes. The AMD will plan, coordinate, task, and execute air mobility missions in accordance with the JFACC's guidance and intent. In addition, the AMD will:

7.1.1. Coordinate with the DIRMOBFOR, the JFC movement requirements and control authority (e.g., the Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), COMAFFOR A-4 staff, and the 618 AOC (TACC)). **(T-2)**

7.1.2. The DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR's designated coordinating authority for air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR, normally a senior AF air mobility officer familiar with the theater AOR, coordinates and integrates the total air mobility effort for the COMAFFOR or JFACC. **(T-2)**

7.1.3. The DIRMOBFOR provides mobility guidance to the AOC AMD to execute the air mobility mission. For more doctrinal information regarding the DIRMOBFOR, refer to Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-36, *Air Mobility Operations*. **(T-2)**

7.1.4. Maintain maximum (aircraft) on ground management, and integration and deconfliction of theater and AMC assigned air mobility assets in support of JFC objectives. Plan and execute air mobility support for user requirements identified and validated by the DDOC. **(T-2)**

7.1.5. Participate in air and space planning and execution processes and coordinate with the AOC Commander to ensure the ATO/ACO incorporates air mobility missions. **(T-2)**

7.1.6. Coordinate with the CISR to fulfill all mobility intelligence requirements. **(T-2)**

7.1.7. Ensure air mobility missions are visible in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and reflected in the ATO/ACO. **(T-2)**

7.1.8. Integrate planning and execution of combat support AR operating in the AOR/JOA in support of JFACC requirements/objectives. **(T-2)**

7.1.9. Provide theater information to support in-transit visibility, total asset visibility and global transportation network. **(T-2)**

7.1.10. Integrate non-kinetic operations, electronic warfare, space and cyber in mobility operations. **(T-2)**

7.1.11. Consider impacts of IW, space and cyber events or actions on mobility operations. **(T-2)**

7.1.12. Establish requirements for protecting key communications supporting mobility operations from cyberspace intrusion/attack/denial in coordination with NKT. **(T-2)**

7.1.13. Identify IO and Public Affairs requirements to support the air mobility mission and integrate/deconflict IO and Public Affairs with respective specialty teams. **(T-2)**

7.1.14. ***Shaping Operations*** . The AMD will plan, coordinate, task and execute intratheater airlift, aeromedical evacuation (AE) and air refueling (AR) missions. The AMD provides for integration and support of all air mobility missions. The AMD schedules theater airlift requests

in conjunction with the supported CCDR's airlift priorities through the CCDR's DDOC, if established, and the 618 AOC (TACC), as required. The AMD Chief ensures that the AMD works as an effective division of the AOC in the air planning and execution process. The AMD will integrate and direct execution of allocated, apportioned, and assigned theater-mobility forces operating in the AOR/JOA in support of the JFC requirements/objectives. The AMD should plan and direct air mobility missions in high threat environments (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) or Integrated Air Defense Systems. **(T-2)**

7.1.15. ***Beyond Shaping Operations*** . In contingencies, air mobility requirements peak during the deployment and build-up stage of the operation. As the contingency transitions into the sustainment phase, requirements decrease to a near-steady level. Once the redeployment stage begins, air mobility requirements will once again peak. The increased use of non-linear air mobility assets throughout the competition continuum will also increase the demand for airlift and refueling and may require the need for increased AOC AMD readiness. Therefore, the AOC AMD will be prepared to quickly transition from normal to contingency surge operations at the very outset of a contingency response and be ready to maintain a surge ops tempo through the redeployment stage of a contingency. **(T-2)**

7.2. Major AMD Process Inputs. Inputs include: DDOC/joint theater patient movement/air refueling planner, and other validated requirements, timed phased force deployment data, JAOP, JFC priorities, Orders (OPORDS, Deployment Orders, OPLAN, etc.), DIRMOBFOR guidance, TPFDD, AOD, ACP, AADP, MAAP brief, ACO, ATO, SPINS, ROE/RUF, RFF, UTC list, Situation Reports (SITREPS), Airdrop targeting products/intelligence folders, IPB outputs, patient movement and other AE support requests, and inputs from US Transportation Command and 618 AOC (TACC).

7.3. Major AMD Processes. The AMD Chief and all team chiefs will establish effective procedures for managing AMD activities within their span of control. These activities include establishing and enforcing procedures that ensure all personnel provide complete, accurate, properly formatted, and timely inputs to the global air mobility scheduling systems, and developing and managing the battle rhythm sufficient to support JAOP, AOD, SPINS and ATO/ACO development, Threat Working Group policy recommendations, operational assessment, and special projects, as required. **(T-2)**

7.4. Major Process Outputs. Outputs include: The airlift schedule, tanker schedule, air mobility support schedule, DIRMOBFOR briefing, ATO/ACO change requests, SPINS, JPRL, AMD MA, AOC OA, aircraft status, theater AE plan, inputs to COP, TPFDD data, request for forces, after-action reports, lessons learned, airspace control means requests. and SITREPS to inform higher headquarters of air mobility activity in the AOR/JOA.

7.5. Organization. The AMD is comprised of four functionally oriented teams led by the AMD Chief. The functional teams are the ALCT, ARCT, AECT, and AMCT. Tailor functional team composition (e.g., numbers, specialties, and skill levels) to meet unique mission requirements as shown below in **Figure 7.1**.

Figure 7.1. AMD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note: Division normally supported by other teams as required during operations: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, WST, Cyberspace Support Element, NKO Team, Component and Coalition liaison officers, KO.

7.6. AMD Personnel and Responsibilities.

7.6.1. ***Air Mobility Division Chief*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank O-6). The AMD Chief is responsible to the AOC/CC for the direction and supervision of the AMD. The AMD Chief will know and ensure AMD personnel know the JFC's and JFACC's guidance, intent, and daily apportionment. If there is no DIRMOBFOR, the AMD Chief will coordinate directly with CCDR Staff (which will coordinate with United States Transportation Command) and Air Force Transportation Component for intertheater mobility forces and airlift tasking requirements as needed. **(T-2)** The AMD Chief will:

7.6.1.1. Be the point of contact for all air mobility operations in the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.2. Plan, task, and execute valid air mobility requirements based on Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and supported CCDR priorities and air mobility asset availability. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.3. Consider DIRMOBFOR recommendations to ensure smooth coordination of all air mobility and air mobility support assets. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.4. Keep the DIRMOBFOR and AOC/CC informed on air mobility actions and issues. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.5. Tailor AMD manning levels to achieve effective and efficient capability to meet anticipated mission requirements. Report manning shortfalls to the AOC/CC, and Component Major Command / Numbered Air Force AFFOR/A1. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.6. Maintain an AMD process schedule. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.7. Select team chiefs and deputy team chiefs for each of the AMD teams from among the AMD staff. Base selection on individual expertise and scope of planned operations. Synchronize processes of the four air mobility teams. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.8. Select the AMD Superintendent from among the AMD staff. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.9. Provide guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating AMD portion of the AOC KMP. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.10. Ensure positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate AMD duty positions. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.11. Ensure theater air mobility command and control concept of operations are developed. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.12. Coordinate with the Chief, Combat Support Team for overall logistics and supply expertise for intratheater air mobility operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.13. Integrate all airlift missions into the ATO/ACO. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.14. Coordinate with AFFOR/A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish & facilitate seamless processes for in-transit visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between strategic and intratheater airlift distribution channels. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.15. Coordinate with SRD to ensure air mobility requirements are developed into the overall campaign plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.16. Coordinate with ISRD target/TA team on airfield and threat status. **(T-3)**

7.6.1.17. Understand and incorporate *Notice to Airmen* procedures and criteria into all planning and execution activities. This is especially imperative to ensure that pertinent airfield conditions are available for the international flying community to avoid accidents or incidents. During planning and execution, coordinate with and ensure all appropriate AMD teams/personnel and other AOC divisions review NOTAMs and AFTTP 3-3/3-1, *AOC Combat Fundamentals-Air Operations Center (AOC),* airfield status considerations that apply to the theater of operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.2. ***AMD Strategy*** . AMD strategy reports directly to the AMD Chief and maintains a working relationship with the DIRMOBFOR staff. AMD strategy provides mission assessment. They provide inputs to the OAT and apply guidance from the SRD to air mobility operations. AMD strategy may be appropriate in some theaters but not in others (ensure security and program clearance). AMD Strategy will:

7.6.2.1. Act as a liaison between the AMD and the SRD. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.2. Establish relationships with Air Mobility Liaison Officer and Joint Air Component Coordination Element. Air Mobility Liaison Officer and Joint Air Component Coordination Element personnel can aid in advance notification for planning airlift operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.3. Keep AMD Chief and DIRMOBFOR informed of potential changes to future airlift and tanker requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.4. Provide guidance and apportionment inputs to the SRD for inclusion in the AOD. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.5. Coordinate course(s) of action/branch/sequel development and analysis with DIRMOBFOR, AMD Chief, and SRD. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.6. Conduct periodic meetings with the DDOC futures division to assess long-range airlift requirements in relation to airlift capacity. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.7. Assess utilization of DDOC validated theater channels or standard theater airlift routes and recommend changes to maximize effectiveness of airlift assets. **(T-3)**

7.6.2.8. Provide inputs to TGT/TA team (e.g., airfields that should maintain a minimum operating surface for future airlift operations, or aerial surveillance of potential airlift operating locations). **(T-3)**

7.6.3. ***Airlift Control Team*** . The ALCT provides intratheater airlift functional expertise to plan and coordinate intratheater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA. Airlift planners within the ALCT will complete the airlift portion of the ATO by processing validated airlift requests received from the DDOC, opportune cargo, and merging them with forecast intertheater airlift movements into the AOR/JOA. ALCT coordinates airspace for airlift with the airspace management team (AMT). ALCT provides airlift inputs to theater SPINS and OPORD/JAOP development. The ALCT also ensures the integration of intertheater air mobility missions with intratheater and other service teams and operations planning. This includes air mobility integration and coordination of United States Transportation Command-controlled air mobility forces. Direct-delivery intertheater air mobility missions, if required, will be coordinated with the AMD and planned/tasked by the 618 AOC (TACC). The ALCT coordinates with Mobility Air Forces- Mobile C2 units (Contingency Response Group) deployed within the AOR/JOA to identify airfield capabilities and mobility support requirements. The ALCT should integrate its activities with the ARCT, AMCT, AECT, and specialty/support functions to the maximum extent possible to support the total air mobility effort. The AMD may embed an airlift planner in the MAAP Team to coordinate airlift mission planning and/or to assist the MAAP Chief in planning airlift mission execution. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1. ***ALCT Chief. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank O-5)*** . The ALCT Chief is directly responsible to the AMD Chief for the intratheater airlift functional expertise from the

theater organizations to plan and coordinate intratheater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA for the JFACC. The ALCT Chief will ensure the integration of intertheater air mobility missions with intratheater air operations. This includes coordination with 618 AOC (TACC) to resolve problems and provide C2 information on air mobility operations (e.g., airspace deconfliction, airfield operations, and other assets) to ensure the seamless integration of intratheater and intertheater air mobility operations. The team functional areas normally include airlift operations, aerial port, logistics, airlift requirements, tactics, plans, and Contingency Response Group management. The ALCT Chief will:

7.6.3.1.1. Integrate intratheater airlift into the ATO/ACO. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.2. Obtain intratheater airlift requirements from the DDOC. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.3. Plan and schedule airlift missions to satisfy validated airlift requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.4. Monitor available airframes and aircrews to meet airlift tasking. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.5. Coordinate and support immediate airlift requests and mission numbers with AMCT. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.6. Coordinate air mobility airspace requirements with the AMD Airspace Manager prior to coordination with the CPD C2 Plans Team Airspace Managers. If the AMD does not have airspace manager, coordinate directly with CPD C2 Plans Team and AMT. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.7. Coordinate with Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group, Special Tactics Team, and fixed enroute Air Mobility Control Centers on daily taskings. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.8. Coordinate AOR/JOA transponder code management for all airlift assets. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.9. Coordinate with Airlift Tactics and Aerial Port Management to determine requirements for airdrop loads. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.10. Obtain diplomatic (DIP) clearances as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.11. Manage movement of distinguished visitors in the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.12. Coordinate with AFFOR/A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish and facilitate seamless processes for in-transit visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between intertheater and intratheater airlift distribution channels. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.13. Monitor intertheater airlift missions to integrate intertheater and intratheater cargo/passenger movement seamlessly within the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.14. Ensure airlift tactics coordinates tactical support requirements with the MAAP Team. The MAAP Team develops package support requirements, including support to landing zones and drop zones. By integrating airlift tactics experts into MAAP meetings, the airlift tactics experts will be able to articulate airlift tactical support requirements in the most appropriate venue. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.1.15. Provide the ALCT portion of the SITREP. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2. Airlift Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X2A/B/C/D/L/M) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.3.2.1. Duty Description. Airlift planners are responsible to the ALCT Chief for planning theater airlift missions.

7.6.3.2.2. Airlift planners will:

7.6.3.2.2.1. Plan airlift missions to meet validated theater airlift requirements and requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.2. Coordinate mission plans with AOC functional areas, Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group, tailored elements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.3. Identify and coordinate airspace requirements with AMT plans. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.4. Monitor available airframes and aircrews to meet airlift taskings (identify procedures to obtain prioritization from theater DDOC/users). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.5. Assist AMCT in planning missions that support immediate airlift requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.6. Enter planned missions into Mobility Air Forces C2 systems, as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.7. Coordinate DIP clearances for intratheater airlift as required (e.g., aircraft and personnel automated clearance system). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.8. Coordinate prior permission required clearance at airfields. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.9. Produce daily airlift flying schedule. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.10. Provide long-range mission planning for maximum threat mitigation. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.11. Coordinate with ISRD, SOLE, Air Mobility Liaison Officers and JACCE on airdrop and landing zone/drop zone requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.2.2.12. Coordinate with the TA/TET, WOC on aircraft airdrop configurations. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3. Airlift Tactics. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.3.3.1. Duty Description. The airlift tactics officer is responsible to the ALCT Chief for providing airlift tactics support required for planning theater airlift missions that may be appropriate in some theaters but not others (ensure security and program clearance).

7.6.3.3.2. Airlift Tactics will:

7.6.3.3.2.1. Convene and chair mission feasibility team, consisting of tactics, ISRD (to include Air Force National Tactical Integration), weather, airspace, TGT/TA, TET, Contingency Response Group and BCD or Army liaison officer, as a minimum. Coordinate Special Tactics Team support as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.2. Plan and coordinate all airdrop missions and missions scheduled to locations requiring additional approval. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.3. Provide assistance or support to the AMCT on tactical airlift execution issues including operations in high threat environments. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.4. Establish relationships outside of AMD with the SOLE, MARLE, NALE, Air Mobility Liaison Officer, coalition forces and BCD to keep the AMD apprised of the changing battlespace. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.5. Coordinate with applicable liaison officers to evaluate low-level flight route deconfliction. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.6. Develop and disseminate tactical information and procedures to the Installation Control Center and coalition liaison officers. Airlift Tactics should create an AMD tactics website. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.7. Identify and submit tactical route requirements for the ACP and ACO to AMT plans. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.8. Attend AOC meetings as required. For example, SGT, SPT, TET and MAAP. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.9. Create and submit SPINS inputs for all tactical considerations. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.10. Maintain a database of airfield and landing zone / Drop Zone planning factors for the entire AOR. Develop, publish and maintain airfield capability, airfield approval and airfield threat matrices. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.11. Maintain airdrop data regarding crew qualifications, pallet availability, parachute availability, buffer stop assemblies, centerline vertical restraints and container delivery system kits. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.12. Verify and coordinate airdrop load plans with the Installation Control Center and user. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.13. Coordinate with ISRD, SOLE, Air Mobility Liaison Officers and Joint Air Component Coordination Element on airdrop and landing zone /Drop Zone requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.14. Coordinate with the TA/TET and Installation Control Center on aircraft airdrop configurations. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.3.2.15. Maintain data on airdrop malfunctions, accuracy and usage. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4. Airlift Requirements Planner. (AFSC: 21R/2T2X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.3.4.1. Duty Description. Airlift requirements planners are personnel who work in the ALCT responsible to the ALCT Chief for receiving and planning validated airlift movement requests based on the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List.

7.6.3.4.2. Airlift requirements planners will:

7.6.3.4.2.1. Monitor TPFDD to identify intertheater cargo and passengers requiring onward intratheater lift. Coordinate with DDOC to ascertain priority of movement. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.2. Receive validated movement requests from the DDOC (include unit line numbers/transportation control numbers). The AECT will provide validated

patient movement requirements received from the Patient Movement Requirements Center for planning. Identify requirements for short tons, over/out/bulk cargo, passengers/litter patients and hazardous material requirements per required delivery date and operating location. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.3. Develop movement plan based on inputs (e.g., Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List, patient movement requirements) from DDOC/AECT/distinguished visitor movement requests and provide to ALCT airlift planners. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.4. Contact air terminal operations centers to confirm cargo/passengers available for airlift as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.5. Input load data into Mobility Air Forces C2 systems as required and inform DDOC/AECT of movement request status. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.6. Re-plan movement requests not executed as scheduled. Maintain a daily event log. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.4.2.7. Deconflict validated airlift requests with the DDOC and provide the DDOC with a feasible closure date for the requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5. Mobility Air Force Air Tasking Order Integrator. (1C5X1/1C3X1) (Rank: E-5/E-7).

7.6.3.5.1. Duty Description. The Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator is the functional expert for integrating the air mobility movement plan (schedule) into TBMCS.

7.6.3.5.2. The Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator will:

7.6.3.5.2.1. Coordinate with ATO Production to receive cutoff and ATO push times. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.2. Integrate airlift missions into the ATO using GDSS and TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.3. Continually import external airlift missions throughout the air tasking cycles (planning and execution). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.4. When required, manually build theater missions directly into TBMCS throughout the air tasking cycle (planning and execution). Access and monitor TBMCS Airlift Import Tool. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.5. Coordinate the establishment of and continually monitor the operational connectivity between GDSS and TBMCS through the GDSS system administrator help desk at Scott AFB, local TBMCS system administrator, and the AOC Communications Team. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.6. Configure and manage GDSS Mission Partner Interface Tools, ensure GDSS AOR airlift is contained on the ATO, monitor airlift flow, and ensure ATO accuracy and coordinate database updates/changes with the GDSS system administrator at Scott Air Force Base (AFB). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.7. Review TBMCS Friendly Order of Battle to ensure current air mobility data for appropriate AOR. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.8. Coordinate TBMCS Friendly Order of Battle changes through ATO production cell chief/data base manager. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.9. Determine and ensure the AOR flags, for applicable AOR, are set in the force status and monitoring base status screen. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.10. Monitor the Airlift Import Tool application. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.11. Monitor the GDSS Mission Partner Interface tool, ATO Integrator Summary, to identify, correct and resend failed missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.12. Allocate Friendly Order of Battle, Call-words, call-numbers and Identification Friend or Foe /Selective Identification Feature codes in the "O" shell ABP and are correct for the day-time group of the ABP. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.13. Ensure call-words and call-numbers match between TBMCS and GDSS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.14. Assign identification friend-or-foe/selective identification features to all ATO missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.15. Complete ATO change sheet and submit to ATO change technician (if required). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.2.16. Review and quality control check the “O” shell prior to handing it off to ATO Production, and upon release of the two-digit ABP, to ensure that the number of missions and tactical information is correct. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3. The Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator will create Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator Inputs, to include: **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3.1. Receive and review component-planning shells from ATO production (referred to as the “O” shell ABP). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3.2. Build external airlift missions. Theater and non-theater missions built directly into GDSS or Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System imported into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3.3. Manually build missions directly into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3.4. Change Friendly Order of Battle data (e.g., new units, aircraft mission design series, and/or International Civil Aviation Organization). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.3.5. Incorporate mission changes received via GDSS, written changes form (if required), and/or theater specific procedure. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4. Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator Processes:

7.6.3.5.4.1. Allocate Friendly Order of Battle, call-words, call-numbers and Identification Friend or Foe /Selective Identification Feature codes in the “O” shell ABP and ensure they are correct for the day-time group of the ABP. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.2. Coordinate Friendly Order of Battle data changes with ATO production Air Operations Database Manager. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.3. Residual missions are those that fly in more than one ATO. Copy residual missions from previous ABP; check they are imported properly. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.4. Check the GDSS ATO Integrator Summary screen throughout shift to ensure external airlift missions send successfully (identified with an S). Identify and fix errors for failed missions (identified with an F) and send unsent missions (identified with an N). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.5. Ensure external airlift missions successfully processed through the airlift import tool. Identify and fix errors for non-processed missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.6. Continually import air mobility missions into the "O" shell ABP/ATO. Fix errors identified during the MCAMP merge process. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.7. Ensure call-words and call-numbers match between TBMCS and GDSS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.8. Assign identification friend-or-foe/selective identification features to all ATO missions. If not enough identification friend-or-foe/selective identification features s assigned in the "O" shell ABP, coordinate with ATO production to add identification friend-or-foe/selective identification features. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.9. Input manual-built missions into TBMCS as needed. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.10. Assist and support the AMCT on integrating immediate airlift missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.11. Ensure the ATO change technician imports external airlift mission changes/add-ons into the executing ABP/ATO/ACO and ATO incremental changes. Complete ATO change sheet and submit to ATO change technician (if required). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.12. Coordinate ABP backups with ATO production. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.13. Inform ATO production when "O" shell ABP is complete. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.4.14. Upon release of the two-digit ABP, review and quality control check it for the correct number of mission and tactical information. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.5.5. Outputs:

7.6.3.5.5.1. Completed "O" shell ABP.

7.6.3.5.5.2. Mobility Air Forces mission changes to executing ATO.

7.6.3.5.5.3. Changes to Mobility Air Forces Friendly Order of Battle data (new units, aircraft mission design series, and/or International Civil Aviation Organization requirements).

7.6.3.6. Airlift Processes:

7.6.3.6.1. JFACC/JFC Guidance Input Process (96 + hours).

7.6.3.6.1.1. Determine future airlift/AE and enroute support equipment capabilities. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.2. AMD will gather airlift capability and availability data from beddown information and MX. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.3. AMD will gather enroute support equipment capability and availability

data from beddown information, MX, AFFOR A4 staff and AMC Air Mobility Operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.4. AMD tactics will assess airfield capability/availability (coordinate with intelligence, and BCD or Army liaison officer and AFFOR A4) per AFTTP 3-3.AOC, Table 7.13, ALCT Mission Planning Checklist. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.5. AMD will determine if airlift movement is operating in accordance with Air Force Manual 24-604, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.6. AMD strategy will provide future airlift capability inputs to the SRD and DDOC futures division. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.7. AMD strategy will identify shortfalls and make allocation recommendations to the SRD for incorporation into the AOD. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.1.8. AMD strategy will determine availability of joint and coalition aircraft from liaison officers. The allocation requests process should be utilized. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2. Long-Range Airlift Allocation Process (96 to 84 hours/AOD development):

7.6.3.6.2.1. ALCT Chief will review and confirm accuracy of input data. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2.2. AMD strategy will determine and acquire joint and coalition airlift aircraft allocation from liaison officers. AMD strategy should use the allocation requests process. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2.3. Allocate mobility aircraft based on JFACC guidance. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2.4. ALCT Chief will make inputs for course of action development and determine associated risks and shortfalls to AMD strategy, utilizing inputs from the BCD and/or Army liaison officer, intelligence, tactics, weather and airspace. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2.5. ALCT Chief will implement JFACC approved courses of action. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.2.6. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3. ***Requirement Movement Development Process*** (84 to 72 hours/requirements development):

7.6.3.6.3.1. AMD strategy will recommend an airlift apportionment plan based on DDOC guidance for inclusion in the AOD. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.2. ALCT requirements will obtain validated movement requests from DDOC and include movement assessment of previous requirements scheduled but not moved. Identify TPFDD requirements needing intratheater onward movement. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.2.1. ALCT requirements planners will utilize the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List to prioritize/schedule cargo/passengers during the ATO process. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.2.2. Factor in shipments that require re-planning due to mission cancellations. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.2.3. Consider priority/routine patient movement and/or short-notice

airlift requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.2.4. ALCT requirements personnel will determine cargo-handling requirements (e.g., hot cargo, married pallets, and materials handling equipment requirements and aircraft configuration) from validated airlift movement requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.3. Airlift tactics will coordinate delivery method and airfield approval status. Airdrop missions or airland missions to currently unapproved airfields require additional planning consideration. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.3.1. Convene feasibility team consisting of, as a minimum: tactics, intelligence, weather, airspace, Contingency Response Group and BCD or Army liaison officer. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.3.2. Provide the preliminary airdrop/airland feasibility study and draft plan to the AMD MAAP representative. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.3.4. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4. ***Airlift Movement Plan Development Process*** (72 to 36 hour/Weaponeering/and Allocation):

7.6.3.6.4.1. ALCT airlift planner will confirm and deconflict scheduled meetings and inputs with the ATO process schedule. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.2. ALCT airlift planner will verify projected availability of resources (airframe, enroute support, number of coalition aircraft and aircrew) with AFFOR A4 staff, AMCT and Installation Control Center. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3. Airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan: **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3.1. Revalidate and incorporate AMD intelligence update into airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3.2. Revalidate and incorporate AMD and BCD or Army liaison officer update into airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3.3. Review long-range weather forecast with AMD weather for mission impact. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3.4. Review current ACO for existing suitable airspace coordinating measures or create/adjust as necessary (airspace control means requests) with the AMT. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.3.5. Review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.4. Review airfield operating restrictions and requirements (operating hours; crash, fire and rescue; security; Air Traffic Control; and navigation aids, etc.). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.5. Assign aircraft type and numbers to the airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.6. ALCT airlift planner, in coordination with 618 AOC (TACC), will

develop a coordinated airlift plan. ALCT airlift planner passes a coordinated (inter/intratheater) initial airlift plan to MAAP airlift planners to initiate coordination. With a Geographic CCDR-USTRANSCOM support relationship, the 618 AOC (TACC) may send a coordinating planning element as the Theater Direct Delivery to work with the AMD planners. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.4.7. ALCT airlift planner will annotate all pertinent events in a daily event log. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5. Airlift Mission Schedule Process (36 to 18 hours/MAAP):

7.6.3.6.5.1. ALCT airlift planner will confirm and deconflict scheduled meetings and inputs with the ATO process schedule. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.2. AMD MAAP representative will attend MAAP chief briefing to coordinate airlift operations/requirements with the MAAP development. The AMD MAAP representative will maintain awareness of all planned airlift and DV movement for the ATO in MAAP. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.3. AMD MAAP representative will make inputs for missions requiring support for mission package integration. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.4. ALCT airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.4.1. Review long-range weather forecast with AOC weather for mission impact. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.4.2. Review current ACO for existing suitable airspace coordinating measure or create/adjust as necessary (airspace control means requests) with the AMT. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.4.3. Review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.5. The ALCT airlift planner will assign missions to satisfy requirements identified in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.6. The ALCT airlift planner will ensure crew duty day is in accordance with AFMANs/theater direction. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.7. The ALCT airlift planner will establish DIP requirements and submit requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.8. The ALCT airlift planner will assign call signs and mission numbers. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.9. The ALCT airlift planner will provide the daily airlift schedule to ALCT requirements with assigned missions and/or call signs. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10. The ALCT airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.1. The ALCT airlift planner will revalidate and incorporate AMD intelligence update into airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.2. The ALCT airlift planner will revalidate and incorporate AMD and BCD or Army liaison officer update into airlift plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.3. The ALCT airlift planner will review long-range weather forecast with AOC weather for mission impact. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.4. The ALCT airlift planner will review current ACO for infrastructure and schedule with TBMCS; create or adjust as necessary with AMD airspace using an airspace control means requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.5. The ALCT airlift planner will review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.6. The ALCT airlift planner will review airfield operating restrictions and requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.7. The ALCT airlift planner will request prior permission required clearances, request/review DIP clearances as required and coordinate slots with regional air movement coordination center (RAMCC). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.8. The ALCT airlift planner will deconflict maximum (aircraft) on ground for intertheater and intratheater airlift. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.9. The airlift planner will build missions in the applicable Mobility Air Forces C2 system and transmit airlift schedule messages. Missions requiring mission package integration must be input directly into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.10. The airlift planner populates the requirements section of the Mobility Air Forces C2 system with movement requests (unit line numbers and transportation control numbers for passengers and cargo).

7.6.3.6.5.10.11. Airlift planner will include mission-specific remarks as required (e.g., engine running on/offload, overt versus covert lighting, daylight-only airfields, Raven requirements, secure launch requirements). **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.12. During the airlift mission schedule process and as required for timing and unit coordination, distribute an Initial Frag (Fragmentation Order), often referred to the “Soft Frag” and a Final Frag, aka “Hard Frag,” prior to ATO push.

7.6.3.6.5.10.13. Airlift planner will compare allowable cabin load versus fuel to meet mission requirements, and adjust accordingly. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.14. Airlift tactics personnel will coordinate with AOC airspace to build/submit/activate or verify airspace using an airspace control means requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.15. ALCT airlift plans will pass the airlift movement plan (schedule) to the AMD ATO integrator and disseminate to appropriate agencies. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.16. ALCT airlift plans will annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3)**

7.6.3.6.5.10.17. Positive Launch Procedures. Positive launch may be used to ensure flow control and for management reasons. When implemented, notify departure station C2 agencies of applicable missions. One hour prior to aircrew alert at crew rest locations and one hour prior to departure at enroute stops, theater C2 agencies will call the AMD AMCT for alert/launch coordination and approval. Determine whether to implement positive launch procedures, and assign to specific mission.

7.6.3.6.5.10.18. Secure Launch Control. The secure launch program attempts to minimize exposure of forces by identifying potential high threat locations/areas and maintaining timely intelligence information during mission execution. AMD AMCT monitors daily launches for mission segments transiting unstable regions. After receiving the latest threat assessment from ISRD, AMD AMCT will approve/disapprove launch into high threat areas. Enter this secure launch control decision into GDSS and telephonically forward it to the departure C2 agency or directly to the aircraft commander as applicable. Determine launch approval by weighing the intelligence assessment of the potential threat against mission requirements. Determine whether to implement secure launch procedures, and assign to specific mission.

7.6.4. ***Air Refueling Control Team*** . The ARCT will plan, task, and execute air refueling missions to support theater air operations, and coordinates air refueling planning, tasking, and scheduling to support an air bridge and/or global attack missions within the AOR/JOA. Air refueling planners assigned to ARCT will provide air-refueling expertise to the MAAP Team to incorporate tanker missions into the ATO and meet JFACC objectives within air refueling resource limitations. Based on JFC and JFACC guidance, theater-assigned tankers may also provide air-refueling support to intertheater air operations. The ARCT should coordinate with other AMD teams, COD, and CPD on all aspects of the air-refueling mission. Normally, the 618 AOC (TACC) plans intertheater air refueling missions; however, it is possible the ARCT could be tasked with this responsibility. For intertheater operations, the ARCT may also coordinate aircraft location and redeployment of intertheater tanker assets and fighter unit movements requiring tanker support. Air Refueling Duty Officers (ARDO's) assigned to the ARCT provide expertise to the COD. ARDO's will monitor and execute missions under their control. They facilitate air refueling missions in the ATO to meet JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1. ***ARCT Chief*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M). (Rank: O-5). The ARCT Chief reports directly to the AMD Chief, and should ensure close coordination with the CCO and CPD Chief on all theater air refueling operations. The ARCT Chief provides the JFACC with intratheater air refueling functional expertise. The ARCT Chief plans and tasks air refueling missions to support theater air operations and coordinates air refueling planning, tasking and scheduling to support an air bridge and/or global attack missions within the AOR/JOA. Functional areas managed by the ARCT Chief include intra and intertheater air refueling integration, planning and execution. The ARCT Chief will:

7.6.4.1.1. Build/schedule tanker missions using the appropriate TBMCS applications to satisfy air-refueling requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.2. Ascertain tanker user requirements and number of tanker sorties available for each specified operational period. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.3. After air-refueling conflicts have been resolved, ensure planners assign the best available type of tanker selected from the most appropriate base. Also, ensure planners build these air-refueling missions into the appropriate TBMCS applications. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.4. Coordinate controlling agency and airspace requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.5. Communicate with the tanker units on a daily basis, monitoring the status of tanker aircraft/aircrews and providing open lines of communication with the tanker units throughout the daily ATO planning cycle. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.6. Develop and ensure ATO, ACO, SPINS, and C2 Communication Plans are distributed and received at the tasked air refueling units. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.7. Establish ARDO as the senior air refueling C2 officer reporting directly to the CCO. Manage the daily air-refueling plan via COD. Route ATO changes appropriately during execution. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.8. Analyze mission results and post-mission reports from ARDOs and unit staffs for improvements in SPINS, airspace, communications plans, and tanker utilization. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.9. Determine long-range air refueling requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.1.10. Coordinate aircraft location and deployment/ redeployment requirements of intertheater tanker assets. Support air bridges as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2. ***Long-Range Air Refueling Planner*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X2G/H/I/J) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.4.2.1. The long-range tanker planner conducts future tanker planning and analysis (assessment), embeds in the SRD normally, and may be part of the AMD strategy cell. The long-range tanker planner makes tanker inputs to the JAOP. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated long-range tanker planner, the ARCT Chief or designated alternate normally accomplishes the following functions.

7.6.4.2.2. The long-range tanker planner will:

7.6.4.2.2.1. Provide broad-based plans of AR assets for incorporation into JAOP/AOD. Monitor campaign progression and provide force-sizing recommendations through the ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.2.2. Plan tanker airspace requirements to meet JFACC order of battle and ensures it conforms to established regulations. Review and adjust as required, tanker airspace to include AR tracks/orbits, ingress/egress, retrograde, threat mitigation, arrival/departures and altitude deconfliction ensuring tanker tracks and anchor areas conform to regulatory requirements. Coordinate changes/additions with AMT. Coordinate airspace construction through ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.2.3. Coordinate air-bridge, global strike missions, deployment/redeployment of intertheater tanker assets and fighter-unit movement requirements with 618 AOC (TACC) and intertheater tanker planner. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.2.4. Monitor tanker basing through the ARCT Chief and review Operations Orders/deployment orders for operational control/tactical control/direct support and waiver authority. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.2.5. Collect data from situation reports/ mission reports/ARDO and coordinate with AMD strategy and SRD to determine if tanker planning/execution effectively supports JFC/JFACC objectives under current guidance. Report analysis to AMD Chief/ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.2.6. Make tanker force sizing recommendations to ARCT. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3. ***Master Air Attack Plan Tanker Planner*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X2G/H/I/J) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.4.2.3.1. The MAAP Tanker Planner (MTP), normally embedded in the CPD MAAP team, is responsible for planning and scheduling AR missions. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated intertheater tanker planner, the MTP will fulfill those functions. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2. The MTP will:

7.6.4.2.3.2.1. Review tanker allocation and review Operations Orders/ deployment orders for operational control/tactical control/direct support and waiver authority. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.2. Make tanker force sizing recommendations to ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.3. Present tanker inputs as appropriate at pre-MAAP brief. Identify constraints on aircraft availability resulting from weather, MX, airfield issues, aircraft configuration. Monitor deployment/redeployment of intra/intertheater tanker assets and fighter/bomber unit movement requirements through ARCT Chief, as required. These will affect numbers of tanker sorties available for tasking in the MAAP. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.4. Review mission routings to include AR tracks/orbits, ingress/egress, retrograde, arrival/departures and altitude deconfliction. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.5. Construct and coordinate airspace for tanker missions in coordination with ARCT DIP clearance issues affecting tanker operations and obtain appropriate DIP clearances as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.6. Resolve Air Traffic Control issues to include routing and deconfliction of tanker orbits with airspace management team. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.7. Coordinate air-bridge and global strike missions with appropriate external agencies Combatant Commands/Major Commands/ Numbered Air Forces/AOCs, etc. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.8. Establish and review ground and airborne alert AR requirements

(number/response time/locations) in conjunction with MAAP Chief and ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.9. Maintain knowledge of beddown locations, type aircraft available for tasking, configurations, utilization rates (surge/non-surge) and maximum fuel availability for departure. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.10. Provide briefing inputs on tanker airspace and aircraft/aircrew utilization to MAAP team chief, ARCT Chief, reports and brief team, DIRMOBFOR and others as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.11. Fulfill MAAP AR requests for ISR, defensive counterair, CAS, strike packages and airlift support in conjunction with identified priorities. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.12. Enter and/or monitor mission data in appropriate C2 system (TBMCS/GDSS). **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.13. Provide SPINS inputs as required through ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.14. Monitor active and planned tanker missions for their effect on the number of tanker sorties available for MAAP planning. Factors to consider may include diverted aircraft, threat assessments and pending waivers. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.3.2.15. Review and highlight carry-over missions. **(T-3) Note:** Carry-over missions are particularly risky due to the possibility of scheduling more than one aircraft into the same airspace at the same time across two ATOs.

7.6.4.2.3.2.16. Provide inputs to and receive feedback from AMD strategy and SRD for tanker operational assessment. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.4. ***Intratheater Air Refueling Planner*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X2G/H/I/J) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.4.2.4.1. The intratheater tanker planner normally embeds in the CPD, ensures correct entry of all tanker missions into TBMCS/ Mobility Air Forces C2 systems, and crosschecks the tanker plan prior to submission to ATO production.

7.6.4.2.4.2. The intratheater tanker planner will:

7.6.4.2.4.2.1. Enter AR missions into TBMCS as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.4.2.2. Maintain knowledge of basing locations, type aircraft for taskings, configurations, utilization rates (surge/non-surge) and maximum fuel availability for departure. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.4.2.3. Ensure ground and airborne alert AR requirements (number/response time/locations) are satisfied. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.4.2.4. Review status of active and planned tanker missions to include diverted aircraft and/or other changes to aircraft available for tasking. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.2.4.2.5. Review and highlight carry-over missions. Carry-over missions consist of residual missions from previous ATO that cross over into current ATO, and sequential missions that exist at the end of current ATO that cross

over into following ATO. **(T-3) Note:** Carry-over missions are particularly risky due to the possibility of scheduling more than one aircraft into the same airspace at the same time across two ATOs. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.3. ***Intertheater Air Refueling Planner*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X2G/H/I/J) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.4.3.1. The intertheater air-refueling planner is responsible for intertheater AR missions in coordination with Combatant Commands/Major Commands/ Numbered Air Forces/AOCs, etc. Coordinate deployment/redeployment of intertheater tanker assets and unit movement requirements.

7.6.4.3.2. The intertheater air-refueling planner will:

7.6.4.3.2.1. Coordinate air-bridge and global strike missions with appropriate AOCs. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.3.2.2. Resolve DIP issues affecting tanker operations and coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC), as required. Enter appropriate mission information into C2 system (GDSS, aviation resource management system, TBMCS, and MAAP toolkit). **(T-3)**

7.6.4.3.2.3. Coordinate all intertheater tanker movement with the MTP for deconfliction, ATO integration and safe passage. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.3.2.4. Know lines of command: operational control, tactical control and supported and supporting. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.3.2.5. Know waiver authority, processes and tracking for operational control and tactical control assets. Submit and review waiver requests as required.

7.6.4.3.2.6. Comply with JFC/JFACC guidance including, but not limited to ACP, AOD, ROE, and SPINS. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4. ***Air Refueling Duty Officer*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.4.4.1. The ARDO manages execution of AR missions supporting theater air/space operations as well as air-bridge and global strike missions within/transiting the AOR/JOA. The ARDO is normally assigned to the ARCT and embedded in the COD.

7.6.4.4.2. The ARDO will monitor the current tanker situation including weather, threat, airborne fuel available, MX, aircraft available, DIP clearances, airborne picture, base capabilities, late tankers and tanker/receiver cancellations. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.3. Maintain knowledge of beddown locations, type aircraft available for tasking, configurations, UTE rates (surge/non-surge) and maximum fuel availability for departure. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.4. Provide briefing inputs on tanker airspace and aircraft/aircrew UTE to MAAP team chief, ARCT, and DIRMOBFOR. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.5. Fulfill MAAP AR requests for ISR, DCA, CAS, strike packages and airlift support in conjunction with identified priorities. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.6. Enter and/or monitor mission data in appropriate C2 system (TBMCS/GDSS). **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.7. Provide SPINS inputs as required through ARCT C/D. Monitor active and planned tanker missions for the effect on the number of tanker sorties available for MAAP planning. Factors to consider may include diverted aircraft, threat assessments and pending waivers. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.8. Review and highlight carry-over missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.9. Provide inputs to and receive feedback from AMD strategy and SRD for tanker operational assessment. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.4.10. Manage execution of AR missions supporting theater air/space operations as well as air-bridge and global strike missions within/transiting the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5. ***Air Refueling Tactics Officer*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.4.5.1. The AR (tanker) tactics officer produces and modifies plans and theater tactics to mitigate threats to the AR system and maximizes AR effectiveness. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated AR tactics officer, these duties will normally be performed by the ARCT Chief and/or W-coded personnel within the ARCT (ensure security and program clearance). **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2. The AR Tactics Officer will:

7.6.4.5.2.1. Evaluate tanker airspace for air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.2. Recommend changes to tanker planning/execution to mitigate threats to tankers in coordination with JFC/JFACC in accordance with JFACC guidance. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.3. Provide tanker inputs to quarterly AMD and theater tactics review boards, and Weapons and Tactics Conference. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.4. Assess combat effectiveness of AR procedures and recommend changes to increase tactically sound support to receivers. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.5. Develop/disseminate tactical procedures as appropriate for tanker units. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.6. Recommend changes/inputs to ATO/ACO/SPINS. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.7. Provide real-time tactics guidance/support to ARDOs. **(T-3)**

7.6.4.5.2.8. Provide pertinent tactics information to intertheater crews. **(T-3)**

7.6.5. Air Refueling Control Team Inputs, Processes, and Outputs.

7.6.5.1. ***Air Refueling Control Team Inputs*** : Inputs include: Planning documents and orders (e.g., OPORD, PLANORD, JAOP), tanker capabilities, intelligence assessment, JFACC/ DIRMOBFOR guidance, MISREPs/SITREPs, UTC lists, communications and PACE plans, planning factors, and threat information.

7.6.5.2. Air Tasking Order Tanker Allocation Process. (84 to 48 Hours).

7.6.5.2.1. Review planning guidance from JFC/ Joint Task Force, JFACC, ACP, AOD, ROE, SPINS, ATO, ACO and communications plans and annotate weights of effort, operational planning and execution of air and space operations during the particular ATO period.

7.6.5.2.2. Review the air tasking cycle to include the ABP identification, valid ABP times, ATO cut-off, ATO push time, ATO changes and daily SPINS inputs.

7.6.5.2.3. Review the theater tanker basing plan including aircraft types, number of aircraft, locations, configurations, number/qualifications of crews, boom versus drogue, wing air refueling pod system, multipoint refueling system, special operations air refueling, aircraft fuel and coalition aircraft as well as C2 connectivity and operational control/tactical control/direct support and waivers/waiver authority.

7.6.5.2.4. Review overflight issues affecting tanker operations and ensure appropriate DIP clearance.

7.6.5.2.5. Establish communication with divisions, teams and liaison elements within the AOC, Installation Control Center, 618 AOC (TACC), US Defense Attaché Office, and DDOC, Contingency Response Group, coalition coordination cell and other AOCs as appropriate.

7.6.5.2.6. Assist development of ATO coordination folder initiated by the SGT and ensure information flow through MAAP, execution and operational assessment. **Note:** In smaller operations, a briefing from the intratheater tanker planner to the ARDOs may accomplish this function.

7.6.5.2.7. Compute and monitor utilization rates (surge/non-surge) and use this information for proactive force sizing in anticipation of campaign phasing.

7.6.5.2.8. Identify available fuel resources by type, quantity and delivery capability.

7.6.5.2.9. Annotate airfield and runway restrictions (e.g., ramp fuel weight, obstacles, night/instrument meteorological conditions, maximum (aircraft) on ground).

7.6.5.2.10. Resolve Air Traffic Control issues (routing that may affect flight time to/from tracks and fuel available, slot times, Standard Arrival Route, base departure/arrival procedures, etc.).

7.6.5.2.11. Provide SPINS inputs as required in coordination with ARCT Chief.

7.6.5.2.12. Review and ensure the Friendly Order of Battle in TBMCS has correct data resources for aircraft types, configurations, beddown, utilization rates, burn rates, fuel on-load rates, turn times, call signs, codes and additional planning factors required to accurately plan missions within TBMCS and other C2 systems.

7.6.5.2.13. Review planning factors for standard fuel loads, flight distances within theater, flight times within theater, standard theater airlift routes, instrument departure procedures and Diplomatic (DIP) clearance considerations.

7.6.5.2.14. Establish and publish mission report policies. Require coordination between the ARDO and Installation Control Center for on-time takeoff, situation reports.

7.6.5.3. ***Threat mitigation process*** (72 to 48 Hours/Target Development):

7.6.5.3.1. Review threats to tankers with ISRD unit support.

7.6.5.3.2. Adjust airspace and routing as required to mitigate known threats.

7.6.5.3.3. Provide tanker units with threat mitigation procedures at least 72 hours prior to arriving in theater and daily to units in AOR.

7.6.5.4. ***MAAP Process*** (36 to 24 Hours): **Note:** Conventional tanker mission planners are not normally qualified to plan special operations air refueling missions. Special operations air refueling missions are normally the planning responsibility of the joint special operations air component or equivalent.

7.6.5.4.1. Attend MAAP meeting.

7.6.5.4.2. Threat mitigation process will contact units to monitor available tanker capabilities.

7.6.5.4.3. Review TBMCS and update tanker database as required.

7.6.5.4.4. Threat mitigation process defines macro-MAAP (defensive counterair, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and other constants) and identifies constant requirements with input from the MAAP chief.

7.6.5.4.5. Assign tankers to constant requirements (macro-MAAP). Considerations include:

7.6.5.4.5.1. Boom versus drogue receiver requirements.

7.6.5.4.5.2. Soft versus hard baskets receiver requirements.

7.6.5.4.5.3. Coalition/US tanker aircraft capabilities and ROE, versus receiver requirements and ROE.

7.6.5.4.6. Ensure deconfliction by altitude and time. Check for 4,000 feet between the high tanker in the low cell and the low tanker of the high cell while in the same track at the same time.

7.6.5.4.7. Ensure fuel offload does not exceed unit takeoff capabilities.

7.6.5.4.8. Identify remaining MAAP receiver requirements.

7.6.5.4.9. Identify NALE, MARLE, SPLE, SOLE, and coalition requests not included in MAAP.

7.6.5.4.10. Identify number of alert sorties required, the response timing required and the refueling configuration required.

7.6.5.4.11. Pair tanker to requirements in accordance with guidance issued above for macro-MAAP as well as the following.

7.6.5.4.12. Ensure carry-over missions are de-conflicted between ATOs.

7.6.5.4.13. Create/update ATO coordination folder and pass to/brief ARDO.

7.6.5.5. ***ATO Production Process*** (24 to 12 Hours). ATO will push for execution in accordance with JFACC guidance, normally 12 hours prior to execution. After ATO push, COD is responsible for all ATO changes.

7.6.5.5.1. For unit posturing, the intratheater tanker planner will send intends (intended tanker schedule or sortie allotment messages) to the Installation Control Center as soon as possible, normally no later than four hours prior to ATO push. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.5.2. Intratheater tanker planner will ensure complete executable tanker plan entered into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.5.3. ATO Production Team will produce ATO, ACO and SPINS for dissemination in accordance with coalition clearance levels. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.6. ***ACO Production Process*** (36 to 12 Hours):

7.6.5.6.1. Refer to ACP for complete airspace procedures.

7.6.5.6.2. Cross-check SPINS and ACO for conflicting information.

7.6.5.6.3. All AR airspace changes should be coordinated through the ARCT Chief. However, any tanker planner may coordinate with AMT plans for inputs to the ACO.

7.6.5.6.4. ARCT notifies units of changes to ACO.

7.6.5.7. Special Instructions Production Process (48 to 12 Hours):

7.6.5.7.1. ARCT Chief or MTP will receive and review feedback from units, Installation Control Center and ARDO. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.7.2. ARCT Chief or designated representative submits inputs to SPINS manager for JFACC approval.

7.6.5.8. ATO/ACO/SPINS Transition Process from Plans to Operations (12 hours to execution):

7.6.5.8.1. For major combat operations, ARCT creates the tanker execution portion of the ATO folder with next day's ATO/ACO/SPINS, TBMCS deconfliction sheet, fuel available spreadsheet, tanker flow sheet and comments on this ATO development cycle.

7.6.5.8.2. For other than major combat operations, intratheater tanker planner briefs ARDO on issues that may affect ATO/ACO execution.

7.6.5.8.3. ARDO will make changes to ATO/ACO during transition process with assistance as required from other ARCT members. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.9. ***Tanker Execution Process*** (12 Hours to ATO Closeout):

7.6.5.9.1. Review ATO coordination folder and provide feedback to MAAP cell, ARCT Chief/AMCT Chief/ALCT Chief and liaison officers as needed. **Note:** In smaller operations, a handover briefing from the intratheater tanker planner to the ARDO may accomplish this function.

7.6.5.9.2. Identify waiver authority for theater-assigned tankers.

7.6.5.9.3. In coordination with CCO, liaison officers and units, ensure support for receivers.

7.6.5.9.3.1. Determine additional fuel availability.

7.6.5.9.3.2. Ensure real-time tanker deconfliction by time and/or altitude.

7.6.5.9.3.3. Accomplish ATO/ACO/SPINS changes and enter changes into TBMCS if required. Send information to units as required.

7.6.5.9.3.4. Maintain liaison with Installation Control Center to update aircrew availability, airfield status, weather, status of alert jets and other factors affecting execution.

7.6.5.9.3.5. Consider different ROEs for coalition and US aircraft when matching tankers to receivers.

7.6.5.9.4. Coordinate real-time tanker diverts arising from operational considerations such as low fuel, weather, MX, DIP clearance, runway closures and changing tactical operations, etc.

7.6.5.9.4.1. Brief CCO on tanker plan.

7.6.5.9.4.2. Communicate changes to tanker aircraft and units.

7.6.5.9.4.3. Complete a detailed changeover brief between shifts to include:

7.6.5.9.4.3.1. Current weather conditions affecting the AOR.

7.6.5.9.4.3.2. Brief all current and pending ATO/ACO changes. (Check status of alert jets and aircrew availability.)

7.6.5.9.4.3.3. Current airborne picture including extra fuel available, late tankers and tanker/receiver cancellations.

7.6.5.9.4.3.4. Changes that affect tanker execution including track changes, guidance, airfield status and CCO/deputy of combat operations priorities.

7.6.5.9.4.3.5. Review ATO coordination folder with oncoming ARDO.

7.6.5.9.4.4. Ensure all daily ATO/ACO changes have been input into daily log and are accurate in the ATO/ACO.

7.6.5.9.4.5. Collect ATO closeout/mission analysis data in accordance with ARCT Chief direction.

7.6.5.9.4.6. Provide feedback to MAAP team, ARCT Chief and liaison officers, as needed.

7.6.5.10. ***ATO Closeout Process*** (End of Execution to 6 Hours). ARDO in coordination with the COD ensures ATO closeout and data collection and reporting. ARDO will provide tanker assessment feedback to SRD and ARCT Chief regarding items such as the ability to execute a tanker AR plan, tanker ground alert plan, tanker reliability plan, receiver supportability issues, and any other factors that affected the tanker portion of the ATO. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.11. ***Information Gathering and Analysis Process*** (Mission Assessment/Operational Assessment):

7.6.5.11.1. ARCT determines tanker effectiveness definition in coordination with AMD Chief and combat plans division chief/deputy (CPD Chief).

7.6.5.11.1.1. The number AR requested versus number AR supported (booms in the air) is used to show if the booms in the air are being used optimally (e.g., offload may be available; however, there may not be enough physical booms in the air).

7.6.5.11.1.2. Tanker sorties scheduled versus tanker sorties flown. If different, include reasons why (e.g., MX, weather, receiver cancel, late additions to the airfield suitability report).

7.6.5.11.1.3. Offload scheduled versus actual offload. Include numbers of missed ARs, receiver type and reason.

7.6.5.11.1.4. Amount of fuel dumped, and reasons why.

7.6.5.11.1.5. ARCT Chief develops courses of action and recommendation to present to chief of combat plans for incorporation in MAAP.

7.6.5.11.2. Ensure standardized format for situation report per theater intelligence reporting directive instructions.

7.6.5.11.3. Establish collection process with ARDO.

7.6.5.11.4. Collect mission report/situation report and ARDO execution data.

7.6.5.11.5. OAT will analyze collected data to determine if the tanker mission is effective and supporting JFC objectives under current guidance. **(T-3)**

7.6.5.12. ATO Tanker Tactics Process (Continuous):

7.6.5.12.1. Evaluate tanker airspace in coordination with AOC intelligence for threats to tankers and effect support to receivers.

7.6.5.12.2. Provide proactive tactics information and recommendations to AMD Chief and DIRMOBFOR as appropriate.

7.6.5.12.3. Coordinate with inbound aircrews/tasking agencies to ensure appropriate tactics-related information is available.

7.6.5.13. ***Air Refueling Control Team Outputs*** : Outputs include SPINS and ACO inputs, duty roster/contact list, ACM Requests, AR CONOPs, tanker pairing MAAP, ATO inputs, Available asset list, DIP clearances, arrival and departure procedures.

7.6.6. ***Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT)*** . The AMCT provides centralized control of all intratheater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA. The AMCT tasks, coordinates, and flight-follows subordinate air mobility units and mission forces. The AMCT directs/redirects air mobility forces in concert with air, space, and cyberspace operations forces to respond to changing requirements, priorities, and immediate execution limitations. The AMCT will deconflict all air mobility operations into, and out of, the AOR/JOA and facilitates integration of mobility assets into the ATO. **(T-2)** The AMCT's integration of direct-support and direct-support apportioned users, AECT, Mobility Air Forces Mobile C2 units (Contingency

Response Group/Contingency Response Element/Contingency Response Team), and other specialized functional requirements supports the total air mobility effort. On occasion, the AMCT coordinates with 618 AOC (TACC) to resolve problems and provide C2 information on air mobility operations. Alternatively, the AMD may establish an airlift execution officer to oversee airlift mission execution. The construct employed is at the discretion of the AOC/CC.

7.6.6.1. ***AMCT Chief*** . (AFSC: 11/12M). (Rank: O-5). The AMCT Chief directs or redirects air mobility forces to respond to requirements changes, higher priorities, or immediate execution limitations. The AMCT Chief will deconflict all air mobility operations into, out of, and within the AOR/JOA. The AMCT Chief maintains the execution process and communications connectivity for tasking, coordinating, and flight following with the AOC COD, subordinate air mobility units, and mission forces. The AMCT Chief will:

7.6.6.1.1. Exercise airlift C2 in the AMD and provide centralized control of all allocated, apportioned, and assigned airlift assets. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.2. Direct aircraft diverts when required. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.3. Plan and execute immediate airlift missions when necessary. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.4. Develop positive and secure launch procedures with the coordination of tactics, intelligence, IO, and under the guidance of the AMD Chief. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.5. Launch ground alert aircraft when required. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.6. Coordinate actions with appropriate AMD and AOC functional areas for ATO changes. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.7. Enter correct mission data inputs into automated systems. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.8. Act as AOR/JOA C2 focal point for all mobility Interface Control Cells, Contingency Response Group and fixed enroute Air Mobility Control Center locations. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.9. Monitor intertheater mobility crews staging within the AOR/JOA, as coordinated with 618 AOC (TACC). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.10. Monitor and report airfield capability issues (maximum (aircraft) on ground, fuel, materials handling equipment, etc.). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.11. Interface with 618 AOC (TACC) on intertheater airlift missions and other supporting theater AMD (if applicable) for intratheater missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.12. Operations report 3 reporting will be coordinated through the AOC Combat Report Cell. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.13. Monitor aerial port activities and movement of passengers and cargo. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.14. Coordinate with AFFOR staff A4, JFC/J4 staff, and DDOC to ensure processes established for total asset visibility effort. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.15. Be responsible for supporting the Airlift Duty Officer. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.16. Coordinate actions by off-station MX repair teams, and assist in support of theater air mobility MX. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.17. Ensure slot times (airspace and landing) are coordinated and deconflict with the appropriate agencies. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.18. Coordinate immediate airspace change requirements with AMD airspace managers prior to coordination with COD airspace managers. If the AMD does not have internal airspace management support, then coordinate directly with the AMT. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.19. Coordinate airlift planning and tactical support from the ALCT. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.20. Include air mobility operations in the theater ACP. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.21. Provide SPINS inputs, AMD read file, and events log. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.22. Update AMCT portion of the SITREP. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.1.23. Establish execution processes and alternate communication connectivity for tasking, coordinating and mission management with theater C2 agencies. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2. ***Airlift Execution Officer*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.6.2.1. The airlift execution officer is responsible to the AMCT Chief for performing C2 tasks of theater airlift operations (also known as senior director).

7.6.6.2.2. The airlift execution officer will:

7.6.6.2.2.1. Direct diverts. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.2. Plan and schedule immediate/urgent missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.3. Launch ground alert aircraft. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.4. Coordinate actions with appropriate AMD and AOC functions for ATO/ACO changes. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.5. Submit and follow-up on inputs for immediate/urgent missions to intelligence and airspace. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.6. Coordinate with Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on airlift mission integration into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.7. Coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC) on intertheater airlift missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.8. Identify/resolve issues in execution related to airfield limitations (e.g., maximum (aircraft) on ground, fuel, materials handling equipment, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination status). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.9. Coordinate airlift planning and tactical support from the ALCT for urgent or immediate missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.10. Acts as the AOR C2 focal point for all airlift Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group and enroute Air Mobility Control Center locations. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.11. Maintain and execute applicable Quick Reaction Checklists. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.12. Enter appropriate information into the event log. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.13. Utilize two-way communications capability for global, real-time, reliable and rapid information exchange with enroute sorties. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.2.2.14. Delegate duties to mission manager. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3. ***Airlift Mission Manager*** . (AFSC: 1C3X1/1C5X1) (Rank: E-5/E-7).

7.6.6.3.1. The Airlift Mission Manager updates mission data (e.g., additions, changes, and deletions) in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and ensure it reflects in TBMCS.

7.6.6.3.2. The Airlift Mission Manager will:

7.6.6.3.2.1. Update mission data (e.g., additions, changes and deletions) in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and reflect in TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.2. Enter mission movement data (arrivals, departures, etc.) and airlift advisories information in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems when mission support forces are not able. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.3. Ensure information in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and TBMCS is complete and accurate. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.4. Coordinate with Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on integration of air mobility mission into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.5. Aid in mission coordination, as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.6. Collect and record mission data. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.7. Maintain and execute applicable Quick Reaction Checklists. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.3.2.8. Maintain event logs. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4. ***Airlift Requirements Executor*** . (21R/2T2X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/-E7). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.1. Airlift requirements personnel working in the AMCT are responsible to the AMCT Chief for execution of the air mobility portion of the current ATO by monitoring and ensuring the timely flow of cargo and passengers.

7.6.6.4.2. Airlift requirements personnel will:

7.6.6.4.2.1. Coordinate with theater AFFOR A4 as appropriate, for aerial port capabilities. Recommend calling individual ports to confirm capabilities. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.2. Monitor aerial port materials handling equipment and provide in-transit visibility for the AMD. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.3. Monitor aerial port cargo-station inventories. Monitor force flow (unit line number) and theater priority movements. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.4. Monitor airlift execution and loads that require re-planning due to weather/MX cancel, diverts. Coordinate undelivered cargo with Airlift Requirements Planners as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.5. Execute validated immediate airlift requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.6. Maintain current cargo and passengers backlog reports for theater aerial ports. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.7. Maintain liaison with DDOC/AFFOR A4. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.8. Coordinate actions with appropriate AMD personnel for airlift missions executing current ATO. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.4.2.9. Maintain a daily event log. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5. ***AMD Logistics/Maintenance*** . (AFSC: 21A/2A5X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-8).

7.6.6.5.1. Duty Description. AMD logistics/MX (sometimes referred to as mobility aircraft recovery or MX recovery) personnel are responsible to the AMD Chief and direct, monitor, coordinate, control and expedite movement of aircraft equipment, supply spares and MX recovery teams for recovery of operationally-controlled mobility aircraft including intratheater and intertheater recoveries. Recoveries of disabled aircraft transiting or enroute through another MAJCOM/ Component Numbered AF theater will be coordinated with that MAJCOM/ Component Numbered AF staff and AOC/AMD. The AMD logistics/MX may be composed of MX, supply and transportation personnel. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2. AMD logistics/MX will:

7.6.6.5.2.1. Establish aircraft recovery responsibilities for mobility aircraft not mission capable or partially mission capable away from home-station in accordance with command-to-command relationships. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.2. Upon request, assist AFFOR A4 staff concerning aircraft beddown and intratheater off-station MX requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.3. Maintain liaison with respective AFFOR A4 staff concerning MX issues (e.g., time-compliance technical orders). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.4. Maintain a mission capability sourcing capability separate from the centralized Mobility Air Forces logistics support center. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.5. Provide inputs to AFFOR A4 staff on plans, execution, sustainment, and reachback issues as requested. Collaboration between the AFFOR A4 staff and AMD logistics/MX is essential. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.6. Obtain air mobility MX status for each beddown and point of delivery location from AFFOR A4 when requested. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.7. Monitor, control and implement priority movement of equipment, supply spares and MX Recovery Teams with ALCT requirements/aerial port control center, as appropriate. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.8. Follow current USAF, AMC and theater guidance for airlift of contaminated/contagious passengers, cargo and casualties. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.9. Provide MX expertise to AMD and DIRMOBFOR for waivers, as appropriate. Coordinate with respective theater AMD and/or wing agencies for facility requirements (e.g., fuel cell, jacking, and hangar space). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.5.2.10. Implement/develop supply project codes to facilitate special handling/shipment of mission capability supply spares or equipment. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6. ***Airlift Duty Officer*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.6.6.1. Duty Description. The Airlift Duty Officer is responsible to the AMCT Chief to perform liaison/integration duties between the AMD and COD in executing the ATO. The Airlift Duty Officer ensures the seamless execution of the airlift mission in the ATO while the liaison function also ensures a feedback loop exists to highlight COD impacts to the airlift mission (AMCT Chief or Airlift Execution Officer can assume the responsibilities of this position during smaller scale operations).

7.6.6.6.2. The Airlift Duty Officer will:

7.6.6.6.2.1. Coordinate with ATO/ACO changes with COD personnel. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.2. Coordinate mission changes with the airlift execution officer. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.3. Monitor the intertheater and intratheater air movement. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.4. Coordinate with the Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on integrating air mobility mission into TBMCS. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.5. Update the CCO about theater airlift. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.6. Update the AMD Chief and AMCT Chief regarding combat operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.6.2.7. Coordinate with AMCT Chief as necessary. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7. ***Flight Managers*** . (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O-2/O-3).

7.6.6.7.1. Duty Description. Flight Managers are Federal Aviation Administration and United States Air Force (USAF)-trained and certified aircraft dispatchers who perform many sortie-related tasks traditionally accomplished by aircrews serving as the primary point of contact for real-time support to Mobility Air Forces aircrews. Flight managers collaborate with aircraft commanders for the safety and operational control of sorties in collaboration with air traffic service agencies. **Note:** Position may be appropriate in some theaters, but not in others.

7.6.6.7.2. Flight Managers will:

7.6.6.7.2.1. Expedite mission accomplishment and ensure safety of flight. Flight managers perform final validation of information (e.g., weather, Notices to Airmen), and planning for assigned sorties. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.2. Create flight profiles. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.3. File flight plans. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.4. Produce and distribute aircrew departure papers. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.5. Provide direct support to Mobility Air Forces aircrews. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.6. Coordinate all relevant activities directly related to the accomplishment of the sortie according to military instructions and applicable civil regulations. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.7. Serve as primary agents on the ground responsible for sortie situational awareness, including knowledge of the position and the endurance of the airborne sortie at all times. Flight Managers are responsible for proactively flight following each Mobility Air Forces operational sortie and facilitating required changes in the plan during execution. **(T-3)**

7.6.6.7.2.8. Utilize two-way communications capability for global, real-time, reliable and rapid information exchange with enroute sorties. **(T-3)**

7.6.7. ***Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team*** . The AECT will conduct operational planning, scheduling and execution of intratheater AE missions. The AECT advises and briefs the AMD Chief on AE issues. The AECT provides C2 of all theater assigned/attached AE units/operations within the specified AOR/JOA and assists with intertheater AE operations arriving, departing or transiting the AOR/JOA. The AECT receives validated patient movement requirements from the Patient Movement Requirements Center supporting the AOR/JOA. The AECT Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System (TAES) manager will coordinate with theater medical planners and develop plans and strategies to determine appropriate force lay-down of AE ground forces and AE crews in support of joint patient movement operations. The AECT maintains secure and non-secure communications links with all AE elements, Patient Movement Requirements Centers, theater medical planners and the DDOC. The AECT should coordinate closely with the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell and Joint Personnel Recovery Center to establish/develop integrated AE support following Personnel Recovery operations. The AECT integrates its activities with the ARCT, AMCT, ALCT, and specialty/support functions to the maximum extent possible to support the total air mobility effort. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1. ***AECT Chief*** . (AFSC: 46F) (Rank O-5). The AECT Chief is directly responsible to the AMD Chief for operational planning, scheduling, and execution of AE missions and positioning of AE ground support assets. The AECT Chief monitors execution of AE missions, coordinates and communicates with theater planning cells and AE elements. The functional team duties include AE operations, AE plans, and TAES management. The AECT Chief will:

7.6.7.1.1. Monitor execution of the theater AE plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.2. Obtain validated patient movement requests from the appropriate Patient Movement Requirements Center supporting the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.3. Coordinate with deployed AE elements and component medical planners, component liaisons (NALE/MARLE/SPLE/SOLE/BCD) on AE issues within the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.4. Coordinate with deployed AE elements, component medical planners, and component liaisons for pre-planned intratheater airlift, the AMCT for immediate intratheater airlift, and 618 TACC for intertheater airlift requests. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.5. Ensure operational support of AE missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.6. Ensure the AE section of JAOP/Operations Order / theater AE plan is developed and coordinated. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.7. Coordinate logistics support for TAES forces. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.8. Establish information flow of airlift schedules and patient movements with supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center and AE ground support elements. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.9. Monitor and coordinate intertheater airlift supporting aeromedical evacuation requirements using Mobility Air Forces C2 Systems. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.10. Coordinate with AFFOR/A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish and facilitate seamless processes for in-transit visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between intertheater and intratheater airlift distribution channels. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.11. Apply precautionary measures to the movement of contaminated and/or contagious patients in accordance with AMC contamination and biological Concept of Operations and applicable directives. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.12. Keep the AMD Chief, DIRMOBFOR, AOC/CC, JFACC informed of significant events. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.13. Monitor and coordinate AE operations with other AOC divisions/teams/functions as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.14. Maintain real-time information on TAES capability (Unit Type Codes, equipment and personnel available) at each deployed location. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.15. Establish frequency requirements for AE channel missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.1.16. Notify supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center of scheduled missions to maintain patient in-transit visibility. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2. ***Aeromedical Evacuation Operations*** . (AFSC: 46F/4N0X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.7.2.1. Duty Description. AE operations is responsible to the AECT Chief for centralized control of intratheater AE operations and coordination of intertheater AE operations.

7.6.7.2.2. AE operations will:

7.6.7.2.2.1. Monitor theater AE missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.2. Coordinate with AMCT on AE ATO/ACO changes. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.3. Analyze patient movement requirements and coordinate airlift to meet AE requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.4. Analyze Patient Movement Requirements and task-appropriate AE elements to meet special medical requirements and pass mission information to the Patient Movement Requirements Center. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.5. Contact appropriate AE elements with airlift and patient information to ensure they properly prepare patients for the AE mission. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.6. Monitor patient movement. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.7. Establish information flow of airlift schedule and patient movements with appropriate AE element. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.2.8. Establish multimode secure and non-secure communications capability within the TAES. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.2.3. Aeromedical Evacuation Operations Process. In conjunction with the AE mission planning process, AECT operations personnel use this process to execute AE missions. AE plans and operations officers/noncommissioned officers should use the AE operations checklist to assist them with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.2.4. Initial Operations Process. Use this process at the outset of air mobility operations to integrate AE into the overall theater patient-movement plan, and upon new personnel assignment or rotation into the AECT. Use the AE initial operations checklist to assist with completion of the initial operations process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.2.5. Daily Operations Process. AECT plans and operations personnel use the daily operations process to conduct day-to-day AE operations. Use the AE daily operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.2.6. Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Planning Process. AECT personnel use the AE mission planning process in conjunction with the AE plans and AE operations process, to plan/execute AE missions. Use the AE mission-planning checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.3. ***Aeromedical Evacuation Plans*** . (AFSC: 46F/4N0X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E-7).

7.6.7.3.1. Duty Description. AE plans is responsible to the AECT Chief for planning and scheduling of AE missions.

7.6.7.3.2. AE Plans will:

7.6.7.3.2.1. Develop and establish a theater AE plan in conjunction with theater AE policy. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.2. Notify supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center of scheduled missions to maintain patient in-transit visibility. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.3. Establish information flow of airlift movement plan (schedule) and patient movements with deployed AE elements. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.4. Coordinate with the ALCT, AMCT, 618 AOC (TACC), and other agencies as appropriate to support AE airlift missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.5. Coordinate with the appropriate Patient Movement Requirements Center for validated mission requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.6. Coordinate with DDOC on integration of patient movement priorities into the JFC priority list to meet AE requirements and optimize the use of limited airlift assets. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.7. Establish frequency requirements for AE channel missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.8. Coordinate with the SRD, CPD, component liaisons (NALE, MARLE, SPLE, SOLE) and theater medical planners (joint/component/coalition) for integration of AE operations into theater patient movement plan and JAOP/Operations Order. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.9. Provide mission information to the Patient Movement Requirements Center and deployed AE elements for patient in-transit visibility. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.2.10. Assist in the development of a theater repatriation plan with the Joint Personnel Recovery Center as required. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.3.3. Aeromedical Evacuation Plans Process. AECT plans personnel use the AE plans process in conjunction with the AE mission planning process, to plan AE missions. Use the AE plans checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.7 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.3.4. Initial Operations Process. Use this process at the outset of air mobility operations to integrate AE into the overall theater patient movement plan, and upon new personnel assignment or rotation into the AECT. Use the AE initial operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.7 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.3.5. Daily Operations Process. AECT plans and operations personnel use the daily operations process to conduct day-to-day AE operations. Use the AE daily operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.7 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs**)**.

7.6.7.3.6. Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Planning Process. AECT personnel use this process in conjunction with AE plans and AE operations processes, to plan/execute AE missions. Use the AE mission planning checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.7 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.7.4. Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System Management. (AFSC: 41A) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

7.6.7.4.1. Duty Description. TAES will provide AE expertise within the AOC/AMD. TAES addresses TAES-specific issues at the appropriate level, manages deployed AE elements, and coordinates with theater medical planners on integration of AE support into the theater patient movement plan. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2. TAES will:

7.6.7.4.2.1. Coordinate with deployed AE elements, Joint Task Force and user service (United States Navy, USAF and special operations forces) medical planners on AE issues within the AOR. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.2. Coordinate movement of TAES equipment and personnel. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.3. Coordinate logistics support for TAES forces. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.4. Maintain real-time information on TAES capability (Unit Type Codes, equipment and personnel available) at each deployed location. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.5. Collect daily situation reports from deployed AE elements and provide to appropriate personnel (delegate this duty to AECT ops or plans when a TAES manager is not assigned). **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.6. Provide measures and indicators inputs to future operations applicable to TAES. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.2.7. Brief AECT Chief, AMD Chief, on TAES information. **(T-3)**

7.6.7.4.3. TAES Management Process. The process used by the AECT TAES manager to coordinate AE deployment and redeployment operations into the Theater Patient Movement Plan. Also, use the TAES management process to manage AE personnel and equipment Unit Type Codes and associated logistical support. Use the TAES management checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3-3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.8. ***Air Mobility Division Support Activities*** . **Note:** The following applies in the event of embedded specialty and support functions within the AMD. If not embedded, the described specialty and support functions, AMD and the pertinent specialty and support teams will coordinate these activities. (**T-3**)

7.6.8.1. ***AMD Intelligence Support*** . (AFSC: 14N/1N0X1) (Rank: O-3/O-4, E-5/E--7) Air Mobility Intelligence Support is responsible for all intelligence required for planning and executing theater airlift and AR missions (ensure security and program clearance).The AMD may be augmented by ISR Division personnel that are responsible for evaluating ISR information for its effect on air mobility planning, execution, and force protection. The AMD does not produce ISR information but uses ISR information and products developed by other ISR division functions within the AOC. Refer to **chapter 6** for a complete description of ISR analysis, unit support, targeting, and operations that will help support AMD processes. AMD Intelligence Support will:

7.6.8.1.1. Identify and forward to the ISRD all DIRMOBFOR and AMD Chief priority intelligence requirements, essential elements of information, collection requirements, RFIs, and requests for assistance. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.2. Interface with other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions within the AOC to ensure the most current information on surface operations is being linked to air, space, and cyberspace operations and the airspace structure. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.3. Coordinate and provide intelligence for planned or immediate air mobility missions and force protection information, including direct and coordinated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to airdrop planning and execution. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.4. Work closely with ISRD to develop the theater intelligence reporting directive to ensure mobility fields are included in the standardized theater mission report format. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.5. Coordinate with other theater intelligence functions and the command net to supply required intelligence information. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.6. Assist ISRD unit support with ensuring quality, timeliness and dissemination of intratheater mobility asset mission reports. ISRD will ensure the AMD receives and assesses the impact of mobility mission reports in a timely manner. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.7. Assist in planning and execution of intratheater airlift, airdrop, AE, and AR missions. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.8. Assess threat at theater airfields and landing zone / Drop Zones and assist airlift/tanker tactics planner with the development of airfield threat matrices. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.9. Provide recommendation to AMD AMCT/ALCT based on threat situation for all secure launch missions through the Threat Working Group. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.10. Monitor threats to mobility missions in execution, identify changes to the Operational Environment and work with airlift/tanker tactics planners to recommend mission changes to appropriate C2 nodes. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.1.11. Support deployed intelligence assets at Contingency Response Group locations and Mobility Air Forces unit locations. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2. ***Air Mobility Division Knowledge Operations (AMD KO)*** . (AFSC: 1D7X1) (Rank: E-4 - E-7). The AMD KO is responsible to the AMD Chief for all administrative functions, to include AMD client support administrator. AMD KO will:

7.6.8.2.1. Prepare and disseminate messages, reports, schedules and general correspondence. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.2. Maintain message traffic logs, read files, suspense control documents, classified and unclassified files, file plan and publications. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.3. Suspense control documents, classified, unclassified and publication files. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.4. Ensure proper procedures for handling, dissemination, storage and destruction of classified material. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.5. Provide administrative support and materials to all functional areas of the AMD. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.6. Post briefings to the appropriate website. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.7. Monitor security requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.2.8. Establish and maintain an air mobility historical database. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.3. **Airspace Management** . (AFSC: 1C1X1) (Rank: E-5/E-7) Airspace Management acts as the JFACC's focal point for coordinating airspace matters with civilian/coalition airspace authorities. The AMD may have organic airspace management personnel that coordinate air mobility airspace requests and issues with the AOC airspace managers to ensure air mobility airspace requests and issues are integrated into ATO, ACO, and ACP production and execution. Airspace Management will:

7.6.8.3.1. Interface with AOC/theater airspace managers to obtain or deconflict AMD airspace requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.3.2. Maintain current display of the theater operating locations, airspace structure, and airspace coordinating measures as necessary to support air mobility operations. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.3.3. Integrate with intelligence, IO, and airlift tactics to create/adjust airspace coordinating measures based on the threat and integrate airspace coordinating measure change requests with COD and AMT. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.3.4. Coordinate with airlift tactics to publish appropriate information in the SPINS and ACO. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.3.5. Link current information on surface operations to AMD airspace planning, and ensure compatibility with AOC operations airspace structure. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4. ***AMD Communications Support*** . (AFSC: 1D7X1) (Rank: E-5/E-7). AMD communications support personnel are responsible to the AMD Chief for ensuring all AMD communications requirements are rapidly established and maintained. The size and make-up of the AMD communications package will be determined by the ability of the AOC Communications Team (ACT) to support the unique requirements of the AMD during a specific exercise or contingency. The AMD Communications Team will:

7.6.8.4.1. Act as the single focal point for tracking and resolving all AMD communications issues. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4.2. Coordinate with CFP on computer/software problems that team cannot correct. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4.3. Establish and maintain all AMC provided deployable communications equipment in direct support of the AMD. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4.4. Coordinate with AMC for user access to mobility specific C2 systems such as GDSS and Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4.5. Coordinate with supporting AFFOR/A6 and ACOMS for any non-organic communications support including but not limited to network access, telephone connectivity and frequency requirements. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.4.6. Maintain a Master Station Log and log all AMD communications issues that require action. **(T-3)**

7.6.8.5. Army Liaison Officer. The Army Liaison Officer provides liaison with appropriate Army organizations and special staff assistance to the Air Force Commander. Assign liaison officers to the appropriate Army organization with duty at the supported Air Force headquarters. The liaison officers will participate in all training events for and operations of the supported organization. **(T-3)**

7.6.9. ***Specialty Teams Supporting the Air Mobility Division*** . Reference **Chapter 8** for more details on the following supporting functions:

7.6.9.1. Weather. WST will provide environmental impacts on intratheater and intertheater airlift assets, missions and beddown locations during planning and execution to the AMD Chief and disseminate appropriately to AMD personnel. **(T-3)**

7.6.9.2. Communications. Communications personnel support the entire AOC by providing C2 communications system ISR support and communication architecture to facilitate ATO production, dissemination, execution and combat operation assessment.

7.6.9.3. NKO. The NKO team is the JFACC's theater focal point for NKO planning and execution. The NKO team integrates into all AOC divisions and provides dedicated support to the SRD, CPD, COD and ISRD. If the AMD needs dedicated NKO support for mobility operations, AMC/A3D provides assistance.

7.6.9.4. Airspace Management. AMT acts as the JFACC's focal point for coordinating airspace matters with civilian/coalition airspace authorities.

7.6.9.5. AOC Legal Advisor. The AOC legal advisor serves as the single point of contact to the JFACC for all operational legal issues within the AOC, coordinates all legal inputs from other JAs and ensures uniform legal advice in the AOC.

7.6.9.6. Combat Support Team. The Combat Support Team supports all AOC sections with combat support information for recurring reports. At a minimum, Combat Support Team maintains logistics status reports, combat support status reports and ensures automated planning systems data and other combat support-related decision tools reflect the most current information. AMD logistics/MX will coordinate with Combat Support Team for air mobility aircraft information. **(T-3)**

Chapter 8

SPECIALTY/SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

8.1. General. The specialty/support functions provide the AOC with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate theater air operations power. Agencies external to the AOC organization provide many of these capabilities to the AOC. It is crucial to the success of the AOC to integrate these capabilities into the air operations planning and execution process to ensure the best use of available assets. The AFFOR staff coordinates regularly with the AOC and often provides specialized expertise. The following paragraphs list specialty/support functions.

8.2. Component Liaisons. Component liaisons work for their respective component commanders and with the JFACC, AFFOR staff and AOC. Each component normally provides liaison elements (BCD, SOLE, NALE, MARLE, SPLE) that work within the AOC. These liaison elements consist of experienced specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. They help integrate and coordinate their component's participation in JAOP. The AOC may require other liaison augmentation to support mission operations such as Coast Guard, space forces, cyberspace forces, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 16 AF, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Aviation Administration and other organizations in various operational and support areas.

8.2.1. ***Battlefield Coordination Detachment*** . The Army Service component commander provides the BCD as a liaison element to the Service component commander designated as the JFACC or to the Air Force Service component if a JFACC is not designated. The BCD is a liaison element and supports the integration of Army Forces air and ground maneuver operations, with air component operations. Integrate BCD personnel into AOC divisions to support planning, operations, air and missile defense, intelligence, airlift/logistics, airspace control, and communications. In particular, the BCD coordinates ground force priorities, requests, and items of interest. One of the BCD's most important functions is to coordinate boundary line and fire-support coordination line changes and timing. The BCD brings ground order of battle (friendly and enemy), situational awareness and expertise into the AOC, and will normally brief the ground situation/intelligence update. The BCD may also provide current ground situation inputs to AOC teams for incorporation into daily briefings and intelligence summaries. When the Commander, Army Forces is the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), the BCD may expedite coordination of air component operations and fires within the CFLCC operating area.

8.2.2. ***Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element*** . The principal responsibility of the NALE is to represent Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) interests with the JFACC and AOC. The JFMCC should establish a NALE to meet maritime scheme of maneuver and coordination requirements. The NALE consists of Navy personnel facilitating integration of JFMCC / Network Control Center guidance and intent into JAOP. The NALE coordinates the inclusion of JFMCC objectives and maritime requirements in the JFACC AOD, advocates the inclusion of JFMCC targets into the joint integrated prioritized target list, and collaborates on maritime airspace requirements and development of appropriate airspace coordinating measure. The NALE facilitates integration of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander ABP into the ATO, deconflicts all naval air and surface activities in the JFACC's

ATO, and assists air missions planning when necessary. The NALE monitors execution of JAOP, ensuring effects on maritime targets, and integration/coordination of organic missions in support of maritime operations. The NALE Tomahawk land attack missile representative plays an important role in Tomahawk land attack missile coordination, including airspace coordinating measures with the AOC. As collaboration tools and network-centric operations between the AOC, the MOC, and the CTFs become more enhanced and reliable, the NALE activities will become more focused on those activities requiring rapid or uninterruptable responses for JFMCC support. When the Commander, Navy Forces is the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC), the NALE may expedite coordination of air component operations and fires with the CFMCC operating area.

8.2.3. ***Marine Liaison Element*** . The MARLE represents the Commander, Marine Corps Forces and his associated Aviation Combat Element Commander. The MARLE support the JFACC in integrating Marine Air-Ground Task Force fires, maneuver, and Marine air into the theater campaign and supporting JAOP. This team will be well versed in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander's guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support aviation plan.

8.2.4. ***Space Liaison Element*** . CDRUSSPACECOM is the supported commander for space operations. The CSpOC provides a COP to the Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) to enable broad, shared awareness of critical information requirements, status of forces, and full range of militaryactivities arranged in time, space, and purpose. The SPLE is the senior space advisor to the JFACC and represents the CFSCC, with broad space expertise, theater familiarity, and advice on the planning, executing, and assessing of space operations. The SPLE facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities on behalf of the CFSCC to include providing support for joint space operations to the JFACC. Space Control includes defensive and offensive space control. The entire joint force (air, space, land, maritime, cyberspace, and special operations forces) conducts space control operations across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Space control operations include protective and defensive measures to ensure friendly forces can continuously conduct space operations across the entire spectrum of conflict; and operations to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities.

8.2.4.1. Defensive Space Control. Active and passive measures taken to protect friendly space capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards. Defensive Space Control operations preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its advantage. Active and passive actions both protect friendly space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. Friendly space-related capabilities include space systems such as satellites, terrestrial systems such as ground stations, and communication links. Defensive Space Control is key to enabling continued exploitation of space by the US and its allies by protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly space-related capabilities before, during, and after an attack by an adversary.

8.2.4.2. Offensive Space Control. Offensive operations conducted for space negation. Offensive Space Control operations hinder an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. Offensive Space Control operations may target an adversary's space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, links, or third party space capability), using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means. As adversaries become more dependent on space capabilities, space control operations have the ability to produce effects that directly affect

their ability and will to wage war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Denying adversary space capabilities may hinder their ability to effectively organize, coordinate, and orchestrate a military campaign.

8.2.4.3. Space control operations support both the space control mission of United States Space Command and theater military operations. United States Space Command mission includes surveillance of space, protection of US and friendly space systems, prevention of an adversary's ability to use space systems for hostile purpose, and negation of adversarial capability if necessary.

8.2.5. ***Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)*** . The Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander, or Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force provides a SOLE to the JFACC to coordinate and integrate special operations force activities in the entire operational environment. The SOLE coordinates, integrates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all SOF air, surface and subsurface activities by providing a SOF presence in all the AOC divisions. The joint SOLE is comprised of representatives from special operations forces aviation, intelligence, airspace, logistics, AF Special Tactics Teams, Army Special Forces, Navy Sea-Air Land Teams, and Marine Special Operations Forces, as required. Depending upon command structure agreements, the SOLE may, or may not represent coalition or allied special operations forces. SOLE personnel coordinate, integrate and synchronize with various AOC functional areas to ensure that all special operations forces targets, special operations forces teams, and special operations forces air tasks and/or missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated during planning and execution phases. The prevention of fratricide is a critical objective of the SOLE's efforts.

8.2.5.1. Specific SOLE functions include but are not limited to: Inputs into JFACC strategy development, inputs into ATO and ACO development, real-time mission support coordination with the Special Operations Task Group with special emphasis on airspace deconfliction, operational and intelligence inputs into the targeting process, and close coordination with the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell/Joint Personnel Recovery Center.

8.2.5.2. As the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander / Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force and the JFACC share a common environment throughout the entire operational environment, they must integrate special operations forces aviation and surface forces into joint air, space, and cyberspace operations planning and execution to prevent fratricide, duplication of effort, and conflict. Active SOLE participation in the development of air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy and the supporting plans to the theater campaign plan ensures that special operations forces efforts will, in fact be a force multiplier for the theater campaign plan.

8.2.5.3. Special operations forces normally pursue special operations forces-unique objectives, which prepare, shape or enhance broader JFC objectives. They may also operate in support of conventional objectives or require conventional support of their objectives, which requires SOLE coordination with the AOC for joint special operations.

8.2.5.4. Additionally, SOLE will provide inputs and guidance to the NKE Team. It acts as the focal point for raising JFACC concerns or military information support operations objectives/tasking to the JFC for consideration, planning, and execution. SOLE provides support to the NKE team's Mission Information Support Operations (MISO) effort to

synchronize and deconflict MISO with air, space, and cyberspace operations (leaflet drops, message broadcasts, and aircraft missions are included in the ATO, etc.).

8.2.6. ***Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers*** . Liaison officers representing coalition/allied forces are integrated into the AOC and improve situational awareness regarding the disposition of friendly forces, especially when those forces do not have a mature TACS. They are also essential for unity of effort for coalition air and missile defense operations and airspace deconfliction. Liaison officers who possess sufficient foreign and English language skills, or if teamed with linguists, can also help overcome language barriers with remote allied/coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an immature theater, the AOC/CC should anticipate the need for liaison officers and actively seek them out via the JFC staff, in-country military group, staff country team, or direct contact with coalition forces. Normally use the request for forces process, either in the operational pre-planning or during specific operations, to request these liaisons. Request specific expertise to assist in planned or continuing operations.

8.2.7. ***Other Liaisons*** . The COMAFFOR/JFACC may require other liaison augmentation to support AOC functions, to include: unit-level; United States Coast Guard; DIA; National Security Agency; CIA; Drug Enforcement Agency; Citizenship and Immigration Services; Customs and Border Patrol; FAA; or other federal agencies or departments and allied personnel in various operational and support areas.

8.3. Air and Missile Defense Command. As the senior Army air and missile defense element at the AADC's location, the AAMDC serves as the primary interface at the AOC for all land-based active air and missile defense. The AAMDC is normally under the operational control of the Commander, Army Forces. When directed by the JFC, AAMDC assets may directly support or be under tactical control of the JFACC/AADC as appropriate. The roles of the AAMDC include Senior Army Air Defense Artillery lead and theater Army air and missile defense coordination. Coordination and liaison functions between all three components and coalition partners are essential to effective air and missile defense operations within a given theater. The AAMDC and AOC intelligence personnel build a collaborative air and missile defense intelligence preparation of the operational environment, which serves as the basis for joint theater air and missile defense strategies and plans. The AAMDC (attack operations section in coordination with the intelligence section) submits theater missile target nominations directly to the AOC for inclusion as JFACC nominated targets. The AAMDC also sends a robust liaison officer team (active defense, intelligence, and attack operations personnel) to support the JFACC and AADC requirements and may deploy the AAMDC Tactical Operations Center to the JFACC AADC location.

8.4. Combat Reports Cell (CRC). (Any AFSC) (Rank E-3-O-4). The combat reports cell reports directly to the CCO for guidance and direction. Given the KM nature of CRC responsibilities, CCO may designate the CRC as the COD KM representative and/or assign the CRC directly to the AOC KM team to represent COD KM requirements. However, CRC must adhere to the AOC KMP regardless of the organization ties to the AOC KM team. The manning of the combat reports cell is contingent upon the level of operations. Unless the AOC Commander assigns responsibility to knowledge operations personnel elsewhere in the AOC, combat reports personnel are the focal point for collection of current operations information provided to the AOC by all elements of the TACS and employed forces. Required reports address the operational status of forces, weapons, and control system equipment employed by an AOC. Reports cell personnel are responsible for collection and consolidation of COD inputs to the JFACC update briefing and the daily situation report. Should be knowledgeable on US Message Text Format and understand how to complete

additional reports such as Operational Taskings, Operations Reports, nuclear, biological and chemical reports, and search and rescue requests. Personnel are required to access and manipulate sortie data within the TBMCS database; parse the ATO; coordinate and obtain results of flying operations from other agencies within the AOC; establish computer information pipeline requirements (Non-secure IP Router Network, Secret IP Router Network, UNCLAS e-mail, Coalition networks, TBMCS, etc.); post JFACC briefings to the Secret IP Router Network; and perform any other duties assigned by the JFACC.

8.5. Airspace Management Team. (AFSC: 13M/13B/1C1/1C5) (Rank: 0-4 - O-5/E-4 - E-8). The airspace management team assists with the procedural deconfliction air space and provides the JFACC a single point of contact for airspace matters. The team is responsible for producing the ACP. The goal of the AMT is to enhance air, land, maritime and special operations forces components' effectiveness in accomplishing the JFC's objectives, while decreasing the potential for fratricide. Effectively coordinating, integrating and de-conflicting airspace and Coordination Measures within the joint/Coalition AOR accomplishes this objective. The AMT is a cross-functional specialty team with representatives in CPD and COD.

8.5.1. ***Airspace Management Team Inputs*** . AOC divisions and cells, the International Civil Aviation Organization, FAA, host nation, neighboring nations, Nongovernmental Organization, and the United Nations (UN) may all place requirements and/or restrictions on use of airspace. Inputs may include ACM requests from all airspace users (e.g., components, coalition), host nation restrictions, coalition members, and components, in addition to existing airspace restrictions (e.g., civil airways, host nation/component air traffic control, and threats to aircraft).

8.5.2. **Airspace Management Team Outputs** . The ACP may be stand-alone or part of the JAOP. ACO and ACO changes, properly formatted IAW US Message Text Format (USMTF) requirements. ACM requests to identify conflicts and to assist in the coordination with various airspace users. When all conflicts have been resolved or the associated risks accepted, the ACO will be generated, validated IAW USMTF standards, and disseminated through appropriate USMTF message handling system or available via posting on AOC webpage.

8.5.3. **Airspace Management Team Chief** . (AFSC: 13M/13B) (Rank: O-3/O-4).

8.5.3.1. Directs operations of the AMT supporting all AOC airspace needs especially within the CPD and COD. The AMT Chief is responsible for the development/currency of the ACP; the development, generation, and dissemination of the ACO; and the development, generation and dissemination of all applicable changes to the daily ACO. The AMT Chief is normally the senior airfield operations officer in the AOC.

8.5.3.2. Acts as the AOC/CC's focal point for coordinating all airspace matters with civilian/coalition/host nation airspace authorities and users. Ensures sufficient trained and qualified manning is available to support JFACC mission needs.

8.5.4. ***Airspace Management Team Superintendent*** . (AFSC 1C1 or 1C5D) (Rank E-8). The AMT superintendent provides oversight and direction to the enlisted members of the AMT and reports to the AMT Chief. The AMT superintendent also fulfills the duties of the AMT Chief in his or her absence and is normally the senior Air Traffic Control non-commissioned officer in the AOC. His specific duties are the same as the AMT Chief.

8.5.5. ***Airspace Management Technicians*** . (AFSC 1C1 or 1C5). (Rank E-4-E-7). The AMTs work for the AMT superintendent.

8.5.6. The AMT will:

8.5.6.1. Develop, generate, disseminate, execute, and manage the ACP and daily ACO and any required changes as they occur. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.2. Identify conflicts with airspace control means requests and facilitate airspace integration/deconfliction utilizing appropriate automation tools. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.3. Ensure airspace integration/real-time airspace C2 is coordinated with appropriate tactical C2 nodes. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.4. Provide inputs on airspace considerations for ATO development and execution. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.5. Coordinate with the integrated air and missile defense planners, ATO Production Team, MAAP Team, COD teams, and other airspace liaisons and users on matters concerning ACP/ACO development, production, dissemination, and changes. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.6. Assist in procedural deconfliction between airspace coordinating measures entered into the current airspace tool and interface with the C2 nodes for effective real-time airspace integration. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.7. Input and evaluate airspace coordinating measure requests based on the ACP separation rules and JFACC priorities in the AOD. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.8. Provide expertise on operating within existing Air Traffic Control and civil airspace systems. **(T-3)**

8.5.6.9. Coordinate with the Air Traffic Control cell, International Civil Aviation Organization, joint/coalition/host nation and other airspace users as required. **(T-3)**

8.5.7. Airspace Management Team Limitations.

8.5.7.1. Cannot provide real-time tracking of airspace use or aircraft within active airspace coordinating measures.

8.5.7.2. Cannot identify airspace coordinating measure conflicts that no one has entered into the appropriate automation tool.

8.5.7.3. Cannot provide battlefield data such as fire support coordination line, forward edge of the battle area, forward line of own troops, or other fire support coordinating measures unless coordinated and entered into airspace tool following coordination with the BCD.

8.5.7.4. In accordance with the DoD F*oreign Clearance Manual*, requests for DIP clearances are the responsibility of the unit to which aircraft are assigned. Tracking progress of DIP clearances is the responsibility of the Service component (AFFOR staff, Marine Forces staff, etc.) to which the unit is assigned.

8.6. Non-Kinetic Team (NKT).

8.6.1. General. The NKT is a single organization that serves as an administrative grouping of non-kinetic subject matter experts. The NKT serves as the JFACC's theater focal point for planning, execution, and assessment of non-kinetic operations. (See AFTTP 3-3.AOC for additional information.) These processes primarily apply to geographic AOCs. Global AOCs may have different organizations and processes. NKT should coordinate with other NKT for support, unity of effort, and situational awareness when necessary. The AOC NKT includes strategy, planning, execution, and assessment capabilities in electronic warfare, MISO, operations security, military deception, counter propaganda, and engagements. The AOC NKT coordinates with AFCYBER and 616 OC for defensive cyberspace operations. AOC NKT coordinates with the theater space component for space control and other space effects. In addition, the NKT often serves as NKE capabilities, and non-kinetic operations capability specialists for the AFFOR staff.

8.6.1.1. Non-Kinetic Duty Officer (NKDO). The NKDO is the focal point on the AOC floor for all IW and non-kinetic operations and works directly for the CCO in support of SADO and SODO. The NKDO coordinates directly with each team across COD and with other divisions to synchronize and layer kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. Brief SODO/SADO on the non-kinetic synchronization matrix for when non-kinetic assets are available to support operations. The NKDO should be experienced in multiple non-kinetic disciplines and may fulfill several NKO team functions. For example, an experienced EWO assigned as the NKDO may also fill the role of Electronic Warfare Duty Officer (EWDO). The NKDO should be familiar with enemy NK threats, NK defenses, threats to cyber and space operations, spectrum management requirements, and deconfliction.

8.6.1.2. Non-Kinetic Duty Technician (NKDT). The NKDT works directly for the NKDO and ensures the various functions of non-kinetic operations are performed. Act as non-kinetic operations equipment outage POC, coordinates with CFP/help desk for all system MX issues related to IW Operations Team equipment (e.g., radios, computers, and telephones). Maintain NKDO logbook and ensure end-of-shift compilation of significant events from the IW Operations Team logs.

8.6.1.3. Electronic Warfare Duty Officer (EWDO): The EWDO coordinates the employment of all EW assets in the ATO by working closely with the EWCC duty officer during the preparation and execution of EW missions. Although the EWDO is a function under the NKDO, the EWDO's duties may be performed by the same person who acts as the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Duty Officer (SEADDO). In such situations, the NKDO should not be tasked with EWDO duties in order to avoid saturating the NKDO.

8.6.1.4. Interdiction Duty Officer (IDO). Responsible for management of all interdiction assets assigned or made available (to include joint/coalition assets).

8.6.1.5. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Duty Officer (SEADDO). The SEADDO coordinates the employment of SEAD assets in the ATO. The SEADDO coordinates closely with the EWDO.

8.6.1.6. Closer Air Support Duty Officer (CASDO). Coordinates and monitors the employment of CAS missions and with the other ODOs/BCD/Air Support Operations Center for non-CAS missions short of the fire support coordination line.

8.6.2. NKT normally supports each step of the air tasking cycle by integrating NKT members into divisions and teams, including SGT, SPT, OAT, TET, MAAP Team, ACF, ISRD Targets Team, and duty positions in the COD. NKT members should attend training based on commander determination of principal duty position during contingency operations. For example, a crewmember assigned to be a NKDO should attend COD initial qualification training.

8.6.3. As the team lead, the NKT Chief handles administrative non-kinetic operations issues for the team. At a minimum, the NKT Chief will address non-kinetic effects issues, including: organization, training, and equipping issues; manning and personnel issues (including annual reports); financial issues; and team member work schedules, including whom should attend which meetings or working groups. **(T-3)**

8.6.4. At a minimum, there should be one subject matter expert for each of the functions described in the following sections. If manning does not allow for separate subject matter experts to perform each of the functions listed in the subsequent sections, the NKT Chief will identify an individual to be responsible for each function and ensure proper training. **Note:** operations security is a commander's program and the commander formally appoints the OPSEC Program Manager for the command. The AOC operations security point of contact may be the Program Manager for the entire Component Major Command/ Component Numbered AF or just a coordinator (depending on who the commander appoints. NKT members may come from any AFSC, however, 12B/F/R, 14N, 17D/17S, 14F, 1B4, 1NX are the most common AFSCs on the team, with 35P supporting synchronization and deconfliction with command information and media activities. NKT members should attend applicable division training. **(T-3)**

8.6.5. NKT members will lead or participate in various cells and working groups, related to their particular specialty. Working groups are enduring or ad hoc organizations within the AOC formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The working group consists of a core functional group and other staff and capability specialists. The cells and working groups may include: Information Operations Working Group (IOWG), OPSEC Working Group, MISO Working Group, Military Deception (MILDEC) Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, offensive cyberspace working group, defensive cyberspace working group, Combat Information Cell, Threat Working Group, joint working groups and the Special Technical Operations working group. **(T-3)**

8.6.6. Depending on mission tasking and available manpower, the AOC Commander may modify the organizational structure of the NKT. If the situation arises where other non-kinetic and/or IW capabilities require inclusion on the NKT (such as Public Affairs) or existing manpower is augmented, the team may be adapted. If, for example, electronic warfare or cyberspace missions and manning increase, there may be a need to have a Cyberspace team, an Electronic Warfare team or even a combined Cyberspace/Electronic Warfare Cell in addition to the NKT. In major combat operations, the COD may need a NKDO team to monitor and make dynamic changes during execution. These additional team(s) would normally

operate independently of, but should integrate planning and execution efforts with the NKT via the IOWG. See AFTTP 3-3.AOC for additional information.

8.6.7. Ensure full integration of the NKT with special technical operations planning.

8.6.8. The Component Commander's Communication Strategy is the commander's process to coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions to support operational-level, communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. This process should coordinate with those above, below and adjacent to deliver a mutually supporting communication to the intended audiences. At a minimum, the Component Commander's Communication Strategy is comprised of an activity synchronization chart in support of component inform and influence related objectives, and consolidated lists of talking points for specific audiences of concern. Although the NKE planner (or designated communication synchronization lead) is the overall responsible person to develop the Component Commander's Communication Strategy, all AOC planners will be involved in the process.

8.6.9. The NKT Chief will serve as the primary focal point coordinating with the AFFOR staff, higher headquarters, and other government and military agencies in support of non-kinetic effects and activities. **(T-3)**

8.6.10. Normally, several individuals will support NK planning. NK Planners will:

8.6.10.1. Provide, as needed, subject matter expert support to all AOC divisions and AOC processes. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.2. Coordinate with Combatant Command, service component, AOC, AFFOR staff planners and reach back entities on operational issues, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.3. Provide inputs and insights into all component planning efforts. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.4. Integrate behavioral, media, and nodal analysis considerations into appropriate AOC processes, especially the targeting process. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.5. Work with planners to ensure all plans support the Component Commander's Communication Strategy to the maximum extent possible and minimize misinterpretation of friendly actions as being counter to Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.6. In coordination with appropriate planners, develop and plan for the use of non-kinetic capabilities to meet objectives and support the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.7. Synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions to support the JFC's objectives for adversary as well as those that communicate to neutral and friendly audiences. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.8. Support the joint planning process for air throughout the entire process. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.9. Ensure identification and analysis of stakeholders, including key communicators, potentials, and tendencies. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.10. Ensure identification, analysis, and segmenting of specific audiences occurs. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.11. Ensure analysis of cognitive dimension within the information environment. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.12. Ensure analysis of narrative, themes, and messages. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.13. Ensure higher authorities' themes, messages, images, and actions are included in planning. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.14. Develop (or assist in developing) and maintain a Component Commander's Communication Strategy for audiences of concern. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.15. Ensure air component words and actions are mutually supportive, consistent, and are aligned with Component and CCDR guidance and objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.16. Ensure development of assessment measures and indicators to assess performance and effects achievement that result from NKE and relate them to NKE-related objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.17. Develop and maintain a synchronization chart depicting all projected NKE-related activities and their relationship with measures of performance, measure(s) of effectiveness, and relevant objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.18. Develop or help develop the consolidated staff estimate, key audience identification and segmentation, message/action alignment, stakeholder analysis, desired effects, desired communication means/conduits, identification of high-payoff individuals, risk assessment, decision points, and assessment measures and means. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.19. Provide Signature Management recommendations through operations security and military deception personnel to maximize desired effects of planned activities. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.20. Inform Public Affairs of planned activities, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.21. Coordinate assessment and intelligence support (including the submittal of RFIs). **(T-3)**

8.6.10.22. Coordinate with other NKE Teams for support, unity of effort, and situational awareness. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.23. Assign NKDO duties as needed to include:

8.6.10.23.1. Monitor the execution for all NKE activities performed to meet objectives or the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.23.2. Maintain NKE situational awareness and recommend changes to on-going operations or future plans, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.23.3. Provide assessment inputs and updates for all activities performed to meet objectives related to NKE or the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.23.4. Coordinate with Electronic Warfare Duty Officer and others as needed. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.24. Serve as focal point for NKE support to COD. **(T-3)**

8.6.10.25. Participate in the OPSEC Working Group, Joint Task Force and/or CCDR, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.11. ***Military Information Support Operations*** . MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military mission objectives. The MISO subject matter expert(s) will serve as the expert on human influence and the cognitive domain and is responsible for the development and inclusion of MISO and human influence related objectives into operational-level planning. The person(s) responsible for the MISO will:

8.6.11.1. Plan for and integrate air component MISO activities with the AFFOR staff and AOC planning processes, develop MISO measure(s) of performance / measure(s) of effectiveness, and coordinate with the joint MISO development and approval cycle. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.2. Coordinate and liaise between the AOC, AFFOR staff, Combatant Command, and the Joint Military Information Support Task Force to plan, execute, and assess MISO activities in support of national, theater, and component objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.3. Coordinate influence strategies and target audience analysis in support of CCDR and component influence activities. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.4. Coordinate with the Combat Information Cell/Joint Military Information Support Task Force to analyze potential adversary MISO courses of action, identify blue vulnerabilities to enemy propaganda, and develop plans to counter enemy propaganda. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.5. Incorporate planned dissemination mechanisms for MISO (COMMANDO SOLO, COMPASS CALL, Cyberspace Operations, leaflet drops, etc.) into the ATO. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.6. Ensure MISO activities are coordinated and synchronized with all kinetic or non-kinetic operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.7. Provide guidance in the employment of USAF MISO activities and develops measure(s) of performance / measure(s) of effectiveness supporting JFC and/or JFACC. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.8. Keep Public Affairs informed about MISO operations to deconflict objectives and activities and strengthen communication plans, as appropriate. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.9. Coordinate assessment and intelligence support (including submitting RFIs). **(T-3)**

8.6.11.10. Consider and plan for the psychological effects of airpower on the adversary and target audiences. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.11. Document tactics, techniques, and procedures and lessons learned. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.12. Review pertinent plans and MISO annexes annually. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.13. Review CCDR and JFACC guidance and direction for MISO purposes annually. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.14. Maintain a schedule of planned MISO activities. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.15. Perform or assist with the joint planning process for air process from a MISO perspective, as appropriate. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.16. Perform or assist with air tasking cycle activities from a MISO perspective, as appropriate. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.17. Lead, co-lead or support component efforts in MISO related areas. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.18. Lead, co-lead or support the planning of engagements, to include key leader engagements. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.19. Lead, co-lead or support the counter propaganda process. **(T-3)**

8.6.11.20. Lead, co-lead or support the Component Commander's Communication Strategy function (e.g., strategic communication or commander's communication synchronization at the operational level). **(T-3)**

8.6.11.21. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.12. ***Operations Security (OPSEC)*** . OPSEC is a process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities. This process identifies actions that adversary intelligence systems can observe, and determines which specific indications they could collect, analyze, and interpret to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. The OPSEC process also selects and executes measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. The person(s) responsible for the OPSEC function will perform applicable responsibilities found in AFI 10-701, *Operations Security* and applicable MAJCOM supplement. The person(s) responsible for OPSEC will:

8.6.12.1. Assist commander, strategists, and planners in identifying critical information and OPSEC indicators from all functional areas requiring protection for air operations plans and activities throughout the AOR to include intertheater air mobility and support missions. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.2. Assist in making vulnerability assessments using intelligence reports and threat analysis from the ISRD, Office of Special Investigations, Air Communications Squadron, to identify appropriate protective measures to mitigate unacceptable operational risks. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.3. Determine potential OPSEC countermeasures to reduce vulnerabilities with unacceptable risk. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.4. Present potential countermeasures to leadership for implementation decision. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.5. Develop measure(s) of performance and measure(s) of effectiveness for each countermeasure. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.6. Ensure that OPSEC activities are coordinated and deconflicted with all kinetic and non-kinetic plans/operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.7. Participate in the OAT predictive performance and applicable Combat Assessment analysis. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.8. Use the OPSEC process to increase the chance of mission success by eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities to an acceptable level through the application of OPSEC countermeasures, including, but not limited to cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, intentional deviations from normal patterns, and direct strikes against adversary collection. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.9. Provide guidance and tasking to subordinate units to protect operation details. Provide guidance and coordinate with supporting units prior to deployment from home station if called for by operational plans. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.10. In coordination with the military deception point of contact, develop Signature Management tasks for Air Force units identified to support the JFACC and communicate the tasks to the supporting units. The supporting unit tasks will focus on the JFACC's desired signatures, observables, and/or indicators of unit activity that are required to achieve his objectives. The tasked units will use data obtained from their respective Base Profiling Process products to provide the correct presentation of their unit activities to meet the tasks received from the supported JFACC. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.11. Develop, present, and track mission specific, unit oriented OPSEC training as required by AFI 10-701. Present this training to all new personnel upon arrival, or more often by request of the commander. Consider training when the mission, threat, or vulnerabilities change. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.12. Lead the OPSEC Working Group. The OPSEC Working Group should include electronic warfare, Cyberspace, Space, IO, military deception, public affairs, Office of Special Investigations representatives and other planners, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.12.13. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.13. ***Military Deception (MILDEC)*** . MILDEC are those actions executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary or violent extremist organization decision makers; thereby causing the adversary decision maker to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC is applicable at all levels of war, throughout the competition continuum, and during all phases of military operations. Integrate MILDEC at the earliest possible phase of an operation to ensure its effectiveness. Base MILDEC on the specific situation and the supported commander's objectives for the operation or campaign. Do not confuse MILDEC with perfidy. Perfidy is the false claim to protections under the law of war to secure a military advantage over the opponent. Acts of perfidy invite the confidence of enemy persons to lead them to believe they are entitled to, or are obligated to accord, protection under the law of war, with intent to betray that confidence. The person(s) responsible for MILDEC will:

8.6.13.1. Obtain behavioral influence analysis on specific adversary military decision makers and/or non-state sponsored leaders of adversary militants within the AOR, and identify friendly actions to affect their behaviors in ways that are beneficial to friendly operational objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.2. Act as primary advocate for MILDEC within the JFACC's strategy team. The MILDEC planner's principal functions are the development, MX, integration, and assessment of operational-level MILDEC activities in support of the JFACC's courses of action, objectives and plans. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.3. In coordination with the operations security point of contact, develop Signature Management tasks for units identified to support the JFACC and communicate those tasks to the supporting units through official channels. The supporting unit tasks will focus on the JFACC's desired signatures, observables, and/or indicators of unit activity that are required to achieve his objectives. The tasked units will use data obtained from their respective Base Profiling Process products to provide the correct presentation of their unit activities to meet the tasks received from the supported JFACC. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.4. Assess all aspects of the MILDEC plan against measure(s) of effectiveness and measure(s) of performance as identified in the JAOP, and recommend continuation, change, or termination measures accordingly. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.5. Ensure that MILDEC activities are coordinated and deconflicted with all other kinetic and non-kinetic operations within the JFACC's operation. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.6. Ensure MILDEC planning documents are stored and controlled separately from the supported plan. **(T-3)**

8.6.13.7. Lead the MILDEC Working Group. The MILDEC Working Group should normally meet on an as needed basis and consist of subject matter experts from across all air component staff functions and specialty teams, as needed for a particular MILDEC plan. Additionally, the working group should develop, integrate and coordinate MILDEC tasks for the AOC and units identified as assets for the supported commander's deception plans as well as participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.14. ***Electronic Warfare*** . Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, to include directed energy, to control the electromagnetic spectrum, or to attack an enemy. Within the AOC, electronic warfare should be fully integrated into strategy development, operational-level assessment, detailed planning, ATO production, and execution functions. The person(s) responsible for electronic warfare will:

8.6.14.1. Perform operational-level planning (including target systems analysis, links, and nodal analysis) and integrate electronic warfare into the overall planning, operations execution, and assessment effort. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.2. Develop a coherent, synchronized plan to employ electronic warfare assets to achieve JFC/JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.3. Plan, manage and assess air and space component electronic warfare operations.

8.6.14.4. Develop electronic warfare support, deconfliction, and targeting priorities and recommendations. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.5. Coordinate activities and reachback as outlined in DAFMAN 10-703, *Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming* and the USAF Electronic Warfare Planning and Integration Guide. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.6. Provide support to electronic warfare integrated reprogramming, support suppression of enemy air defenses, enemy C2 data/communication links, enemy navigation aids, and anti-radiation weapon planning. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.7. Prepare and submit electronic warfare asset requests for forces to appropriate staff. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.8. Provide inputs to jamming control authority, Joint Restricted Frequency List, and to the SPINS via the C2 plans team. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.9. Assist in the development of electronic warfare measures and indicators for operational assessment. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.10. Provide inputs to the development of methodologies to defeat and attack adversary electronic emitters, aids in developing electronic warfare courses of action to achieve JFC and/or JFACC objectives, and recommends jamming aircraft flight profiles necessary to satisfy IO or non-kinetic operations requirements. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.11. Coordinate assessment and intelligence support (including the submittal of RFIs). **(T-3)**

8.6.14.12. Monitor the execution and assessment of electronic warfare missions. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.13. Maintain electronic warfare situational awareness and recommend changes to on-going operations or future plans. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.14. Coordinate with internal and external agencies to include the 616 OC. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.15. Lead the Electronic Warfare Cell when required. Electronic Warfare Cell will normally meet to provide the Lead electronic warfare subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform electronic warfare functions. **(T-3)**

8.6.14.16. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.15. ***Cyberspace Operations*** . Refer to AFTTP 3-3.AOC for definitive guidance. Cyberspace operations is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace operations will:

8.6.15.1. Develop JFACC cyber-related RFIs, CCIRs, and IRs in coordination with AOC/AFFOR cyber POCs and CCMD JCC. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.2. Apply cyberspace capabilities in operations plans and integrate them across all warfighting domains during operational planning and execution. Cyberspace capabilities are most effective when synchronized with other kinetic and non-kinetic operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.3. When established, the Director of Cyberspace Forces (DIRCYBERFOR/DC4) is the senior cyberspace advisor to the COMAFFOR/JFACC for the integration of the Department of Defense Information Network, defensive cyberspace operations, and offensive cyberspace operations capabilities in support of air component operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.4. Normally, the DC4 is attached to the COMAFFOR’s special staff and should be given appropriate coordination authority. The DC4 is tasked to synchronize and coordinate

full spectrum Cyberspace Operations in support of the CFACC. The DC4 will ensure all cyber planning and execution are integrated into the warfighting lines of operation across all domains for the CFACC. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.5. The DC4 will coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations through the planning, targeting, and execution processes, and facilitate integration of cyberspace capabilities through coordination of cyberspace capabilities, authorities, and priorities with the JCC and supporting Joint and DAF cyber functional organizations. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.6. Cyberspace operations planners integrate, synchronize, and deconflict CCDR cyber operations into the scheme of maneuver. Coordinate with the JCC and Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Element to ensure the requested cyber operations are properly planned and tasked for approval and execution. Work with the Director of Cyberspace Forces (when established) to coordinate and integrate cyberspace capabilities with the IO/NKO Team, cyberspace planners, and the JCC. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7. The Director of Cyberspace Forces (when established), Cyberspace Operations Cell or Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber liaison element responsible for the cyberspace operations will:

8.6.15.7.1. Integrate cyberspace effects into the COMAFFOR/JFACC's time-phased scheme of maneuver and fires based on commander's guidance, desired effects, friendly capabilities, and likely adversary courses of action. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.2. Integrate 616 OC cyberspace support into the COMAFFOR/JFACC's planning and execution. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.3. Coordinate cyberspace activities and reachback with 616 OC, Combatant Command, USCYBERCOM J2T, ACOMS, AFFOR A2, ISRD, JCC, and other Joint and USAF agencies, as required, to integrate offensive and/or defensive cyberspace operations into the AOC mission. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.4. Fully integrate cyberspace operations planning into the joint planning process for air. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.5. As appropriate, synchronize the Cyber Tasking Order and the theater ATO throughout the tasking cycle, working closely with those at the 616 OC. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.6. Develop cyberspace courses of action in support of theater operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.7. Assess cyberspace operations; develop cyberspace operations measure(s) of performance and measure(s) of effectiveness. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.8. Coordinate the development and implementation of defensive cyberspace operations measures with the ACOMS and the 616 OC. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.9. Determine operational impact of information conditions and/or tailor response options, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.10. Consult with non-kinetic operations planners prior to, and during, all cyberspace operations to ensure operational-level synergy with other kinetic/ and/or non-kinetic engagements. **(T-3)**

8.6.15.7.11. Lead the Cyberspace Working Group, which will provide the lead AF Cyberspace Operations subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform cyberspace operations functions. The Cyberspace Working Group will propose SPINS and ROE changes. Additionally, members of the working group should participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.16. ***Public Affairs*** . Public Affairs comprises public information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. One or more Public Affairs personnel assigned to or deployed to augment the Component Numbered AF or Component Major Command/Public Affairs office will normally provide Public Affairs planning capability. Person(s) responsible for Public Affairs will:

8.6.16.1. Directly advise the JFACC, AOC/CC, directors, division chiefs, and team chiefs on implications of command decisions, actions, and operations on foreign and domestic public perceptions. Develop over-arching themes and messages on air, space, and cyberspace operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.2. Coordinate with senior staff and other IW capabilities to develop the commander's communication plan in support of operational objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.3. Communicate accurate, truthful, timely, and useful information about USAF operations to inform internal and external audiences and to meet the commander's desired effects. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.4. Plan for Public Affairs operations as part of the joint planning process for air. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.5. Ensure Public Affairs is part of strategy development, planning, and execution phases of the air tasking cycle. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.6. Provide the JFACC with communication advice in support of operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.7. Integrate Public Affairs into AOC operational products, working groups and meetings, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.8. Provide support to AOC planned activities and operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.9. Deconflict Public Affairs and IO-related activities, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.10. Monitor current operations for emerging issues that have the potential to affect the overall operation in a positive or negative fashion (a successful strike using a new WS, civilian casualties, fratricide, etc.). **(T-3)**

8.6.16.11. Plan, execute, and evaluate Public Affairs activities to support and achieve the desired effects necessary to accomplish the commander's operational objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.12. Provide security and policy review for official information, including imagery, weapons and cockpit video, for release to the public. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.13. Have the clearances and unescorted access (where permitted) to all elements of the AOC, including intelligence, special access programs or SAR facilities. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.14. Consider all Public Affairs tasks (command information, media operations, public engagement, visual information, security review, and communication synchronization) to achieve desired effects in the information environment. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.15. Consider all products and resources available (internal print, web and social media products, radio and television broadcasting, visual information services, civic groups and community engagement, Combat Camera, and musical programs) when planning. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.16. Oversee activities of Combat Camera teams producing visual information products used to inform communication, operational planning, and decision-making as well as provide historical documentation of operations. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.17. Contribute to counter propaganda functions. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.18. Lead the Combat Information Cell if designated the counter propaganda lead. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.19. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.20. Coordinate frequently with subordinate units to ensure each PA unit understands JFACC objectives and can localize such objectives for their use. **(T-3)**

8.6.16.21. Coordinate with JA to ensure PA output products meet all applicable legal standards prior to release. **(T-3)**

8.6.17. Counter Propaganda. Counter propaganda operations are efforts used to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, foreign psychological operations or propaganda efforts, including misinformation and disinformation. Adversary propaganda frequently targets the resolve of American and allied publics through national and international mass media. In these cases, Public Affairs will normally lead the counter propaganda effort and aim to inform friendly or neutral audiences appropriately about military operations. Adversary propaganda also may target audiences within the theater of operations through more localized or segmented methods of communication. In these cases, there may be increased emphasis placed on IW capabilities outside of Public Affairs, and an IO or MISO specialist should lead the effort. A combination of global and local propaganda efforts requires careful synchronization of IW capabilities activities by the person(s) best equipped to manage the component's communication efforts, which may vary from scenario to scenario. The person(s) responsible for counter propaganda will:

8.6.17.1. Conduct counter propaganda to minimize friendly vulnerabilities to disinformation in coordination with Component Numbered AF Public Affairs and higher-level IO and Public Affairs organizations. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.2. Gain and maintain the information initiative to help defeat propaganda. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.3. Integrate use of Public Affairs operations and other IW capabilities to respond to propaganda and collateral damage charges. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.4. Consider all available assets to counter adversary propaganda. Efforts may range from specific public IO to convey accurate information to the audiences and mitigate the intended effects of adversary propaganda, to efforts to destroy adversary propaganda resources and assets kinetically. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.5. Plan, coordinate, and assess kinetic and non-kinetic contributions to counter propaganda objectives of disrupting, degrading, and disabling adversary propaganda mechanisms. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.6. Not intentionally misinform the US Congress, public, or media. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.7. Minimize friendly vulnerabilities to disinformation and enemy propaganda via timely information release, countering enemy propaganda or misinformation that may affect unit morale and readiness. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.8. Develop a process to develop appropriate response to propaganda issues, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.9. Lead the Combat Information Cell. The Combat Information Cell will:

8.6.17.9.1. Meet on an as needed basis and will be comprised of experts/planners from: public affairs, IO, operations security, military deception, and MISO, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.9.2. Assist with development and coordination of counter propaganda communication courses of action and plans. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.9.3. Assist the C/JFACC in developing rapid, accurate, fact based responses to significant ATO events. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.9.4. Be prepared to contend with various high-profile operational scenarios. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.9.5. Mitigate C/JFACC strategic exposure to propaganda and to maximize domestic and international support for coalition/partner nation air efforts. **(T-3)**

8.6.17.10. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.18. Counterintelligence. Office of Special Investigations agent(s) will normally provide counterintelligence support to the entire AFFOR and its elements. The person(s) responsible for counterintelligence will:

8.6.18.1. Provide the AOC with required counterintelligence support. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.2. Serve as the Component Major Command/ Component Numbered AF's counterintelligence AOR expert in their region of the world. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.3. Support operational-level planning, execution and assessment. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.4. Coordinate with other counterintelligence personnel and external agencies, as required, to provide the AOC information necessary to plan, execute and assess missions. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.5. Identify which counterintelligence tools and techniques to employ to protect air, space, cyberspace and IW capabilities. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.6. Serve as the focal point for advising, coordinating and assessing air component counterintelligence activities in AFFOR staff and AOC plans and activities to include detecting, analyzing, exploiting, mitigating, and engaging adversary intelligence collection efforts. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.7. Provide information that may be used to develop future plans, support Target Audience Analysis and Human Terrain Factors development, change current planning efforts or on-going operations, or information that can be used to develop courses of action and operational assessments of activities. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.8. When augmented by AF Office of Special Investigations for counterintelligence support, the counterintelligence planner will be the focal point for coordinating air component counter intelligence plans and activities, to include detecting, analyzing, exploiting, and engaging adversary intelligence collection efforts. **(T-3)**

8.6.18.9. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**

8.6.19. Engagements. An engagement is a personal interaction by an Airman with an audience in the AOR, designed to inform and/or influence. The AOC should plan for engagements in support of Component Commander's Communication Strategy and component commander's objective(s). The AOC should also ensure that those persons involved in engagements are aware of talking points and objectives they should support while interacting with others. The person(s) responsible for engagements will work with the AFFOR as appropriate to**)**:

8.6.19.1. Prepare "Themes and Messages Cards" and/or "Cultural Smart Cards," for airmen to carry in theater, as appropriate, to synchronize words and activities all the way down to the individual level. Cultural Smart Cards serve as a quick guide to cultural understanding. They may contain key religious facts (five pillars of Islam, key dates, and associated behaviors), customary dress (male and female) and gestures, major ethnic and cultural groups, cultural customs, and history. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.2. Plan for engagements to help meet command objectives, when appropriate. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.3. Link engagements to component objectives. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.4. Prepare individuals for deliberate (planned) or dynamic (unplanned or unanticipated) engagements for all ranks. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.5. Understand cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, communication methods, cultural/social background, perspectives, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, authorities, spheres of influence, and motivators of target audience(s). **(T-3)**

8.6.19.6. Build relationships with enough strength and depth over time, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.7. Develop and tailor topics and messages to local conditions for airmen involved in engagements. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.8. Ensure airmen deliver an effective, consistent message that supports the command's goals, when possible. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.9. Assess engagement performance and effectiveness. **(T-3)**

8.6.19.10. Coordinate assessment and intelligence support (including the submittal of RFIs). **(T-3)**

8.6.19.11. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell. **(T-3)**

8.7. AOC Legal Advisor. (AFSC: 51J) (Rank: O-4/O-5). The AOC Legal Advisor is a JA in an AOC who provides legal expertise and resources in support of the JFACC, each of the five AOC divisions, as well as specialty and support functions within the AOC. The size and nature of the air operations, the tempo, and the number of processes in use by the AOC will assist in determining the number of JAs assigned to support an AOC. However, the AOC should have dedicated Legal Advisors for the JFACC, SRD, CPD, and COD on all shifts when all processes are in regular use.

8.7.1. The Legal Advisor assigned to the JFACC will also be the lead AOC JA and coordinate the activities of and be responsible for all other JAs assigned to the AOC. **(T-2)**

8.7.2. To advise the JFACC, a JA will:

8.7.2.1. Attend the major briefings or decision meetings attended by the JFACC. **(T-2)**

8.7.2.2. Provide advice on international law, agreements and domestic law as well as higher headquarters guidance, law of war, and ROE/RUF. **(T-2)**

8.7.2.3. Attend any other meetings necessary to gather information to provide the JFACC timely and accurate advice. **(T-2)**

8.7.3. JAs advising the SRD will:

8.7.3.1. Ensure that all proposed strategy is consistent with international law, the law of war, domestic law, ROE/RUFs, orders from superior headquarters, and any other specific guidance or constraints specified by the JFC, other superior commanders, or the JFACC. **(T-2)**

8.7.3.2. Serve as the principal assistants in the process of drafting requests for supplemental ROE/RUF and reviewing ROE/RUF approved by the CCDR or other higher echelons of command. **(T-2)**

8.7.3.3. Brief ROE/RUF or assist others who brief ROE/RUF. **(T-3)**

8.7.3.4. Provide support to the special technical operations team. **(T-3)**

8.7.4. JAs advising the CPD will:

8.7.4.1. Conduct a thorough legal analysis for selected targets and weaponeering. **(T-2)**

8.7.4.2. Review the choice of tactics for certain sensitive targets. **(T-2)**

8.7.4.3. Participate in the development of the JIPTL and MAAP throughout the air tasking cycle. **(T-2)**

8.7.4.4. Work with the C2 plans Chief to develop the ROE/RUF chapter for the SPINS. **(T-2)**

8.7.5. JAs advising the COD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division, including insuring law of war and ROE/RUF compliance for dynamic targeting,

personnel recovery, interpreting SPINS and ROE/RUF, and addressing other emergent legal issues that arise during the execution of the current ATO. **(T-2)**

8.7.6. JAs advising the ISRD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division, including the currency of information about a target and its location with respect to non-military structures and personnel, the weaponeering or WS being used, the likelihood of disproportionate collateral damage, and ROE limitations and restrictions, law of war considerations, and intelligence authorities. **(T-2)**

8.7.7. JAs advising the AMD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division including international agreements affecting landing rights, over-flights, sovereignty, taxes, customs, aircraft accidents, and civil reserve air fleet. These issues need to be coordinated with the JFACC/JA staff. **(T-2)**

8.7.8. JAs advising specialty teams or AOC personnel in communication roles, such as the NKO Team, IO Cell, or Combat Information Cell, will review communications and assist in the development of communication courses of action and products. **(T-2)**

8.7.9. Joint JAs will work with other service JAs who may have differing approaches in the way they conduct business. Establish early communications with JA peers at respective components within the CCMD. Participate in joint exercises with other service JAs and consider inviting them to attend AOC exercises either as participants or observers.

8.7.10. Coalition JA should establish good working relationships with both allied and coalition JAs. Doing so will develop both a mutual understanding of differing legal approaches and methodologies and will assist in both cross-coordination of concerns when conducting coalition operations, and timely issue resolution.

8.8. Weather Specialty Team. Administratively assigned to the COD, the WST is a horizontally crosscutting capability integrated into all five AOC divisions to enable ATO mission planning and execution. In general, the AOC WST gathers weather information from strategic global forecast centers and tailors/provides this information to the JFACC and AOC operators for situational awareness. The composition and size of the WST will be dependent on the size and scope of operations. WST members must possess security clearances that provide the ability to support each AOC division effectively. The WST provides timely notification of METOC impacts affecting launch and recovery bases, active orbits/tracks, routes of flight, and other areas of operations as directed by the CCO. The WST will generate tailored weather graphics derived from the assigned theater operational weather squadron surface forecast and aviation hazard charts, 14th Weather Squadron, and appropriate Naval METOC centers that depict weather impacts across the planning and execution cycle for the JOA. The WST will post high frequency/UHF fade effects to communications on organic systems so they are available to JFACC staff and the AOC. Solar flare events will be passed as they are received. These events need to be passed to the space duty officer and the communications officer. Once impacts have been assessed, information should be passed to the CCO and any other divisions/teams that may be affected. METOC refers to the whole range of atmospheric, oceanographic, and space environment phenomena. **(T-3)**

8.8.1. Weather Specialty Team Chief. (AFSC: 15W) (Rank: O-3/O-4). The WST chief is responsible for integrating METOC and METOC effects information into all AOC planning and execution processes. Information provided by the WST Chief, in general, consists of daily briefings to the AOC and JFACC staff, with updates as required, on significant METOC

impacts to strategic and operational-level planning and execution. The WST Chief will define requirements for reachback support from the appropriate METOC organization. The team chief is the senior operational forecaster, and must have a security clearance that allows effective support to any division. **(T-3)**

8.8.2. SRD Support. Immerse the WST in strategic planning from the outset to gain a complete understanding of JFACC intentions in meeting JFC objectives and to ensure consideration of climatological and current METOC conditions in the forming of strategy. The WST uses medium to long-range forecasts and climatological information to identify potential environmental impacts to enemy and friendly operations. During development of the joint air estimate, JAOP, and branch and sequel plans, the strategy plans team will use meteorological information to mitigate impacts to friendly forces while capitalizing on advantages due to asymmetric environmental effects on enemy capabilities. The WST will focus the strategy guidance team on METOC conditions in the 48-96 hour timeframe that could degrade friendly force capabilities to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess potential targets. Thorough weather information at this stage of planning can have a greater and more influential impact on operations than weather information delivered closer to execution. For this reason, it is imperative to integrate one or more members of the WST into long-range planning. The more familiar the WST member is with the planners, the mission, and the WSs used to accomplish the mission, the more effective will be the exploitation of weather information. **(T-3)**

8.8.3. CPD Support. The WST will provide medium to near term METOC information to the MAAP Team and TET teams to support all aspects of mission planning, including target area METOC effects information, predictions of METOC impacts on missile effectiveness, and METOC impacts to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors. Provide the MAAP team METOC-effects decision aids, including electro-optical and space METOC-effects guidance, for determination of timing and weapons selection. Properly integrated, METOC operations play a key role, especially during development of the MAAP. The WST should highlight METOC conditions in the next 48-72 hours that could degrade friendly forces' ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess potential targets. These forecasts provide the TET and MAAP Team an opportunity to adjust the timing of missions as necessary. In addition, the MAAP Team can exploit target METOC information and METOC impacts to sensors, weapons, weapons systems, and platforms to modify weapons/sensor configurations and system mixes. By optimally pairing weapons systems and platforms to targets based on METOC conditions, the MAAP Team can maximize the probability of achieving desired effects. The WST should study the METOC effects on enemy weapons systems and provide METOC influences on enemy systems so that the MAAP and TET teams understand threats to friendly forces. **(T-3)**

8.8.4. COD Support. The WST will support all aspects of mission execution including dynamic targeting and Personnel Recovery missions, the BCD, and other emerging targeting decisions. The WST will maintain situational awareness of the meteorological/oceanographic/solar conditions; provide timely notification of METOC elements affecting launch and recovery bases; active orbits/tracks, route of flight, and other operations or areas as directed by the CCO. To increase mission effectiveness, the WST should inject relevant, accurate METOC and space environment information as early as possible into the daily ATO process, enabling decision-makers to mitigate risks and optimize the pairing of capabilities to targets. The WST should also be responsive to the need for real-time or near

real-time forecasts in support to dynamic re-attack, time sensitive targets, combat search and rescue operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection activities, and other emerging requirements. **(T-3)**

8.8.5. ISRD Support. The WST will provide METOC information and predicted impacts on ISR sensors, and other friendly and enemy assets and activities. The WST will collect any METOC information/imagery available from hostile areas or other areas where routine METOC data is unavailable. To support ISR operations effectively, the WST should have access to detailed ISR mission profiles and collaborate with appropriate analysts to identify the probable METOC sensitivities of enemy capabilities. The security classification of this information may demand that the WST Chief directly support the ISRD. During joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, analysts should leverage METOC information to help determine likely enemy courses of action, but more importantly, to highlight instances in which enemy capabilities are degraded more than friendly capabilities (i.e., asymmetrically), offering friendly force commanders an exploitable advantage. The ISRD should employ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor/system capabilities to provide non-traditional collection of METOC information in data-sparse and data-denied areas. METOC forces leverage this information to formulate a more accurate depiction of current and predicted METOC conditions in the operational environment, enhancing support to the joint force. The environmental information obtained from the ISRD should be reintegrated into the forecast process of the theater Operational Weather Squadron and weather flights/detachments providing mission execution forecasts. **(T-3)**

8.8.6. AMD Support. The WST will provide the AMD with tailored information on any METOC impacts to air mobility operations. This should include impacts to theater air mobility operations such as transport, air refueling, paradrop, and medical evacuation. In particular, the WST delivers strategic and operational-level environmental impacts on areas of departure and recovery bases (including alternates), landing and drop zones, and air refueling routes throughout the designated AOR/JOA. The WST should keep the AMD staff and DIRMOBFOR apprised at all times of significant METOC impacts to mobility operations. The WST will coordinate with the 618 AOC/WST for mobility missions controlled by the TACC. **(T-3)**

8.9. Logistics Combat Support Team. The Logistics Combat Support Team is the AOC's focal point for all Combat Support related issues affecting the AOC's ability to plan and execute combat air power. When conducting joint operations, other service or coalition logisticians should supply combat support information affecting support and sustainment to the Logistics Combat Support Team. During strategy development and other planning processes, the AFFOR staff will provide the Logistics Combat Support Team assessments of potential impact to beddown decisions, impacts of time phased force and deployment data, and feasibility and forces closure estimates. The Logistics Combat Support Team is comprised of officers and non-commissioned officers from across the Agile Combat Support community, as the mission/situation requires. The Logistics Combat Support Team gives the AOC an on-site team with a broad range of combat support expertise as well as a direct line of communication to the combat support expertise on the AFFOR staff. The Logistics Combat Support Team is a part of the AFFOR staff and reports directly to the AFFOR staff A4. A field-grade combat support officer familiar with AOC processes and the broad range of combat support operations that may affect AOC processes and ATO execution leads the Logistics Combat Support Team.

8.10. Knowledge Management Team. The component headquarters organization will establish an effective KM organizational structure and flow strategy throughout the air component. The KM team will develop the KMP and design a strategy to meet the entire component headquarters and subordinate organizations' needs for seamless, relevant and timely information, while optimizing the use of information infrastructure resources. The AOC KM support team is a sub-element of the Component Headquarters KM organization. The goal of KM is to provide relevant, precise, accurate, timely, usable, and complete information that supports the commander in obtaining situational awareness, and an understanding that allows him to make timely and effective decisions faster than the adversary can react. In a non-combat situation, it enables a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish the mission. **(T-3)**

8.10.1. ***General Information*** . General information is a weapon and a target. The intent is to treat information as an asset, just like any other weapon or tool of warfare. It controls forces and delivers precise effects. Command and control of information supports the commander in three main areas: achieving situational awareness/ understanding, making decisions, and communicating execution information to implement those decisions. In that context, everyone in the AOC is an information manager with an inherent responsibility to acquire, assess, reason, question, correlate, and disseminate quality information to other users, and to maintain and protect it throughout its life cycle.

8.10.2. ***Supported and Supporting Division/Team Relationships*** . The division/team chiefs, information and information system users have a shared, corporate responsibility with the KM support team for the effectiveness and efficiency of the KM processes supporting AOC operations.

8.10.3. ***KM Team Responsibilities*** . The AOC KM team is responsible for the AOC KMP that documents applicable processes and knowledge flow optimizing the availability of timely and relevant information required for AOC decisions. The KM Officer leads the AOC KM Team. The KM Team will create the AOC KMP, in collaboration with all divisions, and the AOC/CC approves it. The KM Team synchronizes the KMP with applicable AFFOR staff and Combatant Command KM teams. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.1. AOC KM Officer. (AFSC 17D or any KM Trained Officer as assigned by AOC/CC). (Rank O-4/O-5). The KM Officer is directly responsible to the AOC/CC with functional coordination responsibilities to the AOC Divisions, AFFOR KM Team, and Combatant Command KM Team. KM Officer is responsible for coordinating the flow and management of information throughout the AOC including control of processes linking sensor and discovery information to knowledge management tools used to build and, execute operations, assess operational success, and adjust AOC KM activities accordingly. The KM Officer works with the AOC director and divisions to ensure information needs are met through focused data and KM processes. The AOC KMP should be synchronized to the larger component NAF or component-MAJCOM KMP. Provide the KM Officer and respective KM Team members with any applicable training offered by both AFFOR and Combatant Command KM team. The KM Officer must proactively engage with the respective KM community to ensure the KMP is synchronized and implementable. The AOC KM Team is normally composed of the KM Officer, KM non-commissioned officer in charge, and KM Team members. The AOC/CC, in coordination with AFFOR staff and Combatant Command KM leadership, will make the final decision on composition of the AOC KM team depending upon each unique circumstance. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.2. Division and Specialty/Support KM Team. Team personnel are directly responsible to the division and specialty/support team chiefs they are supporting. They are responsible for assuring that the supported division/specialty/support team is complying with the KM plan. Specialty/Support team KM personnel serving in functional specific positions such as AOC special security office, etc. are also responsible to their team for performing KM duties.

8.10.3.3. KM Superintendent. (AFSC: 1D7XX) (Rank: E-5/E-6/E-7) The KM Superintendent will:

8.10.3.3.1. Perform all KM officer duties, if KM officer not assigned. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.2. Prepare and present a KM procedures briefing to AOC personnel. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.3. Establish liaison with JFC/J1 and AFFOR staff A1 and A6 for combat service support. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.4. Maintain shift log. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.5. Manage master actions suspense log. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.6. Process incoming/outgoing correspondence, messages, and reports (includes situation report). **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.7. Retrieve briefing inputs and prepare update briefing. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.8. Perform duties as the AOC functional area records manager at the discretion of the commander. Ensures AOC/division inventories of records are prepared and coordinated with CFP. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.9. Serve as AOC privacy act officer and/or monitor. **(T-3)**

8.10.3.3.10. Serve as freedom of information act manager in accordance with DODM 5400.07 AFMAN 33-302, *Freedom of Information Act Program*. **(T-3)**

8.10.4. ***AOC KM Personnel*** . (AFSC: 1D7XX) (Rank: E-3 – E-6). KM Team will:

8.10.4.1. Create and maintain a collection point for after action feedback and/or Joint Lessons Learned Information System inputs. **(T-3)**

8.10.4.2. Create/maintain web pages and TBMCS AOC Portal structure, policy, and knowledge operations content. **(T-3)**

8.11. Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC). The PRCC will plan, coordinate, and direct the execution of Personnel Recovery missions for the JFACC. The PRCC is a specialty team within the AOC, administratively assigned to the COD, but with PRCC personnel integrated into, or working closely with other AOC divisions to facilitate the planning, coordination, and execution of all AFFOR PR missions and the reintegration of recovered AFFOR personnel. The PRCC may vary in size and composition; organized based on mission requirements. Duties involve coordinating the five tasks of reporting, locating, supporting, recovering, and reintegrating isolated personnel. Isolated personnel are, in effect fleeting targets of critical value—available capabilities and assets should be expeditiously coordinated and employed to effect successful recoveries. The JFACC, through the AOC and PRCC, exercises tactical control of joint force-assigned, Personnel Recovery-capable assets made available for Personnel Recovery tasking. The PRCC is typically composed of a chief/deputy chief, duty officers, planners, controllers; survival, evasion, resistance,

and escape personnel; and intelligence specialists. The PRCC Chief is responsible to the CCO during daily execution. The PRCC is normally located on the COD floor. Some of the PRCC personnel integrate or closely work with various sections of the AOC. Additional PRCC information can be found in AFTTP 3-3/3-1.AOC, and AFI 10-3005, *PRCC Organization and Training*. **(T-3)**

8.12. Special Technical Operations (STO) Team. The STO team will ensure proper integration of special technical capabilities with conventional operations to meet JFC and JFACC objectives as defined in the JAOP. The STO works for the AOC/CC and supports all divisions within the AOC. The STO planning process mirrors the conventional planning process, and the capabilities presented through the STO process should be treated no differently than any other capability except for their special security requirements. The STO team does not "own" any AOC process but supports all processes across the AOC. Consequently, the team relies on collaboration with STO briefed individuals in the AOC divisions and teams to develop the separate but necessary classified concepts, briefings, legal reviews and documents for strategy, guidance, targeting, apportionment, plans, and operations. **(T-3)**

8.12.1. The STO team will:

8.12.1.1. Facilitate the development of STO and operationally sensitive military capabilities supplements to the JAOP, AOD, MAAP, etc. The STO team will facilitate coordination for planners and other specialty teams/special mission units to provide additional assistance to the planner. For example: As the AOD and AOD supplement are developed by the SRD, the STO team makes available resources and facilities to the strategy representatives in obtaining the information necessary to complete the AOD supplement and preparation of the AOD decision brief. **(T-3)**

8.12.1.2. Ensure adequate facilities are available to facilitate compartmented planning and briefings. These facilities will have proper accreditations, compartmented approvals, and security measures in-place to enable compartmented-level planning operations. The STO team will ensure that personnel are available to manage physical and personnel security requirements consistent with AOC planning, execution and assessment schedules. **(T-3)**

8.12.1.3. Ensure communications/information systems are available to facilitate compartmented planning. **(T-3)**

8.12.1.4. Provide the status of capabilities and make other pertinent information necessary for planning and operations available. **(T-3)**

8.12.1.5. Deliver STO and advanced program tasking orders and SPINS to affected units. **(T-3)**

8.12.2. STO Team Composition. Positions annotated below represent core team members, permanently assigned to the AOC. As contingencies evolve, additional STO manning may be required. Augmentation from other service components and/or WS subject matter experts should be anticipated.

8.12.2.1. AOC STO Chief: (AFSCs: 11X, 12X, 13B, 13S, 14X, 17S) (Rank O-5). The AOC STO Chief facilitates all STO security and operationally sensitive military capabilities activities in the AOC. The AOC STO Chief’s primary focus is to support all AOC divisions and teams, and appropriately integrate sensitive military capabilities into

Joint strategy, plans, and operations. Additionally, the AOC STO Chief coordinates with other components and JFC STO teams to synchronize plans and operations. This coordination includes requesting reach back support The STO Chief will appoint a deputy from the officers within the cell to act as Chief in his/her absence, requesting additional capabilities, and obtaining necessary authorities to deploy and employ STO capabilities. **(T-3)**

8.12.2.2. STO Intelligence Officer. (AFSC 14N) (Rank O-4). The STO intelligence officer works with other AOC Divisions to coordinate STO specific collection plan requirements, RFIs, target nominations, and updating the STO team on the current battle situation. In addition, this position is responsible for coordinating STO mission intelligence assessment and provides those STO assessments back to AOC STO planners.

8.12.2.3. STO Duty Officers (AFSCs 11, 12, 13, 17) (Rank: O-3/O-4). The STO Duty Officers will monitor, coordinate, and direct STO efforts during ATO execution. STO Duty Officers monitor STO-related missions on the ATO, issue execute/terminate instructions, and participate in the dynamic targeting/time sensitive targeting process, to ensure retargeting of STO targets as appropriate. STO Duty Officers feed results of STO execution back to STO planners for consideration in devising follow-on plans and to SRD operational assessment personnel to help them evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, and cyberspace operations in achieving JFC and JFACC objectives. **(T-3)**

8.12.2.4. STO KM Manager: (AFSC 1D7X) (Rank E-5/E-6). The STO KM Manager ensures proper setup, MX, and operation of STO equipment. This position manages access to STO information, systems, and facilities for all briefed personnel. Additionally, the STO KM Manager transmits, receives, and distributes special capabilities information.

8.12.2.5. STO Security. (AFSC 3P or 1NX) (Rank E-5/-E6). The STO security member manages access to STO information, capabilities and facilities. Transmits, receives, and distributes special capabilities information. Additionally, assists the AOC STO Chief in billet management actions.

8.12.2.6. STO Planners (Varies). STO planners provide inputs to the divisions that affect or support division products/processes.

8.13. Regional Air Movement Control Center. A RAMCC may be established in an area when significant military forces operate in an area with an inadequate air traffic control infrastructure. The RAMCC is considered a Coordination vs a Control Center per doctrinal reference. This specialty team, which is not necessarily collocated with the AOC, reports directly to the AOC Director and provides a way for the AADC to have visibility over non-military air traffic not depicted on the ATO. The RAMCC serves two specific functions with regard to assisting the JFACC in the role of ACA. The first function of the RAMCC is to provide airspace control when there is an inadequate Air Traffic Control infrastructure. In this capacity, the RAMCC uses procedural measures to deconflict air traffic transiting the AOR/JOA. The second function of the RAMCC is to provide contingency airflow management, of civilian and military air traffic, at designated airfields within the AOR/JOA. This ensures interagency coordination during planning and execution to prevent exceeding airfield capabilities with respect to parking and support. The DIRMOBFOR may be strongest advocate to the COMAFFOR/JFACC when establishing a RAMCC.

8.13.1. RAMCC Organization.

8.13.1.1. Long-Range Plans. Focusing on operations beyond 24 hours, the Long-Range Plans Section coordinates with the air space planners to develop airspace requirements, procedures for deconfliction and issues slot times to aircrew, planners and C2 agencies.

8.13.1.2. Current Operations. Focusing on plan as established by Long-Range Plans Section, the Current Operations Section focuses on making mission adjustments as required to maximize throughput and maintain systemic velocity.

8.13.1.3. Airfield Operations. Liaising with airfield managers and C2 elements, Airfield Operations identifies capabilities such as parking and working maximum (aircraft) on ground that have a direct impact airflow planning and executions. Capabilities are coordinated with Long-Range Plans and Current Operations for the purpose of planning and execution. This team is necessary, at the discretion of the RAMCC Team Chief, if Long-Range Plans and Current Operations are unable to coordinate with airfield managers and C2 elements.

8.13.1.4. Mission Support. Mission Support provides communications and administrative support for the RAMCC. This is of particular need when the RAMCC is not collocated with the AOC. This team is generally not required when the RAMCC is collocated with the AOC.

8.13.2. Duties and Responsibilities.

8.13.2.1. RAMCC Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O-5). The RAMCC Team Chief is responsible to the AOC/CC for the overall management of air traffic deconfliction and airflow management. Serving as a focal point for interagency coordination, the RAMCC team chief will ensure the RAMCC is a fair and impartial broker in satisfying the airspace and airflow needs of all its customers. **(T-3)**

8.13.2.2. Long Range Plans Section Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O-4). The Long Range Plans Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for coordinating with airspace planners, aircrew, mission planners and C2 agencies to develop a sound deconfliction and airflow plan to facilitate operations within the AOR/JOA. The Long-Range Plans Chief will establish processes and procedures and directs planners for the issuing of slot times. **(T-3)**

8.13.2.3. Current Operations Section Chief. (AFSC: AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O-4) The Current Operations Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for coordinating with aircrew mission planners and C2 agencies to monitor and adjust the deconfliction and airflow management plan to ensure successful operations in the AOR/JOA.

8.13.2.4. Airfield Operations Section Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O-4). The Airfield Operations Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for liaising with airfield managers and C2 elements to identify airfield requirements and coordinate with Long Range Plans and Current Operations.

8.13.2.5. Mission Support Section Chief. (AFSC: 17D). The Mission Support Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for ensuring the RAMCC computer and

communications systems are adequate and maintained to ensure mission success. The Mission Support function also provides administrative support to the RAMCC.

8.14. ATO Coordination Team. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14) (Rank O-4/O-5). The AOC/CC will determine the size of the overall ATO coordination team. ATO coordinator teams facilitate communication of CFACC intent through the entire air tasking cycle from strategy to assessment. The team works directly for the AOC director. Each ATO is assigned a two-person team working on opposite 12-hour shifts. ATO coordinators should be well-experienced in AOC processes and have appropriate program clearances, including STO and Special Access Program (SAP) access, to facilitate coordination required to adequately integrate planning and execution of each ATO and associated activities. They help ensure effective and efficient production, dissemination, and execution of each assigned ATO, and ensure guidance is appropriately/accurately integrated and maintained in all applicable AOC processes. As the primary focal point for their assigned ATO, ATO cells help maintain continuity of effort across the seams between AOC divisions/teams and resolve issues as required. If required, add additional expertise from space, IO, and intelligence to the team. Find specific ATO Coordinator functions in AFTTP 3-3.AOC.

8.14.1. ATO Coordinators will:

8.14.1.1. Develop and post ATO coordination team schedule with ATO association. **(T-3)**

8.14.1.2. Attend and participate in meetings and activities of key AOC teams during ATO development process. **(T-3)**

8.14.1.3. Monitor and manage the ATO Folder to include feedback and supplemental sheet production. **(T-3)**

8.14.1.4. Execute the ATO coordinator checklist. An example of checklist is available in AFTTP 3-3.AOC. **(T-3)**

8.15. Standoff Weapons Management. Any AOC anticipating standoff weapon operations should establish a Standoff Attack Coordination Cell. This cell will:

8.15.1. Synchronize and integrate standoff munition operations with other missions in the AOR, working primarily within the AOC's/OC's CPD with the MAAP Team, although the cell may also support the AOC's/OC's COD. **(T-3)**

8.15.2. The cell and chief's position are not full-time manned organizations or positions with dedicated personnel from the AOC. Activate the cell when anticipating or conducting military operations that include standoff WSs. **(T-3)**

8.15.3. The Standoff Attack Coordination Cell Chief may elect to augment his support staff with other personnel from within the AOC, manpower permitting.

8.15.4. The Standoff Munitions Application Center provides training to the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell. The Standoff Munitions Application Center is located at Barksdale AFB, LA, has direct liaison authority with geographic combatant commands, and reports directly to the Joint Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC) Commander. The Standoff Munitions Application Center is composed of personnel trained in planning cruise missile routes and will have the expertise to synchronize and integrate cruise missile operations.

8.15.5. The Standoff Munitions Application Center will support the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell/AOC through deployment to the supported AOC or through reach back. If

the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell Chief uses the reach back option, he/she may elect to have one or more liaison officers from Standoff Munitions Application Center deploy forward to the supported AOC. During peacetime, the Standoff Munitions Application Center will provide on-going expertise in standoff munitions planning and coordinating cruise missile operations. **(T-3)**

8.16. Common Tactical Picture Management Cell. JFACC JDNO Equivalent. The JFACC JDNO Equivalent (CJE) is responsible for the management integration of all the JDN function within the AOC. The CJE is ultimately responsible for the planning, development, implementation, and management of the common C2ISR integrated pictures. The CJE works for the AOC director and receives inputs from intelligence, operations, and communications teams to ensure the JFACC's CTP architecture is established properly. CJEs should be experienced 13B or 17D officers (O-4 to O-5) with COP-CTP planning and operational experience and be formally trained in JDNO operations. CJEs will require a strong working relationship with the JICO and the ACOMS/CC (SYSAD, networks, etc.) for terrestrial-IP quality of service, IP and port assignments, firewall management, and other functions to ensure robust and uninterrupted AN-to-Link 16 operations. This position is also responsible to coordinate with the other CJEs to deconflict parameters (as detailed in the OPTASKLINK CNR segment) to employ NEW sorties (i.e., unit reference number, CNR modem IP address, crypto setting, call signs, primary/secondary control and voice frequencies). At the air component level, the CJE's responsibilities include: Develop the OPTASK CNR. Execute the JTF JDNO-produced operations tasking COP (OPTASK COP). Implementation command and control doctrine across the integrated AOC picture. Set up and manage the AOC GCCS architecture. Provide CTP SME support to AOC personnel. Ensure all CTP feeds correlate together to provide an accurate display of the battlespace. Ensure that CTP data is distributed to subordinate TACS elements equipped with the appropriate GCCS client software. Monitor and resolve connectivity and interoperability issues.

8.16.1. Common Tactical Picture (CTP) Manager. The CTP manager is responsible for correlating, associating, fusing multi-source CTP track data, and maintaining the CTP support architecture. The CTP is the component portion of the COP, and is focused on the current, projected, and planned disposition of hostile, neutral, and planned disposition of hostile, neutral, and friendly forces (air, ground, maritime, and Intelligence). The CTP Manager works for the CJE and receives inputs from the intelligence, operations, and communications teams to ensure the CTP clearly represents the near-real-time situation in the AOR. The CTP Manager should be an experienced 1C5 with COP-CTP planning and operational experience, and be formally trained in JDNO operations. CTP Manager will collect, index, and disseminate CTP track data and other related information throughout the AOC, work with the KM team on alternative dissemination methods and ensure dissemination is IAW respective KM plan, resolve naming conflicts using the processes of correlation (matching tracks plotted on the tactical display with the contacts they represent) and fusion (integrating correlated track data with amplifying information). Resolve CTP track conflicts and anomalies (i.e., dual designations, duplicate tracks, false targets, runaway tracks, and identification and category conflicts). Manually correlate tracks to resolve data conflicts in the CTP. Automate multi-source integration techniques when available. Create, edit, delete, merge, and monitor tracks, overlays, and routes. Coordinate with CJE, JICO, and ISRD to ensure compliance with OPTASK COP parameters, MX of intelligence feeds, correlation of the ATO, and other messages into the air picture. Implement and manage CTP track data filters. Ensure filters are

properly set to support reporting requirements. Create and manager CTP communication channels. Establish effective CTP data management procedures that ensure reliable data. Assist in the development of firewall rule-sets for coalition CTP requirements. Maintain data tables to manage the incoming tactical data feeds for the C2 picture. Update the force identification matrix to the FLAG-THREAT Table assigning the alert/category/threat/flag features, for specific AENs and ELNOTs.

8.16.2. Roles and Responsibilities. For additional information, refer to CJCSM 3115.03, *Joint Data Network (JDN) Operations*: Vol III; CJCSM I 6120.01, *Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link (TDL) Operating Procedures (JMTOP)*; CJCSI 3151.02C, *Common Operational Picture/Shared Situational Awareness Command Assistance Visit*.

8.17. External Support.

8.17.1. Air Support Squadron (ASUS). There are two Air Support Squadrons; 609 ASUS and 700 ASUS. The two squadron missions are similar, but the scope is different.

8.17.1.1. The 609 ASUS provides operational support directly for the 609 AOC.

8.17.1.2. Command. The 609 ASUS is aligned as a squadron reporting to 609 AOC.

8.17.2. The mission of the 700 ASUS is to provide persistent enterprise services to improve and integrate warfighter capability across Air Components and their joint or coalition partners across the globe. The 700 ASUS offers continuity of operations options, operational data backup and reach-back support, and enterprise support to AFFOR staff, AOCs, OCs and associated weapons systems to support worldwide operational C2.

8.17.2.1. The 700 ASUS is an ACC unit aligned reporting to COMACC. When coordinated, units may utilize the 700 ASUS as a line of external support to operations.

8.17.2.2. Enterprise Help Desk. The enterprise help desk for AOCs is made up of four levels of support (Tiers 0-3). Tier 0 support is located at the unit CFP. Trouble tickets should be opened with the unit CFP for all system failures/problems. For those problems that cannot be resolved locally, the unit CFP will request support from Tier 1 at the 700 ASUS. If further support is required to mitigate the issue, additional support can be requested from Tier 2 and Tier 3 entities (Production Center and vendor support) as needed.

Chapter 9

AIR COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (ACOMS)

9.1. General. The ACOMS provides critical communications and cyberspace support to the AOC, ensuring continuous security, operational availability, and reliability of resources (systems and people) in support of the AOC mission. The ACOMS integrates AOC systems with other USAF, DOD, joint, and coalition systems. Its goal is to deliver reliable secure communication and cyber capabilities to the AOC/CC and the AOC staff, enabling air, space and cyberspace operations throughout the tactical or JOA. The ACOMS/CC coordinates directly with the AOC/CC. The ACOMS works on a regular basis with the unit's AOC Configuration Manager, ISSO, and WSM to configure AOC networks, keep them on-line for AOC users, and control them in accordance with guidance provided by the AOC/CC, AOC WS Configuration Review Board, and site AOC Configuration Review Board.

9.1.1. The ACOMS is typically composed of five functions: CFP, Network Operations, C2 Systems, Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions, and Plans and Programs. Collectively, the functions provide AOC-unique communications services and tools for planning, generating, employing, and directing air, and IO forces. The ACOMS will coordinate with space and cyber components on space and cyberspace planning and operations. Some communications and cyberspace personnel may be embedded in core AOC divisions and specialty or support teams, and they may or may not operate as extensions of and in coordination with the ACOMS (i.e., they may work for the chief of their assigned division or team and not for the ACOMS). Operations, reporting instructions, and responsibilities for communications support will follow guidance in Methods and Procedures Technical Order, 00-33A-1001, *General Cyberspace Support Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, applicable joint and AF directives, operation plans or orders, and local supplements. If any guidance conflict occurs, joint publications take precedence; personnel will follow the joint publication pending guidance or clarification from proper authorities. **(T-2)**

9.1.2. The ACOMS receives information exchange requirements or communications system (CS) requirements from AOC divisions and teams; the ACOMS collaborates with the WSM, Configuration Manager, site ISSO, and other AOC personnel as required to staff and process AOC Configuration Review Board-approved requirements. The C2 Plans Team often consults AOC communications personnel, who may support C2 communications planning and COD during execution of those plans. The ACOMS' roles and responsibilities for cyberspace security (formerly known as Information Assurance) are key to ensuring efficient flow of information into, through and out of the AOC, while providing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information and their systems.

9.2. Major ACOMS Process Inputs. Communications support requirements include, but are not limited to: IER, higher headquarters direction, Enterprise Change Notices, spectrum/frequencies, internal and external data networks (Non-secure IP Router Network, Secret IP Router Network, etc.), email and message services, cryptographic support, data link networks, line of sight and beyond line of sight voice, video teleconference, Multilevel Secure Voice, computer hardware, and special circuits (e.g., Intel distribution networks), Annex K, joint communications-electronics operating instructions, AOC floor plan, KMP, Operational requirements, joint restricted frequency

list, ACOMS/CC, AFFOR A6, and JFC J6 guidance. Communications system and service requirements will be coordinated and managed via local change management process with inputs from the site's ACOMS, WSM, ISSO, and Configuration Manager.

9.3. Major ACOMS Processes. The major communications support processes are communications integration, system administration, planning, cyberspace security, network operations, configuration management, spectrum management, system monitoring and outage reporting, system MX, requirements management, project management, and client systems support. The team works with the MAJCOM/Air Force Forces Communication Control Center, 16 AF (AFCYBER), 616 OC, the assigned Cyberspace Liaison/Support Element, host base communications squadron, and the AOC WS Help Desk, as required. **Note:** In some cases, the host base may provide some services, such as long-haul communications connectivity, telephone, network services, internal and external data networks (NIPR, SIPR, JWICs) power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning, etc. In those instances, the support should be documented in appropriate agreements (memoranda of agreement, service-level agreements, etc.).

9.4. Major ACOMS Process Outputs. Major ACOMS process outputs are communications planning and communications plans; communications systems (phones, computers, switches, routers, etc.); communications system planning, CFP input to the DAL, configuration management and MX; network architecture planning, configuration, operations and management; cyberspace security; cryptographic management; information exchange requirements and CS requirements management; project management; help desk support; and systems technical expertise.

9.5. Organization. The ACOMS/CC routinely coordinates directly with AOC/CC. The ACOMS is typically organized into six functional areas (see **Figure 9.1**., Typical ACOMS Organization and Functions).

Figure 9.1. Typical ACOMS Organization and Functions.



Note: Enlisted AFSC shreds may be consolidated to 1D7X1Q pending official guidance.

9.5.1. The ACOMS organization and functions at any AOC may differ based on the mission and the structure of a particular AOC or theater command.

9.5.2. The ACOMS/CC may combine or increase ACOMS functions and/or sections as a matter of mission support or efficiency of operation; when this happens, the ACOMS/CC must ensure each of the responsibilities in the six-function model described herein are covered. **(T-3)**

9.6. ACOMS Personnel Responsibilities:

9.6.1. ***ACOMS Commander*** . The ACOMS/CC provides guidance and direction to all ACOMS personnel and provides guidance on communications and cyberspace matters to other communications and cyberspace personnel assigned to other AOC divisions and teams. The ACOMS Commander will:

9.6.1.1. Maintain situational awareness and status reporting on communications systems and services specified to sustain AOC operations in accordance with unit and cyberspace security procedures. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.2. Coordinate current and new AOC communications requirements with the AOC commander, AFFOR A6, support group commander (if applicable), Configuration Manager, WSM, CJE and site ISSO to determine activation and restoration priorities based on input from stakeholders. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.3. Possess authoritative knowledge of communications tasking in applicable AFIs, TOs, Operations Orders, Operations Plans, Concept of Operations and Defense Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implantation Guide. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.4. Advise the AOC/CC, AFFOR A6, support group commander (if applicable), WSM, and appropriate division and team chiefs on the mission impacts of scheduled and unscheduled communications equipment and service outages and recommend the best methods for mitigating/eliminating outage impacts. Coordinate with the Configuration Manager prior to any communication/system configuration changes. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.5. Coordinate communications system and service requirements with appropriate ACOMS functions and other AFFOR staff, Service, joint, coalition, allied and commercially based communications systems and services providers who support AOC operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.6. Maintain all AOC communications systems and services at the highest possible level to maintain information and information system confidentiality, integrity and availability. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.7. Act as liaison between the supporting component AOC spectrum manager and AOC operators. Coordinate with CPD on frequency assignments for ATO and ATO SPINS and maintain an accurate list of satellite communications users to include the mission of each assigned channel to enable the AOC/CC to prioritize satellite communications. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.8. In close coordination with WSM and CJE, actively participate in the site Configuration Review Board as lead for the AOC systems management process. This process includes the Configuration Manager as the AOC commander’s orchestrator for configuration management and representatives from AOC divisions and teams. Any changes or additions to AOC systems must include sufficient technical and configuration

management support material, identify and address any MX concerns, and be approved by AOC commander. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.9. Verify with WMS and CM that all AOC systems are certified and accredited in accordance with DODI 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, and AFI 17-101. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.9.1. Ensure all systems within the AOC connecting to the Air Force Network comply with the DODI 8510.01. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.9.2. Verify all cyberspace security requirements are met in accordance with DODI 8500.01 for all platform information technology and platform information technology interconnections. **(T-3)**

9.6.1.10. Develop plans to achieve maximum availability of the AOC communications systems and services when operating in a contested, degraded or denied environment. **(T-3)**

9.6.2. ***Communications Focal Point Function*** . The CFP is a support staff for the ACOMS comprised of communications and cyberspace personnel who have a working knowledge of the AOC mission. As the operational arm of the ACOMS, the CFP oversees operations and MX of site communications systems and services supporting the AOC and maintains situational awareness of systems and services external to the AOC that support the AOC and air operations. The CFP manages and maintains communications support for the AOC, as well as directing the activities of personnel who work for the ACOMS. In addition, the CFP usually provides coordination with AOC area support units that provide or support long-haul transmission, voice and data services, C2 radios, electrical power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning and other services supporting AOC operations. The CFP function monitors and coordinates production and execution of scheduled and unscheduled MX while maintaining visibility of communications system and service metrics and indicators. CFP personnel evaluate communications management requirements and direct timely corrective actions. Following guidance in TO 00-33A-1001, *General Communication Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, and based on local conditions, the CFP, as a minimum, will:

9.6.2.1. Act as the single focal point for AOC communications problem resolutions. The CFP will communicate with AOC personnel on problems with communications systems and services, and coordinate with other functions (internal or external to the AOC) to ensure that problems and issues are addressed and resolved. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.1.1. Establish a site help desk capability (either integrated into or separated from the CFP) to provide AOC system users a central service point to report communications system and service problems, regardless of whether the problem is internal or external to the AOC. The site help desk capability provides Tier 0 support, as identified in the *AOC Weapon System Help Desk Enabling Concept*, for the AOC. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.1.2. Report external infrastructure component problems impacting an AOC to the host base Network Control Center, the Air Force Forces Communication Control Center, and/or it's servicing Integrated Network Operations and Security Center, as appropriate, and track any problem until it is resolved. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.1.3. Per the 700 ASUS Mission Directive and the *AOC Weapon System Help Desk Enabling Concept*, the AOC WS Help Desk at Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA is

the AOC WS Tier 1 help desk, providing support to the AOC WS enterprise community. Its mission is to assist and/or coordinate in resolving AOC WS baseline hardware and software integration problems through technical solutions and advice. The CFP will open trouble tickets for all system failures/problems encountered at the local level; if the Tier 0 support cannot resolve a problem locally, the CFP should elevate any AOC WS baseline problems to the AOC WS help desk for resolution. The AOC WS help desk will assist in reporting and ensure the tracking, resolution, and return to service of any problem or outage encountered with mission applications, services, and internal infrastructure in the approved AOC WS baseline. The AOC WS help desk provides a dedicated 24/7 capability during contingencies. **(T-3) Note:** The Tier 0 help desk accepts variances from the approved baseline as risk. The site's Configuration Manager and ISSO, not the AOC WS help desk manages these variances.

9.6.2.2. Maintain situational awareness of all links, circuits, systems, and networks supporting the AOC and air operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.2.1. Continuously track system and circuit status and update the ACOMS/DO and appropriate divisions and teams of communications system, network or circuit outages that impact AOC operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.2.2. Access AOC WS internal and external network connectivity diagrams. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.2.3. Display system, network, link, and circuit status charts that identify communications systems and services supporting AOC operations and updating these status charts to reflect activations, deactivations and outages. **Note:** the Plans and Programs function develops these status charts and updates them when configuration changes occur. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.3. Maintain the ACOMS Master Station Log and log all activities or events that affect communications or cyberspace support to AOC and air operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.4. Collect trouble tickets/job information, assign control numbers and maintain the status of all active, scheduled, unscheduled, and deferred trouble tickets/jobs in an approved Automated Information System such as Remedy and/or the Integrated Maintenance Data System. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.5. Report problems to MAJCOM/Air Force Forces Communication Control Center and AOC commander that affect communications support to the AOC and air operations, especially those that require coordination or support with outside agencies for resolution. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.6. Collect outage and incident information on all communication degradations and outages to help identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, deliberate attacks, and alternate procedures to assist the ACOMS in making system and network configuration corrective action decisions. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.7. Support configuration management by notifying the ACOMS/DO, WSM, Configuration Manager, ISSO, Plans and Programs function of any intentions to change AOC WS configuration. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.8. Determine, manage and oversee communications and MX efforts. **(T-3)**

9.6.2.9. Pass to the Plans and Programs function any new information exchange requirements or communication requirements presented to the CFP. **(T-3)**

9.6.3. ***Networks Operations Function*** . The AOC Network Operations function is a staff management element of the ACOMS that focuses on network administration to include applications services, configuration management, and messaging. It provides AOC network operations, cyberspace security, and cyber defense operations using network boundary protection, intrusion detection and vulnerability assessment techniques, and software tools. The function consists of network management technicians, client support technicians, infrastructure technicians, system controllers, and web applications technicians. The Network Operations function will:

9.6.3.1. In coordination with the AOC WS Program Office, implement and enforce national, DOD and USAF security policies to protect networks from internal and external threats. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.2. Coordinate Multiple Discipline Vulnerability Assessment and configure Program Office approved network hardware and software patches to specifications. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.3. Update and accurately maintain configuration documents/records (e.g., network topologies and rack elevation drawings). **(T-3)**

9.6.3.4. Assist in testing and validation of network security. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.5. Monitor C2 system network capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.6. Ensure AOC WS Program Office direction on network security is enforced. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.7. Coordinate with the IO Team and assigned Cyberspace Liaison/Support Element to support cyberspace operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.8. Coordinate with appropriate agencies (such as the base Network Control Center, AFFOR Communication Control Center, Integrated Network Operations and Security Center or 616 OC) to monitor/maintain AOC networks. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.9. Provide support to the site ISSO:

9.6.3.9.1. Ensure each cross-domain solution implementation has a Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group approval and a Defense Information Systems Agency authority to connect or interim authority to connect for each AOC location/site in accordance with CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**

9.6.3.9.2. Ensure any secure wireless connection has separate Defense Information Systems Agency Connection Approval Office approval for each implementation at each AOC location/site since these connections are a special case of Secret IP Router Network connection approval per CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**

9.6.3.9.3. Ensure any AOC connection to the Internet has a DOD Chief Information Officer Global Information Grid waiver approval prior to implementation per CJCSI 6211.02D. The Global Information Grid is now called the DOD Information Network. **(T-0)**

9.6.3.9.4. Obtain separate approval for any foreign national presence or use of foreign software in accordance with AFI 17-101 and other Air Force System Security Instructions. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.9.5. Reaccredit any major modification or changes to the security architecture, security configuration, or security posture that deviates from the system(s) as accredited, in accordance with AFI 17-101 and DODI 8510.01. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.10. Coordinate with appropriate agencies to monitor/maintain AOC video teleconferencing suites/audio-visual networks. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.11. Monitor and maintain all circuits supporting AOC C2 Radio Frequency transmissions. **(T-3)**

9.6.3.12. Coordinate with AOC divisions, teams and the C2 Systems function to provide support for common information technology assets (e.g., monitors, keyboards, voice over IP phones, etc.). **(T-3)**

9.6.4. ***Command and Control (C2) Systems Function*** . The C2 Systems function works for the ACOMS/CC and ensures servers and workstations (which include peripherals, communications devices, and on-line software) are available to the user. The C2 Systems function's responsibility within the AOC is from the user's terminal to the server. This function normally contains the C2 System Administrator Technicians and Application Services Administrator Technicians. The AOC C2 system function will:

9.6.4.1. Install, configure, maintain, and administer C2 systems. **(T-3)**

9.6.4.2. Perform backup of C2 systems as designated by the ACOMS/DO and/or AOC commander. **(T-3)**

9.6.4.3. Manage users' computer software configurations and local area network systems. **(T-3)**

9.6.4.4. Coordinate with users, the CFP, client support technicians, and other ACOMS functions to resolve computer software and hardware problems. **(T-3)**

9.6.4.5. Coordinate configuration changes with the CFP, the Plans and Programs function, the site Configuration Manager, and the site Configuration Review Board. **(T-3)**

9.6.4.6. Update and maintain rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories; coordinate any updates with the Configuration Manager. **(T-3)**

9.6.5. ***Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions Function*** . The Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions function works for the ACOMS/CC. The function helps plan, coordinate, and establish the AOC connections to the MTN and AOC C2 radio networks. The function's primary customer is the AOC's Interface Control Cell, but it may also provide data link and radio support to other AOC entities, such as the ISRD, SODO, Senior Air Defense Officer, CTP Management Cell and the Dynamic Targeting Cell. This function is normally comprised of Radio Frequency transmission technicians who setup and maintain data link, gateway and C2 radio systems and networks supporting data link operations. The Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions function will:

9.6.5.1. Support the AOC Interface Control Cell plan, manage, and coordinate the MTN architecture. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2. Establish and maintain data links, gateways, and C2 radio networks and circuits supporting data link operations. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2.1. Maintain data link, gateway, and C2 radio system software and hardware. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2.2. Ensure mission critical voice, data and video services and circuits, links, nodes, and networks supporting data link and C2 radio networks remain operational; coordinate with internal and external entities to resolve problems outside the AOC's/OC's control. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2.3. Perform intricate alignment and calibration procedures to ensure maximum operating efficiency and complete repair procedures necessary to correct defective equipment. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2.4. Establish priorities, maintain, test, troubleshoot, and repair MTN and C2 radio systems. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.2.5. Conduct gateway operational system checks and monitor performance of systems and circuits. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.3. Using approved floor plans, properly position data link and C2 radio equipment in the AOC. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.4. Monitor the MTN to ensure datalink information integrity and availability. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.5. Monitor AOC communications networks supporting distribution and display of MTN and CTP situational awareness information. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.6. Resolve installation, repair, overhaul, and modification problems associated with communication and cyberspace changes or upgrades. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.7. When tasked to coordinate with AFFOR A6, maintain configuration control of airborne and ground-based data link and communication relays and gateways, such as the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node or roll-on beyond line of sight enhancement packages. **(T-3)**

9.6.5.8. Update and maintain rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories. **(T-3)**

9.6.6. ***Plans and Programs Function*** . The AOC WS has a dynamic baseline with changes that accommodate the fielding of new capabilities, systems, applications, updates to existing products, and the incorporation of unique unit variances to the approved site baseline. The Plans and Programs function is the AOC's central point for AOC baseline hardware and software configuration and change management, and project management. Additionally, the function coordinates changes to the site AOC's baseline and new requirements through the site Configuration Review Board, Configuration Manager, WS Manager, ISSO, AOC divisions and teams, MAJCOMS, and AOC WS Program Office, as appropriate. **(T-3)** The Plans and Programs function will:

9.6.6.1. Manage the as-built site configuration and coordinate changes and requests for variances in accordance with **paragraph 2.3.9.2** of this AFMAN. **(T-3)**

9.6.6.2. Manage activities related to CS planning, to include communications support planning and plan development, cyberspace security support, engineering support, strategic planning, and requirements analysis. **(T-3)**

9.6.6.3. Manage CS hardware and software implementation, including architectures, integration, direction, and standards as outlined in T.O. 00-33A-1001, the AOC WS Program Office, MAJCOM and site CMP, and joint publications. **(T-3)**

9.6.6.4. Manage internal support efforts of the ACOMS to include asset management and coordination of CS support agreements with the host base, service-level communications entities, customers or lateral units. **(T-3)**

9.6.6.5. Monitor and maintain the quality of AOC on-site communications systems and services. Quality assurance is an ACOMS or Support Squadron responsibility that applies to all communications and cyberspace personnel who install, configure, operate, inspect, maintain, repair, and remove CS equipment in support of AOC operational requirements. Quality Assurance Work Center personnel provide the ACOMS/Support Squadron commander status on equipment, unit training, and other activities. The Plans and Programs function will support the ACOMS/Support Squadron quality assurance efforts. If tasked, Plans and Programs will manage the ACOMS/Support Squadron quality assurance program. T.O. 00-33A-1001 outlines quality assurance roles and responsibilities. **(T-3)**

9.6.6.6. Update and maintain rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories. **(T-3)**

9.6.7. ***Cyberspace Defense Function*** . The Cyberspace Defense function provides an in-depth cyberspace defense of the AOC, but also presents the AOC Commander and CFACC with the information necessary to make informed decisions about operations, based on known cyber threats, cyber anomalies, and ongoing cyber incidents. Manning the teams is not assured. Cyberspace Defense functions were removed from the AOCs due to lack of funding and the creations of Prime MDTs. Outside of those AOCs selected to have Prime MDTs, ACOMS/AOCs have no manpower or funding for continuing Cyberspace defense functions and AOC CCs may be forced to support the functions out of existing AOC manpower and/or reporting mission shortfalls in SORTS. The Cyberspace Defense function should be comprised of the Flight Commander, AOC Cyber Mission Assurance and Cyber Defense Technicians with various specialty shreds as deemed appropriate by the ACOMS/CC. Although the Network Operations Function in the AOC already performs some network and cyberspace defense tasks for the AOC, the Cyberspace Defense function will focus in on the Key Terrain – Cyber (KT-C) and may be trained and equipped to perform a more in-depth defense of this terrain. The Cyberspace Defense function should have a solid understanding of how certain risks to the KT-C could affect the AOC IT/cyber based capabilities and possibly influence the mission. This is a key point as successful cyber mission assurance is focused on the mission first and defense of the KT-C second. Decisions under the respond and recover functions for an AOC will primarily be driven by the tempo/timing of operations and the associated risk to those operations whereas cyber defense of networks not tied to a WS would normally focus on neutralizing and potentially clearing a threat as quickly as possible. The tasks associated with cyber mission assurance fall within the Air Force Cybersecurity Framework as laid out in AFI-17-130 *Cybersecurity Program Management*, 13 Feb 20, and therefore, the responsibilities

listed below are organized according to the five core functions of this framework. The AOC Cyberspace defense function will:

9.6.7.1. Identify Activities:

9.6.7.1.1. Perform Functional Mission Analysis of the AOC to identify KT-C and associated mission dependencies. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.1.2. Periodically review KT-C for changes and assess them for any recommended changes to the AOC cyber defense posture. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.1.3. Develop local AOC and component level notification and reporting procedures for anomalous activity and possible cyber incidents. These procedures should not contradict AFI17-203, *Cyber Incident Handling*. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.2. Protect Activities:

9.6.7.2.1. Advise the AOC/CC on policies and plans to better posture the AOC for cyberspace defense. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.2.2. Advise the site ISSO on AOC firewall vulnerabilities. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.2.3. Coordinate with AOC/CC, WSM, site ISSO, PMO and other entities as needed to develop Pre-Approved Actions and Pre-Coordinated Actions. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.3. Detect Activities:

9.6.7.3.1. Monitor AOC KT-C and MX actions. Keep and monitor logs for all KT-C relevant systems. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.3.2. Report all anomalies and possible incidents in accordance with AFI 17-203. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.3.3. Execute local notification and reporting procedures when anomalous activity and possible incidents are detected. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.3.4. Be prepared to satisfy requests for additional data, information or files from 616 OC. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.4. Respond Activities:

9.6.7.4.1. Support AOC/CC OPREP and SITREP reporting. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.4.2. Participate in Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) if one is stood up to address a reported anomaly or incident. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.4.3. Provide the AOC/CC with possible courses of action from a mission assurance perspective, based on the effect on AOC capabilities and risk to mission. This will happen in conjunction with the CIRT if one has been stood up. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.5. Recover Activities:

9.6.7.5.1. In coordination with CIRT, restore systems to baseline as risk to mission permits. **(T-3)**

9.6.7.5.2. Document actions taken, observations, and lessons learned for distribution to the AOC enterprise and CIRT members. **(T-3)**

Chapter 10

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

10.1. General. This chapter informs AOC units, and associated units below MAJCOM level, how to publish a supplement to this publication. Differences identified in an AOC supplement should only apply to that AOC and any aligned or associated ARC AOC unit. Publish in accordance with DAFMAN 90-161. Units will follow instructions on page 1 of this volume for approval/distribution of the MAJCOM Supplement. **(T-2)**

10.1.1. Procedures in the supplement shall not be less restrictive than specified elsewhere in this AFMAN. This chapter's intent is for all units to highlight their specific differences in operation procedures or organization dictated by their local AOR/JOA, CCDR guidance or functional command. Most geographic AOCs and the 608 AOC have an organization structure aligned with this basic manual. Global AOCs should provide their organization structure and processes not included in this AFMAN.

10.1.2. The supplement will contain a statement in the opening paragraph advising the reader that it further implements and is incomplete without AFMAN 13-1AOC, Volume 3. **(T-2)** The supplement is not a single source document for procedures contained in other official publications, directives, or regulations. Avoid unnecessary repetition of guidance provided in other official publications; however, reference to those publications is acceptable when it serves to facilitate location of information necessary for local operating procedures.

10.2. Organization. The supplement should be organized in the following format and, as a minimum, include the following: **Note:** Due to the diversity of AOC missions, units are authorized to organize their supplement which will best suit their mission.

10.2.1. Introduction.

10.2.2. General Policy.

10.2.3. Unit Mission.

10.2.4. Unit Peacetime Organization.

10.2.5. Command and Control.

10.2.6. Unit Standards (Optional).

10.2.7. OPSEC/ Communications Security procedures.

10.2.8. Associated Unit Organization and Support Mission.

ADRIAN L. SPAIN, Lt Gen, USAF
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Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AADC—Area Air Defense Commander

AADP—Area Air Defense Plan

AAMD—Army Air and Missile Defense

AAMDC—Army Air and Missile Defense Command

ABP—Air Battle Plan

ACA—Airspace Control Authority

ACC—Air Combat Command

ACF—Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion

ACM—Airspace Control Means

ACO—Airspace Control Order

ACP—Airspace Control Plan

ACOMS—Air Communications Squadron

ADCON—Administrative Control

ADW—Air Defense Warnings

AE—Aeromedical Evacuation

AECT—Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team

AETF—Air Expeditionary Task Force

AF—Air Force

AFB—Air Force Base

AFDP—Air Force Doctrine Publication

AFFOR—Air Force Forces

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

AIR—assessment information requirement

ALCT—Airlift Control Team

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AMCT—Air Mobility Control Team

AMD—Air Mobility Division

AMT—Airspace Management Team

ANG—Air National Guard

AOC—Air Operations Center

AOC/CC—AOC Commander

AOD—Air Operations Directive

AODB—Air Operations Database

AOR—Area Of Responsibility

AR—Air Refueling

ARC—Air Reserve Component

ARCT—Air Refueling Control Team

ARDO—Air Refueling Duty Officer

ASUS—Air Support Squadron

ATO—Air Tasking Order

ATONEWS—Air Tasking Order-Network-Enabled Weapons Supplement

BCD—Battlefield Coordination Detachment

C2—Command and Control

C2ISR—Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

CAOC—Combined Air Operations Center

CAP—Combat Air Patrol

CAS—Close Air Support

CC—Commander

CCDR—Combatant Commander

CCIR—Commander's Critical Information Requirements

CCO—Chief, Combat Operations

CFP—Communications Focal Point

CISR—Chief of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CJCSM——Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

CFLCC—Combined Force Land Component Commander

CFMCC—Combined Force Maritime Component Commander

C/JFACC—Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander

CJE—Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent

CM—Configuration Manager

CNR—Combat Net Radio

COA—Course of Action

COD—Combat Operations Division

COMAFFOR—Commander, Air Force Forces

CONOP—Concept of Operations

COP—Common Operational Picture

CPD—Combat Plans Division

CSpOC—Combined Space Operations Center

CTP—Common Tactical Picture

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction

DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual

DAFPD—Department of the Air Force Policy Document

DAL—Defended Asset List

DCA—Defensive Counter Air

DDO—Defensive Duty Officer

DDOC—Deployment and Distribution Operations Center

DIP—Diplomatic

DIRCYBERFOR—Director of Cyber Forces

DIRMOBFOR—Director of Mobility Forces

DIRSPACEFOR—Director of Space Forces

DISUM—Daily Intelligence Summaries

DO—Director of Operations

DOD—Department of Defense

DODI—Department of Defense Instruction

DT—Dynamic Targeting

EW—Electronic Warfare

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

GDSS—Global Decision Support System

GTC—Ground Track Coordinator

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

IAMD—Integrated Air and Missile Defense

ICO—Interface Control Officer

IER—Information Exchange Requirements

IO—Information Operations

IOWG—Information Operations Working Group

IP—Internet Protocol

IPB—Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

ISR—Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ISRD—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

ISRODO—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations Duty Officer

ISSO—Information System Security Officer

INTSUM—Intelligence Summaries

ITO—Integrated Tasking Order

IW—Information Warfare

JA—Judge Advocate

JACCE—Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JADSI—Joint Air Defense System Integrator

JAG—Judge Advocate General

JAOC—Joint Air Operations Center

JAOP—Joint Air Operations Plan

JCC—Joint Cyber Center

JDN—Joint Data Network

JDNO—Joint Data Network Operations Officer

JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFC—Joint Force Commander

JFSCC—Joint Forces Space Component Command

JICC—Joint Interface Control Cell

JICO—Joint Interface Control Officer

JIPCL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Collection List

JIPRL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List

JIPTL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

JOA—Joint Operations Area

JP—Joint Publication

JFSCC—Joint Force Space Component Commander

JTCB—Joint Targeting Coordination Board

KM—Knowledge Management

KMP—KM Plan

KO—Knowledge Operations

LNO—Liaison Officer

MAAP—Master Air Attack Planning

MAAPTK—Master Air Attack Planning Tool Kit

MAJCOM—Major Command

MARLE—Marine Liaison Element

MCAMP—Marine Corps Air Mission Planner

METOC—Meteorological and Oceanographic

MICT—Management Internal Control Toolset

MILDEC—Military Deception

MISO—Mission Information Support Operations

MOE—Measure of Effectiveness

MTN—Multi-Tactical Data Link network

MTP—MAAP Tanker Planner

MX—Maintenance

NALE—Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element

NEW—Net Enabled Weapons

NGB—National Guard Bureau

NKDO—Non-Kinetic Duty Officer

NKDT—Non-Kinetic Duty Technician

NKO—Non-Kinetic Operations

OAR—Operational Assessment Report

OAT—Operational Assessment Team

OC—Operations Center

OPLAN—Operational Plan

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC—Operations Security

OPTASKLINK—Operational Task Link

PACE—Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency

PIR—Priority Intelligence Requirements

PRCC—Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell

RAMCC—Regional Air Mobility Control Center

RFI—Request For Information

RMF—Risk Management Framework

ROE—Rules of Engagement

RSTA—Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition

RUF—Rules for the Use of Force

SADO—Senior Air Defense Officer

SCA—Space Controlling Authority

SGT—Strategy Guidance Team

SIDO—Senior Intelligence Duty Officer

SODO—Senior Offensive Duty Officer

SOLE—Special Operations Liaison Element

SPINS—Special Instructions

SPT—Strategy Plans Team

SRD—Strategy Division

STO—Special Technical Operations

TA—Tactical Assessment

TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TACON—Tactical Control

TACS—Theater Air Control System

TAES—Theater Aeromedical Evacuation Systems

TBMCS—Theater Battle Management Core Systems

TDL—Tactical Data Link

TDT—Target Duty Technician

TET—Targeting Effects Team

TGT/TA—Targets/Tactical Assessment

TPFDD—Time-Phased Force and Deployment Document

TST—Time Sensitive Target

UHF—Ultra High Frequency

USAF—United States Air Force

USSF—United States Space Force

WOC—Wing Operations Center

WS—Weapon System

WSM—Weapon System Manager

WST—Weather Specialty Team

XAB—Expeditionary Air Base

Office Symbols

ACC/A2—Air Combat Command Director of Intelligence

ACC/A3—Air Combat Command, Director of Operations

ACC/A3C—Air Combat Command, Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division

ACC/A5/8/9—Air Combat Command Director of Plans, Programs, and Requirements

ACC/A5/2C—Air Combat Command, Air Operations Center Requirements Division

AF/A3TE—Air Force, Exercises and Training Branch

AF/A3X—Air Force Operations Digital Enterprise

COMACC—Commander, Air Combat Command

DIRCYBERFOR/DC4—Director of Cyber Forces

SAF/AQ—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

USCYBERCOM/J2T—US Cyber Command

Terms

AOC—C2 center that provides the capability to plan, direct, and assess the activities of assigned and attached forces.

Commando Solo (EC130E)—USAF aircraft whose military information support operations (MISO) and civil affairs broadcasts in FM radio, television, and communications bands.

Compass Call (EC-130H)—USAF aircraft whose mission is to disrupt enemy command and control communications, perform offensive counter-information operations, and carry out other kinds of electronic attack.

Cyberspace—A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

Cyberspace Operations—Employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpoe is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.

Electronic Warfare—Military action involving the use of the EM spectrum, to include directed energy to control the EM spectrum, or to attack an enemy.

Information Operations—The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

Joint Planning Process for Air (JPPA)—The process used to develop a Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) that guides employment of the air capabilities and forces made available to accomplish missions assigned by the JFC.

Link 16—A military tactical data link network used by military aircraft, ships and ground forces to exchange their tactical picture in near-real time.

METOC—The entire range of atmospheric, oceanographic, and space environment phenomena.

Military Deception (MILDEC)—Actions executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary or violent extremist organization decision makers; thereby causing the adversary decision maker to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Nodal Analysis—Analysis of the effects of actions at the communications system locations that support information exchange.

Operations Security (OPSEC)—The process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities.

"O" Shell ABP—Component-planning shells from ATO production.

Signature Management—The process used to profile day-to-day observable activities and operational trends. SM incorporates the analytical methods of OPSEC.