


Homework/Lab #4 – CSEC 489

5 Points

Part 1 – Installation

When complete, return to 10.10.10.20:8000/ and take a screenshot of your installed apps.

Answer: See screenshot below



The screenshot shows the Splunk Manager interface in a web browser. The browser tabs include 'Settings | Splunk', 'Installation', and 'Where to install Splunk add-ons'. The address bar shows the URL '10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/manager/search/apps/l...'. The page displays a table of installed apps with columns for Name, Folder name, Version, Update checking, Visible, Sharing, Status, and Actions. The table lists various apps including ES Content Updates, MITRE ATT&CK Framework, SplunkForwarder, SplunkLightForwarder, Splunk Common Information Model, Microsoft Sysmon Add-on, Log Event Alert Action, Alert Manager, Webhook Alert Action, Apps Browser, Introspection Generator Add-on, Journald Input, Home, Learned, Legacy, Upgrade Readiness App, Sample Data, Sankey Diagram, and Search & Reporting. The 'Status' column indicates whether each app is enabled or disabled, and the 'Actions' column provides links to launch or edit the app.

Name	Folder name	Version	Update checking	Visible	Sharing	Status	Actions
ES Content Updates	DA-ESS-ContentUpdate	4.41.0	Yes	Yes	Global Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties
MITRE ATT&CK Framework	DA-ESS-MitreContent	3.11.0	Yes	Yes	Global Permissions	Enabled Disable	Set up Launch app Edit properties
SplunkForwarder	SplunkForwarder		Yes	No	App Permissions	Disabled Enable	
SplunkLightForwarder	SplunkLightForwarder		Yes	No	App Permissions	Disabled Enable	
Splunk Common Information Model	Splunk_SA_CIM	5.3.2	Yes	Yes	Global Permissions	Enabled Disable	Set up Launch app Edit properties
Microsoft Sysmon Add-on	TA-microsoft-sysmon	10.6.2	Yes	No	Global Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Log Event Alert Action	alert_logevent	9.0.1	Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Alert Manager	alert_manager	3.0.11	Yes	Yes	Global Permissions	Enabled Disable	Set up Launch app Edit properties
Webhook Alert Action	alert_webhook	9.0.1	Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Apps Browser	appsbrowser	9.0.1	Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled	Edit properties View object
Introspection Generator Add-on	introspection_generator_addon	9.0.1	Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Journald Input	journald_input		Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Home	launcher		Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled	Launch app Edit properties
Learned	learned		Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View object
Legacy	legacy		Yes	No	App Permissions	Disabled Enable	
Upgrade Readiness App	python_upgrade_readiness_app	4.0.3 Update to 4.5.0	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties
Sample Data	sample_app		Yes	No	App Permissions	Disabled Enable	
Sankey Diagram	sankey_diagram_app	1.6.0	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties
Search & Reporting	search	9.0.1	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled	Launch app Edit properties

Part 2 – Configuration

- 1) Include screenshots above. What do you think of this rule? Is it a good rule (low false positive, high true positives)? (1 pt)

Answer:

I think this rule is great to try and catch an attacker through these action logs. It is one way to monitor specific commands when an attacker is learning information about a device. It states in the rule description that an adversary may use common command line network commands to try and find out basic network configuration and account information. The listed techniques used that I searched for based on the MITRE Enterprise Technique ID # are: Account Discovery (local, domain, email, cloud) , Permission Group Discovery (Local, Domain, Cloud), System Network Configuration Discovery (Internet Connection/Wi-Fi), System Owner/User Discovery, Process Discovery, and System Service Discovery.

Next, in this case, since a true positive is when the computer actually has the virus and the test results would be positive, the settings in the search box in this rule would actually produce results that do in fact tell the truth because if there are records being produced while a device is on, but the authorized user is away, then we know that the “allowed” entries/processes being produced that match this rule, are an attacker/adversary.

Furthermore, I copy pasted into Google one of the lines in the search code called ‘security_content_ctime(firstTime)’ and this Splunk webpage came up <https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/ad03bfcf-8a91-4bc2-a500-112993deba87/> and this quote confirms furthermore that just having this line of code in the rule is amazing.

“The following analytic detects the execution of query.exe with command-line arguments aimed at discovering logged-in users. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use query.exe to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to identify active users, aiding in further lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.” – research.splunk.com

See three Screenshots Below

Searches, reports, and alerts are saved searches created from pivot or the search page. [Learn more](#)

2,057 Searches, Reports, and Alerts Type: All App: All Owner: All 10 per page

Name	Actions	Type	Next Scheduled Time	Display View	Owner	App	Alerts	Sharing	Status
AttackDetection - Registry Edit from Screensaver - Rule Adversaries may use screen saver files to run malicious code. This analytic triggers on suspicious edits to the screensaver registry keys, which dictate which .scr file the screensaver runs. - MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: T1546	Edit Run	Report	none	none	nobody	DA-ESS-MitreContent	0	Global	⛔ Disabled
AttackDetection - Active Directory Dumping via NTDSUtil - Rule The NTDSUtil tool may be used to dump a Microsoft Active Directory database to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. - MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: T1003	Edit Run	Report	none	none	nobody	DA-ESS-MitreContent	0	Global	⛔ Disabled
AttackDetection - Application DLLs - Rule Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate pr...	Edit Run	Report	none	none	nobody	DA-ESS-MitreContent	0	Global	⛔ Disabled

Searches, reports, and alerts | S | x Installation x Where to install Splunk add-on: x +

Not secure | 10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/manager/search/saved/search...

splunk-enterprise Apps Administrator 2 Messages Settings Activity Help Find

Searches, Reports, and Alerts

Searches, reports, and alerts are saved searches created from pivot or the search page. [Learn more](#)

12 Searches, Reports, and Alerts Type: All App: All Owner: All host discovery x 100 per page

Name	Actions	Type	Next Scheduled Time	Display View	Owner	App	Alerts	Sharing	Status
AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule	Edit Search Edit Permissions Edit Schedule Edit Acceleration Edit Summary Indexing Enable Advanced Edit Clone Embed Move Delete	Report	none	none	nobody	DA-ESS-MitreContent	0	Global	Disabled
ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In File - Rule		Alert	none	none	admin	DA-ESS-ContentUpdate	0	Global	Disabled

AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule
When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment. - MITRE ATT&CK

ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In File - Rule
The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) a

Searches, reports, and alerts | S | x Installation x Where to install Splunk add-on: x +

Not secure | 10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/manager/search/saved/search...

Apps Administrator 2 Messages Settings Activity

Edit Search

Title: AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule

Description: When entering on a host for the first time, an adversary may try to discover information about the host. There are several built-in Windows commands that can be used to learn about the software configurations, active users, administrators, and networking configuration. These commands should be monitored to identify when an adversary is learning information about the system and environment. - MITRE ATT&CK

Search:

```
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.action="allowed" AND (Processes.process_exec="hostname.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="ipconfig.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="net.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="quser.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="qwinsta.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="systeminfo.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="tasklist.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="whoami.exe" OR (Processes.process_exec="sc.exe" AND (Processes.process="* query *" OR Processes.process="* qc *")) BY Processes.user, Processes.dest, Processes.action, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.process_path, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

Earliest time: -24h
Time specifiers: y, mon, d, h, m, s [Learn More](#)

Latest time: now

Cancel Save

Searches, reports, an

Search | Splunk 9.0.1

Not secure | 10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/app/DA-ES

MITRE ATT&CK ComplianceMITRE ATT&CK MatrixMITRE ATT&CK Triggered Tactics &

AttackDetection - Host Discovery Comma...

```
| tstats 'security_content_summariesonly' count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
WHERE Processes.action="allowed" AND (Processes.process_exec="hostname.exe" OR Pr
.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="quser.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="qwinsta
.process_exec="tasklist.exe" OR Processes.process_exec="whoami.exe" OR (Proce
Processes.process="* qc *"))
BY Processes.user, Processes.dest, Processes.action, Processes.process_name, Proce
Processes.parent_process, Processes.parent_process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

5 events (10/8/24 6:45:59.000 PM to 10/9/24 6:45:59.000 PM) No Event Sampling

EventsPatternsStatistics (5)Visualization

20 Per PageFormatPreview

user	dest	action	process_name	process	process_path	parent_process_name	parent_process	parent_process_path
Administrator	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	allowed	HOSTNAME.EXE	hostname	C:\Windows\System32\HOSTNAME.EXE	cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\
Administrator	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	allowed	ipconfig.exe	ipconfig	C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe	cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\
Administrator	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	allowed	net.exe	net	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\
Administrator	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	allowed	quser.exe	quser	C:\Windows\System32\quser.exe	cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\
Administrator	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	allowed	tasklist.exe	tasklist	C:\Windows\System32\tasklist.exe	cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\System32\

Administrator: Command Prompt

Ethernet adapter Ethernet1:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Link-local IPv6 Address : fe80::7d2f:39fd:2e9c:54b1%
IPv4 Address. : 10.20.20.15
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway : 10.20.20.254

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Link-local IPv6 Address : fe80::c474:674b:b553:8470%
IPv4 Address. : 10.10.10.15
Subnet Mask : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway : 10.10.10.254

C:\>net
The syntax of this command is:
NET

Part 3 – Analysis

Give it 5-10 minutes, then go to the alert manager application. You should see a new alert in the informational column! Take a full page [screenshot](#) including the details of the alert below.

Answer: See Screenshots below

Incident Posture | Splunk

Techniques - Enterprise

Installation

Not secure | 10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/app/alert_manager/incident_post...

splunkenterprise

Apps

Administrator

2 Messages

Settings

Activity

Help

Find

Incident Posture

Reports

Pivot

Alerts

Settings

Search

Help

Alert Manager

Incident Posture

Today's number of incidents, compared to yesterday

Timerange: Last 7 days

Submit

Hide Filters

11

Informational

0

Low

0

Medium

0

High

0

Critical

Recent Incidents

Owner: All

Alert: All

Category: All

Subcategory: All

Tags: All x [Untagged] x

Status: All open x

Incident ID:

Title:

Impact: All x

Urgency: All x

Priority: All x

Group: All

Filter: Search produced no results.

Select All | Edit Selected | Edit All 1 Matching Incidents | Reset Selection

i					_time	owner	status_description	title	app	category	subcategory	tag
1					2024-10-09 18:50:02.010	unassigned	New	AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule	DA-ESS-MitreContent			[Un

Details

incident_id=de9b6cac-1a4a-4685-a6c0-550f215aa237 impact=low urgency=low

Select All | Edit Selected | Edit All 1 Matching Incidents | Reset Selection

i					_time	owner	status_description	title	app	category	subcategory	tag
1					2024-10-09 18:50:02.010	unassigned	New	AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule	DA-ESS-MitreContent			[Un

Details

incident_id=de9b6cac-1a4a-4685-a6c0-550f215aa237 impact=low urgency=low

	Key	Value	Value 2	Value 3	Value 4	Value 5
1	user	Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	Administrator
2	dest	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT	WIN-N7EOH88RCVT
3	action	allowed	allowed	allowed	allowed	allowed
4	process_name	HOSTNAME.EXE	ipconfig.exe	net.exe	quser.exe	tasklist.exe
5	process	hostname	ipconfig	net	quser	tasklist
6	process_path	C:\Windows\System32\HOSTNAME.EXE	C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	C:\Windows\System32\quser.exe	C:\Windows\System32\tasklist.exe
7	parent_process_name	cmd.exe	cmd.exe	cmd.exe	cmd.exe	cmd.exe
8	parent_process	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
9	parent_process_path	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
10	count	1	1	1	1	1
11	firstTime	2024-10-09T18:45:16	2024-10-09T18:45:19	2024-10-09T18:45:23	2024-10-09T18:45:37	2024-10-09T18:45:41
12	lastTime	2024-10-09T18:45:16	2024-10-09T18:45:19	2024-10-09T18:45:23	2024-10-09T18:45:37	2024-10-09T18:45:41

- 2) Include screenshots above. What is the parent process of the command(s) that were run? What were the process names? What user ran the commands? Does this information match with the actions you took? (1 pt)

Answer:

The parent processes of the command that were run were: "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"


The process names were all cmd.exe.

The Administrator user ran the commands.

Yes, this information matches the actions that I took. I literally typed in hostname (enter), then ipconfig, then net, then quser, then tasklist last. So I know the results in the screenshot are 100% accurate.

This application provides a visualization and breakdown of different mitre TTPs. Scroll down to the Discovery tactic and take a [screenshot](#) of what is displayed.

Answer: See Screenshot below.




- 3) Include screenshots above. How many tactics have hits? What are they? (1pt)

Answer:

Only one tactic has hits, which is the TA007 Discovery MITRE tactic.

They hits would be classified as related to the following techniques: T1087 (Account Discovery), T1069 (Permission Groups Discovery), T1057 (Process Discovery), T1082 (System Information Discovery), T1016 (System Network Configuration Discovery), T1033 (System Owner/User Discovery), T1007 (System Service Discovery), which are the ones in the rule and also the ones in the Discovery section in the screenshot above.

See Screenshot below:



Part 4 – Custom Rules

4) What does this search look for? How might this be malicious? How might it not? (1pt)

Answer:

This search looks for event logs in the default main index in Splunk for process creation events. Of these process creation events, it's filtering through only events that involved executed cmd.exe or powershell.exe. The != after CommandLine means it wants to exclude anything with "Splunk" word in it. **However**, I redid the search and I deleted the AND CommandLine != *Splunk and I got the same results. Lastly, the ParentImage= explorer means it is only asking to see logs where the .exe events that were executed were executed in explorer.exe.

This might be malicious because we learned in class that when a process/program appears to be opened under the ParentImage=explorer.exe that it looks like normal activity and *could* mean that an adversary is trying to run it. However, it might not be malicious because I deleted the "ParentImage=*explorer.exe" and redid the search and I got 515 event results instead of 2 results. So what I noticed is they are all around the same time and it could be a UniversalSplunkForwarder Install/restart event that actually only occurred during an installation by the original user. Anyways, I don't think the results are malicious.


See Screenshot below

The screenshot shows the Splunk Search interface. The search bar contains the query: `index="main" sourcetype=xmlwineventlog EventCode=1 (cmd.exe OR Powershell.exe) AND CommandLine != *Splunk AND ParentImage=explorer.exe`. The search results show 2 events. The first event is a process creation event for cmd.exe, with a parent image of explorer.exe. The second event is a process creation event for powershell.exe, with a parent image of explorer.exe. The interface includes a search bar, a search button, and a search results table.

Time	Event
10/9/24 8:18:22.000 PM	<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" Guid="{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}" /><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime="2024-10-09T20:18:22.563158400Z" /><EventRecordID>2018</EventRecordID><Correlation><Execution ProcessID="5580" ThreadID="6272" /><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>WIN-N7E0H88RCVT</Computer><Security UserID="S-1-5-18" /></System><EventData><Data Name="RuleName"></Data><Data Name="UtcTime">2024-10-09 20:18:22.562</Data><Data Name="ProcessGuid">{af1065ca-e50e-6706-510e-000000000000}</Data><Data Name="ProcessId">3860</Data><Data Name="Image">C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name="FileVersion">10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)</Data><Data Name="Description">Windows Command Processor</Data><Data Name="Product">Microsoft Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name="Company">Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name="OriginalFileName">Cmd.Exe</Data><Data Name="CommandLine">"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" </Data><Data Name="CurrentDirectory">C:\Users\Administrator\</Data><Data Name="User">WIN-N7E0H88RCVT\Administrator</Data><Data Name="LogonGuid">{af1065ca-a579-6706-45bc-070000000000}</Data><Data Name="LogonId">0x7bc45</Data><Data Name="TerminalSessionId">1</Data><Data Name="IntegrityLevel">High</Data><Data Name="Hashes">MD5=0D088F58CF8F086FBA163647CD80CAB, SHA256=9023F8AAEDA4A1DA45A477A8185B8E4128E413F19A08FA3715465AD66ED5CD, IMPHASH=272245E2988E1E430500B852C4FB5E18</Data><Data Name="ParentProcessGuid">{af1065ca-a57a-6706-c400-000000000000}</Data><Data Name="ParentProcessId">1184</Data><Data Name="ParentImage">C:\Windows\explorer.exe</Data><Data Name="ParentCommandLine">C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE</Data></EventData></Event>
10/9/24	<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" Guid="{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}" /><EventID>1</EventID><Version>5</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>1</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime="2024-10-09T20:18:22.563158400Z" /><EventRecordID>2018</EventRecordID><Correlation><Execution ProcessID="5580" ThreadID="6272" /><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>WIN-N7E0H88RCVT</Computer><Security UserID="S-1-5-18" /></System><EventData><Data Name="RuleName"></Data><Data Name="UtcTime">2024-10-09 20:18:22.562</Data><Data Name="ProcessGuid">{af1065ca-e50e-6706-510e-000000000000}</Data><Data Name="ProcessId">3860</Data><Data Name="Image">C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe</Data><Data Name="FileVersion">10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)</Data><Data Name="Description">Windows Command Processor</Data><Data Name="Product">Microsoft Windows® Operating System</Data><Data Name="Company">Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name="OriginalFileName">Cmd.Exe</Data><Data Name="CommandLine">"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" </Data><Data Name="CurrentDirectory">C:\Users\Administrator\</Data><Data Name="User">WIN-N7E0H88RCVT\Administrator</Data><Data Name="LogonGuid">{af1065ca-a579-6706-45bc-070000000000}</Data><Data Name="LogonId">0x7bc45</Data><Data Name="TerminalSessionId">1</Data><Data Name="IntegrityLevel">High</Data><Data Name="Hashes">MD5=0D088F58CF8F086FBA163647CD80CAB, SHA256=9023F8AAEDA4A1DA45A477A8185B8E4128E413F19A08FA3715465AD66ED5CD, IMPHASH=272245E2988E1E430500B852C4FB5E18</Data><Data Name="ParentProcessGuid">{af1065ca-a57a-6706-c400-000000000000}</Data><Data Name="ParentProcessId">1184</Data><Data Name="ParentImage">C:\Windows\explorer.exe</Data><Data Name="ParentCommandLine">C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE</Data></EventData></Event>

On the windows 2019 host, run cmd.exe and powershell.exe Return to Alert Manager. You should see your new alert hit the queue. Take a [screenshot](#) of the alert.

See screenshot from the Alert Manager above.



5) Include screenshots above. Come up with you own search and make it into an alert. Include the search here, along with a [screenshot](#) of the alert triggered in alert manager. (1 pt)

Answer:

Command I searched in the Search and Reporting search bar:
index="main" (msedge.exe OR ieexplorer.exe)

This search searches for all event logs relating to these two internet browsing programs. I titled it when I saved it as "Internet Explorer/Edge Special Alert".

See Screenshot below of the Alert Manager showing my Alerts.

splunk>enterprise Apps Administrator 2 Messages Settings Activity Help Find

Search Analytics Datasets Reports Alerts Dashboards Search & Reporting

Alerts

Alerts set a condition that triggers an action, such as sending an email that contains the results of the triggering search to a list of people. Click the name to view the alert. Open the alert in Search to refine the parameters.

2 Alerts

All Yours This App's filter

i	Title	Actions	Owner	App	Sharing	Status
▼	Internet Explorer/Edge Special Alert	Open in Search Edit	admin	search	Private	Enabled
<p>This alert looks for the Internet Explorer OR Microsoft Edge Browsers Running</p> <p>Enabled: Yes. Disable</p> <p>Permissions: Private. Owned by admin. Edit</p> <p>Modified: Oct 9, 2024 9:46:39 PM</p> <p>Alert Type: Scheduled. Cron Schedule. Edit</p> <p>Trigger Condition: .. Number of Results is > 0. Edit</p> <p>Actions: 1 Action Edit</p> <p>(x) Alert Manager</p>						
>	The Lab's Part 4 Custom Alert for CMD.exe and Powershe...	Open in Search Edit	admin	search	Private	Enabled

Not secure | 10.10.10.20:8000/en-US/app/alert_manager/incident_post...

2,872
Informational

0%
Low

2%
Medium

0%
High

0%
Critical

Recent Incidents

Owner: All Alert: All Category: All Subcategory: All Tags: All x [Untagged] x

Status: All open x Incident ID: Title: Impact: All x Urgency: All x

Priority: All x Group: All Filter: Search produced no results.

Select All | Edit Selected | Edit All 2874 Matching Incidents | Reset Selection

i					_time	owner	status	description	title	app	category	subcategory	tags	priority
>	□	Q	≡	👤	2024-10-09 22:00:03.948	👤	New		Internet Explorer/Edge Special Alert	search			[Untagged]	medium
>	□	Q	≡	👤	2024-10-09 22:00:02.948	unassigned	New	AttackDetection - Host Discovery Commands - Rule	DA-ESS-MitreContent				[Untagged]	informational
>	□	Q	≡	👤	2024-10-09 22:00:02.948	unassigned	New	AttackDetection - Processes Spawning cmd.exe - Rule	DA-ESS-MitreContent				[Untagged]	informational
>	□	Q	≡	👤	2024-10-09 22:00:02.256	unassigned	New	The Lab's Part 4 Custom Alert for CMD.exe and Powershell.exe	search				[Untagged]	medium
>	□	Q	≡	👤	2024-10-09	unassigned	New	Eric's Question	search				[Untagged]	informational

Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Windows.

3:02 PM
10/9/2024