

[illegible][illegible]

রবীন্দ্রনাথ ঠাকুর। *Liberalism in India* (1993); in *Political Writings and Collected Papers* (1999); এবং *নৈতিক দর্শনের ইতিহাসের উন্নয়ন* (2000)। আরও দেখুন *Moral Philosophy* (2000)। See also LIBERALISM এবং কনসিউটিভ রিফর্মিজম। [J.R.]

The word 'essentially' is important here. It would not refute a realist about the external world if every bit of reality was dependent in some causal or continuous way on human mind and one can be a realist about objects (for instance, to use the apple example cultivated cherry tree), which would not have existed without human consciousness. যদি এই ধরনের dependence is justified, তবে আর বিশ্বাস করা যায় না যে বস্তুটি যুক্তিগতভাবে মস্তিষ্ককেই কল্পনা থেকে স্বাধীনভাবে নির্দেশনা প্রদান করে। এটি একটি বৈশিষ্ট্য। এই বৈশিষ্ট্যটি characterizes the external world. কোন মানুষ না হলেও বস্তুটি দ্বারা সত্যবাদী সিস্টেমকে defining realism about the world by definition, since

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obviously no mind can exist essentially independently of itself. One could avoid this difficulty by defining realism as the view that a thing could exist independently not of mind in general, but more specifically of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about it. We are realists about mental contents like pain if we hold that one can be in pain even if one does not believe it. We are realists about morality if we think that actions can be right, or things can be good, whether or not anyone believes that they are. In this sense, realism is connected with the epistemological idea that what is real can always serve as an objective 'other' against which our beliefs can be tested. The important point for realism, recharacterized in this way, is that it is always possible either that our beliefs are wrong, or that we are wrong about which beliefs we have. Error and mistake are always possible in epistemology. This is the point of realism. Truth is associated with the metaphysical doctrine of realism.

Scientific realism can be characterized using this second definition. It is the view that scientific theories about unobservable entities should be construed at face value, as attempts to describe an independent even if unobservable reality. Historically, empiricists (like PEIRCE) and phenomenologists (like MACH) argue for an anti-realist view that scientific theories do not refer to an independent reality, but are either heuristic tools for the prediction of empirical data, or shorthand summaries, equivalent to the set of empirical statements which follow from them. Of course, scientific realists need not deny the factual or causal dependence of some part of reality upon theory, for example, in the case of self-fulfilling predictions which bring about the facts that make them true. But for the scientific realist, any factual ties between reality and scientific

theory are always logically or causally dependent on the theory.

Sometimes anti-realism is described more weakly as the view that our knowledge of reality is theory-dependent, or that it necessarily depends on language. It then might seem an easy step to conclude that reality itself is dependent on language or theory. But this characterization would be a mistake: a clear distinction must be drawn between the mind-dependence of language or theory and the mind-independence of reality. The mind-dependence of language or theory is a claim about the way we describe the world, not about the way the world is. The mind-independence of reality is a claim about the way the world is, not about the way we describe it. The mind-dependence of language or theory is a claim about the way we describe the world, not about the way the world is. The mind-independence of reality is a claim about the way the world is, not about the way we describe it. The mind-dependence of language or theory is a claim about the way we describe the world, not about the way the world is. The mind-independence of reality is a claim about the way the world is, not about the way we describe it.

The great problem that faces realism is that since it places a gap between mind and reality, it has to say that real objects transcend the content of our minds; that social phenomena are more than the individuals who participate in them; and that universals are irreducible to the particulars of which those universals are true. But if real objects transcend experience, how is knowledge of reality possible? See also RELIGION. [D.-H.R.]

Reductio ad absurdum A technique of refutation in which a proposition is shown to entail a contradiction.

Reid, Thomas (1710-96) Thomas Reid was the originator of the Scottish