
CCRB INVESTIGATIVE RECOMMENDATION

Investigator:		Team:	CCRB Case #:		Force		Discourt.	U.S.
Conor O'Shea		Squad #05	201905389	V	Abuse		O.L.	☐ Injury
Incident Date(s)		Location of Incident:			18 N	Io. SC	OL	Precinct:
Tuesday, 06/18/2019 5:00 AM		§ 87(2)(b)			8/-	4/2021	1	107
Date/Time CV Reported		CV Reported At:	How CV Reported	:	Date/Tim	e Rece	eived at CC	RB
Thu, 06/20/2019 10:29 AM		CCRB	Phone		Thu, 06/2	0/2019	9 10:29 AN	1
Complainant/Victim	Туре	Home Addre	ess					
Witness(es)		Home Addre	ess					
Subject Officer(s)	Shield	TaxID	Command					
1. DT3 Michael Leclair	5045	943471	WARRSEC					
Witness Officer(s)	Shield N	o Tax No	Cmd Name					
1. DT3 Munir Alhidami	1315	940953	WARRSEC					
2. DT2 Kevin Brady	00646	915340	WARRSEC					
3. DT3 Felix Garcia	04045	906303	WARRSEC					
4. DT3 David Mischo	517	937115	WARRSEC					
Officer(s)	Allegatio	on			Inv	estiga	tor Recor	nmendation
A.DT3 Michael Leclair	Abuse: D § 87(2)(b)	Abuse: Detective Michael Leclair threatened to damage property.						
B.DT3 Michael Leclair		Abuse: Detective Michael Leclair threatened to notify and Administration for Children's Services.			e			
C.DT3 Michael Leclair	Abuse: D	Abuse: Detective Michael Leclair entered in Queens.						
D.DT3 Michael Leclair	Abuse: D	Abuse: Detective Michael Leclair searched in Queens.						
E.DT3 Michael Leclair		Detective Michael Leclar ith a business card.	ir failed to provide	87(2)(b)			

Case Summary



had refused to provide to the CCRB while the investigation into [83/2/6] was still open. Det. Leclair's investigation primarily consisted of database searches, which revealed possible address both within NYC (including § 87(2)(6) residence) and outside of NYC. Det. Leclair ultimately determined that \$87(2)(b) address was "the most probable address that \$87(2) would be living at." He based this assessment at least on the romantic relationship with the multiple database hits—including a NY State DMV search—as well as the fact that \$ 87(2)(b) had provided \$ 87(2)(b) address on a late-January 2019 traffic summons he received. Det. Leclair's case file of DD5s (**Board Review 05**) are largely consistent with Det. Leclair's testimony as described above with the following additions and specifications. They show that about two weeks before this incident, Det. Leclair conducted several database searches A search of the CJA folders database revealed a 2014 folder identifying \$87(2)(b) "common law child's mother." At least two searches—a New York State DMV inquiry and a Human Resource/Benefits inquiry—revealed an address for \$87(2)(b) in Queens, the address in question in this incident. The investigation was able to verify the DMV search results (Board Review 06). A shelter check revealed that §87(2)(b) was not in the shelter system.

These initial database searches also revealed one commercial property in Raleigh, North Carolina related to [857(2)(6)] In the week leading up to this incident, Det. Leclair twice spoke with a sergeant in the Raleigh Police Department's Fugitive Division/Fugitive Apprehension Team. Det. Leclair first requested the sergeant's assistance and sent [857(2)(6)] "wanted" poster. The next day, the sergeant advised Det. Leclair that he conducted surveillance at the Raleighbased commercial address in question, which was also associated with [857(2)(6)] sister, but did not see [857(2)(6)] there. The Raleigh sergeant also provided license plates for vehicles at the location. Det. Leclair determined that these plate numbers did not have any recent license plate reader (LPR) hits.

CCRB interview (**Board Review 07–09**). She recounted that officers announced that they were the police and knocked on, kicked, and rattled her front door for an extended period of time. She initially did not open it because she was scared. After some time, Det. Leclair yelled that the officers had been outside for 20 minutes, but no one had opened the door yet. Det. Leclair also said, "We're about to kick the door down" (addressed separately below in **Allegation A**), "If there's [sic] kids in there, they're going to get taken away; they're going to ACS" (addressed separately below as **Allegation B** separately below), and to move any children and pets away from the door. Fearing that the officers would kick down her door, [\$37(2)(6)] opened it about halfway—at an approximately 45° angle—while she stood by the door. The officers rushed directly inside [\$37(2)(6)] apartment without any conversation about whether they could do so or whether [\$37(2)(6)] gave them permission to enter. [\$37(2)(6)] did not want the officers in her home, did not consent to their entry at all, and told them so in the moment.

Det. Leclair was not interviewed until approximately seven months after the incident (**Board Review 04**). He initially testified that \$\frac{87(2)(6)}{2}\$ "let us into the apartment," but later clarified that he did not remember how far she opened the door before the officers went in. Det. Leclair typically asks civilians for permission to enter their apartment. When asked how responded to that question, Det. Leclair said, "I believe she was okay with it." Det. Leclair was unable to remember anything \$\frac{87(2)(6)}{2}\$ specifically said or did to make him think she was consenting to the entry.

Det. Alhidami (**Board Review 10**) was one of the officers who went with Det. Leclair to the apartment doorway itself. Det. Alhidami could not recall the conversation at the doorway and did not remember the "exact moment" of how or when the officers actually entered, but he believed that Det. Leclair and spoke for some time before she allowed the officers to enter. Det. Alhidami denied that the officers forced their way into the apartment. Det. Alhidami

believed that gestured so as it to invite the officers inside, but he could not describe the gesture. It should be noted that Det. Alhidami was not interviewed until nearly two years after the incident.

Det. Mischo (**Board Review 11**) testified that Det. Leclair believed was living in this apartment and would likely be sleeping there when they arrived, given the early hour of the morning. Det. Mischo did not remember any specifics about whether or how the VFS team obtained consent to enter the apartment, how they got inside, or any specifics about any conversations (or even whether such conversations occurred) about whether officers could come inside the apartment. Det. Mischo was certain that they did not force the door open or break it down.

Det. Garcia (**Board Review 12**) was not in a position to have witnessed this portion of the incident. Multiple members of the VFS team who either definitively were present (Det. Brady) or were possibly present (the VFS supervisor, Sergeant Michael Powers) retired from the NYPD before the investigation could interview them (**Board Review 13**).

Although Det. Leclair and Det. Alhidami testified that [870] let the officers inside, they also testified that they did not believe any such consent was necessary. They believed they had sufficient legal authority—indeed, "absolute legal authority," in Det. Leclair's words—to enter the apartment based on the bench warrant. The warrant made Det. Leclair think that [870] consent "wouldn't have made a difference either way," given his belief that [870] resided in that apartment and was likely present at the time.

Ultimately, it was not necessary for the investigation to determine whether serons consented to the officers entering the apartment, as the investigation found that the officers did not require consent to enter.

"[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (Board Review 14). In New York State, a bench warrant "must be executed in the same manner" as an arrest warrant. NY Criminal Procedure Law, § 530.70 (Board Review 15). Generally, officers may reasonably presume that a suspect is at his residence based on the early hour of the morning. United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that it was reasonable for officers to presume that a suspect would be at his residence at 8:45 a.m. on a Sunday morning) (Board Review 16).

§ 87(2)(g)
§ 87(2)(g)

Allegation (A) Abuse of Authority: Detective Michael Leclair threatened to damage property.

It is undisputed that waited at least several minutes to open the door even after the officers knocked and announced their presence and authority. It is further undisputed that Det. Leclair was the primary contact officer with during this incident, which is consistent with the VFS team's practice that the case officer takes the lead in these situations.

recounted that Det. Leclair threatened to kick the door down if she did not open it.

Det. Leclair (**Board Review 04**) testified that he did not remember whether he threatened to kick the door down if \$87(2)(b) and did not open it, but notably he did not deny making this statement. Det. Leclair *did* deny hearing any *other* officer threaten to kick the door down if \$100 did not open it.

Det. Alhidami (**Board Review 10**) testified that he was "pretty sure" Det. Leclair was saying something while knocking on the front door of the apartment, but he did not remember what was being said specifically. Det. Alhidami did not remember whether Det. Leclair or any other officer said they would kick the door down. Det. Alhidami did not deny that any officer made such a statement, though. Det. Mischo (**Board Review 11**) denied that any officer threatened to kick the door down.

"If the officer is authorized to enter premises without giving notice of his authority and purpose, or if after giving such notice he is not admitted, he may enter such premises, and by a breaking if necessary." NY Criminal Procedure Law § 120.80(5) (Board Review 17).

§ 87(2)(g)
It is undisputed that Det.
Leclair knocked and announced his authority and purpose, and that \$87(2)(b) waited at least several minutes before opening the door. \$87(2)(g)

Allegation (B) Abuse of Authority: Detective Michael Leclair threatened to notify the Administration for Children's Services.

At the time of the incident, \$87(2)(b) two sons lived in her apartment. They were home and asleep when the officers arrived. \$87(2)(b) testified that, before she opened the door, Det. Leclair shouted that if there were children inside, they were going to be taken to ACS. Ultimately, none of the officers actually called or notified ACS during the incident.

When Det. Leclair (**Board Review 04**) was asked if he or any other officer made statements about what would happen to any children inside the apartment, he explained that his team will frequently ask if there are children inside for the children's safety. The presence of children would change Det. Leclair's calculus for how to gain entry to an apartment because as a member of the Violent Felony Squad, he often investigates suspects who are armed with weapons. With regard to this specific incident, however, Det. Leclair testified that he did not know if any children were present in safety.

Safety. The presence of children's safety. The presence of children would change Det. Leclair testified that he did not know apartment. Det. Leclair did not remember whether he said any children inside the apartment would go to ACS, and he did not remember whether he mentioned ACS in any context. Det. Leclair did not deny, however, that he ever mentioned ACS or that he said in substance that any children in the residence would go to ACS. Det. Leclair did explicitly deny hearing any *other* officer mention ACS.

Det. Leclair's understanding of ACS's function and powers was that the mere execution of an arrest or bench warrant like this would not trigger ACS involvement—unless a suspect actually endangered a child by, for example, barricading himself in a room using the child's occupied crib. Det. Leclair articulated no reason to believe that there was any child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment involving [87(2)(6)] or any children living with them.

Det. Alhidami (**Board Review 10**) did not remember whether Det. Leclair or any other officer said that any children in the apartment would go to ACS, or whether ACS was mentioned at any point in any capacity or context. Det. Alhidami did not deny that any officer made those statements. Det. Mischo (**Board Review 11**) did not remember whether there was any conversation prior to the entry. He denied that any officer ever said that any children inside the apartment would be going to ACS. Det. Mischo did not remember anything about this incident that would have prompted any ACS-related concerns.

The investigation credited \$87(2)(6) testimony that Det. Leclair threatened notify ACS when he was attempting to convince her to open her door. \$87(2)(6) consistently testified to hearing this threat in three separate statements: two days after the incident in both her intake call and her telephone statement, and a few months later in her CCRB interview. Moreover, although Det. Leclair denied hearing any *other* officer mention ACS or threaten to call ACS, he conspicuously did *not* deny mentioning ACS or threatening to call ACS himself. Instead, he merely said he did not remember whether he did so. Det. Leclair remembered a notable level of detail in other parts of this incident, and remembered enough of what *other* officers said to explicitly deny that they made such a statement, but he could not make such a denial on his own behalf. Comparing \$87(2)(6) specific, consistent allegation to Det. Leclair's conspicuous non-denial, the investigation concluded that a preponderance of the evidence existed to support \$887(2)(6) testimony.


Patrol Guide Procedure 215-03 (Board Review18) states that, in order for an officer to submit a report of suspected child abuse or maltreatment, he must have "reasonable suspicion of abuse/neglect/maltreatment." If there is no imminent danger to the life or health of the child, the officer cannot remove the child from his residence and/or from the person who is legally responsible for the child's care. Even when an officer has reasonable cause to believe that a child's continued presence in his home presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health, the officer still cannot personally remove the child from the residence absent consent from the child's guardian. Absent consent, the officer can only notify the patrol supervisor, who then has the power to direct a forcible removal of the child if there is not sufficient time to apply for a court order.

Det. Leclair did not claim to have had any suspicion that any children in safety apartment had been abused, neglected, or maltreated. safety s

Allegation (E) Abuse of Authority: Detective Michael Leclair failed to provide with a business card.

(Board Review 09) testified that Det. Leclair did not provide her with a business card during this incident, and that she did not request one. When street first filed her CCRB complaint about this incident in June 2019, she did not report Det. Leclair's name or any other identifying information for him. street testified that she did not learn Det. Leclair's name until the incident on September 11, 2019, when he called her from her apartment building while she was not home and asked her to meet with him to discuss his investigation. That same day, street protected Det. Leclair's name, shield number, and command to the CCRB for the first time when she filed a new complaint about the September incident (Board Review 19).

Det. Leclair (**Board Review 04**) testified that during the post-search conversation, he "gave her [his] information" verbally, including his name and telephone number. Det. Leclair had been issued business cards prior to the incident date, but he did not remember giving a card to and did not remember if he had any such cards on his person during the incident.



Mediation, Civil, and Criminal Histories

- declined to mediate this complaint.
- As of May 19, 2021, the NYC Office of the Comptroller has no record of any Notice of Claim regarding this incident (Board Review 24).

CCRB Case # 201905389

CCRB CTS – Confidential

[§ 87(2)(b)] [§§ 86(1)(3)&(4)] [§ 87(2)(c)]		
Squad No.:	<u>#05</u>		
Investigator:	Conor Seamus O'Shea Signature	Investigator Conor S. O'Shea Print Title & Name	<u>June 9, 2021</u> Date
Squad Leader:	<u>Daniel Giansante</u> Signature	IM Daniel Giansante Print Title & Name	<u>June 9, 2021</u> Date
Reviewer:	Signature	Print Title & Name	Date