DO MORE GUNS AND /OR **HIGHER INCARCERATION REDUCE CRIME?**

By,

Sumukh Umesha – BUAN6312.001 (sxu170530)

Jagrutee Gawande – BUAN6312.001 (jxg173030) Deepak Anthony – BUAN6312.001 (dxa171830)

Bhargav Anand Reddy Sadive – BUAN6312.001 (bxs173930)

Ruchi Rathore – BUAN6312.001 (rxr174530)

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Data Description & Data Analysis

The data provided (guns.dta) is panel in nature. It comprised of 50 states in United States of America and included District of Columbia tallying up to 51 states over a time period of 23 years (1977 - 1999). By looking at the data first, it looked like there were states missing with the states codes '3', '4', '14' and '43'. Upon further investigation it was identified that these states codes do not exist. From basic understanding it looked like states with Shall law implemented would have lower violence rates. However, this was not the case, there were states with higher violence rate when Shall Law was implemented.

Analysis of the data throughout the project was performed using STATA, R and SAS programming.


Summary of the data -

ye	ar		vio			mur			rob	
Min.								Min.	:	6.4
1st Qu.	:82	1st C	Qu.: 28	33.1	1st	Qu.: 3	.700	1st C	Qu.: 7:	1.1
Median	:88:	Media	an: 44	13.0	Medi	an: 6	.400	Media	an : 12	4.1
Mean	:88:	Mean	: 50	3.1	Mean	: 7	. 665	Mean	: 16	1.8
3rd Qu.	:94	3rd C	Qu.: 65	0.9	3rd	Qu.: 9	. 800	3rd C	Qu.: 19	2.7
Max.	:99	Max.	:292	21.8	Max.	:80	. 600	Max.	:163	5.1
							•			
incarc	_rate		pb1	.064		p	w1064		pm1	029
Min.		0 1	Min.	: 0.2	482	Min.	:21.	78 N	in.	:12.21
1st Qu.	: 114.	0 1	Lst Qu.	: 2.2	022	1st Q	u.:59.	94 1	st Qu.	:14.65
Median	: 187.	0 1	1edi an	: 4.0	262	Media	n :65.	06 N	1edi an	:15.90
Mean	: 226.		1ean			Mean	:62.	95 N	lean	:16.08
3rd Qu.	: 291.	0	3rd Qu.	: 6.8	507	3rd Q	u.:69.	20	3rd Qu.	:17.53
Max.	:1913.	0 1	Max.	:26.9	796	Max.	:76.	53 N	lax.	:22.35
pop)		avo	inc		den	sity		s	tateid
Min. :	0.402	7 1	Min.	: 8.5	55	Min.	: 0.0	00707	Min.	: 1.00
1st Qu.:	1.187	7 1	Lst Qu.	:11.9	35	1st Qu	.: 0.0	31911	1st	Qu.:16.00
Median:	3.271	.3	Median	:13.4	02	Median	: 0.0	81569	Medi	an:29.00
Mean :	4.816	53 N	Mean	:13.7	25	Mean	: 0.3	52038	Mean	:28.96
3rd Qu.:	5.685	6	3rd Qu.	:15.2	71	3rd Qu	.: 0.1	77718	3rd	Qu.:42.00
Max. :	33.145	51 M	Max.	:23.6	47	Max.	:11.1	02116	Max.	:56.00

From the above statistics we get a vague idea of the range and level of data we are dealing with.


The following insights were found when we performed exploratory analysis on the data –

1. Incarceration rate Vs violent crime rate




From the above graph it can be see that there is positive relationship between incarceration rate and violent crime rate (incidents per 100,000 members of the population). For majority of the cases, as crime rate increases incarceration rate also increases.

2. Population density Vs violent crime rate




In the above graph violence rate is plotted against population density (population per square mile of land area, divided by 1000). Here as well, we could say there is positive trend between the 2 variables. Very high violent crime rate exists where the population density is also very high.

3. Population Vs violent crime rate




In the above graph violent crime rate is plotted against population. Crime rate increases as population increases. There a few states where violence rate is high even though population is less.

4. pm1029 vs violent crime rate



In the above graph violent crime rate is plotted against male population percentage in the age group of 10 to 29. The graph doesn't show a high correlation between these variables.


5. pw1064 Vs violent crime rate



In the above graph violent crime rate is plotted against the white population percentage in the age bracket of 10 to 64. The graph shows that as the white population percentage is higher in that state, violent crime rate declines. This is a very interesting insight and an area we would love to dig deeper into.

6. pb1064 Vs violent crime rate






In the above graph, violent crime rate is plotted against black population percentage in the ages of 10 to 64. This is the exact opposite scenario of white population percentage vs violent crime rate (lateral flip in the graphs). This graph shows that as black population percentage increases, the violent crime rate seems to also increase. From economic theory the wages of black people when compared to white is comparatively lower, due to this they might be staying in a dangerous neighbourhood.

7. Violent crime rate Vs average income


Violent crime rate Vs Average Income



In the above graph violent crime rate is plotted against average per capita personal income of the state (in thousands of dollars). Here again we can observe that states with higher average per capita personal income have lower crime rates indicating that the neighbourhood is safer (people with higher pay wouldn't indulge in crime related activities) when compared to lower income states. However, some states with high average income seems to have higher violent crime rate. This maybe because richer people also face a risk of getting attacked.


8. Comparing state wise violent crime rate based on shall-carry law

State wise violent crime Rate when Shall-carry law isn't in effect




The above graph plots the state wise violent crime rate when Shall-carry law isn't in effect. The state id 11 (District of Columbia) seems to have an exceptionally high violent crime rate when compared to other states when the shall-carry law wasn't implied. State id 38 (North Dakota) seems to have the lowest violent crime rate even though data is available till 1985 only.

State wise violent crime Rate when Shall-carry law is in effect



The above graph plots the state wise violent crime rate when Shall-carry law is in effect. Violent rate seems to be lesser in the states where shall-carry law is in effect. With the shall law implemented, Florida (12) seems to still have a high violent crime rate and North Dakota continues to have the least violent crime rate amongst all other states.

Now we shift our focus towards Shall Law. We have performed several comparison analyses of crime rate against shall law. Below are further insights specific to shall law –



Side by side comparison of violent crime rate when shall law was implemented and when it wasn't.

Violent Rate with respect to Shall law:

Shall: 0, no shall law

Shall: 1, shall law present in the state

Murder Rate with respect to Shall law:

```
hr$shall: 0
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.700 4.200 7.400 8.429 10.400 80.600
hr$shall: 1
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
0.200 2.300 4.600 5.284 7.300 20.300
```

Shall: 0, no shall law

Shall: 1, shall law present in the state

Robbery Rate with respect to Shall law:

```
hr$shall: 0
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
6.4 85.9 133.8 182.3 210.6 1635.1

hr$shall: 1
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
6.4 23.3 86.6 97.9 141.4 416.8
```

Shall: 0, no shall law

Shall: 1, shall law present in the state

It looks like shall law does influence the respective crime rates. We see general drop in crime rates when shall law was implemented in the state

Hypothesis Testing on Shall Law

1. Analysis of Average Violent Crime rates in Shall law states and states not having Shall law with T-test:

We conduct T-test to know if there is any difference between states having shall law and states that are not having shall law in average violent crime rate.

Hypothesis:

Ho: No difference between shall law states and no shall law states

Ha: Significant difference between average violent crime rate in shall law states and average violent crime rate in no shall law states

```
welch Two Sample t-test

data: hr$vio by hr$shall
t = 8.2381, df = 613.37, p-value = 1.06e-15
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
122.7622 199.6115
sample estimates:
mean in group 0 mean in group 1
542.2377 381.0509
```

We can see the p value is < 0.05, hence null hypothesis is rejected. We conclude that there is significant difference in the violent crime rate between states having shall law and states not having shall law.

2. Analysis of Average Murder rates in Shall law states and states not having Shall law with T-test:

We conduct T-test to know if there is any difference between states having shall law and states that are not having shall law in average murder rate.

Hypothesis:

Ho: No difference between shall law states and no shall law states

Ha: Significant difference between average murder rate in shall law states and average murder crime rate in no shall law states

```
Welch Two Sample t-test

data: hr$mur by hr$shall
t = 8.9797, df = 1069.9, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
   2.458192   3.832873
sample estimates:
mean in group 0 mean in group 1
        8.429392    5.283860</pre>
```

P-value is < 0.05, hence null hypothesis is rejected. We conclude that there is significant difference in the murder rate between states having shall law and states not having shall law.

3. Analysis of Average Robbery rates in Shall law states and states not having Shall law with T-test:

We conduct T-test to know if there is any difference between states having shall law and states that are not having shall law in average robbery rate.

Hypothesis:

Ho: No difference between shall law states and no shall law states

Ha: Significant difference between average robbery rate in shall law states and average murder crime rate in no shall law states

```
Welch Two Sample t-test

data: hr$rob by hr$shall
t = 10.428, df = 1012.2, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0
95 percent confidence interval:
    68.54833 100.32565
sample estimates:
mean in group 0 mean in group 1
    182.3356 97.8986</pre>
```

P-value is < 0.05, hence null hypothesis is rejected. We conclude that there is significant difference in the robbery rates between states having shall law and states not having shall law.

4. Analysis of Average Incarceration Rates in Shall law states and states not having Shall law with T-test:

We conduct T-test to know if there is any difference between states having shall law and states that are not having shall law in average incarceration rate.

Hypothesis:

Ho: No difference between shall law states and no shall law states


Ha: Significant difference between average incarceration rate in shall law states and average murder crime rate in no shall law states

The p-value is **not** < 0.05, hence null hypothesis is not rejected. There is no significant difference in average incarceration rate between states having shall law and states not having shall law

With a clearer picture and understanding of the data now, we performed regression models and compared how Shall law affects the crime rates. The below sections have various types of regression models and insights from these models. (at the end of the report, we have attached all the .do files written for this project)

Regression Analysis

To model the violent crime rate over the years we look at the distribution of violent crime rate and we plotted the histogram for the same. As seen in the graph the histogram is highly right skewed and therefore we take the log for the crime rate before modelling the data.



Before we blindly go ahead and run models on the data, our main focus was on finding extent up to which shall law has an impact on the violent crime rate. By the help of a covariance matrix we found variables that are correlated to each other.

. corr vio mur rob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 pop avgine density (obs=1,173)


	vio	mur	rob	incarc~e	pb1064	pw1064	pm1029	pop	avginc	density
vio	1.0000									
mur	0.8265	1.0000								
rob	0.9071	0.7976	1.0000							
incarc_rate	0.7027	0.7096	0.5668	1.0000						
pb1064	0.5698	0.6018	0.5812	0.5308	1.0000					
pw1064	-0.5730	-0.6154	-0.5842	-0.5271	-0.9820	1.0000				
pm1029	-0.1696	0.0150	-0.0860	-0.4463	0.0162	-0.0126	1.0000			
pop	0.3190	0.0999	0.3172	0.0953	0.0581	-0.0654	-0.0975	1.0000		
avginc	0.4080	0.2206	0.4148	0.4615	0.2627	-0.1912	-0.5279	0.2152	1.0000	
density	0.6647	0.7486	0.7818	0.5593	0.5432	-0.5551	-0.0637	-0.0780	0.3433	1.0000

From the above matrix we can see that robbery rate is highly correlated to violent crime rate and murder rate is also highly correlated to violent crime rate.

We regressed only violent crime rate against shall law to see the effect of shall law on violent crime rate not considering any other factor playing its part. As expected the model fit of the model was very bad, had an R-square value of 0.08. Shall law was highly significant, and the model interpreted that if the state employed shall law the violent crime rate would decrease by 44.2% when compared to shall law not being implemented. This result is bogus because a lot of other significant variables were residing in the error term & had a clear case of omitted variable bias.

1. Pooled OLS Model

Ignoring the panel nature of the data, change in crime rate across different states was checked by using pooled OLS regression. Before running the model, we did check for heteroskedasticity in the data. While the residuals plot didn't give much information w.r.t presence of heteroscedasticity (function of variance was unknown, so WLS didn't in solving for heteroskedasticity), as a safe practice we used cluster robust standard errors under the assumption that heteroskedasticity exists.



Above graphs shows the residual plots of individual variables plotted against residual

. reg lnvio incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pw1029 pop avginc density shall, vce(cluster state)

Linear regression	Number of obs	=	1,173
	F(8, 50)	=	62.13
	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.5643
	Root MSE	=	.42769

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
incarc_rate	.0016126	.0005999	2.69	0.010	.0004076	.0028177
pb1064	.0808526	.0713875	1.13	0.263	0625334	. 2242386
pw1064	.0312005	.03409	0.92	0.364	0372713	.0996723
pm1029	.0088709	.0340964	0.26	0.796	0596137	.0773554
pop	.0427098	.011729	3.64	0.001	.0191515	.0662681
avginc	.0012051	.0240808	0.05	0.960	0471626	.0495728
density	.0266885	.0414909	0.64	0.523	0566485	.1100255
shall	3683869	.113937	-3.23	0.002	5972361	1395378
_cons	2.981738	2.166513	1.38	0.175	-1.369831	7.333307

We observe that the crime rate is decreases by 36.84% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Also, we can observe that if the incarceration rate increases by 1 unit the crime rate also increases by 0.16%. We observed that the impact of shall law on violent crime rate decreased from 44% to 36.8%. population, incarc_rate and shall law are highly significant variables. The least square estimators are no longer efficient.

Interaction terms where created and tested with the model. These interaction terms were highly insignificant and didn't add value into the model. Thus, they were exempted from the final model which was to be regressed.

The least square estimators are no longer BLUE as they are inefficient. We move ahead with panel effect modelling.

2. Fixed Effects Model

Since it is panel data, we perform panel regression. There are 3 ways of doing it – least square dummy variable estimator, fixed effects estimator & random effects estimator. Least square dummy variable estimator is not feasible because we create a dummy variable for every observation, i.e. 1173 dummy variables. So, we go ahead with Fixed Effects estimator.

To check the within effects we perform the Fixed Effects panel regression. We observe that the impact of crime rate on violent crime rate drastically goes down to 4.61% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. The incarceration rate has become an insignificant variable and does not have a very high impact on the crime rate.

The population variables (pm1029, pw1064 & pb1064) have become significant variables. At this point, it looks like Fixed Effects model does a great job in capturing the unobserved heterogeneity which Pooled OLS failed to do so. From the fixed effects model, it can be interpreted that when shall law is in effect, the violent crime rate decreases by 4.61% when compared to shall law not in effect.

. xtreg lnvio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe vce(cluster stateid)

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs =	1,173
Group variable: stateid	Number of groups =	51
R-sq:	Obs per group:	
within = 0.2178	min =	23
between = 0.0033	avg =	23.0
overall = 0.0001	max =	23
	F(8,50) =	34.10
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3687	Prob > F =	0.0000

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
incarc_rate	000071	.0002504	-0.28	0.778	0005739	.0004318
pb1064	.1042804	.0326849	3.19	0.002	.0386308	.1699301
pw1064	.0408611	.0134585	3.04	0.004	.0138289	.0678932
pm1029	0502725	.0206949	-2.43	0.019	0918394	0087057
avginc	0092037	.0129649	-0.71	0.481	0352445	.016837
pop	.0115247	.014224	0.81	0.422	0170452	.0400945
density	1722901	.1376129	-1.25	0.216	4486936	.1041135
shall	0461415	.0417616	-1.10	0.275	1300223	.0377392
_cons	3.866017	.7701057	5.02	0.000	2.319214	5.412819
sigma_u sigma_e	.68024951 .16072287					
rho	.94712779	(fraction	of varia	nce due t	co u_i)	

3. Random Effects Model

To observe both within and between effects we now perform the Random Effects Panel Regression. We observe that the violent crime rate decreases by 6.96% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Population related variables are highly significant. Shall law is significant at 90% confidence interval not at 95%.

. xtreg lnvio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re cluster(stateid)

Random-effects GLS regression Group variable: stateid	Number of obs = Number of groups =	1,173 51
R-sq:	Obs per group:	
within = 0.2044	min =	23
between = 0.4908	avg =	23.0
overall = 0.4591	max =	23
	Wald chi2(8) =	167.14
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)	Prob > chi2 =	0.0000
I		

(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)

		(SCG. E	.rr. auju	sceu for	JI Clusters 1	n statelu)
lnvio	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall cons	.0001888 .1067022 .0400716 0375292 0105112 .0225755 .0661588 069609 3.525463	.0001877 .0270973 .0127282 .0180436 .0117802 .0116369 .0437925 .038845	1.01 3.94 3.15 -2.08 -0.89 1.94 1.51 -1.79 4.53	0.314 0.000 0.002 0.038 0.372 0.052 0.131 0.073	0001791 .0535924 .0151248 072894 0335999 0002323 0196729 1457438 1.999268	.0005567 .1598119 .06501840021643 .0125775 .0453833 .1519905 .0065258
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.33790775 .16072287 .81550462	(fraction	of varia	nce due 1	to u_i)	

To decide which is the better model between Fixed Effects and Random Effects model, we perform the Hausman Test. This test compares the coefficient estimates from the Random Effects model to those from the Fixed Effects model.

```
. quietly xtreg lnvio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
. estimates store fe
 quietly xtreg lnvio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re
. estimates store re
. hausman fe re
                   — Coefficients —
                 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_fe re Difference S.E.
                                              (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
               -.000071 .0001888 -.0002598 .0000635
incarc_rate
                                            -.0024217
     pb1064
                 .1042804
                              .1067022
                                                                .011767
                 .0408611
                             .0400716
                                              .0007895
     pw1064
                                           -.0127434
.0013075
-.0110508
                                                             .0021099
                -.0502725 -.0375292
-.0092037 -.0105112
.0115247 .0225755
     pm1029
                                                               .0006269
     avginc
                                                               .0059821
       pop
                             .0661588 -.2384489
-.069609 .0234675
                                                               .0763882
                -.1722901
    densitv
      shall
                -.0461415
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreq
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
   Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
                 chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
               = 31.86
Prob>chi2 = 0.0001
                (V_b-V_B \text{ is not positive definite})
```

According to the Chi Square statistic and the P-value we will have to reject the Null Hypothesis of no endogeneity. We conclude that the Fixed Effects model is a better model for this analysis. From the Hausman test it is established that the Fixed effects model is better than Random Effects model (Random Effects model also risks the occurrence of endogeneity). We go ahead and perform entity fixed effects model and time fixed effects model.

4. Entity Fixed Effects Model

Here in this model, each state has an intercept of its own.

. reg lnvio in	ncarc rate pb1	064 pw1064	pm1029 av	inc po	p density sha	Ll i.stateic	21	4255548	.1049019	-4.06	0.000	6313824	2197272
-		-			_		22	.3685392	.057251	6.44	0.000	.2562073	.4808711
Source	SS	df	MS	Num	ber of obs	1,173	23	-1.131981	.1330361	-8.51	0.000	-1.39301	8709513
				- F(5	8, 1114)	306.93	24	.3961276	.0592262	6.69	0.000	.2799202	.512335
Model	459.854887	58	7.9285325	1 Pro	b > F	0.0000	25	. 2869058	.1489839	1.93	0.054	005415	. 5792265
Residual	28.7766714	1,114	.02583184	L R-s	quared	0.9411	26	.2449163	.0991731	2.47	0.014	.0503291	.4395035
				- Adj	R-squared	0.9380	27	5760094	.1251856	-4.60	0.000	8216356	3303833
Total	488.631558	1,172	.41692112	5 Roo	t MSE	.16072	28	392985	.0771168	-5.10	0.000	5442955	2416745
							29	.1455349	.0922059	1.58	0.115	0353819	.3264516
							30	9910133	.1051692	-9.42	0.000	-1.197365	7846612
lnvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf	. Interval]	31	4432373	.11437	-3.88	0.000	6676422	2188325
							32	.3226112	.0865611	3.73	0.000	.15277	.4924524
incarc_rate	000071	.0000936	-0.76	0.448	0002547	.0001126	33	-1.277052	.139976	-9.12	0.000	-1.551698	-1.002406
pb1064	.1042804	.0177564	5.87	0.000	.0694407	.1391201	34	.1222139	.1265728	0.97	0.334	126134	.3705618
pw1064	.0408611	.0050745	8.05	0.000	.0309044	.0508177	35	.3817845	.0768095	4.97	0.000	.2310769	.5324921
pm1029	0502725	.0064037	-7.85	0.000	0628373	0377078	36	. 4354412	.1459921	2.98	0.003	.1489906	.7218917
avginc	0092037	.0059083	-1.56	0.120	0207963	.0023889	37	0965572	.0549367	-1.76	0.079	2043483	.0112339
pop	.0115247	.0087239	1.32	0.187	0055924	.0286417	38	-1.843342	.111446	-16.54	0.000	-2.06201	-1.624675
density	1722901	.0850362	-2.03	0.043	3391392	0054409	39	1884885	.1257346	-1.50	0.134	4351919	.0582149
shall	0461415	.0188668	-2.45	0.015	08316	009123	40	0411461	.0684913	-0.60	0.548	1755325	.0932403
stateid							41	.0049471	.1153633	0.04	0.966	2214067	.2313009
2	.0559649	.0727213	0.77	0.442	0867213	.198651	42	3249639	.1370178	-2.37	0.018	593806	0561218
4	.2404116	.0887689	2.71	0.007	.0662385	.4145848	44	1003761	.1577365	-0.64	0.525	4098703	.209118
5	1272757	.0664795	-1.91	0.056	2577149	.0031635	45	.334051	.0576949	5.79	0.000	.2208482	.4472539
6	.2442405	.2304245	1.06	0.289	2078744	.6963554	46	-1.024605	.0989142	-10.36	0.000	-1.218684	8305256
8	1050866	.1121747	-0.94	0.349	3251842	.1150109	47	.0446805	.0720137	0.62	0.535	0966174	.1859784
9	0955651	.1348337	-0.71	0.479	3601218	.1689916	48	.0526546	.1451395	0.36	0.717	2321229	.3374321
10	.0975979	.0767356	1.27	0.204	0529647	.2481605	49	3039108	.1136771	-2.67	0.008	526956	0808655
11	2.759405	.7797288	3.54	0.000	1.229502	4.289307	50	-1.254522	.1352965	-9.27	0.000	-1.519987	9890573
12	.6771463	.1135223	5.96	0.000	.4544047	.8998878	51	6017665	.0614983	-9.79	0.000	7224321	4811009
13	.0225319	.0538476	0.42	0.676	0831224	.1281861	53	1321725	.1036698	-1.27	0.203	3355826	.0712377
15	-1.127962	.2590434	-4.35	0.000	-1.63623	6196937	54	9691482	.122316	-7.92	0.000	-1.209144	7291524
16	5029989	.1220814	-4.12	0.000	7425344	2634634	55	7812224	.1174512	-6.65	0.000	-1.011673	5507718
17	.4085668	.1072083	3.81	0.000	.1982138	.6189197	56	4804004	.121985	-3.94	0.000	7197467	2410541
18	2056563	.1110607	-1.85	0.064	4235679	.0122553							
19	62914	.1277561	-4.92	0.000	8798097	3784703	cons	4.036775	.3893662	10.37	0.000	3.272801	4.800749
20	180834	.1015614	-1.78	0.075	3801071	.0184391							

Shall law is significant and indicates a 4.6% drop in violent crime rate when shall law is present.

5. Time Fixed Effects Model

In order to observe the Shall law effect on the crime rate over the years we perform Time Fixed Effects Panel Regression.

xtreg lnvio	incarc_rate p	pb1064 pw106	4 pm1029	avginc po	p density sh	all i.year,	fe vce(cluster
ived-effects	(within) reg	ression		Number o	fobs =	1,173	
coup variable				Number o		51	
-					_ 5		
-sq:				Obs per	group:		
within =	0.4180				min =	23	
between =	0.0419				avg =	23.0	
overall =	- 0.0009				max =	23	
				F(30,50)	=	56.86	
orr(u_i, Xb)	= -0.2929			Prob > F	=	0.0000	
		(Std. E	rr. adju:	sted for 5	1 clusters i	n stateid)	
		Robust					
lnvio	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]	
incarc_rate	.000076	.0002079	0.37	0.716	0003416	.0004935	
pb1064	.0291862	.0495407	0.59	0.558	0703192	.1286916	
pw1064	.0092501	.0237564	0.39	0.699	0384659	.0569662	
pm1029	.0733254	.0524733	1.40	0.168	0320704	.1787211	
avginc	.0009587	.0164931	0.06	0.954	0321688	.0340861	
pop	0047544	.0152294	-0.31	0.756	0353436	.0258347	
density	091555	.1238622	-0.74	0.463	3403396	.1572296	
shall	0279935	.0407168	-0.69	0.495	1097757	.0537886	
year	0505054	0454555	2 50	0.004	0050757	0000755	
78	.0585261	.0161556	3.62	0.001	.0260767	.0909755	
79	.1639486	.0244579	6.70	0.000	.1148233	.2130738	
80	.2170759	.0334184	6.50	0.000	.1499531	. 2841987	
81 82	.2172551 .1946328	.0391956 .0465743	5.54 4.18	0.000 0.000	.1385284 .1010856	.2959819 .28818	
83	.158645	.0593845	2.67	0.010	.0393676	. 2779223	
84	.1929883	.0770021	2.51	0.015	.0383251	.3476515	
85	.2444764	.0922217	2.65	0.013	.0592438	.4297091	
86	.3240904	.1089181	2.98	0.004	.1053219	. 5428589	
87	.324365	.1249881	2.60	0.012	.073319	.5754111	
88	.3867412	.1397074	2.77	0.008	.1061305	.6673518	
89	.4422143	.1535358	2.88	0.006	.1338286	.7505999	
90	.5430478	.1960859	2.77	0.008	.1491976	.936898	
91	. 5959456	. 2040685	2.92	0.005	.1860618	1.005829	
92	.6275171	.2170306	2.89	0.006	.1915982	1.063436	
93	.6497414	.2246177	2.89	0.006	.1985834	1.100899	
94	.6354187	.2332437	2.72	0.009	.1669349	1.103903	
95	.6276831	.2423607	2.59	0.013	.1408874	1.114479	
96	.5713423	.2534067	2.25	0.029	.06236	1.080325	
97	.5501153	.2613516	2.10	0.040	.0251751	1.075055	
98	. 4932904	.2746546	1.80	0.079	0583697	1.04495	
99	. 4328776	.2862197	1.51	0.137	1420117	1.007767	
_cons	3.765525	1.152108	3.27	0.002	1.451448	6.079603	
sigma u	.6663043						
sigma e	.1400264						
rho	.95770338	(fraction	of varia	nce due to	u i)		
	1	,					

The effect of shall law on violent crime rate further decreases. The violent crime rate decreases by 2.79% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. From 1983-1995 shows a major trend with an increase in the magnitude of the coefficients. And after 1996 we see a drop till 1999.

Furthermore, to check if there is any trend effect we perform a hypothesis test. This hypothesis test checks for the joint significance of time effects **Hypothesis:**

H0: Year78=year79=year80.....=year99=0

H1: Atleast one of the year estimator is not equal to 0

```
testparm i.year
(1) \quad 78.year = 0
(2) 79.year = 0
(3) 80.year = 0
(4) \quad \textbf{81.year} = \mathbf{0}
(5) 82.year = 0
(6) \quad \textbf{83.year} = \mathbf{0}
(7) \quad \textbf{84.year} = \mathbf{0}
(8) 85.year = 0
(9) 86.year = 0
(10) 87.year = 0
(11) \quad 88.year = 0
(12) 89.year = 0
(13) \quad 90.\mathbf{year} = 0
(14) \quad 91.year = 0
(15) \quad 92.year = 0
(16) \quad \mathbf{93.year} = \mathbf{0}
(17) \quad 94.year = 0
(18) 95.year = 0
(19) 96.year = 0
(20) 97.year = 0
(21) 98.year = 0
(22) 99.year = 0
      F( 22, 50) = 21.62
         Prob > F = 0.0000
```

The F-stat value obtained is 21.62 and the P-value is approximately 0. We can now reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a joint significance of time effect.

By performing the series of regression exercise we can conclude that time fixed effect is the most credible model as it uses the entire data to estimate the significance of shall law on crime rate.

6. Fixed Effect Regression on Murder & Robbery rate

Further analyzing the effect of shall law we model the murder and the robbery rate using the Fixed Effects panel regression.

. xtreg lnmur	incarc_rate	pb1064 pw1064	pm1029	avgine po	op density	shal	1, fe cl	uster(stateid)
Fixed-effects	(within) reg	ression		Number o	of obs	=	1,173	1
Group variable	e: stateid			Number o	of groups	=	51	L
D				00				
R-sq:	= 0 1528			Obs per	group.	_	23	,
between =					avo		23.0	
overall =					max		23.0	
0,451,411	0.1010				max		2.	
				F(8,50)		=	156.39	1
corr(u_i, Xb)	= -0.8961			Prob > I	ŗ	=	0.0000	1
		(Std. Er:	r. adju	sted for !	51 cluster:	s in	stateid)	
	I	·						-
		Robust						
lnmur	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Co	nf.]	[nterval]	
incarc_rate	00036	.0004231	-0.85	0.399	0012099	9	.0004899	-)
pb1064	.0307009	.0781245	0.39	0.696	1262169	•	.1876186	i
pw1064	.0103313	.0128776	0.80	0.426	015534	L	.0361967	1
pm1029	.0392384	.0215964	1.82	0.075	004139	1	.0826161	
avginc	.0243114	.0156779	1.55	0.127	007178	5	.0558013	1
pop	0257054	.0203457	-1.26	0.212	0665709	•	.0151602	!
density	6707132	.3957745	-1.69	0.096	-1.4656	5	.1242232	!
shall	06081	.0369632	-1.65	0.106	135052	7	.0134327	,
_cons	.4600088	.8425884	0.55	0.588	-1.2323	3	2.152397	! -
sigma_u	1.36035						·	_
sigma_e	.21942693							
rho	.97464151	(fraction o	f varia	nce due to	u_i)			
	<u> </u>							-

We observe that the murder rate is going down by 6.1% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Shall law is not a significant variable.

xtreg 1mmur	incarc_rate p	pb1064 pw106	4 pm1029	avginc p	op density sh	all i.year,	fe cluster(s
ixed-effects	(within) reg	ression		Number	of obs =	1,173	
roup variable	: stateid			Number	of groups =	51	
-sq:				Obs per	aroun:		
within =	0.2905			one per	min =	23	
between =					avg =	23.0	
overall =	0.1413				max =	23	
				E / 20 E0		01.40	
orr(u i, Xb)	= -0.8336			F(30,50 Prob >		81.49 0.0000	
OII (u_I, AD)	0.0330			rion >	-	0.0000	
		(Std. E	rr. adju	sted for	51 clusters i	n stateid)	
		Robust					
lnmur	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]	
incarc rate	0001164	.0003631	-0.32	0.750	0008457	.0006129	
pb1064	.0219833	.0758151	0.29	0.773	1302958	.1742624	
pw1064	0004893	.0201044	-0.02	0.981	0408701	.0398915	
pm1029	.0691941	.0417945	1.66	0.104	0147526	.1531408	
avginc	.0566492	.0165554	3.42	0.001	.0233967	.0899017	
pop	0320769	.0209819	-1.53	0.133	0742202	.0100664	
density	5442635	.3192203	-1.70	0.094	-1.185436	.0969093	
shall	0149524	.0382403	-0.39	0.697	0917603	.0618556	
year							
78	0007195	.0322722	-0.02	0.982	0655401	.0641011	
79	.0592481	.0311141	1.90	0.063	0032465	.1217427	
80	.0901814	.041058	2.20	0.033	.0077139	.1726489	
81	.1021543	.0510636	2.00	0.051	00041	.2047186	
82	.0224098	.0581861	0.39	0.702	0944604	.1392799	
83	0314385	.0640621	-0.49	0.626	1601111	.0972341	
84	1359192	.071662	-1.90	0.064	2798565	.0080181	
85	0866144	.0856965	-1.01	0.317	2587409	.0855122	
86	0122752	.0927286	-0.13	0.895	1985262	.1739758	
87	0290338	.0999408	-0.29	0.773	2297707	.1717032	
88	0174594	.1196893	-0.15	0.885	2578626	.2229437	
89	0145617	.1321034	-0.11	0.913	2798993	.2507759	
90	.059998	.1649718	0.36	0.718	2713577	.3913537	
91	.1053071	.1754909	0.60	0.551	2471767	.4577909	
92	.0681002	.1828352	0.37	0.711	2991352	.4353355	
93	.1544297	.1898113	0.81	0.420	2268176	. 535677	
94	.0442648	.1971908	0.22	0.823	3518047	.4403342	
95	.0556601	.1989082	0.28	0.781	3438588	.455179	
96	015709	.2125365	-0.07	0.941	4426011	.4111831	
97	1221824	.2186706	-0.56	0.579	5613952	.3170304	
98	1863381	. 2332966	-0.80	0.428	6549281	.2822519	
99	2554286	.2420434	-1.06	0.296	741587	.2307298	
_cons	.1882653	1.056771	0.18	0.859	-1.934322	2.310853	
sigma_u	1.1362086						
sigma_e	. 20281999						
	.96911961		of varia				

From the time fixed effects model, we can see that the model has improved. The murder rate is decreases by 1.4% now for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Shall law is not a significant variable.

. xtreg inros	incarc_rate	pb1064 pw106	4 pm1029	avginc p	оp	density	sha	ll, fe cluster(st	tateio
Fixed-effects	(within) reg	ression		Number	of	obs	=	1,173	
Group variable	e: stateid			Number	of	groups	=	51	
R-sq:				Obs per	a	coun:			
within :	- 0.0366			F	9-	min	=	23	
between :	= 0.0531					avg	=	23.0	
overall:	- 0.0521					max	=	23	
				F(8,50)			_	2.86	
corr(u i, Xb)	0 0950			Prob >			_	0.0108	
,,								_	
		(Std. E	rr. adju	sted for	51	cluster	s in	stateid)	
		Robust							
lnrob	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	ŧ	P> t		[95% Co	nf.	Interval]	
lnrob	Coef.		t -0.24	P> t		[95% Cor		Interval]	
		Std. Err.					L		
incarc_rate	0000763	Std. Err.	-0.24	0.813		000721:	L 5	.0005685	
incarc_rate pb1064	0000763 .1115421	.000321	-0.24 2.18	0.813 0.034	-	.000721	L 5	.0005685	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064	0000763 .1115421 .0271807	.000321 .0511546 .0164344	-0.24 2.18 1.65	0.813 0.034 0.104	-	000721: .008799	L 5 5	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702	-	000721: . 00879: 005828: 047262:	L 5 5 5	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817 0175195	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976 .0220352	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38 -0.80	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702 0.430	-	000721; .00879; 0058286 0472626	l 5 5 5 1	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626 .0267395	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817 0175195 .0163332	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976 .0220352 .0275874	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38 -0.80 0.59	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702 0.430 0.556	-	000721: . 008799 0058280 0472620 0617789	L 5 5 5 1 3	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626 .0267395	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817 0175195 .0163332 1860917	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976 .0220352 .0275874 .1663413	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38 -0.80 0.59 -1.12	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702 0.430 0.556 0.269	-	000721: .008799 0058286 0472626 0617786 0390777	L 5 5 1 1 3	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626 .0267395 .0717441	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817 0175195 .0163332 1860917 0078189	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976 .0220352 .0275874 .1663413 .0551653	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38 -0.80 0.59 -1.12 -0.14	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702 0.430 0.556 0.269 0.888	-	000721: .00879; 005828; 047262; 061778; 039077; 52019; 118621	L 5 5 1 1 3	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626 .0267395 .0717441 .1480147 .1029838	
incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pw1029 avginc pop density shall _cons	0000763 .1115421 .0271807 .0111817 0175195 .0163332 1860917 0078189 2.445723	.000321 .0511546 .0164344 .0290976 .0220352 .0275874 .1663413 .0551653	-0.24 2.18 1.65 0.38 -0.80 0.59 -1.12 -0.14	0.813 0.034 0.104 0.702 0.430 0.556 0.269 0.888	-	000721: .00879; 005828; 047262; 061778; 039077; 52019; 118621	L 5 5 1 1 3	.0005685 .2142891 .0601901 .069626 .0267395 .0717441 .1480147 .1029838	

Also, the robbery rate is going down by 0.78% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Shall law is not a significant variable.

xtreg Inrob	incarc_rate	pb1064 pw106	4 pm1029	avginc p	op density sh	all i.year
xed-effects	(within) reg	ression		Number	of obs =	1,173
oup variable	≘: stateid			Number	of groups =	51
-sq:				Obs per	group:	
within :	0.2359				min =	23
between :	- 0.1358				avg =	23.0
overall	0.1362				max =	23
				F(30,50) =	40.77
corr(u_i, Xb)	- 0.1441			Prob >	F =	0.0000
		(Std. E	rr. adju	sted for	51 clusters i	n stateid)
		Robust				
lnrob	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
incarc_rate	.0000314	.0003477	0.09	0.928	000667	.0007297
pb1064	.0141078	.0840609	0.17	0.867	1547335	.1829491
pw1064	0128322	.0327626	-0.39	0.697	0786379	.0529734
pm1029	.1046049	.072997	1.43	0.158	0420138	.2512236
avginc	.0143569	.0247676	0.58	0.565	0353903	.064104
pop	.0000164	.0259374	0.00	0.999	0520805	.0521133
density	0447449	.1982135	-0.23	0.822	4428684	.3533786
shall	.0268298	.0521753	0.51	0.609	0779673	.1316269
year						
78	.0328497	.0216897	1.51	0.136	0107154	.0764148
79	.1375917	.032117	4.28	0.000	.0730828	. 2021006
80	.243408	.045464	5.35	0.000	.1520908	.3347251
81	.2737088	.0508793	5.38	0.000	.1715147	.375903
82	.21599	.0644109	3.35	0.002	.0866168	.3453632
83	.1208158	.0867066	1.39	0.170	0533395	. 2949711
84	.078831	.1064308	0.74	0.462	1349416	. 2926036
85	.1131495	.1272629	0.89	0.378	1424655	. 3687645
86 87	.1895678	.1521449	1.25	0.219	1160242	. 4951598
88	.1572151	.1688872	0.93	0.356	1820049	. 496435
89	.1927596 .2487313	.1878849 .2140573	1.03 1.16	0.310 0.251	1846184 1812154	.5701376 .6786781
90	.3509806	.2668617	1.32	0.194	185027	.8869881
91	.4668537	.2791767	1.67	0.194	0938891	1.027596
92	.4633221	2951262	1.57	0.123	1294562	1.0561
93	.4796983	.3082342	1.56	0.126	1394084	1.098805
94	.4943754	.3234124	1.53	0.133	1552175	1.143968
95	.4940171	.3338462	1.48	0.145	1765328	1.164567
96	.4341625	.3504351	1.24	0.221	2697072	1.138032
97	.3652393	.3581743	1.02	0.313	354175	1.084654
98	.2677144	.3690383	0.73	0.472	4735208	1.00895
99	.1894683	.3845414	0.49	0.624	5829059	.9618425
_cons	3.27912	1.676644	1.96	0.056	088518	6.646759
sigma u	.88484023					
sigma_e	.19352746					

The robbery rate now decreases by 2.6% for those states who have the shall law implemented as compared to the other states where the shall law is not implemented. Shall law is not a significant variable. For both murder & robbery rate, time effects is significant.

7. Non – Linear Regression in Fixed Effects Model

```
Call:
plm(formula = vio ~ incarc_rate + incarc_sq + pb1064 + pw1064 +
    pm1029 + pm1029sq + pop + avginc + avgincsq + density + shall,
data = data2, index = c("stateid", "year"), method = "within")
Balanced Panel: n = 51, T = 23, N = 1173
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu. Median
-707.0787 -46.2730 -3.2072
                       Median 3rd Ou.
                                45.0785 795.3026
Coefficients:
               Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
incarc_rate 2.0549e-01
                          9.1159e-02 2.2542 0.024380 *
pb1064
            1.9847e+00 3.3996e+00 0.5838 0.559477
5.5114e+01 3.7273e+01 1.4786 0.139519
pw1064
pm1029
pm1029sq
           -1.9934e+00 1.0967e+00 -1.8177 0.069387
            8.6504e+00
                         5.2552e+00 1.6461 0.100032
pop
avginc
            9.8069e+01
                          1.6465e+01 5.9561 3.463e-09 ***
            -3.1518e+00 5.3066e-01 -5.9395 3.820e-09 ***
avgincsq
density
            -3.0984e+02
                         7.0666e+01 -4.3846 1.272e-05 ***
shall
            -3.2899e+01 1.1578e+01 -2.8416 0.004571 **
Signif. codes: 0 '*** 0.001 '** 0.01 '* 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '1
Total Sum of Squares:
                          13576000
Residual Sum of Squares: 10308000
R-Squared: 0.24073
Adj. R-Squared: 0.19904
F-statistic: 32.0225 on 11 and 1111 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16
```

In the above model we have added incarc_sq (square term of the variable "incarc_rate", incarceration rate), pm1029sq (square term of the variable "pm1029", male population percentage), and avgincsq(square term of the variable "avginc", average income). Adding non-linear terms has made the variable "shall" significant in the model but made the male population percentage and white people population percentage insignificant. This model doesn't seem to improve the model when compared to the model without non-linear terms.

Conclusion

After running a series of regression models, we have got a much better picture on the effect of shall law on crime rate. From our best model we saw that implementation of shall law reduces the crime rate by just 2.7% and is insignificant. This value is pretty low from a world point of view.

The above achieved result tells us that there is no significant impact of shall law on crime rate.

Limitations

There might be few cases which is preventing us from thoroughly validating our model. 3 main cases are –

- Heteroskedasticity: Apart from the investigation performed on the data for identifying heteroskedasticity, a clear culprit variable couldn't be identified. The graphs didn't depict much and also no knowledge about the function of variance hampered from employing Weighted Least Squares. To mitigate the risk of heteroskedasticity affecting our models, precaution was taken by using robust cluster standard errors.
- 2. Omitted variable bias: There might have been few variables which might not have been provided for analysis. These omitted variables could explain the effect the shall law on violent crime rate to a better extent. Due to this there could be omitted variable bias which can affect our models. Few omitted variables could be policies that vary between states and over time which help in governing the shall laws.
- 3. Simultaneous Causality: We sensed the presence of simultaneous causality bias in the data. Let's look into it violent crime rate/ incarceration rate. This can be looked in two ways. If the incarceration rate at a place is high i.e. more number of law offenders are getting prisoned, then this instills a fear in the public and would in turn reduce the crime rate in that particular area. Another way of looking at this is, if the crime rate of a place is exceedingly high then the law enforces (police/ government) would deploy more squad of police and tighten the security. By doing so the incarceration would also increase. Another case of simultaneous causality could be between crime rate and shall law. If the crime rates at a particular state has always been low, then there wouldn't be a need to implement a concealed weapon law to reduce the crime. Also, if there is a high crime rate at a state over a long period of time, this would force the policy makers to introduce shall law in that state.

^{*} from this page onwards, the report contains all the code which was written for this project*

------ BEGIN OF ALL DO FILES -------***R Code***

```
library(readstata13)
library(ggplot2)
library(dplyr)
library(directlabels)
data1<-read.dta13("guns.dta")
data2<- data1
# plots
attach(data2)
s<- ggplot(data = data2,aes(y=vio))
# Scatter plots
s+ geom_point(aes(x=avginc)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=avginc),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Violent crime rate Vs Average Income",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Average Income(in k)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=incarc_rate)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=incarc_rate),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Incarceration Rate Vs Violent crime rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Incarceration Rate(previous year)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=density)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=density),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Population Density Vs Violence Rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Population Density(per sq.mile / 1000)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=pop)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=pop),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Population Vs Violence Rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Population (in millions)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=pm1029)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=pm1029),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Male Population percentage Vs Violence Rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Male Population percentage (btwn age 10-29)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=pw1064)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=pw1064),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="White Population percentage Vs Violence Rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="White Population percentage (btwn age 10-64)")
s+ geom_point(aes(x=pb1064)) +geom_smooth(aes(x=pb1064),method="Im", se=F)+
 labs(title="Black Population percentage Vs Violence Rate",
   y="Violence Rate",
   x="Black Population percentage (btwn age 10-64)")
# State wise plots
shall0=filter(data2, shall == 0)
shall1=filter(data2, shall == 1)
p0<-ggplot(data=shall0)
p1<-ggplot(data=shall1)
p0+geom_line(aes(x=year,y=vio,group = stateid,color=stateid))+
 geom_dl(aes(label = stateid,x=year,y=vio,group = stateid,color=stateid), method = list(dl.combine("first.points",
"last.points"), cex = 0.8))+
 labs(title="State wise violent crime Rate when Shall-carry law isn't in effect",
   y="Violence Rate")
p1+geom_line(aes(x=year,y=vio,group = stateid,color=stateid))+
 geom_dl(aes(label = stateid,x=year,y=vio,group = stateid,color=stateid), method = list(dl.combine("first.points",
"last.points"), cex = 0.8))+
 labs(title="State wise violent crime Rate when Shall-carry law is in effect",
   y="Violence Rate")
# Non-Linear Fixel Effect Model
```

data2\$incarc_sq <- data2\$incarc_rate*data2\$incarc_rate

```
data2$pm1029sq <- data2$pm1029 * data2$pm1029
data2$avgincsq <- data2$avginc * data2$avginc
nl_model < -plm(vio \sim incarc_rate + incarc_sq + pb1064 + pw1064 + pm1029 + pm1029sq + pop + avginc + avgincsq + pop + avginc + avgi
density + shall,data = data2,method = 'within',index = c("stateid","year") )
summary(nl_model)
install.packages('ggplot2')
library(ggplot2)
library(dplyr)
library(tidyr)
library(haven)
setwd("C:/Users/BHARGAV/Desktop/Econometrics/project/project")
hr <-read_dta('guns.dta')</pre>
hr$rob
summary(hr)
p <- ggplot(aes(x=vio),data = hr)+
  geom_histogram(color="black", fill="gray20", bins=30)+
  labs(title="crime rate for 'shall law' and 'no shall law'", x="crime rate", y="frequency")
p1= p+ facet_wrap(~shall)
р1
by(hr$vio, hr$shall, summary)
by(hr$mur, hr$shall, summary)
by(hr$rob, hr$shall, summary)
t.test(hr$vio~hr$shall)
t.test(hr$mur~hr$shall)
t.test(hr$rob~hr$shall)
by(hr$vio, hr$stateid, summary)
summary(hr$incarc_rate)
by(hr$incarc_rate, hr$shall, summary)
t.test(hr$incarc_rate~hr$shall)
                                                                  ***STATA DO FILE WITH OUTPUTS***
use "H:\econ\project\guns.dta", clear
des
summ
histogram vio
use guns.dta
describe
/* create log variable for vio */
gen Invio = log(vio)
/* correlation matrix */
corr vio mur rob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 pop avginc density
/* (obs=1,173)
             / vio mur rob incarc~e pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 pop avginc density
         vio | 1.0000
         mur | 0.8265 1.0000
        rob | 0.9071 0.7976 1.0000
 incarc_rate | 0.7027 0.7096 0.5668 1.0000
     pb1064 | 0.5698 0.6018 0.5812 0.5308 1.0000
     pw1064 | -0.5730 -0.6154 -0.5842 -0.5271 -0.9820 1.0000
     pop | 0.3190 0.0999 0.3172 0.0953 0.0581 -0.0654 -0.0975 1.0000
      avginc | 0.4080 0.2206 0.4148 0.4615 0.2627 -0.1912 -0.5279 0.2152 1.0000
     density | 0.6647 0.7486 0.7818 0.5593 0.5432 -0.5551 -0.0637 -0.0780 0.3433 1.0000
 From the matrix we cab see that mur & rob are highlu correlated to vio variable. We'll have to skip these variables while
performing regression. */
```

/* let us check how only the shall_law has an impact on vio rate */

```
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
  ------ F(1, 1171) = 111.08
   Model \mid 42.3348289 \quad 1 \quad 42.3348289 \quad Prob > F = 0.0000
 Residual | 446.29673 1,171 .381124449 R-squared = 0.0866
Total | 488.631558 1,172 .416921125 Root MSE = .61735
   Invio | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
  shall | -.4429646 .0420294 -10.54 0.000 -.525426 -.3605032
   _cons | 6.134919 .020717 296.13 0.000 6.094272 6.175566
We can see that, when shall law is implemented in a state, the violence rate drops by 44.2% */
/* since we are employing regression on panel data, it is advised to use robust standard errors */
reg Invio shall, vce(robust)
                             Number of obs = 1,173
Linear regression
                       F(1, 1171) = 86.86
                       Prob > F = 0.0000
                       R-squared = 0.0866
                       Root MSE = .61735
   | Robust
   Invio | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+----+-----
   shall | -.4429646 .0475283 -9.32 0.000 -.5362148 -.3497144
   _cons | 6.134919 .0193039 317.81 0.000 6.097045 6.172793
We can observe changes in the t-values & standard errors but coefficients remain same. */
/* let us go ahead and regress a pooled OLS model with robust standard errors */
Adding the interaction term doesn't improve the fit of the model. Hence we'll go ahead the model without the interaction
term */
/* Since it is panel data the least square estimators are not efficient. This is due to the fact that there can be unobserved
heterogeneity.
We'll go ahead and create a fixed effect model & interpret the fixed effect estimators. We can do this in two ways - dummy
variable creation or
fixed effect estimator. since N is large it isn't feasible to do so. Let's go ahead with fixed effect estimator.
We have to let Stata know that we are dealing with panel data -*/
xtset stateid year
/* panel variable: stateid (strongly balanced)
   time variable: year, 77 to 99
       delta: 1 unit */
/* since it is a balanced panel data, it makes sense to use fixed effect over random effects */
xtreq Invio incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avainc pop density shall, fe cluster(stateid)
Fixed-effects (within) regression
                                  Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid
                              Number of groups = 51
R-sq:
                      Obs per group:
  within = 0.2178
                                 min = 23
  between = 0.0033
                                    avg = 23.0
  overall = 0.0001
                                   max = 23
                       F(8,50) = 34.10
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3687
                             Prob > F = 0.0000
              (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
            Robust
   Invio | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.000071 .0002504 -0.28 0.778 -.0005739 .0004318
   pb1064 | .1042804 .0326849 3.19 0.002 .0386308 .1699301
```

reg Invio shall

```
pw1064 | .0408611 .0134585 3.04 0.004 .0138289 .0678932
  pm1029 | -.0502725 .0206949 -2.43 0.019 -.0918394 -.0087057
  avginc | -.0092037 .0129649 -0.71 0.481 -.0352445 .016837
   density | -.1722901 .1376129 -1.25 0.216 -.4486936 .1041135
  shall | -.0461415 .0417616 -1.10 0.275 -.1300223 .0377392
  _cons | 3.866017 .7701057 5.02 0.000 2.319214 5.412819
 sigma_u | .68024951
 sigma_e | .16072287
   rho | .94712779 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
/* we can have 2 more variations for fixed effects. entity fixed & time fixed effects. We'll good ahead with both */
/* fixed entity fixed effect. create dummy variable for state */
reg Invio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall i.stateid
  Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
Total | 488.631558 1,172 .416921125 Root MSE = .16072
  Invio | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
incarc_rate | -.000071 .0000936 -0.76 0.448 -.0002547 .0001126
  pb1064 | .1042804 .0177564 5.87 0.000 .0694407 .1391201
  pw1064 | .0408611 .0050745 8.05 0.000 .0309044 .0508177
  pm1029 | -.0502725 .0064037 -7.85 0.000 -.0628373 -.0377078
  avginc | -.0092037 .0059083 -1.56 0.120 -.0207963 .0023889
   density | -.1722901 .0850362 -2.03 0.043 -.3391392 -.0054409
  shall | -.0461415 .0188668 -2.45 0.015 -.08316 -.009123
     1
 stateid |
   2 | .0559649 .0727213 0.77 0.442 -.0867213 .198651
   4 | .2404116 .0887689 2.71 0.007 .0662385 .4145848
   5 | -.1272757 .0664795 -1.91 0.056 -.2577149 .0031635
   6 | .2442405 .2304245 1.06 0.289 -.2078744 .6963554
   8 | -.1050866 .1121747 -0.94 0.349 -.3251842 .1150109
   9 | -.0955651 .1348337 -0.71 0.479 -.3601218 .1689916
   10 | .0975979 .0767356 1.27 0.204 -.0529647 .2481605
   11 | 2.759405 .7797288 3.54 0.000 1.229502 4.289307
   12 | .6771463 .1135223 5.96 0.000 .4544047 .8998878
   15 | -1.127962 .2590434 -4.35 0.000 -1.63623 -.6196937
   16 | -.5029989 .1220814 -4.12 0.000 -.7425344 -.2634634
   17 | .4085668 .1072083 3.81 0.000 .1982138 .6189197
   18 | -.2056563 .1110607 -1.85 0.064 -.4235679 .0122553
   19 | -.62914 .1277561 -4.92 0.000 -.8798097 -.3784703
   20 | -.180834 .1015614 -1.78 0.075 -.3801071 .0184391
   21 | -.4255548 .1049019 -4.06 0.000 -.6313824 -.2197272
   22 | .3685392 .057251 6.44 0.000 .2562073 .4808711
   23 | -1.131981 .1330361 -8.51 0.000 -1.39301 -.8709513
   24 | .3961276 .0592262 6.69 0.000 .2799202 .512335
   26 | .2449163 .0991731 2.47 0.014 .0503291 .4395035
   27 | -.5760094 .1251856 -4.60 0.000 -.8216356 -.3303833
   28 | -.392985 .0771168 -5.10 0.000 -.5442955 -.2416745
   29 | .1455349 .0922059 1.58 0.115 -.0353819 .3264516
   30 | -.9910133 .1051692 -9.42 0.000 -1.197365 -.7846612
   31 | -.4432373 .11437 -3.88 0.000 -.6676422 -.2188325
   32 | .3226112 .0865611 3.73 0.000 .15277 .4924524
   33 | -1.277052 .139976 -9.12 0.000 -1.551698 -1.002406
   34 | .1222139 .1265728 0.97 0.334 -.126134 .3705618
   36 | .4354412 .1459921 2.98 0.003 .1489906 .7218917
   37 | -.0965572 .0549367 -1.76 0.079 -.2043483 .0112339
   38 | -1.843342 .111446 -16.54 0.000 -2.06201 -1.624675
```

```
40 | -.0411461 .0684913 -0.60 0.548 -.1755325 .0932403
   42 | -.3249639 .1370178 -2.37 0.018 -.593806 -.0561218
   44 | -.1003761 .1577365 -0.64 0.525 -.4098703 .209118
   45 | .334051 .0576949 5.79 0.000 .2208482 .4472539
   46 | -1.024605 .0989142 -10.36 0.000 -1.218684 -.8305256
   49 | -.3039108 .1136771 -2.67 0.008 -.526956 -.0808655
   50 | -1.254522 .1352965 -9.27 0.000 -1.519987 -.9890573
   51 | -.6017665 .0614983 -9.79 0.000 -.7224321 -.4811009
   53 | -.1321725 .1036698 -1.27 0.203 -.3355826 .0712377
   54 | -.9691482 .122316 -7.92 0.000 -1.209144 -.7291524
   55 | -.7812224 .1174512 -6.65 0.000 -1.011673 -.5507718
   56 | -.4804004 .121985 -3.94 0.000 -.7197467 -.2410541
     1
  _cons | 4.036775 .3893662 10.37 0.000 3.272801 4.800749
*/
/* the estimate on shall law hasnt changed. let's go with time-fixed effect */
xtreg Invio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall i.year, fe cluster(stateid)
Fixed-effects (within) regression
                            Number of obs =
                                            1,173
Group variable: stateid
                          Number of groups =
R-sq:
                    Obs per group:
  within = 0.4180
                             min =
                                     23
                                    23.0
 between = 0.0419
                              avg =
  overall = 0.0009
                             max =
                   F(30,50)
                            = 56.86
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.2929
                         Prob > F
                                   = 0.0000
            (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
    1
         Robust
  Invio | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
pw1064 | .0092501 .0237564 0.39 0.699 -.0384659 .0569662
  avginc | .0009587 .0164931 0.06 0.954 -.0321688 .0340861
   pop | -.0047544 .0152294 -0.31 0.756 -.0353436 .0258347
  density | -.091555 .1238622 -0.74 0.463 -.3403396 .1572296
  shall | -.0279935 .0407168 -0.69 0.495 -.1097757 .0537886
   vear l
   78 | .0585261 .0161556 3.62 0.001 .0260767 .0909755
   79 | .1639486 .0244579 6.70 0.000 .1148233 .2130738
   80 | .2170759 .0334184 6.50 0.000 .1499531 .2841987
   81 | .2172551 .0391956 5.54 0.000 .1385284 .2959819
   83 | .158645 .0593845 2.67 0.010 .0393676 .2779223
   84 | .1929883 .0770021 2.51 0.015 .0383251 .3476515
   85 | .2444764 .0922217 2.65 0.011 .0592438 .4297091
   86 | .3240904 .1089181 2.98 0.004 .1053219 .5428589
   87 | .324365 .1249881 2.60 0.012 .073319 .5754111
   88 | .3867412 .1397074 2.77 0.008 .1061305 .6673518
   89 | .4422143 .1535358 2.88 0.006 .1338286 .7505999
   90 | .5430478 .1960859 2.77 0.008 .1491976 .936898
   91 | .5959456 .2040685 2.92 0.005
                                  .1860618 1.005829
   92 | .6275171 .2170306 2.89 0.006 .1915982 1.063436
   93 | .6497414 .2246177 2.89 0.006
                                  .1985834 1.100899
   94 | .6354187 .2332437 2.72 0.009
                                  .1669349 1.103903
   95 | .6276831 .2423607 2.59 0.013 .1408874 1.114479
   96 | .5713423 .2534067 2.25 0.029
                                   .06236 1.080325
   97 | .5501153 .2613516 2.10 0.040 .0251751 1.075055
   98 | .4932904 .2746546 1.80 0.079 -.0583697 1.04495
```

39 | -.1884885 .1257346 -1.50 0.134 -.4351919 .0582149

```
1
   cons | 3.765525 1.152108 3.27 0.002 1.451448 6.079603
  sigma_u | .6663043
  sigma_e | .1400264
    rho | .95770338 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
we can see that effect of shall law has decreased more. this model can be better because it explained for a lot of
unobserved characteristics */
/* we can check if the years are jointly significant ot not
 H0: effects of all time effects = 0
 H1: effect not equal to 0 at least for 1 year */
 testparm i.year
(1) 78.year = 0
(2) 79.year = 0
(3) 80.year = 0
(4) 81.year = 0
(5) 82.year = 0
(6) 83.year = 0
(7) 84.year = 0
(8) 85.year = 0
(9) 86.year = 0
(10) 87.year = 0
(11) 88.year = 0
(12) 89.year = 0
(13) 90.year = 0
(14) 91.year = 0
(15) 92.year = 0
(16) 93.year = 0
(17) 94.year = 0
(18) 95.year = 0
(19) 96.year = 0
(20) 97.year = 0
(21) 98.year = 0
(22) 99.year = 0
   F(22, 50) = 21.62
      Prob > F = 0.0000 */
/* Yes, the time effects are jointly statistically significant */
/* Also, the effect on shall law drops even more. so, this model can be utilized to explain about the data. hence, we prefer a
model with both entity & time effect*/
/* random effects model */
xtreq Invio incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re cluster(stateid)
                                      Number of obs = 1,173
Random-effects GLS regression
Group variable: stateid Number of groups = 51
R-sq:
                        Obs per group:
  within = 0.2044
                                    min = 23
  between = 0.4908
                                      avq = 23.0
  overall = 0.4591
                                      max = 23
                        Wald\ chi2(8) = 167.14
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
               (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
            Robust
   Invio | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
pb1064 | .1067022 .0270973 3.94 0.000 .0535924 .1598119
pw1064 | .0400716 .0127282 3.15 0.002 .0151248 .0650184
   pm1029 | -.0375292 .0180436 -2.08 0.038 -.072894 -.0021643
   avginc | -.0105112 .0117802 -0.89 0.372 -.0335999 .0125775
```

99 | .4328776 .2862197 1.51 0.137 -.1420117 1.007767

```
shall | -.069609 .038845 -1.79 0.073 -.1457438 .0065258
  _cons | 3.525463 .7786851 4.53 0.000 1.999268 5.051658
  sigma_u | .33790775
  sigma_e | .16072287
   rho | .81550462 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
/* test for endogienty - Hausman test */
quietly xtreg Invio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
estimates store fe
quietly xtreg Invio incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re
estimates store re
hausman fe re
      ---- Coefficients ----
     | (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
| fe re Difference S.E.
     | fe
incarc_rate | -.000071 .0001888 -.0002598 .0000635
  pb1064 | .1042804 .1067022 -.0024217 .011767
  pw1064 | .0408611 .0400716 .0007895
  pm1029 | -.0502725 -.0375292 -.0127434 .0021099
  avginc | -.0092037 -.0105112 .0013075 .0006269
   pop | .0115247 .0225755 -.0110508 .0059821
  density | -.1722901 .0661588 -.2384489 .0763882
  shall | -.0461415 -.069609 .0234675
-----
          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
    B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
 Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
       chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^{-1}](b-B)
         = 31.86
      Prob>chi2 = 0.0001
      (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) */
/* reject null and conclude at least 1 has endogeneity. from the differences we can suspect density is an endogenous
variable */
/* -----*/
/* ----- BEGIN of rob variable ----- */
use guns.dta
describe
/* create log variable for mur */
gen\ Inrob = log(rob)
/* let us check how only the shall_law has an impact on mur rate */
reg Inrob shall
 Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
------ F(1, 1171) = 160.90
  Model \mid 129.02655 \quad 1 \quad 129.02655 \quad Prob > F = 0.0000
 Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
  shall | -.7733207 .0609644 -12.68 0.000 -.8929323 -.6537091
  cons | 4.873051 .0300503 162.16 0.000 4.814093 4.93201
```

```
We can see that, when shall law is implemented in a state, the violence rate drops by 77.3% */
/* since we are employing regression on panel data, it is advised to use robust standard errors */
reg Inrob shall, vce(robust)
Linear regression
                            Number of obs = 1,173
                       F(1, 1171) = 124.66
                       Prob > F = 0.0000
                       R-squared = 0.1208
                       Root MSE = .89548
            Robust
   Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
  shall | -.7733207 .0692623 -11.17 0.000 -.9092128 -.6374286
   _cons | 4.873051 .0279093 174.60 0.000 4.818293 4.927809
We can observe changes in the t-values & standard errors but coefficents remain same. */
/* let us go ahead and regress a pooled OLS model with robust standard errors
From the above model, we have to remove mur rob variables since they are highly correlated to vio, remodelling - */
reg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, vce(robust)
Linear regression
                             Number of obs = 1,173
                       F(8, 1164) = 144.90
                       Prob > F
                                   = 0.0000
                       R-squared = 0.5962
                       Root MSE = .60869
   -----
    | Robust
   Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | .0010057 .0001869 5.38 0.000 .0006391 .0013724
  pb1064 | .1021881 .0265948 3.84 0.000 .0500091 .1543672
pw1064 | .0275209 .0135419 2.03 0.042 .0009515 .0540902
  avginc | .0407325 .0092722 4.39 0.000 .0225404 .0589246
    pop | .0778176 .0054853 14.19 0.000 .0670554 .0885799
  density | .0905048 .0153545 5.89 0.000 .0603792 .1206303
   shall | -.5288202 .0510021 -10.37 0.000 -.6288865 -.4287539
   _cons | .9041383 .8893029 1.02 0.310 -.8406777 2.648954
we can see that contribution of shall law towards vio rate has decreased. Now vio rate is reduced by 31% when a shall law
was introduced. */
/* Since it is panel data the least square estimators are not efficient. This is due to the fact that there can be unobserved
We'll go ahead and create a fixed effect model & interpret the fixed effect estimators. We can do this in two ways - dummy
variable creation or
fixed effect estimator. since N is large it isn't feasible to do so. Let's go ahead with fixed effect estimator.
We have to let Stata know that we are dealing with panel data -*/
xtset stateid year
/* panel variable: stateid (strongly balanced)
   time variable: year, 77 to 99
       delta: 1 unit */
/* since it is a balanced panel data, it makes sense to use fixed effect over random effects */
xtreg Inrob incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
/*Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid
                              Number of groups = 51
```

```
R-sq: Obs per group:

within = 0.0366 min = 23

between = 0.0531 avg = 23.0

overall = 0.0521 max = 23
```

```
F(8,1114) = 5.29
                       Prob > F = 0.0000
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0859
  Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.0000763 .0001253 -0.61 0.542 -.0003222 .0001695
  pb1064 | .1115421 .0237693 4.69 0.000 .0649045 .1581796
  pw1064 | .0271807 .0067929 4.00 0.000 .0138525 .040509
  pm1029 | .0111817 .0085722 1.30 0.192 -.0056378 .0280012
  avginc | -.0175195 .007909 -2.22 0.027 -.0330377 -.0020012
   pop | .0163332 .0116781 1.40 0.162 -.0065803 .0392466
  density | -.1860917 .1138322 -1.63 0.102 -.4094413 .037258
  shall | -.0078189 .0252557 -0.31 0.757 -.0573731 .0417352
  _cons | 2.445723 .5150678 4.75 0.000 1.435111 3.456335
-----+-----+------
  sigma_u | .9174441
  sigma_e | .21514885
   rho | .94787229 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-----
F test that all u_i=0: F(50, 1114) = 164.06 Prob > F=0.0000
We can see that the coeffecitent of shall rate has reduced considerably. If there is unobserved heterogeniety, we can make
our model robust to these effects as well - */
xtreg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe cluster(stateid)
                            Number of obs = 1,173
/* Fixed-effects (within) regression
                         Number of groups = 51
Group variable: stateid
                   Obs per group:
R-sq:
  within = 0.0366
                             min = 23
  between = 0.0531
                             avg = 23.0
  overall = 0.0521
                             max = 23
                  F(8,50) = 2.86
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0859
                         Prob > F = 0.0108
          (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
  | Robust
  Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
pb1064 | .1115421 .0511546 2.18 0.034 .008795 .2142891
  avginc | -.0175195 .0220352 -0.80 0.430 -.0617784 .0267395
  density | -.1860917 .1663413 -1.12 0.269 -.520198 .1480147
  shall | -.0078189 .0551653 -0.14 0.888 -.1186217 .1029838
  cons | 2.445723 1.012584 2.42 0.019 .4118887 4.479557
-----+-----+------
 sigma u | .9174441
  sigma_e | .21514885
  rho | .94787229 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
*/
/* we can have 2 more variations for fixed effects. entity fixed & time fixed effects. We'll good ahead with both */
/* fixed entity fixed effect. create dummy variable for state */
reg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall i.stateid
/* Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
----- F(58, 1114) = 378.61
  Model | 1016.46714 58 17.5252956 Prob > F = 0.0000
 Residual | 51.5659789 1,114 .04628903 R-squared = 0.9517
------ Adj R-squared = 0.9492
  Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.0000763 .0001253 -0.61 0.542 -.0003222 .0001695
```

```
pw1064 | .0271807 .0067929 4.00 0.000 .0138525 .040509
  avginc | -.0175195 .007909 -2.22 0.027 -.0330377 -.0020012
   density | -.1860917 .1138322 -1.63 0.102 -.4094413 .037258
  shall | -.0078189 .0252557 -0.31 0.757 -.0573731 .0417352
 stateid l
    2 | -.2524599 .0973471 -2.59 0.010 -.4434642 -.0614555
    4 | .4998573 .118829 4.21 0.000 .2667034 .7330112
    5 | -.0886909 .0889917 -1.00 0.319 -.263301 .0859193
    6 | .6758399 .3084537 2.19 0.029 .0706242 1.281056
    8 | .1977714 .1501607 1.32 0.188 -.0968584 .4924011
    9 | .8646919 .1804928 4.79 0.000 .5105477 1.218836
   10 | .3987445 .1027208 3.88 0.000 .1971965 .6002924
   11 | 3.271549 1.04377 3.13 0.002 1.223571 5.319526
   13 | .3174942 .0720822 4.40 0.000 .176062 .4589264
   15 | -1.003273 .3467639 -2.89 0.004 -1.683657 -.3228892
   16 | -1.1913 .1634222 -7.29 0.000 -1.51195 -.8706501
   17 | 1.026567 .1435125 7.15 0.000 .7449816 1.308152
   18 | .1770861 .1486694 1.19 0.234 -.1146175 .4687897
   19 | -.5782475 .1710185 -3.38 0.001 -.9138022 -.2426929
   21 | -.1137133 .1404251 -0.81 0.418 -.3892408 .1618142
   22 | .4261722 .076638 5.56 0.000 .2758012 .5765433
   23 | -1.121693 .1780864 -6.30 0.000 -1.471115 -.7722701
   24 | .9937587 .0792821 12.53 0.000 .8381997 1.149318
   25 | .7654727 .1994347 3.84 0.000 .3741627 1.156783
   26 | .7157619 .1327564 5.39 0.000 .4552811 .9762426
   28 | -.5037359 .103231 -4.88 0.000 -.706285 -.3011868
   29 | .6637821 .1234298 5.38 0.000 .421601 .9059632
   30 | -1.19872 .1407829 -8.51 0.000 -1.47495 -.9224906
   31 | -.2888544 .1530994 -1.89 0.059 -.58925 .0115413
   32 | 1.156535 .1158735 9.98 0.000 .9291797 1.38389
   33 | -1.056983 .1873764 -5.64 0.000 -1.424634 -.6893328
   34 | 1.014261 .1694344 5.99 0.000 .6818145 1.346708
   35 | .2376604 .1028197 2.31 0.021 .0359183 .4394024
   36 | 1.326163 .1954298 6.79 0.000 .9427105 1.709615
   37 | -.163333 .07354 -2.22 0.027 -.3076256 -.0190404
   38 | -2.21564 .1491853 -14.85 0.000 -2.508356 -1.922924
   39 | .5056484 .1683125 3.00 0.003 .1754032 .8358935
   41 | .5380183 .154429 3.48 0.001 .2350138 .8410229
   42 | .4905667 .1834165 2.67 0.008 .130686 .8504475
   45 | -.1018475 .0772322 -1.32 0.188 -.2533845 .0496896
   46 | -1.616425 .1324097 -12.21 0.000 -1.876225 -1.356624
   47 | .512852 .0963999 5.32 0.000 .3237061 .7019979
   48 | .4202159 .1942884 2.16 0.031 .0390035 .8014283
   49 | -.2693639 .1521718 -1.77 0.077 -.5679395 .0292117
   50 | -1.559857 .1811122 -8.61 0.000 -1.915216 -1.204497
   51 | -.1249104 .0823236 -1.52 0.129 -.2864373 .0366164
   53 | .2616721 .1387758 1.89 0.060 -.0106193 .5339635
   54 | -.7122682 .1637362 -4.35 0.000 -1.033534 -.3910021
   55 | -.0994233 .157224 -0.63 0.527 -.4079118 .2090653
   56 | -1.283712 .1632931 -7.86 0.000 -1.604108 -.9633148
     1
  /* the estimate on shall law hasnt changed. let's go with time-fixed effect */
xtreq Inrob incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avainc pop density shall i.year, fe cluster(stateid)
/* Fixed-effects (within) regression
                              Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid
                          Number of groups =
R-sq:
                    Obs per group:
 within = 0.2359
                             min =
                                     23
 between = 0.1358
                              avg =
                                      23.0
 overall = 0.1362
                                      23
                             max =
```

```
F(30,50) = 40.77
corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.1441 \qquad Prob > F = 0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
```

(7) 84.year = 0 (8) 85.year = 0 (9) 86.year = 0 (10) 87.year = 0 (11) 88.year = 0 (12) 89.year = 0 (13) 90.year = 0 (14) 91.year = 0 (15) 92.year = 0 (16) 93.year = 0

```
Robust
  Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----+------
incarc_rate | .0000314 .0003477 0.09 0.928 -.000667 .0007297
  pw1064 | -.0128322 .0327626 -0.39 0.697 -.0786379 .0529734
  pm1029 | .1046049 .072997 1.43 0.158 -.0420138 .2512236
  density | -.0447449 .1982135 -0.23 0.822 -.4428684 .3533786
  1
  year |
   78 | .0328497 .0216897 1.51 0.136 -.0107154 .0764148
   79 | .1375917 .032117 4.28 0.000 .0730828 .2021006
   80 | .243408 .045464 5.35 0.000 .1520908 .3347251
   82 | .21599 .0644109 3.35 0.002 .0866168 .3453632
   85 | .1131495 .1272629 0.89 0.378 -.1424655 .3687645
   86 | .1895678 .1521449 1.25 0.219 -.1160242 .4951598
   87 | .1572151 .1688872 0.93 0.356 -.1820049 .496435
   88 | .1927596 .1878849 1.03 0.310 -.1846184 .5701376
   89 | .2487313 .2140573 1.16 0.251 -.1812154 .6786781
   90 | .3509806 .2668617 1.32 0.194 -.185027 .8869881
   91 | .4668537 .2791767 1.67 0.101 -.0938891 1.027596
   92 | .4633221 .2951262 1.57 0.123 -.1294562 1.0561
   93 | .4796983 .3082342 1.56 0.126 -.1394084 1.098805
   94 | .4943754 .3234124 1.53 0.133 -.1552175 1.143968
   95 | .4940171 .3338462 1.48 0.145 -.1765328 1.164567
   96 | .4341625 .3504351 1.24 0.221 -.2697072 1.138032
   97 | .3652393 .3581743 1.02 0.313 -.354175 1.084654
   99 | .1894683 .3845414 0.49 0.624 -.5829059 .9618425
    1
  _cons | 3.27912 1.676644 1.96 0.056 -.088518 6.646759
-----+----+-----
 sigma_u | .88484023
 sigma_e | .19352746
   rho | .95434775 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
we can see that effect of shall law has decreaed more, this model can be better because it explanied for a lot of unobserved
characterisics */
/* we can check if the years are jointly significant ot not
HO: effects of all time effects = 0
H1: effect not equal to 0 atleast for 1 year */
testparm i.year
/* (1) 78.year = 0
(2) 79.year = 0
(3) 80.year = 0
(4) 81.year = 0
(5) 82.year = 0
(6) 83.year = 0
```

```
(17) 94.year = 0
(18) 95.year = 0
(19) 96.year = 0
(20) 97.year = 0
(21) 98.year = 0
(22) 99.year = 0
  F(22, 50) = 25.86
     Prob > F = 0.0000 */
/* Yes, the time effects are jointly statistically significant */
/* Also, the effect on shall law drops even more. so this model can be utlized to explain about the data. hence we prefer a
model with both entity & time effect*/
/* random effects model */
xtreg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re cluster(stateid)
/* Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid
                     Number of groups =
R-sq:
                     Obs per group:
 within = 0.0269
                              min =
                                      23
                              avg = 23.0
 between = 0.5183
                                     23
 overall = 0.4910
                              max =
                   Wald\ chi2(8) = 83.85
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
                     Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
           (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
______
   1
          Robust
  Inrob | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----+------
pb1064 | .1074485 .0337729 3.18 0.001 .0412548 .1736422
  pw1064 | .0282639 .0162546 1.74 0.082 -.0035945 .0601223
  avginc | -.0152975 .0199351 -0.77 0.443 -.0543697 .0237747
   density | .0997518 .0479974 2.08 0.038 .0056786 .1938251
  shall | -.0411192 .0529293 -0.78 0.437 -.1448586 .0626203
  _cons | 1.8759 1.025224 1.83 0.067 -.1335014 3.885301
 sigma_u | .48469008
 sigma_e | .21514885
   rho | .83539542 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
*/
/* test for endogienty - Hausman test */
quietly xtreg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
estimates store fe
quietly xtreg Inrob incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re
estimates store re
hausman fe re
       ---- Coefficients ----
     (b) (B) (b-B) sgrt(diag(V b-V B))
     l fe re Difference S.E.
pb1064 | .1115421 .1074485 .0040936 .0153173
  pw1064 | .0271807 .0282639 -.0010832 .
  pm1029 | .0111817 .0252997 -.014118 .002718
  avginc | -.0175195 -.0152975 -.002222 .0005277
                                     .00772
   pop | .0163332 .0405861 -.0242529
 density | -.1860917 .0997518 -.2858435 .1008633
  shall | -.0078189 -.0411192 .0333002
           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreq
     B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
 Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
```

```
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^{-1}](b-B)
= 26.94
Prob>chi2 = 0.0007
```

```
/* reject null and conclude at least 1 has endogeneity. from the differences we can suspect density is an endogenous
/* ----- BEGIN of mur variable -----*/
use guns.dta
describe
/* create log variable for mur */
gen Inmur = log(mur)
/* let us check how only the shall_law has an impact on mur rate */
reg Inmur shall
/* Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
----- F(1, 1171) = 106.51
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
------
  shall | -.4733725 .0458686 -10.32 0.000 -.5633664 -.3833785
  _cons | 1.897556 .0226094 83.93 0.000 1.853196 1.941915
We can see that, when shall law is implemented in a state, the violence rate drops by 47.3% */
/* since we are employing regression on panel data, it is advised to use robust standard errors */
reg Inmur shall, vce(robust)
                        Number of obs = 1,173
/* Linear regression
                  F(1, 1171) = 95.12
                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                  R-squared = 0.0834
                  Root MSE = .67375
______
  | Robust
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
  _cons | 1.897556 .0219606 86.41 0.000 1.854469 1.940642
______
We can observe changes in the t-values & standard errors but coefficents remain same. */
/* let us go ahead and regress a pooled OLS model with robust standard errors
From the above model, we have to remove mur rob variables since they are highly correlated to vio, remodelling - */
reg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, vce(robust)
/* Linear regression
                       Number of obs = 1,173
                  F(8, 1164) = 176.49
                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                  R-squared = 0.6059
                 Root MSE = .44312
   | Robust
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----+------
incarc rate | .002097 .0001544 13.58 0.000 .0017941 .0023999
  pb1064 | .1307641 .018782 6.96 0.000 .0939137 .1676145
  pw1064 | .0470796 .0090873 5.18 0.000 .0292502 .0649089
  pm1029 | .0655308 .0136782 4.79 0.000 .0386941 .0923674
  avginc | -.0772578 .0087513 -8.83 0.000 -.0944278 -.0600878
   pop | .0416175 .0035077 11.86 0.000 .0347355 .0484995
  density | .0396669 .0117541 3.37 0.001 .0166054 .0627284
  shall | -.3131735 .0357019 -8.77 0.000 -.3832208 -.2431262
  _cons | -2.485593 .6149912 -4.04 0.000 -3.692209 -1.278978
```

(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) */

we can see that contribution of shall law towards mur rate has decreased. Now mur rate is reduced by 31% when a shall law was introduced. */

/* Since it is panel data the least square estimators are not efficient. This is due to the fact that there can be unobserved heterogeneity.

We'll go ahead and create a fixed effect model & interpret the fixed effect estimators. We can do this in two ways - dummy variable creation or

fixed effect estimator. since N is large it isn't feasible to do so. Let's go ahead with fixed effect estimator.

```
We have to let stata know that we are dealing with panel data -*/
xtset stateid year
    panel variable: stateid (strongly balanced)
   time variable: year, 77 to 99
      delta: 1 unit */
/* since it is a balanced panel data, it makes sense to use fixed effect over random effects */
xtreg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
/* Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid Number of groups = 51
R-sq:
                   Obs per group:
 within = 0.1528
                            min =
                                    23
 between = 0.2221
                             avg = 23.0
 overall = 0.1846
                            max =
                                   23
                 F(8,1114)
                           = 25.12
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8961
                       Prob > F = 0.0000
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.00036 .0001278 -2.82 0.005 -.0006107 -.0001093
  pw1064 | .0103313 .006928 1.49 0.136 -.003262 .0239246
  pm1029 | .0392384 .0087427 4.49 0.000 .0220844 .0563923
  avginc | .0243114 .0080663 3.01 0.003 .0084846 .0401382
   pop | -.0257054 .0119103 -2.16 0.031 -.0490745 -.0023363
 density | -.6707132 .1160957 -5.78 0.000 -.898504 -.4429224
  shall | -.06081 .0257579 -2.36 0.018 -.1113495 -.0102704
  sigma_u | 1.36035
 sigma_e | .21942693
   rho | .97464151 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
______
We can see that the coeffecitent of shall rate has reduced considerably. If there is unobserved heterogeniety, we can make
our model robust to these effects as well - */
xtreg Inmur incarc rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avainc pop density shall, fe cluster(stateid)
/* Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid Number of groups =
R-sq:
                   Obs per group:
 within = 0.1528
                            min =
                                    23
                                   23.0
 between = 0.2221
                            avg =
 overall = 0.1846
                            max =
                                   23
                  F(8,50) = 156.39
                  Prob > F = 0.0000
corr(u \ i, Xb) = -0.8961
          (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
   1
          Robust
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc rate | -.00036 .0004231 -0.85 0.399 -.0012099 .0004899
  pop | -.0257054 .0203457 -1.26 0.212 -.0665709 .0151602
 density | -.6707132 .3957745 -1.69 0.096 -1.46565 .1242232
  shall | -.06081 .0369632 -1.65 0.106 -.1350527 .0134327
  _cons | .4600088 .8425884 0.55 0.588 -1.23238 2.152397
 sigma_u | 1.36035
 sigma e | .21942693
   rho | .97464151 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
*/
/* we can have 2 more variations for fixed effects. entity fixed & time fixed effects. We'll good ahead with both */
/* fixed entity fixed effect. create dummy variable for state */
reg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall i.stateid
/* Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 1,173
```

```
Model | 526.264844
                    58 9.07353179 Prob > F = 0.0000
 Residual | 53.6370704 1,114 .048148178 R-squared = 0.9075
Total | 579.901914 1,172 .494796855 Root MSE
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.00036 .0001278 -2.82 0.005 -.0006107 -.0001093
  pb1064 | .0307009 .0242419 1.27 0.206 -.0168641 .0782658
  pw1064 | .0103313 .006928 1.49 0.136 -.003262 .0239246
  pm1029 | .0392384 .0087427 4.49 0.000 .0220844 .0563923
  avginc | .0243114 .0080663 3.01 0.003 .0084846 .0401382
   pop | -.0257054 .0119103 -2.16 0.031 -.0490745 -.0023363
 density | -.6707132 .1160957 -5.78 0.000 -.898504 -.4429224
  shall | -.06081 .0257579 -2.36 0.018 -.1113495 -.0102704
    1
 stateid |
   2 | -.5647602 .0992828 -5.69 0.000 -.7595625 -.3699578
   4 | -.2651784 .1211918 -2.19 0.029 -.5029684 -.0273885
   5 | -.187964 .0907612 -2.07 0.039 -.3660462 -.0098819
   8 | -.8074469 .1531466 -5.27 0.000 -1.107935 -.5069587
   9 | -.6007435 .1840818 -3.26 0.001 -.9619296 -.2395574
   10 | -.829185 .1047633 -7.91 0.000 -1.034741 -.6236295
   11 | 7.77904 1.064525 7.31 0.000 5.69034 9.86774
   12 | .3369919 .1549863 2.17 0.030 .032894 .6410899
   15 | -1.294748 .3536591 -3.66 0.000 -1.988661 -.6008354
   16 | -1.280885 .1666717 -7.69 0.000 -1.607911 -.9538593
   18 | -.3334492 .1516256 -2.20 0.028 -.6309531 -.0359453
   19 | -1.739756 .1744191 -9.97 0.000 -2.081983 -1.397529
   20 | -.7768745 .1386567 -5.60 0.000 -1.048932 -.5048169
   21 | -.3966237 .1432174 -2.77 0.006 -.6776299 -.1156175
   23 | -1.633723 .1816275 -8.99 0.000 -1.990094 -1.277353
   24 | .0639087 .0808585 0.79 0.429 -.0947435 .2225608
   25 | -.8014337 .2034003 -3.94 0.000 -1.200525 -.4023427
   26 | .0231729 .1353962 0.17 0.864 -.2424873 .2888331
   27 | -1.525127 .1709097 -8.92 0.000 -1.860468 -1.189786
   29 | -.1471592 .1258841 -1.17 0.243 -.3941559 .0998375
   30 | -1.159839 .1435823 -8.08 0.000 -1.441561 -.8781166
   31 | -1.337181 .1561436 -8.56 0.000 -1.64355 -1.030812
   32 | -.0583977 .1181776 -0.49 0.621 -.2902734 .173478
   33 | -1.747664 .1911023 -9.15 0.000 -2.122625 -1.372703
   34 | -.112379 .1728035 -0.65 0.516 -.451436 .226678
   35 | -.2073594 .1048642 -1.98 0.048 -.4131129 -.0016058
   36 | .4095608 .1993158 2.05 0.040 .0184842 .8006375
   37 | -.1033656 .0750023 -1.38 0.168 -.2505274 .0437961
   38 | -2.39921 .1521517 -15.77 0.000 -2.697746 -2.100673
   39 | -.3293598 .1716592 -1.92 0.055 -.6661717 .007452
   40 | -.3157795 .0935077 -3.38 0.001 -.4992506 -.1323084
   41 | -.9237303 .1574997 -5.86 0.000 -1.23276 -.6147007
   42 | -.299992 .1870636 -1.60 0.109 -.6670287 .0670447
   44 | -.6714586 .2153498 -3.12 0.002 -1.093996 -.2489217
   45 | -.1236207 .0787679 -1.57 0.117 -.2781709 .0309296
   46 | -1.889717 .1350426 -13.99 0.000 -2.154683 -1.62475
   47 | -.0904587 .0983168 -0.92 0.358 -.2833656 .1024483
   48 | .380945 .1981517 1.92 0.055 -.0078475 .7697376
   49 | -1.363478 .1551976 -8.79 0.000 -1.667991 -1.058966
   50 | -1.650036 .1847135 -8.93 0.000 -2.012462 -1.287611
   51 | -.3505359 .0839606 -4.18 0.000 -.5152746 -.1857972
   53 | -.8461956 .1415353 -5.98 0.000 -1.123901 -.5684898
   54 | -.6978991 .166992 -4.18 0.000 -1.025553 -.3702449
   55 | -1.154587 .1603503 -7.20 0.000 -1.46921 -.8399648
   56 | -1.145291 .1665401 -6.88 0.000 -1.472059 -.8185238
```

```
/* the estimate on shall law hasnt changed. let's go with time-fixed effect */
xtreg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall i.year, fe cluster(stateid)
/* Fixed-effects (within) regression
                                Number of obs = 1,173
Group variable: stateid
                            Number of groups =
R-sa:
                     Obs per group:
  within = 0.2905
                                min =
                                         23
  between = 0.1945
                                avg = 23.0
  overall = 0.1413
                                max =
                                         23
                     F(30,50) = 81.49
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8336
                      Prob > F = 0.0000
             (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
            Robust
     1
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
incarc_rate | -.0001164 .0003631 -0.32 0.750 -.0008457 .0006129
  pb1064 | .0219833 .0758151 0.29 0.773 -.1302958 .1742624
  pw1064 | -.0004893 .0201044 -0.02 0.981 -.0408701 .0398915
  pm1029 | .0691941 .0417945 1.66 0.104 -.0147526 .1531408
  avginc | .0566492 .0165554 3.42 0.001 .0233967 .0899017
   pop | -.0320769 .0209819 -1.53 0.133 -.0742202 .0100664
  density | -.5442635 .3192203 -1.70 0.094 -1.185436 .0969093
   shall | -.0149524 .0382403 -0.39 0.697 -.0917603 .0618556
     1
   year |
   78 | -.0007195 .0322722 -0.02 0.982 -.0655401 .0641011
    80 | .0901814 .041058 2.20 0.033 .0077139 .1726489
   81 | .1021543 .0510636 2.00 0.051 -.00041 .2047186
   82 | .0224098 .0581861 0.39 0.702 -.0944604 .1392799
   83 | -.0314385 .0640621 -0.49 0.626 -.1601111 .0972341
   84 | -.1359192 .071662 -1.90 0.064 -.2798565 .0080181
   85 | -.0866144 .0856965 -1.01 0.317 -.2587409 .0855122
   86 | -.0122752 .0927286 -0.13 0.895 -.1985262 .1739758
   87 | -.0290338 .0999408 -0.29 0.773 -.2297707 .1717032
   88 | -.0174594 .1196893 -0.15 0.885 -.2578626 .2229437
   89 | -.0145617 .1321034 -0.11 0.913 -.2798993 .2507759
   91 | .1053071 .1754909 0.60 0.551 -.2471767 .4577909
   92 | .0681002 .1828352 0.37 0.711 -.2991352 .4353355
   95 | .0556601 .1989082 0.28 0.781 -.3438588 .455179
   96 | -.015709 .2125365 -0.07 0.941 -.4426011 .4111831
   97 | -.1221824 .2186706 -0.56 0.579 -.5613952 .3170304
   98 | -.1863381 .2332966 -0.80 0.428 -.6549281 .2822519
   99 | -.2554286 .2420434 -1.06 0.296 -.741587 .2307298
     1
   cons | .1882653 1.056771 0.18 0.859 -1.934322 2.310853
  sigma_u | 1.1362086
  sigma e | .20281999
   rho | .96911961 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
_____
we can see that effect of shall law has decreased more. this model can be better because it explained for a lot of
unobserved characteristics */
/* we can check if the years are jointly significant ot not
H0: effects of all time effects = 0
H1: effect not equal to 0 at least for 1 year */
testparm i.year
/* (1) 78.year = 0
(2) 79.year = 0
(3) 80.year = 0
(4) 81.year = 0
(5) 82.year = 0
(6) 83.year = 0
(7) 84.year = 0
(8) 85.year = 0
```

```
(9) 86.year = 0
(10) 87.year = 0
(11) 88.year = 0
(12) 89.year = 0
(13) 90.year = 0
(14) 91.year = 0
(15) 92.year = 0
(16) 93.year = 0
(17) 94.year = 0
(18) 95.year = 0
(19) 96.year = 0
(20) 97.year = 0
(21) 98.year = 0
(22) 99.year = 0
   F(22, 50) = 19.61
     Prob > F = 0.0000 */
/* Yes, the time effects are jointly statistically significant */
/* Also, the effect on shall law drops even more. so this model can be utlized to explain about the data. hence we prefer a
model with both entity & time effect*/
/* random effects model */
xtreg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re cluster(stateid)
                                 Number of obs = 1,173
/* Random-effects GLS regression
Group variable: stateid
                            Number of groups =
                      Obs per group:
R-sq:
  within = 0.0813
                                min =
                                         23
  between = 0.4921
                                        23.0
                                 avg =
  overall = 0.4381
                                max =
                     Wald\ chi2(8) = 277.18
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)
                             Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
             (Std. Err. adjusted for 51 clusters in stateid)
     1
            Robust
  Inmur | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
pb1064 | .0512656 .0376346 1.36 0.173 -.0224967 .125028
  pm1029 | .0734716 .0229191 3.21 0.001 .0285511 .1183922
  density | .0163429 .067886 0.24 0.810 -.1167113 .1493971
  shall | -.1153705 .039896 -2.89 0.004 -.1935652 -.0371757
  _cons | -.3301384 .7279221 -0.45 0.650 -1.75684 1.096563
  sigma u | .30755149
  sigma e | .21942693
   rho | .66267693 (fraction of variance due to u i)
/* test for endogienty - Hausman test */
quietly xtreg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, fe
estimates store fe
quietly xtreg Inmur incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 avginc pop density shall, re
estimates store re
hausman fe re
        ---- Coefficients ----
      (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
     | fe
              re Difference S.E.
incarc_rate | -.00036 .0004438 -.0008037 .0000882
  pb1064 | .0307009 .0512656 -.0205648
                                          .017453
  pw1064 | .0103313 .0069318
                               .0033995
                              -.0342333
  pm1029 | .0392384 .0734716
                                          .0024109
  avginc | .0243114 .0093982 .0149132
   pop | -.0257054 .0029126 -.0286179
                                         .0094248
  density | -.6707132 .0163429 -.6870561
                                        .1096429
   shall | -.06081 -.1153705 .0545605
```

```
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
    B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
 Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
       chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^{-1}](b-B)
            91.44
      Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
      (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) */
/* reject null and conclude at least 1 has endogeneity. from the differences we can suspect density is an endogenous
variable */
infile \ "H: \ \ con\ \ project \ \ guns. dta" \ firstobs=2;
input year vio mur rob incarc_rate pbl064 pwl064 pml029 pop avginc density stateid shall;
data guns;
set guns;
Invio = log(vio);
proc reg data=guns;
model Invio = incarc_rate pb1064 pw1064 pm1029 pop avginc density shall;
plot residual.*incarc_rate;
plot residual.*pb1064;
plot residual.*pw1064;
plot residual.*pm1029;
plot residual.*pop;
plot residual.*avginc;
plot residual.*density;
run;
```

******************** BEGIN OF REPORT ****************