

Malware Reverse Engineering, Spring 2022

Practical 3

POX03

Date: 10th April, 2022

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
Executive Summary:

The malware with sha256 hash

94A84585432FB2AE6E9F836A92EFF960736416CB6E4E0D34B920E6DBC14F4246 is of Emotet family (a family of banking trojan malwares). When we run the malware we can see in the network activity that the malware is trying to contact C&C servers. This malware is essentially a credential stealer that can attack the host machine as a form of website, downloadable document, link etc.

Some key activities that the malware performs are:

- Creates files in the C:\Windows\Temp folder



- Makes changes to registry keys

4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegOpenKey	HKLM	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_DLLs	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWO...
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows	SUCCESS	
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\VOLE	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE\PageAllocator\UseSystemHeap	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 144
4:1...	rundl32.exe	3848	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE	SUCCESS	

- Imports functions like TerminateProcess, SuspendThread, RegCreateKeyA, SetFileAttributesA etc. This shows that the malware works with processes, registry keys and the file system of the local machine.
- Network calls are made to external domains like sf.symcd.com where potentially the malware can have access to more malicious files.

Static Analysis:

a. Compilation date of the program:

Compilation date of the malware is March 4th, 2022 at 12:51:31

subsystem	GUI
compiler-stamp	0x62220B53 (Fri Mar 04 12:51:31 2022 UTC)
debugger-stamp	n/a

b. Suspicious properties of program's Imports:

TerminateProcess: Terminates a process and all of it's threads.

GetEnvironmentVariable let's the malware retrieve the environment variable for the current process. **GetTimeZoneInformation** gets the current time zone settings.

SetEnvironmentVariableA can be used by the malware to some specific environment variable for a process. **SetFileAttributesA, FindFirstFileA, UnlockFile, WriteFile, LockFile, DeleteFileA, MoveFileA** shows that the malware is working with files. **GetVolumeInformationA** get's information about the file system and volume associated with the root directory. **GetCurrentProcessId, GetCurrentThreadId** gets the process/thread ID of a particular process/thread. Malware can use this to get a process, change it's environment variables etc. **RegisterClipboardFormatA** registers a new clipboard format. **SuspendThread** suspends a thread. **PostThreadMessageA** posts a message to a specified thread. This means that the malware is accessing a thread to send some message. **WinHelpA** launches Windows Help (malware starts winhelp.exe process). **GetCapture** receives mouse input in a particular windows meaning that the malware tracks mouse events. **SystemParametersInfoA** retrieves or sets the value of one of the system-wide parameters. This function can also update the user profile while setting a parameter. **RegCreateKeyA, RegDeleteValueA, RegSetValueExA, RegSetValueA, RegEnumKeyA, RegDeleteKeyA** shows us that the malware is working with registry keys.

c. Suspicious Strings:

Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer, Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network, Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Comdlg32, Software\Classes, Software\ : These strings show that the malware is working with these registry keys. **Command failed.)Insufficient memory...Registry entries have been removed** also shows that the malware is working with Registry entries.

Destination disk drive is full.
5Unable to read from %1, it is opened by someone else.
AUnabl...
Enter a number.#Enter an integer between %1 and %2.!Enter a number between %1 and %2...
%1 contains an incorrect path.
8Could not open %1 because there are too many open files.
Access to %1 was denied.
0An incorrect file handle was associated with %1.
8Could not rem...
Seek failed on %1.
14Encountered a hardware I/O error while accessing %1.
3Encountered a sh...
Disk full while accessing %1.
\$Attempted to access %1 past its end.
No error occurred.-An unknown error occurred while accessing %1.
%Attempted to write to...
%1 has a bad format."%1 contained an unexpected object. %1 contains an incorrect schema.
%1: %2\r\nontinue running script?
t.Ht

Here we can see the error messages that the malware might be using while performing it's activity.

USER32.DLL, GDI32.DLL, COMDLG32.DLL, COMCTL32.dll, CustomMessageBox.dll are some of the dll's that are being used by the malware. **RecentFileList** shows that the malware is accessing files. **unsigned, long, int short, char**: Maybe the malware is working with different datatypes.

HH:mm:ss
dddd, MMMM dd, yyyy
MM/dd/yy
December
re November
o October
e December
August
July
June
April
March
February
January
Saturday
Friday
Thursday
Wednesday
Tuesday
Monday
Sunday
am/pm
united-states
united-kingdom
trinidad & tobaqo

Here we can see the time and date formats along with name of months and countries suggesting that maybe the malware is using different timezones to it's benefit. **GetDateFormat** and **GetTimeFormat** also points to the same.


DllGetVersion get's the version of cabinet.dll file.

d. Anti-Disassembly techniques

Nothing found as ghidra was able to disassemble the dll file without any errors.

e. Is the program obfuscated?


Yes, the program is obfuscated. After loading the rundll32.dll file into x32dbg and changing the command line arguments to include sample3.dll file with #1 as the ordinal, we can run the debugger and we finally reach a point where we get the sample3 entry point.



```
67E37942 8BFF 55          mov     edi,edi
67E37943 8BEC        mov     ebp,esp
67E37944 837D 0C 01   cmp     dword ptr ss:[ebp+C],1
67E37945 75 05       jne     sample3.67E37952
67E37946 E9 53BF0000 call     sample3.67E43845
67E37947 FF75 08     push    dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
67E37948 8B4D 10     mov     ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+10]
67E37949 8B55 0C     mov     edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp+C]
67E3794A E8 ECFFFFFF call     sample3.67E3784C
67E3794B 59         pop     ecx
67E3794C 5D         pop     ebp
67E3794D C2 0C00    ret     C
67E3794E 8BFF 55          mov     edi,edi
67E3794F 8BEC        mov     ebp,esp
67E37950 57         push    edi
67E37951 BF E0300000 mov     edi,3E8
67E37952 57         push    edi
67E37953 FF15 B061E667 call    dword ptr ds:[<sleep>]
67E37954 FF75 08     push    dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
67E37955 FF15 C052E667 call    dword ptr ds:[<GetModuleHandle>]
67E37956 81C7 E0300000 add     edi,3E8
67E37957 81FF 60EA0000 cmp     edi,EAX
67E37958 77 04       ja      sample3.67E37992
67E37959 85C0       test    eax,edx
67E3795A 85C0       test    eax,edx
```

Once we continue running from here we can see that in some of the functions being called some of the DLL's that are being imported by the malware.

Here we can see that




```
775CDAFF 895D E0     mov     dword ptr ss:[ebp-20],ebx
775CDB02 81FB 8C5D6A77 cmp     ebx,ntdll.776A5D8C
775CDB03 0F84 A6000000 je      ntdll.775CDB84
775CDB04 895D D8     mov     dword ptr ss:[ebp-28],ebx
775CDB05 8B43 50     mov     eax,dword ptr ds:[ebx+50]
775CDB06 8378 20 09   cmp     dword ptr ds:[eax+20],9
775CDB07 0F8C 8F000000 jl      ntdll.775CDBAD
775CDB08 8B45 E4     mov     eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C]
775CDB09 8B40 08     mov     eax,dword ptr ds:[eax+8]
775CDB0A 8B43 18     cmp     eax,dword ptr ds:[ebx+18]
775CDB0B 0F84 80000000 je      ntdll.775CDBAD
775CDB0C 8B43 34     mov     eax,dword ptr ds:[ebx+34]
775CDB0D A9 00000400 test    eax,40000
775CDB0E 75 76       jne     ntdll.775CDBAD
775CDB0F 8B48 1C     mov     ecx,dword ptr ds:[ebx+1C]
775CDB10 894D DC     mov     dword ptr ss:[ebp-24],ecx
775CDB11 894D D4     mov     dword ptr ss:[ebp-2C],ecx
775CDB12 85C9       test    ecx,ecx
775CDB13 74 69       je      ntdll.775CDBAD
775CDB14 25 04000800 and     eax,80004
775CDB15 85C0       test    eax,edx
775CDB16 85C0       test    eax,edx
```

Dynamic Analysis


a. Interesting Behavior after malware execution

Once the malware is run, we can see in C:\Windows\Temp directory that some file are created. We can see the file creation time and the time on the local machine in the screenshot below.



b. Network Calls:

We can see here that the malware is trying to contact sf.symcd.com.



A quick google search about sf.symcd.com shows us a domain with many malicious files hosted in it. Maybe the malware is trying to contact the domain to get access to these files.

HOSTNAME

sf.symcd.com

Add to Pulse +

Pulses

20

Passive DNS

104

URLs

917

Files

7K

Analysis Overview

Verdict

Whitelisted

Domain

symcd.com

19 Pulses 500 Passive DNS 7,898 URLs 0 Files

IP Address

23.49.139.27

Location

Canada

ASN

AS6327 SHAW

Nameservers

ns13.dnsmadeeasy.com, ns1.p03.dynect.net. More

WHOIS

Registrar: MarkMonitor, Inc., Creation Date: Dec 11, 2013

Related Pulses

OTX User-Created Pulses (20)

Related Tags

237 Related Tags
code, server, san jose, date, key identifier More

Indicator Facts

989 malicious files communicating Historical OTX telemetry
Running webserver Present in Umbrella Present in Akamai

Antivirus Detections

ALF:HSTR:MITM:UtilAds, ALF:HeraklezEval:VirTool:MSIL/Shrewd:Alfrn, ALF:JASYP:PUA:Win32/InstallCorelatmm, ALF:Trojan:MSIL/AgentTeslaKM, ALF:Win32/GbdlInf_4E52B34C.Jlbt More

AV Detection Ratio

989 / 1000

Certificate Issuer

C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, CN=GeoTrust RSA CA 2018

Certificate Subject

CN=ocsp-ssl.ws.symantec.com

External Resources

Alexa, Whois, VirusTotal, UrlVoid

HOSTNAME sf.symcd.com Add to Pulse				
SHOWING 1 TO 10 OF 917 ENTRIES				
1 2 3 4 5 ... 92 NEXT				
Associated Files				
Show 10 entries				
DATE	HASH	AVAST	AVG	CLAMAV
Apr 10, 2022	a8a4b2fa5e748f018da32f50a60efb51643ce9afab54288b00c5f-da6c073a63			Win.Malware.Slimware-680448...
Apr 9, 2022	cc93b64865955c6a7c75bc779219cd3f3ca89fc355f24dc1c98f128f9e9568			Win.Malware.Slimware-680448...
Apr 9, 2022	9443c42a4e5dccc170f61b7c70708596b13d019703d5ddec3d-d02498f38c4			ALFHSTRMTMLXAds

Here we can see that the malware is making some DHCPv6 calls and we can see interesting things like “2022Malware7-2”.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of network traffic. The packet list on the left shows a DHCPv6 Solicit message from 192.168.245.130 to 192.168.245.255. The packet details on the right show the Solicit message structure. The packet bytes on the right show the Solicit message structure. The packet bytes show the Solicit message structure.

We can also see NBNS calls to 2022MALWARE7-2<1c>. Perhaps a device or network that malware is trying to contact.

27	13.462556501	VMware_87:8b:3c	VMware_87:9c:b6	ARP	42	192.168.245.133	is at 00:50:56:87:8b:3c
28	13.743478597	192.168.245.130	192.168.245.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB 2022MALWARE7-2<1c>	
29	14.507912993	192.168.245.130	192.168.245.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB 2022MALWARE7-2<1c>	
30	17.191132874	192.168.245.130	192.168.245.133	DNS	77	Standard query 0x5044 A csl.microsoft.com	

▶ Frame 28: 92 bytes on wire (736 bits), 92 bytes captured (736 bits) on interface ens33, id 0
 ▶ Ethernet II, Src: VMware_87:9c:b6 (00:50:56:87:9c:b6), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.245.130, Dst: 192.168.245.255
 ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 137, Dst Port: 137
 ▶ NetBIOS Name Service

0000	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	56 87 9c b6 08 00 45 00P V.....E
0010	00 4e 02 da 00 00 00 11	ca f1 c0 a8 f5 82 c0 a8	.N.....
0020	f5 ff 00 89 00 89 00 3a	7e 1d 8c fb 01 10 00 01:.....
0030	00 00 00 00 00 00 20 44	43 44 41 44 43 44 43 45D CDADCDE
0040	4e 45 42 45 4d 46 48 45	42 46 43 45 46 44 48 43	NEBEMFHE BFCEFDHC
0050	4e 44 43 43 41 42 4d 00	00 20 00 01	NDCCABM.....

c. Registry Keys created/modified:

Keys added:

```

-----
Keys added: 28
-----
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\Deployment\Package\*S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\{13CEFC...
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\1044
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\2748
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\3984
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\4920
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\5200
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\5740
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\6436
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\6960
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\TermReason\7756
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Power\Profile\BootCheck
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VSS\Diag\SwProvider_{b5946137-7b9f-4925-af80-51abd60b20d5}
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\VSS\Diag\VssapiPublisher
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Power\Profile\BootCheck
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS\Diag\SwProvider_{b5946137-7b9f-4925-af80-51abd60b20d5}
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\VSS\Diag\VssapiPublisher
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:000000000020408
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:000000000030392
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:00000000007040E
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:00000000008031A
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\2\0\4
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84\Shell
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84\Shell\{5C4F28B5-F869-4E84-8E60-F11D897C5CC7}
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84\Shell
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\84\Shell\{5C4F28B5-F869-4E84-8E60-F11D897C5CC7}
-----

```

Keys Deleted:

```

-----
Keys deleted: 10
-----
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Wbem\Transports\Decoupled\Client\{7C0C823A-9A56-4BA3-9492-AE2F1BF8D7BC}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Wbem\Transports\Decoupled\Client\{9484C00B-1604-4BF9-B815-48A99E83C2CF}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Wbem\Transports\Decoupled\Client\{C959F880-A3CB-451E-83D8-E498D9DFF788}
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Wbem\Transports\Decoupled\Client\{DE3F04D3-91C6-4382-B698-9E453E7D4D76}
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:0000000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Search\JumplistData
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Storage\microsoft
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Storage\microsoft
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Storage\microsoft.windows
HKU\S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Storage\microsoft.windows
-----

```

Keys modified:

Values modified: 80

```
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\ConnectivityRestrictedNetworkTime: 0x00000001
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\ConnectivityRestrictedNetworkTime: 0x00000709
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\HeartBeats\Default\LastHeartBeatTime: D8 AC 1A 2D F8 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\HeartBeats\Default\LastHeartBeatTime: 9B FB 02 5E FF 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\HeartBeats\Default\HeartBeatSequenceNumber: 0x0000001A
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\HeartBeats\Default\HeartBeatSequenceNumber: 0x0000001B
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\SettingsRequests\LastDownloadTime: 87 B4 87 45 FD 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Diagnostics\DiagTrack\SettingsRequests\LastDownloadTime: 47 A2 38 65 FF 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\GlobalAssocChangedCounter: 0x00000002
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\GlobalAssocChangedCounter: 0x00000003
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\VFUPProvider\StartTime: 72 0F 09 4C FE 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\VFUPProvider\StartTime: A3 7B 23 6A FF 4D D8 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\418A073AA3BC1C75: 44 06 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 01 00 05 00 01 01 00 06
39 01 2A 68 A9 00 2A B7 22 01 2A C7 DE 00 28 24 99 00 2C 3D 81 00 2C D8 42 01 2D 0A EE 01 2D D8 F4 00 2E 80 1D 01 2F 34 F8 00 2F 95 46 01 30 31 14
2 6B 79 FB 01 6C 52 0D 01 6D 3E 43 01 6E F8 41 01 6F B3 11 01 6F BD A9 00 6F E5 D6 01 71 05 28 01 71 40 A3 00 72 3C 12 00 72 6E 4A 00 72 98 37 01 ;
05 06 00 A3 E7 15 01 A4 58 02 00 A4 BA 37 01 A4 C0 08 02 A5 6C FE 01 A5 AD CF 00 A6 44 A6 00 A6 82 44 01 A7 36 A8 00 A7 B8 AD 00 A8 A2 35 01 A9 54
1E 02 DF 1F 00 01 E0 3E E7 01 E1 7E 8C 00 E2 18 ED 01 E2 18 56 00 E4 40 27 01 E4 69 C9 00 E5 76 F8 01 E6 3E 2B 0D E6 7D 07 01 E7 A4 D9 00 E8 9E FA
1 A3 00 2E 53 4C 01 2E 68 A9 00 32 55 1E 01 32 56 AE 00 32 D4 5F 01 34 BB EF 00 36 D8 41 01 37 22 C7 00 37 F8 1D 01 3D 5E 35 01 3F 1C EA 00 42 7F ;
00 A3 C4 E2 00 A3 F7 6A 00 A5 04 03 01 A5 22 A4 00 A5 8F 00 00 A6 38 DA 00 A7 C2 33 01 A9 B2 D8 00 AB 78 3D 01 AC 84 0E 01 AF EF C9 00 B0 75 5E 0E
A9 00 2A B7 22 01 C9 38 4F 01 CD AD 05 01 03 00 42 01 00 00 27 69 12 01 38 0E 67 01 72 ED 81 01
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\418A073AA3BC1C75: 54 06 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 04 00 01 00 05 00 01 01 00 06
3B 01 29 45 01 01 29 CC 10 01 2A 0E 39 01 2A 68 A9 00 2A B7 22 01 2A B8 5E 01 2A C7 DE 00 28 24 99 00 2C 3D 81 00 2C D8 42 01 2D 0A EE 01 2D D8 F4
0 63 E5 07 02 64 1C A3 01 64 D4 19 01 65 30 54 01 65 A6 9E 00 67 1E F9 01 68 13 EC 01 69 CC 4F 01 6A 13 17 02 68 79 FB 01 6C 52 0D 01 6D 3E 43 01 ;
72 46 01 9B 2B D8 00 9B AD 07 00 9C 23 05 02 9C 47 41 01 9C 62 3A 01 9C A4 EB 00 9C E0 A8 00 9D 9D 92 00 9D 8D FB 01 9E BC E9 01 9F 91 92 01 A0 8E
DA 00 CC 49 56 00 CC EF EF 00 CD AD 05 01 CD 8D 8C 00 CF 86 E7 01 CF D9 35 00 D0 17 56 00 D1 9A 78 00 D1 D2 A7 00 D2 A9 2B 01 D3 82 61 00 D6 F6 FE
5 80 00 12 8D 0E 02 13 19 83 00 13 2F D3 00 14 AA FD 00 15 4D 28 01 15 9A DB 00 18 1F 1B 01 19 C3 98 00 1A 66 11 01 1A FA 99 00 21 DF 5E 01 22 D3 ;
00 82 E6 F4 00 84 68 08 01 8C 3B D3 00 8D 05 47 01 8F 06 43 01 8F 3C F3 00 91 67 C8 00 91 96 22 01 92 82 71 00 92 83 51 01 92 C4 14 01 93 05 47 01
E9 D1 F5 00 F0 0E 4E 01 F0 3A DD 00 F1 9F 43 01 F3 89 40 01 F3 9E D3 00 F4 06 28 01 F4 79 3D 01 F4 AD 7A 00 F4 C8 2F 01 F6 D9 EC 00 F7 D4 5F 01 F8
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\418A073AA3BC3475: A2 03 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 04 00 01 02 04 00 00 00 06
41 03 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 04 00 01 03 04 00 00 00 06
```

d. Files created/modified

Files added:

☒ Files added: 18

```
C:\Windows\Logs\waasmedic\waasmedic.20220411_154418_082.etl
C:\Windows\Logs\waasmedic\waasmedic.20220411_164418_104.etl
C:\Windows\Logs\waasmedic\waasmedic.20220411_171858_968.etl
C:\Windows\Logs\waasmedic\waasmedic.20220411_173941_363.etl
C:\Windows\Logs\WindowsUpdate\WindowsUpdate.20220411.111349.340.3.etl
C:\Windows\Performance\WinSAT\DataStore\2022-04-11 11.59.32.834.winsat.etl
C:\Windows\Performance\WinSAT\DataStore\2022-04-11 11.59.33.569 Cpu.Assessment (Recent).WinSAT.xml
C:\Windows\Performance\WinSAT\DataStore\2022-04-11 11.59.33.569 Graphics3D.Assessment (Recent).WinSAT.xml
C:\Windows\Performance\WinSAT\DataStore\2022-04-11 12.00.40.562 Formal.Assessment (Recent).WinSAT.xml
C:\Windows\Prefetch\AgG1UAD_P_S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000.db
C:\Windows\Prefetch\AgG1UAD_S-1-5-21-39733034-3216902470-2998706464-1000.db
C:\Windows\Prefetch\RUNDLL32.EXE-F4F26DED.pf
C:\Windows\Prefetch\SVCHOST.EXE-473F5CDC.pf
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\ScreenOn\ScreenOnPowerStudyTraceSession-2022-04-11-11-55-18.etl
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\user-not-present-trace-2022-04-11-13-39-41.etl
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU000BC.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU000BD.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU000BE.log
```

Folders added:

Folders added: 1

C:\Windows\Logs\SystemRestore

Files deleted:

```

-----
Files deleted: 12
-----
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\ScreenOn\ScreenOnPowerStudyTraceSession-2022-02-17-14-29-24.etl
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\ScreenOn\ScreenOnPowerStudyTraceSession-2022-02-17-14-36-14.etl
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\ScreenOn\ScreenOnPowerStudyTraceSession-2022-02-17-14-39-17.etl
C:\Windows\System32\SleepStudy\ScreenOn\ScreenOnPowerStudyTraceSession-2022-02-19-11-17-59.etl
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU0006C.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU0006D.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU0006E.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU0006F.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU00070.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU00071.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU00072.log
C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRU00073.log

```

e. Processes started by the malware:

The malware starts the rundll32.exe and slui.exe process. The slui process checks if the Windows OS on the system is genuine or not. This is a very important process for Windows as if this process is deleted or tampered with in a way that it does not work, the system will stop working altogether.

Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
7:19:4...	rundll32.exe	2472	c:\Process Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 3824, ...
7:19:5...	slui.exe	2836	c:\Process Start		SUCCESS	Parent PID: 620, C...

f. Persistence mechanism employed by Malware

No persistence mechanism was found.

g. Deobfuscation:

The obfuscation method is the same as described in static analysis.

Indicators of Compromise

When the malware runs, it tries to contact sf.symcd.com which is a domain which contains other malicious files (potentially malwares) that can affect the local system. On the local system we can see that about 4 files are created in the C:\Windows\Temp directory (for Win 7 machines).

Yara rule:

```

rule identify_emotet
{

```

meta:

description="YARA Rule to detect a emotet malware"

strings:

\$a="Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer"

```
$b="Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network"  
$c="Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Comdlg32"  
$d="GetTimeZoneInformation"  
$d="VirtualProtect"  
$e="GetModuleFileName"
```

condition:

```
    ($a or $b or $c or $d or $e)  
}
```

Note: We are not checking for file extension as this family of malware essentially attacks by making the user download some content. That content could be pdf, image, doc or any other file.