

Security and Privacy, Blatt 4

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28. Juni 2018

Problem 1: Transitivity of computational indistinguishability

D_x is computationally indistinguishable from $D'_x \implies \forall \text{ TM } U, \exists \text{ a negligible function } f, \text{ such that } \forall x \in L :$

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1]| \leq f(|x|).$$

Analogous for D'_x and $D''_x : \exists \text{ a negligible function } g, \text{ such that:}$

$$|Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]| \leq g(|x|).$$

Let $h(|x|) = \max(f(|x|), g(|x|))$: We can conclude that in the above $f(|x|)$ and $g(|x|)$ can be replaced by $h(|x|)$. (Note that $h(|x|)$ is still negligible, as it is just the greater of the both functions.)

We now want to have a look at:

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]|$$

Which is equivalent to:

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1] + Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]|$$

Applying triangle inequality, we conclude that:

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]| \leq$$

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1]| + |Pr[U(D'_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]|$$

Thus:

$$|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]| \leq 2 \cdot h(|x|)$$

As $2 \cdot h(|x|)$ is negligible (namely the sum of two negligible functions), $|Pr[U(D_x, x) = 1] - Pr[U(D''_x, x) = 1]|$ is upper bounded by the negligible function $j(|x|) := 2 \cdot h(|x|)$. It follows that D_x and D''_x are also computationally indistinguishable.

Problem 2: Check for $e = 0$ in the Fiat-Shamir identification protocol

Soundness: $\forall (n, v) \notin L$ and $\forall \text{ ITMs } P^*$ it shall hold true, that $Pr[\langle P^*, V' \rangle(n, v) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2}$. That means there should not be a Prover that can convince V' for an $(n, v) \notin L$ to accept with a high probability. (V' as described in the problem description.)

We consider $n = 5$, hence $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Furthermore we consider $v = 2$. Since $1^2 \equiv 1, 2^2 \equiv 4, 3^2 \equiv 4$ and $4^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$: $(n, v) = (5, 2) \notin L$. (There is no square root for 2 in \mathbb{Z}_5^* .)

We now want to show that there is a Prover B that can convince V' to accept upon input $(5, 2)$ with a probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$:

First note that V' is deterministic, since it does not use any randomness. Thus if our prover is able to convince V' once, it is always able to convince it with probability 1 just by repeating the same message flow.

For our example we let B commit to $x = 2$. V' will then send the challenge $e = 1$. We let B respond with $y = 3$. V' now calculates: $y^2 \pmod{5} = 4$. $x \cdot v^e = 2 \cdot 2 = 4 \pmod{5}$. Thus the check for $y^2 = x \cdot v^e$ is successful. Also the check $y \in \mathbb{Z}_5^*$ is successful. V' accepts and outputs 1, while actually $(5, 2) \notin L$. So we found a Prover B and an input (n, v) such that $\Pr[\langle B, V' \rangle(n, v) = 1] = 1 > \frac{1}{2}$. Thus (B, V') is not an IPS, since the soundness is not fulfilled.

Problem 3: Pedersen commitment scheme without randomness

Commitment scheme $\mathcal{C} = (\text{Gen}, \text{com}')$:

- **Computationally Hiding:** \mathcal{C} is computationally hiding if \forall ppt TM A $|\text{Adv}_{A, \mathcal{C}}^{\text{hiding}}(\eta)|$ is negligible.

Claim: \mathcal{C} is not computationally hiding. There is an Adversary A' that has a non-negligible advantage $|\text{Adv}_{A', \mathcal{C}}^{\text{hiding}}(\eta)| > 0$, and thus $\text{suc}_{A', \mathcal{C}}(\eta) > \text{fail}_{A', \mathcal{C}}(\eta)$. More specifically A' has the advantage $|\text{Adv}_{A', \mathcal{C}}^{\text{hiding}}(\eta)| = 1$.

Proof: Let $A' = (A'_F, A'_G)$. The security experiment $\mathbb{E}_{A', \mathcal{C}}^{\text{hiding}}$ runs as follows:

- Gen is used to generate a group \mathcal{G} with generator g and $q = |\mathcal{G}|$ a prime.
- A'_F just selects two values $v_0, v_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.
- A random $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is selected and a commitment $c = \text{com}((\mathcal{G}, q, g), v_b)$ is calculated.
- Now it is A'_G 's turn to guess given (\mathcal{G}, q, g) and c , which $v_{b'}$ corresponds to that commitment and return b' . A'_G works as follows: It calculates g^{v_i} for each $v_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and returns $b' = i$ if $c = g^{v_i}$.

- Finally the security game returns 1 if $b == b'$ and 0 otherwise.

It is obvious, that A'_G is always able to find the correct b' . Thus

$$\Pr[\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C}}^{hiding} = 1] = 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C}}^{hiding}(\eta)| &= 2 \cdot (\Pr[\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C}}^{hiding} = 1] - \frac{1}{2}) \\ &= 2 \cdot (1 - \frac{1}{2}) = 2 \cdot \frac{1}{2} = 1 \end{aligned}$$

- **Computationally Binding:** \mathcal{C} is computationally binding if \forall ppt TM A $|\text{Adv}_{A, \mathcal{C}}^{binding}(\eta)|$ is negligible.

$$|\text{Adv}_{A, \mathcal{C}}^{binding}(\eta)| = \Pr[\mathbb{E}_{A, \mathcal{C}}^{binding}(1^\eta) = 1]$$

... to be continued

Problem 4: Schnorr's protocol - proof of knowledge