

# 2k19. Yet Another Cold-Boot Attack



Il'ya Sukhoplyuev  
Security & Network Engineering



April - May 2019

# Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

Halderman and team, USENIX Security Symposium (2008), [pdf](#)



Objective

**Reproduce  
RAM memory dumping  
on our equipment**

# Targets

1. Explore results of “Lest We Remember”

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  - a. on Virtual Machine
  - b. on Real Hardware
4. Try to create own *Memory Scraper*



# Targets

1. Explore results of “Lest We Remember”
2. Explore DIMM DRAM specifications
3. Repeat with published tools set
  - a. on Virtual Machine
  - b. on Real Hardware
4. **[Work In Progress]** ~~Create Memory Scraper~~

# Experiments

# Breaking BitLocker on VirtualBox

1. Deploy VM with [Windows 10](#)
2. Encrypt Disk with BitLocker
3. Dump the RAM:

a. `VBoxManage debugvm "WinDev1903Eval" dumpvmcore --filename dump.ram`

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## 4. Find AES keys:

- a. `scripts/coldboot-attacks/bin/aeskeyfind dump.ram`
- b. `4ffa2b21ca45676f321739cef00db137`
- c. `bd91534fca3e27b74969b8c7dc856805`

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5. Load with Ubuntu Mate:

```
a. sudo apt-get install libbde-utils  
b. sudo bdemount -k  
   4ffa2b21ca45676f321739cef00db137:bd91534fca3e27b74969b8c7dc856805\  
c. /dev/sda2 /mnt  
d. sudo mount -t ntfs -o ro /mnt/bde1 /media
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
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# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal



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


# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal

```
C:\Windows\system32> manage-bde -status c:  
BitLocker Drive Encryption: Configuration Tool v  
Copyright (C) 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All ri
```

```
Volume C: []  
[OS Volume]
```

```
Size: 118.64 GB  
BitLocker Version: 2.0  
Conversion Status: Fully Encrypted  
Percentage Encrypted: 100.0%  
Encryption Method: AES 128  
Protection Status: Protection On  
Lock Status: Unlocked  
Identification Field: Unknown  
Key Protectors:  
    Password  
    Numerical Password
```



# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal




# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal






# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal



# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal



```
atstrap loaded... trying c/h/s mode... starting.  
B memory scraper, written by Bill Paul (Jul 21 2014 14:05:39)  
Memory segment 0: base: 0x0000000000000000: size: 641024 (0x9c800)  
Memory segment 1: base: 0x0000000000100000: size: 2995228672 (0xb2879000)  
Memory segment 2: base: 0x00000000b297b000: size: 121933824 (0x7449000)  
Memory segment 3: base: 0x00000000ba0f3000: size: 1499136 (0x16e000)  
Memory segment 4: base: 0x00000000baeff000: size: 4096 (0x1000)  
Memory segment 5: base: 0x0000000100000000: size: 5351931904 (0x13f000000)  
Total memory: 8471238656 bytes  
Keyboard buffer: [ ]  
Disk size: 2785017856 bytes  
Dumping 0x0000000000009c800 bytes: 00%  
Write error at block 128  
Writing page 0 failed  
Dumping 0x00000000b2879000 bytes: 04%
```

# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal

```
1|suhoy@quark Scraper_32-bit$ sudo ./bios_memimage/usbdump/usbdump /dev/sdb > dump.raw
recover segment0 [base: 0x0 size: 641024]
recover segment1 [base: 0x100000 size: 2995228672]
recover segment2 [base: 0xb297b000 size: 121933824]
recover segment3 [base: 0xba0f3000 size: 1499136]
recover segment4 [base: 0xbaeff000 size: 4096]
recover segment5 [base: 0x100000000 size: 5351931904]
```



# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal

```
ir;EFI_LOAD_ERROR
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER
EFI_UNSUPPORTED
EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE
EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
EFI_NOT_READY
EFI_DEVICE_ERROR
EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED
EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES
EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED
EFI_VOLUME_FULL
EFI_NO_MEDIA
EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED
EFI_NOT_FOUND
EFI_ACCESS_DENIED
EFI_NO_RESPONSE
EFI_NO_MAPPING
EFI_TIMEOUT
```

```
EFI_NOT_STARTED
EFI_ALREADY_STARTED
EFI_ABORTED
EFI_ICMP_ERROR
EFI_TFTP_ERROR
EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR
EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
EFI_CRC_ERROR
EFI_END_OF_MEDIA
EFI_UNDEFINED_29
EFI_UNDEFINED_30
EFI_END_OF_FILE
EFI_INVALID_LANGUAGE
EFI_COMPROMISED_DATA
EFI_INTERRUPT_PENDING
EFI_REQUEST_UNLOAD_IMAGE
```

```
ting
aYeType
cdows.S
#temToa
.Hello
\dows.S
\temToa
|.Locat
|nManag
dows.S
temToa
```

# Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal

```
0|suhoy@quark Scraper_32-bit$ ./aeskeyfind/aeskeyfind dump.ram  
Segmentation fault (core dumped)  
139|suhoy@quark Scraper_32-bit$ strings dump.ram | grep -i Hello  
1|suhoy@quark Scraper_32-bit$ █
```

Possible reasons:

- More than 4 GiB
- Do not believe in binaries from Internet
- Bad BIOS / hardware
- DDR4 degrades too fast



Dumping on ~~Bare~~ Brutal Metal

Stay tuned?

# Back to theory ...

# Related Works, Standards and Resources

1. Memory Forensics over the IEEE 1394 Interface, Witherden (2010), [pdf](#)
2. The Chilling Reality of Cold Boot Attacks(2018),F-Secure lab, [blog](#), [youtube](#)
3. Demo is shown in InfoSec (2019), ([September 2014](#) ??)
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  - c. HyperX Part Number Decoder, [Web-page](#)
  - d. **DDR4 SDRAM Standard - Jedec, \$284**, [download page](#)
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5. [OSDev.org](#) - *the longest way*
6. [wikipedia.org](#) - *good start to explore about PC components*
7. A lot of similar videos and materials ...

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Before we start....

Broad our task




# How to dump RAM?




# How to extract Machine State?

# What is Machine State?




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


Simple, but...


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
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


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
# What is Machine State?



# What is Machine State?

Volatile


Non-Volatile



# What is Machine State?

Volatile


Non-Volatile



# Question: Is I/O really *stateless*?

Volatile


Non-Volatile



# Defining the objective...

Volatile

Non-Volatile



Inspired By: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motherboard#/media/File:Motherboard\\_diagram.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motherboard#/media/File:Motherboard_diagram.svg)


# Extraction Procedure

## **FIX STATE**


- Hibernate
- Sleep
- Shutdown
- Force-Off
- Debug?

## **NOT FIX STATE**

# Extraction Procedure




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





# Extraction Procedure



# Extraction Procedure



# Extraction Procedure



# Properties:

- Dump Consistency
- Dumping/Acquisition Speed
- Anti-dumping methods Availability
- Method interference (Impact on RAM Content)
- ...

# FIX STATE

	<b>Hibernate</b>	<b>Sleep</b>	<b>Shutdown</b>	<b>Force-Off</b>
<b>Consistency</b>	Virtualization seems possible		OS Leftovers	Uncontrolled CPU state
<b>Anti-dumping</b>	YES	YES	YES	More Difficult

# DUMP

	Hardware	BIOS	Mini Kernel	Linux (Any OS)
Method interference	~0	Few KiB	Few KiB-MiB	The Most Harmful

# DUMP

Acquisition Speed depends on

- RAM volume
- using buses and devices  
i.e. USB, SATA, Ethernet, etc...

# 50 DUMP shades

**HARDWARE REQUIRED BARRIER**

---



# 50 DUMP shades

- Hardware
  - Raspberry Pi + DDR Connector? (as [xDevs.com](#))
  - FPGA Devices (Like [NanoBoard 3000](#)) [**EXPENSIVE ~1k\$**]
  - Open-Source Hardware ([Respects Your Freedom](#))

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- BIOS [**Experience WANTED**]
  - Coreboot (<https://www.coreboot.org/>)
  - u-boot (<https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot>)

**HARDWARE REQUIRED BARRIER**

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## HARDWARE REQUIRED BARRIER

---

- Mini Kernel - Following By Halderman Steps [**That x86**]
- Custom Linux - *Work In Progress*

# Thank you for attention. Any questions?



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Telegram: [@suhoy95](https://t.me/suhoy95)

Presentation: <https://bit.ly/2waVeX1>