CCRB INVESTIGATIVE RECOMMENDATION

Investigator:		Team:	CCRB Case #:	☐ Force	☑ Discourt.	U.S.
Owen Godshall		Squad #15	201809776	✓ Abuse	O.L.	☐ Injury
Incident Date(s)		Location of Incident:	•	Precinct:	18 Mo. SOL	EO SOL
Thursday, 08/02/2018 7:30 PM		§ 87(2)(b) stationhouse.	26th Precinct	26	2/2/2020	2/2/2020
Date/Time CV Reported		CV Reported At:	How CV Reported:	Date/Tim	ne Received at CCI	₹B
Fri, 11/23/2018 3:54 PM		CCRB	Phone	Fri, 11/23	3/2018 3:54 PM	
Complainant/Victim	Туре	Home Addre	ess			
Subject Officer(s)	Shield	TaxID	Command			
1. Officers						
2. LT Kimberly Motto	00000	935360	PB CAS			
3. DI Michael Shugrue	00000	923172	PSA 6			
4. POM Nikaurys Martinez	05565	953062	PSA 6			
5. An officer						
Witness Officer(s)	Shield No	o Tax No	Cmd Name			
1. POM Kingsley Joachim	18313	950637	PSA 6			
2. POM Joshua Escobar	07464	958554	026 PCT			
3. POM Deniz Aktas	10316	956373	026 PCT			
4. POM Brian Stanton	11683	949693	026 PCT			
5. LT Daniel Delaney	00000	945653	026 PCT			
6. POM Andrew Chang	09035	963451	026 PCT			
7. POM Antonio Castelluccio	04953	963438	026 PCT			
8. POM German Geronimo	11218	943293	026 PCT			
9. POF Ivis Ayala	26665	941375	026 PCT			
10. SGT Joseph McKenna	02208	899573	026 PCT			
11. POM Badr Haimoudat	26975		026 PCT			
12. POF Daniela Rizzo	17116		PSA 6			
13. LT Okelie Bentley	00000	936196	MED DIV			
Officer(s)	Allegatio	n		Inv	estigator Recon	 amendation
A.DI Michael Shugrue	_	eputy Inspector Michae	el Shugrue entered	37(2)		
B. Officers	Discourte Manhatta	esy: At §87(2)(b) n, officers spoke discou	in			

Officer(s)	Allegation	Investigator Recommendation
C.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue searched in Manhattan.	
D.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At § 87(2)(b) in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested § 87(2)(b)	
E.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At § 87(2)(b) in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested § 87(2)(b)	
F.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At \$ 87(2)(b) in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$ 87(2)(b)	
G.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At § 87(2)(b) in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested § 87(2)(b)	
H.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At ^{8 87(2)(b)} in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested ^{8 87(2)(b)}	
I.DI Michael Shugrue	Abuse: At § 87(2)(b) in Manhattan, Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested § 87(2)(b)	
J.LT Kimberly Motto	Abuse: Lieutenant Kimberly Motto entered in Manhattan.	
K.LT Kimberly Motto	Abuse: Lieutenant Kimberly Motto searched in Manhattan.	
L.POM Nikaurys Martinez	Abuse: At the 26th Precinct stationhouse, Police Officer Nikaurys Martinez refused to provide his shield number to \$87(2)(b)	
M. An officer	Abuse: At the 26th Precinct stationhouse, an officer refused to provide his shield number to \$\frac{8.87(2)(b)}{2.00}	

Case Summary

On November 23, 2018, \$87(2)(b) filed this complaint with the CCRB via telephone.



Body-worn camera (BWC) footage was obtained from Lieutenant Daniel Delany, Sergeant Joseph McKenna, Police Officer Brian Stanton and Police Officer Badr Haimoudat. It has been attached in IAs #126-131 (Board Review #1-6) and summarized in IA #135 (Board Review #7). The videos do not depict any of the allegations.


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they had unrelated open warrants.

Findings and Recommendations

Allegation (A) Abuse of Authority: Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue entered [8872] in Manhattan. Allegation (C) Discourtesy: Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue searched 887(2)(b) in Manhattan. and § 87(2)(b) were interviewed at the CCRB on November 28, 2018. §87(2)(b) also provided a notarized written statement, prepared on December 8, 2018 (Board Review #8). \$87(2)(6) provided a follow-up telephone statement on September 5, 2019 (Board Review #9). He also participated in a photo-viewing session at the CCRB on November 12, 2019 (Board Review #10-12). The investigation was unable to obtain statements from § 87(2)(b) regarding this incident (Board or § 87(2)(b) Review #3). Police Officer Joachim was interviewed at the CCRB on February 8, 2019. Lieutenant Motto was interviewed at the CCRB on March 12, 2019. Deputy Inspector Shugrue was interviewed at the CCRB on April 11, 2019. It is undisputed that § 87(2)(b) and § 87(2)(b) were standing outside of § 87(2)(b) unidentified individual produced a firearm. The six civilians fled from the gunman by running into the building, up to the third floor, and then into the \$87(2)(b) family's apartment, \$87(2)(b) The gunman followed them up to the third floor, where he fired his weapon approximately five times. The bullets struck the front door of \$87(2)(b) which is located immediately next to the front door of \$87(2)(b) None of the civilians were injured. Numerous officers, including Deputy Inspector Shugrue, responded to the scene of the shooting. The unidentified occupants of § 87(2)(b) invited the police into their apartment to inspect the damage caused by the bullets. Deputy Inspector Shugrue directed ESU officers to enter \$87(2)(b) officers entered the apartment, handcuffed the civilians inside, and removed them. The ESU officers did not conduct any searches inside the apartment beyond locating the civilians and taking them outside. did not state how much time passed between when he and the other civilians entered his apartment and when the police arrived at the building. He could hear that the officers were speaking to his neighbor in § 87(2)(b) for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Afterwards, several ESU officers knocked on the door to §87(2)(b) went to the door while his sons and their friends remained in a bedroom at the rear of the apartment, told the officers to wait. The ESU officers then removed the door's peephole. initially stated that he then opened the door, at which point the officers pushed past him into the apartment. He later stated that the officers forced the door halfway open when they removed the peephole, and that he responded by fully opening the door. Once the ESU officers were inside, they told § 87(2)(b) that everybody had to leave the apartment. They escorted all of the civilians, including § 87(2)(b) out of the apartment. The other civilians' statements were generally consistent with \$87(2)(b) s, except stated that the ESU officers responded to the building almost as noted. § 87(2)(b) Page 3



the ESU officers entered [87(2)(b)] They did not observe any damage to the door to after ESU removed the civilian occupants.
ICAD event #\$87(2)(b) was generated for this incident (Board Review #14). It records that at 9:32 p.m. on August 2, 2018, a female caller stating that she heard several gunshots in a hallway at \$87(2)(b) At 9:34 p.m., an off-duty officer reported shots being fired at the same location. The officer reported that the perpetrator ran up the stairs. At 9:38 p.m., ESU was dispatched to the location. At 9:58 p.m., the commanding officer of PSA 6 requested that ESU respond to the location to investigate possible victims in \$87(2)(b)
None of the BWC footage depicted either the shooting or the officers entering \$87(2)(6) Sergeant McKenna's footage depicts him approaching \$87(2)(6) after the shooting but prior to the entry into \$87(2)(6) (Board Review #2). The video shows the occupant of \$87(2)(6) inviting Sergeant McKenna and several other officers into her apartment to show them the damage caused by the bullets. The video ends while Sergeant McKenna is in the apartment speaking to its occupant. She is not heard on Sergeant McKenna's video discussing the civilians in \$87(2)(6)
Officers may enter a private residence without a search warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. Three factors must be in place to justify a warrantless entry on these grounds. First, the police must possess reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance to protect life or property. Second, the search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to make an arrest or seize property. Third, there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. People v. Musto, 106 A.D.3d 1380 (App. Term, 3 rd Dept., 2013) (Board Review #15).
§ 87(2)(g)
§ 87(2)(g)

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Allegation (B) Discourtesy: At 887(2)(b)	in Manhattan, officers spoke
discourteously to §87(2)(b)	
knocked on the front door of \$87(2)(b) one of the ostating, "Open the effing door." When asked to clarify the stated that he did not recall if the officer us	
In both his written statement and his sworn statement, spoke to any officers through the front door. He state door for the ESU officers. When the officers then entered down!" § 87(2)(b) did not allege that officers used any offi	d that \$87(2)(b) opened the d, one of them shouted, "Get the fuck
	ers calling through the front door, telling earing any officers use profanity.
All of the officers who were interviewed denied that the during the incident.	y or any other officers used profanity
§ 87(2)(g)	
Allegation (D) Abuse of Authority: At 837(2)(b)	in Manhattan,
Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(5)	. 34
Allegation (E) Abuse of Authority: At \$87(2)(6)	<u>in Manhattan,</u>
Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(6)	in Manhattan
Allegation (F) Abuse of Authority: At 887(2)(5)	<u>in Manhattan,</u>
Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(b)	in March 444
Allegation (G) Abuse of Authority: At \$87(2)(5)	<u>in Manhattan,</u>
Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(b)	in Manhattan
Allegation (H) Abuse of Authority: At \$87(2)(b) Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(b)	<u>in Manhattan,</u>
Allegation (I) Abuse of Authority: At § 87(2)(b)	in Manhattan,
Deputy Inspector Michael Shugrue arrested \$87(2)(b)	in Mamatall,
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It is undisputed that the six civilians who were handcuffed and removed from \$87(2)(b) were taken into police custody. They were transported to the 26th Precinct stationhouse and held there in holding cells for several hours. During this time, detectives from the 26th Precinct Detective Squad questioned each of the civilians individually about the shooting. After they were taken into

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custody and lodged at the stationhouse, \$87(2)(b) and \$87(2)(b) were found to have open warrants for matters unrelated to the shooting and were subsequently arrested for them. The other civilians were released without being arrested or issued summonses.

It is also undisputed that several individuals called 911 to report the shooting. One of the callers identified himself as an off-duty NYPD officer. The investigation was unable to identify this officer. The off-duty officer and at least one other civilian provided descriptions of the shooter to 911.

is a black male. He stated that he was wearing a white T-shirt and red shorts at the time of the incident. \$87(2)(b) is a Hispanic male. He did not indicate what clothes he wore at the time of the incident. None of the other civilians described how \$87(2)(b) or were dressed.

Deputy Inspector Shugrue stated that the civilians were transported to the stationhouse so that they could assist police investigators in identifying the shooter. After the civilians left [88/2] an unidentified officer told Deputy Inspector Shugrue that they spoke to an off-duty police officer who had called 911 to report the shooting. Deputy Inspector Shugure did not identify the off-duty officer. He was uncertain of who the officer who spoke to him about the offduty officer was, but believed that it was Lieutenant Motto. The officer who spoke to the off-duty officer told Deputy Inspector Shugrue that the off-duty officer had observed a black male wearing a red shirt run past him while holding a gun. Deputy Inspector Shugrue never spoke to the offduty officer himself. Deputy Inspector Shugrue noted that \$87(2)(b) was a black male and was wearing a red shirt. Based on this resemblance to the off-duty officer's description, Deputy Inspector Shugrue came to suspect that \$87(2)(b) might have been involved in the shooting, and that the other civilians who had been in \$87(2)(b) with \$87(2)(b) might have been accessories to the shooting. No other factors contributed to this suspicion beyond (\$87(2)) attire. As a result of this suspicion, the civilians were held in custody at the stationhouse as suspects. Deputy Inspector Shugrue did not travel to the stationhouse himself and did not participate in the civilians' questioning. At some point later in the evening, an unidentified officer informed Deputy Inspector Shugrue that investigators had reviewed VIPER video footage from The footage showed both §87(2)(b) and a separate, unidentified individual who was carrying a firearm. Both \$87(2)(b) and the shooter were wearing red shirts. Since the video established that \$87(2)(b) and the shooter were different people, \$87(2)(b) and the other civilians were cleared of suspicion. § 87(2)(b) and § 87(2)(b) were kept in custody due to their unrelated warrants. § 87(2)(5) and the other civilians were released from custody. Deputy Inspector Shugrue did not recall who informed him of the VIPER footage, but believed that it was Lieutenant Motto, Police Officer Joachim, or an unidentified investigator from the 26th Precinct Detective Squad. Deputy Inspector Shugrue did not view the footage himself.

Lieutenant Motto's statement was generally consistent with Deputy Inspector Shugrue's statement, except as noted. She also stated that the civilians were already in the process of being transported to the 26th Precinct stationhouse when the unidentified off-duty officer provided a description of the shooter. She stated that the off-duty officer described the shooter as a male wearing a white shirt and red shorts. This description matched to \$87(2)(5) not \$27(2)(5) Based on this information, along with the fact that the civilians had refused to open the

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door for the police, led Lieutenant Motto to suspect that the civilians were involved in the shooting. Lieutenant Motto also stated that the civilians were cleared of suspicion when the footage showed that the shooter was dressed in a similar manner to one of the civilians from the apartment.

Police Officer Joachim and Police Officer Martinez stated that the civilians were transported to the stationhouse because investigators from the 26th Precinct Detective Squad wanted to interview them about the shooting. Neither officer mentioned receiving a description of the shooter, or if any of the civilians were suspected of being the shooter. Police Officer Joachim noted, though, that the six civilians were initially arrested but that Lieutenant Motto directed him later in the evening to void the arrests. He did not state why the civilians were arrested or why the arrests were voided.

Arrest reports were prepared for all six civilians, but were subsequently voided (Board Review #16). The investigation was able to obtain unsealed copies of \$87(2)(b) s and \$87(2)(b) s voided arrest reports, which were prepared by Police Officer Joachim. Both reports state that \$87(2)(b) and \$87(2)(b) were charged with \$87(2)(b). \$87(2)(b)

The ICAD event generated for this incident records that multiple individuals called 911 to report the incident (Board Review #14). An unidentified caller stated that there was a black male wearing a white shirt and red shorts carrying a firearm. Another caller identified himself as an off-duty police officer named '§ 87(2)(5) with shield number § 87(2) A review of the CTS database found no officers matching this information. This caller described the shooter as a black male wearing a white shirt and black shorts. He also stated that the shooter ran up a staircase inside

s arrest report confirmed that he was wearing a white shirt and red shorts. Since the ICAD event indicates that at least one of the people who called 911 described the shooting suspect as a black male wearing a white shirt and red shorts, the investigation determined that suspect as a black male wearing a white shirt and red shorts, the investigation determined that rather than street was identified as the potential shooting suspect among the six civilians. The investigation also determined based on the ICAD event that the suspect was described by the off-duty officer as having run up a staircase inside \$\frac{87(2)(b)}{2}(b)\$

Officers may temporarily detain an individual in the course of a investigation to obtain information from them to confirm or dispel suspicion of their involvement in criminal activity. Such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the methods employed to investigate the individual's involvement should be the least intrusive reasonably available. Transporting a suspect to another location, including to a police station, does not necessarily escalate this detention into an arrest. When an individual is handcuffed, searched, and placed into a police vehicle for transport, however, the action is considered to be an arrest. An officer requires probable cause to believe that an individual has

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been involved in the commission of a crime to arrest them. <u>People v. Robinson</u>, 282 A.D.2d 75 (App. Term, 1st Dept., 2001) (Board Review #17).

In <u>People v. Campbell</u>, the police approached an individual suspected of a crime because that individual matched a general description of the suspect and was found in close proximity to the scene of the reported crime. That individual then fled from the police and discarded a coat. These actions, taken together, provided the police with reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was involved in the reported crime. This suspicion did not ripen into probable cause to arrest that individual, however, until the police recovered a firearm from the coat that the individual discarded. <u>People v. Campbell</u>, 155 A.D.3d 412 (App. Term, 1st Dept, 2017) (Board Review #23).

§ 87(2)(g)	
	
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Allegation (J) Abuse of Authority: Lieutenant Kimberly Motto entered in Manhattan. Allegation (K) Abuse of Authority: Lieutenant Kimberly Motto searched in Manhattan.

It is undisputed that ESU officers entered Aptartmen.3G and removed all of its civilian occupants. The occupants were subsequently transported to the 26th Precinct stationhouse, leaving the apartment empty. Officers remained at the apartment afterwards to secure it in the civilians' absence.

Lieutenant Motto stated that once the civilians were removed from the apartment, Deputy Inspector Shugrue directed Police Officer Shahzeb Ahmed of PSA 6 to secure by preventing anybody from entering or exiting the apartment unless they obtained a search warrant first. Despite this command, however, Lieutenant Motto entered the apartment. She explained that she did so because one of the apartment's windows looked out onto an overhang on the side of the building. She shined a flashlight out the window and onto the overhang to check if any of the civilians had discarded a firearm from inside the apartment by throwing it down onto the overhang. She did not see any firearms on the overhang. Lieutenant Motto did not take any other actions inside the apartment besides checking the overhang with her flashlight.

Deputy Inspector Shugrue stated that he ordered Lieutenant Motto, not Police Officer Ahmed, to guard the apartment until NYCHA could repair the damage to the front door. He did not see any officers enter the apartment after that point. At some point later in the evening, however, Lieutenant Motto informed Deputy Inspector Shugrue that she had entered the apartment to look for a firearm on the apartment's windowsill. Deputy Inspector Shugrue denied having instructed Lieutenant Motto to do this. He was not aware of any other officers entering the apartment.

Neither Police Officer Martinez nor Police Officer Joachim were aware of any officers entering after the civilians were extracted.

Officers may conduct a warrantless entry of a private residence to address emergency situation that presents an immediate danger to life or property. This exception to the general warrant requirement is "narrowly construed" and places the burden of justifying such an entry on the officers involved. It does not apply in situations where, after conducting an investigation, the police fail to establish the presence of an emergency situation. <u>People v. Mormon</u>, 100 A.D.3d 782 (App. Term, 2nd Dept., 2012) (Board Review #17).

§ 87(2)(g)	

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Allegation (L) Abuse of Authority: At the 26th Precinct stationhouse, Police Officer Nikaurys Martinez refused to provide his shield number to §87(2)(b)

In his sworn statement, stated that after he arrived at the 26th Precinct stationhouse, he was separated from the other civilians and placed in a holding cell. Two officers stood in front of his cell. The investigation identified one of them as Police Officer Martinez. Society asked both of the officers for their shield numbers. Police Officer Martinez ignored the request. He did not ultimately provide his shield number to Society.

During a follow-up telephone statement, stated initially stated that he asked multiple officers for their shield numbers. When asked to specify which officers he made the requests to, stated that Police Officer Martinez was one of them. Later in the statement, however, he stated that he did ask Police Officer Martinez for his shield number.

None of the other civilians mentioned §87(2)(b) asking any officers for their shield numbers.

Police Officer Martinez stated that he monitored the civilians in their holding cells while they were held in custody at the 26th Precinct stationhouse. He denied that the civilians asked him or any other officers for their shield numbers. He denied that he refused to provide his shield number to any of the civilians.

None of the other officers who were interviewed heard a civilian ask Police Officer Martinez for his shield number. They were not aware of any officers refusing to provide their shield numbers to a civilian.

§ 87(2)(g)

Allegation (M) Abuse of Authority: At the 26th Precinct stationhouse, an officer refused to provide his shield number to §87(2)(b)

stated that after he arrived at the 26th Precinct stationhouse, he was placed in a holding cell. Two officers stood in front of his cell. The investigation identified one of them as Police Officer Martinez, but did not identify the other officer. This officer also ignored strength of the shield number. He did not provide his shield number to strength at any point.

consistently described this male across statements as a white male in his 20s with blond hair. He did not know the officer's name. In his sworn statement, sated this officer was one of the officers who entered sated him removed him from the apartment and placed him in handcuffs. The investigation identified these officers as ESU officers. He did not state which officer transported him to the 26th Precinct stationhouse. When he was lodged in a holding cell, this officer stood in front of the cell with Police Officer Martinez.

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In his telephone statement, [87(2)(0)] did not recall if this officer handcuffed him. He stated that this officer transported him to the stationhouse with Police Officer Martinez. The three of them rode in a marked sedan. [837(2)(0)] initially denied that he asked either this officer or Police Officer Martinez for their shield numbers. He later stated that he asked numerous officers for their shield numbers throughout the incident, and was uncertain if this officer was one of them. Later, when directly asked if he could identify specific officers he asked for their shield numbers or specific instances where he asked officers for their shield numbers, [837(2)(0)] stated that he asked Police Officer Martinez and this officer. He did not specify when he made the request. He did not identify any other officers who he asked to provide their shield numbers.

Police Officer Martinez denied hearing request any officer's shield number during the incident. He followed the six civilians to the 26th Precinct stationhouse, but he denied that he transported any of them. Police Officer Martinez rode to the stationhouse in a marked SUV. He was partnered with Police Officer Daniela Rizzo, a white female, at the time, but she did not ride with him in the SUV. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Okelie Bentley, a black male. No one else rode with them. Police Officer Martinez watched the civilians in their holding cells at the stationhouse. He was accompanied by another officer, but he did not recall who that officer was.

Due to the nature of the incident, a large number of officers from multiple commands, including both PSA 6 and the 26th Precinct, responded to Several of these officers were identified by cross-referencing unit information from the ICAD event with the PSA 6 and 26th Precinct roll calls (Board Review #21-22). Additional officers were identified via BWC footage (Board Review #1-6). Still more officers were identified by name by other officers during their CCRB interviews. In total, seventeen officers were identified in this manner. Since Seventeen officers who were either white or Hispanic male, this list was then narrowed down to a list of nine officers who were either white or Hispanic males. This list included Police Officer Martinez. On November 15, 2019, Seventeen officers aphoto viewing with Seventeen officers who transported him to the stationhouse. He did not recognize any of the other officers' photographs (Board Review #10-12).

30 (2)(9)
also provided differing statements regarding the subject officer's role in the incident. He initially identified the officer as the officer who entered the apartment and handcuffed him.
§ 87(2)(9) He leter identified the subject
He later identified the subject
officer as the officer who accompanied Police Officer Martinez in transporting him to the
stationhouse. Police Officer Martinez, however, denied that he transported any of the civilians.
He also stated that he rode to the stationhouse in an SUV, not a sedan, and that he was working

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s description.

with Lt. Bentley, an officer who does not match § 87(2)(b)

 \$87 CC The beed first Lie 	Civilian and Officer CCRB Histories has been a party to one previous CCRB complaint and has be med as a victim in one previous allegation (Board Review #19):
 \$87 CO The beefire Define Lie 	has been a party to one previous CCRB complaint and has be med as a victim in one previous allegation (Board Review #19):
 \$87 CO The beefire Lie 	has been a party to one previous CCRB complaint and has be med as a victim in one previous allegation (Board Review #19):
 ser/CCC The beefire Lie 	med as a victim in one previous allegation (Board Review #19): S87(2)(b) and S87(2)(b) have both been party to one previous CRB complaint. Neither was named as a victim. his is the first CCRB complaint to which S87(2)(b) en a party to (Board Review #19). Equity Inspector Shugrue has been a member of the service for 21 years and this is the st CCRB complaint to which he has been a subject.
COThe beefireDefineLie	CRB complaint. Neither was named as a victim. has is the first CCRB complaint to which \$37(2)(b) or \$37(2)(b) has en a party to (Board Review #19). The puty Inspector Shugrue has been a member of the service for 21 years and this is the st CCRB complaint to which he has been a subject.
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DefirsLie	eputy Inspector Shugrue has been a member of the service for 21 years and this is that CCRB complaint to which he has been a subject.
• Lie	
	one previous CCRB complaint and two allegations, one of which was substantiated 201102808 involved a substantiated allegation of vehicle search. The Board recommended that she receive charges. The NYPD imposed instructions.
the	olice Officer Martinez has been a member of the service for seven years and has been subject of one previous CCRB complaint and one allegation, which was not betantiated. §37(2)(9)
	Mediation, Civil and Criminal Histories
De	Notice of Claim request was submitted to the NYC Office of the Comptroller on exember 2, 2019. The results will be included in the case file upon receipt.

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[§ 87(2)(b)] [§§ 86	(1)(3)&(4)] [§ 87(2)(c)]		
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Carra I Na			
Squad No.:			
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Investigator:	Signature	Print Title & Name	Date
	Signature	Time Time & Ivaine	Date
C 17 1			
Squad Leader:	Signature	Print Title & Name	Date
	~-8	2 2222 2222 22 2 2 3	2
Reviewer:			
Keviewer:	Signature	Print Title & Name	Date