

Iamblichus

Iamblichus See NEOPLATONISM.

এসপি এনলোপ্লাটোনিজম। আইডি 'নৈতিক লক্ষ্য' থেকে the ব্যবহার করুন। কখনও কখনও দার্শনিক পিপ্পনচ্যালের ডিভিনের কন্ডারকার থা

Idealism In its philosophical use the term 'idealism' is quite distinct from 'idealism' in the sense of high moral aims. While the term has sometimes been employed by philosophers to express all views according to which the basis of the universe is ultimately spiritual, it has most commonly stood (in opposition to REALISM) for a theory according to which physical objects can have no existence apart from a mind which is conscious of them. (Thus it does not cover those who, while they believe in God, also ascribe a substantial existence to matter as quite conceivable independently of being experienced, although ultimately created by God.)

Idealism in this narrower sense originated in the eighteenth century with BERKELEY. He argued that physical objects were only 'ideas' (hence the term 'idealism'), or that their *esse* (existence) was *percipi* (to be perceived). His main argument was that we could not conceive the qualities we ascribe to them as existing in abstraction from our sense-experience. He also used the negative argument that we could not possibly know unexperienced physical objects. These two arguments in some form are common to most idealist thinkers. He then argued that ideas, being passive, cannot cause anything and that those which cannot be explained by human action must be due to the direct action of a non-human spirit, spirits being the only possible causal agents since they alone are 'active', that is possess volition. He explained the fact that physical things still seem to exist when no one is perceiving them by saying

that they exist in God's mind, thus providing a new argument for God.

Berkeley made practically no converts in his lifetime, and the 'idealism' school only began to gain ground with KANT, who however approached the subject in a different way. He contended that we can account for our a priori knowledge of things only by supposing that our mind has imposed on them a structure to which they must conform. But the human mind cannot impose on reality itself, but only on appearances, so Kant concluded that our knowledge must be limited to appearances. Appearances have to obey the conditions which our mind imposes, since they exist only as objects of actual or possible experience. This was the reason, Kant thought, why we are able to apply categories such as substance and cause to the physical world, but it also debars us from extending them beyond the realm of human experience, and thus proceeding with Berkeley, to metaphysics. This, Kant insisted, does not cast doubt on science; on the contrary it is the only way of saving it from scepticism. If we claimed that the function of science was to tell us the truth about reality, we should have to admit that it was wholly illusory; but not if it tells us only about appearances (phenomena). Kant consequently called himself both an 'empirical realist' and a 'transcendental idealist'. By this he meant approximately what some later thinkers expressed by saying that physical-object propositions have to be analysed in terms of 'SENSE-DATA'. He also argued that, if we hold that reality is in space and time, we will become involved in certain self-contradictions ('antinomies'). We will

একটি antithesis, সমাধান করা আনুগত্য, যার antinomy, এবং we reached a new synthesis, and so on till the reached পর্যন্ত fundamental category of the absolute idea এবং পুরোটা ধরিয়ে নিয়েছে বাস্তবতা যেমনটা হেল হেলের করা। হেল traced such processes not only in philosophy but also in politics and politics. In রাজনৈতিক জগৎ, রাজনীতিতে নয়। দায়ের expense of উদাহরণ স্বরূপ, কেউ কেউ শক্তির মূল্যে স্বাধীনতা পান, অন্যরা the স্বাধীনতার ব্যয়ে আদেশ দেন, কিন্তু উভয়ই into সানমে মন্দে পরিণত হতে পারে, the strongest regardless of others: political development consisted of successive syntheses of the two processes of the synthesis of what was of value in order to achieve the সংরক্ষণ করে। শক্তির এবং স্বাধীনতার মূল্য। Unfortunately Hegel sometimes gave the দুর্ভাগ্যবশত হেলের কখনও কখনও বারবার দিচ্ছে যে তার সময়ের প্রাথমিক রাজ্যে চূড়ান্ত সমাপ্তি হয়েছিল, কিন্তু তার এই ধারণা ছিল যে his day so that his philosophy was used to হেলের প্রাথমিক পদ্ধতিতে বর্ণনা করে, প্রতিটি হিসাবে, the impression that the state is the representative of the Absolute on earth (হেলের ধারণা মার্কসবাদের প্রারম্ভে একই কথা can do no wrong.) (On the other hand the 'Hegelian left' developed the almost equally one-sided doctrine of Marxism.) It many বহুদিক থেকে বিচার করে হেলের বিশ্বাস in a personal God: he regarded philosophy সন্দেহ করা যেতে পারে: তিনি প্রশ্নকে ধর্মের চেয়ে প্রকৃতির ধর্ম হিসেবে গ্রহণ করে, কিন্তু নিজেকে একটি অসীম প্রাথমিক প্রকৃতির প্রতীকী উপস্থাপনা হিসেবে।

Idealism spread from Germany to Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century and became dominant in Oxford and Scotland. GREEN এরি নিম্নের প্রকাশিত প্রচারের প্রাথমিক প্রভাব ছিলেন, তিনি বিশেষভাবে অন্তর্গত ছিলেন। তিনি idealism into connection with Christianity and with liberal political philosophy আরও সুস্পষ্ট রূপটি ব্যবহার করেছিলেন। He used a more subtle method of Berkeley's argument to show that physical objects cannot be conceived without relation to mind and therefore thought as dependent on a divine mind. He discarded Berkeley's empiricism in theory of knowledge and insisted,

like Kant and Hegel on the place of God was based mainly on the view that relations imply mind and yet are independent of human minds. F. H. BRADLEY, also of Oxford, began his leading work *Appearance and Reality* with an attempt to show that all our ordinary concepts are self-contradictory. This argument however led him not to scepticism but to the coherence theory of truth, according to which all these contradictions are reconciled. Bradley developed the coherence theory of truth, according to which all these contradictions are reconciled. Truth lies in the coherence of a system. একটি সিস্টেমের সুসংগত নথি সত্য মত। তার মতে, একটি সিস্টেমের সত্যতা, তাহলে সবকিছু all our judgements being both partly false (corrigible in the light of wider knowledge) and partly true (irrevocably true in some of its elements). He did not mean to deny that a limited system for ordinary purposes judgements could be taken as absolutely true or false. The coherence theory was also expounded by AMERSON, HARRIS, and WARD.

J. M. E. McTAGGART, who was at Cambridge, developed a form of idealism according to which reality consists of a number of spirits (including human beings) in a permanent harmonious harmony. By way of an elaborate a priori argument he arrived at the conclusion that matter, time and space are all mere appearances. The most satisfactory features of human experience are only apparent, and that in reality nothing exists except immortal spirits loving each other. Especially in the last 20 years the idealist movement has been revived in Italy by GENTILE. উপরোক্ত থেকে দেখা যায় যে, idealist case against independent matter বিষয়ের বিরুদ্ধে আদর্শবাদী মতামতটি স্থায়ী মতামতের জন্য জোরগাড়ে দেয়। It may be said that it is not possible to have a view of reality as by Berkeley, but it is not the form of

abtyam, rsmne ধরনের দ্বন্দ্ববোধ।
 এমনকি এটি বজায় রাখা যেতে পারে যে প্লি সিকাল
 ওজটি ইনিয়াম আইরি থেকে নিছক বিমূর্ততা, অন্যান্য
 আইডিয়ালিস্টরা এই মতটি গ্রহণ করেছেন যে আমরা
 মাকে কাছ পদার্থ বলিতা অত্যন্ত অপ্রকৃত মনের
 (এমহিম) উপস্থিতি এই new argument দ্বারা
 সুদূর প্রাচ্যে যে prob
 supported the argument that the problem
 মানবের ব্যক্তি এবং মনের relation between the human
 body and mind cannot be solved if we
 regard our body (or brain) as the appearance
 of our mind, which naturally led
 to the theory that everything physical is the
 appearance of something mental. It would
 be hard to find many philosophers who
 would call themselves idealists today. There
 are indeed many who would reject the view
 that physical objects should be regarded as
 entities existing independently of experi-
 ence except in the hypothetical sense that
 under suitable conditions they would
 appear in experience; and some trends in
 modern science can be regarded as sup-
 porting this conclusion (see QUANTUM
 MECHANICS, RELATIVITY). But such views
 are usually referred to not as 'idealism'
 but as 'PHENOMENALISM'. (ACE)

Ideas শব্দটির ধারণা 'ইডিয়া' হিসাবে দ্বি-
 history in philosophy in English. It is
 tantly related to its ordinary use. It is
 সাধারণ ব্যবহারের সাথে খুব বেশি সম্পর্কিত।
 এটি প্রথম গ্রীক philosopher of ideas
 শব্দের একটি প্রতিবাদীকরণ, এবং
 সাধারণত প্লেটোর অনুবাদে এবং ক্যান্ট
 development of aspects of Platonism by
 KANT, HEGEL, SCHOPENHAUER, and
 Second, it was extensively employed
 দ্বিতীয়ত, এটি ব্যাপকভাবে দ্বারা employed
 Locke in the late seventeenth century,
 এবং এখন philosophical use for
 a hundred years. The expression
 had already been much employed by
 French writers, notably DESCARTES and
 MALEBRANCHE, and Locke's usage no
 থেকে লকের সাধারণ source.
 এই শব্দটি আসলে fact the cause
 great deal of confusion in the philosophy
 দর্শনশাস্ত্রে ব্যাপক বিভ্রান্তি the philosophy
 সৃষ্টি করেছিল।

জাতিদর্শনশাস্ত্রের একটি early critic,
 Thomas Reid, went so far as to suggest that
 the main errors of Locke were
 and in it could be traced to it, and that,
 the major errors এটিকে অনুসরণ করা যেতে
 পারে, এবং এটি, কিন্তু এই key পর্যায়ে অস্পষ্টতার
 জন্য, তাদের কিছু তার খুব কমই হতে পারে।
 stated. This contention, though extreme,
 is not without some basis. The root of the
 trouble was that the meaning of 'idea' was
 either made undesirably wide or left
 highly indeterminate. Locke in introducing
 the expression writes of it as
 being that which I think, and which I
 stand for whatsoever is the object of the
 understanding when a man thinks. I have
 used it to express whatever it is, whether
 phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it
 is, whether I have it in my mind or not.
 করেছি।, ধারণা, প্রজ্ঞা, বা যাই হোক না কেন,
 বা নিয়ে মনকে চিন্তার নিয়োজিত করা যায়। এই
 মন্তব্যটি অস্পষ্টই অস্পষ্ট। প্রকৃতপক্ষে লক অস্পষ্ট
 চারটি উপায়ে 'ধারণা' শব্দটি ব্যবহার করেছেন।
 the word 'idea' in at least four ways.

(1) তিনি এটি এই অর্থে ব্যবহার করেছেন: 'I
 not perspicuous - of the modern expres-
 sion 'SENSE-DATUM' উল্লেখ করে অন্য
 to the
 immediate objects' of sense and experience।
 ইন্দ্রিয়-অভিজ্ঞতার তাৎক্ষণিক বস্তু।
 (2) He uses it also, occasionally in the
 sense of an image or notion. (3) In his
 discussions of imagination and memory. (4) The
 term 'idea' sometimes designates the
 meaning of a word (or a concept): for
 instance to have the 'idea' of whiteness is
 to know what 'white' means. (4) Less
 clearly, Locke sometimes seems to mean
 by 'ideas' whatever it is that one has in
 mind when one thinks or understands.

The chief danger of this liberal
 use of terms is that it makes it very
 difficult to discuss very different things under
 the same name. It is like using identical
 language, obscuring how different they
 are. In the present case perhaps the most
 seriously harmful result was that from
 Locke to Hume, no adequate distinctions
 were ever drawn between perceiving,
 thinking, understanding, imagining and
 even believing. The result was that con-
 siderable difficulty was experienced
 to assimilate them all to