



HUMUN IV



STUDYGUIDE

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEE



MAHAD AKBAR

SECRETARY GENERAL

Greetings Delegates,

My name is Mahad Akbar, and I am honored to welcome you all as the Secretary-General of HUMUN IV. This conference has meant a lot to me, and to a lot of other people who have been involved with it. In the past three editions, I have gone from an ACD, to a USG to becoming Secretary-General and I have come to cherish every single one of those experiences. HUMUN is a place where having actually productive conversations is prioritized above all else. I hope that you spend your time here, actually trying to learn, grow and become better equipped to live in a world that needs critical thought. Our commitment to making this conference about more than just winning is not a gimmick, we take a lot of pride in ensuring that all of you gain something from your committees. The most valuable thing you can take away from this conference is not a trophy, it's the ability to look back on your time here and remember actually having learned something. The majority of our current EC have been where you are now, I think that fact alone speaks volumes to the kind of impact this conference has on people. My only request to you is to respect yourself and the people around you. Don't be afraid to ask for help, and don't make anyone feel worse if they need help.

Best,
Mahad Akbar
Secretary-General,
HUMUN IV.



ZAINAB JAVAID

UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL

Your Excellency's,

Foremost, I am incredibly privileged to welcome you to HUMUN IV! For my brilliant team and me, HUMUN is no less than a holy grail- a conference that we have aspired to revive in all of its former glory and a lot more. As the Under-Secretary-General for DISEC, Historical UNSC, and CSW, and the chair for DISEC, my time in HUMUN is nothing short of extraordinary.

As an individual who has raised their placard infinitesimal times, I can assure you there is nothing wrong with giving a terrible speech. I will share something that my father once told me. He said that if people laugh at you for a 45-second speech, they will forget about it in the next 7 seconds. But those 45 seconds and the courage you gathered may change your life. That's exactly how I recovered when I told the entire committee that Iran is in Europe in my first ever MUN. Such mistakes are super cool and definitely okay. Do not mock your fellow delegates as you tread on so many dreams.

HUMUN is the first and the only conference in Karachi operating under a cohesive equity framework. My time with HUMUN is largely characterized by the mutual respect of being a person in a leadership capacity and a non-cis male identity. Very honored to offer the same sense of safety and homage to every delegate of HUMUN IV. In the classic MUN acclamation, if not us, then who? If not now, then when?

In the pursuit of equity and inclusivity, I leave you all with this brilliant quote by Leslie Feinberg: 'My right to be me is tied with a thousand threads to your right to be you.'

Regards,
Zainab Javaid



MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE DIRECTOR



AHMED SHIWANI

COMMITTEE DIRECTOR

Greetings, Delegates!

Very proud and honoured to chair all of you in DISEC at the fourth iteration of Habib Model United Nations. This year, DISEC has been carefully curated to discuss two topics that are fundamental to the world's political climate and shape war politics in the 21st Century.

In light of the most heart-wrenching and destructive conflicts that have eroded human rights across regions, the committee staff wanted to accentuate the irregularities and asymmetries embedded in dissensions and strifes around us. Keeping the understanding of unequal and disparate warfare and political hostilities, I urge you to look beyond the popular discourses that we indulge in. The world manifests inequalities unfairly for so many of us; I also encourage you to maintain a holistic understanding of gendered security threats that differ across the international community. It is of utmost importance that you carefully, thoughtfully, and responsibly deliberate on the study guide. Use credible resources for your research, and do justice to the people you're preparing to represent. The conviction that you have for the powerful agendas of DISEC should reflect in your speeches.

One important pillar of HUMUN IV is to give you an enriching academic experience. And to fulfil that promise, you must debate under an equitable framework. After all, in the essence of equity, legacy, and opportunity, the committee staff of DISEC is excited to meet you all. God-speed!

Regards,
Ahmed Shiwan



MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE DIRECTOR



RAAHIM ABBASI

COMMITTEE DIRECTOR

Dear delegates.

I have been more than privy to the catalogue of polarizing attitudes towards Model UN's merits as an extracurricular activity. There are those who deem this exercise invaluable, unavailing, and a waste of time. I for one, hold such conjecture to be an absolute falsehood, and it is my conviction that young students with the will to learn and broaden their scholastic horizons will find Model UN to be a potent and endearing pastime.

The beauty of DISEC rests in its exhausting conceptual discourse. A careful and considered approach towards understanding committee-specific jargon, and conveying grounded, realistic ideas is crucial to success. I encourage all the young and inexperienced delegates to give their best effort to learn and bolster their confidence. And most of all, to enjoy this committee. To the more seasoned of you, I expect you to be mindful of the procedural aspects of the debate, and the concepts concerning authoritative documents.

It is easy to lose sight of the fact that Model UN is as much an academic exercise, as it is a social event. And I encourage you all to make every session count.

Regards,
Raahim Abbasi.



MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE DIRECTOR



ZAINAB JAVAID

COMMITTEE DIRECTOR

Hello, everyone!

In a sheer pursuit of equitable discourse, prolific conversations, and equal opportunities, it is my utmost pleasure to welcome you all to the First Committee of the fourth iteration of HUMUN. My name is Zainab Javaid, a sophomore majoring in Social Development and Public Policy at Habib University. This year, I am ecstatic to chair DISEC- a committee that has complemented my MUN journey profoundly due to my striking interest in political warfare, conflict-induced erosion of human rights, and gendered threats in security. Other than that, I love to dissect armed conflicts and security threats in the context of contemporary intersectional feminism. You will not be surprised to see a horizon of gendered perspective and security in DISEC this year and tracing warfare in an equitable framework.

This year, DISEC revolves around two agendas that hold monumental gravitas- asymmetrical warfare in the 21st Century and the disarmament and denuclearization aspirations of the Korean Peace Process. Two classic DISEC agendas scintillate with the political climate around us. The ending of the Korean War ‘in principle’ holds a futuristic capacity to strategize the peace process in a status quo setting. And look around you. No militarized or ideological conflict is symmetrical.

Make use of the study guide that Mustafa, my brilliant ACD, and I have curated for you. Research well. Debate well. Would unapologetically recommend playing Red (Taylor’s Version) to keep you focused while going through this comprehensive guide. Unless All Too Well (10-minute version) makes you incredibly sad, in that case, take a minute. Good luck!

Regards,
Zainab Javaid



COMMITTEE OVERVIEW & MANDATE

ASSISTANT COMMITTEE DIRECTORS

MUSTAFA HUSSAIN

As per the United Nations Charter Article 9, all of the member-states of the United Nations are automatically eligible for a seat in the Disarmament and International Security Committee, the First Committee of the General Assembly. The committee is concerned with maintaining peace, security, and human dignity by addressing questions about important matters such as demilitarization, denuclearization, state fragility, proliferation, and state sovereignty. As the United Nations puts it, "DISEC considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments." (United Nations, main body, main organs, General Assembly). Maintaining international peace and security is a matter of grave concern in a global landscape, and the fair complication and complexity of the process raise hard-hitting questions. The delegates in DISEC are expected to answer those questions holistically and come up with feasible, sustainable, and equitable solutions that apply to a plethora of political climates. According to the United Nations Charter, DISEC is responsible for curating general guiding principles concerning garnering cooperation and disarmament, maintaining international security and peace, regulation of armaments, and principles governing security. In addition to that, DISEC also has the capacity to give recommendations to the Security Council and other member-states on matters of peace and security.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic 1: Asymmetrical Warfare in the 21st Century

1

Introduction of Topic

- 1.1 Forms of assymetrical warfare
- 1.2 Three Levels of Asymmetrical Warfare
- 1.3 UN Provisions

2

Asymmetric Strategies

- 2.1. Definitions of asymmetric strategies
- 2.2. Characteristics of Asymmetrical Threats: Status Quo and the Future

3

Asymmetric Threats

4

Asymmetries in International Conflicts

5

Asymmetries in Internal Wars

6

Asymmetries in Transnational Wars and International Terrorism

7

Obstacles in minimizing Asymmetries in Warfare

8

Moral Asymmetries and the Armed Conflict



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic 1: Asymmetrical Warfare in the 21st Century

9

Role of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs)

9.1. Some hurdles in curbing the role of NSAs in Asymmetrical Warfare

10

Foreign Military Bases

11

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

12

Proliferation of Drones

12.1 Regimes that regulate the armed drone technology

13

The proliferation of Nuclear-Powered Submarines

14

Insurgency

15

Counterinsurgency (COIN)

16

Terrorism as a form of Asymmetrical Warfare

16.1 Types of Terrorism

16.2. Asymmetrical Forms of Terrorism



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic 1: Asymmetrical Warfare in the 21st Century

17

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs)

18

Status of PMCs and PSCs: Civilians or Combatants?

19

Responsibility of the States in monitoring the PMCs and PSCs

20

PMCs and PSCs: in the context of Asymmetrical Warfare

21

Case Studies

22

Recommended readings for the case studies

23

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

24

Bibliography



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic 2: Disarmament and Denuclearization Aspirations of the Korean Peace Process

1

Introduction of Topic

2

Demands of North Korea

2.1 Historical Context: Korean Armistice Agreement

3

Recent events

4

Previous Attempts at Peace Processes

5

Comparison of both the nuclear arsenals of the two countries and their impact

5.1. North Korea
5.2. South Korea

6

Proxies and Regional Treaties

7.1. China
7.2. United States of America
7.3 Russia
7.4. France
7.5. India

7

Two key treaties

8

Weapons manufacturing

8.1. North Korea
8.2. South Korea



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topic 2: Disarmament and Denuclearization Aspirations of the Korean Peace Process

9

Tanks, arms, and missiles

- 9.1. Naval
- 9.2. Aircraft

10

Panmunjom Declaration

- 10.1. Recent Developments

11

Questions A Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

TOPIC AREA A: ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Introduction of the Topic:

Asymmetrical warfare refers to the utilization of unconventional tactics in warfare by the forces in contention when the forces in question have disparity in terms of military and belligerent powers, military strategies, instruments of war, and types of attacks exchanged. Although the concept of asymmetrical warfare holds historical connotations, the Cold War landscape introduced the notion of disparity in warfare in literature and academia concerning political sciences and humanitarian intervention. As the United States of America and the Soviet Union geared up to engage in a cohesive war in a complex political climate, their military strategies and the procurement of instruments of war (such as nuclear weapons and high-military grade technologies) evolved exponentially. In this context, the world saw the future of warfare. Now that the Soviet Union is dissolved, now that the United States is the only superpower in the world, now that an enemy of the United States has launched an attack on the American homeland, this nation must once again evolve to face a new enemy. So, what type of war is this? (Buffaloe, 2017).

The US President, John F. Kennedy, addressed this topic very eloquently to a West Point graduating class: ‘This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. . . . It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training’ (Buffaloe, 2017).

Some of the past efforts to define asymmetric warfare have not been very helpful in identifying the underlying problems. For instance, asymmetric warfare used to be defined as “a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic resources.” In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the definition has been modified. One author now defines asymmetric warfare as “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve a disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining [the opponent’s] will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives.” While this definition has the advantage of not being limited to inter-State armed conflicts, it has not added much insofar as almost all armed conflicts have been asymmetric (Heinegg, 2010).



In many contexts, asymmetrical warfare has been defined with numerous jargon such as irregular warfare, fourth-generational warfare, low-intensity conflict, and military operations other than war. However, despite multiple connotations and conceptualizations, understanding asymmetrical warfare is a fairly complicated process. 'Understanding the concept of asymmetric warfare has always been challenging. During the Cold War, the two world superpowers participated in various arms races—each side was always in fear of a gap in their capabilities when compared to the other. Peace was secured through mutually assured destruction (MAD). This bipolar order of the world's military forces relied mainly on concepts of symmetry. Even if a perfect symmetry of forces could not be achieved, a balancing of qualitative advantage of the West versus quantitative numbers of forces in the East led to an arguable symmetry. Also, during this time, much trust was placed in documents such as the Geneva Conventions—whereby the great powers agreed to certain rules of war and thus dictated the management of violence. Building on the grand-scale conventional war fought during World War II, great-power warfare as understood during this time was a detailed, measured, ordered event, getting messy only on the periphery in places such as Afghanistan for the Soviets and Vietnam for the Americans.' (Buffaloe, 2017).

Forms of asymmetrical warfare

1. Asymmetries in warfare exist in terms of power, methods, tactics, strategies, and time as a resource.
2. Technological superiority and moral asymmetries.
3. Armed conflicts involve stakeholders like non-state actors, terrorists, rebels, partisans, and resistance fighters.
4. Military-grade infrastructure such as foreign military bases.
5. Arsenal, weapon profiles, instruments of war, forms of violence, and extent of technological development.
6. Conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts and military apparatus.
7. Logistical provisions and means.
8. Economic power and means.

Three Levels of Asymmetrical Warfare

1. Operational Level: terrorism, ruse de guerre (ruses of war), covert operations, perfidy, and perfidious use of peace or ceasefire emblems like the Red Cross flag.
2. Political Strategic Level: moral asymmetries, holy war, religious war, clash of cultures, cultural war, disagreements on prioritization of societal values, etc.
3. Military Strategic Level: guerrilla warfare, ambushes, petty warfare, massive retaliation, Blitzkrieg, man oeuvre warfare, airpower, etc.



■ UN Provisions

1. S/2015/1035: Asymmetric threats and the impact of improvised explosive devices on United Nations peace operations.
2. S/RES/1373: Security Council's resolution on counter-terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks.
3. Arms Trade Treaty (2013)
4. UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
5. UNSC Res 2325: Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

■ Asymmetric Strategies

Asymmetric strategies exploit vulnerabilities that the "target" (victim) is unaware of or take advantage of the victim's lack of defense against the threat. These techniques rely on concepts of operation that are profoundly different from the victim's and recent history (but not entirely).

They frequently use new or unusual weapons. They can also serve political or strategic goals that could be different from the ones pursued by the victim. It's critical to remember that symmetric and asymmetric strategies are defined relative to one another: Asymmetric strategies are more common than symmetric ones. An asymmetric challenge must target a key vulnerability or dependency of the victim in order to be hazardous.

Essentially any US-led and allied mission operates on airpower as its COG- Centre of Gravity. Most potential US enemies will be unable to deploy air forces capable of confronting US air forces because they cannot manage to oppose US airpower in air-to-air combat equally. Instead, they deploy surface-to-air missiles and air defense artillery as their primary air defense systems; the United States deploys similar systems but expects to counter most adversary air forces in an air-to-air mode first; air defense systems in the United States are typically viewed as a backup rather than a primary defense- taking up the angle of asymmetrical warfare.

Defining Asymmetric Strategies

Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the target or capitalize on limited preparation against the threat

- 1) They rely primarily on concepts of operations fundamentally different from those of the target and/or from those of recent history—often employing different weapons—and/or
- 2) Can serve political or strategic objectives substantively different from those the target pursues

Nonvital interests are very vulnerable to asymmetric threats

- Threats can focus on will, not defeating the military in detail
- The will threshold can be low (e.g., Beirut or Mogadishu)

The essence of asymmetric strategy is not new

- Sun Tzu, maneuver warfare, centers of gravity, etc.



Characteristics of Asymmetrical Threats: Status Quo and the Future

Abbreviations	Full-Form
CONOPs	Concepts of Operation
MTW	Major Threat War
CBW	Chemical and Bio-Weapons
Adv.	Advanced
SAMs	Surface-to-air Missiles
SOF	Special Operation Forces
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
TM	Theatre Missile
IW	Information Warfare
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
tech.	Technology
mil.	Military

Other Characteristics of Asymmetric Threats

- Symmetric strategies and CONOPs are common because**
 - The strengths of these strategies are understood and proven
 - Militaries are more comfortable preparing to "fight the last war"
 - They appear less risky

- Asymmetric CONOPs are more difficult to prepare**
 - More risky, usually require innovation
 - Hard to penetrate adversary innovation cloaked in secrecy

- Thus, the U.S. should study them**

Key Weapons Today

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| • CBW | • Adv. SAMs |
| • Theater missiles | • SOF, terrorism |
| • Info warfare | • Deep-sea mines |
| • Adv. diesel subs | |

- Few asymmetric CONOPs are "silver bullets" in MTWs
- They may play the dominant role for limited attacks
 - They will be used with other elements of adversary strategy
 - A synergy of asymmetric efforts may prove decisive in major conflicts

But a single asymmetric act may be a "silver bullet" against less-than-vital interests

Asymmetric Threats: More Dangerous Today? (not conceptually new, but, in practice, increasingly dangerous)

- Adversaries are more likely to choose asymmetric strategies**
 - Nations emulate successful strategies, but U.S. strategy is too expensive

Proliferation of specific, powerful technologies

- Creates coercive possibilities even for poor adversaries (WMD, TM, IW)

The end of the Cold War

- High-end, relative symmetric challenges had dominated
- Increase of U.S. intervention abroad, no chance of alt. superpower patron
- Less-than-vital U.S. interest, high interest for the adversary

Changes in the "nature of warfare"

- U.S. reliance on RMA creates dependencies/vulnerabilities
- Shorter wars (due to tech., size of mil.) means preparation more important

RAND

Asymmetric Strategies-10

Asymmetries in International Conflicts

In today's backdrop of international conflicts and war, the phenomenon of symmetrical warfare is non-existent. As opposed to asymmetrical warfare, symmetrical warfare operates when the opposing parties are equal in military strength. Especially after the rise of superpowers and the increase in proxy wars' intensity, warfare is hardly symmetrical. However, on a strategic level, the possibility of symmetrical warfare can be gauged due to similar arsenals and nuclear capacities. One example of this phenomenon is the looming threat of military action between India and Pakistan- these two states are nuclear powers, and have never agreed to sign NPT. It is important to notice that despite potential strategic asymmetry, factors like economic resources, arsenals, and international political affiliations are most likely to turn any military action into an asymmetrical engagement. It is safe to conclude that asymmetries always exist in the context of international and armed conflicts.



To broaden the context, the side with superior military power and arsenal is bound to trap the weaker side with the chains of massive use of force. In such cases, the weaker side is most likely to avoid confrontation. Such weaker sides are then ‘forced to’ employ unconventional tactics of war and strategies to prolong the conflict. Even though the result of war is highly conclusive and predictable, the damages are incurred on both sides- with an asymmetrical angle.

In the modern context of warfare that is equipped with modern high-tech weapons and bio warfare, there are numerous examples of highly asymmetrical military actions. Following examples of asymmetrical warfare are highly monumental to the topic, and hence, to the committee:

1. The Gulf War
2. Iraq War
3. Israel-Palestine Conflict
4. Vietnam War
5. Pacific War

Forms of asymmetrical warfare

Asymmetry usually exists in internal armed conflicts, owing to the fact that governments are mostly fighting a non-governmental armed group. In this type of conflict, inequality between the belligerents and their weaponry is the rule rather than the exception. The conflicts in Chechnya (Russian Federation), Aceh (Indonesia), Darfur (Sudan) and many other African regions fall into this category (Pfanner, 2005).

The context of conflicts has altered, especially since the end of the Cold War and the “proxy wars” in which the adversaries were supported symmetrically by the United States and the former Soviet Union. The government side is usually fairly well organized. It has more firepower at its disposal than the rebel movements, although it may be unable to retain control of the whole country and neutralize the armed opposition groups. In such a situation, rebel movements will tend to resort to the same means as those employed in the aforesaid international asymmetrical wars and, in particular, to guerrilla tactics, where fighters melt into the civilian population and rebels disclose their identity (Pfanner, 2005).

There has been a perceptible increase in the privatization of war in many parts of Africa, for example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, but the same phenomenon is also seen in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Myanmar and Columbia. Such wars are driven not so much by politics as by economics. The belligerents become war enterprises. The motives for war are economic, and links with organized crime, illegal trade and drug trafficking often make them even more lucrative. Furthermore, many of these conflicts transcend national borders (Pfanner, 2005).



■ Asymmetries in Transnational Wars and International Terrorism

Private wars frequently collide with new forms of transnational violence, particularly international terrorism, with the goal of undermining or defeating the enemy politically by destroying capital, making it unsafe to exploit resources, or forcing economic players to withdraw from areas that are becoming increasingly dangerous.

Such warfare engagements are highly asymmetrical because the State and Non-State Actors differ in the military equipment they use and the strategies they employ. In such cases, open battles and warfare are hardly in the non-state actors' interest. Instead, such violent groups not only employ non-conventional tactics of war such as terrorism or the use of IEDs, but they also engage in perfidious isolated acts and coveted operations. It is also important to notice that such hostile engagement between the State and the violent non-State actors is bound to no rules, time frames, and geographical limitations. However, many of such insurgencies are transnational in nature. Even though such conflicts are not characterized by engagement between the states, weak border security, firm worldwide networks, and the transnational support of such violent, hostile non-State actors take asymmetrical warfare across the borders. Such asymmetrical warfare's drastically differ from the classic guerilla conflicts because the non-State actors do not rely on the support of the masses and their sympathizers and perfidious means to carry out successful operations. Instead, their networking and operations are highly coveted. Additionally, such transnational conflicts and international terrorism is highly unpredictable, geographically widespread, and has no fixed timeline for the start and the end of the hostilities. Only when the plans are strategic and occur in pattern to facilitate a much broader and colossally violent agenda and are attributed to well-structured organizations, such asymmetrical warfare can be categorized under the notion of armed conflict.

On the outlook, the involvement of the non-State actors and terrorist organizations with the States are more essential to the notion of organized crimes in comparison with a 'classical' war. However, when such violent non-State Actors can operate beyond their native geographical territories and are actively equipped with high-grade military tactics and weapons, it is important to gauge the threat such ideals pose to the maintenance of world peace and security. Moreover, with the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and nuclear weapons by these insurgents and hostile groups, the situation is more like that of war than the organized crimes. For instance, the United Nations Security Council deemed the 9/11 Attacks with the characterization of war (as opposed to a systemic or organized crime) considering its threat on international security.

■ Obstacles in minimizing Asymmetries in Warfare

1. Unregulated and unmonitored flow and exchange of armaments across borders and transnational borders.
2. Illicit arms trade, illegal acquisitions of arms, the lack of white markets, and non-universal regulation of arms trade transactions.
3. Lack of enforcement of the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013.

4. Illegal markets in weapons and arms trafficking.
5. Illegal and malicious procurement of weapons by non-state actors.
6. Lack of border control, security, monitoring, and management.
7. Operational foreign military bases.
8. Untracked mobility and emergence of non-state actors, as well as their decentralization.
9. Cross-border movement of non-state actors.
10. The proliferation of technologies like nuclear-powered submarines, WMDs, drones, IEDs, bio-weapons, nuclear weapons and other specialized weapons.
11. Arms race.

Moral Asymmetries and the Armed Conflict

One important aspect of dissecting asymmetrical warfare is the implications and inequality of moral grounds in a particular armed conflict. In principle, the international law of armed conflict, just war theory and equal war conventions are rendered ineffective in scrutinizing the moral asymmetries of the groups involved. Moral asymmetries ‘legal and illegal implications are hard to define when it comes to Jus ad Bellum (conditions in which a state can engage in war and use arms). The principle of equal application dictates that the law of international armed conflict applies to every circumstance that amounts to an international armed conflict, regardless of the political or strategic aims pursued or the legitimacy of the use of armed force by either of the belligerents. This also holds true for a resort to the use of armed force authorized or mandated by the UN Security Council. As emphasized in the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, the “fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law . . . are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement.” (Heinegg, 2010).

The moral equality of troops is a major part of the prevalent view of just war theory: fighters have equal rights to wage war against one another. They are entitled to certain protections if captured, regardless of which side's cause of war is legitimate. The failure of the law of armed conflict to acknowledge soldiers' moral equality in asymmetric battles is particularly surprising, given that non-international armed conflicts are far more common than interstate wars and have been increasing as a proportion of wars since World War II ended. While it is understandable that states do not believe it is in their best interests to grant violent non - state groups who take up arms against them war rights, the growing prevalence of asymmetric warfare forces us to consider whether non-state groups should be granted war rights, theoretically speaking (Heinegg, 2010).

Role of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs)

VNSA is an “old-new” phenomenon. it refers to an existing constellation of terrorist, insurgent, guerrilla, extremist political or religious, resistance, and organized crime structural units (such as quasi-states, movements, organizations, parties, groups, even the empowered individuals), operating worldwide. What makes them different from the Cold War era is the complete disappearance of “patron – proxy” relationships with the states (Arasli, 2011).

To add more historical context to the rise and strengthening of armed NSAs, it is viable to look at Al-Qaeda, a terrorist group that was able to facilitate the emergence of VNSAs in the political outlook of the world. Al-Qaeda, which began as a logistical support system for the Muslim fighters in the Afghan War, took an image of an Islamic hyper-militant organization that successfully launched grave and lethal attacks on the United States of America, an irrefutable superpower of the world. Similarly, the organization of VNSAs like Boko Haram, ISIS, Al-Shabab, and Hezbollah and their structural embedding in the system of governments on a transnational level is a question of concern for the committee. It is important to trace the factors that led to these now powerful groups' organization, establishment, and overall militarization.

Violent non-state actors are operational on two levels: structural and territorial. On a structural level, VNSAs employ:

A. Military Wing: surges of terrorism, terrorist cells, military and combat training of the supporters, hybrid guerilla forces, etc.

B. Political Wing: legal front organization, social interventions, and garnering the support of the masses through massive coveted social engineering projects, etc. The political wing also constitutes logistical measures such as fundraising and linkages to organized crimes to garner financial means, sustainability and resources.

C. Media Wing: For the sole purpose of thriving through concrete propaganda, NSAs usually have biased interference in various forms of media, running their radio channels, and using news coverage to maintain submission and compliance, suppression of press freedom, system spread of misinformation.

On a territorial level, NSAs mostly operate in geographical zones and states characterized by a power vacuum, lawlessness, state failure, weakened states, grey zones, and non-governance. After the procurement of a geographical area, NSAs tend to turn such fragile areas into hubs for their centralized activities that include but are not limited to storage for weapons, training hubs, centers for human and arms trafficking, illegal economic activities such as drug trafficking, staging bases, etc.

Despite the political and military grounds of the NSAs and added rigor to their violent ambitions, they remain weaker and less organized than the nation-states. The reverse could be possible for many cases as well, such as the Taliban taking over Afghanistan, yet such cases are less visible than vice versa.

The asymmetries in the state versus non-state actors exist on manifold levels. Both of the parties differ in their means of morals, legal norms, equipment, and type of personnel, goals and objectives. At this point, it is imperative to notice that the asymmetries in these particular conflicts, even though they are inherent, are not just reliant on the inequalities in military prowess- the conflict becomes asymmetrical when the parties choose to engage in unconventional warfare to compensate for its lack of equipment.

Domain	Nation-States	VNSAs
Societal	Post-modern/Post-industrial	Traditional
Organizational	Hierarchical Structures	Horizontal Structures
Technological	Hi-Tech	Low-Tech
Normative	Disparate legal and ethical standards	
War-fighting	Instrumental	Expressive
Personnel	Soldiers	Warriors/Rebels

The Security Council Resolution 2325 reaffirms the role of states in limiting the accessibility of VNSAs to procure nuclear weapons and the weapons of mass destruction alike. In the aftermath of the Res 2325, the United Nations highlighted key three areas of concern that are focal in countering and mitigating the effects of asymmetrical warfare. These three critical areas are:

1. The need to adapt and modify the UN and other regional mandates to incorporate more specific mechanisms to counter the threats posed by the VNSAs. Oversimplification, uniformity, and overgeneralization of the UN provisions and mandates are not viable in handling the wide variety of VNSAs, especially when such violent groups differ in their strategies, prospects, goals, and tactics.
2. Ensuring the safety of peacekeeping forces and NGOs that are employed for humanitarian intervention and providing relief to the victims of the VNSAs and other hostile engagements such as transnational or internal wars.
3. Building the capacities of vulnerable states in order to empower them to tackle the threats posed by the VNSAs- in lessening their influence, limiting the procurement of the weaponry, and dismantling their networks on the source. Moreover, states also need to be equipped to ensure conflicts that are characterized by armed non-state actors.

■ Some hurdles in curbing the role of NSAs in Asymmetrical Warfare

States have a plethora of ways for countering NSAs engaged in asymmetric warfare. As mentioned earlier in the study guide, insufficient and inadequate border control is a huge hurdle in neutralizing the threat of VNSAs on an international and transnational level. States may contemplate constructing obstacles and roadblocks at critical border and entry points, which security forces could regulate through screening checkpoints. Limiting the movements of NSAs and restricting their access to resources is another important aspect of coming up with feasible solutions. It is important to notice that a plethora of viable solutions cannot be implemented because the limitation of financial resources makes it difficult for states to purchase checkpoint equipment and hire additional workers to constantly man roadblocks. Furthermore, corruption provides a significant challenge because checkpoint personnel may be bribed, compromising the effectiveness of the roadblocks and monitoring.



Furthermore, roadblocks encourage VNSs to simply establish local unsupervised and unregulated routes or access points to infiltrate their target areas. Security forces lock down an area and search it for relevant materials, weapons, personnel, and Intel during structured search operations. This strategy, however, is predicated on solid intelligence gathering and can frequently result in civilians being illegally arrested and detained.

States with adequate resources can invest in high-interest surveillance equipment. However, increased surveillance does not always signify that citizens or regions are safe. It is imperative to notice that frequent patrols can efficiently safeguard an area by preventing non-state actors from entering. These patrols, however, constitute the security officials involved direct targets of any incident that occurs in the region. A raid, or a surprise coordinated attack on a place or person of interest, is the last and most aggressive approach a state can employ.

■ Foreign Military Bases

A military base is defined as an extraterritorial unit with an external actor's sovereign or semi-sovereign rights. For the last decades, numerous installations called military facilities which serve similar functions but lack this extraordinary status have also been established (Klin, 2020).

On a principle level, there are two focal issues with the operation of foreign military bases (FMBs):

A. These facilities are necessary for war preparations and hence jeopardize world peace and security. The Iraqi invasion would not have been facilitated without the operation on the foreign military bases in Turkey, Germany, Diego Garcia, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. These bases are also integral in strengthening the military capacities of states because FMBs serve as the sites for the proliferation of weapons, violence is increased in asymmetrical angles, and international stability is undermined as a result of the operation of these bases.

B. In a local-specific context, bases cause social and environmental harm to the masses of the host countries. Communities living near military bases are frequently subjected to sexual assaults by foreign soldiers, heinous crimes and abuse of human rights, illegal acquisition of land, loss of livelihood, pollution and health dangers as a result of weapons testing, both conventional and non-conventional. In many countries, the agreement that allowed the base to be built says that foreign soldiers who commit crimes are immune from prosecution because they have been granted immunity.

Military bases are the backbone of the US, NATO, and EU military apparatuses and hold gravitas in maintaining the strategic military alliances on regional or transnational levels. Broadly speaking, the role of FMBs becomes highly vital in international conflicts, when the strong party retorts to make warfare asymmetrical by either overthrowing regimes directly on the battlefield or giving the visible strength to impose pressure at the negotiating table. Many of the US's 300 overseas military interventions and invasions throughout the last century were only possible because the country had the well-positioned military infrastructure to launch and assist them. It is not surprising that the United States of America controls



more than 750 FMBs in around 80 countries. It is said that these stats are under-stated by the Pentagon and the actual number might be even higher than 850. Out of the official 750 FMBs of the US, Japan hosts 120 active bases, while Germany and South Korea host 119 and 73, respectively. Even though the United States has called back its deployed troops from countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, President Biden has pledged his support for coordinated airstrikes facilitated by the FMBs of the country. The worldwide military network of military bases is viewed as a threat to the national security of any country that does not support the United States or NATO. As a result, Russia, China, and many other countries have been compelled to respond to this danger, which contributes to the ongoing arms race.

■ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Improvised explosive device (IED) is a homemade bomb constructed from military or nonmilitary components frequently employed by guerrillas, insurgents, and other non-state actors as a crude but effective weapon against a conventional military force (Britannica, Improvised explosive device). IEDs can be made from an array of materials ranging from "everyday tools to commercial explosives used in construction and mining." Additionally, the lack of proper security for stockpiles over both military and commercial explosives only increases the accessibility of the production of IEDs.

IEDs are a modern combat weapon system that can be employed in irregular and hybrid warfare and military actions of and by "lone wolf" actors. Exploiting a weakness is a critical component of asymmetrical warfare and the most effective way to overcome a greater opponent's military superiority. Similarly, the use of IEDs limits the mobility of the weaker party. It also effectively blocks the flow of any humanitarian supplies by the agencies like the Red Cross and the United Nations. As put by the United Nations, the impact of IEDs on "the security and stability of affected States is profound: IED attacks not only hinder the political, social and economic development of a country, they also block life-saving humanitarian aid" and 'in recent years, IEDs have become the primary weapon for non-state armed groups across many conflicts.' Insurgent groups, for instance, often adopt a non-traditional approach because they lack the capacity to challenge the incumbent government in traditional combat directly. As the means of unconventional warfare, IEDs are utilized with equal effectiveness in both symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare. IEDs are often used to kill or disable an opponent's ability to accomplish their goals, influence a target audience, or denigrate officials in positions of power.

IEDs are asymmetric as they are characterized as non-conventional weapon systems and are utilized as, primarily, weaker parties are not equipped with conventional weapon systems. Aggressors often utilize iEDs to compensate for their inferior hardware, human capital, or paucity of mass support by circumventing or negating an opponent's stronger position. IEDs are being used to weaken or deny an opponent's superior position by employing them in a manner that abuses a weakness in their opponent's defenses. On a fundamental level, the use of IEDs is similar to the use of sabotage tactics.



As stated previously, by balancing asymmetric disparity through their tactical, operational, and strategic impact, IEDs may be considered the near-perfect irregular warfare weapon system (Amoroso & Solis, 2019). Contributing factors are based on:

1. Their tactical effectiveness, especially when considering the cost to impact ratio; specifically; the train and equip reaction often employed to counter them reactively;
2. Low cost in comparison to their potential target effects, conventional weapon system alternatives, and the research and development efforts needed to prevent and counter their use;
3. The relative ease of access to many IED components most purchased “off the shelf” or configured as part of existing debris and infrastructure at an attack location
4. Ease of access to the know-how of construction and employment through the internet, sharing lessons learned within and between VEO;
5. Use of the internet to inspire other would-be aggressors and generate publicity for the cause they are used to promote, such as advertising their capabilities as a projection of strength and inducement of fear in a target audience, e.g. publicizing willing and trained suicide bombers;
6. Psychological impact and consequences they can have on target audiences the aggressors are attempting to influence;
7. Their versatility and unconventional employment methodology, which is almost limitless;
8. Conceal ability.

Proliferation of Drones

In recent years, a plethora of states have joined the club of drone manufacturing and possessing countries. The three top exporters of drone technology are:

1. The United States of America
2. Israel
3. People's Republic of China

In addition to the three states as mentioned earlier, Iran, UAE, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Iraq, South Korea, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Italy and North Korea are also in the race to procure drone technology and invest in drone development projects.

Drones, or unmanned aerial systems, are integral to the discussion of asymmetric warfare in the world. Militant organizations have increasingly used them for tactical and wider strategic reasons in recent years, affecting regional security and changing conflict dynamics between governments and armed non-state entities. The most promising (and concerning) developments are yet to emerge as drones become more common, more readily available, and more sophisticated – offering improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and autonomous flight capabilities, as well as ever-expanding range, endurance, and payload capacity. Despite being an emerging technology, drone warfare promises to initiate more violent methods to non-conventional warfare. Specifically, the widespread availability of low-cost drones, illegal methods of procurement, combined with rapid developments in artificial intelligence and autonomy, could significantly increase militant groups' ability to launch coordinated and deadly attacks against a variety of targets

on and off the battlefield in the coming years. Despite the increasing global sales of drones in general, and military drones in particular, there is no consensus among nations, and no coordinated, collaborative steps to make drone transfers more transparent, responsible, and accountable.

Hezbollah has the longest history of employing drones warfare among the violent non-state actors operational in the Middle East. The group's first successful deployments are believed to have occurred in 2004 and 2005 when it used Iranian-made, military-grade Mirsad-1 drones to undertake vital Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions in northern Israel. During these deployments, the Mirsad-1 escaped Israeli air defense systems and returned to Lebanon safely before being intercepted by the Israeli air force. In 2012, the organization flew an Ayoub drone built-in Iran over the Dimona nuclear site. Even though the drone was shot down by an Israeli aircraft, it is suspected that images of Israeli installations were acquired and successfully communicated.

The outlook of drone transfers from drone-producing to non-producing countries has also evolved considerably in recent years. The main concern now is that states that are not members of the Missile Technology Control Regime. China, for instance, has dramatically altered the landscape of drone production and transfer by producing relatively inexpensive drones and exporting them to other countries, particularly in the Middle East, while refusing to participate in arms control regimes like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Wassenaar Arrangement, and MTCR.

■ Regimes that regulate the armed drone technology

1. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987
2. United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) of 1991
3. Wassenaar Arrangement of 1996
4. Arms Trade Treaty

■ The Proliferation of Nuclear-Powered Submarines

In September 2021, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia announced a trilateral security partnership- citing their first project to produce a fleet of 8 nuclear-powered submarines for Australia. This strategic alliance is called AUKUS. Previously, Australia had made a deal with a French shipbuilder to buy 12 diesel-electric attack submarines. Much to France's dismay, Australia cancelled the deal favoring joining heads with the USA and the UK for military and technical assistance. China, particularly, characterizes AUKUS as a strategic means to offset China and its allies. Moreover, China also denounced Australia's contribution to the already intensified arms race. Particularly, the signing of AUKUS is also considered to be United States' uncompromising commitment to maintaining its military presence in Asia-Pacific.

A rising and increasingly assertive China, as well as the geopolitical risks it poses to the area, would be looming in the distance. An ASEAN-centric regional infrastructure has limited utility in this regard. At the same time, there should be serious concerns about how



the United States, which has historically been seen as an offshore stabilizing factor in the region, would be "pushed out" as China's military power strengthens. Australia may be attempting to strengthen the US position in the Indo-Pacific area by leveraging this new security cooperation as a source of regional peace and stability, as well as drawing on this military-technical pool for defense modernization and buildup.

Given many countries' commitments against the spread of WMD delivery systems, official viewpoints on the spread of submarine technology can only be regarded as "subjective." France, for instance, has made direct sales of sophisticated submarines to nuclear-armed countries, even transferring entire production lines and blueprints, ostensibly ignoring any potential security risks. Russia continues to export finished diesel submarines and is now supplying China and India with a nuclear reactor and submarine design technology. Even though at least one of its clients has a nuclear weapon, Germany is a major submarine exporter in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a result, current major power policies (including those of the United States) appear to accept the Cold War premise that modern submarines are safe in the 'appropriate' hands. By extension, the proliferation of submarines is not a threat to regional security or stability.

The world's finest naval-strong countries (the United States, France, and the United Kingdom) currently only operate nuclear-powered submarines, sending a strong message to other countries that conventional submarines are officially outdated. Furthermore, the world's nuclear powers have progressively increased the proportion of their nuclear warheads deployed on submarines. Such objectives were expressly stated in the text of the United States-Russian START ME agreement. They represent the specific direction of the US and, to a lesser extent, Russian nuclear forces in enforcing the New START accord. The United Kingdom has concentrated all of its remaining nuclear weapons on its undersea troops, whereas France has the vast majority of its nuclear weapons on submarines. Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing the size of its nuclear navy and strengthening its use.

As part of its attempts to limit the international spread of weapons-grade materials, the US has grown increasingly involved in promoting nuclear trafficking prevention measures, such as those outlined in the US-sponsored U.N. Resolution 1540. Whether exports can be slowed or blocked, or whether the spread of strategic submarines must be considered "inevitable," is a policy matter that demands more consideration. However, the evidence is conflicting in this regard. On the one hand, advanced diesel boats are produced by a variety of companies, and there appears to be no international agreement prohibiting their proliferation. Additionally, used submarines are commonly sold on the foreign market. On the other hand, nuclear submarines are produced in small numbers, suggesting that a supplier regime among the five existing possessors could be formed and successfully implemented, or at the very least that recommendations to prevent their proliferation may be developed.



Insurgency

An insurgency is a civil war in which the belligerent groups have asymmetrical power. The 'insurgent' party comprises the weaker of these groupings, while the government is made up of the stronger. The insurgent party tries to transfer political power from the government to itself through intellectual and sociological manipulation of the general public. As a result, insurgent operations may entail violence, but they are also likely to incorporate a broader ideological and social activism platform. The 'progressive erosion of [the insurgent party's] opponent's political [emphasis mine] power to wage war' is a fundamental aspect of any successful insurgency.

Definitions (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5)

noetic

Insurgency: an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict...an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

Counterinsurgency: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.

There are no fixed, standard operational techniques in COIN. It is a form of "**counter-warfare**" that morphs in response to changes in the character of an insurrection.

© David J. Kilcullen, 2007

Obstacles in minimizing Asymmetries in Warfare

Counterinsurgency uses all elements of a nation's power—including combined-arms operations and psychological, political, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic operations—to defeat an insurgency. An insurgency is an organized uprising that uses violent and nonviolent means to overthrow an existing government or to wrest away control, either de jure or de facto, over part of its territory. Insurgencies typically have a platform despite multiple connotations and conceptualizations such as perfidious political or religious motivation, but criminal gangs can also become powerful enough to imperil a state's authority. Most insurgencies utilize a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics—the former are hit-and-run attacks directed primarily at government security forces, the latter are attacks directed primarily against civilians—supported by propaganda and political organizing (Maneuver self-study program, Counterinsurgency).

Because of the fluidity and dynamism of most VNSAs' operations and the ever-evolving nature of asymmetric warfare, coordinating and comparing methods with other coun

tries becomes critical to any counterinsurgency effort's success. It is clear from prior conflicts, such as the dealing of violent groups such as Boko Haram and ISIS, the strength and appeal of VNSAs are one of the most important determinants of its success, as this is what attracts support in the form of people, resources, training, weaponry, and intelligence. As outlined earlier, such NSAs operate on the firm levels of politics, military, and propaganda. Furthermore, bad governance and police force solidarity might serve as catalysts for non-symmetric conflict's future development and complexity.

In contemporary settings, political scientists recognize two types of insurgencies—cold and hot. Cold insurgency is recognized by the absence of widespread violence and open warfare. On the other hand, the hot insurgency is the opposite of the cold insurgency: it is characterized by full-fledged war and heinous surges of violence. The hot insurgency is maintained by the existence of three groups: a favorable minority group (the cohort, i.e. anti-insurgents), a neutral group, and a hostile minority (the group i.e. pro-insurgents). In the case of a hot insurgency, the COIN mechanisms institutionalize the favorable minority to adopt the neutral group for a joint opposition against the insurgent and simultaneously, co-opt the hostile group as well.

For the Cold Insurgency, there are four recognized ways of operating the counterinsurgency mechanisms:

1. Neutralize the leadership of the insurgency, particularly the insurgent leader;
2. Dismantle the conditions that facilitate the insurgency;
3. Espionage of the insurgency to dismantle it from the source/root;
4. Revitalization of the state apparatus and the political machine.

Dr David Kilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, describes three vital pillars of counterinsurgency that are equal in power and importance. His three pillars of counterinsurgency are best described in the pictures below and on the next page:

Figure 1 – the Conflict Ecosystem





Figure 2 – Inter-agency Counterinsurgency Framework



Terrorism as a form of Asymmetrical Warfare

The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994), titled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," contains a provision that describes terrorism as:

'Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.'

The UN Member States of the UN have no uniform and universal definition of terrorism, and this inconsistency has been a major hurdle in designing and adopting concrete and holistic international countermeasures or driving equitable counterterrorism frameworks. In many cases, the recognized definition for a 'terrorist' is considered to be interchangeable with that of a 'freedom fighter.' Terminology consensus would be vital for a single comprehensive and uniform convention on terrorism, which some countries favor in place of the present 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols.

UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as:

'Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.'

As a strategic choice and asymmetrical tactic, the methodology of terrorism follows a three-stage method:

1. Disorientation: seeks to sow a general sense of insecurity within a population and detract from the legitimacy of existing state structures, often through random acts of violence that prey upon the civilian population in general.



2. Target Response: seeks to prompt a disproportionately harsh collective reprisal from a government to radicalize the affected population and win international legitimacy or to wrestle political concessions.

3. Gaining legitimacy: The terrorist group seeks to transfer legitimacy from the government to its own cause through skilful manipulation of the media, grassroots social agitation, or alternative media such as the internet. At this stage, ideology becomes crucial.

■ Types of Terrorism

A. Revolutionary Terrorism: A type of terrorism that is initiated to seek regime change and overthrow an existing political system, typically in favor of the social and political engineering of the insurgents. This type of terrorism is highly common, easy to detect, and most widespread globally. Examples of revolutionary terrorist groups include the Taliban, ISIS or ISIL, and Boko Haram.

B. Sub revolutionary Terrorism: This type of terrorism is aimed at changing and modifying the sociopolitical structures rather than bringing a political regime change or overthrowing the existing government.

C. Establishment Terrorism: Commonly known as state or state-sponsored terrorism, this type of terrorism is initiated by the governments or particular groups in the government against the masses or the political opposition or certain factions among the government or the foreign governments. Examples of this type of terrorism include Saddam Hussein's reign of terror in Iraq, Bashar Al-Assad's Syrian Civil War, and Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union.

■ Asymmetrical Forms of Terrorism

1. Suicide bombings and car bombings
2. Hijackings
3. Use of IEDs
4. Hostage takings and mass kidnappings
5. Mass shootings
6. Utilizing rape as the weapon of war
7. Strategic bombings
8. Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
9. Use of bio and chemical weapons

■ Private Military Contractors (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs)

Traditionally, private military companies (or "PMCs") provide services to replace or supplement an army or armed force initiated to change and modify politics or improve their efficacy. There are two types of recognized PMCs: "active PMCs, who are willing to carry weapons into combat, and passive PMCs, who concentrate on training and organizational concerns." Private security companies (or "PSCs") provide services targeted at preventing criminal conduct in businesses and on private property. These firms have been for a long time and can be found almost anywhere. Still, their number appears to be growing, particularly in war zones where enterprises believe they cannot always rely on state security agencies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for their protection.



Article 4 (4) of the Third Geneva Convention makes a direct reference to the PMCs in the following words: “persons who accompany the armed forces without being members thereof, such as [...] supply contractors, members of labor units or services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces.” Article 4 (4) of the Third Geneva Convention also states that those persons who have fallen into the territory of the enemy shall be a prisoner of war “provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model”. In the context of our agenda, it is important to dissect the degree of outsourcing that is now taking place and receive the kind of the activities that are being outsourced out to private corporations to perform jobs that were formerly performed by the military. Moreover, it is also imperative to notice how PMCs’ operations add to the hostilities of asymmetrical warfare.

■ Status of PMCs and PSCs: Civilians or Combatants?

PSC personnel may take an integral and direct role in armed conflict since they are frequently employed in war-torn states and where armed conflict is ongoing and recurring. For example, the facility for which they provide protection could be attacked or strategically targeted, and it's worth considering what would happen if security company members returned fire in such circumstances. The implications of such possibilities are important to trace under the international humanitarian law and the international law of armed conflict. Furthermore, certain of the operations carried out by private enterprises may be considered direct participation in hostilities under specific circumstances. This raises several problems about the crucial distinction between civilians and combatants that is at the heart of international humanitarian law.

There is a general consensus that PSCs, both the companies, its workforce and personnel, are civilians who cannot be categorized as combatants under humanitarian law. Although they share some traits with militias—at least when acting for their government—the keepers of the international law believe that assuming PSCs fit this model is a stretch. PSCs generally do not meet all of the criteria for non-state actor (violent or otherwise) armed groups or militias to qualify for combatant status, such as operating under a clear command, having a distinctive sign or emblem or uniform that can be identified from a distance, openly carrying weapons, and adhering to the laws of war, due to the way they operate.

■ Responsibility of the States in monitoring the PMCs and PSCs

Violations of international humanitarian law that are attributable to a state are held personally liable. International protocols and conventions also maintain such propositions. For instance, Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention and Article 91 of Protocol I is a clear indication that the States are accountable and answerable for violations and the breaches of international humanitarian law perpetrated by their organs, including their armed forces. Moreover, and by extension, Article 3 of the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention also dictates that a belligerent party is responsible “for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” However, the International Law Commission clarified that states are not



solely responsible for the actions of their organs. States can be held liable for violations committed by persons or entities with authority to exercise components of government authority or who are de facto acting on its orders or under its direction and control. Furthermore, states must undertake "due diligence" in order to prevent or penalize private individuals or businesses from violating the law.

As a result, outsourcing operations typically performed by the armed forces may imply accountability on the part of the state that granted such authority. Whatever the degree of accountability on an individual basis, if private contractors are acting in a public capacity, such as policing an area, violate international law, the State retains responsibility.

■ PMCs and PSCs: in the context of Asymmetrical Warfare

With an increasingly global sector, some observers are concerned that personnel from different governments may come into conflict with one another; thus, it's critical that all PSC employees follow humanitarian law. Combatant privileges, according to PSCs, could have a direct impact on their overall contribution to the military mission in irregular conflicts. If equivalent recognition is not explored for other non-state organizations, singling out PSCs and awarding them some type of legal status could be a step in the wrong direction. Not to mention, such discriminatory policy practically favors the non-state entities that strong states like, so strengthening strong state capabilities against non-state adversaries is highly unfair. Secondly, the selection of the NSAs for such important status is also a critical question. Selecting non-state actors on the biased grounds is not viable to make such stakeholders respect humanitarian law, especially if locals believe that corporations they associate mercenaries with are receiving preferential treatment. A negative perception of mercenaries persists in many places where PSCs work.

On a principle level, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that PSCs' operations and accountability do not fall outside the law and other relevant international or regional legislative frameworks. States are expected to prevent civilian participation in hostilities and ensure that civilians working for them are conscious of their respective humanitarian obligations. Such provisions are fundamental as they demand that the states eliminate the current limitations on prosecution and regulation in domestic law, allowing them to control firms and prosecute PSC contractors who commit crimes.

PSCs are carrying out activities in Iraq and other regions that risk alienating locals and making them unprivileged belligerents. Several analysts have emphasized the need of striking the right balance between public and private duties when it comes to the use of force. One obvious option is to reconsider the missions that should be delegated to PSC workers in international and asymmetric wars under humanitarian law.e concrete law enforcement and to foster of human rights.



Case Studies

This year, DISEC will be closely looking at the following four case studies that are critical to the conceptualization of the agenda and demand our immediate attention. The delegates should ideally discuss these case studies in the context of asymmetrical warfare. The four case studies are mentioned below:

- A. Saudi-Yemen Conflict
- B. Israel-Palestine Conflict
- C. Russia-Ukraine Conflict
- D. Syrian Civil War

Recommended readings for the Case Studies

1. <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03200026/document>
2. <https://news.berkeley.edu/2021/05/13/a-long-conflict-between-israel-palestinians-no-one-wins-scholar-says/>
3. <https://law.stanford.edu/index.php?webauth-document=child-page/370999/doc/slspublic/Ross%20Barriers%20to%20Agreement%20in%20the%20Asymmetric%20Israeli-Palestinian%20Conflict.pdf>
4. <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-nuclear-element-in-russia-s-asymmetric-warfare-strategies/>
5. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331174103_The_Influence_of_Geography_in_Asymmetric_Conflicts_in_Narrow_Seas_and_the_Houthi_Insurgency_in_Yemen

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

1. What are the potential mechanisms and strategies to proliferate the nuclear-powered submarines and drones?
2. What are the interventions that DISEC could work on to limit the accessibility of the VNSAs to procure weapons illegally and through trafficking?
3. How can your state effectively contribute to the decommissioning of the global supply chain of IED elements or components?
4. What should be done to curb down the role of PMCs and PSCs in carving the asymmetry of warfare- both international and transnational?
5. What are the potential areas in strengthening the border security and monitoring to limit the trafficking of arms and movements of the VNSAs?
6. How can the states contextualize breaking down insurgencies in the context of asymmetrical warfare?
7. What are the cohesive measures the committee can take to curb down the rape as a weapon of war in the context of moral asymmetries?
8. How do asymmetries shape the internal wars? And what international protocols can DISEC adopt to curb asymmetries in internal and civil wars?
9. How can we revitalize the role of NPT in limiting the potential of an asymmetric international conflict?
10. What steps can the states take to decommission terrorist organizations not only geographically but also ideologically?



11. What is the scope of harmonizing relevant national legislature and strategies with the international protocols?
12. How can we revitalize the global campaign to shut down FMBs as the contributors of asymmetrical warfare?

Bibliography

1. Amoroso, P., & Solis, M. (2019). Improvised Explosive Devices, a near perfect asymmetric weapon system of necessity rather than a weapon of choice. *Improvised Explosive Devices, a Near Perfect Asymmetric Weapon System of Necessity Rather than a Weapon of Choice* | Small Wars Journal. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/improvised-explosive-devices-near-perfect-asymmetric-weapon-system-necessity-rather-weapon>
2. Arasli , J. (2011). (rep.). States vs. Non-State Actors: Asymmetric Conflict of the 21st Century and Challenges to Military TransformationStates vs. Non-State Actors: Asymmetric Conflict of the 21st Century and Challenges to Military Transformation (Ser. 13).
3. Britannica. (n.d.). Improvised explosive device. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.britannica.com/technology/improvised-explosive-device>
4. Buffaloe, D. L. (2017, November 15). Defining asymmetric warfare. AUSA. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.ausa.org/publications/defining-asymmetric-warfare>
5. Heinegg, W. H. (2010). Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond? , 87.
6. Klin, T. (2020). Review of The Significance of Foreign Military Bases as Instruments of Spheres of Influence. *Croatian International Relations Review* , (87). Retrieved from <https://hrcak.srce.hr/>.
7. Maneuver self study program. Counterinsurgency. (n.d.). Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Counterinsurgency/>
8. Pfanner, T. (2005, March). Review of Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action. *International Review of the Red Cross* , 87. Retrieved from <https://international-review.icrc.org/>.
9. United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations, main body, main organs, General Assembly. United Nations. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml>



TOPIC AREA B: DISARMAMENT AND DENUCLEARISATION ASPIRATIONS OF THE KOREAN PEACE PROCESS

Introduction and the agreement to end Korean War ‘in principle’

The aim of this topic will be to come to a resolution as to what exactly, given past events, current situations, current political climates, and aspirations of stakeholders, is the correct way to navigate the process of Disarmament and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The purpose to discuss this particular agenda in DISEC comes from recent developments to end the Korean War in December 2021. In the second week of December 2021, South Korea’s President, Moon Jae-in, reported an armistice among his country, North Korea, the United States, and China. The President also reported that even though the war has ended ‘in principle’, further conceptualisations and the peace process would be talked about in near future. Such efforts to end the war and lighten the tensions concerning the arms race and the potential of an armed conflict are credited to Moon Jae-in, who has advocated for facilitating the peace process. However, many political scientists and analysts have shown concern about the denuclearization and disarmament component of the Korean Peace Process.

■ The demands of North Korea

North Korea has maintained its reservations against the hostile policy of the United States of America. For many years, the country has voiced its disapproval for the joint US-South Korea military training and drills, United States’ foreign military bases in South Korea, and the US-led sanctions against North Korea’s weapon program. Even though the North Korean leadership wants to progress further with the peace talks, but it will not do so until the United States lifts its sanctions and arms embargo imposed on the country. Whereas, the United States demands that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and halt programs focused on building up its nuclear arsenal to discuss the potential lift of the sanctions. In this context, the policies of the United States of America are of sheer importance. It is viable to notice that due to North Korea’s rigidness and the United States exercising its status of a ‘hegemon’, the Biden Administration has inadequate interest and incentive to facilitate the peace program. In fact, the US has explicitly declared that its idea, conditions, and timeline for the peace process might differ from South and North Korea.

■ Historical Context: Korean Armistice Agreement

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by military leaders from the United States (representing the United Nations Command), the Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, ending almost three years of warfare in the 1950-1953 Korean War. The Korean Armistice Agreement is remarkable in that it was formally endorsed at the United Nations General Assembly on August 28, 1953, despite the fact that it was signed by military commanders. The accord provided the essential military truce



to allow for the negotiation of a final, diplomatic peace agreement. Peace negotiations began in Geneva, Switzerland in 1954, however, no formal peace treaty was established. At the last point of contact between the opposing forces, the Armistice Agreement established a Military Demarcation Line (MDL). To keep combat forces apart, both sides retreated two kilometers from the MDL, forming a four-kilometer wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that spans the Korean peninsula's width of 241 kilometers. Both sides were given access to their two-kilometer section of the DMZ, but they were not allowed to cross the MDL without the other's permission.

The Armistice Agreement formed three commissions and physical mechanisms to carry out the agreement's provisions. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission completed its mission with the repatriation of prisoners of war in 1953(United Nations Command, Armistice negotiations). According to paragraph 19 of the Armistice Agreement, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was established "to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle any violations of this Armistice Agreement through discussions."

■ Relevant UN Regimes

1. Security Council Resolution 82
2. Security Council Resolution 83
3. Security Council Resolution 1874
4. Security Council Resolution 1718
5. Security Council Resolution 2087
6. Security Council Resolution 2094
7. Security Council Resolution 2270
8. Security Council Resolution 2321
9. Security Council Resolution 2371
10. Security Council Resolution 2375
11. Security Council Resolution 2379
12. Security Council Resolution 1540

■ Recent Events (2015-2021)

2015 to 2017

The situation between North Korea and South Korea has culminated in new peace talks which finally look to be on the path to success. To understand how we got here, it is important to know the rollercoaster of events that led us here.

On January 1, 2015, when Kim Jong Un, the DPRK's Supreme Leader, declared in his New Year's address to the state that he was willing to continue higher-level dialogue with South Korea. The conflict escalated after a mine exploded in the demilitarized zone in the first week of August 2015, injuring two South Korean soldiers. It was no surprise that the South Korean administration claimed that the North had planted the mine. No involvement



was claimed by the North. As a result, allegedly, the South resumed indoctrination transmissions to the North.

On the 20th of August 2015, it was reported that North Korea had fired a shell attack on the South Korean city of Yeoncheon. This particular action further halted the peace process on the South Korean side. South Korea responded with a barrage of artillery shells. There were no South Korean casualties as a result of the fighting, but some civilian evacuations were necessary.

The bombardment prompted both countries to adopt pre-war statuses and a meeting of high-ranking officials in the Panmunjom to de-escalate tensions on August 22, 2015, which lasted till the next day. The talks went on into the next day, and on August 25, all parties struck an accord, and military tensions were lifted. Despite ongoing peace dialogues, North Korea continued to conduct missile tests on September 9, 2016. North Korea steps into the reality of carrying out its fifth nuclear test.

Other important aspects of the years 2017 to 2018 are:

1. As Moon-Jae acquires the presidential office in May 2017, he announced the revival of the Sunshine Policy;
2. After a long hiatus of two years, the Seoul-Pyongyang hotline or the inter-Korean hotline was resumed. A series of over 40 network and telecommunication lines became accessible to the mainland's of Korea;
3. In a dramatic turn of events, the leader supreme of DPRK affirmed the presence of the North Korean delegation in the Winter Olympics of 2018, hosted by South Korea. During the Olympics, in a historic fashion, the women ice hockey teams marched together;
4. Both of the countries signed the Panmunjom Declaration.

2018

President Moon and Supreme Leader Kim met again on the 26th of May 2018, to discuss Kim's upcoming meeting with Donald Trump, which went well which resulted from further meetings throughout the month of June, and agreements to reopen the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in Kaesong and a resumption of family reunions.

It was announced by South Korea on the 23rd of June 2018, that they would not conduct annual military exercises with the US in September, and that they would also stop their own drills in the Yellow Sea, so as not to provoke North Korea, and to continue the peaceful dialogue. South Korea and North Korea resumed ship-to-ship radio communication, which could prevent accidental clashes between South and North Korean military vessels around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, and on 17 July they had resumed their military communication line on the western part of the peninsula. On 23rd October, the President of South Korea had ratified the Basic Agreement and Pyongyang Declaration. A South Korean train stopped at Panmun Station on the DMZ border with North Korea on November 30, 2018- marking the first occasion since 2008 when a South Korean train crossed into North Korean territory.



2019

On June 30th, a trilateral meeting consisting of Trump, Kim, and Moon took place at the DMZ. The progress of this meeting was carried forward by a trilateral talk at the Inter-Korean House of Freedom. However, in a classic matter of the 'other picture', North Korea executed short-range missile launches at the same time as the US and South Korea undertook joint military drills in August. North Korea's ruling party denounced the South's participation and purchase of US military weaponry on August 16, 2019, calling it a "grave provocation" and announcing the halt on the peace talks.

For the first time in history, the 2019 South Korean Defense White Paper does not refer to North Korea as an "enemy" or "danger," however it does mention North Korea's weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the Korean peninsula.

2020

After Pyongyang repeatedly urged South Korea to halt North Korean ex-pat activists from spreading anti-establishment propaganda across the border, North Korea began cutting off all communication links with South Korea on June 9, 2020. Kim Yo-Jong, Kim Jong Un's sister and Vice-Chair of the governing Workers' Party's Central Committee, declared that North Korea had begun to treat South Korea as an enemy- quite in a traditional manner.

The South Korean parliament approved a rule on December 14, 2020, making it illegal to send propaganda leaflets into North Korea. This prohibition applies not just to the vast number of balloon propaganda leaflets that have been carried into North Korea over the years, but also to flyers sent in bottles and thrown into rivers that run down the Korean peninsula.

2021

In February 2021, South Korea continued to omit "enemy" status, and on October 4th, the Unification Ministry announced the communication lines had been restored, following Kim Jong Un's vows to restart communication with South Korea.

Previous Attempts at Peace Processes

The Red Cross table talks between North and South Korea were held in August 1971 as a result of contact initiated by President Park Chung-hee. As time progressed these conversations expanded to creating an air of forming relationships with one another to create various alliances. The following year lead to Lee Hu-Rak and Kim Il-sung meeting in order to resolve matters at hand. This resulted in an apology on behalf of Mr Kim for the Blue House Raid which he seemed to deny to have had approved. Moving forward, in 1972 the North-South Statement was introduced and it highlighted the renowned Three Principles of Reunification. The Statement called for the following: (i) reunification must be solved without any intervention from and dependence upon foreign powers (ii) reunification must be implemented in a manner that promotes peace and does not utilize weapons or armed forces and (iii) reunification should pave the way to set aside differences of ideologies to be able to encourage the unity amongst citizens of Korea as one ethnic community. This



being put into light, in 1983 there seemed to be a relapse in efforts made and events as North Korea's proposal for three-way talks with the US and South Korea paralleled with the Rangoon assassination attempt against the South Korean President. This incident provides no grounds for explanation or discussion.

During the time of the Post-Cold War, the newly elected president of South Korea, Roh Tae-woo decided to launch a diplomatic project called the Nordopolitik. This was around a year prior to the boycott initiated by North Korea during the Summer Olympics in 1988 when Seoul was chosen. This led to the development of a Korean Community which resembled the proposition put forward by North Korea regarding a confederation. During the first week of September 1990, many qualitative talks were held in Seoul. Following this event, the North was gathering communities and protesting against the Soviet Union's close relationship with the South.

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation, as well as the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, were signed in 1991 as a result of these dialogues. Both North and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations at the same time.

The economic crisis at the end of the Cold War resulted in expectations that reunification was imminent. In December 1991, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation, pledging non-aggression and cultural and economic exchanges was signed.

The end of the Cold War brought the economic crisis to North Korea and led to expectations that reunification was imminent. Both countries signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange, and Cooperation in December 1991, promising non-aggression and cultural and economic exchanges. They also promised to give advance notice of important military movements and set up a military hotline, as well as work toward replacing the armistice with a "peace regime." Concerns about North Korea's nuclear development prompted the United States and North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. The sunshine policy was announced in 1998 by the South Korean President Kim Dae-jung aiming towards the North. Regardless of a naval clash in 1999, the implementation of the policy led towards the first Inter Korean summit in June 2000, between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il. In the following years, there was a significant increase in trade to an extent that South Korea became the largest trading partner of North Korea. In 2003, the Kaesong Industrial Region also came into existence to aid South Korean businesses to be able to invest in the North. The Sunshine Policy came to a cease and was formally abandoned by President Lee Myung-bak in 2010 as a result of the 15th June 2000 Joint Declaration of holding a second South-North Summit.

Kim John-un delivered a New Year's address on the 1st of January 2015 to the citizens of the country and stated that he is looking forward to resuming and indulging in higher-level talks with the South. In May 2017, Moon Jae-in was elected the president of South Korea and promised to instil the Sunshine Policy once again. In an address on New Year's in 2018,

North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un brought forth a proposal of sending a delegation to South Korea for the Winter Olympics. On April 27, the first time since the Korean War, a North Korean leader had come to Southern territory for the purpose of attending a summit with the Joint Security Area.

On the 23rd of June 2018, South Korea announced its concern for not conducting their annual military exercises with the US and would cease its drills in the Yellow Sea. This decision was made to discourage provoking North Korea and continue to maintain peace. On July 1, 2018 North and South Korea planned to resume ship-to-ship radio communication in order to stop the accidental conflict between the two military vessels around the Northern Limit Line or NLL in the West Yellow Sea. On July 17 2018, the North and South of Korea were able to successfully restore their military communication line upon the western peninsula and three months later, on 23 October, Moon ratified the Basic Agreement and Pyongyang Declaration hours prior to the approval sent by his cabinet. On 30 November 2018, a train from South Korea crossed the DMZ border assisted by North Korea, and stopped at the Panmun Station. This was marked as the first time a South Korean train had entered the territory of the North since 2008.

■ Comparison of both the nuclear arsenals of the two countries and their impact


North Korea

In recent memory, the ferocity of the North Korean nuclear arsenal has become a matter of household talk, with countries all around the world renouncing the rapid development that has taken place. The test has been condemned by organizations ranging from NATO to the United Nations, as well as China, one of the DPRK's closest allies. North Korea is expected to have a nuclear arsenal of 30 to 40 nuclear weapons and enough fissile material to produce six to seven nuclear weapons per year as of early 2020. North Korea exited the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003. (NPT). The government has been conducting a series of six nuclear tests with escalating levels of skill since 2006, resulting in sanctions being imposed.

North Korean missile launches

Kim Jong Un has launched more than 100 missiles since 2011, a greater total than his father and grandfather combined

Missile Launches



Missile Type

- Unknown
- Taepodong-1/2, Unha-3
- Nuclear Test
- Submarine-Launched
- BM-25 Musudan
- Medium-Range Ballistic
- Cruise Missile
- Hwasong-12/14/15
- Short-Range Ballistic

SOURCE: CSIS Missile Defense Project





South Korea

South Korea, whilst possessing the raw material and equipment to produce nuclear weapons, chooses not to make one. It is believed if South Korea does develop nuclear weapons, it could change the balance of power in the peninsula. Further, due to the NPT, South Korea maintains a policy to keep the Korean peninsula nuclear-free. With the escalation of the 2017 North Korean nuclear crisis, it was believed that the United States may not step in to defend South Korea, amid fears of North Korea acting on threats made to the US, promotion South Korean public perception to result in 60% of the population favoring the development of nuclear weapons in a poll. On May 21, 2021, the decades-old South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines was scrapped, allowing South Korea to develop and possess any type of missile, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

■ Proxies and Regional Treaties

China—

China is considered to be North Korea's closest ally and the only country in which China has a mutual aid and cooperation treaty.

Upon resumption of the relationship, China and South Korea have been organizing presidential and governmental visits, working together on the Korean Peninsula, assisting with the development of other countries, and cooperating in numerous areas.

United States of America—

Relations between the US and North Korea, have developed mainly after the Korean War, and in recent memory, have been soured by North Korea's six nuclear tests, their ICBM development, and their threats to the US and South Korea. For consular matters, Sweden acts as the protecting power of US interests in North Korea.

South Korea is one of the most Pro-American countries in the world at the moment, with strong relations in media, cultural exchange, and most importantly, South Korea is one of the top buyers of US military hardware, with an August 2019 deal for Seahawk helicopters summing to 800 million USD.

Russia—

After China, Russia is considered to be DPRK's closest ally, highlighted by its strategic interests and its stance on the settlement of the North Korean crisis, while Russia's interests in South Korea are mainly economic. The total trade volume between South Korea and Russia in 2003 was 4.2 billion US dollars, which increased to 24.8 billion US dollars in 2018.

France—

France and South Korea still maintain very good relations. They collaborate on many topics and issues, such as the question of North Korea which is a matter of great importance for both countries. Besides bilateral cooperation France and South Korea also work together in international organizations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, and the OECD etc. On the matter of North Korea. France is one of the few European countries to not have official diplomatic relations with North Korea. France has also supported the Six-party talks as well as the role of the IAEA in finding solutions to the nuclear issue.



Officially, there are no relations between the French Republic and North Korea. Only France and Estonia are members of the European Union that do not have diplomatic relations with North Korea. In Pyongyang, there is no French embassy or other sort of diplomatic presence, and in Paris, there is no North Korean embassy, albeit a North Korean diplomatic office is established in adjacent Neuilly-sur-Seine. France's stated position is that if and when North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons programme and improves its human rights record, it will consider establishing diplomatic ties.

India—

India and North Korea have healthy trade and diplomatic relations, maintaining an embassy in Pyongyang, while North Korea has an embassy in New Delhi. India believes North and South Korea should be reunified. Diplomatic relations between South Korea and India are relatively limited, although much progress has been made, resulting in multiple trade agreements: Agreement on Trade Promotion and Economic and Technological Cooperation in 1974; Agreement on Cooperation in Science & Technology in 1976. Further, India has been urged by the US increasingly, to act as a mediator given its improving relations with North and South Korea.

■ Two Key Treaties

1. Mutual Defense Treaty (United States–South Korea)
2. Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty

■ Weapons manufacturing:

North Korea:

North Korea's defense industry predates the Korean War but has emerged as a major supplier to the North Korean armed forces beginning in the 1970s, but increasingly so after the fall of the Soviet Union and to supplement those purchased from China. Most equipment produced are copies of Soviet and Chinese built military hardware.

South Korea:

The Republic of Korea Armed Forces receive the majority of its munitions from South Korea's defence sector. Initially reliant on the United States for weapon supplies, South Korea has progressed to the point where it can now produce its own weapons as part of its modernization and military reforms. South Korea has built a strong defence sector as a result of this change, and its products are exported to a variety of countries. In the global armaments market, South Korea is one of the most important suppliers.

■ Tanks, arms, and missiles:

1. First Machine Industry Bureau - supplier of machine guns, likely Type 62 Light Machine Gun and Type 73 Light Machine Gun
2. Ryu Kyong-su Tank Factory - Sinhung South Hamgyong Province
3. Second Machine Industry Bureau - Sōngch'ön-Kun, South Pyongan Province - builds Chonma-ho and Pokpung-ho MBT; likely Chuch'e-Po and Koksan artillery gun
4. Third Machine Industry Bureau: Multi-stage rockets



5. Fourth Machine Industry Bureau: Guided missiles
6. Fifth Machine Industry Bureau: Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
7. Tokhyon Munitions Plant

Naval:

1. Bong Dao Bo Shipyards, Sinpo - located on the mainland across from Mayang-Do Island Naval base - builder of the Sang-O and Gorae class Submarines.
2. Mayang-do Naval Shipyards, Mayang-do Island in northeast coast - maintenance facility with graving dock; has built some ships for the navy (12 Romeo class submarines)
3. Najin Shipyards - Kowan-Class submarine rescue ship, Soho class frigates and Najin class frigates
4. Nampho Shipyards - located on the west coast and builds small- and medium-size submarines (Sang-O and Yugo?)
5. Wonsan Shipyards - located on the east coast and builds small- and medium-size submarines (Sang-O and Yugo?)
6. Yukdaeso-Ri Shipyards - located on the west coast and has built midget submarines (Yugo-class submarines or Yono-class submarines) since the 1960s
7. Sixth Machine Industry Bureau: Battleships and submarines

Aircrafts:

There are no known indigenous aircraft built in North Korea, factories supply components or parts for current aircraft flown such as for the Tumansky RD-9 turbojet engine used by Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 and Shenyang J-6.

1. Ch'onjin - the small factory used to build spare parts and rebuild aircraft for the Air Force.
2. Taechon - used to build spare parts and rebuild aircraft for the Air Force.
3. Panghyon - North Korea's primary aircraft assembly, repair and research facility established in the mid-1980s.
4. Seventh Machine Industry Bureau: Production and purchase of war planes

Panmunjom Declaration

The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula was adopted between the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, and the President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, on 27 April 2018, during the 2018 inter-Korean Summit on the South Korean side of the Peace House in the Joint Security Area.

Recent Developments:

South Korea became the first country without nuclear weapons to test a ballistic missile from a submarine in October 2021. The test came after talks between the US and South Korea about partnering on projected nuclear-powered submarines, which may provide South Korea access to fissile fuel stores that aren't subject to IAEA inspections (IAEA). South Korea's interest in dual-use military technologies implies that support for a nucle-



ar-weapons-defense capability is no longer confined to the margins. However, it is imperative to notice that for years, the South Korean public has mainly backed proliferation, owing to concerns about relying on the United States' nuclear security guarantee.

First and foremost, South Korea's current efforts to manage relations with both the US and China are effective. South Korea has expressed its support for the 'Quad,' a security alliance comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, without formally joining it. South Korea has strengthened commercial and diplomatic connections with Southeast Asia and India under President Moon Jae-in's Southern Policy." South Korea has also increased regional security cooperation, with better coordination on matters such as law enforcement and cyber security, as well as joint military exercises focused on peacetime activities such as search and rescue. This strategy allows South Korea to maintain a balance against China without engaging in outright conflict. South Korea and China work together on key topics such as trade, denuclearization of North Korea, and pandemic preparedness. If South Korea does decide it needs nuclear weapons, it will find them to be both expensive and deadly. The UN Security Council might impose sanctions unless South Korea's departure from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was perceived as occurring in "good faith." At the very least, China would make a strong case for this conclusion. The United States might possibly retaliate against South Korea. Nuclear proliferation would contradict the pledges to peaceful, civilian utilization of nuclear facilities stated in the US-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement. In the event of a violation, the US would be able to seek the return of any transferred nuclear technologies or materials. Sanctions may be possible as well. While imposing sanctions on a proliferating ally may provide political challenges, it has been done before.


On the 13th of December 2021, South Korea, DPRK, the US, and China, agreed to formally end the Korean War, in principle. The North Korean government laid out a precondition for this, however, setting a requirement for modern day US hostilities to end. This is a major development in the Peace Process, as this has been one of the major obstacles standing on the road to peace. Chinese officials have called for this, while the South Korean and WE are said to be in the final stages of a draft declaration. It is believed by many supporters that this, if finalized, will help bring attention back to denuclearization talks which are currently stalled.

■ Questions a resolution must answer (QARMA):

1. What are the obstacles in achieving complete denuclearization and disarmament?
2. How can we incorporate the notions of denuclearization in the 'principled' end of war?
3. What should be the mechanisms for the Security Council to facilitate the potential of lifting sanctions from DPRK?
4. How can we revitalize the role of mediators in Korean Peace Process?
5. How to strategize the demilitarization in the Korean Peninsula from the perspective of ending war 'in principle'?
6. How to curb down the spill-over effects of the potential failure of Korean Peace talks?



7. How to safely decommission and disarm nuclear and other WMDs?
 8. What should be the financial plan to operate the denuclearization and disarmament of the Korean Peninsula?
 9. What political/legislative tools can be used to achieve denuclearization and disarmament?
 10. How to revitalize the role of NPT in facilitating denuclearization and disarmament?
 11. What should be the effective steps to take in order to decrease the hostile military engagement of North Korea and South Korea with their allies?
 12. What should be an effective successor for the Armistice Agreement?
 13. How can it be ensured that the region remains peaceful?
-



humun@habib.edu.pk