

INTERNSHIP REPORT

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
Internship Organization : Redynox

Duration: 1 Month


2. Task 2: Introduction to Web Application Security

2.1 Task 1: [Installing WEBGOAT]

first open up your browser go to Google and type OS web goat and press enter go to the first link where it says OS webcode when you're on this site on the right side you will see a link called Standalone jars under downloads click on the link and you will be prompted to a GitHub page scroll down under the latest version you will see a jar file so for me it is web code dash 2023.4.jar click on the link and your download of the jar file will start wait for the download to get finished after the download is finished go back to your terminal and change to the directory where your file got downloaded to CD downloads and I can now confirm that my file has been downloaded successfully next you need to have Java installed on your system Java comes pre-installed on Kali Linux type in the command javaspace dash version and I can see Java open jdk 17 is



```
File Actions Edit View Help
2024-09-07T11:05:32.551-04:00  WARN 12068 — [main] o.o.w.c.lessons.CourseConfiguration : Lesson: webgoat.tit
le has no endpoints, is this intentionally?
2024-09-07T11:05:34.204-04:00  INFO 12068 — [main] o.s.b.a.e.web.EndpointLinksResolver : Exposing 3 endpoint
(s) beneath base path '/actuator'
2024-09-07T11:05:34.336-04:00  INFO 12068 — [main] o.s.s.web.DefaultSecurityFilterChain : Will secure any req
uest with [org.springframework.security.web.session.DisableEncodeUrlFilter@247bbfb, org.springframework.security.web.context.
request.async.WebAsyncManagerIntegrationFilter@5834198f, org.springframework.security.web.context.SecurityContextHolderFilter@7
7bb916f, org.springframework.security.web.authentication.logout.LogoutFilter@b1d19ff, org.springframework.security.oauth2.cli
ent.web.OAuth2AuthorizationRequestRedirectFilter@6dcf7b6a, org.springframework.security.oauth2.client.web.OAuth2LoginAuthenti
cationFilter@53dba9cd, org.springframework.security.web.authentication.UsernamePasswordAuthenticationFilter@efe49ab, org.spring
framework.security.web.savedrequest.RequestCacheAwareFilter@5a48d186, org.springframework.security.web.servletapi.SecurityCont
extHolderAwareRequestFilter@521ba38f, org.springframework.security.web.authentication.AnonymousAuthenticationFilter@4eb63dc8,
org.springframework.security.web.access.ExceptionTranslationFilter@273aaab7, org.springframework.security.web.access.intercept
.AuthorizationFilter@184de357]
2024-09-07T11:05:39.715-04:00 [main] WARN FilenoUtil : Native subprocess control requires open access to the JDK IO subsystem
Pass '--add-opens java.base/sun.nio.ch=ALL-UNNAMED --add-opens java.base/java.io=ALL-UNNAMED' to enable.
2024-09-07T11:05:47.526-04:00  WARN 12068 — [main] ion$DefaultTemplateResolverConfiguration : Cannot find templat
e location: classpath:/templates/ (please add some templates, check your Thymeleaf configuration, or set spring.thymeleaf.c
heck-template-location=false)
2024-09-07T11:05:47.577-04:00  INFO 12068 — [main] io.undertow : starting server: Un
derTow - 2.3.10.Final
2024-09-07T11:05:47.589-04:00  INFO 12068 — [main] o.s.b.w.e.undertow.UndertowWebServer : Undertow started on
port(s) 8080 (http) with context path '/WebGoat'
2024-09-07T11:05:47.621-04:00  INFO 12068 — [main] org.owasp.webgoat.server.StartWebGoat : Started StartWebGoat
in 22.02 seconds (process running for 60.425)
2024-09-07T11:05:47.630-04:00  WARN 12068 — [main] org.owasp.webgoat.server.StartWebGoat : Please browse to ht
tp://127.0.0.1:8080/WebGoat to start using WebGoat ...
```



2.2 Task 2: Perform Basic Vulnerability Analysis:

Objective of the Task:

The main goal of this task was to explore how web applications can be vulnerable to common attacks. I used **OWASP ZAP**, a popular security tool, to scan a demo website and identify potential threats like:

- **SQL Injection**
- **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)**
- **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**

This task helped me understand how attackers might exploit these flaws and how developers can defend against them.

Tools and Methods Used:

For this task, I used:

- **OWASP ZAP** for scanning and detecting vulnerabilities.
- A browser (Chrome/Firefox) set up with ZAP as a proxy.
- **DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web App)** running on XAMPP as the test site.
- **Kali Linux** to host and manage the scanning environment.

Steps I Followed:

1. Environment Setup:

I first installed DVWA on my local machine using XAMPP and ensured it was running properly. I launched Kali Linux and opened OWASP ZAP.

2. Connecting ZAP with the Web App:

I configured my browser to route all traffic through ZAP's proxy. This allowed ZAP to monitor and capture every interaction I had with the test website.

3. Scanning the Web App:

I used the **Spider** tool to crawl through all the pages of the site and then ran an **Active Scan** to automatically test for vulnerabilities.

4. Finding SQL Injection:

ZAP flagged a login form where it injected test inputs like '`' OR '1'='1`'—which could allow an attacker to log in without a password.

5. Finding XSS:

In the site's search box, ZAP injected a script: `<script>alert(1)</script>`. When this script ran, it showed a popup, confirming the site was vulnerable to XSS.

6. Finding CSRF:

ZAP also detected forms (like the user update form) that didn't have CSRF protection, meaning an attacker could trick someone into submitting that form unknowingly.

The screenshot shows the OWASP ZAP 2.10.0 interface. In the top right, a modal window titled "Automated Scan" is open, prompting the user to enter a URL to attack (http://10.10.149.133) and select a traditional spider. The progress bar indicates the scan is at 28%. Below the modal, the main ZAP interface displays a tree view of "Sites" containing various URLs, and a table of "HTTP Sessions" showing detailed network traffic. The table includes columns for ID, Request, Timestamp, Response, Method, URL, Code, Reason, RTT, Size Resp. Header, and Size Resp. Body. The table lists numerous requests and responses, including several POST and GET requests to URLs like /Login.php and /Security.php, with various status codes such as 200 OK, 302 Found, and 301 Moved Permanently.

The image consists of three vertically stacked screenshots of the OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) application.

- Screenshot 1:** Shows the "Fuzzer" tab with a table of fuzzing results. The table includes columns for Task ID, Message Type, Code, Reason, RTT, Size Resp. Header, Size Resp. Body, Highest Alert, Reflected, State, Payloads, and a "password" column. The "Highest Alert" column shows various severity levels like Medium, Low, and Info. The "State" column lists years from 2013 to 2019.
- Screenshot 2:** Shows the "Response" tab with a detailed view of an HTTP request. It displays the raw request and response headers, and the raw request body which contains a password field and a login button.
- Screenshot 3:** Shows the "Spider" tab with an "Automated Scan" dialog open. The dialog asks for a URL to attack (http://10.10.149.133), a traditional spider (checked), and an ajax spider (unchecked). It also has an "Attack" and "Stop" button. Below the dialog, the "Spider" tab shows a list of URLs discovered during the scan, including /, /index.php, /Login, /password, /username, /brute, and /captcha.

Challenges I Faced and How I Solved Them:

- HTTPS Traffic Wasn't Showing Up:**

At first, I couldn't see any HTTPS traffic in ZAP. To fix this, I installed ZAP's security certificate into my browser to allow it to decrypt secure traffic.

- DVWA Security Level Was Too High:**

Some vulnerabilities didn't show up initially. I later found out DVWA was set to "high" security. Switching it to "low" made it easier to test.

- **Understanding the Alerts:**

ZAP shows a lot of alerts, which was confusing at first. But after going through them carefully and testing them manually, I understood how each attack worked.

Results and What I Learned:

By the end of this task, I was able to successfully:

- Find an **SQL Injection** in the login form.
- Confirm a **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability in the search bar.
- Identify a **CSRF vulnerability** in the profile update form.

This hands-on experience taught me how automated tools like OWASP ZAP can find real security flaws and how developers can secure their applications by addressing these issues early. It also gave me a clearer idea of how ethical hackers think and operate during real-world security assessments.

1.3 Task 3 Exploring Vulnerabilities

Explore Vulnerabilities Using OWASP ZAP

Understanding How Vulnerabilities Work:

As part of this task, I used OWASP ZAP not only to scan for vulnerabilities but also to understand the technical details behind each issue. ZAP provides descriptions, risk levels, and recommended solutions for every detected vulnerability, which helped me gain a deeper understanding of how attacks are performed and how they can be prevented.

Here are three key vulnerabilities I focused on:

```
- Nikto v2.1.6
-----
+ Target IP:      93.184.216.34
+ Target Hostname: <domain/lp>
+ Start Time:    2024-04-08 12:00:00 (GMT)
-----
+ Server: Apache/2.4.46 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.1.1d PHP/7.4.24
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user
agent to protect against some forms of XSS.
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent
to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type.
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS, HEAD
+ OSVDB-3092: /manual/: Web server manual found.
+ OSVDB-3268: /manual/images/: Directory indexing found.
+ OSVDB-3092: /manual/images/: Directory indexing found.
+ 11118 requests: 0 error(s) and 14 item(s) reported on remote host
+ End Time:      2024-04-08 12:05:00 (GMT) (300 seconds)
```

SQL Injection (SQL):

- **How it works:** SQL Injection occurs when user input is improperly filtered, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands on a database. This can lead to unauthorized access, data leakage, or even deletion of entire databases.

- **ZAP Alert:** ZAP highlighted a vulnerable login parameter. It included a test payload like ' OR '1'='1.
- **Manual Exploitation:** I tested this manually by entering ' OR '1'='1 -- in the username field of DVWA's login form. It bypassed authentication and granted access without valid credentials.
- **Learning Outcome:** This showed how poor input validation can compromise authentication mechanisms.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):

- **How it works:** XSS lets attackers inject malicious scripts into webpages viewed by other users. It can be used to steal session cookies, deface websites, or redirect users.
- **ZAP Alert:** The tool flagged a search input field as vulnerable to reflected XSS.
- **Manual Exploitation:** I manually entered <script>alert("XSS Test")</script> into the search box. The script executed on the same page, confirming the vulnerability.
- **Learning Outcome:** I learned how script injection can hijack browser sessions if output is not sanitized properly.

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF):

- **How it works:** CSRF tricks an authenticated user into unknowingly submitting a request to a web app, such as changing account details or passwords.
- **ZAP Alert:** ZAP identified forms that lacked anti-CSRF tokens.
- **Manual Exploitation:** Using ZAP's "Generate Anti-CSRF Test Form" feature, I crafted a fake HTML form that could submit a request on behalf of the user. When executed, it successfully updated the account details without user consent.
- **Learning Outcome:** This showed the importance of CSRF tokens and how simple HTML forms can exploit missing protections.

Summary:

By combining automated scanning with manual testing, I was able to clearly understand how these vulnerabilities work in real-world applications. Reading the detailed explanations provided by OWASP ZAP helped me bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical exploitation. This exercise improved my ability to recognize insecure coding practices and understand how attackers think.

3. Conclusion

This internship was a transformative experience that equipped me with both theoretical knowledge and hands-on cybersecurity skills. I learned how to:

- Secure a small network using industry best practices.
- Analyze and understand network traffic with Wireshark.
- Scan web applications and find critical vulnerabilities using OWASP ZAP.
- Improve my professional branding through strategic LinkedIn engagement.

The experience also strengthened my passion for ethical hacking and system defense.

4. Closing Remarks

I sincerely thank the Redynox team for the opportunity and guidance throughout the internship. The structured tasks, real-world simulations, and self-paced learning approach made this journey enriching. I recommend future interns to:

- Stay curious and try manual testing along with tools.
- Document everything with screenshots and notes.
- Engage in the cybersecurity community for continuous learning.

Looking forward to applying these skills in future cybersecurity roles.