## CCRB INVESTIGATIVE RECOMMENDATION

Investigator:		Team:	CCRB Case #:	$\overline{\mathbf{V}}$	Force		Discourt.	☐ U.S.
Ariel Courage		Squad #6	201601077		Abuse		O.L.	✓ Injury
Incident Date(s)		Location of Incident:		P	recinct:	18	Mo. SOL	EO SOL
Saturday, 01/30/2016 12:30 AM		§ 87(2)(b)			105	7/	30/2017	7/30/2017
Date/Time CV Reported		CV Reported At:	How CV Reported:		Date/Time	Rece	ived at CCF	RB
Sat, 01/30/2016 10:35 PM		IAB	Phone		Mon, 02/08	3/201	6 11:22 AN	1
Complainant/Victim	Type	Home Addre	ess					
Witness(es)		Home Addre	ess					
Subject Officer(s)	Shield	TaxID	Command					
1. POM Joseph Fernandez	24064	946982	105 PCT					
2. POF Annmarie Haines	08133	930305	105 PCT					
Witness Officer(s)	Shield N	o Tax No	Cmd Name					
1. POM Vick Ramjaiwan	18039	931002	105 PCT					
2. POF Kelly Troiano	18244	918511	105 PCT					
3. POM Jonathan Venetucci	10384	942663	105 PCT					
4. POM Dennis Jackson	19726	958718	105 PCT					
5. POM Pete Hamilton	28188	931716	105 PCT					
6. POM Todd Ello	24281	950375	105 PCT					
7. POM Michael Didyk	14957	956596	105 PCT					
8. POF Jacqueline Adelson	19600	958215	105 PCT					
Officer(s)	Allegatio	n			Inve	stiga	tor Recon	nmendation
A.POM Joseph Fernandez	Force: Po § 87(2)(b)	olice Officer Joseph Feri	nandez used a taser a	gair	nst			
B.POM Joseph Fernandez	Force: Po	olice Officer Joseph Ferr	nandez used physical	for	rce			
C.POM Joseph Fernandez	Force: Po	olice Officer Joseph Fern e against § 87(2)(b)	nandez used a taser i	n to	uch-			
§ 87(2)(g), § 87(4-b)								


## **Case Summary**

On January 30, 2016, Captain Marash Vucinaj of Patrol Borough Queens South called IAB to report this incident (BR 01). On February 8, 2016, it was spun off to the CCRB. IAB Group 54 conducted a simultaneous investigation which, as of the writing of this report, is still open. On January 30, 2016, at 12:30 a.m., § 87(2)(b) called 911 to report that his friend and § 87(2)(b) was in the basement of that location banging on walls, violent, and needed to take his medication (BR 02). Multiple officers from the 105th Precinct responded to the scene in roughly the following order: Sectors E and F, identified by the investigation as PO Jonathan Venetucci and PO Dennis Jackson; Sectors A and B, identified by the investigation as PO Jacqueline Adelson and PO Joseph Fernandez; Sectors C and D, identified by the investigation as PO Todd Ello and PO Michael Didyk; and Sectors G and H, identified by the investigation as PO Vick Ramjaiwan and PO Pete Hamilton, and Sector I, identified by the investigation as PO Kelly Troiano and PO Annmarie Haines. Two FDNY EMTs, identified by the investigation as §87(2)(b) and § 87(2)(b) also responded. § 87(2)(b) was forcibly removed to \$87(2)(b) for psychiatric evaluation, and an AIDED report was completed for him (BR 03 and BR 04). The investigation was unable to establish contact with either §87(2)(b) Of § 87(2)(b) IAB obtained video footage from in Queens, which they in turn provided to the CCRB on March 16, 2016. There are two video files, both of which are black and white and both of which lack audio. One angle faces towards the rear of § 87(2) , including the entrance to the basement. The captures the northwest side of second faces southeast on towards its intersection with \$87(2) and depicts the front vard of the location. The first video angle (BR 05) depicts \$87(2)(b) exit the basement of push an officer, identified by the investigation as PO Ramjaiwan. \$87(2)(6) then runs from the towards its front yard, pursued first by PO Fernandez, then by PO side of Ramjaiwan, who is in turn followed by a number of other officers. Although this is not clearly discernible on the video footage, PO Fernandez discharged his taser at §87(2)(6) A). According to officers, the taser failed to shock \$87(2)(b) as the prongs did not penetrate his clothing. 201601077 20160405 1520 DM.mp4 The second video angle (BR 06) shows that \$87(2)(b) fled out of the front gate of \$87(2)(b) and then fell face-first onto the sidewalk. It is not clear from the video footage what caused him to fall. § 87(2)(b) then turned onto his back. § 87(2)(b) is eclipsed from the head down by the fence in front of \$87(2) . PO Fernandez reached § 87(2)(b) positioned himself at § 87(2)(b) s left side. PO Fernandez then appeared to strike § 87(2)(b) on an unknown part of his upper body approximately seven times in quick succession (Allegation **B**). 201601077 20160405 1516 DM.mp4

Page 2

PO Fernandez stopped striking \$87(2)(6) as additional officers came to his unclear what occurred thereafter due to the number of officers surrounding \$87(2)(6) this is not clearly depicted on the video footage, PO Fernandez said that he used once more in touch stun mode to overcome his resistance (Allegation C doing so, PO Fernandez accidentally stunned PO Ramjaiwan's right hand, causis PO Ramjaiwan's index finger and numbness, for which PO Ramjaiwan later rectreatment (BR 07).  \$87(2)(9). \$87(2)(9). \$87(4-5)	while his taser on (27/20). In the course of a laceration to
The incident resulted in no arrests of summonses.	
Mediation, Civil and Criminal Histories	
<ul> <li>Due to the ongoing IAB investigation, this case was ineligible for media</li> <li>As of April 11, 2016, neither \$87(2)(b) nor \$87(2)(b) has filed a c</li> </ul>	tion. omplaint with
respect to this incident (BR 08).	mpianit with
[§ 87(2)(b)] [§§ 86(1)(3)&(4)] [§ 87(2)(c)]	
Civilian and Officer CCRB Histories	
• This is the first CCRB complaint involving \$87(2)(b) (BR 10).	
• PO Fernandez has been a member of the service for 7 years. There is on	e prior allegation
against him (physical force – pushed/shoved/threw), which was exonera	(-97D)
	(g)
Potential Issues	
• The investigation was not able to establish contact with \$87(2)(b)	\$ 07(2)
The referral from IAB (BR 01) included only \$87(2)(6) and s add in Queens. Sgt. Morano, the IAB investigator, had no additional control of the state	((0))
information for \$157(2)(b) was not involved in any prior (	
complaints, and had no prior arrests that might contain contact informat	
search did not yield any additional contact information. On February 10 February 16, 2016, two please-call letters were mailed to \$87(2)(b)	
2016, CLEAR and Lexis Nexis searches returned two possible phone nu	
one associated with \$87(2)(b) and another associated with	17.001
These searches also revealed a second potential address, [87(2)]	in Queens.
No phone number was returned associated directly with \$87(2)(b) in Queens.	or with § 87(2)(b)
On February 18, 2016, the undersigned attempted to contact the	number for
which was found not to be in service. Between Februar	•
March 7, 2016, the undersigned called the number for \$87(2)(b) for March 7, 2016, \$87(2)(b) called the undersigned back and identification.	our times. On
\$ 87(2)(b) s father. \$ 87(2)(b) said that \$ 87(2)(b) could not reached t	
he did not know of any phone number for \$87(2)(b) and that he thought	•
lived at section in Queens.	

Page 3



Page 4

Jackson, were able to convince him to walk outside to the ambulance of his own free will.

basement, he pushed PO Ramjaiwan by placing both hands around his chest. PO Ramjaiwan stumbled back but did not fall. [\$ \$7(2)(5)] then turned and began running towards the front of the house. PO Ramjaiwan and PO Fernandez together followed [\$ \$7(2)(5)] to the front yard.

and then turned so that he was facing the front of the house. When \$87(2)(b)


walked up the stairs out of the basement. PO Fernandez followed directly PO Ramjaiwan was standing to the right of the basement door upon exiting.

emerged from the

PO Fernandez (BR 11) said that as he was walking up the basement steps behind \$\frac{8}{27(2)}\$ begin to pick up his pace. PO Fernandez picked up his pace to match
s. When \$87(2)(b) reached the top of the basement steps, he turned and pushed an officer backwards. At the time of the incident PO Fernandez could not tell who was pushed as it
was dark outside. §87(2)(b) turned at the top of the steps and began running towards the front
of the house.
PO Fernandez pursued \$87(2)(b) yelling, "Stop!" \$87(2)(b) did not stop. As he ran
after \$87(2)(b) PO Fernandez drew his taser, aimed it at \$87(2)(b) s back, and discharged it.
PO Fernandez did so because he needed to halt \$87(2)(b) s flight and because \$87(2)(b) had
not been responsive to his verbal command. PO Fernandez also said that because \$87(2)(6) had
pushed someone, PO Fernandez feared he might assault others, or might push anyone else he
encountered in the front yard out of his way. PO Fernandez was so focused on pursuing that he did not actually notice whether or not there was anyone in the front yard at the
time he discharged the taser (The second video angle shows that two police officers, identified by
the investigation as PO Kelly Troiano and PO Annmarie Haines, who had just arrived to the
scene, were standing just at the front gate when \$87(2)(b) fled – see above-referenced video
201601077_20160405_1516_DM).
The taser prongs struck § 87(2)(b) in his back. PO Fernandez initially thought that §
fell to the ground because he had been tasered, but he later realized that one of the prongs
had not successfully penetrated the heavy sweatshirt \$87(2)(b) wore, and he therefore had not
actually been shocked; PO Fernandez did not know what caused \$87(2)(b) to fall.
PO Ramjaiwan (BR 12 and 13) heard the sound of PO Fernandez discharging his taser
but did not see it. PO Ramjaiwan believed that \$87(2)(b) was not successfully struck by the
taser, as he continued running for a few seconds before he fell.
Video footage depicts PO Fernandez drawing his taser and activating it – discernible by
its glowing light (see above-referenced video 201601077_20160405_1520) – as he pursues
around the side of the house, though it is not possible to identify the moment that he
discharges it.  The non-lethal restraining device report (BR 14) prepared by Captain Vucinaj indicates
that he found PO Fernandez's first use of the taser to be within department guidelines. IAB Group
54 is concurrently investigating this matter. Because their investigation remains open, their case
file could not be released (BR 15). The AIDED report that PO Fernandez completed for
notes that he suffered from bipolar disorder, and that the taser was deployed to prevent
injury to MOS (BR 03 and 04). The UF-49 confirms that §87(2)(6)
told Captain Vucinaj that there were no signs, such as prongs or puncture wounds, to
suggest that §87(2)(b) had successfully been tasered.
EMT § 87(2)(b) (BR 16) and EMT § 87(2) (BR 17) both denied seeing PO Fernandez use his
taser against \$87(2)(b) said that \$87(2)(b) later told him that he had been
tasered, but that he had not felt anything due to the thick jacket that he wore.
PO Troiano (BR 22) was arriving to the scene just as \$87(2)(b) began fleeing. PO
Troiano heard but did not see PO Fernandez discharge the taser at \$87(2)(b) as \$87(2)(b)
fled.

A conducted energy device can be an effective means of subduing suspects and emotionally disturbed persons in a safe manner. It is intended to augment and provide a greater margin of safety for officers who might otherwise be forced to physically subdue a dangerous subject. It is considered to be within the range of use of less lethal devices such as pepper spray or

Page 5



§ 87(2)(g)
EMT § 87(2) (BR 16) and EMT § 87(2)(b) (BR 17) denied witnessing this portion of the
incident, stating that by the time they emerged from the basement \$87(2)(b) had already been
apprehended. \$87(2)(9)  Both said that \$87(2)(6) did
not complain of being injured, and did not have any physical injuries. The investigation is unable to confirm this as it was not able to access \$87(2)(6) and s Ambulance Call Report without
s signing a HIPAA form, and the AIDED report completed by PO Fernandez did not note
whether or not \$87(2)(b) was injured (BR 03 and 04).
PO Haines (BR 22) and her partner, PO Troiano, were standing just at the front gate of in Queens as \$87(2)(b) fled. When \$87(2)(b) fell, PO Haines was
in Queens as \$87(2)(b) fled. When \$87(2)(b) fell, PO Haines was standing less than a foot away from him. PO Haines saw PO Fernandez approach, position
himself on top of \$87(2)(b) and punch him. PO Haines could not tell how many times PO
Fernandez punched \$87(2)(b) or where on \$87(2)(b) s body the punches made contact.
Before PO Fernandez punched § 87(2)(b) was resisting by swaying his torso side
to side and holding his arms clenched in front of his body, specifically with his elbows bent so
that his hands, which were closed into fists, were against his chest. PO Haines did not observe
ever bring his arms up closer to PO Fernandez, or attempt to strike PO Fernandez.
According to the 105 <sup>th</sup> Precinct Roll Call, PO Troiano is on terminal leave and therefore
could not be interviewed. On April 19, 2016, a request was sent to confirm her status, which will
be added to the case file upon receipt.  The UF-49 (BR 20) prepared by Captain Vucinaj notes that he went to \$87(2)(b)
, where he was not able to interview § 87(2)(b) due to his mental state,
but he did observe \$87(2)(b) and noted a contusion, swelling, and redness to his right eye.
As was discussed above, the investigation was not able to contact \$87(2)(b) or
§ 87(2)(b)
Officers must use the minimum level of physical force necessary to overcome resistance
will be used to effect an arrest or take an emotionally disturbed person into custody. <u>Patrol Guide</u>
Section 203-11 (BR 19) A police officer is permitted to use reasonable force to defend himself
from the "imminent use of physical force" by another. <u>PD v. Potter</u> , OATH Index No. 1918/99
(1999) (BR 21)
§ 87(2)(g)

Page 7

§ 87(2)(g)
Allegation C – Force: Police Officer Joseph Fernandez used a taser in touch stun mode
<u>against</u> § 87(2)(b)
It is not disputed that PO Fernandez used his taser in touch stun mode against
§ 87(2)(b)
It is not possible to discern the exact moment the taser is used in touch stun mode against
though between 12:37:47 a.m. and 12:37:50 a.m. a glowing object, possibly the
taser, is visible positioned above some smidsection in between officers' legs, and it is
again visible at 12:37:57 a.m. (see file 201601077_20160405_1516_DM). Because \$87(2)(b) is
surrounded by police officers, he is not visible to the camera, and because the investigation could
not contact \$87(2)(b) the investigation therefore has no means of determining how \$87(2)(b)
was behaving during this time except the accounts of police officers.
PO Fernandez (BR 11) said that after additional officers approached, he and the fellow officers were able to rotate \$87(2)(b) onto his stomach. Once on his stomach, \$87(2)(b)
continued to resist by kicking his legs and trying to push himself up with his hands underneath his
torso. Because the officers had still not been able to place [\$137(2)(0)] s hands behind his back,
PO Fernandez decided to again use his taser against \$87(2)(b)  Because the prongs had already
been discharged, PO Fernandez could not use the taser again except in touch stun mode. PO
Fernandez held it to \$87(2)(b) s lower back and discharged it. PO Fernandez gave no warning
prior to using his taser, so that officers were still in close proximity when he used it; PO
Fernandez consequently shocked PO Ramjaiwan on his finger with the taser. Once PO Fernandez
used the taser a second time, \$87(2)(6) s arms came out from underneath his body. PO
Fernandez and the other officers were able to place his arms behind his back.
PO Ramjaiwan (BR 12 and 13) said that when he approached, §87(2)(b) was lying on
his back and was actively resisting by moving his arms back and forth at his sides. He continued
to do this as PO Ramjaiwan and PO Fernandez each tried to grip his arms to pull them behind his
back. PO Ramjaiwan believed that \$87(2)(b) was still lying on his back when PO Fernandez
touch stunned §87(2)(b) with the taser, inadvertently striking §87(2)(b) PO Ramjaiwan did
not remember where around \$87(2)(b) s body his hand was at the time he felt the shock from
the taser. PO Ramjaiwan then backed away to attend to his injured hand. PO Ramjaiwan did not
know what happened to \$87(2)(b) thereafter.
PO Haines (BR 22) said that after \$87(2)(6) was punched, and after additional officers
came to PO Fernandez's assistance, she stepped back from the struggle and did not see further
how § 87(2)(b) behaved or how officers handcuffed him. PO Troiano was not aware of PO

Fernandez using the taser a second time.

The non-lethal restraining device report (BR 14) and UF-49 (BR 20) note that Captain Vucinaj found PO Fernandez improperly used his taser a second time for the following reasons: PO Fernandez issued no warning to \$87(2)(b) or to his fellow officers prior to discharging the taser, resulting in the injury to PO Ramjaiwan; there were, by this point, numerous other officers surrounding \$87(2)(b) who could have safely subdued him by other means; and \$87(2)(b) was actively resisting but was not physically assaulting the officers attempting to handcuff him. Captain Vucinaj recommended that PO Fernandez be retrained on the use of a taser, and that he be prohibited from carrying one until his retraining was complete.

Page 8

A conducted energy device, or taser, can be an effective means of subduing suspects and emotionally disturbed persons in a safe manner. It should only be used against persons who are actively physically resisting, exhibiting active physical aggression, or to prevent individuals from physically injuring themselves or other persons actually present. The use of a taser is within the range of use of less-lethal devices, such as pepper spray or a baton, on the force continuum, due to its effectiveness at a distance and at close range. Officers should issue an appropriate warning, consistent with personal safety, to the intended subject and other members of the service present prior to discharging the taser. Touch-stun mode is when the officer discharges the taser in such a manner that the unit makes direct contact with a subject's body. This should be used only in exceptional circumstances and not as a primary method of use. <a href="Patrol Guide">Patrol Guide</a> Section 212-117 (BR 18)

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§ 87(2)(g),	§ 87(4-b)
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Page 9

Investigator: _			
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Squad Leader: _	Title/Signature	Print	Date
Reviewer:			
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