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Inventor(s)	Sumpter; Jodessiah et al.

Monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals

Abstract

A server obtains real-time video depicting an area that includes a terminal. The server analyzes the video for depictions of a vehicle and objects associated with attacks on terminals, A server provides factors associated with the analysis to a machine learning model (MLM). The server receives a confidence value as output from the MLM. The server sends an alert when the confidence value exceeds a threshold as an indication that a potential attack on the terminal may be in progress.

Inventors: Sumpter; Jodessiah (Alpharetta, GA), Costello; Christopher John (Suwanee, GA), Burris; Matthew Robert (Lawrenceville, GA), Hartl; Gregory Joseph (Atlanta, GA), Martinez; Caleb Wayne (Fayetteville, GA)

Applicant: NCR Atleos Corporation (Atlanta, GA)

Family ID: 1000008747764

Assignee: NCR Atleos Corporation (Atlanta, GA)

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Primary Examiner: Ellis; Suez

Attorney, Agent or Firm: Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Background/Summary

RELATED APPLICATIONS (1) The present application is a Continuation of application Ser. No. 17/732,889, entitled “Monitoring and Predicting Physical Force Attacks on Transaction Terminals”, filed on Apr. 29, 2022, which is a Continuation-In Part (CIP) of application Ser. No. 17/665,021 entitled “Currency Trapping Detection,” filed Feb. 4, 2022, the disclosures of which are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety.

BACKGROUND

(1) Transaction Terminal fraud comes in a variety of techniques used by thieves. Malicious software can be installed on the terminals that permit thieves to monitor and/or control operation of the terminals and/or the peripherals of the terminals. Small malicious hardware devices can be inserted into slots of peripherals to affect the operation of shutters on the peripherals and/or to record and transmit a customer's private payment/bank card data.

(2) Brute physical force is another technique by which thieves steal currency from media depositories of the terminals. Unfortunately, physical force is a growing trend with thieves as they become more emboldened and impatient with other techniques that require technical skill and

patience. A popular brute force attack entails attaching a chain on one end to an axle of a truck while the other end of the chain is wrapped around an outer housing of an Automated Teller Machine (ATM—one type of transaction terminal), the thief then drives off with the ATM in tow. This type of attack is referred to as a “hook and chain” attack. Hook and chain attacks do substantial infrastructure damage to the ATMs and if the thieves get away with the ATMs, it is a complete loss in terms of the currency that was stored in the ATMs' media cassettes/safe. Physical force attacks are centered on dismantling the ATM to obtain the currency in the safe.

(3) Physical force attacks are only identified after the ATM has been actively damaged or stolen from its original site (after the fact). Existing video or witnesses may subsequently assist in capturing the thieves but by this point the ATM is usually a complete loss and most of the currency has been spent or cannot be accounted for.

SUMMARY

(4) In various embodiments, a system and methods for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals are presented.

(5) According to an aspect, a method for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals is provided. Visual features are extracted from a video, wherein the visual features are associated with a vehicle, an orientation of the vehicle relative to a transaction terminal, and an individual at the transaction terminal in a given location. Factors associated with past brute force attacks on terminals in an area associated with the given location for a given period of time are obtained. The visual features and the factors are provided as input to a Machine-Learning Model (MLM). A confidence value is received as output from the MLM indicating a percentage potential that the individual is likely to engage in a current brute force attack on the transaction terminal. An alert is provided when the confidence value exceeds a threshold value.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

(1) FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system for hand action tracking for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment.

(2) FIG. 2 is a diagram of a method for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment.

(3) FIG. 3 is a diagram of another method for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

(4) FIG. 1 is a diagram of a system **100** for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment. It is to be noted that the components are shown schematically in greatly simplified form, with only those components relevant to understanding of the embodiments being illustrated.

(5) Furthermore, the various components (that are identified in system/platform **100**) are illustrated and the arrangement of the components are presented for purposes of illustration only. It is to be noted that other arrangements with more or less components are possible without departing from the teachings of monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, presented herein and below.

(6) As used herein and below the terms “cash” and “currency” may be used synonymously and interchangeably. This can be any government-backed note.

(7) As will be demonstrated herein and below, system **100** and the methods that follow permit a low cost and accurate approach to detecting a brute force ATM attack and predicting when a brute force attack is potentially going to occur (before the attack is actually made by a thief). Computer vision techniques are processed on video captured for an area associated with the ATM and Machine-

Learning Models (MLMs) are processed on factors/features identified with the computer vision to predict whether a brute force attack is potentially going to take place on the ATM. The factors/features of the computer vision technique may include determining a vehicle size, a vehicle type, and current positioning or orientation of a vehicle relative to the ATM.

(8) History associated with the ATM or the area (location) of the ATM is also obtained as a factor/feature from incident logs associated with the ATM or other ATMs within a configured distance of the ATM. The incident logs indicated whether or not and when a brute force attack (such as a hook and chain attack) took place at the ATM or in the vicinity of the ATM in the past. Past video associated with past hook and chain events is also acquired using the incident logs. The computer vision is processed on the past video to obtain training input factors/features derived from the past video. A MLM is then trained on the training factors/features as input with the known hook and chain events labeled during training as expected output from the factors/features. This causes the MLM to configure itself when provided the factors/features in any new current situation to produce as output a confidence value (prediction) as to whether the new current situation is potentially a hook and chain event that is about to occur (but has not yet actually occurred).

(9) Any confidence value produced by a trained MLM that is above a threshold triggers a variety of additional processing by system **100**, such as, and by way of example only, enhanced video analysis for facial images or individual-specific attributes (hair length, complexion, clothing, mannerisms, voice, etc.), enhanced video analysis for object detection (license plate numbers, vehicle attributes, chains, tools, etc.), sending alerts or notifications to a variety of systems in real time (Financial Institution (FI) systems, security systems, local law enforcement systems, etc.), sending license plate numbers to a local department of motor vehicles to obtain registrations and violation histories of the individuals that registered the vehicles, shutting down the ATMs, activating currency/media dye packs within media cassettes of the ATMs to render the currency within the ATMs unusable, comparing images of a current event against past images available with historical crimes in the area of the ATMs, and/or generating a report comprising any combination of, or all of the above for analysis. Analysis can be further used for modifying the MLM in subsequent training sessions on new or different factors/features so that the MLM is continuously improving on its accuracy of hook and chain predictions for the ATMs.

(10) It is within this initial context that embodiments are now discussed with reference to the FIGS.

(11) System **100** includes a cloud/server **110** (optional), zero or more overhead/on site cameras **120**, an ATM **130**, one or more ATM integrated or affixed cameras **137**, and one or more external servers **140**.

(12) Cloud/Server **110** comprises a processor **111** and a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium **112**. Medium **112** comprises executable instructions for a visual feature/factor manager **113**, a physical force detection manager **114**, and a Machine-Learning Model (MLM) **115**. The executable instructions when provided or obtained by the processor **111** from medium **112** cause the processor **111** to perform operations discussed herein with respect to **113-115**.

(13) Overhead/On site cameras **120** stream image frames captured from above ATM **130**, across a street, or in a vicinity (proximity) of an area surrounding the ATM **130**. Overhead/On site cameras **120** are not attached or affixed to ATM **130**. Overhead/On site cameras **120** stream the images for the image frames directly to a storage location on ATM **130** and/or cloud/server **110**.

(14) ATM **130** comprises, a at least one processor **131**, peripheral modules **132** (depository, safe, cash dispenser/acceptor, recycler, touchscreen, key pad, receipt printer, media infeed, etc.) and a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium **134**. Medium **134** comprises executable instructions for an ATM application (app) **135** and a security agent **136** (optional). The executable instructions when provided or obtained by the processor **131** from medium **134** cause the processor **131** to perform operations discussed herein with respect to **135** and **136**.

(15) ATM integrated or affixed cameras **137** stream image frames captured from adjacent to and focused on any one of the peripheral modules **132** from one or more exterior side surfaces of the

ATM **130** focused on any given peripheral module **132**. ATM integrated or affixed cameras **137** stream the images for the image frames directly to a storage location on ATM **130** and/or cloud/server **110**.

(16) It is noted that cameras **120** and/or **137** may be existing cameras **120** and/or **137** situated overhead/on site of the ATM **120** for security purposes and/or integrated as a peripheral device of the ATM **120**. Thus, in some embodiments no additional or new cameras are needed beyond what is already present at the ATM **120** for security monitoring. In some instances, existing cameras **120** and/or **137** can be refocused or reangled from their existing locations for purposes of some of the embodiments that follow.

(17) It is noted in other embodiments, additional new cameras **120** and/or **137** are deployed and positioned (located and focused) for the purposes of some embodiments that follow.

(18) In some embodiments, cameras **120** and/or **137** may be a combination of existing and new cameras **120** and/or **137**.

(19) Each external server **140** comprises at least one processor and a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium **142**. Medium **142** comprises executable instructions for an external system/service **143**. The executable instructions when provided or obtained by the processor **141** from medium **142** cause the processor **141** to perform operations discussed herein with respect to **143**.

(20) Initially, historical video and historical data for a given location associated with a given ATM **130** is acquired. The historical records comprise incident records for which it was determined that a given ATM **130** was subjected to a brute force attack. The historical video is provided to the feature/factor manager **113**, and the feature/factor manager analyzes the image frames of the historical video for each incident and obtains visual features relevant to a vehicle make and model involved, the orientation and positioning of the vehicle relative to the ATM **130**, attributes of the vehicle such as color, size, shape, etc. Feature/Factor manager **113** also obtains visual features of any individuals detected in the historical video, such as size, gender, weight or build, approximate age, complexion, etc. Moreover, Feature/factor manager **113** obtains attributes of the individuals, such as clothing type, color of clothing, jewelry worn, any noticeable tattoos, etc. Feature/Factor manager **113** obtains the time of day of each given incident, day of week, weather conditions (from a web-based weather service using a zip code for the location, the date, and the time), etc. Feature/Factor manager **113** also identifies objects present in the past video, such as chains, tools, hooks, explosive devices, guns, etc. as other visual features beyond just vehicle visual features and individual visual features. The visual features, attributes, time of day, day of week, weather conditions, location information (such as zip code) are provided a features/factors to train the MLM **115** to physical force detection manager **114**.

(21) Physical force detection manager generates uses the incident records and the corresponding feature/factors as training records during a training session with the MLM **115**. Each training record comprises input to the MLM **115** that comprises the feature/factors derived by the feature/factor manager along with the time of day, day of week, calendar date, weather conditions, and location information. The training input also comprises an identifier for the ATM **130** that was subject to the brute force attack and a geographical location of that ATM **130**. Each training record is further labeled with a flag that indicates a brute force attack occurred for this set of input data. The input data and the expected output (an indication that the ATM **130** was subject to a brute force attack) is passed to the MLM **115**.

(22) The MLM **115** configures its weighing factors on the input data necessary to correctly output that the ATM **130** was subject to a brute force attack and derives a machine-learning algorithm that when provided the input data without the labeled indication for the brute force attack, provides as output a predicted brute force attack on the ATM **130**.

(23) Feature/Factor manager **113** continues training the MLM **115** on a set of training records over a given past historical period of time and then tests the MLM **115** for accuracy on some training

records not used during the training session. Once the accuracy is sufficient, the MLM **115** is released for use in predicting brute force ATM attacks when provided a new set of input data (visual features/factors and other data discussed above with the training records).

(24) MLM **115** is now ready to provide predicted brute force attacks on specific ATMs **130** in specific geographic locations. Cameras **120** and/or **137** stream video of an area that surrounds and is adjacent to the ATM **130**. When the video identifies a person, vehicle, and any objects (chains, hooks, ropes, explosive devices, guns, etc.) present at the ATM, the video is passed to feature/factor manager **113**. Feature/Factor manager **113** returns features/factors such a vehicle type, vehicle make, vehicle size, vehicle orientation relative to the ATM **130** (for example the front of the vehicle is facing away from the front of the ATM **130**, the front of the vehicle is pulled past an outer side of the ATM **130**, the vehicle is aligned directly in front of the ATM **130**, etc.), a calculated distance between the vehicle and the ATM **130**, a total number of individuals present in the vehicle, attributes of each individual and attributes of clothing, jewelry, tattoos, etc.; and any known objects present in the video such as chains, hooks, ropes, explosive devices, guns, etc. Feature/Factor manager **113** returns the visual features/factors back to physical force detection manager **114** is real time as the video is continuing to be streamed from the cameras **120** and/or **137**.

(25) Physical force detection manager **114** passes the features/factors as input to the MLM **115** along with a location identifier (such as zip code), time of day, day of week, calendar date, current weather at the location (obtained from a web-based weather service), and ATM identifier for the ATM **130**. MLM **115** returns as output a predicted confidence value 0-100% that the given individuals and vehicle presently in front of or at the ATM **130** are potentially going to attempt a brute force attack on the ATM **130**.

(26) Physical force detection manager **115** receives the confidence value and compares it against one or more thresholds or a threshold range to determine what next processing actions if any to perform. For example, if the confidence value when compared to a first threshold is above that threshold but below another threshold (or the confidence value is within a threshold range), physical force detection manager **115** may not raise any alert yet but may begin to performing more fine grain visual feature analysis from the real-time video, such as obtain a license plate from an image frame of the video, process an Application Programming Interface (API) to interact with a local department of motor vehicles system **143** and obtain a traffic incident records for the vehicle and if permitted, a registered individual that has the vehicle registered. Physical force detection manager **114** may then uses the information about the registered individual to check with a local law enforcement system **143** for arrests and/or pending charges of the individual. The information returned may not precipitate any additional action by manager **114** but may cause the manager **114** to elevate the confidence score to a higher score, which now exceeds that threshold for sending an alert. In such a case, manager **114** uses another API to message a law enforcement service/system **143** that a potential hook and chain event is in progress at ATM **130** located at address X and/or a FI system **143** associated with the ATM **130** may also be messaged.

(27) So, even when the confidence value returned by MLM **115** is not high enough (not elevated enough), manager **114** may perform additional actions and modify the confidence value such that it becomes elevated and necessitates the manager **114** sending an alert or notification message to a law enforcement service/system and a FI service/system **143**.

(28) Additionally, when the confidence value (as returned by MLM **115** or as adjusted by manager **114**) is above a predefined threshold, Manager **114** sends the alerts to systems **143** and begins to actively gather a variety of information about the event for the vehicle, the individual(s), the ATM **130**, video clip from the video, etc. This information is packaged into an incident report, which can be logged and/or sent to systems **143**.

(29) In an embodiment, the features/factors supplied as input may also comprise additional feature/factors gathered by manager **114** after the visual feature/factors are provided by feature/factor manager **113**. For example, manager **113** uses an API to identify a total number of

hook and chain incidents within a zip code/city associated with the ATM **130** within a predefined period of time using an external crime reporting system **143**. This total number of local hook and chain incidents may be an additional feature/factor used to train MLM **115** and obtained and provided by manager **114** for real time events being evaluated for the ATM **130**. Each previous hook and chain incidents may also have a severity level assigned to it in a corresponding FI system, which manager **114** can cross reference and obtain the severity levels for each incident and use the severity level as still another feature/factor used to train MLM **115**.

(30) When physical force detection manager **114** determines that an alert is needed for a current event ongoing at the ATM **130**, manager **114** may perform a customized workflow of actions. A first portion of the workflow may instruct manager **114** to notify a security system **143**, the FI system **143** associated with the ATM **130**, and local law enforcement system **143**. A second portion of the workflow may instruct manager **114** to instruct ATM app **135** and/or security agent **136** to shut down the ATM **130**, activate dye packs in currency bins of the ATM **130**, locking any gates that the ATM **130** has access to, sounding an alarm, etc. A third portion of the workflow may instruct manager **114** to compare photos captured of the individual and the vehicle within image frames provided in the video by cameras **120** and **137** to compare against photos associated with past incidents of hook and chain events in the local area (by obtaining incident records from a local crime reporting system **143** or from the security system **143** of a FI). Photos that substantially match based on a scoring system of similar objects and attributes are retained within a packet of information for the current event at the ATM **130**. A fourth portion of the workflow may instruct manager **114** to activate previously inactivated cameras **120** and/or **137** and start actively looking for fine-grain visual characteristics for the vehicle (such as license plate number), facial attributes, or any distinctive attributes of the individual (including clothing, walk or gait, deformities, tattoos, etc.). A fifth portion of the workflow may instruct manager **114** to assemble a detailed (fine-grain) packet of information for the current hook and chain event at the ATM **130** comprising the visual features, the details visual features, a video clip of the event, license plate number, registration information and records, crime records, potential related incidents to other hook and chain events based on photo comparison, etc. The packet of information is retained and linked to the hook and chain event and may be transmitted to any external system **143** within an alert or notification of after an alert or notification is sent to the external system **143**.

(31) It is noted that the workflow processed by manager **114** is configurable such that all the workflow steps can be processed, just one workflow step can be processed, or any combination of workflow steps can be processed.

(32) Moreover, the workflow is configurable by any given FI to include additional steps, modified steps, or removed steps from that which was described above.

(33) In an embodiment, either cameras **120** and/or **137** or one of the peripheral modules **132** comprises a microphone. The microphone captured audible data spoken by the individual during an event and captures sounds such as chains hitting the ground or the pavement. Physical force detection manager **114** may be configured to use audio to text translation or use a third-party service for the audio to translation. Keywords or preconfigured sounds (such as chains) can be identified and used as feature/factors in training the MLM **114** and for any current event being evaluated.

(34) Additionally, an audio clip can be retained in the packet of information for the hook and chain event. In some cases, physical detection manager **114** utilizes a text to speech translator to actively communicate and warn any individual about to engage in a hook and chain event at the ATM **130** by playing a warning message over a speaker of the ATM **130** informing the individual that authorities have been dispatched or are about to be dispatched and that the individual identity is known or will be known from the video captured.

(35) In an embodiment, voice analysis on speech captured of the individual may be performed and recorded as a unique voice print in the packet of information.

(36) In an embodiment, manager **114** can attempt to match the voice print to a previously recorded voice print available through a crime system **143** and/or security system **143** of a given FI. Any match to the individual causes manager **114** to note the match and the identity of the individual within the packet of information retained for the event.

(37) System **100** utilizes computer vision and machine-learning to predict brute force attacks on ATMs **130** in the manners discussed above and below. Fine-grain visual features and a variety of external system **143** information is obtained in a packet of information for any brute force attack. System **100** can elevate a current event to an alert situation and enhance information gathering based thereon. This provides an adapted, customized, learning, and preventative security to ATMs **130** subject to brute force attacks.

(38) In an embodiment, system **100** operates on any transaction terminal that comprises a card reader with card slot **132**, such as Self-Service Terminals (SSTs) operated for self-checkouts and/or Point-Of-Sale (POS) terminals operated by cashiers of a retailer during customer-assisted checkouts. Thus, system **100** can comprises a plurality of different types of transaction terminals beyond just the ATM **130** illustrated in FIG. **1** of system **100**.

(39) In an embodiment, feature/factor manager **113**, physical force detection manager **113**, and MLM **115** is processed on a local server **110** associated with ATM **130**.

(40) In an embodiment, feature/factor manager **113**, physical force detection manager **113**, and MLM **115** is processed on a cloud **110**.

(41) In an embodiment, only a single camera **120** or **137** is deployed with the system **100**. In an embodiment, the single camera is overhead camera **120**. In an embodiment, the single camera is integrated or affixed camera **137**.

(42) In an embodiment, more than one camera **120** or **137** is deployed with system **100**. In an embodiment each of the more than one cameras are overhead cameras **120**. In an embodiment each of the one or more cameras are integrated or affixed cameras **137**. In an embodiment, at least one of the one or more cameras is an overhead camera **120** and at least one other of the one or more cameras is an integrated or affixed camera **137**.

(43) In an embodiment, wireless transceivers (types of peripheral modules **132**) may be activated to scan for wireless devices in possession of the individual at the ATM **130**. The transceivers can scan for wireless device identifiers that are within range of the transceivers, and the device identifiers may be recorded in the packet of information for purposes of linking a device of the individual to other past brute force attacks or for purposes of allowing law enforcement to track the location of the mobile device in possession of the individual.

(44) These embodiments and other embodiments are now discussed with reference to the FIGS. **2-3**.

(45) FIG. **2** is a diagram of a method **200** for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment. The software module(s) that implements the method **200** is referred to as a “terminal brute force attack predictor.” The terminal brute force attack predictor is implemented as executable instructions programmed and residing within memory and/or a non-transitory computer-readable (processor-readable) storage medium and executed by one or more processors of a device. The processor(s) of the device that executes the terminal brute force attack predictor are specifically configured and programmed to process the terminal brute force attack predictor. The terminal brute force attack predictor has access to one or more network connections during its processing. The network connections can be wired, wireless, or a combination of wired and wireless.

(46) In an embodiment, the terminal brute force attack predictor executes on cloud **110**. In an embodiment, the terminal brute force attack predictor executes on server **110**.

(47) In an embodiment, the terminal brute force attack predictor executes on ATM **130**.

(48) In an embodiment, a portion of the terminal brute force attack predictor executes on cloud/server **110** and another portion of the terminal brute force attack predictor executes on ATM

130.

(49) In an embodiment, the terminal brute force attack predictor is one, all, or any combination of or both of **113**, **114**, **115**, and/or **136**.

(50) At **210**, the terminal brute force attack predictor extracts visual features from a video. The video features are associated with one or more of a vehicle, an orientation of the vehicle relative to a transaction terminal **130**, an individual at the transaction terminal **130** in a given location, a predefined object associated with a chain, a hook, a rope, a weapon, etc. It is to be noted that the terminal brute force attack predictor is continually evaluating the video, such that an individual that parks a vehicle out of the line of sight of one of the cameras **120** and/or **137** will still be monitored closely such that when the vehicle comes into the line of sight the vehicle features and orientation relative to terminal **130** is extracted from the video and accounted for in the threat level associated with the individual. The same may be true with the tools, such as a chain, a hook, a rope, or even a weapon (such as an explosive device or a gun).

(51) In an embodiment, at **211**, the terminal brute force attack predictor identifies the visual features as a size of the vehicle, a color of the vehicle, a make of the vehicle, a model of the vehicle, a position and a direction of the vehicle relative to the transaction terminal **130**, and a calculated distance between the vehicle and the transaction terminal **130**.

(52) In an embodiment of **211** and at **212**, the terminal brute force attack predictor identifies individual visual features as a height of the individual, a hair color of the individual, a complexion of the individual, clothing worn by the individual, jewelry worn by the individual, facial features of the individual, tattoos of the individual, and any object being held or in proximity to the individual (such as a weapon (explosive device, gun, etc.), a tool, a rope, a hook, a chain, etc.).

(53) At **220**, the terminal brute force attack predictor obtains factors associated with past brute force attacks on terminals **130** in an area associated with the given location (such as zip code, city, etc.) for a given period of time.

(54) In an embodiment of **212** and **220**, at **221**, the terminal brute force attack predictor interacts with an external crime reporting system **143** and obtains some of the factors as a total number of the past brute force attacks in the area and a severity level associated with each past brute force attack.

(55) In an embodiment of **221** and at **222**, the terminal brute force attack predictor adds a current time of day, a current day of week, current weather being experienced at the given location, and a current calendar date to the factors.

(56) At **230**, the terminal brute force attack predictor provides the visual features and the factors as input to a MLM **115**.

(57) At **240**, the terminal brute force attack predictor receives a confidence value as output from the MLM **115** indicating a percentage potential that the individual is likely to engage in a brute force attack on the transaction terminal **130**.

(58) In an embodiment, at **241**, the terminal brute force attack predictor modifies the confidence value by increasing the percentage based on fine-grain information obtained on the vehicle and the individual from one or more external systems **143** (such as license number and registration records and crime arrests or conviction for the individual).

(59) At **250**, the terminal brute force attack predictor provides an alert when the confidence value exceeds a threshold value.

(60) In an embodiment, at **251**, the terminal brute force attack predictor processes a workflow comprising a plurality of actions based on the confidence value.

(61) In an embodiment, at **260**, the terminal brute force attack predictor activates dye packs within media cassettes of the transaction terminal **130** to render currency in the media cassettes unusable in a safe of the transaction terminal **130**.

(62) In an embodiment, at **270**, the terminal brute force attack predictor shuts down operation of the transaction terminal **130**.

(63) In an embodiment, at **280**, the terminal brute force attack predictor activates a microphone and a camera that was not associated with the video to capture fine-grain visual features of the individual and audio associated with speech and activities of the individual at the transaction terminal **130**.

(64) In an embodiment of **280** and at **281**, the terminal brute force attack predictor assembles and logs a packet of information comprising a video clip for the video, the visual features, the factors, the confidence value, the fine-grain visual features, and the audio.

(65) In an embodiment of **281** and at **282**, the terminal brute force attack predictor adds a department of motor vehicle information for the vehicle through interaction a vehicle registration system **143** to the packet of information and the terminal brute force attack predictor adds crime information for the individual through interaction with a crime reporting system **142** to the packet of information.

(66) FIG. **3** is a diagram of another method **300** for monitoring and predicting physical force attacks on transaction terminals, according to an example embodiment. The software module(s) that implements the method **200** is referred to as a “terminal brute-force attack monitor” The terminal brute-force attack monitor is implemented as executable instructions programmed and residing within memory and/or a non-transitory computer-readable (processor-readable) storage medium and executed by one or more processors of a device. The processor(s) of the device that executes the terminal brute-force attack monitor are specifically configured and programmed to process the terminal brute-force attack monitor. The terminal brute-force attack monitor has access to one or more network connections during its processing. The network connections can be wired, wireless, or a combination of wired and wireless.

(67) In an embodiment, the device that executes the terminal brute-force attack monitor is cloud **110**. In an embodiment, the device that executes the terminal brute-force attack monitor is server **110**.

(68) In an embodiment, the device that executes the terminal brute-force attack monitor is ATM **130**.

(69) In an embodiment a portion of the terminal brute-force attack monitor executes on cloud/server **110** and another portion of the terminal brute-force attack monitor executes on ATM **130**.

(70) In an embodiment, the terminal brute-force attack monitor is one of, some combination of, or all of **113**, **114**, **115**, **136**, and/or method **200**.

(71) The terminal brute-force attack monitor presents another and, in some ways, enhanced processing perspective from that which was discussed above with method **200** of FIG. **2**.

(72) At **310**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor obtains past incident records for past brute force attacks on transaction terminals **130** within an area during a given period of time.

(73) At **320**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor obtains past video for each of the past incident records.

(74) At **330**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor extracts training visual features from the past video for each past incident record. The training visual features associated with individuals of past brute force attacks, vehicles of the past brute force attacks, orientations of the vehicles relative to corresponding transaction terminals **130** of the past brute force attacks, and objects (explosive device, gun, weapon, hook, rope, chain, tools) held of in proximity to the individuals during the past brute force attacks.

(75) At **340**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor identifies training factors as a total number of the past brute force attacks within a given period of time, a severity of each past brute force attack, a time of day of each past brute force attack, a calendar day for each past brute force attack, a day of week for each past brute force attack, and weather known to be experienced in the area for each past brute force attack.

(76) At **350**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor generates training records for training a MLM

115 using the incident records and using non-incident records for where there was no past brute force attack. Each training record that is associated with a corresponding incident record is labeled with an expected output that a given past brute force attack occurred, and each transaction record corresponding to a non-incident record labeled with the expected output that no brute force attack occurred.

(77) At **360**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor trains the MLM **115** with the corresponding training visual features and the corresponding training factors as input for a given training record and a corresponding confidence value produced as output by the MLM **115** as a percentage potential that the given training record is or is not associated with one of the past brute force attacks.

(78) In an embodiment, at **370**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor receives real-time video for a particular transaction terminal **130**. The terminal brute-force attack monitor extracts current visual features for a current vehicle and at least one current individual identified with the current vehicle. The terminal brute-force attack monitor obtains current factors for the area within a current period of time and the terminal brute-force attack monitor provides the current visual features and the current factors to the MLM **115** as input. The terminal brute-force attack monitor receives as output from the MLM **115** a current corresponding confidence value.

(79) In an embodiment of **370** and at **371**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor adjusts the current corresponding confidence value based on additional information obtained for the current individual and the current vehicle from one or more external systems **143**.

(80) In an embodiment of **371** and at **372**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor processes a workflow of actions based on the corresponding confidence value when compared to one or more threshold confidence values or when compared to a range of threshold values.

(81) In an embodiment of **371** and at **373**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor determines after **371** that the corresponding confidence value exceeds a threshold value and sends a real-time alert to a law enforcement system **143**, a security system **143**, and a FI system **143**.

(82) In an embodiment of **373** and at **374**, the terminal brute-force attack monitor activates a dye pack in a media cassette of the particular transaction terminal **130** and activates a particular camera **120** and/or **137** associated with the particular transaction terminal **130**. Furthermore, terminal brute-force attack monitor activates a microphone for the particular camera **120** and/or **137** and/or the particular transaction terminal **130**. The terminal brute-force attack monitor assembles and retains a packet of information comprising, audio captured by the microphone, additional fine-grain visual features captured by the particular camera **120** and/or **137**, the current visual features, the current factors, the corresponding confidence value, and a video clip of video representing the scene at the particular transaction terminal **130**. The packet of information may also include additional information obtained at **371**.

(83) It should be appreciated that where software is described in a particular form (such as a component or module) this is merely to aid understanding and is not intended to limit how software that implements those functions may be architected or structured. For example, modules are illustrated as separate modules, but may be implemented as homogenous code, as individual components, some, but not all of these modules may be combined, or the functions may be implemented in software structured in any other convenient manner.

(84) Furthermore, although the software modules are illustrated as executing on one piece of hardware, the software may be distributed over multiple processors or in any other convenient manner.

(85) The above description is illustrative, and not restrictive. Many other embodiments will be apparent to those of skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. The scope of embodiments should therefore be determined with reference to the appended claims, along with the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.

(86) In the foregoing description of the embodiments, various features are grouped together in a

single embodiment for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure. This method of disclosure is not to be interpreted as reflecting that the claimed embodiments have more features than are expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive subject matter lies in less than all features of a single disclosed embodiment. Thus, the following claims are hereby incorporated into the Description of the Embodiments, with each claim standing on its own as a separate exemplary embodiment.

Claims

1. A method, comprising: obtaining real-time video depicting an area having a terminal; analyzing the real-time video for depictions of a vehicle and objects associated with the use of brute force; providing factors associated with the analyzing to a machine learning model (MLM) and receiving a confidence value as output from the MLM, wherein the factors include features derived from the real-time video associated with the vehicle, the objects, and an individual associated with the vehicle and the objects, and wherein the factors further include a total number of past brute force attacks in the area and a severity level associated with each past brute force attack; and sending an alert when the confidence value exceeds a threshold.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing further includes determining a size, a color, a make, and a vehicle model of the vehicle from the real-time video.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein analyzing further includes determining a height, hair color, complexion, clothing, jewelry, facial features, and any tattoos of the individual from the real-time video.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing further includes identifying the individual at the terminal from the real-time video.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein analyzing further includes determining whether any of the objects are being held or operated by the individual from the real-time video.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing further includes generating the factors based on the analyzing for the vehicle, the objects, and the at least one individual depicted in the real-time video.
 7. The method of claim 6, wherein generating further includes adding a current time of day, a current day of week, a current calendar date, and current weather at a given location associated with the terminal to the factors.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the confidence value further includes modifying the confidence value based on obtained information for one or more of the vehicle or the individual depicted in the real-time video, wherein the obtained information is obtained from one or more external systems.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein sending further includes causing activation of dye packs within media cassettes of the terminal to render currency unusable in a safe of the terminal when the alert is provided.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein sending further includes causing the terminal to shut down for operation when the alert is provided.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein sending further includes activating a microphone associated with the terminal and a camera not associated with the real-time video to capture audio features and visual features of the individual depicted in the real-time video, wherein the audio features include speech of the individual and the speech is provided with the alert.
 12. The method of claim 1, wherein sending further includes assembling a packet of information when the alert is provided, wherein the packet information includes a video clip taken from the real-time video and motor vehicle information for the vehicle obtained through a vehicle registration system and providing the packet of information with the alert.
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