Algo: given |H|2 |S|=n while (Ih unmatched AND Is in order of his list) st. h hasn't proposed syet) h proposes & else If s prefer h to current h'

Sub h'-s // s rejects h'

add h-s

else If & unmatched se sejets h 0. Loop terminates in atmost O(r) iterations Proof. Each iteration,
some h proposes to exactly one s
st. proposal (h, s) \in HxS has
not happened before · Ateratione cannot exceed | Mxs | = n2 = O(n2)

Algo produce a matching Let e(x) denote number of edges incident on x 11.00 1.1 \th, e(h) \le 1 Proof. h forms a new edge => h proposed

=> h was unmetched

in h was metched => h does not form a new edge

Since, in Algor e(h) can increase by

atmost one in each iteration

and initially e(h) = 0 01.00 02.00 03.00 : | Yh e(h) < 1 04.00 Proof. e(s) increases from 0 to 1
when s forme its first edge.

For each edge added to s

afterwards exactly one previously
incident edge is deleted. 06.00 07.00 i. Its ecs) < 1 From 1.1, 1.2 [Algo produces a matching

2. Algo produces a perfect matching Let Mo be the matching produced

2.1 Mo course all h Mo course all h Mo covers all & Proof: Mo is a matchiny (1)

Mo covers all h (2.1)

[H1 = 18] = n

Mo covers all 8

From 2.1, 2.2

[Algo produces a perfect motchiny] Def. h, s form a blocking pair iff

1.00 h +s And both prefer each other

more than their current partners

1.00 in a given matching I no blocking pair in Mo (Mo is stable) OD Proof. Suppose h, & form a blocking pair h'= s'

h'= s'

pref (s): h' < h

pref (h): s' < s

Since h proposes in order of prefure

h must have proposed s before s'

but since h + s

must have rejected h for some h

if h; \$\pmu h\$ must have rejected

; h for some h

sin ass (T So on (Terminater because IHI=n which contradicti (h) \ h \ \ i. I To blocking pair in Mo Def. Stable Matching M is h optimal iff

for any other stable

metching M'

h prefers its partner in M to its partner

in M'. 4. Mo is h optimal Proof! Suppose not, then 3 M e.t. Mo h — S M h — S'

prof (h): S' > 8

For Mo, since h proposee in order of prefuence
h proposed s' before but was rejected for h'

S.t. pref (s'): h < h' Since M is stable, $\exists s'' s,t$.

Since M is stable, $\exists s'' s,t$.

Repeating above reasoning with

h' as h, s' as l, s'' as s'

we get, \exists new (h'', s''') (: No vertex hos 2 edges)

s.t. h'' - s''' in M incident on it

Above reasoning can be repeated indefinitely

which contradicts $\exists h \exists s = n$ Which contradicts $\exists h \exists s = n$

Def. Stable Matching M is spessional iff
for any s, for any other stable melching
M' s prefess ite partner in M'
to ite partner in M Mo is s pellimal Proof. Suppose not, then I Ms.t. Mo: h - s M: h' - s

pref (s): h > h' In M, s -/ h

s prefus h to its partner h'

Since M is stable,

3 s' \neq s s.t. h - s' in M

AND pref (h): s' 7 s

which contradicts h optimality in Mo is & pessimal