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DOUBLE AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION IN CONTEXT OF FAULTS

Abstract

A method is provided for securely processing digital information performed by a secure element having a secure processor. The method includes loading the digital information from an external memory into the secure element; segmenting the digital information into words of digital information (W_{ij,k}), generating error-detection codes or error-correction codes from said words of digital information and associating said error-detection codes with the corresponding words; transferring the words of digital information and the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes to the secure processor; and in the secure processor, verifying the words of digital information based on the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes before processing the digital information contained in said words.

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Background/Summary

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS [0001] This application is a continuation of and claims benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to U.S. application Ser. No. 17/907,378, filed on Sep. 26, 2022, which is incorporated by reference in its entirety. U.S. application Ser. No. 17/907,378 is a National Stage Application of PCT/EP2021/057819, filed Mar. 25, 2021, and claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 from European Patent Application No. 20167097.3, filed Mar. 31, 2020.

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0002] The present disclosure relates to the field of computer security and more precisely to securely processing digital information, such as code and/or data, with a secure element, for example a smart card.

BACKGROUND

[0003] Generally, a secure element, such as a smart card, includes hardware resources such as a secure processing unit (SCPU), a volatile memory and a non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory stores one or more codes (applications) and data, and, when required to be executed or processed, a code and/or data may be loaded in the volatile memory. The secure element may be embedded in a SoC (System on the Chip) having several processing units, several memories and several functionalities. The SoC may be integrated in a larger module.

[0004] In a constraint environment like an IoT system (that is, the Internet of Things system), the secure element may have only a small non-volatile memory, such as an OTP (one time programmable) memory, that is used to store a limited amount of information, for example counters and/or keys. The secure element is not used to store codes and data. To keep the cost of the secure element low, the codes and data are stored in an external non-volatile memory, that is outside the secure element, for example in the SoC or in the module outside the SoC. A code and/or data are loaded into the volatile memory of the secure element, when required to be executed or processed.

[0005] In such a constraint context, it is important to secure the digital information (codes and/or data) when it is stored in the external memory, when it is loaded from the external memory into the internal memory of the secure element and when it is processed or executed by the secure element. In particular, the digital information has to be protected from physical attacks.

[0006] Such physical attacks concern discrete elements like smart cards, and SoCs. They can be performed in remote. To date, there are two main kinds of known physical attacks.

[0007] A first kind of physical attack is named “side-channel attack”. A side-channel attack is any attack based on information gained from the implementation of a computer system, for example a secure element. Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, sound can provide an extra source of information, which can be exploited. During an operation of the secure element, for example the execution of a cryptographic algorithm by the CPU or a transfer of data from one memory to another memory, an attacker may listen the electromagnetic emanations or power consumption in order to capture the physical behavior of the secure element. Such a listening enables to obtain secret information, like a key. For example, when a processing unit executes a

cryptographic algorithm using secret information, it has a specific power consumption that can be captured by an oscilloscope in order to get the secret information.

[0008] A second kind of physical attacks is called “fault attacks”. Fault attacks are a family of techniques that involve deliberately producing errors in a cryptosystem or in any sensitive system. These attacks can relate to hardware, like a crypto-processor, or software components. They are intended to cause an unusual behavior of cryptographic or sensitive operations in order to extract secret information such as an encryption key. During an operation executed by the secure element, a fault can be injected for example by changing a power supply, changing a clock or injecting laser pulses. The injected fault may result in altering the behavior of some electronic hardware of the secure element. For example, during an encryption operation, the attacker may inject a fault, which blocks the encryption. That means that the output will be in clear and not encrypted. It is a straightforward attack. A fault could also be injected during a PIN verification and the PIN could be considered as valid even if it is the wrong value. In another example, during a command that outputs data, a fault could alter the pointer of the output buffer and enable to dump an internal value that should remain secret.

[0009] A fault attack and a physical attack can also be combined.

[0010] There is a need to improve the situation. More precisely, there is a need to secure the digital information at any time, when it is stored in the external non-volatile memory, when it is loaded from the external memory to the secure element and when it is processed by the secure element.

SUMMARY

[0011] The present disclosure concerns a method for securely processing digital information, including the following steps, performed by a secure element including a secure processor, and at least one internal memory and a code associating unit, both external to the secure processor: [0012] loading the digital information from an external memory into the at least one internal memory of the secure element; [0013] at the code associating unit, segmenting the digital information into words of digital information, generating codes, that are either error-detection codes or error-correction codes, from said words of digital information and associating said codes with the corresponding words in the at least one internal memory; [0014] transferring the words of digital information and the associated codes from the at least one internal memory to the secure processor; [0015] in the secure processor, verifying the words of digital information based on the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes before processing the digital information contained in said words.

[0016] The addition of error-detection codes (EDC) or error-correction codes (ECC) to the small words of digital information allows to ensure that the digital information has not been modified by an attack inside the secure element before transferring the words to the secure processor. Indeed, the EDC or ECC associated with a given word enables to detect one or more errors in this word.

[0017] In case that error-correction codes are generated, the ECC associated with a given word could be used not only to detect an error in the word but also to correct one or more bits in the word.

[0018] Advantageously, the method further includes a step of verifying the integrity of the digital information that is performed after the step of associating the error-detection codes or error-correction codes with the corresponding words and before transferring the words of digital information and the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes to the secure processor.

[0019] The verification of the integrity is carried out after segmenting the digital information into words and can use the words of digital information themselves. This ensures that the words transferred to the secure processor with the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes are not corrupted.

[0020] Advantageously, the method further includes a step of decrypting the digital information loaded from the external memory to obtain the digital information in clear, and wherein the step of

segmenting into words is performed on the digital information in clear.

[0021] The encryption allows to protect the digital information when it is stored in the external memory and when it is transferred from the external memory into the secure element.

[0022] Advantageously, the method further includes a step of verifying the integrity of the digital information in encrypted form. This ensures that the attacker has not changed the encryption.

[0023] Thus, in some embodiments, the protection of the digital information is based on the well-known “Encrypt-then-MAC” (EtM) approach, and can be of the type “MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC”. The EtM approach is considered as the most robust approach for authenticated encryption but it only protects data up to a certain level. In the present disclosure, the digital information in clear can also be authenticated. In that case, the digital information is protected by calculating a first MAC on the clear values with a key $K_{sub.0}$, then by encrypting the digital information authenticated with the first MAC with a key $K_{sub.1}$, then by calculating a second MAC with a key $K_{sub.2}$ on the digital information authenticated and encrypted. In this way, the digital information is authenticated by a first MAC on the clear form and by a second MAC on the encrypted form. This ensures that the digital information has not been altered or corrupted during storage and during transfer from the external memory to the secure element.

[0024] Advantageously, the words of digital information are stored in an internal memory of the secure element in association with the error-detection codes or error-correction codes and, in said step of verifying the integrity of the digital information performed after the step of associating the words of digital information with the error-detection codes or error-correction codes, said words of digital information are read from the internal memory to perform the verification of integrity.

[0025] This allows to verify the integrity of the words of digital information that are stored in the internal memory of the secure element to be transferred to the secure processor. This ensures that the words ready to be transferred to the secure processor have not been altered. It provides an end-to-end security from storage in the external memory to processing by the secure processor in the secure element.

[0026] Advantageously, the words of digital information and the associated error-detection or error-correction codes are transferred to the secure processor only if the integrity of the digital information is successfully verified after the step of associating the error-detection or error-correction codes with the corresponding words.

[0027] The digital information can be segmented into words of a predetermined size that depends on a working format of the secure processor or on a capacity of registers of the secure processor.

[0028] The size of the words to which the error-detection or error-correction codes are added is adapted to the architecture of the secure processor. Typically, it corresponds to the format used by the secure processor (i.e., the size of digital blocks handled by the secure processor). The size of the words may correspond to the size of the registers of the secure processor. For example, the secure processor can be an 8-bit or 16-bit or 32-bit or 64-bit processor (the indicated bit values corresponding to the size of its registers). In that case, the size of the words can be set to the size of the processor registers (i.e. 8 bits or 16 bits or 32 bits or 64 bits respectively). However, for some calculations, the working format of the secure processor (i.e., the size or format of the digital blocks manipulated or processed by the secure processor during execution of a calculation) may be smaller than the size of the processor registers. For example, the working format of the secure processor could be 8 bits while the registers of the secure processor are 32 bits. The size of the words is adapted.

[0029] In some embodiments, the digital information being stored in segments in the external memory, the step of loading the digital information and the step of segmenting the digital information into words are performed iteratively for each of the segments.

[0030] In a particular embodiment, [0031] in the step of loading each segment from the external memory, the secure element loads digital information in encrypted form and an integrity element, [0032] in the step of verifying the integrity of the digital information in encrypted form, the secure

element calculates an integrity element by chaining calculations on L+1 blocks of a predetermined number of bytes in encrypted form, and compares the calculated integrity element with the integrity element loaded.

[0033] Advantageously, [0034] in the step of decrypting, N+1 blocks in encrypted form are decrypted into N blocks of digital information in clear and another integrity element; [0035] in the step of segmenting, each of the N blocks of digital information in clear is divided into words of digital information.

[0036] Advantageously, in the step of verifying the integrity of the digital information performed after the step of associating the error-detection codes or error-correction codes with the corresponding words, the secure element calculates an integrity element by chaining calculations on L blocks of digital information in clear, and compares said calculated integrity element with said other integrity element resulting from the step of decrypting.

[0037] The method can further include the following steps, performed by a digital information provider: [0038] segmenting the digital information in clear into segments; [0039] and, for each segment of digital information: [0040] calculating a first integrity element for the digital information in clear; [0041] encrypting the digital information and the first integrity element; [0042] calculating a second integrity element of the result of the encryption and concatenating the result of the encryption and said second integrity element; [0043] storing the result of the encryption concatenated with said second integrity element in the external memory.

[0044] In addition, when a segment of digital information has been modified by the secure element, said secure element can update said segment of digital information in the external memory by executing the steps of: [0045] calculating a first integrity element for the digital information in clear; [0046] encrypting the digital information and the first integrity element; [0047] calculating a second integrity element of the result of the encryption and concatenating the result of the encryption and said second integrity element; [0048] updating the segment currently stored in the external memory with the result of the encryption concatenated with the second integrity element. [0049] Optionally, each word of each block can have its own error detection code or error correction code stored in the secure element, that could be verified after calculating the first integrity element and before encrypting the N blocks of digital information. Thanks to that, the encryption path is more resistant to the fault attack.

[0050] Advantageously, the words of digital information are processed by the secure processor only if no error is detected in said words of digital information.

[0051] When the step of verifying a word of digital information by the secure processor based on the associated error-detection or error-correction code fails, said word of the digital information can be handled as not relevant by the secure processor or the method for securely processing the digital information can be aborted by the secure element.

[0052] A second aspect of the present disclosure concerns a secure element for securely processing digital information, including: [0053] a secure processor; [0054] at least one internal memory; [0055] a communication interface for loading the digital information from an external memory into the at least one internal memory of the secure element; [0056] a code associating unit for segmenting the digital information into words of digital information, generating error-detection codes or error-correction codes from said words of digital information and associating the generated codes with the corresponding words in the at least one internal memory; wherein the secure processor is configured to load the words of digital information and the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes from the at least one internal memory and verify said words of digital information based on the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes before processing the digital information contained in said words.

[0057] Advantageously, the secure element further includes an integrity verification unit that is configured to verify the integrity of the digital information based on the words of digital information that are read from the at least one internal memory.

[0058] The secure element can further include an integrity verification unit for verifying the integrity of the digital information in encrypted form and a decryption unit for decrypting the digital information that has been loaded to obtain the digital information in clear.

[0059] A third aspect of the present disclosure concerns a system on the chip including the secure element previously defined.

[0060] The system on the chip can have an external memory located outside the secure element.

[0061] A fourth embodiment of the present disclosure concerns a module including the system on the chip.

[0062] Advantageously, in the module, said external memory that is located outside the secure element is located either inside the system on the chip or outside the system on the chip.

[0063] A fifth aspect of the present disclosure concerns a non-transitory computer readable medium including program instructions for causing a secure element for securely processing digital information, said secure element including a secure processor, to perform the steps of the method previously defined.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0064] Other features, purposes and advantages of the disclosure will become more explicit by means of reading the detailed statement of the non-restrictive embodiments made with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0065] FIG. 1 shows a module embedding a SoC (System on the Chip) that has a secure element, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0066] FIG. 2 illustrates operations of preparing digital information to be stored in an external memory (that is, external to a secure element) and liable to be loaded in the secure element, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0067] FIG. 3 illustrates operations of processing the digital information by the secure element, after loading from the external memory into the secure element, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0068] FIG. 4 represents the secure element, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0069] FIG. 5 represents a flowchart of a method of preparing digital information to be stored in an external memory, according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0070] FIG. 6 represents a flowchart of a method of securely processing the digital information stored in the external memory, performed by a secure element, according to an exemplary embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0071] FIG. 1 shows a system including a secure element **100** and an external memory **200** (i.e., external to the secure element). The secure element is for example a smart card or a chip. It can be embedded in a SoC (System on Chip) **110** having several processing units, several memories and several functionalities (not represented). The SoC **110** may be integrated in a larger module **120**. For example, this larger module **120** could be an IoT device (typically provided with a unique identifier and the ability to transfer data over a network), a telecommunication apparatus, a location system, a vehicle like a car or a plane, etc. . . .

[0072] The secure element **100** has a secure processing unit **102**, for example an integrated hardware intellectual property core (IP core).

[0073] Different exemplary and illustrative use cases (not limitative) of the secure element **100** are given below.

[0074] In a first exemplary use case, the secure element **100** can be integrated in a modem of a telecommunication system or apparatus. In such a case, it can handle network authentication and

download secure applications.

[0075] In a second exemplary use case, the secure element **100** can be integrated in a tachograph and securely handle location data.

[0076] In a third exemplary use case, the secure element **100** can be integrated in a vehicle, for example a car or a plane, secure and manage safety data transport.

[0077] The external memory **200** stores digital information. The terms “digital information” designate data liable to be loaded into the secure element **100**, such as executable code or information generated by executable code or used by executable code, or any other data to be used or processed by the secure element **100**.

[0078] The secure element **100** is intended to load and process (or use) digital information stored in the external memory **200**.

[0079] In an exemplary embodiment, memory segmentation is used in the external memory **200**. The digital information is segmented and stored in segments.

[0080] A segment is made up of several blocks of a predetermined number of bytes. For example, a block could be 16-byte long (16B or 128 bits). A segment of digital information can for example include 64 blocks of 16 bytes, which corresponds approximately to a segment of 1 kilo-byte long (1KB). Each segment has a set of attributes associated with it (such as the type of data contained in the segment, the length of the segment, the address of the segment, the version of the data, etc.). These attributes are recorded in a header attached to the segment. There are two main different types of segments, namely code segments including executable code and data segments including digital information which can be used by the code segments or an application or generated by an application.

[0081] The digital information is prepared to be stored in the external memory **200**. The method of preparing the digital information to be stored in the external memory **200** is initially carried out by a digital information provider (i.e. a system for providing digital information).

[0082] An exemplary embodiment of the method of preparing the digital information to be stored in the external memory **200** will be described in reference to FIGS. 2 and 5.

[0083] In a first step **S1**, the digital information in clear is divided into M segments of digital information, referenced as ‘ S_i ’ with $1 \leq i \leq M$.

[0084] Each segment S_i of digital information in clear can be made up of a plurality of blocks of a predetermined number of bytes. For example, the blocks are each 16-byte long (128 bits). The size of the blocks may vary depending on the operation that has to be carried out on the segment. For example, the size of the blocks used for applying a MAC function (or for any other authentication function or algorithm) may be different from the size of the blocks used for encryption or decryption.

[0085] Then, in order to assure the confidentiality and authenticity of the digital information, each of the segments of digital information is subjected to an authenticated encryption in a step **S2**. In the present embodiment, the authenticated encryption is based on the well-known authenticated encryption “Encrypt-then-MAC” (EtM), and follows an approach of the type “MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC”. More precisely, for each segment S_i of digital information in clear, a first integrity element is produced based the digital information in clear in a step **S20**, then the digital information in clear combined to its first integrity element are encrypted in a step **S21**, and then a second integrity element is produced based on the result of the encryption in a step **S22**.

[0086] Each of the first and second integrity elements is a short piece of information used to authenticate the digital information, such as a MAC (Message Authentication Code). In the present disclosure, the first integrity element and the second integrity element related to a segment S_i are referenced as ‘ $MAC_{i.sub.1}$ ’ and ‘ $MAC_{i.sub.2}$ ’, with $1 \leq i \leq M$.

[0087] In the step **S20** of producing $MAC_{i.sub.1}$ on the clear segment S_i , the first MAC is calculated by chaining MAC calculations on the L blocks $P_{i.sub.0}, \dots, P_{i.sub.L-1}$ of digital information in clear using a MAC function (referenced as MAC^* in FIG. 2). The blocks of digital

information in clear are referenced as $Pi.sub.0, \dots, Pi.sub.L-1$, wherein the letter 'P' refers to the word "Plaintext" and 'i' is the index of the segment. In the present exemplary embodiment, each block $Pi.sub.0, \dots, Pi.sub.L-1$ is 128-bit long and each segment Si has L blocks (or possibly less than L blocks for an incomplete segment) of digital information in clear, where L is for example equal to 64 (this value being only an illustrative example).

[0088] The MAC function uses a first secret key $K.sub.0$, for example a key of 256 bits. The resulting $MACi.sub.1$ is for example 16-byte long (128 bits). The integrity element $MACi.sub.1$ is concatenated (combined) with the segment Si of digital information in clear, so as to form a new authenticated segment $Si'=Si|MACi.sub.1$ ('|' representing the concatenation). The segment Si' includes the segment of digital information in clear Si concatenated with the integrity element $MACi.sub.1$.

[0089] In the step S21 of encryption, the authenticated segment Si' resulting from the step S20 is encrypted by the execution of an encryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm is applied on $N+1$ blocks forming the segment Si' and produces $N+1$ encrypted blocks referenced as $Ci.sub.0, \dots, Ci.sub.N$ (the letter 'C' referring to 'Ciphertext'), forming an authenticated and encrypted segment referenced as $[Si']$ (the brackets representing the encryption).

[0090] The number of blocks N related to the encryption can be identical or different to the number L related to the authentication, depending on the type of authentication function and the type of the encryption algorithm used.

[0091] In the present exemplary embodiment, illustrated in FIGS. 2 and 3, N and L are identical and equal to 64. The encrypted blocks $Ci.sub.0, \dots, Ci.sub.N$ are each here 16-byte long (128 bits).

[0092] The encryption uses a second secret key $K.sub.1$, for example a key of 256 bits. In the present embodiment, the second key $K.sub.1$ is different from the first key $K.sub.0$ (but $K.sub.0$ and $K.sub.1$ could be the same key).

[0093] In the step S22 of producing $MACi.sub.2$, the second MAC is calculated by chaining MAC calculations on $L+1$ encrypted blocks $Ci.sub.0, \dots, Ci.sub.L$ using a MAC function (referenced as 'MAC' in FIG. 2). This MAC function uses a third key $K.sub.2$, that is for example a key of 256 bits. In the present embodiment, the third key $K.sub.2$ is different from the first key $K.sub.0$ and from the second key $K.sub.1$ (but $K.sub.2$ could be identical to $K.sub.0$ and/or $K.sub.1$, but this is less secure). The resulting integrity element $MACi.sub.2$ is for example 16-byte long (128 bits). $MACi.sub.2$ is concatenated (combined) to the authenticated and encrypted segment $[Si']$, so as to form a new authenticated segment Si'' to be stored (authenticated and encrypted segment referenced as $Si''=[Si']|MACi.sub.2$).

[0094] Optionally, the integrity element $MACi.sub.2$ may be protected by encryption.

[0095] Optionally, only a part of the bits of the integrity element $MACi.sub.2$ may be appended to the authenticated and encrypted segment $[Si']$, for example only some bits 'LSB' (Least Significant Bits).

[0096] Then, in a step S3, the segment of digital information Si'' with $1 \leq i \leq M$, in protected form (here authenticated, then encrypted and then authenticated), is stored in the external memory **200**.

[0097] The steps S2 and S3 are repeated for each segment Si of digital information with $1 \leq i \leq M$.

[0098] Once stored in the external memory **200**, the digital information can be loaded and processed (or used) by the secure element **100**.

[0099] In reference to FIG. 4, the secure element **100** has a communication interface **101**, a processing unit (CPU) **102**, a first integrity verification unit **103**, a decryption unit **104**, a second integrity verification unit **105**, a code associating unit **106** and at least one internal memory **107**.

[0100] The processing unit (CPU) **102** is for example a secure processor (i.e. a processor with security features having a high assurance level certification for security-critical applications), for example a processor of the type RISC-V or ARM SC300.

[0101] The at least one internal memory **107** is for example a volatile memory. It can be connected

by buses to the processing unit **102**. It could have a local scrambling and an encryption to protect it. [0102] In order to use the digital information stored in the external memory **200**, the secure element **100** performs a method for securely processing digital information, that will now be described in reference to FIGS. **3** and **6** according to a first exemplary embodiment.

[0103] In a first step **S10**, the secure element **100** loads a segment of digital information, in protected form, previously referenced as S_i'' , from the external memory **200** into an internal memory **107** of the secure element **100**, through the communication interface **101**. The segment S_i'' includes the authenticated and encrypted segment $[S_i']$ concatenated with the second integrity element $MAC_{i.sub.2}$, namely $[S_i'] || MAC_{i.sub.2}$.

[0104] In a second step **S11**, the secure element **100** verifies the integrity of the loaded segment S_i'' of digital information in encrypted form. To this end, the first MAC unit **103** calculates a MAC from the loaded segment S_i'' , by chaining calculations on L first blocks $C_{i.sub.0}, \dots, C_{i.sub.L}$ in encrypted form of the segment S_i'' . The first integrity verification unit **103** uses a MAC function and the key $K_{sub.2}$. Then, it compares the calculated MAC with the integrity element $MAC_{i.sub.2}$ included in the loaded segment S_i'' . If the calculated MAC matches the loaded $MAC_{i.sub.2}$, the integrity of $[S_i']$ is successfully checked. In that case, the decryption and an integrity verification after decryption are enabled (step **S19** in FIG. **3**). If the calculated MAC does not match the loaded $MAC_{i.sub.2}$, the integrity of the $[S_i']$ is denied. In that case, the processing of the digital information is followed by an error step **S18** that results in aborting the processing of the digital information. Alternatively, the error step **S18** may result in handling segment S_i'' as not relevant and discarding it (i.e., not processing or not using it).

[0105] In a third step **S12**, after the integrity of $[S_i']$ has been successfully verified, the secure element **100** decrypts $N+1$ blocks $C_{i.sub.0}, \dots, C_{i.sub.N}$. The decryption is executed by the decryption unit **104** and uses the key $K_{sub.1}$. A result of the decryption step **S12** is digital information in clear and the integrity element $MAC_{i.sub.1}$. More precisely, the decryption unit **104** outputs N blocks of digital information in clear $P_{i.sub.0}, \dots, P_{i.sub.N-1}$ and the integrity element $MAC_{i.sub.1}$.

[0106] As previously indicated, the number L used for verifying the integrity could be equal to N used for decryption or be different from N , depending on the function to verify the integrity and the decryption algorithm.

[0107] In a fourth step **S13**, the code associating unit **106** first segments the digital information in clear (i.e., the digital information that results from the decryption step **S12**) into words of digital information. For example, the code associating unit **106** takes the N blocks of digital information $P_{i.sub.0}, \dots, P_{i.sub.N-1}$ as input and segments each block into words of a smaller size. Each block $P_{i.sub.j}$, with $0 \leq j \leq N-1$, is divided into X words $W_{i.sub.j,k}$, with $1 \leq k \leq X$.

[0108] By definition, a 'word' has a predetermined number of bytes. The size of the words may depend on a working format of the secure processor **102** or on a capacity of registers of the secure processor **102**. The working format may be less than the capacity of the registers. In some embodiments, the size of the words $W_{i.sub.j,k}$ is equal to the working format of the secure processor or is equal to the size of the processor registers. The size of the words can be less than or equal to the number of bytes of a block. In a first illustrative example, the secure processor **102** has registers of 32 bits and the code associating unit **106** segments each block of 16-byte long (128 bits) into four words of 32 bits. In a second illustrative example, the secure processor **102** has a working format of 8 bits and the code associating unit **106** segments each block of 16-byte long into 16 words of 8-bit long. In a particular embodiment, the size of the words is equal to the minimal value among the size of the registers and the working format of the processing unit **102**. Alternatively, the size of the words may be less than the working format of the secure processor or less than the size of the processor registers.

[0109] Then, in the first embodiment, in the step **S13**, the code associating unit **106** generates an error-detection code (EDC), referenced as $EDC_{sub.j,k}$, for each of the words $W_{i.sub.j,k}$ and add

(or combine) said error-detection code $EDC.sub.j,k$ to the corresponding word $Wi.sub.j,k$. In other words, the code $EDC.sub.j,k$ is generated from the word $Wi.sub.j,k$ and then appended to said word $Wi.sub.j,k$.

[0110] The calculation of the error-detection codes is based on a mathematical function. For example, the error-detection code is a parity code or a Hamming code. Advantageously, it might not be a cryptographic function, which would result in less computing resources. The error-detection code $EDC.sub.j,k$ allows to detect an error present in data (i.e., in a word $Wi.sub.j,k$) received when said data has been transferred. The code $EDC.sub.j,k$ contains some bits, which are appended to the original data (i.e., the word $Wi.sub.j,k$). The code $EDC.sub.j,k$ allows to detect an error, if it is occurred during transmission of the original data $Wi.sub.j,k$.

[0111] The words $Wi.sub.j,k$ of digital information in clear (with $0 \leq j \leq N-1$ and $1 \leq k \leq X$) associated with their respective error-detection codes $EDC.sub.j,k$ are stored in the internal memory **107** of the secure element **100**.

[0112] After the step **S13** of associating the error-detection codes $EDC.sub.j,k$ to the words of digital information $Wi.sub.j,k$ (with $0 \leq j \leq N-1$ and $1 \leq k \leq X$) and storing the words with their associated error-detection codes in the internal memory **107**, the secure element **100** verifies the integrity of the digital information in clear, in a step **S14**. The integrity of the digital information in clear is verified on the words of digital information $Wi.sub.j,k$ read from the internal memory **107** (without the associated error-detection codes $EDC.sub.j,k$). More precisely, the second integrity verification unit **105** reads the words $Wi.sub.j,k$ from the internal memory **107**, reconstructs the segment Si of digital information in clear and calculates an integrity element (here a MAC) by chaining calculations on L blocks $Pi.sub.0, \dots, Pi.sub.L-1$ of digital information in clear using a MAC function and the key $K.sub.0$. Then, the second integrity verification unit **105** compares the MAC calculated to the integrity element $MACi.sub.1$ resulting from the decryption step **S12**.

[0113] If the calculated MAC matches $MACi.sub.1$, the integrity of the digital information in clear is successfully verified. In that case, the transfer of the words $Wi.sub.j,k$ from the internal memory **107** to the secure processor **106** is enabled (step **S18** in FIG. 3) and the method proceeds with the next steps **S15-S17** shown in FIG. 6. If the calculated MAC does not match $MACi.sub.1$, the integrity of the digital information in clear is denied and the processing of digital information is followed by an error step **S2**. This error step **S18** can result in aborting the processing of the digital information. Alternatively, the error step **S18** may result in handling segment Si as not relevant and discarding it (i.e., not processing or not using it and erasing it).

[0114] The next steps **S15** to **S17** are performed successively for each of the words $Wi.sub.j,k$ (with $0 \leq j \leq N-1$ and $1 \leq k \leq X$) stored in the internal memory **107**.

[0115] In the step **S15**, each word of digital information $Wi.sub.j,k$ (with $0 \leq j \leq N-1$ and $1 \leq k \leq X$) and its associated error-detection code are transferred to the secure processor **102**. The word of digital information $Wi.sub.j,k$ and its associated error-detection code are transferred to the secure processor **102** only when the integrity of the digital information in clear is successfully verified at step **S14**.

[0116] Then, in the step **S16**, the secure processor **102** verifies the received word $Wi.sub.j,k$ by using the associated error-detection code. If no error is detected in the word in the step **S16**, this word of digital information $Wi.sub.j,k$ is processed (or used) by the secure processor **102**, in step **S17**. If an error is detected in step **S16**, the method goes to the error step **S18**. This error step **S18** can result either in aborting the processing of the digital information, or in considering as not relevant and discarding the erroneous word.

[0117] The steps **S10** to **S17** or **S18** are executed iteratively for the plurality of segments Si of digital information, in a protected form, loaded from the external memory **200**.

[0118] During the processing or use of the digital information by the secure element, a segment Si may be modified. The modified segment is referred as $Si.sub.c$. In such a case, the secure element **100** can perform the following steps in order to update the segment that has been modified,

referenced as $Si.sub.c''$, in the external memory **200**: [0119] calculating a first integrity element $MACi.sub.c_1$ for the modified digital information $Si.sub.c$ in clear; [0120] encrypting the digital information $Si.c$ concatenated with the first integrity element $MACi.sub.c_1$ to compute $[Si.sub.c'] = [Si.sub.c][MAC.sub.i_1]$; [0121] calculating a second integrity element $MACi.sub.c_2$ of the result of the encryption $[Si.sub.c'] = [Si.sub.c][MACi.sub.c_1]$ and concatenating the result of the encryption and said second integrity element, to form $Si.sub.c'' = [Si.sub.c][MACi.sub.c_1]MACi.sub.c_2$; [0122] updating the segment currently stored in the external memory (**200**) with the result $Si.sub.c''$ of the encryption concatenated with the second integrity element.

[0123] Optionally, each word $Wi.sub.j,k$ of each block of index j ($Pi.sub.0, \dots, Pi.sub.N-1$) can have its own error detection code stored in the internal memory **107** of the secure element **100**. The error detection code of each word could be verified after the computation of the first integrity element $MACi.sub.c_1$ and before executing the encryption step. Thanks to that, the encryption path is more resistant to the fault attack.

[0124] Then, the updated segment is downloaded from the secure element **100** into the external memory **200** and the currently stored segment is replaced by the updated segment.

[0125] The processing of the digital information, as described in steps **S10** to **S17** or **S18**, is performed by the secure element under control of program instructions. The program instructions are stored in one or more storage modules, such as volatile memory, e.g., RAM, etc., and/or non-volatile memory, e.g., ROM, Flash, NAND, etc., that is permanently or removably integrated in the secure element. Therefore, the present disclosure also concerns a non-transitory computer readable medium including program instructions for causing a secure element for securely processing digital information, said secure element including a secure processor, to perform the steps previously described, in particular the steps of: [0126] loading the digital information from an external memory into the secure element; [0127] segmenting the digital information into words of digital information, generating error-detection codes from said words of digital information and associating said error-detection codes with the corresponding words; [0128] transferring the words of digital information and the associated error-detection codes to the secure processor; [0129] in the secure processor, verifying the words of digital information based on the associated error-detection codes before processing the digital information contained in said words.

[0130] A second exemplary embodiment of the method of processing the digital information, carried out by the secure element **100**, is based on the first exemplary embodiment and differs from it in that the codes generated in the step **S13** by the code associating unit **106** is an error-correction code (ECC), referenced as $ECC.sub.j,k$, for each of the words $Wi.sub.j,k$. This code $ECC.sub.j,k$ is then combined with the corresponding word $Wi.sub.j,k$. The error-correction code $ECC.sub.j,k$ allows to detect and also correct one or more bit errors in the corresponding word $Wi.sub.j,k$, if it is occurred during transmission of the original data $Wi.sub.j,k$. In the second exemplary embodiment, in case of detection of an error in a word $Wi.sub.j,k$, a correction of one or more bits of this word $Wi.sub.j,k$ could be carried out by the secure element **100**, for example by a correction unit, before transferring the word $Wi.sub.j,k$ to the secure processor **102**.

[0131] In the present disclosure, the digital information stored in the external memory **200** and intended to be processed (used) by the secure processor **102** in the secure element **100** is protected by an authenticated encryption that follows an approach of the type "MAC-then-Encrypt-then-MAC". It means that a first MAC is calculated on the digital information in clear, then an encryption is applied on the digital information and the first MAC, and then a second MAC is calculated on the result of the encryption. The digital information thus protected is loaded from the external memory to the secure element. In the secure element, the integrity of the digital information in protected form is verified before decryption. After decryption, the digital information in clear is segmented (divided) into words having a size adapted to the secure processor and error-detection codes or error-correction codes are added to these words. The words

of digital information in clear and the associated error-detection codes (EDC) or error-correction codes (ECC) are stored in an internal memory of the secure element, ready to be transferred to the secure processor. Before transferring the words and their associated codes (EDC or ECC) to the secure processor, the integrity of the digital information in clear is verified. This verification is made by computing a MAC (or integrity element) on the digital information in clear, obtained by reading the words stored in the internal memory, and comparing the computed MAC with a reference MAC computed in a secure environment.

[0132] Such a configuration provides an end-to-end security in the processing of the digital information from storage in the external memory to processing in the secure processor in the secure element. This ensures that the digital information has not been altered during storage in the external memory, during transfer from the external memory into the secure element, and in the secure element up to the point of transferring the digital information to the secure processor.

[0133] Different types of MAC function to generate elements of integrity for the digital information and to verify the integrity of the digital information could be used. For example, a CMAC function (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code), that is a block cipher-based message authentication code algorithm, or a HMAC algorithm (hash-based message authentication code), that is a specific type of message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key, could be used. In that case, the block size might not have the same number of bytes as the one used for the encryption. Instead of a MAC function, any other authentication function could be used.

Claims

1. A method for securely processing digital information, including the following steps, performed by a secure element including a secure processor, and at least one internal memory and a code associating unit, both external to the secure processor: loading the digital information from an external memory into the at least one internal memory of the secure element; at the code associating unit, segmenting the digital information into words of digital information, generating error-detection codes or error-correction codes from said words of digital information and associating said error-detection codes or error-correction codes with the corresponding words in the at least one internal memory; transferring the words of digital information and the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes from the at least one internal memory to the secure processor; in the secure processor, verifying the words of digital information based on the associated error-detection codes or error-correction codes before processing the digital information contained in said words.
