# Digital Forensics Report

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# 1.Brief Summary of Information

This report presents the findings from the forensic analysis of a hard drive labeled 'ENPM687 Final XP,' which was confiscated from a suspect alleged to be involved in malware creation. The primary tool used for the analysis was Autopsy.

During the investigation, the initial assessment of the hard drive using Autopsy's Data Sources summary indicated its size to be 21 GB with a variety of file types. The hard drive's geolocation was identified as the United Kingdom. A detailed exploration of the 'Recent Files' tab revealed frequent access to the 'My Documents' folder, especially to a subfolder named 'code,' which contained Python-related files and executables. These executables, when executed, showed no immediate output but were found to be making server requests and establishing TCP connections to a remote system. Network traffic captured with Wireshark indicated that these executables were sending encrypted messages, with references to 'Obiwan Kenobi' and phrases like 'you're my only hope.'

Further analysis led to the discovery of significant items in the 'Downloads' folder, including ProcessExplorer, a Python installer, and a VeraCrypt folder. The 'My Music' folder also contained an unusual music file that appeared to be a part of the puzzle, linking back to the Star Wars theme found in other parts of the analysis. Using the key 'r2d2,' deciphered from the encrypted messages, the contents of the mp3 file were decrypted using VeraCrypt, revealing a folder named 'Death Star Plans' and an executable 'final-form.exe,' which transmitted messages suggesting possession of critical information.

This summary encapsulates the key findings from the hard drive analysis, indicating the presence of encrypted communications, potentially malicious software, and references to coded messages and plans. A full analysis is underway to uncover the complete extent and intent of the data found.

# 2. Tools Used in the Investigation Process

During the forensic investigation of the 'ENPM687 Final XP' hard drive, a variety of specialized tools were utilized, each contributing uniquely to the analysis process. The primary tools employed included Autopsy, Wireshark, and Veracrypt. Here is an overview of each tool, outlining its specific role in the investigation and the assumptions underpinning its usage:

#### 1. Autopsy:

**Purpose:** Autopsy serves as a digital forensics platform, providing a graphical interface for The Sleuth Kit and other forensic tools. In this case, Autopsy was instrumental in the initial examination of the hard disk image. It was particularly useful for identifying and flagging suspicious files, including the encrypted MP3 file and executable files named 'obiwan.exe' and 'obiwan2.exe'.

**Assumptions:** The investigation relies on the presumption that Autopsy performs a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the disk image. Key to this reliance is the tool's capability to detect anomalies, potential malware, and encrypted files, forming the foundation for subsequent investigative steps.

#### 2. Wireshark:

**Purpose:** Wireshark is a network protocol analyzer designed for capturing and inspecting the traffic on computer networks. It was deployed to monitor and analyze the network traffic generated by the executables 'obiwan.exe', 'obiwan2.exe', and 'final-form.exe'. Wireshark aided in identifying the nature of the remote connections these executables established, including the scrutiny of HTTP requests and responses.

**Assumptions:** The analysis assumes that Wireshark is capable of capturing all pertinent network traffic comprehensively. The accuracy of the findings is contingent on Wireshark's effectiveness in capturing and decoding network packets, which is vital for understanding the network behaviors of the executables.

#### 3. Veracrypt:

**Purpose:** Veracrypt, an open-source disk encryption software, was employed for encrypting and decrypting files. In this investigation, it decrypted the 'not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3' file using the key "r2d2," uncovered earlier in the analysis. This decryption was a pivotal component of the investigation, revealing significant data concealed within the encrypted file.


**Assumptions:** The tool's effectiveness hinges on the assumption that the encryption on the MP3 file is within Veracrypt's decryption capabilities. There is also an underlying assumption that the "r2d2" key is correct and that the file's encryption wasn't multi-layered beyond what Veracrypt can decrypt.

# 3. Repository #1 Analysis

a.Analysis of "obiwan.exe," "obiwan2.exe," "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3," and "final-form.exe"

## Extraction of "obiwan.exe" and "obiwan2.exe" from Autopsy


The first phase in the comprehensive analysis of the executable files "obiwan.exe" and "obiwan2.exe" involved their extraction from the hard disk image. This step was crucial in obtaining a replicable copy of each executable for thorough examination while upholding the integrity of the original disk image.



#### **Extraction Process:**

Using Autopsy: The executables "obiwan.exe" and "obiwan2.exe" were located within the hard disk image through the Autopsy forensic suite. Autopsy is recognized for its extensive capabilities in digital investigations, particularly in file identification and extraction.

Default Extract Option: For the extraction process, Autopsy's default extraction option was employed. This option is specifically designed to ensure a direct and secure method of file extraction, which is paramount in preserving the forensic validity of the evidence.



# i. Analysis of "obiwan.exe"

# Detailed Examination of "obiwan.exe" Execution and Network Activity


The analysis of "obiwan.exe" encompassed an in-depth review of both its execution behavior and network interactions. This process was bifurcated into two key stages: closely monitoring the execution and behavior of the executable and conducting comprehensive Wireshark analysis to decipher its network interactions.

#### **Execution and Behavior:**

**Execution Monitoring:** "obiwan.exe" was executed within a controlled environment, with vigilant monitoring of its activities. This approach was critical to observing the executable's real-time behavior and system interactions.

**Process Explorer Analysis:** Utilizing Process Explorer, the running status of "obiwan.exe" was meticulously tracked. This tool revealed that the executable was initiating requests to a remote server over the internet, providing insights into the nature of these requests and the executable's overall process behavior.

**TCP Connections Observation:** The TCP connections linked to "obiwan.exe" were examined in detail. By tracing the TCP stream, comprehensive information regarding the connections' characteristics and destinations was obtained, elucidating the network behavior of the executable.



## Wireshark Analysis:

**Packet Capturing:** Wireshark was leveraged to capture the network packets generated by "obiwan.exe," crucial for analyzing the data transmitted and received by the executable.


**Follow TCP Stream:** The TCP stream for the request to "www.umd.edu/help-me-obiwan-kenobi" was analyzed, revealing the full HTTP request and response cycle, including the server's "301 Moved Permanently" status code.


```
GET /help-me-obiwan-kenobi HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 23:45:08 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/help-me-obiwan-kenobi
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 878ee5a004f543d6f7b6be3abaddb5d2.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: ATL58-P8
X-Amz-Cf-Id: K1X3CF2HlxFcw258A92XiP6oocZL7Jma-_aWZkxdfXYtKXwxUZpVRA==
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```

**Second TCP Stream Analysis:** A similar approach was adopted for the request to "www.umd.edu/youre-my-only-hope," providing insights into the nature of this second HTTP request and the server's corresponding response.

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 18) · Ethernet
GET /youre-my-only-hope HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Fri, 08 Dec 2023 23:45:15 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/youre-my-only-hope
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 db4cd3ca469cef8285f715a91c8d304e.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: ATL58-P8
X-Amz-Cf-Id: foPUCr_DwGP3fFTQDi5z3Hrqvi_CyIr10VqzD_e96ggw2Hc8CzW1cw==
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```

HTTP Requests Examination: The investigation revealed that "obiwan.exe" consistently made specific HTTP requests to URLs on the "www.umd.edu" server, particularly to "www.umd.edu/help-me-obiwan-kenobi" and "www.umd.edu/youre-my-only-hope," indicating a pattern in the executable's network communication.







**Server Responses:** The responses from the server consistently included a "301 Moved Permanently" status code, suggesting a redirection technique commonly used in web communication.

					9
	1687 2.140095	10.125.26.174	3.163.101.24	HTTP	189 GET /help-me-obiwan-kenobi HTTP/1.1
	1705 2.158979	3.163.101.24	10.125.26.174	HTTP	631 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
-	4626 4.721216	10.125.26.174	3.163.101.24	HTTP	186 GET /youre-my-only-hope HTTP/1.1
-	4642 4.739706	3.163.101.24	10.125.26.174	HTTP	628 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
1	6351 7.269228	10.125.26.174	3.163.101.24	HTTP	189 GET /help-me-obiwan-kenobi HTTP/1.1
	6357 7.287790	3.163.101.24	10.125.26.174	HTTP	631 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	8196 9.854277	10.125.26.174	3.163.101.24	HTTP	186 GET /youre-my-only-hope HTTP/1.1

**Request Tab Findings:** Further scrutiny in the Requests tab indicated a total of 11 requests directed to "www.umd.edu," pointing to a potentially programmed or automated behavior in "obiwan.exe."



**Packet Counter Confirmation**: The Packet Counter tab in Wireshark corroborated these observations, recording 11 requests and 11 corresponding responses, all marked with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code.



**Export Attempts:** Efforts to export objects from these requests were made for additional examination. However, continuous redirection of the web pages presented challenges in obtaining more detailed information.

ii.Analysis of "obiwan2.exe"

# Detailed Examination of "obiwan2.exe" Execution and Network Activity


This section covers the analysis of the executable file "obiwan2.exe," focusing on its execution behavior and network interactions, conducted through a similar approach as with "obiwan.exe."

## **Execution and Behavior:**

**Execution Monitoring:** "obiwan2.exe" was executed within a secure environment, allowing for close observation of its activities and behavior.


**Process Explorer Analysis:** Process Explorer provided valuable insights into the running status and system interactions of "obiwan2.exe," particularly focusing on its network requests.

**TCP Connections Observation:** The TCP connections associated with "obiwan2.exe" were carefully monitored to assess the nature and destinations of these connections.



#### Wireshark Analysis:

Packet Capturing: Network packets from "obiwan2.exe" were captured using Wireshark.



**HTTP Requests Examination:** Wireshark analysis of "obiwan2.exe" revealed three distinct HTTP requests made to the www.umd.edu server. These included:

A request to "http://www.umd.edu/All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us," suggesting a coded message.

A base64 encoded string in the request to "http://www.umd.edu/cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5," translating to "r2d2 is the key," hinting at the use of an encryption key or passphrase.

A request to "http://www.umd.edu/this-is-not-even-my-final-form," indicating the possibility of "obiwan2.exe" being part of a more extensive malware operation.

```
10.125.26.174
                                                                               18 160 46 5
 4563 6.343758
                                                                                                                                           630 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
                                      18.160.46.53
                                                                               10.125.26.174
                                                                                                                       HTTP
                                                                                                                                           638 HTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
199 GET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTP/1.1
641 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
200 GET /All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us HTTP/1.1
642 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
188 GET /cjJkHiBpcyB0aGUgaZVS HTTP/1.1
630 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
199 GET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTTP/1.1
641 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Dermanently (text/html)
  8141 10.431338
                                      10.125.26.174
                                                                               18.160.46.53
8144 10.435423
10277 12.742661
                                      18.160.46.53
10.125.26.174
                                                                               10.125.26.174
18.160.46.53
                                                                                                                       HTTP
HTTP
10282 12.746574
                                      18.160.46.53
                                                                               10.125.26.174
                                                                                                                       HTTP
13312 15.106833
13318 15.110675
                                      10.125.26.174
18.160.46.53
                                                                               18.160.46.53
10.125.26.174
                                                                                                                       HTTP
HTTP
16615 19.191504
                                      10.125.26.174
                                                                               18.160.46.53
                                                                                                                       HTTP
16620 19.195650
                                      18.160.46.53
                                                                               10.125.26.174
                                                                                                                       HTTP
                                                                                                                                           641 HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
```

```
> Frame 4558: 188 bytes on wire (1504 bits), 188 bytes captured (1504 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_(AF08FDDC-2301-40DE-8CFC-2E02E43765EF},

> Ethernet II, Src: ASUSTekC_d4:4b:dd (a8:5e:45:d4:4b:dd), Dst: Routerbo_6b:0c:02 (dc:2c:6e:6b:0c:02)

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.125.26.174, Dst: 18.160.46.53

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 59016, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 134

**Hypertext Transfer Protocol

**OET /cjJkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]

[GET /cjJkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]

[GET /cjJkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]

[Get /cjJkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1\r\n]

Request Version: HTTP/1.1

Accept-Encoding: identity\r\n
Host: www.umd.edu/\r\n
Connection: close\r\n
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7\r\n
IFull request URI: http://www.umd.edu/cjlkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5]

[HTTP request URI: http://www.umd.edu/cjlkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5]

[HTTP request URI: http://www.umd.edu/cjlkMiBpcy80aGUga2V5]

[Response in frame: 4563]
```

L	http						
N	lo. Tir	me	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length 1	info
	770 1.	.412087	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	199 G	GET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTTP/1.1
	775 1.	.417008	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP	641 H	MTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	2943 3.	.956960	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	200 G	GET /All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us HTTP/1.1
	2947 3.	.961559	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP	642 H	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	4558 6.	.339679	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP		ET /cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1
	4563.6	343758	18 160 46 53	10 125 26 174	HTTP	630 H	MTTP/1 1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
Н	+ 8141 10	0.431338	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	199 G	ET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTTP/1.1
6-	8144 10	3.435423	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP	641 H	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	10277 12	2.742661	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	200 G	ET /All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us HTTP/1.1
	10282 12	2.746574	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP	642 H	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	13312 15	5.106833	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	188 G	GET /cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1
	13318 15	5.110675	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP		HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)
	16615 19	9.191504	10.125.26.174	18.160.46.53	HTTP	199 G	GET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTTP/1.1
	16620 19	9.195650	18.160.46.53	10.125.26.174	HTTP	641 H	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently (text/html)

#### **Follow TCP Stream Analysis:**

For the first request to "http://www.umd.edu/All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us," the TCP stream revealed a "301 Moved Permanently" server response, indicating redirection.

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 1) · Ethernet
GET /this-is-not-even-my-final-form. HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2023 00:26:49 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/this-is-not-even-my-final-form.
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 9c13d38452f2017c92d65c8904408686.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: IAD55-P2
X-Amz-Cf-Id: UMORbL5UVDxdpRu6jQMs6L-9ecZI6GBaDnTDtWyYluVZhqefpd78jw==
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanentlv</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```


The second request to "http://www.umd.edu/cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5" followed a similar pattern with the server responding with a redirection status.

```
GET /All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2023 00:26:52 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/All-your-base64-are-belong-to-us
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 9ac471895811a7ff78c729bcc099e068.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: IAD55-P2
X-Amz-Cf-Id: vRCQPKkK383hV1XIk1JB00SuOuEt9FPeRuW9yp0_Cx67pig6G09D1w==
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```


The third request to "http://www.umd.edu/this-is-not-even-my-final-form" was also analyzed, confirming the pattern observed in the previous requests.

```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 11) · Ethernet
GET /cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5 HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2023 00:26:54 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 bdf2aab533e801e16a7a135842a2ee18.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: IAD55-P2
X-Amz-Cf-Id: -6RMGZXdk0i4CrFpmmtC5RH14Rs4DpuWfT0X4K6g9kQcQE0G2iaNXg=
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```


Server Responses: The server's responses to these requests consistently included a "301 Moved Permanently" status code, a typical redirection technique in web communication.



**Request Tab Findings:** The Requests tab in Wireshark showed a total of 7 HTTP requests made by "obiwan2.exe" to "www.umd.edu." This pattern of repeated communication suggests programmed or automated behavior, with each request targeting different URLs, implying a deliberate sequence of actions or messages.




**Packet Counter Confirmation:** The Packet Counter tab in Wireshark recorded 7 requests sent to "www.umd.edu" and an equal number of responses received, all with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code, underscoring the sophisticated and potentially complex nature of "obiwan2.exe."



iii.Analysis of "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3"

#### Decrypting and Examining the Encrypted MP3 File

This section details the procedure and findings from the analysis of the encrypted MP3 file "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3," which involved crucial decryption using a key derived from the analysis of "obiwan2.exe" and the application of Veracrypt for the decryption process.



#### **Decryption Process:**

**Base64 Decoded Key:** The analysis of "obiwan2.exe" revealed a base64 encoded string. Once decoded, the string read "r2d2 is the key," which was hypothesized to be the decryption passphrase.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
$ echo "cjJkMiBpcyB0aGUga2V5" | base64 -d
r2d2 is the key
```


**Using Veracrypt:** Veracrypt, renowned for its powerful encryption and decryption capabilities, was employed to decrypt the MP3 file.

# **Decryption Steps:**

## The MP3 file was loaded into Veracrypt.


"r2d2," derived from the base64 decoded message, was input as the decryption passphrase.

The decryption was initiated, with its successful completion being meticulously monitored.



#### **Post-Decryption Examination:**

The successful decryption of "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3" facilitated an in-depth exploration of its previously encrypted contents.




#### Contents of the Decrypted File:


A folder titled "Death Star Plans" was discovered within the decrypted file, containing images and schematics of the Death Star. This finding indicated the file's utilization for covertly storing and transmitting sensitive information.



A significant discovery was a text file named "ENPM687-Read-This.txt," which contained directives to execute 'final-form.exe,' signifying additional steps in the ongoing investigation.



The presence of an executable named "final-form.exe" within the decrypted file was a notable finding. Its inclusion alongside other contents implied that it could be an integral component in deciphering the broader context and potential objectives of the data concealed within the MP3 file.




# iv. Analysis of "final-form.exe"

## Comprehensive Examination of "final-form.exe" Execution and Network Activity

This section outlines the procedure and findings from the analysis of "final-form.exe," focusing on its execution behavior and network interactions. The analysis was segmented into two primary areas: monitoring the execution and behavior of the executable, and conducting an in-depth Wireshark analysis to understand its network interactions.

#### **Execution and Behavior:**

**Execution Monitoring**: "final-form.exe" was executed within a controlled setting, allowing for close observation of its activities. This was essential for understanding the executable's real-time behavior and system and network interactions.




**Process Explorer Analysis**: Process Explorer was used to monitor the running status of "final-form.exe." This tool shed light on the executable's processes, particularly its attempts to establish connections to remote servers over the internet, providing a comprehensive view of its behavior.

**TCP Connections Observation:** The TCP connections related to "final-form.exe" were meticulously examined. Detailed information regarding the nature and destinations of these connections was gathered through TCP stream monitoring, aiding in deciphering the network behavior of the executable.

# Wireshark Analysis:

**Packet Capturing:** Wireshark was used to capture the network packets from "final-form.exe," a vital step in analyzing the data being transmitted and received by the executable.



#### **Follow TCP Stream Analysis:**

The TCP stream for the first HTTP request to "http://www.umd.edu/We-have-the-blue-prints-to-the-Death-Star" was analyzed, revealing the full HTTP request and response cycle, including a "301 Moved Permanently" status code from the server.


```
Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 4) · Ethernet
GET /We-have-the-blue-prints-to-the-Death-Star HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2023 01:31:02 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/We-have-the-blue-prints-to-the-Death-Star
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 94bfb7d862be49d4dc2eadc0fd2c452a.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: ATL58-P8
X-Amz-Cf-Id: cRNF9M2rgZ6-nOgjEHExM6apxa5h_gOYtJksud6vppcKdmkE68a4dw==
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```


A similar approach was taken for the second HTTP request to "http://www.umd.edu/We-will-defeat-Darth-Vader," providing insights into the nature of this request and the server's identical response.

```
■ Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 8) · Ethernet

GET /We-will-defeat-Darth-Vader. HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: www.umd.edu
Connection: close
User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Server: CloudFront
Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2023 01:31:05 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 167
Connection: close
Location: https://www.umd.edu/We-will-defeat-Darth-Vader.
X-Cache: Redirect from cloudfront
Via: 1.1 5cfa3bf838414b2c366e22f44b738bfa.cloudfront.net (CloudFront)
X-Amz-Cf-Pop: ATL58-P8
X-Amz-Cf-Id: QD5UpTuTlnUtKatCAyUaDXrxnQCpKB1SBbSPMGnH8vIaqY-ObKR_Cg==
<html>
<head><title>301 Moved Permanently</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>301 Moved Permanently</h1></center>
<hr><center>CloudFront</center>
</body>
</html>
```


HTTP Requests Examination: Analysis of the HTTP requests indicated that "final-form.exe" specifically targeted URLs on the "www.umd.edu" server, such as "http://www.umd.edu/We-have-the-blue-prints-to-the-Death-Star" and "http://www.umd.edu/We-will-defeat-Darth-Vader." This pattern suggested a deliberate communication strategy, potentially revealing the executable's objectives or operational tactics.









**Server Responses:** The server's responses consistently included a "301 Moved Permanently" status code, suggesting permanent relocation of the requested resources. This redirection technique might indicate an attempt to conceal the true nature of the communication or to redirect to alternate resources.



**Request Tab Findings:** The Requests tab in Wireshark showed a total of 6 HTTP requests made by "final-form.exe" to "www.umd.edu." This repetitive communication pattern suggested programmed or automated behavior, possibly designed for specific sequences or triggering certain server actions.



**Packet Counter Confirmation:** The Packet Counter tab in Wireshark supported these findings, recording 6 requests and 6 corresponding responses, all marked with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code. This consistency reinforces the notion of an automated communication process.



**Export Attempts:** Efforts were made to export objects from these requests for deeper analysis. However, due to continuous redirection, these attempts did not yield significant insights, complicating the retrieval of more detailed information.

# 4 Strategic Recommendations and Next Steps

Following the in-depth analysis of "obiwan.exe," "obiwan2.exe," "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3," and "final-form.exe," we propose a comprehensive strategy for advancing the investigation:

#### **Sophisticated Malware Lifecycle Analysis:**

Conduct an in-depth behavioral analysis of the executables to delineate their life cycle, focusing on how they evolve, replicate, and persist within systems. Explore their methods of self-modification and replication to understand their adaptability and resilience.

#### **Source and Distribution Path Exploration:**

Investigate the origin of "obiwan.exe" by tracing its distribution channels. Collaborate with ISPs and use advanced forensic tools to track down the initial upload source or distribution networks, potentially uncovering the broader attack infrastructure.

#### **Engagement with Key External Stakeholders:**

Initiate a dialogue with the administrators of "www.umd.edu" to assess the server's security status during the periods of executable activity. This engagement could reveal whether there were any security incidents or unusual activities that align with the timeline of the malware's activities.

#### **Intensive Network Traffic and Botnet Investigation:**

Perform a comprehensive analysis of network traffic to detect patterns indicative of a larger network of compromised systems or a coordinated cyber attack. Be vigilant for signs of data being siphoned off or lateral movements within the network that could be attributed to the executables.

#### **In-depth Examination of Affected Systems:**

Expand the investigation to encompass systems that might have communicated with the compromised device. Analyze their network logs and system files for signs of similar intrusions or malware infections to gauge the extent of the threat.

# **Cybersecurity Policy Overhaul and Upgrades:**

Based on the insights gained from this investigation, thoroughly reassess and upgrade existing cybersecurity policies and incident response frameworks. This could entail refining response strategies, updating configurations of security tools, and enhancing user access control mechanisms.

# **Key Challenges**

# Throughout this forensic investigation, I navigated several complex challenges:

## **Navigating Cryptographic Hurdles:**

The process of decrypting the "not-the-droids-you-are-looking-for.mp3" file was a formidable challenge, particularly in accurately determining the decryption key "r2d2" and effectively applying it. This aspect highlighted the critical role of cryptographic expertise in digital forensic investigations.

# **Addressing Persistent Server Redirection Tactics:**

The consistent redirection behavior by "obiwan.exe" and "final-form.exe" complicated the analysis, necessitating advanced network forensic techniques to track and understand the purpose of these redirections and their impact on the investigation.

#### **Recommendation for Controlled Environment Execution:**

While the executables have not been run in a controlled environment for this project, it is strongly recommended to do so for any actual investigative purposes. Executing potentially malicious files in a secure, isolated environment is crucial to prevent unintended network spread or activation of harmful payloads. This approach is vital for safely analyzing the behavior and impact of such files, especially in an educational or research setting.

## **Managing Extensive Data and Complexity:**

The sheer volume of data, including diverse file types and extensive network logs, presented significant logistical challenges. This required strategic data management and advanced analytical methodologies to ensure thorough and accurate data interpretation.