

Principles of System Administration

Jan Schaumann
`jschauma@netmeister.org`

April 14, 2021

Contents

Preface to the preface	i
Preface	ii
I Introduction and General Concepts	1
1 Introduction	2
1.1 What exactly does a System Administrator do?	3
1.2 The Profession of System Administration	6
1.3 System Administration Education	9
1.3.1 Challenges in System Administration Education	11
1.4 The Three Pillars of Exceptional System Design	13
1.4.1 Scalability	14
1.4.2 Security	16
1.4.3 Simplicity	19
1.5 The Future of System Administration	20
Problems and Exercises	23
Problems	23
Exercises	24
2 Unix	28
2.1 Unix History	28
2.1.1 The Operating System	28
2.1.2 Networking	35
2.1.3 Open Source	37
2.2 Basic Unix Concepts and Features	38

CONTENTS	2
2.2.1 The shell	39
2.2.2 Manual pages and documentation	42
2.2.3 A portable, multitasking, multiuser system	44
2.2.4 The Unix Philosophy	46
Problems and Exercises	50
Exercises	51
3 Documentation Techniques	55
3.1 System Documentation Writing 101	56
3.1.1 Know Your Audience	56
3.2 Online Documentation	58
3.3 Different Document Types	59
3.3.1 Processes and Procedures	60
3.3.2 Policies	61
3.3.3 Online Help and Reference	62
3.3.4 Infrastructure Architecture and Design	63
3.3.5 Program Specification and Software Documentation .	64
3.4 Collaboration	65
3.5 Formats	66
Problems and Exercises	68
II Fundamental Technologies and Concepts	70
4 Of File Systems and Storage Models	74
4.1 Introduction	74
4.2 Storage Models	76
4.2.1 Direct Attached Storage	76
4.2.2 Network Attached Storage	78
4.2.3 Storage Area Networks	80
4.2.4 Cloud Storage	83
4.2.5 Storage Model Considerations	86
4.3 Disk Devices and Interfaces	87
4.3.1 Physical Disk Structure	90
4.4 Dividing and Combining Disks	92
4.4.1 Partitions	93

4.4.2 Logical Volumes	97
4.4.3 RAID	99
4.5 File Systems	106
4.5.1 File System Types	106
4.6 File System Layout	110
4.7 The Unix File System	112
4.8 Conclusions	118
Problems and Exercises	122
Problems	122
5 Software Installation and Package Management	126
5.1 Introduction	126
5.2 Types of Software	128
5.2.1 Up and down the software stack	128
5.2.2 Operating System vs. System Software vs. Third Party Software	135
5.3 File System Layout	137
5.4 OS Installation	141
5.4.1 Identifying server requirements	142
5.4.2 OS Installation Overview	143
5.4.3 OS Installation Details	147
5.5 Package Management Systems	151
5.5.1 “Manual” Software Installation	151
5.5.2 Software Installation by Package Manager	153
5.5.3 Inherent Security Risks	158
5.6 Managing Software Updates and Patches	160
5.7 Conclusions	163
Problems and Exercises	166
Problems	166
6 Of Users and Groups	170
6.1 Introduction	170
6.2 Types of Users	171
6.3 Groups of Users	175
6.4 User Authentication	177
6.4.1 Authentication Examples	179

6.4.2	The Problem with Passwords	181
6.4.3	Sharing <code>root</code>	183
6.5	Summary	184
Problems and Exercises		188
Problems		188
7 Configuration Management		191
7.1	Introduction	191
7.2	Services, not Single Points of Failure	194
7.3	Defining Services and Requirements	195
7.3.1	Example Service: Syslog	196
7.3.2	Example Requirements: LDAP Client Configuration .	197
7.3.3	CM Requirements	199
7.4	Of States and Sets	204
7.4.1	States	204
7.4.2	Sets	207
7.5	Fighting entropy	210
7.5.1	Deployment roles	210
7.5.2	Idempotence and Convergence	214
7.5.3	Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?	217
7.6	Even more formal process definitions	217
7.7	Summary	218
Problems and Exercises		222
Problems		222
8 Automation		226
8.1	Introduction	226
8.2	Of Laziness And Other Virtues	227
8.3	Benefits of Automation	229
8.3.1	Repeatability	229
8.3.2	Reliability	230
8.3.3	Flexibility	232
8.4	Who benefits from automation?	233
8.4.1	Ourselves	234
8.4.2	Our Peers	234
8.4.3	All Users	235

CONTENTS	5
8.5 Levels of Automation	236
8.6 Automation Pitfalls	238
8.6.1 Increased Complexity and Impact	238
8.6.2 Loss of Audit Trail	240
8.6.3 Loss of Accountability	240
8.6.4 Safeguards	241
8.7 Summary	243
Problems and Exercises	246
Problems	246
9 Building Scalable Tools	249
9.1 Introduction	249
9.2 How Software evolves	251
9.2.1 Scripts	252
9.2.2 Programs	253
9.2.3 Software Products	254
9.3 Principles of Developing Robust System Tools	256
9.3.1 Unix Philosophy and User Interface	257
9.3.2 Principle of Least Astonishment	263
9.3.3 Explicit and predictable failure	264
9.3.4 There's no such thing as a temporary solution.	265
9.3.5 Readability counts	266
9.3.6 Of Buses and Windows	268
9.3.7 Code Reviews	270
9.4 Additional Guidelines	270
9.5 Summary	272
Problems and Exercises	274
Problems	274
10 Networking	278
11 Security	279
11.1 Authentication and Authorization	279

CONTENTS	6
III Managing Complex Services	280
12 Managing System Services	282
13 Backup, Failover, and Disaster Recovery	283
13.1 File System Backups and Snapshots	283
14 Monitoring and Visibility	284
IV Meta Matter	285
15 Everything We Haven't Covered	287
15.1 Containers	287
15.2 Service Orchestration	287
16 Ethics and Legal Issues	288
17 Future Direction of System Administration	289
Glossary of Terms	290
A Image Attributions	291
Index	294

Listings

1	Sample command-line invocations	vi
2.1	Simple I/O redirection in the shell	39
2.2	Simple job control in the shell	42
2.3	2-clause BSD license	49
4.1	fdisk(8) sample invocation and output on a Linux system . . .	94
4.2	disklabel(8) invocation and output on a NetBSD system . . .	96
4.3	Absolute and relative pathnames	112
4.4	Output of <code>ls -ai</code>	115
4.5	Output of <code>stat(1)</code>	117
5.1	Excerpt of the boot messages of a NetBSD Xen domU booting in Amazon EC2	132
5.2	Excerpt of the boot messages of a NetBSD system	133
5.3	Excerpt of the <code>hier(7)</code> manual page.	139
5.4	Commands used during the installation of NetBSD	150
5.5	<code>rpm/yum</code> sample commands	156
5.6	<code>pkgrsc</code> sample commands	157
6.1	Excerpt of a typical <code>/etc/passwd</code> file on a NetBSD system .	172
6.2	Password authentication on the console	179
6.3	SSH key authentication	179
6.4	Kerberos authentication	180
6.5	SSHCA and MFA example	181
7.1	Excerpt of a Puppet “manifest” defining the ‘syslog’ service. .	197
7.2	Excerpt of an LDAP client authentication Chef “recipe” . . .	198
7.3	A CFEngine “agent bundle”	203
7.4	Idempotent and non-idempotent commands.	215
8.1	Script to build GCC on an old IRIX system	230
9.1	The Zen of Python	258
9.2	<code>rc(8)</code> key=value pair configuration	262

9.3 Code Sample: Simple is better than complex 267

List of Figures

1.1	Anthora Coffee Cup	2
1.2	An IBM 704 mainframe	22
2.1	Unix genealogy tree	34
2.2	Standard streams in a simple pipeline	41
2.3	Different systems running Unix	45
4.1	Direct Attached Storage	77
4.2	Three hosts using Network Attached Storage, or <i>NAS</i>	79
4.3	NAS and SAN Hardware	81
4.4	SAN illustrated	82
4.5	Cloud Storage	85
4.6	HDD vs. SSD	87
4.7	Physical Disk Structure	91
4.8	Logical Volume Management	98
4.9	RAID Levels illustrated	101
4.10	Apple Xserve RAID	103
4.10	File System Hierarchy	111
4.11	UFS Details	113
4.12	File Metadata	118
5.1	A typical POST and BIOS screen	130
5.2	Second stage boot loader examples	131
5.3	Types of Software	137
5.4	OpenSolaris Installation	142
5.5	Software Dependency Tree	154
5.6	Screengrabs of tweets illustrating the circular dependencies of language-specific package managers ca. 2014.	158

LIST OF FIGURES 10

6.1	User Mappings	174
7.1	Host States in Configuration Management	205
7.2	Sets of changes applied to sets of hosts	209
7.3	Host Deployment Roles as Sets	211
7.4	Configuration Management Overlap with other systems	220
8.1	Evolution of SysAdmin Tools	235

Preface to the preface

This “book” is not (yet) a book. It is incomplete, a work in progress. But given the lack of headway I’ve made, and considering the time and effort I have already invested, I have come to the conclusion that it’s preferable to publish what I have and worry about finishing the remainder another time.

Since I began working on this project back in 2011, a lot has changed in the industry as well as in the SysAdmin class on which this book is based. You may find references or topics to be outdated or seem quaint (although hopefully not obsolete). I remain hopeful that the lessons and examples continue to be applicable, even if details or specific technologies may continue to evolve.

As time goes by, I may come back to update chapters I’ve previously made available. As such, this text may change in content, style, available formats, and organization. It is even possible that updates are already available at <https://www.netmeister.org/book/> and since February 2021, some of the content here is also available in the form of video lectures at <https://v.gd/cs615asa>. In the mean time, I welcome suggestions, corrections, contributions, criticism, and any and all commentary at jschauma@netmeister.org.

Jan Schaumann
New York, February 10, 2021

*This draft last updated:
April 14, 2021*

Preface

The book you are holding is intended to cover the broad topic of “*System Administration*” from a conceptual point of view with a particular focus on the foundation of systems administration in a large scale context. While the book will pay attention to Operating System specific details – in particular the Unix family of operating systems – it does not provide step-by-step instructions, such as how to set up a mail server or how to run a monitoring system. Instead, the basic underlying principles and the factors that help decide how to best set up a system for a given purpose will be the topic of discussion.

Wherever possible, case studies and real world examples based on my own experiences in both small and large environments will be used to illustrate the lessons learned.

Why another book on System Administration?

Like a lot of Open Source software, this book was written to “scratch a specific itch”. In particular, I was in need of a suitable course book as a companion to my class “Aspects of System Administration”, which I have been teaching at Stevens Institute of Technology since 2005. The class was developed to give students a broad overview of the profession and expose them to the many different practical aspects, but not to teach specific individual technologies that would soon be obsolete or replaced by the next generation. The breadth of the topic required that the class focused on fundamental underlying principles rather than implementation details.

A significant problem with teaching System Administration in an academic setting derives from in the fast-paced nature of the Information Technology (IT) world. Curricula and degree programs take a long time to be developed, reviewed and approved. By the time a new textbook has been

published, the technology described may have already become obsolete.

Most existing books relating to System Administration, thorough and useful as they are, have a practical "howto" approach or are targeted towards people already in the profession. They provide detailed instructions for various specific problems or discuss different implementations of a given software service across different operating systems.

This book is different. It focuses on *concepts* and the understanding of the given topics on a fundamental level, so as to facilitate the learning of how to build scalable solutions that are flexible enough to adapt to different system requirements.

Who should read this book

This book was primarily written to address the lack of a general purpose course book on the broad topic of System Administration for my own class. As such, the target audience consists of both instructors, teachers, professors as well as, most importantly, students. Because of the wide range of material covered, some prior knowledge of common computer-related topics is required, including a basic understanding of TCP/IP, operating system and file system concepts, user-level experience using a Unix like operating system and proficiency in at least one programming language.

As a graduate level course book, the target audience may of course also include people with some prior experience in System Administration. Their background will help them take the concepts and topics presented to the next level and apply the lessons learned in their own environment.

Organization of the book

The outline of this book follows the syllabus of my class. The class, in turn, was developed as a series of lectures covering complex computer systems from the bottom up. That is, we begin with more low level concepts such as storage devices and file systems and work our way up a stack of layers (including OS and software installation, multi-user basics and networking) until we have well understood, networked and easy to maintain general purpose system, before we dive into the maintenance of special purpose services.

This book is therefore divided into three major parts. We begin with an

introduction to the profession of System Administration and the approach taken in this book. Next, we cover a number of fundamental technologies and concepts; this part makes up the bulk of the content, and each chapter is intended to accompany or complete a single lecture. Suggested exercises, problems or topics of discussions are included wherever suitable. Finally, we conclude in the third part with a brief review and a look ahead into the future direction of System Administration, both the teaching as well as the professional practice thereof.

Throughout each chapter we will pay special attention to three areas: *Scalability*, *Security* and *Simplicity*. These three related and at times overlapping features can be seen as pillars of professional system design. Without them, no solution is complete. Neither can be added after the fact; all three have to be integral components of a system's architecture.

While in general there is some order to the chapters, you may find yourself flipping back and forth once you arrive in Part III, as it builds on the previous chapters. Part IV concludes this book with with a look at everything we've *not* covered, a disussion of the ethical and legal implications, and a brief look into the future of the profession.

While I have attempted to provide an overall structure and flow to the topics covered in this book, please feel free to pick and choose topics based on your interest or course needs. Each chapter is, as much as possible, self-contained to allow you to assign reading or exercises as you see fit.

Notes, Digressions, Tangents



At times we will include “supplementary” or rather loosely related information that is too large for footnotes but not important enough to be included in the actual text. Such content will be displayed in boxes like this close to the most relevant paragraph. In order to trick the casual user into actually reading the box, it is accompanied by the entirely unrelated graphic of a surfboard, Channel Islands’ “The Tangent by Kelly Slater”.

Advice for instructors



As a course book, we sometimes include advice for instructors. Such advice might be a suggestion how to integrate the subject matter in the class room, an experience report about something

that helped students in the past, or a pointer to supplementary information. Such advice will be presented in a box like this. The rather adorable dog accompanying this box is, of course, a pointer.

Anecdotes from experience



Sometimes we will illustrate important lessons with practical examples, experience reports or anecdotes. These short stories serve to relate the theoretical material covered to the so-called “real world”.

Such anecdotes will be presented using a box like this. The graphic intended to lure you into reading the content is a sock puppet, much like the ones commonly used to entertain children with an educational story of sorts. This particular sock puppet happens to be a donkey because I like to remind myself that despite initial subjective impressions to the contrary it is usually I who turns out to be the ass. Some of these anecdotes will prove this point.

Conventions

A lot of ink and many more innocent bits have been wasted on the difference of the terms “UNIX®”, UNIX, “Unix”, and “unix-like”. For the purpose of this book it hardly warrants further distinction anymore: all such systems discussed in this text and used for examples are “a kind of Unix” (though few will actually be certified by The Open Group and thus be allowed to call themselves UNIX®). These include the various Open Source implementations and derivatives such as the BSD family or Linux (itself trademarked, by the way). We will use the term “Unix” to refer to these different systems.

If we have to distinguish between the “Linux” operating system and other “Unices” (the plural we shall avoid), we will follow common convention and simply call the operating system technically consisting of the Linux kernel and all additional software – much of it provided by or derived from the GNU Project – as “Linux” rather than “GNU/Linux”.

```
$ whoami  
jschauma  
$ su  
Password:  
# whoami  
root  
# exit  
$
```

Listing 1: Sample command-line invocations

We shall also adopt the custom of referring to specific Unix commands by way of writing the name followed in parenthesis by the section of the manual pages in which the command is described. That is, a reference to the `stat(1)` command differs from a reference to the `stat(2)` system call; the documentation for either can be found by providing the section number to the `man(1)` command:

If you see “`stat(2)`” referenced, you’d type `man 2 stat` to get the manual page for the system call; if you see “`stat(1)`”, you’d type `man 1 stat` to get the manual page for the command. Leaving out the section number will get you the *first* matching manual page, so `man stat` and `man 1 stat` would be equivalent.

Next, this book contains a number of code examples and listings of commands to be executed at the shell prompt. To distinguish between commands entered as a regular user and commands entered as the superuser, we use a different prompt following general Unix convention: a \$ denotes a user prompt, a # a superuser prompt. Listing 1 illustrates this.

The English language does not require a gender to be assigned to the “System Administrator”; however, we need to use a personal pronoun if we wish to refer to a person holding such a job title. Consistent use of only a single gender pronoun might raise the impression that the duties can only be performed by a member of that gender, which of course is entirely absurd.

Since any attempt at using “he/she”, “(s)he” or any variation is doomed to become nothing but distracting, we use either “he” or “she” in examples in this book. No suggestion of gender inequality is intended in any of the examples.

Operating systems are distributed by different kinds of organizations. Some have commercial backing; others are provided by a team of volunteers. Some software is provided free of charge, other software requires payment of licensing fees. Some includes the source code, some does not – and either may be the case for both commercially licensed or freely available software. For simplicity, we will use the terms “vendor” or “provider” in either case when referring to the entity distributing the software.

Examples and Exercises

As a course book for a graduate level class, the recommended way to follow the material presented is by completing (some of) the examples and exercises included in most chapters.

I have found it invaluable to provide students access to an environment in which they can create different server instances running different operating systems on demand. At the same time, the nature of many of the exercises demand unfettered access to the systems themselves as well as to the network. This is something that is nearly impossible to achieve in a traditional university environment – had a faculty member approached me requesting such access for her students while I was a System Administrator at Stevens Institute of Technology, I would have balked and dismissed the request as hardly feasible.

However, a flexible Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) environment such Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) or other VPS hosting companies overcomes these hurdles; non-commercial solutions to this problem, such as the “Virtual Unix Lab”[1] for example, exist as well. My own teaching experience has been supported by Amazon’s “AWS in Education” research grants[2]; as a result, a number of exercises will reference the EC2 service, but it is entirely reasonable to perform them in another environment that provides similar services. In many cases, virtualization software installed on a regular workstation or laptop allowing students to create virtual instances of different OS is fully sufficient for many exercises as well.

The job of a System Administrator routinely requires self-guided research, analysis and meticulous documentation of one’s practices and procedures. To enforce these practices, many of the assignments, problems and exercises in this book do not have a simple right-or-wrong answer. Just as in real life,

we frequently need to find *an* answer and then determine if the solution we derived is suitable, even though other equally correct solutions may exist.

To this end, I have made it a habit of requiring students to search any and all information materials available to them – including, but not limited to their course book(s), library materials, online newsgroups and forums, websites and the Internet at large – and to allow them to use such materials so long as they properly cite their resources.

Systems

Practical exercises usually target the Unix family of operating systems, where they focus on exposing students to multiple variations of any given system. I usually assign exercises to be done on the following operating systems, where possible:

- *Linux* – different distributions allow for valuable insights into different solutions to the same problem and frequently illustrate the point that one system running “Linux” may behave rather differently from another. To this end, I usually pick a Red Hat related distribution (Fedora, CentOS) and at least a Debian based distribution (Debian or Ubuntu).
- one of the *BSDs* – as a developer of the NetBSD operating system, I’m of course partial to this particular variant, but any one from this lineage will suffice to illustrate the genetic Unix heritage.
- *Solaris* – now freely available as derivatives of the unfortunately short-lived OpenSolaris project or available as the commercial original version, this system is “different enough” from the more common Linux distributions to provide a good comparison.

Even though the general concepts of System Administration apply across all operating systems and even across administrative domains such as support for a large number of desktop systems versus large deployments of servers in datacenters, we will focus primarily on the large scale installations and infrastructure components. As a result, and due to the significantly different philosophies and practical means by which these systems are maintained, we explicitly exclude Mac OS X and the Windows family of operating systems as a target platform for assignments. Doing so allows us to not get distracted by

implementation details and fundamental platform differences and to instead focus on internalizing the principles and lessons explained.

Programming Assignments

Programming assignments are normally checked on the university's systems. I seldom specify the language in which students have to write their programs. This reflects the real-world scenario, where languages are not usually dictated and the objective is first and foremost to "get the job done". A few select exercises may specify the programming language to use; there is usually an explicit or implicit requirement, or the implementation in one language lends itself to better illustrate the lessons learned.

Programming assignments are usually graded not only by functionality, but also by code quality, user interface and other factors. A demonstrated understanding of the three core pillars – Scalability, Security, Simplicity – is essential. Frequently the assignments will target these criteria, if at times as hidden requirements.

The practice of giving students maximum liberty in their research also extends to programming assignments. Students are allowed – encouraged, in fact – to search for solutions and reuse existing code, to collaborate and discuss possible approaches amongst each other. It should be noted, though, that as in their workplace, students need to make sure to have permission to (re)use the code in question and to properly credit the origin. I have found that this distinction between lifting code found on a website without acknowledgment and deriving your own solution from an attributed reference has become harder for students to make, which is all the more reason to encourage responsible research.

I believe that this freedom to work as one would under "normal" circumstances teaches awareness of code licensing and improves the student's research skills. Frequently, the most important part of a successful homework submission is not the functionality of the program itself, but the required accompanying documentation, which illustrates the student's problem solving progress.

Acknowledgements

My biggest thanks go out to the late Prof. Lawrence Bernstein, formerly of Bell Laboratories, my former Computer Science and Software Engineering professor, an IEEE and ACM fellow, and an industry expert on Trustworthy Computing. Throughout my career, I have found myself going back to the lessons he tried to teach me, the examples he gave, the direction he provided. Larry is the reason all of these words have eventually come into existence and been put into a semi-coherent form:

How about writing a book? If you follow your class notes it is not a burden.

This message came out of the blue back in February of 2011. After a few emails going back and forth, life intervening, my second daughter being born, and me generally trying to figure out how to approach such a project, I eventually signed a contract with Wiley & Sons to actually write this book.

The fact that I never actually completed the work and eventually withdrew my agreement with Wiley & Sons notwithstanding, I remain humbled by the confidence and encouragement I received from Prof. Bernstein. I deeply regret not having been able to complete this work before he died on November 2nd, 2012. Thanks for being a great teacher, Larry!

I have received a lot of feedback on the various chapters making up this book from many people in the industry over the years. I appreciated all the help given by friends and colleagues, with particular thanks to those having reviewed drafts of the different chapters: Subbu Allamaraju, Mohit Chawla, Jennifer Davis, Peter Ellehaug, Patrick Debois, Hubert Feyrer, Al Hoang, Kevin Kempton, Tom Limoncelli James K. Lowden, Jan Lehnardt, Daria Mehra, Marc Farnum Rendino, Kimo Rosenbaum.

Many thanks to Amazon for granting my students ample AWS usage credits. Without access to EC2, many of the exercises in this book would not be possible.

Finally, and as expected, my deepest thanks to my wife Paula and my daughters Ana and Sofie, without whom, as many a famous dedication goes, this book would have been completed much, much earlier. I may still get there.

Bibliography

- [1] Hubert Feyrer, *System Administration Training in the Virtual Unix Lab - An e-learning system with diagnosis via a domain specific language as base for an architecture for tutorial assistance and user adaption*, Shaker Verlag GmbH, Aachen, Germany, 2009. ISBN 978-3-8322-7874-8.
- [2] <https://aws.amazon.com/education/>

Part I

Introduction and General Concepts

Chapter 1

An Introduction to System Administration

system administrator, n.:

one who, as a primary job function, manages computer and network systems on behalf of another, such as an employer or client.



Figure 1.1: System Administrators: well caffeinated and always happy to serve you.

1.1 What exactly does a System Administrator do?

Every semester I start my class with this simple question: “What exactly does a System Administrator do?” My audience consists of undergraduate and graduate students of Computer Science or Computer Engineering; some of them have experience working as a System Administrator or IT support (either part-time or full-time), while others may maintain their own home network or otherwise perform some of the tasks commonly associated with the job of a System Administrator. Some may have no practical experience in this area, but all do have an idea of what the job entails.

As a result, the responses are varied, ranging from very specific (“Use `tcpdump` to troubleshoot network problems.”) to the more general (“Maintain the network.”), quickly illustrating that there is no one concise description of the professional duties of System Administrators; rather, we identify a number of tasks that are expected to be performed by people holding this title. The broad range of these tasks – especially when put in context of the size and goals of different organizations and their deployment footprint – makes obvious the fact that a System Administrator in one company may not do the same thing as one in a different company. In fact, even within a single organization we usually find that two people may well both be called “SysAdmin”, but perform rather different duties.

So what *does* a System Administrator do? It seems that most people agree that this job has to do with computers in some capacity, but that really is already where the definitions start to become fuzzy: System Administrators are in charge of “servers” as well as of personal computers, desktop machines, laptops and, increasingly, mobile devices. With the evolution of computing coming full circle, we find that the migration from the mainframe computer to the personal and independent computing device to the networked server back to the central *Infrastructure as a Service* model inherent in today’s Cloud Computing concepts places the System Administrator in the middle of it all.

So perhaps the main focus of a System Administrator’s job is then really the central connection between the independent systems, the network itself? Hmm, System Administrators surely are involved in the deployment and installation of the computers in a datacenter (or is that the task of specific Datacenter Technicians?) and connecting all the different components

certainly involves a lot of cables. But then, don't we have *Network Administrators*, or is that a more specialized subcategory of System Administrators?

System Administrators seem to spend as much time typing cryptic commands into dark terminal windows as they do running cables and labelling hardware, and while they may no longer shuffle punch cards, they frequently do write programs to help them complete their tasks. System Administrators are known to get woken up in the middle of the night when things go “bump”, and as a result they are also known to have a fondness for caffeinated drinks. They are able to kickstart a generator, assess the required cooling power for their server room, use duct tape in creative and unexpected ways, assemble servers out of mysterious looking parts, and may end up handling a circular saw or other heavy machinery when their Leatherman multi-tool cannot complete the task.

System Administrators plan, budget and design networks and backup or storage systems, add and delete users (well, user *accounts*, anyway¹), install and update software packages, draft policy documents, fight spam with one hand while rebuilding a corrupted revision control system with the other. They have access to all systems in the organization, may undergo retina- and fingerprint scanners to access “Mission Impossible”-style protected datacenters and spend countless hours in front of a multitude of computer screens, typing away on oddly shaped keyboards consuming not entirely healthy amounts of coffee and energy drinks.

Well... in some places, a System Administrator might do all of this. In others, there might be different, more specialized people for the various tasks: there might be datacenter technicians and “SiteOps”, Network Administrators, System Programmers, System Architects, Operators, Service Engineers, Storage Engineers, Site Reliability Engineers, Virtual Operations, Infrastructure Architects... the number of different job titles for things that might otherwise fall into the more general “SysAdmin” category seems endless.

The various areas of expertise included in the day to day routine such as system design, infrastructure architecture, system fault diagnosis, hardware benchmarking, and others eventually require experience in a number of related fields; a lot of them involve more than just a little bit of programming experience and in some cases complex infrastructure tools based on solid

¹There is a strong love/hate relationship between System Administrators and their users. Much as the SA may joke that they wish they could make users disappear, without users the systems they are in charge of might well hum along uninterrupted, but would ultimately be entirely useless.

software engineering practices need to be built. This illustrates that just as it is hard to clearly define where System Administration begins, we often can't quite put our finger on where it ends and another discipline becomes the primary job function.

Even if job descriptions and duties differ significantly, there are a lot of people who simply identify as *System Administrator* regardless of job title. We all have something in common: *we manage and maintain computer and network systems.*

A typical bug



At one place of employment we had a tool that would add users to a given host by gathering the login information for all the users, `ssh(1)` to each host and update `/etc/passwd` using the host's native tools (such as `useradd(8)`, etc.). Many a system administrator has written a similar tool, and for the most part, this program worked reasonably well. (We will discuss how to better manage user accounts across large numbers of machines later in this book.)

But all software fails eventually, and for one reason or another I had to debug the tool. Groveling through a few hundred lines of perl that had clearly been written by different people in different stages of their career, I came across a code block that included the following call:

```
chmod(0666, "/dev/null");
```

Asking around, it became clear that *somewhere* some of the systems ended up in a state where `/dev/null` was unreadable or -writable by normal users, which leads to a number of complications. But nobody had been able to track down just how exactly this happened until one day we were lucky enough to witness the change in permissions, but the only activity by a user with sufficient privileges to make such a change was a `sudo(8)` invocation of `less(1)`.

`less(1)` happens to make use of a history file to remember search commands between invocations, much like your shell may use a history file (such as `~/.bash_history`). `less(1)` is aware of the fact that the history file might contain sensitive information, and it actively changes the permissions on that file to only allow read/write access to the owner. But

for the root user, we explicitly symlinked all common such history files to `/dev/null` to avoid accidental leaking of secrets to disk.

And therein lies the bug: `less(1)` was invoked by the super user, it would check the permissions on the file `/root/.lessshst`, follow the redirection to `/dev/null` find that they're not 0600 and call `chmod(2)`, yielding and unreadable/unwritable `/dev/null`. We were able to confirm this behaviour and identified a code change in later versions of `less(1)` that fixed this problem.

Understanding such failures and identifying their root causes requires a deep understanding of the operating system and its tools, but tracking down bugs like this[1] is just one of the many aspects of a System Administrator's daily routine.

1.2 The Profession of System Administration

Most professions have a fairly clear and formal definition as well as an obvious career path and background requirements. In fact, for a person to take on a particular line of work, it frequently is a requirement to undergo a specific, regulated education, to perform a certain amount of practical training (such as an apprenticeship), to subscribe to specific professional ethics and guidelines, and eventually to obtain a license to practice the given profession. Doctors, scientists and lawyers all have well-defined professions, as do engineers of most disciplines.²

System Administration, on the other hand, does not (yet) have any of the criteria given above: there is no specific, regulated training, and as we have seen in Section 1.1 not even agreement on what precisely the job definition ought to be. The USENIX Special Interest Group for Sysadmins (LISA) attempts to fill this void to some degree by providing for an informal but professional community. Still, due to the nature of the changing environment, any attempt to create a concise job description invariably fails by resorting to

²Software Engineering, another young discipline related to System Administration and technically a specialized branch of Computer Engineering, differs in that it does *not* have strict licensing regulations. Anybody can call themselves a “Software Engineer”, just as anybody can call themselves a “System Administrator”.

very general terms. Consider the following description given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics[2]:

Systems administrators design, install, and support an organization’s computer systems. They are responsible for LANs, WANs, network segments, and Internet and intranet systems. They work in a variety of environments, including large corporations, small businesses, and government organizations. They install and maintain network hardware and software, analyze problems, and monitor networks to ensure their availability to users. These workers gather data to evaluate a system’s performance, identify user needs, and determine system and network requirements.

While this captures *in general* the common job duties of a System Administrator, it does not answer the question we asked initially: Just what *exactly* does a System Administrator do?

In order to better grasp the generic description, I’ve found it useful to break down the title into its components, *System* and *Administrator*. What, then, is a “System”? Any dictionary will give you a reasonable definition along the lines of:

system, n: A group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements that together form a complex whole.

In this context we will focus on *computer-human systems*[3] consisting of any number of computing devices, the network(s) connecting them, the users utilizing these resources, and of course the impact of the goals of the organization running such systems.

What about “Administrator”? Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the term “to administer” as:

administer, v: to manage or supervise the execution, use, or conduct of

The profession of System Administration should therefore be described as one in which practitioners “manage or supervise the execution, use, or conduct of a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent computer-human elements”, leaving us, in terms of specificity, about where we began! We find slightly more formal definitions of actual job titles, desired skills

and a rather useful distinction between “small uniform”, “complex”, and “large and complex” sites in the LISA booklet “Job Descriptions for System Administrators” [5], but in searching for a suitably clear definition of the profession, we realize that the formal education as a System Administrator is almost completely lacking.

Job descriptions and postings normally list a degree in Computer Science or Computer Engineering as “desirable”; more frequently you will find a requirement expressed as “BS, MS or PhD in Computer Science or equivalent work experience”. Computer Scientists will wonder just how, exactly, “work experience” can be mapped, treated as equivalent to their formal education – all too often, “Computer Science” in this context is equated with “knows how to program, understands TCP/IP”.

As invaluable as actual hands-on experience is, it is no substitute for a formal degree in the area of Computer Science. (Nor is having such a degree a substitute for practical experience.) Rare is the candidate who can fully understand the average and worst-case runtime of his or her programs and scripts without having learned Big-O Notation; rare the system programmer who completely grasps the elegance of modularization provided by, say, function pointers without having learned the λ -calculus. Becoming a proficient System Administrator without this background is certainly possible, but it makes it significantly harder to advance beyond a certain level.

Be that as it may, the focus on many years of real-world experience as the primary qualification is both cause and effect. In the past, there really existed *no* formal training whatever: technically skilled people found themselves in the position of being the go-to guy to fix the computers, to make things work. Perhaps they ended up working with a more senior administrator in a sort of informal apprenticeship, but for the most part their skills were learned by experience, through trial by fire. The lack of any formal program in this area necessitates and then further encourages self-learning, and many things simply can only really be understood by experience. It’s a cliché, a platitude that you learn the most from your worst mistakes – it is also entirely true.

As a result, many of the senior people in hiring positions do not have an academic background and are hesitant to require what was not available then to fill current openings. System Administrators are also still frequently treated as – and at times view themselves as fulfilling – a “janitorial” role. If no industry standard exists by which to measure a candidate’s accomplishments in the field, how can we require formal education for a job that eludes definition in the first place?

Therein, however, lies a fallacy. Practical experience and formal training do not make up for one another; they complement each other. It *is* true that we learn the most from our worst mistakes (and thus need a chance to make them); it is *also* true that we frequently are only *able* to learn due to a deeper understanding of the problem.

The profession of System Administration is incredibly interesting precisely *because* it eschews a fixed definition, a formal governing body, a static career path, or a licensing exam. It attracts and invites interesting people from all sorts of backgrounds; it allows phenomenal potential for job growth and it is – must be, due to the advances in the industry – fast-paced and continually evolving. But it has become more mature: professional organizations like LISA have contributed significantly to the status of the profession by formalizing the requirements and duties as well as providing a Code of Ethics³, and over the last few years more and more universities have started to offer classes and degree programs in this area.

System Administrators may not need to be licensed by a central board anytime soon – and people will continue to argue about whether or not that is desirable or even possible in this field – but what a few years ago still was best described as “a job” certainly has grown up to become a career, a craft, a *profession*.

1.3 System Administration Education

System Administration is rarely taught as an academic discipline in large part due to its perceived “blue-collar” status: from the top of the scholarly ivory tower, it must be hard to distinguish where an entry-level job like “Tech Support” or the “Help Desk” ends and where a profession demanding a significant background in Computer Science and Engineering begins.

System Administrators are highly skilled information technology specialists shouldering significant responsibility in any organization. As we discussed in the previous sections, the variety of job descriptions and differences in what a System Administrator actually may be doing make it difficult to provide simple step-by-step instructions on how to enter this field. As a

³For a more detailed discussion of both the (lack of a) definition of the profession and the ethical obligations we face, please refer to [15].

result, System Administration has long been a profession that is learned primarily by experience, where people grow into a position in order to fulfill the requirements of an organization rather than follow a career path well-defined by courses, degrees, and meaningful certifications.

The industry has responded by producing a large number of practical certification exams that hope to attest to the student's proficiency in the subject matter. Practically, most of these certifications appear to primarily test a person's ability to memorize specific commands, further reinforcing the notion that System Administration can be reduced to empirical knowledge, making practical experience indeed equivalent, if not superior to one of those scholastic degrees.

But certification that one remembers a specific vendor's unique configuration file syntax does not imply actual *learning* has taken place; holding a one-week "boot camp" – the name itself is revealing of its educational intention – to drill enough information into the participants' heads such that they pass an exam at the end of the week does not guarantee long-term retention of that knowledge. Furthermore, there is no oversight of the topics taught in such classes, no review of suitability or correctness.

System Administrators who excel at their jobs do so not because they have accumulated arcane tribal knowledge about obscure pieces of hardware and odd software systems (useful as that is), but because they understand fundamental underlying principles and combine that knowledge with their concentrated experience.

System Administration – its principles, fundamentals and practice – should be *taught*. Since you are reading this book, chances are that you are currently taking a class in System Administration as a student or perhaps you are teaching such a class. But we cannot teach an entire profession in a single class or even using a few select courses. It is necessary to develop academic degree granting programs that comprehensively prepare students for the varied and wide requirements imposed on them when they enter the industry. Such programs should be combined with extensive real-world and hands-on experience wherever possible, perhaps by including internships, cooperative education and apprenticeships provided by industry leaders. As students you are entitled to practical and useful exercises; as educators we have an obligation to create these and make available the required resources.

We need classes that combine the academic mission of fostering independent research with the factual requirements posed by the positions offered in the marketplace. We need instructors who have years of experience in var-

ied environments, who understand the practical restrictions that may make the ideal theoretical solution utopian but who are consciously aware of these boundaries and able to teach their students the awareness of them. At the same time, we need scholars willing to further this profession through research and build a theoretical body of knowledge to become the foundation of future programs.

1.3.1 Challenges in System Administration Education

Formal classes in System Administration as part of a Computer Science or Engineering curriculum are still uncommon, but in the past few years more and more institutions have recognized the industry's need for academic courses that adequately prepare students for the multitude of responsibilities within this field and have started to offer such classes (and in some cases complete degree programs). But the history of this profession brings with it a number of unique challenges when it comes to formally teaching its principles and practices.

To really understand and appreciate some of the most general aspects of System Administration, you need to be exposed to actual running systems. Practical experience is so integral to this profession that it cannot be separated from the theoretical knowledge and postponed until the student enters his or her first job or apprenticeship. But therein lies a significant hurdle to traditional teaching methods: students need to administer a system, to have superuser access, to have a chance to configure a system for a specific service, and to make the kind of spectacular mistakes that experienced System Administrators value (if only in hindsight).

This normally conflicts with the requirements of the IT department at your university: students would require access to a number of different OS when the school's system administrators strive for a certain level of homogeneity. In order to understand OS installation concepts, file system tuning, and other low-level principles, students need to perform these tasks themselves. Learning to debug network connectivity issues or being able to actually see the payload of captured network traffic requires access to raw sockets, which the staff responsible for the security of the campus network would certainly rather not provide.

After years of struggling to give all students equal access to the resources required for the diverse assignments and frequently having to change the assignments to be able to make use of available resources, I finally decided to

do what many companies do: I outsourced the resource provision problem into “the Cloud” – specifically, to Amazon’s EC2⁴.[6] Similar results can be achieved by granting students access to a dedicated laboratory environment or by providing another on-demand infrastructure via virtualization of the local compute resources. If you are a student, it is worth your time to investigate all possible resources available to you; if you are an instructor, consult with your IT department as to the availability (or perhaps development) of such systems.

But teaching System Administration should also combine the practical elements noted above with topics from other academic fields. As an area of specialization, System Administration fits in well within the current Computer Science curricula, since the profession’s requirements draw heavily from many of the same subjects. Shared requirements include Operating Systems, Networking, Database Systems, Distributed Systems, Cryptography and of course Software Engineering; at the same time, System Administrators benefit from deep insights in Computer Architecture and Systems Engineering as well as Project Management and of course “the 5 elements of administration” (Planning, Organizing, Command (directing people), Coordination, Control, also listed as Budgeting)[7], usually covered in Business Administration classes.

To advance the practice of System Administration, the two existing professional organizations LISA and the League of Professional System Administrators (LOPSA) are already promoting best practices and important communities. Still, we are missing strong proponents of System Administration as an academic discipline⁵ But there are more and more of us who believe that it’s time for the profession to be recognized as both requiring a theoretical background in addition to extensive practical experience and benefitting from the opportunities of dedicated research opportunities and the development of universally accepted degree granting requirements. Some even write books to further this goal...

⁴In this book, I will frequently make reference to or cite examples from this experience. At the same time, I also will suggest exercises that cannot be done in a cloud environment and that may require access to dedicated hardware.

⁵Mark Burgess, previously of the Oslo University College in Norway, one of the only universities offering a Master’s degree in Network and System Administration, deserves explicit mention as one of the few exceptions.

1.4 The Three Pillars of Exceptional System Design

More than just maintain computers and infrastructure components, System Administrators control entire systems. With more experience and seniority, they are ultimately in charge of building these systems, of designing the infrastructure and its components so that the job title frequently morphs into that of a Systems or Network “Architect”. It seems that people can’t help but draw parallels to the so-called “real” world, where engineers and architects have well defined roles (and status). This does not come as a surprise; as Brooks[8] illustrates masterfully, the parallels between designing and building a house, a computer or a complex piece of software are plentiful.

Billy Hollis points out[9] that the title of the “Software Architect” is a misleading analogy, that the duties traditionally performed by people holding this title are much more akin to those of a structural engineer than those of a (traditional) architect. The role of the System Administrator is likewise frequently comparable to that of the structural engineer in the mechanical world, but the advanced senior System Administrator – who ultimately steps into the role of planning, designing and overseeing the construction of complex systems – might better known as “Systems Architect”. Structural systems engineers are then needed to aide in the final design and implementation of the system in question.

Conceiving of and designing systems as complex as those System Administrators are in charge of, with their myriad pieces, the unpredictable human element and the rather unfortunate tendency of computers to do precisely what they were instructed to do rather than what we intended them to do requires expert in-depth knowledge in a broad range of topics. Exceptional System Administrators are generalists – they have been trained in a wide area of topics, deepened their understanding of several and perhaps have become subject matter experts in a few, but ultimately back into a role that allows them to apply their ability to connect the dots, to see the big picture and the connections between and effects of multiple systems on each other. They are well-equipped to model new components of an infrastructure or to redesign a system from scratch to meet the new requirements.

For a system to be suitable both for the immediate requirements today and for a few years down the road, when the current needs have changed, it must embody two basic principles: Scalability and Security. Neither of

these can be added to a system after it has been built: trying to apply “security” after the system interfaces have been defined yields restrictions, limitations; trying to make a system with inherent limitations perform under circumstances it was not designed for yields hacks and workarounds – the end result frequently resembles a fragile house of cards more than a solid reliable structure.

The third fundamental feature of expertly designed systems, Simplicity, is simultaneously obvious and counter-intuitive. Simplicity underlies both scalability and security, since reduced complexity implies better defined interfaces, minimized ambiguity in communications or data handling and increased flexibility. As with the other two core aspects, simplicity cannot be added after the fact; it must be inherent in the architecture. Simplicity is the enabler of both scalability and security.

An exceptional system exhibits inherent structural integrity (another wonderful analogy to the world of bricks and mortar), and this integrity is provided by these three pillars. Our focus on these components may initially seem arbitrary: meeting requirements across different teams with different priorities has long been the bane of many a program manager due to each team focusing on different qualities, of which we could have picked any number. However, upon more detailed analysis and with some years of experience we have time and again found Simplicity, Security and Scalability to be the core qualities enabling a harmonious development- and deployment process.

Throughout this book, we will analyze the systems we discuss with special focus on these crucial criteria. You will find that we will frequently talk in broad abstracts or surprising detail about the implications of our design decision.

1.4.1 Scalability

In recent years, the word “scalability” has become one of the defining requirements for virtually all technical solutions. Providers of infrastructure services and products throw it around in an attempt to impress their customers by how much load their systems can handle. It typically seems near synonymous with “high performance”, the ability to handle large amounts of data, traffic, connections, and the like. This may be misleading, as people might be inclined to believe that such capabilities come at no additional (or incremental or proportional) cost. In fact, scalability does not relate to the costs of the running system, but to its architecture. A scalable system may

well require additional resources and throwing money at a problem actually *is* a perfectly viable solution in many cases. However, a scalable architecture is one that does not require a refactoring of the whole system, a restructuring of *how* data is handled based on changing circumstances. Instead, it abstracts data from process flow and simply adapts.

System Administrators frequently suffer from Goldilocks Syndrome, striving to provide a solution that is *just right*; wasting resources is just as anathema to their definition of a correct solution as not providing adequate capabilities. Therefore, we tend to focus not only on the ability to scale *up* – to accommodate larger amounts of data or more requests per minute, for example – but also to scale *down*, to free up unused resources based on the demands. As such, our definition of “scalability” leans more towards the overall flexible nature of a scalable system, its ability to adapt to changing requirements at run time; a term frequently associated with Cloud Computing, “elasticity”, perhaps more aptly describes this feature, yet it fails to quite capture as well the sense of meeting extreme requirements. We shall continue to use the term “scalability” for that reason.

While many systems are *flexible*, few are able to handle input or requirements an order of magnitude different from those initially conceived of when the system was designed. In order to accommodate such changes, systems are said to either scale *vertically* – that is, one system is able to handle the added load, possibly by addition of certain resources (network bandwidth, CPU power, memory, disk space, ...) – or to scale *horizontally* – that is, a single system is replicated and demands are spread across them evenly. Either approach has certain implications on the overall architecture. For horizontal scaling to be beneficial, for example, the problem space needs to be such that a distribution is both possible and algorithmically feasible. However, this adds communication overhead, as interfaces and data flow becomes more complex.

Whether by vertical or horizontal means, a scalable system is one that readily adapts to changing demand. The designer may not know what will be required of it in the future, but will make choices that permit the system to grow and shrink without bumping into arbitrary limits.

We will take a closer look at the implications of this idea on the software development practices and overall Unix Philosophy in Chapter 2; for the time being, let us consider the Unix tradition of simple tools operating on streams of text as a wonderful example of a clear interface definition. Anybody de-

veloping a tool that accepts input only from a file restricts the flexibility of the tool; this frequently goes hand in hand with an implicit limitation on the amount of data that can be handled (think maximum file size, buffers frequently allocated to read in the entire file, the ability to `seek(2)` on the file handle, ...). By choosing text rather than a binary format, any future use of the output is not limited by the original author's imagination of what future users might wish to accomplish. Given sufficiently large or, rather, diverse datasets, building more complex systems that perform equally well under heavy load using complicated, yet limited interfaces so frequently developed by major software companies easily becomes a frustrating exercise in determining these boundaries.

But scalability is not only of concern when tools are developed; as we design infrastructure components, we need to be acutely aware of the interfaces between them and what kind of data can flow back and forth. Frequently we have no control over the input (both type and amount), so our systems need to be fault tolerant of many unenvisioned circumstances. Even though somewhat counter-intuitive at first, I argue throughout this book that a robust system will remain resilient to overall failure by being comprised of infrastructure components that themselves may fail quickly (and explicitly) and that such well-defined behaviour underlies true scalability.

Hindsight being 20/20, scalability related issues often can be traced back to a lack of imagination or confidence in the system. What if our initial use case increases not by a factor of two or three, but hundredfold? Suppose our system is still in use in five years – will average input be likely to remain the same? In our discussions, exercises and problems we will encourage students to consider how a system performs if circumstances and inputs change by an order of magnitude. The ability to anticipate extraordinary change in requirements requires some practice and experience by the System Administrators in charge of the infrastructure; reacting in well-defined ways to such change is one of the core features of a reliable system, and the principles that make a system scalable – fault tolerance, data abstraction, clearly defined interfaces – must be applied at all stages. We will reinforce these axioms throughout all chapters in this book.

1.4.2 Security

All too frequently, the software or information technology industry treats system security as an afterthought, as something that can be added to the

final product once it has met all the other functional requirements, after the user interface has been determined and after all code has been written. It is then not surprising that the old adage that security and usability are directly and inversely related seems to hold true. Nevertheless, I would argue that the very problem statement – “the more secure you make something, the less usable it becomes”⁶ – reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, as it implies that usability is present first and security “added” afterwards.

This approach suggests that the only way to reduce risks is to *take away* functionality; but any time you do that or otherwise restrict the users, they will either stop using the product/system altogether or come up with a creative solution that works around your newly imposed restrictions. To be effective, security needs to be built into the system from the design phase on. That is, rather than starting out with a solution that provides the desired functionality and then attempting to figure out how to get it to a secure state, we should instead begin with a secure albeit restricted state and then slowly add functionality – without compromising safety – until the desired capabilities are available. That is, we need to view security as an enabling factor present at the design’s conception.

Much like software, a system infrastructure is usually developed with much looser an idea of what one wishes to accomplish than people are willing to admit. In order to achieve maximum functionality and the widest possible use, people tend to design interfaces with few restrictions. Often it is the role of the security-minded engineers to ask questions that require the developers or designers to revisit their requirements; proactive security imposes restrictions on what the system is able to do. That is a *good* thing! General-purpose systems are much harder to design than special-purpose systems (“Constraints are friends”[8] allow-lists provide significantly better and more reliable security than deny-lists).

Any parent can tell you that it is nearly impossible to take away a toy from a child, even if the toy has not been used in months or years. The very idea of something being taken away seems to trigger in people (of all ages) a “but I might need it some day” response. Giving users access to a resource (network access, disk space, physical access, CPU power, ...) is trivial – restricting the use once access has been granted is near impossible; the genie cannot be put back into the bottle. It is therefore imperative to understand

⁶We will elaborate on the somewhat surprisingly accurate corollary that “The more secure you make something, the less secure it becomes.”[10] detail in a later chapter.

precisely what level of access to what resources you *actually* need and not build a system for the most widest possible use. Well defined – restricted – small components can still provide the flexibility to build scalable systems, but each component needs to be designed from the beginning with security in mind. Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, an infrastructure is only as secure as its most open or exposed component.

Rare is the software developer who dismisses “security” as of minor importance, yet this mythical property everybody pays at least lip service to has an incredibly wide definition and may mean different things in different contexts. Generally speaking, we require *risk management* (we discuss this in more detail in a later chapter); more specifically we will look at a number of computer-human system specific aspects of security such as (but not limited to):

- Cryptography, and the three main features that allow it to help mitigate risks:
 - Secrecy or Confidentiality
 - Accuracy or Integrity
 - Authenticity
- Physical Security
- Service Availability
- Service Design
- Social Engineering and other aspects of human nature
- Trust

Throughout this book, we will allude to these components wherever appropriate, and we encourage students to come up with possible threat scenarios as a regular exercise. Establishing and fostering a proactively defensive, some may say “paranoid”, mindset is an important element of a System Administrator’s development. Knowing that we cannot provide an all-encompassing mantle of security after the system has been designed (much less deployed!), we strive to integrate it in all stages, leading it to bolster our infrastructure as an inherent feature.

1.4.3 Simplicity

As our discussion of scalability and security suggested, the practical application of these principles yields a reduction of interfaces, end-points, use cases and overall variance. In other words, scalable and secure systems are less *complex* and – it is worth drawing this distinction explicitly – much less *complicated*. A complex system may be well-organized and exhibit a clear, logical structure yet require subtle or intricate connections or components. Complicated systems, on the other hand, are irregular, unpredictable or difficult to follow.

“Complexity is the enemy.” This quote has been repeated endlessly in so many contexts that it can almost be assumed common knowledge amongst software engineers, cryptographers and other security experts[11]. But while many people in the information technology industry may agree on this in principle, I have found that, like so many aphorisms, the translation into the real world – the actual application of its consequences – trails far behind the good intentions.

In the world of System Administration reducing complexity is particularly difficult. As we discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, managing large computer networks has *inherent* complexity: multiple components must interface with each other in many ways to help people – simultaneously the origin of true entropy as far as computers are concerned and dangerously predictable – accomplish their individual and collective goals. But it is important to differentiate between *required* complexity and *accidental* complexity[12]. We strive to reduce overall complexity by building ultimately intricate systems out of smaller, simpler components.

To repeat an almost ubiquitous prime example of how simplicity enables astounding flexibility and may allow you to build complex systems, we will time and again draw the analogy to the concept of toy building blocks: themselves simple, nearly unbreakable and available in a reasonably limited number of shapes and sizes you can build just about anything with them.

Like these little blocks, the Unix operating system builds on the philosophy of simple tools that “do one thing and do it well”, that work together, commonly by being connected via the ubiquitous pipe, operating on text streams[13]. We aim for solutions that exhibit comparable elegance. “Simple” does not, it should be noted, mean “trivial” or “easy”: it is so much easier to *add* features, to increase the output, to justify additional input than it is to reduce a component to its bare necessities. As Antoine de Saint

Exupéry, observed[14]:

Perfection is reached not when there's nothing left to add, but when there's nothing left to remove.

But how do we design a simple infrastructure? The simple answer is: we can't. The end result will always be complex. But the systems we create will be more fault tolerant, more performant, more flexible – in short: better – if we remember that our building blocks need to resemble Lego blocks more than swiss army knives. In other words: we design *for* simplicity. We keep interfaces internally consistent and logical. We use simplicity as a scalpel to cut away the clutter.

The ability to resist the temptation to “enhance” your architecture or software tool to implement additional features that, if at all necessary, might better be provided by a separate component, usually only comes with strong will power and years of experience. At the same time, simplicity is found to underly all of the exemplary technologies you are likely to encounter and some of which we will present in the coming chapters. Sometimes it takes a second look to recognize and appreciate the genius of simplicity; hopefully this book will help sharpen your awareness of this trait.

1.5 The Future of System Administration

The System Administrator’s job definition is diverse, and so is the rather significant change the profession has undergone over the years. Gone are the days of shuffling punch cards, of cycling magentic tapes, of connecting your dumb terminals using RS-232 serial connections, of stringing ribbon cables inside large computer cases... or are they?

Some things haven’t really changed all that much. Technologies come and go, but certain principles have remained the same. Using fibre-optic cables rather than twisted-pair, using Infiniband or Fibre Channel instead of Ethernet or parallel SCSI, or using wireless networks instead of physically connected systems does not fundamentally change the day-to-day operations.

Virtualization and Cloud Computing may seem to limit the need of an organization to hire their own System Administrators, but I believe that rather than a threat to the profession these technologies are simply one of the ways in which we make progress as information technology specialists. A chapter towards the end of the book discusses the future direction of

System Administration and revisits these topics as well as some of the latest trends in how System Administration intertwines with other disciplines – the terms “DevOps” and “Agile Infrastructure” (or “Agile Operations”) deserve particular attention in that context.

A few years ago, the Personal Computer signified a paradigm change away from the central Mainframe computer accessed remotely by users towards a distributed storage and compute model. System Administrators found themselves supporting more and more individually powerful connected devices, trying to centralize certain resources and services such as shared filespace or regular backups, for example. In the recent past, the move towards software and data storage services “in the cloud” has brought the evolution full circle: once again, we are challenged to provide reliable central services that are accessed by small, though increasingly mobile, devices.

The separation of *systems* from *networks*, if it ever really existed, is disappearing. Standalone systems separated from the Internet are rare; systems operating completely on their own without *any* network connectivity have become largely impractical. Does this change the job of the System Administrator? Does it make things more or less interesting, difficult, challenging, exciting, different? Will we see another shift back towards a model where data storage and processing happens again on the edge nodes of the network?

We don’t know. But we do know this: whatever happens, System Administrators will be needed. Perhaps they will carry a different title and perform different practical tasks, but the concept of the profession will remain. Organizations small and large will need somebody with the knowledge and experience to analyze, troubleshoot and design new infrastructures; somebody who builds and maintains scalable and secure systems; somebody with an appreciation of the simple things in life.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. – Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr



Figure 1.2: An IBM 704 mainframe. With cloud computing coming full circle, we already live in the future!

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Create a course notebook (electronic or otherwise). In it, write down your notes about each chapter, add any links to additional information, noteworthy insights, etc. After each chapter, write down lessons learned. Differentiate between those directly applicable to you and those you consider worthwhile reviewing or investigating in the future.
2. Create a folder for your course work as a central place for all your documentation. Whenever you go through practical exercises, make sure to write down how you solved a specific problem. Your documentation will later on help you review the lessons you learned and can be used as a practical how-to guide, so make sure to verify all steps before you write them down.
3. Ask a System Administrator (for example: in your university, of an open source project you participate in, at work) to describe their daily routine. Compare notes with others.
4. Consider the current most popular websites and Internet businesses or organizations. Try to find out details about their infrastructure and how it is maintained.
5. Research available classes and degree granting programs in the field of System Administration. Compare their contents to those of industry standard certification courses.
6. Research professional organizations related to System Administration (such as LISA and LOPSA).

- (a) Review their mission and content and consider joining their mailing lists. They provide a great way to keep up to date with real-world experiences and itemlems.
 - (b) How do these organizations compare to the ACM, IEEE or ISOC?
7. Research common Internet standard bodies and practices. What is an RFC? What do the IETF, IANA and ICANN do?
 8. Consider the systems you have access to: what are their primary functions, for what goals were they designed? Suppose they grew by an order of magnitude – what itemlems would you foresee?
 9. Consider the systems you have access to: what kind and how is access granted? What kind of security itemlems can you imagine?
 10. Research the terms “DevOps” and “SRE” SRE. In how far do the practices it represents change the typical job description of a System Administrator?

Exercises

1. Practice basic system tasks in your virtualized environment by creating different OS instances and run them. Once running, log in on the virtual host and run the required commands to:
 - (a) display basic system information (`uname`, `ifconfig`, `netstat`, ...)
 - (b) display the partition table
 - (c) display the currently mounted file systems
 - (d) display available disk space
2. Repeat Exercise 1 for a different Unix flavor than what you are used to. For example, if you used a Linux instance for Exercise 1, repeat it using OpenSolaris or FreeBSD.
3. Determine the Unix commands you execute most frequently (for example via analysis of your shell’s history file). Analyze the top three commands for their complexity and interfaces.

4. Analyze your interactive shell usage.
 - (a) Change your login shell for at least a week to one that you are not accustomed to. Make note of the changes in behaviour.
 - (b) Disable tab completion and any aliases you have defined in your login shell for at least a week. How does this change your workflow?
 - (c) Review the detailed documentation of your login shell's `builtins`. Practice the use of those that you are not familiar with.

Bibliography

- [1] “less bug, more /dev/null”, Jan Schaumann, on the Internet at <http://is.gd/NpihsH> (visited November 29, 2015)
- [2] Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, *Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition, Computer Network, Systems, and Database Administrators*, on the Internet at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos305.htm> (visited December 10, 2011)
- [3] Mark Burgess, *Analytical Network and System Administration: Managing Human-Computer Systems*, Wiley & Sons, 2004
- [4] *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th Edition, Merriam-Webster
- [5] Tina Darmohray, *Short Topics in System Administration: Job Descriptions for System Administrators*, 3d Edition, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 2010
- [6] Jan Schaumann, “Teaching System Administration in the Cloud” in *:login: The USENIX Magazine*, October 2010, Volume 35, Number 5
- [7] *Fayol’s Elements of Management* on the Internet at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fayolism> (visited December 17, 2011)
- [8] Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., *The Design of Design*, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2010
- [9] *Billy Hollis Still Builds Apps*, transcript of an interview with Billy Hollis, “.NET Rocks”, on the Internet at <http://is.gd/Suk2hr> (visited December 23, 2011)
- [10] Donald A. Norman, “THE WAY I SEE IT: When security gets in the way”, in *Interactions*, November 2009, Volume 16, Issue 6, ACM, New York, NY
- [11] Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, and Tadayoshi Kohno, *Cryptography Engineering*, John Wiley & Sons, March 2010

- [12] Frederick P. Brooks, Kr., *The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering, Anniversary Edition*, Addison-Wesley Professional, Anniversary edition (August 12, 1995)
- [13] M. D. McIlroy, E. N. Pinson, and B. A. Tague *Unix Time-Sharing System Forward*, The Bell System Technical Journal. Bell Laboratories, 1978
- [14] Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Wind, Sand and Stars*, Harcourt, 2002
- [15] Jan Schaumann, *Primum non nocere - Ethical Obligations in Internet Operations*, VelocityConf NYC 2015; on the Internet at <https://www.netmeister.org/blog/primum-non-nocere.html> (visited January 16th, 2017)

Chapter 2

Unix

UNIX is basically a simple operating system, but you have to be a genius to understand the simplicity. – Dennis Ritchie



2.1 Unix History

For many people the term “System Administrator” implies operation of Unix systems, even though the same concepts, tasks and practices apply largely to the maintenance of hosts running any operating system. In this book, we strive to describe principles that are universally applicable and not bound by a specific operating system. We will regularly use Unix as the prime example and cite its features and specific aspects because of its academic background, long history of openness, high penetration of the infrastructure marketplace, and its role as a cornerstone of the Internet.

2.1.1 The Operating System

How the Unix operating system came to be and how that relates to the development of the Internet and various related technologies is fascinating; just

about every other Unix-related book already covers this topic in great detail. In this chapter, we summarize these developments with a focus on the major milestones along the road from the birth of Unix as a test platform for Ken Thompson’s “Space Travel” game running on a PDP-7 to the most widely used server operating system that nowadays also happens to power consumer desktops and laptops (in the form of Linux and Apple’s OS X), mobile devices (Apple’s iOS is OS X based and thus Unix derived; Google’s Android is a Linux flavor), TVs, commodity home routers, industry scale networking equipment, embedded devices on the Internet of Things (IoT), and virtually all supercomputers¹. We will pay attention to those aspects that directly relate to or influenced technologies covered in subsequent chapters. For much more thorough and authoritative discussions of the complete history of the Unix operating system, please see [2], [3] and [5] (to name but a few).²

Let us briefly go back to the days before the Unix epoch. Unix keeps time as the number of seconds that have elapsed³ since midnight UTC of January 1, 1970, also known as “POSIX time”⁴. The date was chosen retroactively, since “Unics” – the *Uniplexed Information and Computing Service*, as the operating system was initially called⁵ – was created by Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie, Brian Kernighan, Douglas McIlroy and Joe Ossana in 1969. That is, Unix predates the *Unix epoch*!

It is interesting and a testament to the clean design to see that the basic

¹TOP500[1], a project ranking the 500 most powerful computers in the world, listed over 89% as running a version of Linux or Unix.

²The “Unix Heritage Society” mailing list[6] is another particularly noteworthy resource in this context. It continues to be an incredible source of historical, arcane, and yet frequently and perhaps surprisingly relevant information and discussions around the history of the Unix family of operating systems. It is notable for the regular participation of many of the original developers and researchers from the early days of Unix.

³It is worth adding that this does not include leap seconds, thus making Unix time a flawed representation of what humans like to refer to as linear time. Leap seconds are inserted rather unpredictably from time to time, and Unix time has to be adjusted when that happens. Worse, *negative* leap seconds are possible, though have never been required. Just more evidence that Douglas Adams was right: “Time is an illusion, lunch time doubly so.”[7]

⁴This is also the reason why, for example, Spam with a “Sent” date set to 00:00:00 may, depending on your timezone offset from UTC, show up in your inbox with a date of December 31, 1969.

⁵The name was a pun on the “Multics” system, an alternative for which it was initially developed as.

functionality and interfaces of an operating system developed over 40 years ago have not changed all that much. The C programming language was developed in parallel by Dennis Ritchie[8], for and on Unix. Eventually, Unix itself was rewritten in C, and the programming language became such an integral part of the operating system, such a fundamental building block, that to this day no System Administrator worth their salt can avoid learning it, even though nowadays most tools running on top of Unix are written in higher-level, often interpreted languages.

The structure of the Unix file system, which we will revisit in much detail in Chapter 4, the basic commands available in the shell, the common system calls, I/O redirection, and many other features remain largely unchanged from the original design. The concept of the pipe, which defines and represents so much of the general Unix philosophy, was first implemented in 1973[10], and we still haven’t figured out a better, simpler, or more scalable way for two unrelated processes to communicate with each other.

Since its parent company AT&T was prohibited from selling the operating system⁶, Bell Laboratories licensed it together with the complete source code to academic institutions and commercial entities. This, one might argue, ultimately led directly to the very notion of “Open Source” when the Computer Systems Research Group (CSRG) of the University of California, Berkeley, extended the operating system with their patchsets, which they called the “Berkeley Software Distribution” or BSD.

Likewise, the licensing of this “add-on” software allowed Berkeley Software Design Inc. (BSDI) to develop and sell their operating system BSD/OS. This lead directly to the famous lawsuit[11] by Unix System Laboratories (USL), a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T / Bell Labs, who did not appreciate BSDI selling their operating system via the 1-800-ITS-UNIX number. It has been argued that this lawsuit eroded some companies’ confidence in the BSD family of operating systems and caused them to adopt a new Unix clone called “Linux” despite its more onerous license. Regardless of the “what if’s” involved, this part of the history is rich in lessons ranging from business logic and legal impact of software licensing to the psychological impact of version numbering and other aspects of software product release.⁷

⁶Under a ruling stemming from an anti-trust settlement in 1958[5], AT&T was only able to commercially sell Unix after divesting itself from Bell Labs.

⁷For the rather interesting details, including the full ruling of the courts as well as many discussions around its repercussions, please see the references at the end of this chapter – the legal battle and its impact on the history of computing alone could fill a book.

The different direction taken by the CSRG and the commercial entities which licensed and then sold the Unix operating system and the evolution of the code as it was merged between these branches ultimately lead to two main directions: the BSD derived family of systems and the ones tracing back to (AT&T's) Unix UNIX V, or SysV. The latter had four major releases, with System V Release 4, or SVR4, being the most successful and the basis of many other Unix versions. Multiple vendors entered the operating system marketplace and tried to distinguish themselves from their competitors via custom (and proprietary) features, which lead to significant incompatibilities between the systems (and much frustration amongst System Administrators in charge of heterogeneous environments).

It only contributes to the overall confusion that “Version 7 Unix”, the last version of the original “Research Unix” made available by Bell Labs’ Computing Science Research Center, was released *prior* to and became the basis of “System III”, from whence “System V” would ultimately derive.⁸ (Linux, not being a *genetic* Unix – that is, it does not inherit nor share any code directly with the original version from Bell Labs – can be seen as a third main flavor, as it borrows semantics and features from either or both heritages. This can at times be both a source of great choice and flexibility as well as of frustration and confusion.)

Software Versioning is Largely Arbitrary



As a wonderful illustration of the absurdity of software version numbers, consider Solaris. Internally termed “SunOS 5”, it was released as “Solaris 2” and attempted to correlate SunOS kernel versions to Solaris releases: Solaris 2.4, for example, incorporated SunOS 5.4. As other competing operating systems had higher version numbers, it appears that Sun decided to leapfrog to the “front” by dropping the major version number altogether. The release following Solaris 2.6 became Solaris 7 (incorporating SunOS 5.7).

Similarly, 4.1BSD would have been called 5BSD, but AT&T feared that would lead to confusion with its own “UNIX System V”. As a result, the BSD line started using point releases, ending with 4.4BSD.

⁸You can download or browse the source code and manual pages of many historical Unix versions on the website of the Unix Heritage Society[29].

I have observed similar “back matching” of OS release versions in more than one large internet company: officially supported (major) OS version numbers grow point releases that do not exist upstream, reflecting a merging of internal versions such that third-party software does not break.

Fragile as this approach is, it reflects a SysAdmin’s ability to meet conflicting needs (track OS versions without incrementing the release numbers) in a practical manner.

Throughout the eighties, a number of different versions of Unix came into existence, most notably Hewlett-Packard’s HP-UX (SysV derived; originally released in 1984), IBM’s AIX (SysV derived, but with BSD extensions; originally released in 1986), Microsoft’s Xenix (derived from “Version 7 Unix”; originally released in 1980; ownership of Xenix was later on transferred to Santa Cruz Operation (SCO), where it was ultimately succeeded by “SCO UNIX”), SGI’s IRIX (SysV derived, but with BSD extensions; originally released in 1988) and Sun Microsystems’s SunOS (BSD derived; originally released in 1982 and later on superseded by their own SysV derived Solaris).

Even though these systems were commercial, innovations from one easily flowed to the others. For example, a number of important and now ubiquitous features such as the Virtual File System (VFS) and the Network File System (NFS) were developed at Sun, which was co-founded by Bill Joy, who had been a graduate student in the CSRG at Berkeley, where he worked on various BSD releases and created a number of important tools, including the `vi(1)` editor and the `csh(1)` command-line interpreter.

Not surprisingly, the code released under the permissive BSD-License[13] was equally quickly adapted and integrated into the commercial versions. This included the Berkeley Fast File System (FFS) (also known as the Unix File System (UFS)), the BSD Sockets library and Application Programming Interface (API), and of course the DARPA sponsored integration of the TCP/IP suite (initially developed by BBN Technologies, one of the companies contracted to implement the protocols). The BSD-derived TCP/IP code finally found its way into virtually every major operating system, including Microsoft Windows.

Linux, one of the most widely used Unix versions today – technically

a “Unix-like” operating system, as it inherits from neither the SysV nor the BSD lineages – has its own unique history, invariably tied to that of the GNU Project. Developed on and inspired by MINIX, it was created in 1991 by Linus Torvalds as a “(free) operating system [...] for 386(486) AT clones”[12]. Since a kernel all by itself does not an operating system make, Linux was soon bundled with the freely available software provided by the GNU Project and, like that software, licensed under the GNU General Public License.

The GNU Project in turn was started by Richard Stallman in 1983 ⁹ to provide a Unix-like operating system, and by 1991 it provided a large number of essential programs and tools (starting with the ubiquitous `emacs(1)` editor) and of course including the GNU Compiler Chain `gcc(1)`, the GNU C Library (`glibc`), as well as the GNU Core Utilities; however, it was still in need of a kernel. When Linux was released, it filled this void and GNU/Linux was born. It is interesting to note that despite the unique license this operating system was released under – in a nutshell: you get the source and are free to use and modify it, but any modifications need to be released under this same license – it has found widespread adoption by commercial entities and countless products are based on it.

Different organizations, both commercial and volunteer-based, have sprung up to provide different versions of the GNU/Linux OS. Inherently similar on a fundamental level, they tend to differ in their package manager (see Chapter 5.5 for a detailed discussion of these components), administrative tools, development process, and user interface choices. Some companies trade rapid adoption of new features available in the open source kernel for a reputation of stability and offer commercial support for their particular Linux flavor.

Even though nowadays hundreds of these Linux distributions exist, the two dominant variations in the server market tend to be those based on “Red Hat Enterprise Linux” as well as derivatives of Debian GNU/Linux. The former, a commercial product licensed to users by Red Hat, Inc., gave birth to the “Fedora” and CentOS community projects, while in 2012 Canonical Ltd.’s “Ubuntu” OS became the most widely used Debian derivative. Changes to the core components continue to be merged across all distributions, but the specific bundling of custom tools lead to different Linux flavors drifting further apart.

⁹Note that this makes the GNU project 8 years older than Linux!




Figure 2.1: A partial Unix genealogy tree.

With all this back and forth between the various versions, trying to keep track of the entire genealogy of the Unix family of operating systems is no easy task. Figure 2.1 provides an incomplete and simplified visualization of the main directions; a much more complete graph of the Unix history can be seen on the “Unix Timeline”[14] – printed on letter-sized paper, the graph is over 25 feet long! Many System Administrators have covered their office walls with this reminder of the complex history of their favorite operating system.

Parallel to the development of the various Unix flavors evolved a set of standards that helped define how exactly the operating system should behave, what interfaces it should provide and what kinds of assumptions third-party software could make about the environment. These standards became to be known as the “Single UNIX Specification” (SUS, commonly referred by version, such as SUSv3) and eventually as “POSIX” (for “Portable Operating System Interface for uniX”). The SUS was used to qualify operating systems for the name “UNIX” – this certification was obtained only by a relatively small number of systems, since it was costly and required re-certification of

the system after any significant change (i.e., major OS release), something that Open Source projects, such as the BSDs certainly could not afford.

Eventually, SUSv3 and POSIX:2001 (formally known as IEEE 1003.1-2001) became more or less interchangable; we will commonly refer to systems or interfaces as being “POSIX-compliant” (or not, as the case may be). At the time of this writing, the latest version is POSIX:2008[15], which is divided into a *Base Definition*, the *System Interfaces and Headers*, and the *Commands and Utilities*. It should be mentioned, though, that not only is “the nice thing about standards that you have so many to choose from”[16], as an old phrase coined by Andrew S. Tanenbaum goes, but also that a recommendation or requirement does not necessarily have to make sense or be realistic to be included in a standard. We will occasionally notice discrepancies between what POSIX demands and what different OS vendors chose to implement. As two entertaining examples, please refer to the section of the `fcntl(2)` manual page on e.g. a NetBSD system[17] that elaborates on the locking semantics or the fact that POSIX could be interpreted to require a `cd(1)` *executable*¹⁰.

2.1.2 Networking

No review of the history and basic features of the Unix operating system would be complete without a mention of the parallel evolution of the Internet. As we noted in Section 2.1.1, the development of the Unix system and that of the predecessors of what ultimately became the Internet were not only related, but became inseparably merged. The ARPANET implemented the concept of *packet switching*, allowing payload to be broken into small *datagrams* and routed along different paths; its adoption of TCP/IP[20] as its protocol suite effectively marked the beginning of the modern Internet. Even though some companies developed their own TCP/IP stack, the code included in the Berkeley Software Distribution quickly became the most widely used implementation and ultimately replaced other network protocols¹¹.

In the early days of the Internet, the various different networks – ARPANET,

¹⁰If the problem of a `cd(1)` *executable* isn’t immediately obvious to you... well, see Problem 4!

¹¹Microsoft, for example, did not include TCP/IP in their operating systems until Windows 95, allowing other companies to sell their implementations as add-on software. The move from their native NetBIOS protocol to the BSD derived TCP/IP stack helped make the latter the de-facto Internet standard protocol suite.

CSNET, MILNET, NSFNET, NSI, etc. – were connected via specific gateway hosts, and email exchanges as well as communications on the early BBSes and Usenet were performed via UUCP, the *Unix-to-Unix Copy* tools¹². Once hosts were more frequently directly connected to the Internet, SMTP and NNTP became more widely used, leading to Unix servers running various so-called daemons to provide network services as part of their normal operations.

But even before the advent of the Internet, Unix included networking capabilities. Through its layers of abstraction it was possible to implement support for different networking technologies and allow applications to be network protocol agnostic. In fact, some applications, such as email were available and in use prior to any traditional networking capabilities. The nature of Unix as a multiuser system lead to the development of tools, amongst them the `mail(1)` program, to allow these users to communicate efficiently with one another and across systems. We will frequently review how the nature of a scalable tool allows it to function equally well regardless of where input data comes from or what transport mechanism is used; a simple, well defined program can deliver mail on a single system while relying on a separate transport service (i.e., UUCP or SMTP) to handle connections with other systems.

Furthermore, the software implementing such services was developed on and then included in the Unix operating system. As a result, the Internet and its infrastructure were growing in parallel to the capabilities of Unix, one enabling the other to become more powerful and ubiquitous. And so today, the overwhelming majority of the systems powering the core infrastructure components of the Internet, such as, for example, the DNS root servers or most web- and mail servers, are running on a Unix variant¹³: the by far most popular implementation of the DNS specification is, not surprisingly, the *Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND)* server[21]; `sendmail`, `exim`, and `postfix` push the majority of the world’s email[22]; the `apache` web server still handles more than 45% of all HTTP traffic on active sites than any other web server[23].

¹²Every now and then you may encounter a scruffy oldtimer who insists on pointing out that their email address is something along the lines of “...!orgserver!deptserv!mybox!user”. You can trivially impress them by calling it their “bang path” and agreeing that @-based email addresses are newfangled humbug.

¹³As noted in the introduction, we continue to count Linux as a “Unix variant” to avoid constant repetition of the phrase “Unix or Linux”.

2.1.3 Open Source

Unix is an inherently open system. Developed at a renowned research institution, it was released and licensed together with the source code long before the formal idea of “Open Source” had manifested itself. As we have seen in Section 2.1, the availability of the source code made it possible for other various commercial versions to be developed by different companies, but it also allowed the development of the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) with its distinctly permissive licensing terms.

Having access to the source code of the operating system and all the tools in use is a foreign concept in the world of proprietary software, where the source code is guarded as a trade secret, the pillar upon which a traditional company builds its entire profit model. Within the academic world in which Unix was developed, however, access to the source code was only natural. Peer review and openness were fundamental parts of this world and the system was targeted towards engineers, hackers, advanced users who would naturally like to make changes to tools, who would want to extend the capabilities and add new features.

This wish to share one’s work with others, to allow others to take full advantage of it, and to make their own modifications took two distinct directions early on, embodied in the two open source license models that have remained dominant to this day. On the one hand, the distinctly academic BSD-License (see Listing 2.3) allowed for any use of the software whatsoever (including modification and commercial re-selling of the products) so long as credit was given where credit was due. On the other hand, the GNU General Public License (GPL), written by Richard Stallman intended to very specifically not only *grant*, but to *enforce* certain freedoms using a moral argument. This license, somewhat ironically, imposes a number of restrictions on what you can do with the source code you have received, most notably the requirement to make public under *the same* license any changes you distribute.

People have argued about the benefits of one license over the other for decades by now, and we will not attempt to resolve the dispute in this book. They represent different approaches to one’s software, perhaps a personal choice of how one wishes that it be used in the future. Suffice it to say that there is incredible software licensed using both approaches, and both models thrive to this day. A similar discussion involves the concept of cost and freedom with regards to software (“Free as in beer versus free as in speech”). Open Source software, like all software, comes at a price: a relatively small

component of the total cost of ownership is the actual purchase price, and access to the source code (which in some cases may well come under specific terms of the license with commercial and/or closed source software) is somewhat independent thereof. What's more important – within the context of this book, anyway – is that the very concept of Open Source is embedded in the Unix philosophy and culture, and as a result System Administrators frequently *expect* to be able to analyze the source code to the applications and operating systems they run.

But not only are we *able* to inspect how a piece of software works, we *need* to. All too frequently do we encounter problems or try to analyze a system's behaviour where the question of what on earth might be going on is answered with this advice: “Use the source, Luke!” – Unix has let us do precisely that since the beginning.¹⁴

2.2 Basic Unix Concepts and Features

The Unix operating system consists, somewhat simplified, of three major components: a *kernel*, which controls the hardware, schedules tasks, and interfaces with the various devices; a set of *libraries*, which provide an interface to the kernel (in the form of *system calls* that run in privileged kernel space as well as unprivileged *library functions* running in user space); and a set of *tools and applications* (often referred to as the “userland”) using these libraries to provide functionality to the end user.

Most Unix flavors use a *monolithic* kernel, but allow for dynamically loaded kernel modules.¹⁵ This approach allows for a reduction of the kernel footprint and increased flexibility, as device driver support can be added or removed at runtime without requiring a reboot. The kernel, managing the system's resources, is running in supervisor mode and exposes facilities via system calls. It is desirable to keep the number of these entry points into kernel space limited and let higher-level library functions provide added

¹⁴It should be mentioned that the various commercial Unix versions represent closed source systems. But not only are Open Source Unix versions nowadays much more widely in use, virtually all of the core software running *on top* of the (commercial, closed, open, or any other) OS traditionally comes with its source code.

¹⁵A discussion of *microkernels*, *unikernels*, and the various *containers* that became popular in more recent years is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of this chapter. The broad subject matter of System Administration again forces us to focus on the general principles first.

```
$ cmd >output          # redirection of stdout to a file
$ cmd >/dev/null        # suppression of output
$ cmd >/dev/null 2>&1   # suppression of all output
$ cmd <input           # accepting input from a file
$ cmd1 | cmd2          # feeding output from cmd1 into cmd2

# Of course these redirections can be combined...
$ cmd1 2>/dev/null | cmd2 | cmd3 2>&1 | cmd4 >file 2>output
```

Listing 2.1: Simple I/O redirection in the shell

functionality executed in unprivileged mode. Therefore, most Unix versions have only a comparatively small number of system calls: as of January 2017, NetBSD, for example, had only around 482 such calls[18], with only minimal expected growth¹⁶.

Utilizing these system calls and library functions, the higher level tools and applications are able to interface with the kernel and execute on the user’s behalf. These binaries then can be divided into a number of categories, such as executables essential for the basic operation of the system, tools primarily intended for use by the system administrator, and general purpose utilities. We will revisit this topic in more detail in Chapter 5.

2.2.1 The shell

The Unix *shell*, while in many ways nothing but a regular executable, takes a special place in the list of utilities and commands available on the system. The shell provides the primary user interface, allowing for the invocation and execution of the other tools. AT&T’s Version 7 Unix included the so-called “Bourne shell” (named after Steven Bourne) installed as `/bin/sh`. In addition to the ability to invoke other commands, the shell was designed as a *command interpreter* both for interactive use as well as for *non*-interactive use. That is, it included a scripting language, allowing for complex series of commands to be executed; for example, by system startup scripts at boot time.¹⁷

¹⁶Revisiting an earlier draft of this chapter from January 2012 listed 472 system calls. That is, over the course of five years, only ten new system calls were added.

¹⁷It is worth noting that the early Bourne shell also included support for pipelines (invented by Douglas McIlroy and added to Unix by Ken Thompson in 1973).

Various other shells have been created since then, mostly following either the general Bourne shell syntax or that of Bill Joy’s C `csh(1)` Shell. The most notable shells today include: the Almquist shell `ash(1)`, a BSD-licensed replacement for the Bourne shell, frequently installed as `/bin/sh` on these systems; the GNU Project’s Bourne-again shell `bash(1)`, which is the default shell on most Linux systems and known for a large number of added features; the Korn shell `ksh(1)`, named after David Korn and which became the basis for the POSIX shell standard; the TENEX C shell `tcsh(1)`, a C shell variant developed at Carnegie Mellon University; and perhaps the Z shell `zsh(1)` another very feature rich Bourne shell variant.

As a scripting language and due to its availability on virtually every Unix flavor, `/bin/sh` is assumed to be the lowest common denominator: a Bourne- or Bourne-compatible shell. On Linux, `bash(1)` is typically installed as both `/bin/bash` and `/bin/sh`, and it behaves (somewhat) accordingly based on how it was invoked. Unfortunately, though, its ubiquity on Linux systems has led to a shell scripts masquerading as `/bin/sh` compatible scripts that are, in fact, making use of `bash(1)` extensions or rely on `bash(1)` compatibility and syntax. This becomes frustrating to debug when trying to run such scripts on a platform with a POSIX compliant `/bin/sh`.

All Unix shells include the ability to perform I/O redirection. Each program has a set of input and output channels that allow it to communicate with other programs. Like the concept of the pipe, these streams have been part of Unix’s design from early on and contribute significantly to the consistent user interface provided by all standard tools: a program accepts input from *standard input* (or `stdin`) and generates output on *standard output* (or `stdout`); error messages are printed to a separate stream, *standard error* (or `stderr`).

The shell allows the user to change what these streams are connected to; the most trivial redirections are the collection of output in a file, the suppression of output, acceptance of input from a file, and of course the connection of one program’s output stream to another program’s input stream via a pipe (see Listing 2.1 for Bourne-shell compatible examples).

The concept of these simple data streams being provided by the operating system was inherent in the Unix philosophy: it provided abstraction of interfaces, reduced overall complexity of all tools using these interfaces, and dictated a simple text stream as the preferred means of communication. We will have more to say on the Unix philosophy in Section 2.2.4.




Figure 2.2: Standard streams in a simple pipeline

Finally, the unix shell provides for *job control*, a necessity for a multitasking operating system. When a user logs into the system, their *login shell* is started, serving as the primary interface between the user and the OS. After entering a command or a pipeline, the shell will create (“fork”) a new process and then execute the given programs. The standard streams are connected as illustrated in Figure 2.2. While the program or pipeline is running, the user cannot do anything else – she has to wait until the command completes and control is returned to the shell. In the mean time, all she can do is twiddle her thumbs; so much for multitasking!

To avoid this scenario, the C shell implemented a feature that was quickly incorporated in the Bourne shell, which allows users to start and control multiple concurrent processes by placing them into the *background* (by adding the & symbol at the end of the command or via the shell `builtins`), bringing them to the *foreground* (via `builtins`), suspending and continuing them (by sending possibly keyboard generated signals to the relevant process group), etc. Listing 2.2 illustrates the basic job control functionality.

```
$ cmd1 &                      # send cmd1 to the background
[1] 5836                         # report job number and process ID
$ cmd2 | cmd3 &                  # send a process group to the background
[2] 5912
$ jobs                            # report on running jobs
[1]  Running      cmd1
[2]  Running      cmd2 | cmd3
$ fg %1                          # bring job 1 to the foreground
cmd1
^Z                                # suspend via Control+Z
[1]+ Stopped      cmd1
$ bg                                # send it back to the background
[1]+ cmd1
$                                # hit return again...
[1]+ Done        cmd1
$                                # cmd1 has completed
```

Listing 2.2: Simple job control in the shell

2.2.2 Manual pages and documentation

Another important feature of the Unix operating system was that it included what came to be known as the “online manual pages”¹⁸, reference documentation readily available on the running system and that went beyond just attesting to the existence of a command or feature, but instead provided actually useful information, including the correct invocation, possible options, a description of the tool’s functionality as well as any known bugs. Divided into several sections by topic, system calls are documented in section two, library functions in section three, while commands and executables are usually documented in section one for general purpose tools and section eight (on BSD, section 1M on SysV derived systems) for system administration related commands and daemons.

The standard for this documentation has always been high, reflecting the academic culture behind the operating system. Rather than treat the user as a naive consumer, Unix documentation acknowledges the fact that the target audience consists of skilled engineers who appreciate and require an accurate description of the tools at their disposal in order to make the most of them. It may not surprise you to know that the adoption of Unix within

¹⁸In Unix’s historic context, “online” initially meant that the documentation is available on the running system, not “on the Internet”.

the Bell Labs patent office, which secured funding for further development, was largely thanks to the system’s abilities to typeset beautiful documents using the *roff* text formatting program¹⁹. The same tools are still used to format the manual pages.

Unix provided manual pages and documentation not just of the executables and configuration files provided by the system, but also for so-called “supplementary” documents. These comprise a number of papers that, as in the case of the Interprocess Communication (IPC) tutorials, for example, served as the de-facto reference documentation and continue to be used in countless Computer Science classes today to teach students the fundamentals of Unix IPC. Other highlights include an introduction to the GNU debugger *gdb*, the *make* tool, a *vi(1)* reference manual, an overview of the file system, and various daemons. Since these documents are licensed under the permissive BSD License, they can be – and thankfully are! – included in modern Unix versions (such as e.g. NetBSD) and made available on the Internet[19].

Understanding the Shell



A System Administrator spends a significant amount of time in the shell, both her own login shell as well as various others. Not only does she need to run countless commands to remotely administrate various hosts, she also routinely writes small, large, complex, simple, elegant or convoluted scripts to accomplish any thinkable task. It is therefore imperative to understand how the Unix shell works on a detailed level. It is surprising how frequently the many intricacies of I/O redirection, of job control and pipelines, of aliases and *builtins* taking precedence over commands, as well as other seemingly obscure problems manifest themselves.

If you have a background in C programming, consider writing a general purpose Unix shell from scratch – it will teach you invaluable lessons about how the system works on a very fundamental level. (If you do not have a background in C programming... develop one!)

¹⁹Consider that W. Richard Stevens used to typeset his famous books “Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment” and the “TCP/IP Illustrated” series by himself using *groff(1)*.

2.2.3 A portable, multitasking, multiuser system

The Unix operating system was, from the very beginning, designed as a *portable, multitasking, multiuser* system. These inherent features are largely responsible for the incredible success of this over 40 year old system and each has wide-reaching consequences. Initially developed on a PDP-7 and then a PDP-11 machine, Unix was rewritten in the C programming language, which allowed it to be ported with comparatively little effort to various other machines and hardware architectures. Figure 2.3 shows a few different hardware platforms, each running a version of Unix. Prior to this, operating systems were written in assembly, and that was that – only a fool would attempt otherwise! But as a result of this bold move to stray from convention and instead to apply a fundamental design choice of abstraction of complexity, the system became inherently portable: software *for* Unix – any Unix, really – can usually be adapted to other Unix flavors with few modifications.

Now, to state that Unix is *portable* does not mean that one can trivially recompile the software without any changes – far from it! Any System Administrator can relate stories of having spent hours wrangling Makefiles, *autoconf/automake* frameworks, and hunting down header files and libraries. But in the end, it remains relatively easy to get the software to work, since all Unix systems follow (to some degree, anyway) certain standards and conventions. Consider the effort of adapting a complex piece of software from running on Linux to, say, IRIX to that from running on Windows 95 to Mac OS 9! Unix having been rewritten in the higher level C programming language, the standardization of C, as well as the POSIX guidelines really allowed a world of portable, flexible software to flourish.

The *multitasking* nature of the Unix operating system was a given, as it was intended to be a time-sharing system, allowing multiple processes to use the given resources seemingly simultaneously by means of a scheduler which initiates context switches to grant each process time on the Central Processing Unit (CPU). Allowing for multiple (simultaneous) users was just a logical consequence. Nowadays it may not seem worth mentioning, but it is worth noting that this system, conceived to allow multiple users simultaneous access was designed over 40 years ago. In comparison, Windows NT, first released in 1993, was the first of Microsoft's family of operating systems to eventually introduce multiuser capabilities, around 20 years later; Apple's Mac OS gained multiuser capabilities only with OS X in 2001.

The nature of a *multiuser* system has a number of significant implications:



Figure 2.3: Different systems and architectures running Unix. A VAX-11 by DEC (VAX), an O2 by SGI (MIPS), a Mac Mini by Apple (PowerPC), PowerEdge servers by Dell (x86).

A system that allows multiple users to simultaneously utilize the given resources is in need of a security model that allows for a distinction of access levels or privileges. The system needs to be able to distinguish between file access or resource utilization amongst users, thus requiring the concept of access permissions, process and file ownership, process priorities and the like. Controlling access to shared resources by individual users also required, effectively, a single omnipotent user to control and administer these privileges, thus necessitating the superuser or **root account** (with plenty of security implications and concerns of its own).

In order to meet these requirements, the Unix system uses a set of file permissions to restrict three different types of access – read, write and execute (or **rwx**, respectively) – to the file *owner* or *user*, members of a specific user *group*, or everybody else (i.e., *others*) on the system (**ugo**, respectively).

These permissions can be used to implement efficiently various security models, but at the same time they are simple and flexible enough to allow users to make their own choices.²⁰

Unix has a long tradition of following the *principle of least privilege*: system services are usually run using a dedicated user account, allowing the System Administrator to separate file access and resource usage such that even if the service was compromised, harm would be minimized. This practice translates to routine tasks in system administration and standard operating procedures alike. We will revisit this concept in more detail in Chapter 11.

Processes, like files, are associated with individual users, though privilege escalation can be accomplished by means of changing the *effective user ID*. Processes also may have specific resource limitations, which the superuser can set system-wide or on a per-user or per-group basis. We will revisit the associated system calls and commands like `getrlimit(2)`, `sysctl(8)`, `ulimit(1)`, and *login classes* (see `login.conf(5)`, where available) in Chapter 14 and elsewhere.

2.2.4 The Unix Philosophy

The design of the Unix operating system was based on principles that not only have been proven time and again to lead to stable, scalable and robust solutions, but that have formed the basis of a specific Unix culture, a way of doing things that speaks to advanced users such as System Administrators in particular. You can find a thorough explanation of this culture in classic texts such as Kernighan and Pike’s “The UNIX Programming Environment”[4], Eric S. Raymond’s “The Art of Unix Programming”[5], or simply by searching the Internet for the term “Unix philosophy”, but it warrants summarizing due to the profound impact it has.

At its core, the Unix philosophy stipulates that tools should be kept simple and adhere to specific simple guidelines and implement an equally simple interface (namely text streams). Virtually every one of the great minds involved in the initial invention and continued development of the Unix operating system – from Douglas McIlroy to Rob Pike, from Dennis

²⁰Different Unix versions have since developed support for extended file attributes including e.g. a per-file Access Control List (ACL), allowing the user to wield more fine-grained control. This is implemented on different operating systems and in different file systems, and the details and semantics differ. In the interest of simplification and focusing on the fundamental principles, we are not covering ACLs.

Ritchie to Ken Thompson – can be quoted to underline this point; they must have been on to something.

The most well-known expression of what makes Unix Unix is probably Douglas McIlroy’s summary[24], partially cited in the previous chapter:

Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write programs to work together. Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a universal interface.

This is frequently succinctly described as the KISS (“Keep it simple, stupid”) principle and correlated with Richard P. Gabriel’s “Worse is Better”[25] design philosophy, according to which simplicity is to be preferred over all other attributes of software, at times even including correctness. While I do not tire of repeating precisely this advice, I believe that the existing literature tends to overlook, one major factor that helped arrive at the mantra of simplicity: deference to the user.

One of the smartest insights a program or system developer can have is that even though they are the person writing the software, they cannot foresee all possible uses of the software. They cannot know what the user will want to accomplish or in what ways she may wish to use the tool. And therein lies the crux: if I wish to enable the user to utilize the tool in any way they wish, how can I possibly keep it simple? Wouldn’t it have to end up being a general purpose tool, with countless inherent complexities as I attempt to anticipate every interface of the future? Remember, a “general purpose product is harder to design well than a special-purpose one.”[26]

This is where the Unix philosophy comes in: by imposing restrictions, it counterintuitively opens up the most flexible, the widest use. Simple tools that perform a single task and operate on a well-defined interface are less complex than software that attempts to keep state in deeply nested data structures (or, worse yet: binary objects stored in files). Our users gain the ability to use the tools for purposes we did not initially anticipate. Unix grants the user flexibility. For better or worse, Unix trusts its users to know what they’re doing and will happily let you shoot yourself in the foot.

UNIX was not designed to stop its users from doing stupid things, as that would also stop them from doing clever things. – Doug Gwyn

The awareness that your software might be used in ways you cannot imagine, that the user of the software might actually know better what they may wish to accomplish than the designer or implementer is what makes Unix so fascinating. Interestingly, this philosophy, this trust into the user and his or her capabilities and knowledge stands in stark contrast to that of the late Steve Jobs, who famously quipped that “people don’t know what they want until you show it to them”[27]. Apple’s products are known for their elegance and ease of use, but advanced users know that should you attempt to do something with them that the designers did not anticipate, it’s either impossible or painfully cumbersome.

The primary user interface on the Unix systems remains the command-line. This is not for a lack of other options, but a manifestation of the Unix philosophy. While it may appear more “user-friendly” to a novice to use a pointing device to select pre-determined options from a menu using a Graphical User Interface (GUI), it is anathema to efficient System Administration.

System Administrators need to be able to perform tasks remotely, quickly, and reliably unattended; execution of programs needs to be automated and scheduled, configuration be done outside of the application, and data be transformed with the myriad of available filters. As you can tell, these requirements go back to the Unix way of writing simple tools that work well together by communicating via text streams. Thanks to the consistency with which these principles are implemented across the platform, the learning curve for advanced users, while perhaps steeper than on some other systems, only needs to be climbed once. At the same time, it gets you to a higher level of efficiency quickly.

The ability to combine individual tools to build larger, more complex ones; to remotely access hundreds or thousands of systems in the same manner as one would a single system; to allow rapid development of simple prototypes constructed of growing pipelines; to be able to control access to shared resources following a simple yet flexible security model; to extend and tune the operating system itself; to be able to do all the things that the designers of the system could not have envisioned you doing – this power is what Unix confers upon the advanced user. It is why System Administrators not only prefer Unix, but actually enjoy working on this platform.

```
Copyright (c) <year>, <copyright holder>
All rights reserved.
```

```
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, are permitted provided that the
following conditions are met:
```

1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the
following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the
above copyright notice, this list of conditions and
the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or
other materials provided with the distribution.

```
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND
CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
(INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY
OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR
TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY
WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
```

```
The views and conclusions contained in the software and
documentation are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as representing official policies, either
expressed or implied, of <the project>.
```

Listing 2.3: The simplified, or 2-clause, BSD license. Nice and terse, huh? In contrast, the GNU's Not Unix (GNU) GPL clocks in at 11 full text pages.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Research the history of the Unix operating system in more detail. Branch out into the “USL vs. BSDi” lawsuit. Follow the BSD genealogy into the Mac OS X system. Analyze the future direction of the commercial Unix versions.
2. Review the Linux, NetBSD and Solaris versioning numbers. Try to correlate specific features to specific releases across these systems (note the different Linux distributions numbers as well).
3. Review the `intro(1)` manual pages on your system (they may exist for different sections and, depending on the Unix flavor, in varying detail). From there, move on to the following manual pages, considering the multiuser implications: `chmod(1)/chown(1)`, `login(1)`, `passwd(5)`, `su(1)`, `sudo(8)`
4. Does the POSIX standard really require a `cd(1)` *executable*? If it did, what might be a problem with that? Consider the environment of a process and how a shell executes commands.
5. Play around in the Unix environment of your choice. Look at the executables found in the system’s path (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/sbin`, `/usr/sbin`) – do you know what all these tools do?
6. Review your understanding of the Unix philosophy of simple tools acting as filters. Does this reflect your usage of the tools you most frequently execute? Which tools do *not* work (well) as a filter? Why?

7. Research the design decisions underlying other popular operating systems. In how far do they differ from those presented here? Do they influence or reflect the primary user base (i.e., what is cause and what is effect)? How do they affect or relate to System Administration, especially on a large scale?

Exercises

1. Using the programming language of your choice, write a simple interactive shell capable of executing programs on the user's behalf. Try to use it as your shell. Were you aware of the limitations before you did this? Were you aware of the complexity of even basic features?
 - (a) Compare your shell to some of the existing implementations. What features are missing from your shell? How difficult do you think would it be to implement them?
 - (b) Add additional features to your shell, such as support for input/output redirection, pipelines, expansion of environment variables or job control. (Note: this is a *significant* project, but you will learn a great deal about the Unix operating system in the process.)
 - (c) Research and review the concept of a *restricted shell*. Would writing such a shell be *more* or *less* effort to do?

Bibliography

- [1] TOP500; on the Internet at <https://www.top500.org/statistics/list/> (visited January 16, 2017)
- [2] *The Creation of the UNIX Operating System*, on the Internet at <http://www.bell-labs.com/history/unix/> (visited January 7, 2012)
- [3] Dennis M. Ritchie, 'The Evolution of the Unix Time-sharing System', published in *AT&T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal*, "Computing Science and Systems: The UNIX System," 63 No. 6 Part 2, October 1984; also available via the Internet Archive at e.g. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150408054606/http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/who/dmr/hist.html> (visited January 17, 2017)
- [4] Brian W. Kernighan, Rob Pike, *The UNIX Programming Environment*, Prentice Hall, 1984
- [5] Eric Steven Raymond, *The Art of Unix Programming*, Addison-Wesley Professional, September 2003; also available on the Internet at <http://catb.org/~esr/writings/taoup/> (visited January 7, 2012)
- [6] The Unix Heritage Society Mailing List, <http://minnie.tuhs.org/mailman/listinfo/tuhs>
- [7] Douglas Adams, *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, Pan Books, 1979
- [8] Brian W. Kernighan, Dennis M. Ritchie, *The C Programming Language*, Prentice Hall, 1988
- [9] Dennis M. Ritchie, 'Advice from Doug McIlroy'; now only found on the Internet Archive at <https://web.archive.org/web/20150205024833/http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/who/dmr/mdmPIPE.html>
- [10] Douglas McIlroy, *A Research UNIX Reader: Annotated Excerpts from the Programmer's Manual, 1971-1986*; on the Internet at <http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~doug/reader.pdf>
- [11] 'USL vs. BSDI documents', only available on the Internet Archive via e.g. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150205025251/http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/cs/who/dmr/bsdi/bsdisuit.html> (visited January 18, 2017)

- [12] 'What would you like to see most in minix?', Linus Torvalds, posting to the `comp.os.minix` newsgroup on Usenet, on the Internet at <https://groups.google.com/group/comp.os.minix/msg/b813d52cbc5a044b> (visited January 16, 2012)
- [13] *BSD Licenses* on Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSD_licenses (visited January 18, 2017)
- [14] Éric Lévénez, *Unix History*, on the Internet at <http://www.levenez.com/unix/> (visited January 5, 2012)
- [15] The IEEE and The Open Group, "The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, IEEE Std 1003.1, 2016 Edition" on the Internet at <http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/> (visited January 17, 2017)
- [16] Andrew S. Tanenbaum, in 'Computer Networks', Prentice Hall, 2004
- [17] `fcntl(2)`, NetBSD System Calls Manual, on the Internet at <http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?fcntl++NetBSD-current> (visited January 18, 2017)
- [18] NetBSD system call name/number "master" file, on the Internet at <http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/sys/kern/syscalls.master?rev=HEAD> (visited January 18, 2017)
- [19] 4.4 Berkeley Software Distribution Documentation, on the Internet at <http://www.netbsd.org/docs/bsd/lite2/> (visited January 28, 2012)
- [20] Vinton G. Cerf, Robert E. Kahn, "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication", IEEE Transactions on Communications 22 (5); also available on the Internet at <http://ece.ut.ac.ir/Classpages/F84/PrincipleofNetworkDesign/Papers/CK74.pdf> (visited January 28, 2012)
- [21] DNS server survey, 2004; on the Internet at <http://mydns.bboy.net/survey/> (visited February 4, 2012)
- [22] Mail (MX) Server Survey, August 1st, 2007, showed over 60% of SMTP traffic to originate from a Sendmail, Exim, or Postfix installation; on the Internet at http://www.securityspace.com/s_survey/data/man.200707/mxsurvey.html (visited February 4, 2012)

- [23] January 2017 Web Server Survey, on the Internet at <https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2017/01/12/january-2017-web-server-survey.html> (visited January 18, 2017)
- [24] M. D. McIlroy, E. N. Pinson, and B. A. Tague *Unix Time-Sharing System Forward*, The Bell System Technical Journal. Bell Laboratories, 1978
- [25] Richard P. Gabriel, “Worse is Better”, on the Internet at <http://dreamsongs.com/RiseOfWorseIsBetter.html.html> (visited February 5, 2012)
- [26] Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., *The Design of Design*, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2010
- [27] Steven P. Jobs, as quoted in BusinessWeek (25 May 1998)
- [28] Peter H. Salus, *A Quarter Century of UNIX*, Addison-Wesley Professional, 1994
- [29] The Unix Heritage Society, *The Unix Archive*, on the Internet at <http://www.tuhs.org/Archive/README> (visited April 11, 2012)

Chapter 3

Documentation Techniques

Lack of documentation is becoming a problem for acceptance. –
Wietse Venema



We noted in Chapter 2.2.2 that one of the many ways in which the Unix operating system distinguished itself from other systems was that it included extensive documentation of high quality. Each tool provided by the OS came with a *manual page* describing its use, each library included a description of its interfaces, and configuration files were accompanied by documentation elaborating on its syntax and format.

Even simple systems cannot be operated, maintained, updated – or in a word, administered – without an abstract description of the various moving parts.

But while every System Administrator values good documentation, and will happily agree that, yes, all systems should in fact be properly documented, runbooks created, procedures described, and additional information referenced, it does take practice and conscious dedication to develop a habit of writing high quality system documentation.

For this reason, and before we dive into the fundamental technologies and concepts in Part II, let us briefly focus on a few principles that help us provide better documentation due to a better understanding of what purpose it serves.

3.1 System Documentation Writing 101

Writing is communication. You wish to provide information for your organization, your users, or colleagues. As a reader of system documentation, you are in search of information. This exchange of knowledge is direct communication between the author of the documents and the reader.

The motivation, purpose, and effective techniques used in any kind of writing are similar, so allow us to begin with some advice that, while it may sound like it was cribbed from a “Creative Writing 101” syllabus, still remains sound.

3.1.1 Know Your Audience

Understanding who may be reading our documentation is essential to providing the right information, just as a software engineer must understand who the product’s users will be.

Knowing your audience means that you understand what information they are looking for, what background knowledge they may have, what additional documentation or resources they may have access to, and so on.

When we create system documentation, we usually target the following readers¹:

We write documentation for ourselves. This is the simplest case, as we know our target audience well – or so we think! For the most part, we are writing things down so we can repeat them later on, so we don’t forget, so we have a point of reference in the future. This means that we have a pretty good idea what the prospective reader might expect to find, what they might know about the infrastructure etc.

We write documentation for other system administrators. This case is still fairly straight forward. We expect our target audience to be very technical and have a very good understanding of our systems. For example, we write down the steps of a procedure that our colleagues may not normally perform, or we document the setup of a system component we are in charge of that is crucial to the overall operations of our organizations so that they may use this document as a reference when we are not available.

¹You will note that this same advice for “knowing your audience” translates near verbatim to knowing your *users* when writing software. We will revisit this concept in chapter 9.

We write documentation for other technical people. Our services are used by a number of people in our organization. Some of these are very technical expert users, software developers or other engineers, perhaps. In order to allow these people to get information about our systems quickly, we provide end-user documentation which allows more efficient use of the resources we make available.

We write documentation for our users. The systems we maintain provide a certain service and thus has users, some of whom may be internal to our organization and others which may be outside customers. It is not rare that the people in charge of maintaining the systems provide documentation to these end-users in one way or another to allow them to utilize the service or help them find help when things break down.

We write documentation for other people everywhere. System administrators rely on the Internet at large to find answers to the rather odd questions they come up with in the course of their normal work day. Frequently we encounter problems and, more importantly, find solutions to such problems that are of interest to other people, and so we strive to share our findings, our analyses, and our answers.

Some of the most interesting technical blogs are written by system administrators or operational teams and describe how they scale their infrastructure to meet their demands. Likewise, system administrators present their findings and solutions at industry conferences, write technical papers or participate in Internet standards development, all of which require expert documentation and writing skills.

The differences in target audience have a certain impact on how you would structure your documentation as well as, in some cases, implications on access control of the information in question. Internal documentation targeted towards your peers may well include certain privileged information that you would rather not have made available to the entire organization (or outsiders via the Internet).

As much as the target audience differs, though, the best advice for writing good technical documentation is to avoid making any assumptions about the reader's prior knowledge and familiarity with the systems in questions. At the same time, we need to carefully identify and reference whatever assumptions, unavoidable and necessary as they may be, *are* being made.

Secondly, it is important to clearly distinguish *internal* from *external* documentation. The distinction here is not so much between your corporate or

legal identity and the public at large – an easy and obvious one to draw and enforce – but between distinct entities within a single organization. Documentation containing certain details regarding your infrastructure’s network architecture, access control lists, location of credentials and the like may simply not be suitable to be made available outside your department. Unfortunately the boundaries can be less than obvious as people move in and out of departments as an organization evolves.

3.2 Online Documentation

One of the main differences from creative writing is that our documentation is in almost all cases intended to be read online. Even though certain documents such as a contact information registry of the support staff or the emergency escalation procedures may be useful to have in print, virtually all information we collect and make available are read in an online or computer context. This has a profound impact on the structure and style of our documents.

Studies ([5], [6], et al.) have shown that not all “reading” is equal: content consumed via a web browser, for example, is frequently only glanced through, skimmed over or otherwise not paid full attention to. When we read documents online, we tend to search for very specific information; we attempt to extract the “important” parts quickly and tend to ignore the rest.

As a result, online documentation needs to be much more succinct than information intended for actual print.² Sentences and paragraphs need to be short and simple; the subject matter covered concise. Additional information, further references, or more in-depth analyses can always be made available to the reader via appropriate linking. Section headings, bold or italic fonts and the use of itemized lists make it much easier for the reader to quickly absorb the content.

In addition, we are much less inclined to tolerate superfluous information when reading online. While Dale Carnegie’s advice “Tell the audience what you’re going to say, say it; then tell them what you’ve said.” is spot-on for effective presentations or traditional writing, building up each document you create with an introduction and summary incurs too much repetition to be

²Imagine reading this book entirely online, perhaps as a series of blog posts. You would likely skip a lot of content and perhaps rely on summaries, bullet points and other visual emphases to find what might seem worth reading. I certainly would have structured the content differently.

useful. Getting straight to the heart of the matter is usually advisable in our context.

Another benefit of providing documentation online is that it becomes immediately searchable and can be linked to other sources of information. Helping your readers to find the content they are looking for becomes trivial if your documentation framework includes automated index generation and full text search. To make it easier for your readers, be sure to use the right keywords in the text or use “tags” – remember to include or spell out common acronyms or abbreviations depending on what you and your colleagues or users most commonly use!

tl;dr

Sometime in 2011, an acronym established itself in the “blogosphere”: *tl;dr – too long; didn’t read*. This acronym (in general use since at least 2003) was frequently accompanied by a short summary of the content in question, thus allowing online readers lacking the patience to actually read the document to nevertheless

form opinions about it. While it is certainly useful to provide a succinct summary of the content in e.g. an email (where an appropriate ’Subject’ line or an introductory sentence may suffice), if you feel inclined to provide a *tl;dr* summary to your documentation, chances are that you’re addressing the wrong audience.

3.3 Different Document Types

Knowing your audience and understanding what you wish to communicate to them are the most important aspects to understand before starting to write documentation. From these two main points derive a number of subsequent decisions that ultimately influence not only the process flow but also the structure of the document. Drawing parallels to software engineering once more, where we decide on the programming language or library to use based on its suitability to actually solve the given problem, we find that here, too, we need to use the right tool for the job. We cannot structure our end-user manual as a checklist, nor can we provide online help or reference documentation as a formal paper.

Each document type calls for a specific writing style, a unique structure

and flow of information. In this section, we will take a look at some of the most common distinct categories of system documentation.

3.3.1 Processes and Procedures

Purpose	describe in detail how to perform a specific task; document the steps to follow to achieve a specific goal; illustrate site-specific steps of a common procedure
Target audience	all system administrators in the organization
Structure	simple, consecutive steps; checklist; bullet points with terse additional information

This is probably the most common type of document you will have in your information repository. Without any further classification, pretty much anything you document will fall into this category; it is a broad definition of what most people think of when they think about system documentation. It is worth taking a closer look, as different types of process documentation exist and hence call for different formats or presentation.

Processes usually provide a description of what is done in a given situation, what the correct or suitable steps are to resolve a given problem or how a routine task is accomplished. These documents are generally focused on the practical side of the business or organization.

Procedures are focused slightly more on the operational side of things. They not so much describe what is to be done but list the actual commands to issue to yield a specific result. It is not uncommon to have well-documented procedures be turned into a “runbook”, a list of ordered steps to follow and commands to issue under specific circumstances. Carefully and correctly written, a runbook can frequently be used to let even inexperienced support staff respond to an emergency situation. The procedures listed usually include simple if-this-then-that directions with exit points to escalate the problem under certain circumstances. Furthermore, a good runbook usually makes for an excellent candidate for automation – more on that in Chapter 8.

Another type of document can be considered a subcategory of a process document: the ubiquitous *HOWTO*. Instructional descriptions of how to

accomplish a certain task generally skip any reasoning or justification of the ultimate goal and focus on the individual steps to reach it instead. Using simple sentences, itemized, or enumerated lists and often times including sample invocations and command output, this document will outline the details of each task, noting in particular how the environment in question may differ from those covered by other such guides.

When writing process and procedure documents, it is usually a good idea to include actual command invocations together with their complete output rather than to fabricate seemingly illustrative invocations. By using the exact commands that are applicable in the given environment we make it easy for the reader to follow the process as well as to find this document if they only remember a specific command related to the task at hand.

3.3.2 Policies

Purpose	establish standards surrounding the use of available resources
Target audience	all users of the given systems
Structure	full text, including description and rationale

Most people think of *policies* as lengthy documents full of footnotes and fine print, frequently drafted by your organization's legal or human resources departments. But there are a large number of necessary policies that are – or should be – written by (or with the help of) System Administrators, as they relate to and impact their work directly. In particular, computer related protocols such as the “Terms of Service” or Acceptable Use Policies (of the systems, not the software product(s) possibly offered to outside customers on said systems), various Service Level Agreements (SLAs), and information security guidelines represent an abstract description of practical implementations on the system side under the given circumstances.

Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to have such guidelines be drafted completely outside the functional or possible environment in which they need to be turned into action. In such cases, these policies become meaningless, as they are adhered to only in the letter, but not in the spirit – the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS) compliance is, sadly, a common example.

The documents governing the interactions with the customers or consumers must be specific, clear, and avoid loopholes. Hence, they should be written with the direct feedback and input from the people in charge of implementing the rules and regulations prescribed.

For an excellent and much more in-depth discussion of Computing Policy Documents, please see [2].

3.3.3 Online Help and Reference

Purpose	list and index available resources; illustrate common tasks; describe common problems and provide solutions
Target audience	all users of the given systems; possibly restricted set of privileged users (depending on the resources indexed)
Structure	simple catalog or itemization; short question-and-answer layout; simple sentences with example invocations

In this category you will find all the various documents provided by System Administrators, IT Support, Help Desk, and similar groups that are intended to allow users to find solutions to their problems without having to engage personal assistance. A common solution includes increasingly complex documents entitled “FAQ” (for “Frequently Asked Questions”).

When creating an FAQ compilation, it is important to focus on the questions your users *actually* ask, not the ones that you *think* they might ask. All too often these documents include answers to questions that are not, in fact, all that frequent, but that the author happened to have an answer to or would like the users to ask.

It should be noted that it may well be necessary to separate some of these documents for one audience from those provided to another. The references you provide to your peers may include privileged information, and the style in which you guide inexperienced users would be ill-suited to help your expert users find solutions to their problems. Once again, knowing your audience is key.

In addition, it is important to distinguish between *reference* material and

what might be called a “User Guide”. The latter is conceptual in nature; it might explain the nature of the problem and how it is solved. The former is terse, simple, and strictly limited to the available options; it does not elaborate on why things are the way they are, it merely presents the interface.

3.3.4 Infrastructure Architecture and Design

Purpose	describe in great detail the design of the infrastructure; illustrate and document information flow; <i>document reality</i>
Target audience	other system administrators in the organization
Structure	descriptive sentences with detailed diagrams; references to rationale and decision making process behind the designs

Among the most important sets in a System Administrator’s information repository are the infrastructure architecture and design documents. In these, the system architecture is described in great detail; they aim to provide an accurate representation of reality together with references to the rationale behind certain decisions.³

These records are meant to be authoritative and can be relied on to resolve disputes about what traffic may flow between security zones, to make decisions about where to place a new device, or to identify bottlenecks in throughput, to name just a few examples. Although the quality and accuracy of these documents ought to be a priority, all too often descriptions of the architecture or network are neglected to be updated, quietly drifting into obsolescence.

One of the reasons for this perpetual state of being outdated is the inherent complexity of the subject matter. Complex infrastructures are frequently described in complex, or worse, convoluted ways. Keep your content simple and to the point: you should be able to describe your network in a few straightforward sentences. If you feel yourself in need of numerous illustrations or lengthy explanations, break out larger components into less complex

³At times, this “reality” may, in fact, be a *desired* or *ideal* reality; it is important to explicitly note wherever this diverges from the actual architecture as implemented.

blocks, each documented individually.

3.3.5 Program Specification and Software Documentation

Purpose	describe a single software tool, its capabilities and limitations; illustrate common usage; provide pointers to additional information
Target audience	all users of the tool, inside or outside of the organization
Structure	short, simple, descriptive sentences; example invocations including sample output; possibly extended rationale and detailed description, command or syntax reference etc. via in-depth guide

One of the mistakes System Administrators tend to make is to not treat their tools as a complete software product. Software packages installed from third parties are often ridiculed or derided for having incomplete documentation or lacking examples, yet at the same time, our own little tools and shell scripts remain stashed away in our `~/bin` directory, possibly shared with colleagues. We will cover this topic in much more detail in Chapter 9, but let us consider how our expectations of other people's software differ from what we provide ourselves.

Every software package, every tool, every script, needs documentation. In addition to the generic information we might find on upstream vendors' websites such as where to download the software from, what users are in need of is practical examples. With the tools you have written yourself, you have the distinct advantage of knowing *precisely* the use cases most relevant to the users of the software, and so you should provide them.

I have made it a habit of creating a very simple "homepage" for every software tool I write. On it, I include a short summary of what the tool was designed to do, where in the revision control repository the sources can be found, where feature requests and bug reports can be filed, how the software can be installed, a pointer to the change log, and version history and last and certainly not least a number of example invocations with expected output. This information is also included in the project's repository in the form of a

README.

If the software in question becomes more complex, you may wish to reference additional documents, including pointers to the software architecture, the rationale for certain design decisions, a software specific FAQ etc.

3.4 Collaboration

Unlike other kinds of writing, creating and maintaining system documentation is not a solitary task. Instead, you collaborate with your colleagues to produce the most accurate information possible, and allowing end users to update at least some of the documents you provide has proven a good way to keep them engaged and improve the quality of your information repository.

Depending on the type of document, you may wish to choose a different method of enabling collaboration. Some documents should be treated as less flexible or mutable than others: for example, you probably do not want your customers be able to modify the SLAs you agreed to, but you *do* want to encourage your users to contribute use cases or corrections to your software documentation.

As Bertrand Meyer, creator of the Eiffel programming language, observed:

Incorrect documentation is often worse than no documentation.

For this reason, it is critical that you lower the barrier for collaboration and make it easy for others to contribute with corrections or updates. Carefully marking obsolete documents as such is similarly of importance, but also beware overeagerly removing “stale” content: being able to read up on historical design and architecture decisions can be invaluable even if the documents do not reflect the *current* state.

Documentation should be kept under some kind of revision control, much like software code is. Many different solutions exist, ranging from storing simple text or markup files in your own repository, to using a database backed “Wiki”, to hosting documents online using a cloud provider, to using e.g. Google Docs. Realistically, you will likely encounter a combination of all of the above. When choosing a solution, focus on these properties:

- Usability; how easy is it for you and your colleagues to edit the documents, to keep them up to date?

- Collaboration; how easy is it for others to make corrections, to comment on the content, to suggest and provide improvements?
- Revision Control; how easy is it to review a document's history, see what has changed between edits, see who made what changes when?
- Access Control; how easy is it for you to grant or deny access to individuals, teams, the organization, the public?
- Searchability; how easy is it for you and your users to discover the documents?

Whichever collaborative documentation solution you choose remember that the easier you make it for yourself, your colleagues and your users to create content, to keep it up to date and to correct even minor errors, the better your documentation will be. And with good documentation come happy users, fewer alerts, and significantly less stress for you.

3.5 Formats

Finally, a word on the format of your documentation. Be aware of how your users might read the documents you provide. Frequently, it is necessary to be able to search documents offline, to forward them via email, to link to them, or to copy and paste portions.

With that in mind, be mindful of the format in which you generate and present your information. System Administrators, heavily influenced by the Unix philosophy, are often partial to plain ASCII text or simple markup formatting.

To increase the readability of your documents use a short line-length and the copious use of paragraphs. Viewing a single large block of run-away text with no line breaks immediately puts stress on the reader, as absorbing the information provided therein requires a high degree of concentration and eye movement.

Breaking up your text into smaller paragraphs helps the reader relax and facilitates reading comprehension, speed, and ease. Write the text as you would read it out aloud, with paragraphs allowing the reader to catch their breath for a second.

If you are writing a longer technical document, you can further structure it using headlines, numbered sections, subsections etc. using different ways to

underline or emphasize the section titles. Similarly, you can use itemization, bulleted or numbered lists, or indentation to make your text easy to read.

Use short sentences, even (and especially) if you're German. Just like one single block of text is hard to read, so are never ending sentences with multiple conditionals and subclauses. You are not writing Molly Bloom's Soliloquy.

Use proper punctuation. A period will almost always suffice; semicolons may be used as needed, but exclamation points are rarely called for!

Resist the temptation to use images instead of text. If you are unable to distill the concepts or thoughts into language, then you have likely not fully understood the problem. Use illustrations as *supplementary*, not *instead of* information. Text ought to be your primary content: it can easily be skimmed, indexed and searched, glanced through in a matter of seconds, and parts of a paragraph be re-read with ease; a screencast or video, to cite an extreme example, must be watched one excruciating minute at a time (not to mention the challenges non-textual media pose to visually impaired users).

That's it - with the above advice in mind, you should find that you soon spend a lot more time on defining your thoughts and putting the important information forward rather than fiddling with font faces, sizes and colors.

And remember, if plain text is good enough for RFCs, the standards used to define the Internet and just about everything running on it, then it's quite likely going to be good enough for you.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Identify a tool or utility you use on a regular basis which does not have an adequate manual page. Write the fine manual! Submit it to the tool's author/maintainer.
2. Identify existing systems documentation in your environment. What is the documents' intended purpose, and do they meet that goal? What format are they in? Are they up to date and accurate? How and when are changes made?
3. Many Open Source projects also are transparent in the ways that their infrastructure is maintained and operated – identify a major project and review their documentation. Compare to how different companies present their best practices (for example on a company blog, in presentations at conferences, in articles about their infrastructure, ...). Does documentation play a significant role?

Bibliography

- [1] Thomas A. Limoncelli, *Time Management for System Administrators*, O'Reilly Media, 2005
- [2] Barbara L. Dijker (Editor), *Short Topics in System Administration: A Guide To Developing Computing Policy Documents*, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1996
- [3] William Strunk Jr., E. B. White, *The Elements of Style*, Longman, 4th Edition, 1999 (The original text is now in the public domain and available online, for example at <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37134> (visited January 23, 2017).)
- [4] Gerald J. Alred, Charles T. Brusaw, Walter E. Oliu, *The Handbook of Technical Writing*, St. Martin's Press, 8th edition, 2006
- [5] Mark Bauerlein, *Online Literacy Is a Lesser Kind*, The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 19, 2008; also available on the Internet at <http://greatlibrarynews.blogspot.com/2008/09/online-literacy-is-lesser-kind.html> (visited January 23, 2017)
- [6] Jakob Nielsen, *Writing for the Web*, miscellaneous papers and links; on the Internet at <http://www.useit.com/papers/webwriting/> (visited April 06, 2012)
- [7] Jan Schaumann, *The Art of Plain Text*; on the Internet at <https://www.netmeister.org/blog/the-art-of-plain-text.html> (visited January 28, 2016)

Part II

Fundamental Technologies and Concepts

A concept is stronger than a fact. – Charlotte Perkins Gilman

Having introduced the field of System Administration in the previous section, we will now focus on a number of important technologies and principles. System Administrators need to approach their job holistically; as discussed, a “system” is comprised of many different interdependent components and the maintenance of the complex whole requires an intricate understanding of each.

In this section, we will look at the (computer) system from the ground up; the chapters have a certain order and the materials in one chapter tend to build upon topics covered in those preceding it. However, as both an instructor or student, you are encouraged to work your way through this book in any order you like. To help you better find the topic that is right for your progress and pace, let us briefly summarize the chapters in this part.

To begin our presentation of fundamental concepts and technologies, we start with an overview of storage models, discuss the benefits, drawbacks, and properties of local storage devices, network storage, and even further abstracted cloud storage models. As if building a new machine, we start out at a fairly low level by understanding the physical disk structure and partitions. Next, we review the traditional UFS in some detail in order to illustrate general file system concepts.

Next, in Chapter 5, we cover software installation concepts. We divide the overall chapter into different sections, focusing on firmware, BIOS and operating system installation, system software, and the concept of the basic operating system (versus a kernel all by itself), and finally third party applications. We present different package management solutions, including binary- and source-based approaches and discuss patch management, software upgrades, and security audits.

Once we understand how software is installed and maintained on our systems, we will spend some time examining how to configure our systems for their different tasks and how to use centralized systems to ensure consistency across multiple and diverse environments. In Chapter 7, we will review the fundamental requirements a configuration management system has to meet, discuss architectural decisions and pay particular attention to their impact on scalability and security. This chapter touches upon a number of interesting aspects including, but not limited to, user management, access control, role definition, local or system-wide customizations, and eventually hints at what

has become known as “Service Orchestration”, a concept we will revisit later in Part III in Chapter 12.

Having seen the power of automating system and software deployment and having faced the vast amounts of data collected and processed, we will take a step back and review in detail the basic concepts of automating administrative tasks. In Chapters 8 and 9, we dive into the how, when and why of automation in general. Once again, we will build fundamental knowledge and understanding by reviewing *concepts* rather than explicit code excerpts. We will differentiate between “scripting”, “programming” and “software engineering”, and focus on the art of writing *simple* tools for use in a System Administrator’s daily life. In doing so, we will once again revisit a few topics from earlier in the book and deepen our understanding of (software) documentation and package management.

Following this, we discuss networking in Chapter 10. This chapter can be viewed as being entirely “out of order”, as virtually all previous topics in a way require or relate to working with a network. Within the context of System Administration, we begin our coverage of this significant topic by traversing the layers of the OSI stack. We include practical and detailed examples of how to analyze network traffic and how packets are transferred from one application to another on the other side of the internet. The discussions will cover both IPv4 and IPv6 equally and include the implications and possible caveats of networking with a dual stack.

The internet architecture and some governing standards bodies will also be covered here. Programs covering these topics in depth in pre-requisites may consider skipping this chapter, even though we believe to approach it from a unique angle, i.e. the System Administrator’s point of view.

The last chapter in Part II (Chapter 11) is entitled “System Security”. Like the previous chapter, it, too, feels a bit out of order: all previous chapters include specific security related notes and explicitly identify security concerns in any technology discussed, yet this chapter finally takes a step back and discusses security not from an application point of view, but from a general all-encompassing view. That is, we discuss the basic concepts of Risk Assessment and Risk Management, the different threat scenarios one might experience and how to best respond to them. We will cover basics of encryption and how it provides different layers of security via assurance of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. A second particular focus will be on balancing usability with security as well as the social implications of any instated security policy.

Having built a foundation of core concepts and technologies, we then enter Part III, where we discuss management of complex services by building upon the previous chapters. We will discuss different service architectures (e.g. monolithic vs. microservices), complexity implications and considerations, service orchestration and maintenance in Chapter 12; revisiting certain aspects of different file systems and storage devices, we cover the concepts relating to backups and disaster recovery in Chapter 13. We distinguish between backups for different use cases (prevent temporary data loss, long-term archival of data, file/file system integrity) and help students learn to develop an appropriate disaster recovery plan.

We will analyze the need for large scale system and event logging, which then ties directly into the area of system and network monitoring in Chapter 14. Here we will discuss the Simple Network Monitoring Protocol (SNMP) as well as a few industry standard tools built on this protocol and review how they can be used to measure metrics such as system response time, service availability, uptime, performance and throughput on an enterprise scale.

We will conclude our whirlwind tour across all the diverse areas of System Administration in Part IV, hinting at the fact that we really only have barely scratched the surface in many ways. We will outline major industry trends and developments that we did not have the time or space to include here in Chapter 15, before circling back to the definition of our profession in Chapters 16 and 17, where we elaborate on the legal and ethical obligations and considerations before we take a brief look at what might lie ahead.

As you can tell, each topic is far reaching, and we cannot possibly cover them all in every possible detail. For this reason, we focus not on specific examples but on the basic principles. Instructors should try to choose real-world examples from personal experience to illustrate some of these concepts in class, as we will present some case studies where appropriate. Students, on the other hand, are encouraged to relate the topic to their own experiences and to deepen research based on their interests.

Chapter 4

Of File Systems and Storage Models

*Disks are always full. It is futile to try to get more disk space.
Data expands to fill any void.* – Parkinson’s Law as applied to disks



4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals primarily with how we store data. Virtually all computer systems require some way to store data permanently; even so-called “diskless” systems do require access to certain files in order to boot, run and be useful. Albeit stored remotely (or in memory), these bits reside on some sort of storage system.

Most frequently, data is stored on local hard disks, but over the last few years more and more of our files have moved “into the cloud”, where different providers offer easy access to large amounts of storage over the network. We have more and more computers depending on access to remote systems, shifting our traditional view of what constitutes a storage device.

As system administrators, we are responsible for all kinds of devices: we build systems running entirely without local storage just as we maintain the massive enterprise storage arrays that enable decentralized data replication and archival. We manage large numbers of computers with their own hard drives, using a variety of technologies to maximize throughput before the data even gets onto a network.

In order to be able to optimize our systems on this level, it is important for us to understand the principal concepts of how data is stored, the different *storage models* and *disk interfaces*. It is important to be aware of certain physical properties of our storage media, and the impact they, as well as certain historic limitations, have on how we utilize disks.

Available storage space is, despite rapidly falling prices for traditional hard disk drives, a scarce resource¹. The quote at the beginning of this chapter is rather apt: no matter how much disk space we make available to our users, we will eventually run out and need to expand. In order to accommodate the ever-growing need for storage space, we use technologies such as Logical Volume Management to combine multiple physical devices in a flexible manner to present a single storage container to the operating system. We use techniques such as RAID to increase capacity, resilience, or performance (pick two!), and separate data from one another within one storage device using partitions. Finally, before we can actually use the disk devices to install an operating system or any other software, we create a file system on top of these partitions.

System administrators are expected to understand well all of these topics. Obviously, each one can (and does) easily fill many books; in this chapter, we will review the most important concepts underlying the different technologies from the bottom up to the file system level. At each point, we will compare and contrast traditional systems with recent developments, illustrating how the principles, even if applied differently, remain the same. For significantly deeper discussions and many more details, please see the chapter references, in particular the chapters on file systems in Silberschatz[8] and McKusick et al.'s canonical paper on the Berkeley Fast File System[9].

¹We will take a closer look at the *Total Cost of Ownership* of a hard drive in Chapter 13. Suffice it to say that the purchase price of the storage device itself is only a fraction.

4.2 Storage Models


We distinguish different storage models by how the device in charge of keeping the bits in place interacts with the higher layers: by where raw block device access is made available, by where a file system is created to make available the disk space as a useful unit, by which means and protocols the operating system accesses the file system. Somewhat simplified, we identify as the main three components the storage device itself, i.e. the actual medium; the file system, providing access to the block level storage media to the operating system; and finally the application software. The operating system managing the file system and running the application software then acts as the agent making actual I/O possible.

4.2.1 Direct Attached Storage

The by far most common way to access storage is so simple that we rarely think about it as a storage *model*: hard drives are attached (commonly via a host bus adapter and a few cables) directly to the server, the operating system detects the block devices and maintains a file system on them and thus allows for access with the smallest level of indirection. The vast majority of hosts (laptops, desktop and server systems alike) all utilize this method. The term used nowadays – *Direct Attached Storage (DAS)* – was effectively created only after other approaches became popular enough to require a simple differentiating name.

Figure 4.1a illustrates this model: all interfacing components are within the control of a single server’s operating system (and frequently located within the same physical case) and multiple servers each have their own storage system. On the hardware level, the storage media may be attached using a variety of technologies, and we have seen a number of confusing standards come and go over the years. The best choice here depends on many factors, including the number of devices to be attached, driver support for the connecting interface in the OS, and performance or reliability considerations. We will touch upon all of these aspects throughout this chapter.

A server with a single hard drive (such as the one shown in Figure 4.1b) is perhaps the simplest application of this model. But it is not uncommon for servers to have multiple direct attached devices, the configuration of which then depends entirely on the next higher level of storage strategies. Individual disks can simply be mounted in different locations of the file system hierarchy.



(a) Diagram



(b) A Maxtor IDE Drive

Figure 4.1: Direct Attached Storage

Alternatively, multiple direct attached disks can be combined to create a single logical storage unit through the use of a Logical Volume Manager (LVM) or a Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID). This allows for improved performance, increased amount of storage and/or redundancy. We will discuss these concepts in more detail in Section 4.4.

Direct attached storage need not be physically located in the same case (or even rack) as the server using it. That is, we differentiate between *internal* storage (media attached inside the server with no immediate external exposure) and *external* storage (media attached to a server's interface ports, such as Fibre Channel, USB etc.) with cables the lengths of which depend on the technology used. External media allows us to have large amounts of storage housed in a separate enclosure with its own power supply, possibly located several feet away from the server. If a server using these disks suffers a hardware failure, it becomes significantly easier to move the data to another host: all you need to do is connect the cable to the new server.

Simple as this architecture is, it is also ubiquitous. The advantages of DAS should be obvious: since there is no network or other additional layer in between the operating system and the hardware, the possibility of failure on that level is eliminated. Likewise, a performance penalty due to network latency, for example, is impossible. As system administrators, we frequently need to carefully eliminate possible causes of failures, so the fewer layers of

indirection we have between the operating system issuing I/O operations and the bits actually ending up on a storage medium, the better.

At the same time, there are some disadvantages. Since the storage media is, well, *directly* attached, it implies a certain isolation from other systems on the network. This is both an advantage as well as a drawback: on the one hand, each server requires certain data to be private or unique to its operating system; on the other hand, data on one machine cannot immediately be made available to other systems. This restriction is overcome with either one of the two storage models we will review next: *Network Attached Storage (NAS)* and *Storage Area Networks (SANs)*.

DAS can easily become a shared resource by letting the operating system make available a local storage device over the network. In fact, all network file servers and appliances ultimately are managing direct attached storage on behalf of their clients; DAS becomes a building block of *NAS*. Likewise, physically separate storage enclosures can function as DAS if connected directly to a server or may be combined with others and connected to network or storage fabric, that is: they become part of a *SAN*.²

4.2.2 Network Attached Storage

As the need for more and more data arises, we frequently want to be able to access certain data from multiple servers. An old and still very common example is to store all your users' data on shared disks that are made available to all clients over the network. When a user logs into `hostA`, she expects to find all her files in place just as when she logs into `hostB`. To make this magic happen, two things are required: (1) the host's file system has to know how to get the data from a central location and (2) the central storage has to be accessible over the network. As you can tell, this introduces a number of complex considerations, not the least of which are access control and performance.

For the moment, let us put aside these concerns, however, and look at the storage model from a purely architectural point of view: One host functions as the “file server”, while multiple clients access the file system over the network. The file server may be a general purpose Unix system or a special network appliance – either way, it provides access to a number of disks or

²Don't worry, the various acronyms seem confusing as they are introduced, but hardly anybody actually utters sentences containing more than one. One feels too silly doing so.




Figure 4.2: Three hosts using Network Attached Storage, or *NAS*

other storage media, which, within this system are effectively direct attached storage. In order for the clients to be able to use the server's file system remotely, they require support for (and have to be in agreement with) the protocols used³. However, the clients do not require access to the storage media on the block level; in fact, they *cannot* gain such access.

From the clients' perspective, the job of managing storage has become simpler: I/O operations are performed on the file system much as they would be on a local file system, with the complexity of how to shuffle the data over the network being handled in the protocol in question. This model is illustrated in Figure 4.2, albeit in a somewhat simplified manner: even though the file system is created on the file server, the clients still require support for the *network file system* that brokers the transaction performed locally with the file server.

³The most common protocols in use with network attached storage solution are NFS on the Unix side and SMB/CIFS on the Windows side. The *Apple Filing Protocol* (AFP) is still in use in some predominantly Mac OS environments, but Apple's adoption of Unix for their Mac OS X operating system made NFS more widespread there as well.

In contrast to DAS, a dedicated file server generally contains significantly more and larger disks; RAID or LVM may likewise be considered a requirement in this solution, so as to ensure both performance and failover. Given the additional overhead of transferring data over the network, it comes as no surprise that a certain performance penalty (mainly due to network speed or congestion) is incurred. Careful tuning of the operating system and in particular the network stack, the TCP window size, and the buffer cache can help minimize this cost.

The benefits of using a central file server for data storage are immediate and obvious: data is no longer restricted to a single physical or virtual host and can be accessed (simultaneously) by multiple clients. By pooling larger resources in a dedicated NAS device, more storage becomes available.

Other than the performance impact we mentioned above, the distinct disadvantage lies in the fact that the data becomes unavailable if the network connection suffers a disruption. In many environments, the network connection can be considered sufficiently reliable and persistent to alleviate this concern. However, such solutions are less suitable for mobile clients, such as laptops or mobile devices, which frequently may disconnect from and reconnect to different networks. Recent developments in the area of *Cloud Storage* have provided a number of solutions (see Section 4.2.4), but it should be noted that mitigation can also be found in certain older network file systems and protocols: the *Andrew File System (AFS)*, for example, uses a local caching mechanism that lets it cope with the temporary loss of connectivity without blocking.

While network attached storage is most frequently used for large, shared partitions or data resources, it is possible to boot and run a server entirely without any direct attached storage. In this case, the entire file system, operating system kernel and user data may reside on the network. We touch on this special setup in future chapters.

4.2.3 Storage Area Networks

Network Attached Storage (NAS) allows multiple clients to access the same file system over the network, but that means it requires all clients to use specifically this file system. The NAS file server manages and handles the creation of the file systems on the storage media and allows for shared access, overcoming many limitations of direct attached storage. At the same time, however, and especially as we scale up, our requirements with respect to




Figure 4.3: NAS and SAN Hardware

NAS and SAN enterprise hardware. On the left, Huawei storage servers with 24 hard drives each and built-in hardware RAID controllers; on the right, a NetApp Fabric Attached Storage device, also known as a “filer” with disk enclosures commonly referred to as “shelves”.

storage size, data availability, data redundancy, and performance, it becomes desirable to allow different clients to access large chunks of storage on a block level. To accomplish this, we build high performance networks specifically dedicated to the management of data storage: *Storage Area Networks*.

In these dedicated networks, central storage media is accessed using high performance interfaces and protocols such as *Fibre Channel* or *iSCSI*, making the exposed devices appear local on the clients. As you can tell, the boundaries between these storage models are not rigid: a single storage device connected via Fibre Channel to a single host (i.e. an example of DAS) is indistinguishable (to the client) from a dedicated storage device made available over a Storage Area Network (SAN). In fact, today’s network file servers frequently manage storage made available to them over a SAN to export a file system to the clients as NAS.

Figure 4.4 illustrates how the storage volumes managed within a SAN can be accessed by one host as if it was direct attached storage while other parts are made available via a file server as NAS to different clients. In order for the




Figure 4.4: A SAN providing access to three devices; one host accesses parts of the available storage as if it was DAS, while a file server manages other parts as NAS for two clients.

different consumers in a SAN to be able to independently address the distinct storage units, each is identified by a unique *Logical Unit Number (LUN)*. The system administrator combines the individual disks via RAID, for example, into separate volumes; assigning to each storage unit an independent LUN allows for correct identification by the clients and prevents access of data by unauthorized servers, an important security mechanism. Fibre Channel switches used in SANs allow further partitioning of the fabric by LUNs and subdivision into SAN Zones, allowing sets of clients specifically access to “their” storage device only.

In this storage model the clients – the computers, file servers or other devices directly attached to the SAN – are managing the volumes on a block level (much like a physical disk, as discussed in Section 4.3.1). That is, they

need to create a logical structure on top of the block devices (as which the SAN units appear), and they control all aspects of the I/O operations down to the protocol. With this low-level access, clients can treat the storage like any other device. In particular, they can boot off SAN attached devices, they can partition the volumes, create different file systems for different purposes on them and export them via other protocols.

Storage area networks are frequently labeled an “enterprise solution” due to their significant performance advantages and distributed nature. Especially when used in a switched fabric, additional resources can easily be made available to all or a subset of clients. These networks utilize the *Small Computer System Interface (SCSI)* protocol for communications between the different devices; in order to build a network on top of this, an additional protocol layer – the *Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP)* being the most common one – is required. We will review the various protocols and interfaces in Section 4.3.

SANs overcome their restriction to a *local* area network by further encapsulation of the protocol: *Fibre Channel over Ethernet (FCoE)* or *iSCSI*, for example, allow connecting switched SAN components across a Wide Area Network (or WAN). But the concept of network attached storage devices facilitating access to a larger storage area network becomes less accurate when end users require access to their data from anywhere on the Internet. Cloud storage solutions have been developed to address these needs. However, as we take a closer look at these technologies, it is important to remember that at the end of the day, somewhere a system administrator is in charge of making available the actual physical storage devices underlying these solutions. Much like a file server may provide NAS to its clients over a SAN, so do cloud storage solutions provide access on “enterprise scale” (and at this size the use of these words finally seems apt) based on the foundation of the technologies we discussed up to here.

4.2.4 Cloud Storage

In the previous sections we have looked at storage models that ranged from the very simple and very local to a more abstracted and distributed approach, to a solution that allows access across even a Wide Area Network (WAN). At each step, we have introduced additional layers of indirection with the added benefit of being able to accommodate larger requirements: more clients, more disk space, increased redundancy, etc.

We also have come full circle from direct attached storage providing block-level access, to distributed file systems, and then back around to block-level access over a dedicated storage network. But this restricts access to clients on this specific network. As more and more (especially smaller or mid-sized) companies are moving away from maintaining their own infrastructure towards a model of *Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)* and Cloud Computing, the storage requirements change significantly, and we enter the area of *Cloud Storage*⁴.

The term “cloud storage” still has a number of conflicting or surprisingly different meanings. On the one hand, we have commercial services offering *file hosting* or *file storage* services; common well-known providers currently include Dropbox, Google Drive, Apple’s iCloud and Microsoft’s SkyDrive. These services offer customers a way to not only store their files, but to access them from different devices and locations: they effectively provide network attached storage over the largest of WANs, the Internet.

On the other hand we have companies in need of a more flexible storage solutions than can be provided with the existing models. Especially the increased use of virtualization technologies demands faster and more flexible access to reliable, persistent yet relocatable storage devices. In order to meet these requirements, storage units are rapidly allocated from large storage area networks spanning entire data centers.

Since the different interpretations of the meaning of “cloud storage” yield significantly different requirements, the implementations naturally vary, and there are no current industry standards defining an architecture. As such, we are forced to treat each product independently as a black box; system administrators and architects may choose to use any number of combinations of the previously discussed models to provide the storage foundation upon which the final solution is built.

We define three distinct categories within this storage model: (1) services that provide file system level access as in the case of file hosting services such as those mentioned above; (2) services that provide access on the *object level*, hiding file system implementation details from the client and providing for easier abstraction into an API and commonly accessed via web services⁵ such

⁴Large companies are of course also moving towards *IaaS*, only they frequently are the ones simultaneously consuming as well as *providing* the service, either internally or to outside customers.

⁵“Web services” generally expose an API over HTTP or HTTPS using REpresentational State Transfer (REST) or the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP).




Figure 4.5: A possible cloud storage model: an internal SAN is made available over the Internet to multiple clients. In this example, the storage provider effectively functions as a NAS server, though it should generally be treated as a black box.

as Amazon's Simple Storage Service (S3), or Windows Azure's *Blob* Storage; and (3) services that offer clients access on the block level, allowing them to create file systems and partitions as they see fit (examples include Amazon's Elastic Block Store (EBS) and OpenStack's *Cinder* service).

All of these categories have one thing in common, however. In order to provide the ability of accessing storage units in a programmatic way – a fundamental requirement to enable the flexibility needed in demanding environments – they rely on a clearly specified API. Multiple distributed resources are combined to present a large storage pool, from which units are allocated, de-allocated, re-allocated, relocated, and duplicated, all by way of higher-level programs using well-defined interfaces to the lower-level storage systems.

Customers of cloud storage solution providers reap a wealth of benefits, including: their infrastructure is simplified through the elimination of storage components; storage units are almost immediately made available *as needed* and can grow or shrink according to immediate or predicted usage patterns;

applications and entire OS images can easily be deployed, imported or exported as virtual appliances.

Of course these benefits carry a cost. As usual, any time we add layers of abstraction we also run the risk of increasing, possibly exponentially, the number of ways in which a system can fail. Cloud storage is no exception: by relying on abstracted storage containers from a third-party provider, we remove the ability to troubleshoot a system end-to-end; by outsourcing data storage, we invite a number of security concerns regarding data safety and privacy; by accessing files over the Internet, we may increase latency and decrease throughput; the cloud service provider may become a single point of failure for our systems, one that is entirely outside our control.

4.2.5 Storage Model Considerations

As we have seen in the previous sections, the larger we grow our storage requirements, the more complex the architecture grows. It is important to keep this in mind: even though added layers of abstraction and indirection help us scale our infrastructure, the added complexity has potentially exponential costs. The more moving parts a system has, the more likely it is to break, and the more spectacular its failure will be.

A single bad hard drive is easy to replace; rebuilding the storage array underneath hundreds of clients much less so. The more clients we have, the more important it is to build our storage solution for redundancy as well as reliability and resilience.

System administrators need to understand all of the storage models we discussed, as they are intertwined: DAS must eventually underly any storage solution, since the bits do have to be stored *somewhere* after all; the concepts of NAS permeate any infrastructure spanning more than just a few work stations, and SANs and cloud storage combine DAS and NAS in different ways to make storage available over complex networks.

At each layer, we introduce security risks, of which we need to be aware: any time bits are transferred over a network, we need to consider the integrity and privacy of the files: who has access, who should have access, how is the access granted, how are clients authenticated, and so on. NAS and SAN solutions tend to ignore many of these implications and work under the assumption that the network, over which the devices are accessed, are “secure”; access controls are implemented on a higher layer such as the implementation of the file system. Often times, access to the network in question implies



Figure 4.6: An open PATA (or IDE) hard drive (left) and a Solid State Drive (right). The HDD shows the rotating disk platters, the read-write head with its motor, the disk controller and the recognizable connector socket.

access to the shared storage, even though layer-2 security mechanisms such as IPsec may be combined with or integrated into the solution. Cloud storage, on the other hand, has to directly address the problem of transmitting data and providing access over untrusted networks and thus usually relies on application layer protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

We will touch on some of these aspects in future sections and chapters, but you should keep them in mind as you evaluate different solutions for different use cases. As we will see, in most cases the simpler model turns out to be the more scalable and more secure one as well, so beware adding unneeded layers of complexity!

4.3 Disk Devices and Interfaces

The different storage models we discussed in the previous sections are just a means to access the storage devices in order to, well, store our data. Devices or media used to store data include tape drives (for use with magnetic tape), optical media such as CDs, various non-volatile memory based devices such as flash drives, DRAM-based storage, and of course the hard-disk drive (HDD).

Even though Solid State Drive (SDD) offer significant advantages such as

lower power consumption and generally higher performance, the dominant medium in use especially in enterprise scale storage solutions remains the ubiquitous hard drive⁶, storing data on rotating, magnetic platters (see Figure 4.6a). Understanding the physical structure of these traditional storage devices is important for a system administrator, as the principles of especially the addressing modes and partition schemas used here come into play when we look at how file systems manage data efficiently.

Hard drives can be made available to a server in a variety of ways. Individual disks are connected directly to a Host Bus Adapter (HBA) using a single data/control cable and a separate power cable. The traditional interfaces here are SCSI, PATA and SATA, as well as Fibre Channel.

SCSI, the *Small Computer System Interface*, has been around for over 25 years and has seen a large number of confusing implementations and standards⁷. Once the default method to connect any peripheral device using long, wide and generally unwieldy ribbon cables, SCSI has now been largely obsoleted by the *Advanced Technology Attachment* (ATA) standards. At the same time, however, it lives on in the *Internet Small Computer System Interface* (*iSCSI*), a standard specifying storage connections using the SCSI command protocol over IP-based networks. iSCSI is a common choice in storage area networks; as it uses TCP/IP over existing networks, it does not require a dedicated storage network as is the case in traditional Fibre Channel SANs.

The *Parallel Advanced Technology Attachment* (*PATA*) standard, also frequently referred to as IDE (for *Integrated Device Electronics*, a reference to the fact that the drive controller is included in the hard drive), uses a 40 or 80 wire ribbon cable and allows for a maximum number of two devices on the connector (traditionally referred to as the *master* and *slave*; this is often a source of confusion, as neither device takes control or precedence over the other).

Faster throughput, smaller cables and support for hot-swapping, i.e. the ability to replace a drive without having to shut down the operating system⁸,

⁶Despite declining prices for SSDs, as of 2012 traditional hard drives remain notably cheaper than SSDs and have higher storage capacity.

⁷Different SCSI versions include such wonderful variations as *Fast SCSI*, *Fast Wide SCSI*, *Ultra SCSI*, and *Wide Ultra SCSI*. None of which are to be confused with *iSCSI*, of course.

⁸Hot-swapping was a standard feature in many SCSI implementations. Many system administrators in charge of the more powerful servers, using larger and more performant

were some of the advantages provided by the *Serial ATA* (SATA) interface. A number of revisions and updates to the standard added more advanced features and, most significantly, increasingly greater transfer speeds.

Most motherboards have integrated ATA host adapters, but a server can be extended with additional HBAs via, for example, its PCI Express expansion slots; similarly, dedicated storage appliances make use of disk array controllers to combine multiple drives into logical units (more on that in Section 4.4). Fibre Channel HBAs finally allow a server to connect to a dedicated Fibre Channel SAN. All of these interfaces can be either internal (the devices connected to the bus are housed within the same physical enclosure as the server) or external (the devices are entirely separate of the server, racked and powered independently and connected with suitable cables). In the end, consider a host with a large amount of DAS and a NAS server managing multiple terabytes of file space which is housed in a separate device and which it accesses over a SAN: the main difference lies not in the technologies and protocols used, but in how they are combined.

Hands-on Hardware



I have found it useful to have actual hardware in class whenever possible. In the past, I have brought with me different hard drives by different manufacturers and with different interfaces (PATA, SATA, SCSI); in particular, showing students the inside of a hard drive, the rotating platters and the read-write arms has served as a great illustration of the performance limiting factors, such as rotational latency, seek time etc. Especially old and by now possibly obsolete hardware and the contrast in which it stands to modern solutions is always investigated with great interest.

Likewise, a large variety of cables, connectors and adapters help illustrate the different standards and allow students to connect what they may have seen or used themselves to what we talk about in class. (See also: Problem 4)

SCSI drives when compared to the individual workstations at the time, were rather fond of this: when a disk failed, it could be replaced without scheduling downtime for *all* services.

4.3.1 Physical Disk Structure

Let us open up a typical hard drive and take a look at the physical structure. This will help us better understand the concepts of partitions, how the operating system calculates the disk geometry and allocates physical blocks, how the file system manages cylinder groups, and why, for example, storing data on the outer disk blocks could improve performance.

If you open a traditional hard-disk drive and manage not to destroy it completely in the process, you will look at a number of magnetic platters on a spindle together with the read-write heads. The other main components include the disk motor (spinning the platters), an actuator (moving the read-write heads) and the disk controller.

The platters are coated on both surfaces with magnetic particles, allowing us to store on (and retrieve off) them data in the form of zeros and ones by polarizing the relevant area. The read-write heads – one for each platter surface – may be resting on the *landing zone* near the spindle; they do not touch the platters when they are rotating. Instead, they hover just above the platters and are moved radially across the disks by the actuator to position them at the desired location. If the read-write heads are brought into contact with the spinning platters, the results tend to be rather disastrous, as the magnetic surface of the disk is damaged by this *head crash*.

The surface of each platter is divided into concentric rings, or *tracks*. Congruent tracks on multiple platters form a three-dimensional *cylinder*. Within a single cylinder, data can be read from all available surfaces without requiring the read-write heads to move. This is why *disk partitions* comprise multiple cylinder groups rather than, as we may sometimes imagine them to be, pie wedges.

The tracks on each platter are in turn divided into a number of *sectors*. If you were to divide a disk with concentric tracks by drawing straight lines from the center to the outer edge, you would quickly realize that even though you end up with the same number of such sectors on each track, the fields created in this manner would be of varying sizes: the ones on the outer edge would be significantly larger than the ones in the middle of the disc (see Figures 4.7a and 4.7b).

As these fields represent the smallest addressable unit on a hard drive, we would be wasting a lot of disk space. Instead, each sector is kept at a fixed size⁹ and use a technique known as *Zone Bit Recording* to store more

⁹The industry standard for hard drives used to be 512 bytes for many years; since




Figure 4.7: On the left: Illustration of tracks and sectors on a hard disk. Note that for simplicity, sectors on the inside and outside of the platters are of identical size. On disks with Zone Bit Recording (shown on the right), this is no longer the case.

sectors on the outer tracks of each disc than on the inner area.

The total number of 512 byte sectors across all platters of the hard drive thus define its total capacity. In order to access each storage unit, the read-write head needs to be moved radially to the correct cylinder – a process we call *seeking* – and the platter then spun until the correct sector is positioned under it. In the worst case scenario, we just passed the sector we wish to access and we have to perform a full rotation. Therefore, a drive’s performance is largely defined by this *rotational latency* and the time to position the read-write head (also known as *seek time*).

Since the motor of a drive may rotate the discs at a constant linear velocity (versus constant angular velocity), the discs are in fact moving slower near the spindle than on the outer part. This means that more sectors could be read in a given time frame from the outside of the discs than from the inside. In fact, it used to be not uncommon for system administrators to partition their disks such that large, frequently accessed files would reside on

around 2010, a number of vendors have started creating hard drives with a physical block size of 4096 bytes. Interestingly, file systems having standardized on 512 byte blocks tend to divide these blocks and continue to present to the OS 512 byte “physical” blocks.

cylinders near the beginning (i.e. the outside) of the platters. Nowadays such fine tuning may no longer be common, but instead people have started to simply create a single partition occupying only about 25% of the disk at the beginning and ignoring the rest. This technique, known as “*short stroking*”, may seem wasteful, but the performance gain compared to the cheap prices of today’s HDDs may make it actually worthwhile.

It is worth noting that the physical disk structure described here applies only to traditional mechanical hard drives, not to Solid State Drives or other storage media. Nevertheless, it is useful to understand the structure, as a number of file system or partitioning conventions derive directly from these physical restrictions.

True Hard Drive Capacity



Hard drive manufacturers use a different definition of what constitutes a Gigabyte than is customary pretty much anywhere else: normally, we define computer storage in terms of powers of two. That is, a kilobyte is commonly understood to be 2^{10} bytes, a megabyte 2^{20} and a gigabyte 2^{30} . In contrast, the standard prefix *giga* means 10^9 , and hard drive manufacturers use this meaning. Some people differentiate between these conflicting definitions by using the term *Gibibyte* (GiB) for 2^{30} bytes, but even though technically correct, this term has never really caught on.

As a result, a drive labeled as having a capacity of 500 GB will in fact only be able to store around 465 GiB. The larger the drive, the bigger the difference - at 1TB (2^{40} versus 10^{12}), you are getting a full 10% less storage than advertized!

4.4 Dividing and Combining Disks

Disk space is a finite and fixed resource. Each hard drive we purchase has a given capacity, and it is up to the system administrators to use it efficiently. In this section, we will take a look at the different methods to provide the optimal amount of storage space to your systems. Sometimes this involves dividing a single hard drive into multiple partitions; other times, we want to combine multiple hard drives to increase capacity, yet retain a logical

view of the storage space as a single unit. Finally, the ways in which we divide or combine disks have implications on system performance and data redundancy.

4.4.1 Partitions

Now that we understand the physical layout of the hard disks, we can take a look at how we *partitions* are created and used. As we noted in the previous section, a disk partition is a grouping of adjacent cylinders through all platters of a hard drive¹⁰. Despite this unifying principle, we encounter a variety of partition types and an abundance of related terminology: there are *partition tables* and *disklables*, *primary* and *extended* partitions; there are whole-disk partitions, disks with multiple partitions, and some of the partitions on a disk may even overlap.

Different file systems and anticipated uses of the data on a disk require different kinds of partitions. First, in order for a disk to be bootable, we require it to have a *boot sector*, a small region that contains the code that the computer’s firmware (such as the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)) can load into memory. In fact, this is precisely what a BIOS does: it runs whatever code it finds in the first sector of the device so long as it matches a very simple boot signature. That is, regardless of the total capacity of the disk in question, the code that chooses how or what to boot needs to fit into a single sector, 512 bytes. On most commodity servers¹¹, this code is known as the *Master Boot Record* or MBR. In a classical MBR the last two bytes of this sector contain the signature `0x55 0xAA`; bootstrap code area itself takes up 446 bytes, leaving 64 bytes of space. At 16 bytes per partition entry, we can have at most four such *BIOS partitions* that the MBR can transfer control to.

Sometimes you may want to divide the available disk space into more than four partitions. In order to accomplish this, instead of four *primary*

¹⁰Some operating systems such as Solaris, for example, have traditionally referred to partitions as “slices”; some of the BSD systems also refer to disk “slices” within the context of *BIOS partitions*. Unfortunately, this easily brings to mind the misleading image of a slice of pie, a wedge, which misrepresents how partitions are actually laid out on the disk.

¹¹Even though many other hardware architectures used to be dominant in the server market, nowadays the *x86* instruction set (also known as “IBM PC-compatible” computers) has replaced most other systems. For simplicity’s sake, we will assume this architecture throughout this chapter.

```
# fdisk -l
Disk /dev/cciss/c0d0: 73.3 GB, 73372631040 bytes
255 heads, 63 sectors/track, 8920 cylinders
Units = cylinders of 16065 * 512 = 8225280 bytes

      Device Boot Start   End   Blocks Id System
/dev/cciss/c0d0p1 *      1 2550 20482843+ 83 Linux
/dev/cciss/c0d0p2          2551 7649 40957717+ 83 Linux
/dev/cciss/c0d0p3          7650 7904 2048287+ 82 Linux swap
#
```

Listing 4.1: fdisk(8) sample invocation and output on a Linux system

partitions, the Master Boot Record (MBR) allows you to specify three primary and one so-called *extended* partition, which can be subdivided further as needed. When the system boots, the BIOS will load the MBR code, which searches its partition table for an “active” partition, from which it will then load and execute the boot block. This allows the user to run multiple operating systems from the same physical hard drive, for example. BIOS partitions are usually created or maintained using the `fdisk(8)` utility.

Disk and BIOS Limitations

 In order to address sectors of a hard drive, computers used the *Cylinder-Head-Sector (CHS)* scheme. Early BIOSes were only able to address 1024 cylinders, 256 heads and 63 sectors/track. At the same time, the ATA specification for IDE disks defined a limit of 65536 cylinders, 16 heads, and 256 sectors. As a result, the lowest common denominator required addressing – and thus total disk sizes – to be limited to:

$$1024(\text{cylinders}) * 16(\text{heads}) * 63(\text{sectors}) * 512(\text{bytes/sector}) = 504MB$$

Enhanced BIOSes removed some of these limitations, allowing for disks with an at that time impressive size of approximately 8 GB ($1024 * 255 * 63 * 512$). But they were only able to access the first 1024 cylinders of a disk. This meant that all the files required to boot the OS (which then might be able to address more disk space) had to reside within these cylinders. As a result, many Unix systems have a default

partitioning scheme including a small `/boot` partition created at the beginning of the disk.

To overcome the limitations of CHS addressing, data blocks on the disks were simply numbered and counted, yielding *Logical Block Addressing (LBA)*. Using this method, IDE disks could thus address however many blocks it could store in the data type it used for this purpose; the ATA specification used 28 bits, and thus imposed a limit of $(2^{28} \text{ sectors} * 512 \text{ bytes/sector}) / 1024^3 \text{ bytes/GB} = 128 \text{ GB}$ (or 137.4 GiB at 10^9 bytes/GiB).

In 2012, the current ATA/ATAPI specification uses 48 bits, limiting disk size to 128 Petabytes (PB); however, some operating systems still use 32 bits to address sectors, so that on those systems the largest supported disk size is 2 Terabyte (TB), yet another limitation we now run into and which may seem laughably small in just a few years.

Just as the first sector of the disk contains the MBR, so does the first sector of a BIOS partition contain a *volume boot record*, also known as a *partition boot sector*. In this sector, the system administrator may have placed a second-stage bootloader, a small program that allows the user some control over the boot process by providing, for example, a selection of different kernels or boot options to choose from. Only one partition is necessary to boot the OS, but this partition needs to contain all the libraries and executables to bootstrap the system. Any additional partitions are made available to the OS at different points during the boot process.

In the BSD family of operating systems, the volume boot record contains a *disklabel*, detailed information about the geometry of the disk and the partitions it is divided into. Listing 4.2 shows the output of the `disklabel(8)` command on a NetBSD system. You can see the breakdown of the disk's geometry by cylinders, sectors and tracks and the partitioning of the disk space by sector boundaries. This example shows a 40 GB¹² disk containing three partitions, a 10 GB root partition, a 512 MB swap partition and a data partition comprising the remainder of the disk. Since the disk in question

¹² $(78140160 \text{ sectors} * 512 \text{ bytes/sector}) / (1024^3 \text{ bytes/GB}) = 37.26 \text{ GB}$

Note the difference in actual versus reported disk size:
 $(40 * 2^{30} - 40 * 10^9) / (1024^3) = 40 - 37.26 = 2.74$

```
# dmesg | grep xbd3
xbd3 at xenbus0 id 3: Xen Virtual Block Device Interface
xbd3: 24575 MB, 512 bytes/sect x 50331520 sectors
# disklabel /dev/xbd3
type: ESDI
disk: Universal Swap
label: disk1
bytes/sector: 512
sectors/track: 306432
tracks/cylinder: 1
sectors/cylinder: 306432
cylinders: 255
total sectors: 78140160
rpm: 3600
interleave: 1

8 partitions:
#      size    offset ftype [ fsize bsize cpg/sgs]
a: 20972385       63 4.2BSD   4096 32768     1180 # (Cyl.      0*- 20805)
b: 1048320 20972448 swap                  # (Cyl. 20806 - 21845)
c: 78140097       63 unused      0      0 # (Cyl.      0*- 77519)
d: 78140160        0 unused      0      0 # (Cyl.      0 - 77519)
e: 56119392 22020768 4.2BSD   4096 32768    58528 # (Cyl. 21846 - 77519)
#
```

Listing 4.2: disklabel(8) invocation and output on a NetBSD system

is actually a virtual disk, the information reported relating to the hardware, such as the `rpm` rate, for example, is obviously wrong and should be ignored. This serves as a reminder that a system administrator always may need to have additional background knowledge (“this host is a virtual machine with a virtual disk”) to fully understand the output of her tools in order to make sense of it. Note also that some partitions overlap. This is not a mistake: the BSD disklabel includes information about both the entire disk (partition ‘`d`’) as well as the BIOS partition assigned to NetBSD (partition ‘`c`’, starting at offset 63). Other partitions, i.e. partitions actually used by the OS, should *not* overlap.

Being able to read and understand the detailed output of these commands is important, and students are encouraged to practice making sense of different partition schemas across different operating systems (see exercise 5).

Dividing a single large disk into multiple smaller partitions is done for a number of good reasons: if you wish to install multiple operating systems, for example, you need to have dedicated disk space as well as a bootable primary partition for each OS. You may also use partitions to ensure that data written

to one location (log files, for example, commonly stored under e.g. `/var/log`) cannot cause you to run out of disk space in another (such as user data under `/home`). Other reasons to create different partitions frequently involve the choice of file system or mount options, which necessarily can be applied only on a per-partition basis. We will discuss a number of examples in Section 4.5.

4.4.2 Logical Volumes

Using hard drives with fixed partitions may lead to a number of problems: disk drives are prone to hardware failure, which may lead to data loss; reading data from individual disk drives may suffer performance penalties depending on the location of the data on the disk; and, perhaps most notably, disks are never large enough.

Partitions are a good way to divide a single disk and make available to the OS smaller, distinct units of storage. But throughout the life time of our systems, we frequently have a need to *increase* storage space – consider the quote from the beginning of this chapter: “*Data expands to fill any void.*” We can buy a larger hard drive and add it to the system and then migrate data to it or simply mount it in a separate location¹³, but neither solution is particularly elegant. The problem here is that partitions are fixed in size throughout their life time. Wouldn’t it be nice if we could simply combine the storage from multiple disk drives and then create partitions spanning the total?

Enter *logical volumes*. Much like a SAN may combine multiple storage devices and make them available to its clients, so does a logical volume manager (or LVM) combine multiple physical devices and present them to the OS as a single resource. In this case, the abstraction occurs on the device-driver level; some advanced file systems may include aspects of an LVM (see ZFS’s `zpool(1)` command, for example).

The management of the locally attached storage devices via so-called *logical volume groups* grants the system administrator a significant amount of flexibility: the total storage space can easily be extended (and the file system, if it supports this operation, grown!) by adding new disk drives to the pool; file system performance can be improved by *striping* data across all available drives; data redundancy and fault tolerance can be improved by *mirroring*

¹³An approach aptly described as “JBOD”: “Just a Bunch Of Disks”.




Figure 4.8: Logical Volume Management lets you combine multiple physical disks or partitions into a single *volume group*, from which *logical volumes* can be allocated.

data on multiple devices. These last two advantages are also provided by the RAID storage solution, which we will look at in more detail in the following section.

LVMs manage and combine three distinct resources, as illustrated in Figure 4.8: *physical volumes*, *logical volume groups* and *logical volumes*. A physical volume can be a hard disk, a partition on a hard disk, or a logical unit number of a local or remote device (such as SAN connected storage device). The LVM divides the physical volumes into data blocks, so-called *physical extents*, and allows the system administrator to group one or more of these physical volumes into a logical volume group. In effect, available storage space is combined into a pool, where resources can dynamically be added or removed. Out of such a volume group, individual logical volumes can then be created, which in turn are divided into the equivalent of a hard disk's sectors, so-called *logical extents*. This step of dividing a logical volume group into logical volumes is conceptually equivalent to the division of a single hard drive into multiple partitions; in a way, you can think of a logical volume as a virtual disk. To the operating system, the resulting device looks and behaves just like any disk device: it can be partitioned, and new file systems can be created on them just like on regular hard drive disks.

By creating logical extents as storage units on the logical volumes, the LVM is able to grow or shrink them with ease (the data corresponding to the logical extends can easily be copied to different physical extents and remapped), as well as implement data mirroring (where a single logical extent maps to multiple physical extents).

Since logical volume management is a software solution providing an additional layer of abstraction between the storage device and the file system, it can provide additional features both on the lower level, such as data mirroring or striping, as well as on a higher level, such as file system snapshots, which an LVM can easily implement using a “copy-on-write” approach when updating the logical extents. We will discuss this topic in more detail in our chapter on backups in Section 13.1.

Note that some of the desirable features of logical volume management are not entirely independent of the higher file system layer. For example, a change in size of the logical volumes requires the file system to adapt, and growing a file system to expand to consume additional disk space is often easier than shrinking the file system. Hence, the choice to use an LVM needs to be coupled with the “right” file system!

4.4.3 RAID

Logical Volume Managers provide a good way to consolidate multiple disks into a single large storage resource from which individual volumes can be created. An LVM may also provide a performance boost by striping data, or redundancy by mirroring data across multiple drives.

Another popular storage technology used for these purposes is *RAID*, which stands for *Redundant Array of Independent Disks*¹⁴. Multiple disks can be combined in a number of ways to accomplish one or more of these goals: (1) increased total disk space, (2) increased performance, (3) increased data redundancy.

Much like an LVM, RAID as well hides the complexity of the management of these devices from the OS and simply presents a virtual disk comprised of multiple physical devices. However, unlike with logical volume manage-

¹⁴The acronym “RAID” is sometimes expanded as “Redundant Array of *Inexpensive Disks*”; since disks have become less and less expensive over time, it has become more customary to stress the “independent” part. A cynic might suggest that this change in terminology was driven by manufacturers, who have an interest in not explicitly promising a low price.

ment, a RAID configuration cannot be expanded or shrunk without data loss. Furthermore, an LVM is a software solution; RAID can be implemented on either the software or the hardware layer. In a hardware RAID solution, a dedicated disk array controller (such as a PCI card) is installed in the server, and interacted with via controlling firmware or host-level client tools. As a software implementation, an LVM may provide RAID capabilities, as may certain file systems. *ZFS*, originally developed at Sun Microsystems, for example, includes subsystems that provide logical volume management and offer RAID capabilities, as does Linux's *Btrfs*.

When combining disks in a RAID configuration, the system administrator has to carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of the available options, so-called *RAID levels*, where performance, redundancy, and efficiency of disk usage need to be weighed. The common RAID levels are summarized in Table 4.1 (although many more combinations and obscure levels exist); the by far most popular levels are: *RAID 0*, *RAID 1* and *RAID 5*.

RAID 0	Striped array (block level), no parity or mirroring
RAID 1	Mirrored array, no parity or striping
RAID 2	Striped array (bit level) with dedicated parity
RAID 3	Striped array (byte level) with dedicated parity
RAID 4	Striped array (block level) with dedicated parity
RAID 5	Striped array (block level) with distributed parity
RAID 6	Striped array (block level) with double distributed parity

Table 4.1: A brief summary of standard RAID levels.

RAID 0

By writing data blocks in parallel across all available disks (see Figure 4.9a), RAID 0 accomplishes a significant performance increase. At the same time, available disk space is linearly increased (i.e. two 500 GB drives yield 1 TB of disk space, minus overhead). However, RAID 0 does not provide any fault tolerance: any disk failure in the array causes data loss. What's more, as you increase the number of drives, you also increase the probability of disk failure.

RAID 1

This configuration provides increased fault tolerance and data redundancy by writing all blocks to all disks in the array, as shown in Figure 4.9b. When a disk drive fails, the array goes into *degraded* mode, with all I/O operations continuing on the healthy disk. The failed drive can then be replaced (hot-swapped), and the RAID controller rebuilds the original array, copying all data from the healthy drive to the new drive, after which full mirroring will again happen for all writes. This fault tolerance comes at the price of available disk space: for an array with two drives with a 500 GB capacity, the total available space remains 500 GB.




Figure 4.9: Three of the most common RAID levels illustrated. RAID 0 increases performance, as blocks are written in parallel across all available disks. RAID 1 provides redundancy, as blocks are written identically to all available disks. RAID 5 aims to provide increased disk space as well as redundancy, as data is striped and parity information distributed across all disks.

RAID 5

This level provides a bit of both RAID 0 and RAID 1: data is written across all available disks, and for each such stripe the data parity is recorded. Unlike in levels 2 through 4, this parity is not stored on a single, dedicated parity drive, but instead distributed across all disks. See Figure 4.9c for an illustration of the block distribution.

Since parity information is written in addition to the raw data, a RAID 5 cannot increase disk capacity as linearly as a RAID 0. However, any one of the drives in this array can fail without impacting data availability. Again, as in the case of a RAID 1 configuration, the array will go into *degraded* mode and get rebuilt when the failed disk has been replaced. However, the performance of the array is decreased while a failed drive remains in the array, as missing data has to be calculated from the parity; the performance is similarly reduced as the array is being rebuilt. Depending on the size of the disks in question, this task can take hours; all the while the array remains in degraded mode and another failed drive would lead to data loss.

Composite RAID and Failure Rates

Since a RAID configuration creates a (virtual) disk to present to the upper layer (such as the OS), it should not come as a surprise that it is possible to combine or nest RAID levels to achieve a combination of the benefits provided by either one level; Table 4.2 lists some of the most popular combinations. In each case, we increase fault tolerance at the expense of efficiency.

It is worth noting that the redundancy gained by combining RAID levels is frequently overestimated. Here's why: each drive has an expected failure rate, each array a mean time to data loss. The "Independent" in RAID misleads us to believe that the odds of any one disk failing is entirely unrelated to the others. In reality, it is most common to use identical drives from the same manufacturer if not even the same production batch in a given array. That is, when a single drive fails and the array goes into degraded mode, the

RAID 0+1	Mirrored array of stripes
RAID 1+0	Striped array of mirrors
RAID 5+0	Striped array of multiple RAID 5

Table 4.2: Standard RAID levels can be combined.

probability of a second drive failing is actually higher than one would expect with truly independent drives.

Secondly, the actions performed by the RAID on the disks needs to be taken into consideration as well. When a disk in a RAID 5 array fails and is replaced, *all* of the disks will undergo additional stress as *all* of the data is read in order to rebuild the redundant array. This process may well take several hours if not days – a very long period of time during which our data is at increased risk. In other words, the failure of a single drive will necessarily increase the probability of failure of the other drives¹⁵.

When choosing a composite RAID architecture, it is well worth our time to consider the Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR) in addition to the other factors. From the moment that a disk failure is detected until the array has been rebuilt, our data is at severe risk. In order to reduce the MTTR, many system administrators deploy so-called *hot spares*, disks that are installed in the server and known to the RAID controller, but that are inactive until a disk failure is detected. At that time, the array is immediately rebuilt using this stand-by drive; when the faulty disk has been replaced, the array is already in non-degraded mode and the new disk becomes the hot spare.




Figure 4.10: An Apple Xserve RAID, a now discontinued storage device with 14 Ultra-ATA slots offering Fibre Channel connectivity and implementing a number of RAID levels in hardware as well as software across two independent controllers.

¹⁵RAID 6 improves this situation, at the expense of efficiency. Dropping prices have not very surprisingly lead more and more enterprise environments to consider this trade-off entirely acceptable.

Spectacular File System Confusion



In early 2006, while working at Stevens Institute of Technology as a System Administrator, we bought a new Apple Xserve RAID storage device (like the one seen in Figure 4.10) and populated its 14 disk slots with 400 GB drives, yielding (after RAID, file system overhead and the previously discussed discrepancy in binary versus decimal units) two RAID5 configurations with a capacity of 2.2 TB each, an impressive amount of affordable storage space at the time.

The “left” RAID was dedicated to storing large amounts of video and audio data made available to clients running Mac OS X. We connected the RAID controller via Fibre Channel to a SAN switch, and from there to an Apple Xserve network server, which managed the HFS+ file system on this storage component.

The second 2.2 TB of storage space, the ”right” side of the array, was meant to become the central data space for all workstations in the Computer Science and Mathematics departments as well as their laboratories. Up until then, this file space had been provided via NFS from a two-module SGI Origin 200 server running IRIX, managing a few internal SCSI disks as well as some Fibre Channel direct attached storage. We intended to migrate the data onto the XServer RAID, and to have it served via a Solaris 10 server, allowing us to take advantage of several advanced features in the fairly new ZFS and to retire the aging IRIX box.

Neatly racked, I connected the second RAID controller and the new Solaris server to the SAN switch, and then proceeded to create a new ZFS file system. I connected the Fibre Channel storage from the IRIX server and started to copy the data onto the new ZFS file system. As I was sitting in the server room, I was able to see the XServer RAID; I noticed the lights on the *left* side of the array indicate significant disk activity, but I initially dismissed this as not out of the ordinary. But a few seconds later, when the right side still did not show any I/O, it dawned on me: the Solaris host was writing data over the live file system instead of onto the new disks!



I immediately stopped the data transfer and even physically disconnected the Solaris server, but the damage was done: I had inadvertently created a new ZFS file system on the disks already containing (and using) an HFS+ file system! As it turns out, I had not placed the Solaris server into the correct SAN zone on the Fibre Channel switch, meaning the only storage device it could see was the left side of the array. But since both sides of the array were identical (in size, RAID type, manufacturer), it was easy for me not to notice and proceed thinking that due to proper SAN zoning, it was safe for me to write to the device.

Now it was interesting to note that at the same time as I was overwriting the live file system, data was still being written to and read from the HFS+ file system on the Apple server. I was only able to observe intermittent I/O errors. Thinking I could still save the data, I made my next big mistake: I shut down the Apple server, hoping a clean boot and file system check could correct what I still thought was a minor problem.

Unfortunately, however, when the server came back up, it was unable to find a file system on the attached RAID array! It simply could not identify the device. In retrospect, this is no surprise: the Solaris server had constructed a new (and different) file system on the device and destroyed all the HFS+ specific file system meta data stored at the beginning of the disks. That is, even though the blocks containing the data were likely not over written, there was no way to identify them. After many hours of trying to recreate the HFS+ meta data, I had to face the fact this was simply impossible. What was worse, I had neglected to verify that backups for the server were done before putting it into production use – fatal mistake number three! The data was irrevocably lost; the only plus side was that I had learned a lot about data recovery, SAN zoning, ZFS, HFS+ and file systems in general.

4.5 File Systems

When the operating system is installed, it will create a file system on the specified disk(s). As we have seen, these disks may be made available to the OS in a variety of ways, but in the end, the OS does not distinguish between a DAS device such as a hard drive disk, a volume created by an LVM, a disk represented by a RAID or one backed by a storage device over a SAN. This method of hiding hardware implementation choices or details allows the OS to choose amongst a number of different file systems, each with their own unique strengths, disadvantages and performance impacting tuning options.

Reduced to its most basic tasks, a file system is responsible for storing, managing and updating data on the storage device in question. To this end, it needs to manage the available space and be able to store files as well as their attributes (i.e. *metadata*) in a hierarchy that allows both the user and the OS to efficiently retrieve them, as well as ensure some level of file and file system integrity. In addition, since Unix is a multi-user OS, the file system depends on means to identify and distinguish between different users; access control and the concepts of *file permissions* are a basic requirement. What's more, Unix systems frequently represent as “files” many things that us humans may not usually think of as such¹⁶. This leads us to special purpose file systems that really only provide a file I/O API to their respective resources: the *procfs* file system, representing information about the system’s processes and the *devfs* file system, a virtual file system acting as an interface to device drivers are two examples.

4.5.1 File System Types

In this section, we will take a look at some of the file systems commonly in use on Unix systems. For the most part, these are *disk file systems*, meaning that they are designed to manage hard disk storage. As we’ve seen in previous sections, the physical layout of a hard drive influences partitioning schemas, but the choice and creation of the operating system’s file system may also depend on the underlying hardware.

¹⁶The “Plan 9 from Bell Labs” research operating system took the initial Unix mantra of “everything is a file” much further: all objects are either files or file systems, communicating with each other via the *9P* protocol. Network connections, communications with the kernel’s drivers, interprocess communication etc. all are performed via standard I/O calls.

As we discuss these file systems, we will find that the approach to store both the actual file data as well as the metadata, the information associated *with* the files, differs significantly. We will also notice – as a recurring pattern throughout this book – how different layers of abstraction help us improve portability and provide a consistent interface, as standard file I/O semantics can remain the same across different file systems.

Disk File Systems

A *Disk File System* is probably what most people – at least those who *would* think about these kinds of things to begin with – have in mind when they think about what a file system does. It manages block device storage, stores “files” in “directories”, maintains a file system hierarchy, controls file metadata, and allows for simple I/O via a few basic system calls. The canonical file system for the Unix family of operating systems is, of course, the *Unix File System* (UFS), also known as the *Berkeley Fast File System* (FFS). We will look at the UFS in detail in Section 4.7, but for now suffice it to say that this file system implementation and its use of boot blocks, superblocks, cylinder groups, *inodes* and data blocks is repeated and reflected in many other Unix file systems, including for example *ext2*, for a long time the default file system for Linux systems.

These traditional file systems suffer a notable drawback in the case of unexpected power failure or a system crash: some of the data may not have been committed to the disk yet, causing a file system inconsistency. When the OS boots up again, it will need to perform time consuming checks (see `fsck(8)`) and any problems found may not actually be recoverable, leading to possible data loss. In order to address these problems, a so-called *journaled* file system might choose to first write the changes it is about to make to a specific location (the journal) before applying them. In the event of a crash, the system can then simply replay the journal, yielding a consistent file system in a fraction of the time it would take a traditional file system to traverse the entire hierarchy to ensure consistency.

There are many different journaled file systems, including a number of commercial implementations (such as Apple’s *HFS+*, IBM’s *JFS*, or SGI’s *XFS*) and open source variants (including *ext3*, *ext4* and *reiserfs* for Linux and updates to UFS/FFS providing support for journaling or logging).

Despite the differences in how data is ultimately written to the disk, the fundamental concepts of how data and metadata are managed, the use of

the *inode* structures, or the *Virtual File System* layer to allow the kernel to support multiple different file systems remains largely the same across the different Unix operating and file systems.

Distributed File Systems

Unlike a disk file system, which provides access to the data it holds only to the processes running in the operating system the disk is attached to, a *distributed file system* may allow different client systems to access a centralized storage resource simultaneously, thus forming the basis for any NAS solutions. As we discussed in Section 4.2.2, this model implies that clients no longer operate on the block level of the storage – this access has been abstracted on a higher level and the client OS thus requires in-kernel support for the file system in question.

Sun Microsystems' *Network File System* (NFS), created in 1985, was the first such file system utilizing the *Remote Procedure Calls* (RPC) via the Internet Protocol (IP) for the server to communicate with the clients, and remains to this day the standard distributed file system in the Unix world. Other notable variations include the *Andrew File System* (AFS) and its descendent, *Coda*, developed at Carnegie Mellon University, tightly integrated with the Kerberos authentication protocol, and backed by a local cache, making it particularly tolerant of network interruptions, as well as the *Server Message Block/Common Internet File System* (SMB/CIFS), the predominant network file system in the Windows world, made accessible to Unix systems via the “Samba” implementation of these protocols.

Within the area of massive scale Internet systems, a number of specialized, distributed file systems have emerged, most notably the *Google File System*[3] and the *Hadoop Distributed File System*[4] (the latter being an open source implementation modeled after the former). These file systems provide highly scalable fault tolerance while at the same time providing high performance on low-cost commodity hardware.

As usual, different problems call for different solutions, and despite their significant capabilities, these file systems may not necessarily be suitable for your requirements. In fact, making use of these capabilities requires a significant investment – both in the time and expertise required to manage them as well as in the hardware required to really get anything out of them.

Other distributed file systems may have a different focus, leading to interesting and entirely distinct properties: the *Tahoe Least-Authority File*

System[5], for example, provides data confidentiality through the use of cryptography, thus allowing complete decentralization over the (public) Internet. On the other hand, the advent of cloud computing has further blurred the boundaries of where a distributed file system ends and where a network service begins: Amazon’s *Simple Storage Service* (S3), for example, despite being an API driven web service, might as well be considered a distributed file system, but then so could online storage providers, such as Dropbox, who build their solutions on top of Amazon’s service. It will be interesting to see how these distributed file systems or data stores evolve with time.

“Other” File Systems

In the Unix world, there exists an old mantra: “Everything is a file.” That is, the simple API defining file I/O has proven so useful that a number of non-file “things” have come to implement this interface as well: not only can regular files be accessed using the `open(2)`, `read(2)`, `write(2)` and `close(2)` system calls¹⁷, but so can network sockets and other interprocess communication endpoints, character and block devices, so-called *pseudo-devices* (such as `/dev/null`), and various other “special files”.

Similarly, a number of pseudo- and virtual file systems have been created to use the same API and make resources available using file-like structures. The access points for these structures becomes a mount point in the file system hierarchy, *et voilà*, these resources can be accessed, processed and manipulated using common Unix tools. Examples include the *devfs* virtual file system (used to access special and general devices), the *procfs* pseudo file system (providing information about system information and individual processes), the *UnionFS* (a method of layering two regular file systems on top of each other, providing the union of the two hierarchies to the user), and *tmpfs* (a method of creating a file system in virtual memory, granting significant performance benefits).

In addition to these cases, there are also a number of file systems that have been created to meet very specific requirements, or that effectively function as an overlay on top of an application or protocol in order to facilitate local file access to remote resources, such as, for example, the SSH file system. But file systems are usually implemented in the operating system’s

¹⁷All of these system calls operate on a small non-negative integer, the so-called *file descriptor* or *file handle*. The old expression should therefore more accurately be cited as “Everything is a file descriptor.”

kernel space: file I/O system calls do happen here and devices and certain other resources can only be controlled by the kernel; likewise, mounting or unmounting file systems requires superuser privileges. But not all file systems are actually accessing any of the resources protected by the kernel. In order to facilitate non-privileged access to file system interfaces, some Unix systems have created kernel modules that provide a method to implement virtual “File Systems in Userspace” (known as *FUSE*).

All of these file systems that aren’t actually *file* systems but rather an abstraction of other resources into a file API illustrate how much the concept of simplicity permeates the Unix culture. At this point, few system administrators would wish to part with the convenience of, for example, *procfs* – in fact, its availability is almost universally assumed. For a polyglot administrator, however, it is important to be familiar with the different pseudo- and virtual file systems available on the different Unix versions and, more importantly, know how to access the resources they represent in their absence.

4.6 File System Layout

The traditional Unix file system layout is organized as a tree-like hierarchy, rooted at `/` (“slash”). Under this directory reside a number of standard top-level subdirectories, each with a well-defined purpose and containing further subdirectories, forming a hierarchy described in the `hier(7)` manual page.

Unix systems can make use of multiple different file systems on multiple partitions at the same time. Each may be attached or “mounted” under any directory (or “mount point”) of the file system hierarchy with the exception of the root file system: the file system containing the basic operating system and from which the system was booted, which must be mounted at `/`.

Figure 4.10 illustrates a subtree of the typical Unix hierarchy with different components residing on separate disks. Each node in the tree represents a directory entry used to map file names to inodes; nodes with children represent directories, leaf nodes represent regular files. Traversing the tree from the root to any given node constructs a so-called “pathname” consisting of directory names concatenated with a path separator, “`/`”, followed by the file name.

File names may contain any character except for this separator or the *NUL* character (`\0`), used in the C programming language to terminate




Figure 4.10: The Unix file system is a tree-like structure, rooted at `/`; different file systems can be attached at different directories or mount points. In this illustration, `/home` and `/usr` reside on separate disks from `/`.

a string.¹⁸ Most Unix systems impose a maximum file name length of 255 bytes and a maximum pathname length of 1024 bytes; however, these are file system and OS specific limits.

Every Unix process has the concept of a current working directory – run the `pwd(1)` command or type “`echo $PWD`” in your shell to display where in the file system hierarchy you currently are. Pathnames may either be *relative* to this location, or, if they begin with a `/`, *absolute*.

Each directory contains at least two entries: “`.`” (dot), a name for the current working directory and “`..`” (dot-dot), a name for the parent direc-

¹⁸It is a common mistake to assume that a file name contains only printable characters. The Unix system does not impose many restrictions on how a user might choose to name a file, and file names containing e.g. control characters such as a carriage return (“`\n`”), while confusing on a line-buffered terminal, are possible.

```

$ pwd
/home/jschauma          # pwd(1) writes the absolute pathname
$ echo hello > file      # create "file" in the current directory
$ cd /usr/share/doc       # cd(1) using an absolute pathname
$ pwd
/usr/share/doc           # no surprise here
$ cat /home/jschauma/file # now using an absolute pathname
hello
$ cd ../../.. /home/jschauma # cd(1) using a relative pathname
$ pwd
/home/jschauma
$ cat file                # "./ file" would also work
hello
$
```

Listing 4.3: Absolute pathnames begin with a / and are resolved from the root of the file system; relative pathnames are resolved from the current working directory.

tory.¹⁹ Since relative pathnames are resolved from within the current working directory, the same file can be referred to by different names, as shown in the examples in Listing 4.3.

4.7 The Unix File System

As we discuss the general concepts of file systems in the Unix world, it is impossible to avoid a much closer look at the *Unix File System* (UFS), the initial standard file system for a number of both commercial and open source Unix versions for decades. UFS, also known as the *Berkeley Fast File System* or FFS, created by Marshall Kirk McKusick[9] and others at the University of California in Berkeley in 1984, was a reimplementation of the original file system provided by Bell Lab's UNIX V7.

These improvements and changes introduced most notably the concept of cylinder groups, providing a more equal distribution of the file metadata on the physical disk, thus minimizing seek time. The Unix File System therefore consisted of the following major components, as illustrated in Figure 4.11:

- A **superblock**. This block contains all the system's crucial information, such as the number and location of cylinder groups used as well as

¹⁹As a special case, within the root directory both “.” and “..” refer to the same directory, i.e. /.




Figure 4.11: A disk may be divided into multiple partitions; a partition may contain a file system with multiple cylinder groups; each cylinder group contains some file system meta data as well as inode and data blocks.

the location of the inode and data blocks. As this information is critical for the operation of the file system and corruption of this block would be disastrous, it is replicated and stored in a number of (predictable) locations. This allows the super user to repair a corrupted file system by pointing to an alternate superblock.

- A number of **cylinder groups**, which break the large file system into more manageable chunks by distributing meta data evenly across the physical partition.
- A number of **inode maps** (one for every cylinder group), pointing to the cylinder group's **inode blocks**, which in turn contain the metadata associated with the files.
- A number of **block bitmaps** (one for every cylinder group), pointing to the cylinder group's **data blocks**, which in turn contain the actual file data.

The distribution of this data across multiple cylinder groups illustrates the tight relationship that the file system had with the physical properties of a hard disk drive; this layout remains in place nowadays, even though on

solid state drives, for example, we no longer suffer performance penalties due to seek time.

It is important to note that the data blocks used by the file system are different from the *physical* blocks of the hard disk. The latter are, as we discussed in Section 4.3.1, 512 bytes in size (or, in more recent drives, 4096 bytes); the former – called the *logical* block size – can be decided on by the system administrator at file system creation time. UFS uses a minimum logical block size of 4096 bytes, and defaults to larger block sizes based on the overall size of the file system. Likewise, the number of inodes in a file system is fixed once the file system has been created. Here, UFS defaults to an *inode density* of one inode per 2048 bytes of space for small file systems – consult the `newfs(8)` manual page for this and other parameters to define and tune the file system at its creation time.

Let us dive a little bit deeper and think about how the Unix File System manages disk space: A file system’s primary task is to store data on behalf of the users. In order to read or write this data, it needs to know in which logical blocks it is located. That is, the file system needs a map of the blocks, a way to identify and address each location. This is accomplished by way of the *inode* and *data block* maps: the total number of inodes represents the total number of files that can be referenced on this file system, while the data blocks represent the space in which the file data is stored.

As we noted, a data block is, necessarily, of a fixed size. That means that if we wish to store a file that is larger than a single block, we have to allocate multiple blocks and make a note of which blocks belong to the given file. This information is stored as pointers to the disk blocks within the inode data structure.

Unfortunately, however, not all files will be multiples of the logical block size. Likewise, it is possible that files will be smaller than a single block. In other words, we will always end up with blocks that are only partially allocated, a waste of disk space. In order to allow more efficient management of small files, UFS allowed a logical block to be divided further into so-called *fragments*, providing for a way to let the file system address smaller units of storage. The smallest possible fragment size then is the physical block size of the disk, and logical blocks are only fragmented when needed.

A pointer to the data blocks and fragments allocated to a given file is stored in the inode data structure, which comprises all additional information about the file. This allows for an elegant separation of a file’s metadata,

```
$ ls -ai /
 2 .          5740416 cdrom      5816448 libexec   2775168 stand
 2 ..         1558656 dev        1862784 mnt       2166912 tmp
3003280 .cshrc  988439 emul      4 netbsd     3573504 usr
3003284 .profile 342144 etc      1824768 proc     3497472 var
3421440 altroot 1026432 home    798336 rescue
5702400 bin    3763584 lib       3003264 root
 3 boot.cfg   2204928 libdata   5588352 sbin
$
```

Listing 4.4: Use of the `ls(1)` command on a NetBSD system to illustrate how file names are mapped to inode numbers in a directory. (Note that in the root directory both ‘.’ and ‘..’ have the same inode number as in this special case they actually are the same directory.)

which takes up only a fixed and small amount of disk space, and its contents. Accessing the metadata is therefore independent of the file size (itself a piece of metadata), allowing for efficient and fast retrieval of the file’s properties without requiring access of the disk blocks. Other pieces of information stored in the inode data structure include the file’s permissions, the numeric user-id of the owner, the numeric group-id of the owner, the file’s last access, modification and file status change times²⁰, the number of blocks allocated for the file, the block size of the file system and the device the file resides on, and of course the inode number identifying the data structure.

Now humans tend to be rather bad at remembering large numbers and prefer the use of strings to represent a file, but the one piece of information that is *not* stored in the inode is the file name. Instead, the Unix File System allows for a mapping between a file name and its unique identifier – its inode – through the use of directories. A directory really is nothing but a special type of file: it has the same properties as any other file, but the data it holds is well-structured (in contrast to the byte stream contained in so-called “regular” files) and consists of inode number and file name pairs. You can use the `ls(1)` command to illustrate this – see Listing 4.4.

A mapping of an inode number to a file name is called a *hardlink*, even though humans tend to prefer the term “file name”. An inode can be accessed by more than just one file name: within a single file system, each file may

²⁰A file’s `ctime`, it’s time of last file status change, is frequently misinterpreted to be the file’s *creation* time; most file systems, including UFS, do *not* store this kind of information. Instead, the `ctime` reflects the last time the meta information of a file was changed.

be referenced by multiple names in different directories, and the number of hardlinks for a given file is stored in the inode data structure as well. But since each file is identified by its inode number, and since multiple file systems can be mounted in a running operating system, it is possible that two files on two different file systems have the same inode number. As a result, a file is really only uniquely identified by its combination of file system device and inode number. What's more, at times it may be useful to create a pointer to a file residing on a different file system, but as just explained, creating a hard link across file system boundaries is impossible. To overcome this limitation, so-called “symbolic links” were invented: a symbolic link (often abbreviated as “symlink”) is a special kind of file that contains as its only contents the path name of the file it references. Almost all operations on a symlink will then be redirected to the target file it points to.

In addition to regular files (hard links), directories and symbolic links, the following file types are supported by the traditional Unix file system:

- *Block special devices* – an interface for disk-like devices, providing buffered and non-sequential I/O.
- *Character special devices* – an interface for communication devices such as keyboards, mice, modems, or terminals, providing unbuffered I/O. A number of virtual, so-called pseudo-devices such as `/dev/null`, `/dev/zero`, or `/dev/urandom`, for example, are also accessed as character special devices.
- Named pipes or *FIFOs* – another inter-process communications endpoint in the file system. This type of file represents a manifestation of the traditional Unix pipe in the file system name space; I/O is performed using the same methods as for any regular file. As data is merely passed between processes, a FIFO always has a file size of zero bytes.
- Unix domain *sockets* – an inter-process communications endpoint in the file system allowing multiple processes with no shared ancestor process to exchange information. Communication happens via the same API as is used for network sockets.

The file type as well as its permissions and all the other properties of a file can be inspected using the `stat(1)` command (see Listing 4.5 for an

```
$ stat /etc/passwd
  File: '/etc/passwd'
  Size: 2062          Blocks: 8          IO Block: 4096
regular file
Device: ca02h/51714d   Inode: 725181   Links: 1
Access: (0644/-rw-r--r--)  Uid: (0/root)  Gid: (0/root)
Access: 2011-08-26 23:45:31.000000000 -0400
Modify: 2011-08-26 23:45:31.000000000 -0400
Change: 2011-08-26 23:45:31.000000000 -0400
$
```

Listing 4.5: Sample output of the `stat(1)` command on a Linux system showing the various pieces of information stored in the inode data structure for the file “`/etc/passwd`”.

example), or, perhaps more commonly, using the `ls(1)` command (as illustrated in Figure 4.12). This command is so frequently used and its output so ubiquitous that any system administrator can recite the meaning of the fields in their sleep. The semantics and order in which permissions are applied, however, include a few non-obvious caveats, which is why we will look at the Unix permissions model in more detail in Chapter 6.

Over the last 30 years, UFS has served as the canonical file system for almost all Unix versions. With time, a number of changes have become necessary: more fine-grained access controls than the traditional Unix permissions model allows were made possible via file system extensions such as ACLs; larger storage devices required not only updates to the block addressing schemas, but also to the different data types representing various file system aspects; today’s huge amounts of available data storage have made log-based file systems or journaling capabilities a necessity, and massively distributed data stores pose entirely different requirements on the underlying implementation of how the space is managed.

Yet through all this, as enhancements have been made both by commercial vendors as well as by various open source projects, the principles, the very fundamentals of the Unix File System have remained the same: the general concept of the inode data structure and the separation of file metadata from the data blocks have proven reliable and elegant in their simplicity. At the same time, this simplicity has proven to yield scalability and adaptability:




Figure 4.12: The default output of the `ls -l` command includes most of the metadata of a given file.

the persistent idea that “everything is a file”, and that files simply store bytes and thus have no inherent structure (unlike a database or certain archives) have allowed a surprising flexibility and lead to the creation of many pseudo- or virtual file systems providing a simple API and User Interface (UI) to any number of resources.

4.8 Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, we have built our understanding of file systems and storage models from the ground up. We have seen how simple concepts are combined to construct increasingly complex systems – a pattern that weaves like a red thread through all areas we cover. We noted the circular nature of technology development: the simple DAS model repeats itself, albeit more complex and with additional layers, in common SANs, much as network attached storage utilizes both DAS and SAN solutions, yet is taken to another extreme in cloud storage solutions.

Being aware of the physical disk structure helps us understand a file system’s structure: we realize, for example, that concentric cylinder groups make up partitions, and that the location of data blocks within these cylinders may have an impact on I/O performance. What’s more, the concepts of file system blocks become clearer the further we deepen our knowledge of both the logical and physical components, and the distinction of metadata from the

actual contents of a file allow us to explain how the various file system related Unix tools operate on a fairly low level as well as how to tune these values at file system creation time. As system administrators, this understanding is crucial.

But what about our earlier point of noting the three pillars of strong system architecture and design: Scalability, Security, Simplicity. What role do these play in the context of file systems and storage models?

Scalability is defined by our aptitude to meet changing requirements. As far as file systems are concerned, we need to be able to provide sufficient storage that meets our performance and rapidly increasing space requirements. One might be tempted to jump to a quick conclusion and choose the superficially “most flexible” solution, which nowadays often appears to be a cloud based storage model. However, it behooves us to take a step back and consider the other two major design decisions, simplicity and security, which help us cut through complexities and clarify just how flexible such a model might be. Reliance on a third party provider for data storage, for example, incurs a number of hidden costs: bandwidth requirements increase, data redundancy and duplication need to be weighed, backup and data migration strategies change radically, and vendor lock-in may in fact eliminate true flexibility.²¹.

So what makes for a scalable storage solution? On the one hand, we need to be able to add disk space on demand, so we either require a file system that can grow as needed, or an efficient way to synchronize multiple file systems. This already illustrates a trade-off in complexity and the solutions depend in part on our network architecture: within a single system, the use of an LVM or a file system that allows the pooling of multiple resources seems a good choice, but how do you make that available to multiple clients? If you have hosts in distinct geographical locations, connected only via the Internet (an inherently untrustworthy network), how do you allow for shared access?

The more you think about these requirements, the more you will find yourself weighing conflicting approaches. You will go back and forth between the simplest possible solution (for example, all hosts write data only to direct attached storage) and the more complex (shared storage available

²¹Depending on the size of your organization, these costs may in fact not be hidden at all: at some point, you may find yourself providing “cloud storage” to your organization, and all of a sudden you are the owner of that infrastructure.

via a distributed file system or a cloud architecture). But it becomes increasingly hard to define “simple”, as each solution requires considerations outside of the initial problem domain: hosts writing to DAS is efficient, but data synchronization across all hosts becomes increasingly complicated; a shared storage pool available over the network solves that problem, but incurs a high cost of complexity and dependency on the supporting infrastructure.

What’s more, the security aspects of the file system and the features it provides are manifold: as Unix was designed from the beginning as a multi-user operating system, the capabilities to distinguish between different users were built into the system and is reflected in the file permissions. But file system security goes beyond this basic level, especially when we consider access over the network. Every distributed file system has to solve the problem of deciding whether or not a remote system should be granted access to a given resource, and how such a system should authenticate. The access models range from simplistic (if you are on the local network, you are granted access) to the more sophisticated (a client has to present some sort of time-limited authentication token to gain access).

But a system administrator’s professional paranoia dictates digging *even* deeper. In the case of distributed file systems, of storage area networks or of remotely hosted, cloud-based storage solutions, we not only have to consider how a remote client authenticates and is granted access, but also who has access to the bits and bytes in transit, or how to protect our data’s confidentiality should a remote system be compromised. Is transport security assumed, or do we rely on secure network connections (for example on the network layer via a VPN or IPsec tunnels, or on the application layer via TLS or SSH, to name but a few examples)? Is data stored “in the cloud” accessible to anybody with access to the physical device (simple, but trust is placed into the storage provider, often a third party), or do we encrypt it (more secure, but also more complex)? Under what jurisdiction is the data stored, and what data could be subpoenaed by which authorities? Would you even be notified if access to your and your users’ data was granted to law enforcement?

As we will see throughout this book, there never is a single solution to all our problems. We will continually have to make trade-offs based on assumptions and probabilities, usability considerations and practical concerns. There is no silver bullet, no one solution, no unique, always correct approach. This is why it is so important for a system administrator to be aware of *all*

the factors, and to ask the questions we've started to suggest here at the end of this chapter. Not surprisingly, this line of questions quickly leads us beyond the basic concepts of file systems and storage models, but likewise often brings us full circle when we have to consider higher level applications and consider just how exactly they access data and what kinds of assumptions and requirements they pose as to availability, security and performance. The topics covered in this chapter are the foundation upon which our systems are built.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Identify the storage area model(s) predominantly used in your environment(s). What kind of problems with each do you frequently encounter? Would changing the storage model be a feasible solution to these problems? Why or why not?
2. Research the implementation details of a popular cloud storage provider. What storage solutions did they choose? Can you identify all the different models we discussed?
3. Identify at least three distinct security concerns in each of the storage models we discussed. Outline in detail how an attacker might exploit such weaknesses and how a System Administrator might prevent or counter each attack.
4. Ask your system administrators if they have any old or broken hard drives, if possible from different manufacturers or with different capacities. Open up the drives and identify the various components. How many read-write heads are there? How many platters? How do the different models differ?
5. Compare the output of the `fdisk(8)` command on different operating systems. Divide a disk into a number of different partitions, then use `disklabel(8)` to review the resulting label. Identify all the different partitions, verify their capacities and explain any discrepancies or unexpected findings.
6. Compare the various composite RAID levels and analyze their respective fault tolerance and mean time to recovery in the case of one or

more failed disks.

7. Assuming 500 GB disk drives, what is the total capacity of a RAID configuration using 7 disks under RAID 0, RAID 1, RAID 5, RAID 6, RAID 0+1, RAID 1+0 and RAID 5+0?
8. You want to create a RAID 5 using several multi-terabyte drives. Research and choose your preferred hardware, paying particular attention to their *Unrecoverable Read Error* rates (i.e. the mean time to failure, usually expressed as number of bits read). If the array is filled to capacity with data, and one of the drives fails and has to be replaced, how much data do you end up reading when you rebuild the array? What does this say about the probability of an additional disk failure while you're still in degraded mode?
9. Identify the different file systems in use on the Unix versions you have access to. How many partitions are there, where are they mounted, what mount options do they use? Were they chosen explicitly or do they appear to be OS defaults?
10. Identify all resources made available by the *procfs* system, both about the system and about individual processes. Suppose *procfs* was not available, how would you go about finding out the same information?
11. Identify the different devices found under */dev*. What is the difference between */dev/null* and */dev/zero*, between */dev/random* and */dev/urandom*?
12. Identify the file system limitations on a system you have access to. What is the maximum file system size? What is the maximum file size? What characters may be used in a file name? How many files can you create in a single directory?
13. Compare at least four different file systems with respect to their default block size and inode density. Consider both small (less than 1 GB in size), “normal”, and very large (more than 1 TB in size) partitions or volumes. How efficiently does each system manage this space? Can you specify different inode and block sizes to increase efficiency?
14. Review the concepts of inode mappings to file names, hard links, and symbolic links.

- (a) Create a new file, then create a second hard link for this file. Verify that both files are completely identical by using `ls(1)`, `stat(1)` and by appending data to one of the files and reading from the other.
 - (b) Rename the original file and repeat – what changed? Why?
 - (c) Create a new file, then create a symbolic link for this file. Verify that both the original file and the symbolic link are unique by inspecting their inode numbers. Then append data to the file using the regular name and confirm that reading from the symbolic link yields the same data.
 - (d) Rename the original file and repeat – what changed? Why?
15. Create a very large file. Measure how long it takes to rename the file within one directory using the `mv(1)` command. Next, use `mv(1)` to move the file into a directory on a different file system or partition. What do you observe? Explain the difference.
 16. Experiment with the usability, resilience and limitations of a system's root file system.
 - (a) Identify how much free disk space you have, then fill it up. Can you use up all available space using a single file? What are the effects of using up all disk space? Can you still create new, empty files? Can you still log in? Why/why not?
 - (b) Identify how many free inodes are available on your root file system, then use them up by, e.g., creating lots and lots of empty files. What happens to the directory size in which you create these files? What is the error message once you run out of inodes? Can you still create new files? Can you still write to existing files? How much disk space is available now? Can you still log in? Why/why not?

Bibliography

- [1] EMC Education Service, *Information Storage and Management: Storing, Managing, and Protecting Digital Information*, John Wiley & Sons, 2009
- [2] Æleen Frisch, *Essential System Administration*, O'Reilly Media, 2002
- [3] Sanjay Ghemawat, Howard Gobioff, and Shun-Tak Leung, *The Google File System*, in “Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles”, 2003, ACM, New York, NY; also available on the Internet at <http://research.google.com/archive/gfs-sosp2003.pdf> (visited September 6th, 2012)
- [4] *The Hadoop Distributed File System: Architecture and Design*, on the Internet at https://hadoop.apache.org/common/docs/r0.14.4/hdfs_design.html (visited September 6th, 2012)
- [5] Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn, Brian Warner, *Tahoe – The Least-Authority Filesystem*, in “Proceedings of the 4th ACM international workshop on Storage security and survivability”, 2008, ACM, New York, NY; also available on the Internet at <http://tahoe-lafs.org/~zooko/lafs.pdf> (visited September 6th, 2012)
- [6] Eric Steven Raymond, *The Art of Unix Programming*, Addison-Wesley Professional, September 2003; also available on the Internet at <http://catb.org/~esr/writings/taoup/> (visited January 7, 2012)
- [7] W. Richard Stevens, Stephen A. Rago, *Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment*, Addison-Wesley Professional; 2nd edition, 2005
- [8] Abram Silberschatz, Greg Gagne, Peter B. Galvin *Operating System Concepts*, John Wiley & Sons, 2011
- [9] Marshall Kirk McKusick, William N. Joy, Samuel J. Leffler and Robert S. Fabry *A Fast File System for UNIX*, ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 2 (3), 1984, ACM, New York, NY; also available on the Internet at <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~brewer/cs262/FFS.pdf> (visited September 9, 2012)

Chapter 5

Software Installation and Package Management

There is no neat distinction between operating system software and the software that runs on top of it. – Jim Allchin



5.1 Introduction

Having covered the details of file systems and storage devices in the previous chapter, we can now focus on installing an operating system and adding software according to the intended purpose of the system. Most people never have to actually perform an OS installation, but System Administrators are not most people. We routinely set up new systems, create new services, and need to be able to fine-tune the software from the very lowest layers, defining

exactly what software is installed, what drivers the kernel needs to support, what modules it should load, and what services should be started at boot time.

In addition, even within a single host, some subsystems that control components on a lower layer than even the OS kernel, such as a RAID controller or a Fibre Channel HBA, are driven by their own firmware, accessed by the OS via its kernel drivers and exposed to the administrative users via additional software tools. All of these types of software have specific requirements, yet all of them also have in common the general mechanisms to install, update, maintain and remove the software.

In this chapter we will discuss in some detail the general principles underlying all software installations, beginning with a distinction of the different types of software we commonly encounter, most notably the two main categories of OS components and *add-on* or *third-party* software. We will look at how an operating system is installed on a server and what installation mechanisms are commonly used. Since different operating systems install different components into different locations, we will also take a close look at the file system layout and explain some of the reasons behind the common hierarchy found on most Unix systems.

Later in the chapter, we will cover concepts of software package management that allow a system administrator to not only add or remove software with ease, but to help maintain software runtime dependencies and provide a consistent way to upgrade software when needed. Unfortunately, software package management is still not a solved problem: managing software updates and security patches brings with it a surprising number of complex problems, in part due to competing solutions in this problem domain. All of this does not even touch upon the evolution of how applications are bundled in the context of virtual machines, virtual appliances, and software containers.

Every system administrator has a preferred operating system, and this preference is often the result of years of experience and familiarity not only with the kernel and libraries that make up the OS, but frequently also due to the package management system in use on the host. Just how, exactly, a package manager maintains software dependencies, what kinds of assumptions it makes about the system it is running on, its purpose, and its many uses all reflect deeply on the OS development philosophy. The way software updates are handled speaks volumes about both the system as well as its ad-

ministrators – the better we understand software installation concepts, the better we will be at managing our systems. Understanding all this just a little bit better is, in a nutshell, what this chapter is all about.

5.2 Types of Software

In its most general definition, “software” is just another term for a program telling a computer to perform a certain task. Practically, however, there are a number of different types of software. In this section, we will attempt to categorize these types, even though the distinctions or differentiating factors are far from clear-cut.

In the previous chapter, we have already identified a specific component that happens to be implemented in software: the file system. Instinctively, we categorize the file system as being in a lower layer than certain applications, such as a web server for example. But the file system is only one component of the operating system, which in turn comprises regular application software (such as a text editor or a compiler), software libraries used by many of these applications (such as the resolver library, used to turn hostnames into IP addresses), device drivers providing access to and control of certain hardware components, and the most central component of the OS itself, the kernel.

Looking at software from this perspective quickly makes it clear that the term “operating system” itself requires some definition, as different providers include different components under this umbrella term. Recall from our discussion of the Unix history in Section 2.1.1 that the term “Linux”, for example, may refer to the linux kernel as well as any number of “distributions”, each bundling a variety of components to make up a version of the GNU/Linux operating system. But before we attempt to tackle the question of what, exactly, defines an operating system, let us take a step back and attempt to better categorize software based on its proximity to the hardware or the end user.

5.2.1 Up and down the software stack

One of the most common systems a system administrator may be in charge of is probably a generic HTTP server, offering a web service of some sort. Such a service nowadays consists of a perhaps surprising number of components and software dependencies running – in our example here, anyway – on virtual

hardware within the AWS cloud service. From a "top down" perspective, it might:

- require an HTTP server – the actual daemon handling the network connections on port 80 and 443
- require e.g. PHP, Perl, Python, Ruby, or Java – entirely static pages are seldom found on the internet; instead, most web servers provide dynamic content via integration with other programming languages and modules
- which use generic library functions – the web server and the programming languages or frameworks are utilizing the standard libraries available on the system
- which make various system calls (see our discussion in Chapter 2.2)
- which the kernel handles for the OS
- which is running in a virtual machine – in the case of AWS, the OS our server is running on does not actually sit on top of the hardware itself
- which is running on top of a *hypervisor* – the host system managing the hardware for the different *guest* OS, such as for example the Xen hypervisor
- which uses firmware to manage various hardware components
- which, finally, is running on some hardware in a data center somewhere

Going down this stack, we can already identify a number of different interacting and overlapping categories of software. As such a Unix system boots up, it goes through a number of phases, each of which handled by a different type of software. The typical boot sequence begins at a very low level close to the hardware and with each step adds another layer of abstraction, bringing the system closer to interaction with the user.

In order not to complicate things more than absolutely necessary, we will skip over the layers involving the hypervisor in the following. Pretending that the OS runs on actual, not virtual hardware, the boot process might then include these steps:




(a) American Megatrends POST




(b) Award Software BIOS

Figure 5.1: A typical POST and BIOS screen

- Power-On Self Test (POST) – a few very basic routines intended to insure the hardware is not obviously faulty; Figure 5.1a shows a typical POST screen
- execution of the primary boot loader – a simple program stored in read-only memory; examples include the BIOS (as shown in Figure 5.1b), UEFI, and OpenBoot/Open Firmware
- access of the MBR – a special boot sector found on the primary boot device; the code found in this location allows the system to access the file system(s) and transfer control to a second-stage boot loader; see Chapter 4.4.1
- execution of a secondary or second-stage boot loader – a small program allowing the user to interactively choose an operating systems or kernel to boot; examples include GRUB (Figure 5.2a) or `boot(8)` (Figure 5.2b)
- loading of the hypervisor and starting of the privileged domain (*dom0*)
- initialization of the virtual hardware by the *domU* for the guest OS (*domU*)
- loading of the guest OS kernel – booting, initializing (virtual) hardware, loading modules



(a) GNU GRUB



(b) NetBSD boot(8)

Figure 5.2: Second stage boot loader examples

- **init(8)** – one of the few processes created explicitly by the kernel, **init(8)** spawns all other processes of the running OS and bootstraps the final system
- starting of system services – started by **init(8)**, commonly via a number of shell scripts using e.g. the **rc(8)** or **/etc/init.d** frameworks
- the interactive system runs, presenting a login prompt; the web server accepts network connections and begins traffic

Most Unix systems display diagnostic messages from the boot process on the system console and may retain a copy on the file system under e.g. **/var/run/dmesg.boot**. The **dmesg(8)** command can be used to display these messages. On Amazon's EC2 systems, you can use the **aws ec2 get-console-output** command to retrieve the information displayed on the (virtual) console.

Listing 5.1 and 5.2 show the output on the serial console displayed during the boot process of a NetBSD Amazon EC2 instance showing information from the hypervisor and the virtualized guest OS respectively.

```

i-38d44816      Xen Minimal OS!
    start_info: 0xa01000(VA)
        nr_pages: 0x26700
    shared_inf: 0x7dcc4000(MA)
        pt_base: 0xa04000(VA)
nr_pt_frames: 0x9
    mfn_list: 0x967000(VA)
    mod_start: 0x0(VA)
        mod_len: 0
        flags: 0x0
    cmd_line: root=/dev/sda1 ro 4
    stack: 0x946780-0x966780
MM: Init
    _text: 0x0(VA)
    _etext: 0x61e65(VA)
    _erodata: 0x76000(VA)
    _edata: 0x7b6d4(VA)
stack_start: 0x946780(VA)
    _end: 0x966d34(VA)
    start_pfn: a10
        max_pfn: 26700
Mapping memory range 0xc00000 - 0x26700000
setting 0x0-0x76000 readonly
skipped 0x1000
MM: Initialise page allocator for b3e000(b3e000)-0(26700000)
MM: done
Demand map pfns at 26701000-36701000.
Heap resides at 36702000-76702000.
Initialising timer interface
Initialising console ... done.
gnttab_table mapped at 0x26701000.
Initialising scheduler
Thread "Idle": pointer: 0x36702008, stack: 0xbff0000
Initialising xenbus
Thread "xenstore": pointer: 0x36702478, stack: 0x26600000
Dummy main: start_info=0x966880
Thread "main": pointer: 0x367028e8, stack: 0x26610000
"main" "root=/dev/sda1" "ro" "4"
vbd 2049 is hd0
***** BLKFRONT for device/vbd/2049 *****

backend at /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/1720/2049
Failed to read /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/1720/2049/feature-barrier.
Failed to read /local/domain/0/backend/vbd/1720/2049/feature-flush-cache.
2097152 sectors of 0 bytes
***** vbd 2050 is hd1
*****
```

Listing 5.1: Excerpt of the boot messages of a NetBSD Xen domU booting in Amazon EC2

```

Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012
The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.

NetBSD 6.1.2 (XEN3PAE_DOMU)
total memory = 615 MB
avail memory = 597 MB
mainbus0 (root)
hypervisor0 at mainbus0: Xen version 3.4.3.amazon
vcpu0 at hypervisor0: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 0 @ 2.00GHz, id 0x206d7
xenbus0 at hypervisor0: Xen Virtual Bus Interface
xencons0 at hypervisor0: Xen Virtual Console Driver
npx0 at hypervisor0: using exception 16
xbd0 at xenbus0 id 2049: Xen Virtual Block Device Interface
xbd1 at xenbus0 id 2050: Xen Virtual Block Device Interface
xennet0 at xenbus0 id 0: Xen Virtual Network Interface
xennet0: MAC address 22:00:0a:47:89:0e
balloon0 at xenbus0 id 0: Xen Balloon driver
balloon0: current reservation: 629760 KiB
xennet0: using RX copy mode
balloon0: current reservation: 157440 pages => target: 157440 pages
boot device: xbd1
root on xbd1a dumps on xbd1b
root file system type: ffs
Sat Feb 1 21:46:17 UTC 2014
Starting root file system check:
/dev/rxbd1a: file system is clean; not checking
Starting file system checks:
/dev/rxbd0a: file system is clean; not checking
Setting tty flags.
Setting sysctl variables: ddb.onpanic: 1 -> 0
Starting network.
IPv6 mode: host
Adding interface aliases..
Building databases: dev, utmp, utmpx, services.
Starting syslogd.
Mounting all filesystems...
Clearing temporary files.
Generating public/private rsa1 key pair.
Your identification has been saved in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.
Your public key has been saved in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub.
The key fingerprint is: ca:b3:e5:45:20:69:94:bf:ef:92:69:da:32:7b:1e:cc
Starting sshd.
Starting local daemons:.
Updating motd.
Starting powerd.
Starting inetd.
Starting cron.
Sat Feb 1 21:46:37 UTC 2014

NetBSD/i386 (ip-10-71-137-14.ec2.internal) (console)

login:

```

Listing 5.2: Excerpt of the boot messages of a NetBSD system

At each step of the boot process, we find a different type of software active as the dominant component. At the final stage, when the system is up and running, we can easily identify certain applications or services that interact directly with the user. This kind of software does not require any special privileges and does not rely on any particular hardware. Even though these applications may have a dependency on specific features or capabilities in the OS, they are effectively isolated from the kernel's privileged execution mode. They are entirely optional and installed by the system administrator as needed; common examples include a web browser or a database management system. In this book, we use the term “add-on” or “third-party” software to indicate that it was not included in or distributed directly with the operating system.

Below these software packages exists a layer of software applications and system utilities without which the OS would simply not be complete. All of the common Unix utilities such as `awk(1)` `sed(1)`, or even `ls(1)` fall into this category, as do the common system daemons such as `sshd(8)` or `syslogd(8)`, to name but a few. The standard Unix command interpreter, the shell, is part of this layer, and most systems include a compiler chain and other basic development tools as well. Like add-on software packages, this software also relies on a number of basic OS capabilities, which form another (sub-)category: the system libraries, kernel modules, and device drivers used by applications to interact with the OS kernel, the next layer in our software stack.

We can define the kernel as the central component of the operating system in charge of process-, device- and memory management, facilitating access to the hardware via a small number of *system calls*. Software running in the kernel's address space has full access to all aspects of the hardware and OS, while software running in so-called “user space” relies on the kernel or the system libraries to provide access to these resources when needed.

Finally, we have a layer of software that falls somewhat in between the kernel and the system software: some of the physical resources maintained by the kernel rely on hardware controllers providing increasingly complex code running in persistent memory on the devices themselves. Since this software, frequently consisting of low-level microcode, exists somewhat in between the clearly defined categories of *hardware* and *software*, it is commonly referred to as *firmware*. Besides the previously mentioned RAID controllers or Fibre Channel HBA, the most common example of firmware here is probably the BIOS.

Even though firmware can be viewed as residing “below” the kernel, closer to the hardware, many systems provide tools to interact with or update the firmware from within the OS. Some of this software requires the kernel to facilitate this access, for example via a loadable module. Likewise, the previously mentioned bootloader is an independent program executing outside the OS kernel, but from within the OS we can manipulate its behaviour and configure it to change the way the system is booted.

It is also worth mentioning that some code is executed exactly once (POST, the bootloader), while other low-level components (kernel modules or RAID firmware, for example) are used periodically or continually throughout a system’s running time. Once again, the distinction between what constitutes optional add-on software, an essential system component, or low-level access to the hardware by the kernel is far from obvious.

5.2.2 Operating System vs. System Software vs. Third Party Software

Our attempt to draw the software stack as described in the previous section is illustrated in Figure 5.3. As we review these layers, it quickly becomes obvious that unfortunately the distinctions are not as well-defined as we would like them to be.

It has become increasingly difficult to clearly identify any given piece of software as being an “add-on package”, as OS providers include more and more software in their distributions in order to make their product suitable for the widest variety of uses. Many Linux distributions, for example, include the canonical examples cited above (web browsers, database management systems, web servers, etc.), as they target both the server and desktop markets, while the BSD derived systems tend to favor a leaner setup, explicitly targeting the server market.

But what exactly defines an operating system? It is clear that an OS cannot exist without a kernel, but on the other hand a kernel all by itself does not provide for a useful environment, either. For this reason, different providers bundle the kernel with *system software* (device drivers, loadable kernel modules, core libraries etc.) and *system utilities* (such as a shell, the various command-line utilities, system daemons, development tools etc.). The more closely coupled these components are, the more coherent the resulting OS is. Many core system libraries rely on the presence of certain features in

the kernel, and not keeping these components in sync or even replacing one or the other tends to introduce a significant risk of instability.

For this reason, many OS providers only support their own specific releases of the many system components in their specific software bundle. If you replace parts of the system (either the kernel, core libraries, or various important system components), you are breaking up the bundle of software that initially made up the given release of the OS in question. You are in effect creating a different version, a different “distribution” of the OS.¹

Many Unix versions come in only exactly one flavor, one bundle of kernel plus libraries plus system utilities – the open source BSD versions and virtually all of the “old” commercial Unix versions fall into this category. Releases differ across time in features added or removed, but a given version of the OS will behave the same way anywhere you may encounter it.

Contrast this with the world of Linux, where the definition of a coherent operating system has been replaced with variety in software bundling: a common kernel (possibly with custom modifications) combined with the core libraries from the GNU project and a surprising variety of different add-on software. Some of these “distributions” replace core system utilities, some remove components but add others etc., until they behave sufficiently different from one another that they may well be regarded as unique Unix flavors.

As different OS providers disagree on what components should be part of their final product, it becomes very difficult to declare a software package to belong into any one of the categories we’ve defined. However, most system administrators ultimately develop an instinctive idea of what should or should not be considered *essential*, what can and cannot be removed from the system without unexpected side effects, and which components may only be upgraded in sync with kernel- or system library upgrades.

This understanding comes with years of experience, and it helps to think about software in terms of their place in the software stack we have defined. As so often, we end up creating flexible definitions that allow us to translate core concepts across variable implementations. We will see throughout this chapter how this approach will help us understand the installation- and upgrade process, the placement of software within the file system hierarchy,

¹Nowadays, the term is more commonly used when referring to a specific Linux flavor, but recall from Chapter 2.1.1 that the “D” in “BSD” stands for “distribution”: the idea of bundling different software packages and making them available as a well-defined release has been around for quite some time.




Figure 5.3: We define a software layer stack consisting of “Add-on Applications”, “System Software” and “Applications/Utilities”, the kernel, and firmware, some of which may be controlled via a package management system. Interactions between these types are illustrated as arrows, but it is important to note that none of these distinctions are precise.

how system configuration files and software runtime changes are handled and hopefully gain a better understanding of how to tune and maintain our systems.

5.3 File System Layout

In Section 4.6, we briefly summarized the hierarchical tree-like structure of the Unix file system layout and noted that the purpose or common use of the different subdirectories as described on many Unix versions in the `hier(7)` manual page. Unfortunately, this layout is not standardized and different versions of Unix have, for historical reasons as well as purely by coincidence or developers’ preferences, diverged. But almost all Unix versions do still share a number of common directories, especially as far as the base OS is concerned.

In the early days of Unix, disk space was still expensive, and it was not uncommon to split the files of the operating system across multiple devices. As the system boots up, it obviously requires a number of files to be present and services to run before it can mount any other partitions or disks. For this reason, Unix systems used to have a small root partition (mounted at `/`, pronounced “slash”), sufficient to boot the OS, with additional software stored on a separate disk, commonly mounted under `/usr`. `/` contained all the system binaries (found in `/bin`) and libraries (found in `/lib`) to perform

basic system maintenance, while so-called “user” binaries and libraries were found in `/usr/bin` and `/usr/lib` respectively; the use of the different `bin` and `lib` directories themselves already hints at a clear definition of purpose.

Since costs for disk space have come down so far as to no longer be a limiting factor, it is nowadays rare to find a Unix system that actually has `/usr` on a separate device from the root partition. Nevertheless, this historical distinction remains useful: it illustrates careful forethought with regards to the placement of and interactions amongst software components, which is worth reviewing in detail. Listing 5.3 shows an excerpt of the `hier(7)` manual page on a NetBSD system. The definitions there overlap with those given in the “Filesystem Hierarchy Standard” [2], a formalization of this same old hierarchy overseen by the Linux Foundation.

Due to the previously mentioned traditional separation of `/` and `/usr`, it is not surprising to see a similar subtree reflecting the root file system under `/usr`. That is, we find subdirectories named `bin`, `lib`, `libexec`, `sbin` and `share`, with each having a similar purpose as under the root. On many systems, we also find the `/usr/local` directory as a specific location for files that are not part of the base OS. This directory has become the default location for any “add-on” software, and it is thus not very surprising that it also mirrors the general root hierarchy to some extent.

Note that `/usr` contains a subdirectory named `share` for so-called “architecture independent data-files”. As the name suggests, the files in this location are intended to be able to be shared across multiple system. Another directory with a particularly descriptive name is `/var`, for “variable” or transient data, known to change at runtime.

These two directories already hint at two major properties of files found on any Unix system, each with distinct implications on where or how they might best be organized [2], and each deriving from standards and best practices of the early days of Unix:

Shareable versus **unshareable** content: Data files that remain the same across multiple hosts, and, as the manual page suggests, possibly even across different hardware architectures are considered *shareable*. Flat text files or simple system databases that are not used for runtime configuration such as manual pages, timezone or terminal information, are good examples.² This

²It should be noted that across hosts of a uniform hardware architecture most binaries are also common candidates for shareable directories, and it was, in fact, not uncommon

NAME	hier — layout of filesystems
DESCRIPTION	An outline of the filesystem hierarchy.
/	root directory of the system
/bin/	utilities used in both single and multi-user environments
/etc/	system configuration files and scripts
/lib/	dynamic linked libraries used by dynamic linked programs (such as those in /bin/ and /sbin/) that cannot rely upon /usr/lib/ being available.
/libexec/	system utilities (such as the dynamic linker) required by programs and libraries that cannot rely upon /usr/libexec/ being available.
/sbin/	system programs and administration utilities used in both single-user and multi-user environments
/tmp/	temporary files, usually a mfs(8) memory-based file system (the contents of /tmp are usually not preserved across a system reboot)
/usr/	contains the majority of the system utilities and files
bin/	common utilities, programming tools, and applications
lib/	archive, profiled, position independent archive, and shared libraries
libexec/	system daemons & system utilities (executed by other programs)
sbin/	system daemons and system utilities (normally executed by the super-user)
share/	architecture-independent text files
/var/	multi-purpose log, temporary, transient, and spool files
log/	miscellaneous system log files
run/	system information files, rebuilt after each reboot
tmp/	temporary files that are not discarded between system reboots
SEE ALSO	apropos(1), ls(1), whatis(1), whereis(1), which(1), paths(3)
HISTORY	A hier manual page appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.

Listing 5.3: Excerpt of the **hier(7)** manual page.

data frequently remains unchanged throughout day-to-day operations – that is, it only changes if it is intentionally and specifically updated. Note that these files may at times overlap with some “local” data (i.e. files not included in the base OS).

Data files that need to be individual to each host are considered *unshareable*. Sometimes this is due to the fact that the data simply changes at runtime (such as a system’s log files), other times it is because these files define a unique feature of a given host (most files under the `/etc` directory fall into this category). Note that once again these files may at times overlap with certain “local” data.

Static versus **variable** data: Files that are not expected to change during the runtime of the system are considered *static*. This includes the kernel, all system libraries and binaries and many data files. Note that these files may, of course, be changed when the system is upgraded, for example, but are not modified under normal circumstances.

Files that are updated by the OS, by any running applications or by end-users at runtime, are termed *variable*. That is, we anticipate that these files will be created, modified, updated, or removed. Some may see frequent or even continuous updates (such as the various log files), while others only see comparatively rare modifications (such as when a system dæmon is restarted).

Combining these four classes of data yields a matrix of files with common locations in the file system hierarchy as illustrated in Table 5.1. Note that not all static data is necessarily shareable, just as not all variable data is necessarily unshareable.

for multiple hosts to share `/usr`, for example. Nowadays, such a setup is a rare exception.

	shareable content	unshareable content
static data	<code>/usr</code>	<code>/boot</code>
	<code>/opt</code>	<code>/etc</code>
variable data	<code>/var/mail</code>	<code>/var/run</code>
	<code>/var/spool/news</code>	<code>/var/lock</code>

Table 5.1: Typical examples of shareable/unshareable vs. static/variable files.

Even though nowadays it is less and less common for multiple Unix system to share specific directories or mount points (perhaps with the exception of users' home directories, which are still frequently accessed over a network file system), the distinction of variable versus static data is of particular importance. Carefully separating these kinds of data will allow you to build systems with separate mount options for these types, which can improve performance and security significantly. As examples, consider a read-only partition for system binaries to prevent accidental or malicious writes to the base OS, or mounting a directory containing system logs using the `noatime` or `noexec` mount options.³

Understanding these criteria also helps make sense of why software providers choose a certain location for their files, or how different package managers may apply the file system hierarchy standard. Beware, however, that not all software providers necessarily understand or follow this matrix or even the general Unix conventions!

5.4 OS Installation

System administrators often maintain large numbers of hosts, and so it comes as no surprise that new machines – both physical and virtual – have to be brought up and integrated into the infrastructure on a regular basis. The more systems are maintained and created, the more this process needs to be automated, but at the end of the day, each one follows the same set of common steps. In an ideal world, these steps could be summarized as requiring the installation of a base operating system with subsequent adjustments for the specific task at hand.

As we will see in this section, each step depends on a large number of variables and site-specific customizations, and so most large-scale organizations have written their own automation framework around a few common tools to accomplish the goal of quick and scalable system and service deployment. In fact, the topic of automated deployment tools is too large to adequately cover here (though we will revisit it in later chapters) and we shall instead focus on the essential concepts needed to understand the requirements for such systems.

Installing a new system is a process unique to each OS; installation methods range from unattended deployment systems using information deter-

³Reference your `mount(8)` manual page for details. Many other options are available.



Figure 5.4: A graphical installer showing an interactive disk partitioning tool.

mined at runtime to create the correct configuration to interactive graphical installers (such as seen in Figure 5.4) allowing users to select amongst common options to create a general purpose Unix server. Understanding the individual steps included is valuable, and we recommend strongly for students to perform this task as a learning exercise (see Problems 6 and 7): sooner or later, any system administrator will find him or herself trying to debug a broken installation, and understanding all the steps performed and what things might have gone wrong in the process are invaluable.

5.4.1 Identifying server requirements

Before a system is installed, a number of important choices have to be made: What file system will be used? What are the requirements of the final system with respect to file I/O? How many partitions will be created? What OS will be installed? What add-on software? What is the final purpose of the machine?

Many of these questions are interdependent and answering one may restrict possible answers to other questions. For example, if the purpose of the server is to run a specific piece of software that is only available for a given OS, then this might also influence a very specific partitioning schema or other file system considerations. In fact, the final purpose of the machine and the software it needs to run will likely dictate your hardware choices – processor architecture, amount of memory and disk space, number or types of network interfaces – which in turn restrict your OS choices.

For example, if you plan on building a highly performant database server able to handle a large number of transactions per second, you can quickly identify the number of CPUs and CPU speed needed, the size of RAM to provide a large in-memory buffer cache, as well as hard drive disk speed and network throughput requirements, but not all operating systems are able to handle with equal efficiency the same amount of CPUs, RAM, or perhaps link aggregation, for example. As a result, your database server may *have to* run e.g. Solaris, even though the rest of your hosts are all running Linux (or vice versa).

On the other hand, it is possible that the cost of running a different OS just for one purpose is not worth the benefit of running the theoretically ideal software. Instead, you might prefer to change your infrastructure architecture and perhaps scale the database horizontally across a number of smaller commodity hardware systems to meet the requirements. Whichever approach you choose, these design decisions need to obviously be made prior to the OS installation itself – changing your OS later on often results in much higher costs, as services have to be migrated, ported, and verified while the server is already in production use, a process that has been likened to changing one's tires on a car travelling on a busy highway at 100 miles per hour.

5.4.2 OS Installation Overview

On a high level, the OS installation process itself consists of a few distinct phases:

- **Hardware identification, provisioning and registration.** Before a new system can be installed, suitable hardware needs to be identified, physically installed, and registered with the inventory system. Depending on the size of your organization, this may be a manual step performed immediately before the OS installation is started, or it

might be done continuously in a data center where hardware is racked, asset tags scanned and information automatically entered into a pool of “ready to install” systems.

- **Base OS installation.** The installation of the software itself. Even though any reasonable deployment system combines these steps, we distinguish between the basic OS and additional software added (or unused components removed), to more clearly illustrate at which point in the process customization to our needs tends to happen.
- **Installation of add-on applications.** In this step, we transform the generic OS into a server with a specific purpose. The installation of the right add-on applications may entail fetching software updates over the network from a remote system or even building binaries from sources on the fly.
- **Initial minimum system configuration.** After all software has been installed, a number of very basic configuration steps have to be performed. This phase may include setting a hostname, applying a specific network configuration, adding user accounts or enabling certain system daemons. Note that in most cases a *configuration management system* is installed, which will perform this (and then ongoing) customization.
- **System registration.** When all software is installed and configured and the system is ready to run and fulfill its purpose, we need to integrate it into our larger infrastructure. Our inventory of which systems perform which function needs to be updated, our monitoring system needs to be made aware of this host, other components with which this server interacts may need to be updated etc. It is important to consider this “paperwork” to be part of *installation*, lest it be deprioritized or forgotten.
- **System restart.** Finally, the system needs to be rebooted at least once before it is put into service. This ensures that it can boot off the right media, all daemons start up, the network is functional, the system can be monitored and in general everything behaves exactly as it should. It is important to always include this step: during the installation process the system is in a very different state than under normal circumstances, and it is possible to forget to enable or disable a

service. Placing the system into production use without a fresh reboot might lead to unexpected results when the system is rebooted at a later point.

Obviously, each of these steps consists of many smaller substeps; how exactly each of these main objectives is accomplished depends heavily on the size of the organization, the resources available, and the level of automation required. In addition, there is a thin line between *system deployment* and *system configuration*. As mentioned, the OS installation always includes at the very least a few minimal configuration steps, but some of the steps noted above may be considered part of a configuration management system's first run. That is, much like the distinction between add-on software and core system components, there exists a discrepancy between what aspects of a server's configuration are to be defined at installation time and which ones are dynamically determined at runtime. We will cover this in more detail in Chapter 7; for the time being, let us merely state that one way or another the system, once completely installed and set up, is configured for its final purpose.

Magic Deployment



Around early 2007, during my time at Yahoo! Inc., I worked together with a number of people on a deployment system suitable to quickly build new Unix systems and bring them up, ready to serve production traffic. As so many other shops, we, too, chose to develop our own solution instead of using an existing commercial or open-source system for this purpose. Our setup was “special”, unique, different from whatever the existing solutions provided – just like everybody else’s. (For what it’s worth, this also well predates scalable deployment engines and other IaaS solutions such as e.g. OpenStack.)

As a friend of mine once remarked, you’re not truly a system administrator until you have written your own deployment system. Or configuration management system. Or inventory database. Or parallel secure shell to perform tasks across all of your host. Or...

Anyway, the system we wrote was elegant, and it taught us a lot about the details of the OS installation process. Our goal was to allow hardware to be delivered to the datacenter, be physically racked and their

asset tags scanned, and then not require any more physical contact to be deployed, while at the same time allow existing systems to be rebuilt or decommissioned as needed.

Our final solution used IPMI to power on the host, DHCP to assign a system *profile* to the hardware (derived from a central database, where the system was identified by the asset tag), and a `pxeboot` process to run the system through a number of stages. In the initial stage, the system would power up, identify and apply any pending firmware upgrades, and then check if it was ready to be deployed. If not, it would go into a special “inventory” state and power down.

When a number of hosts (frequently in the order of tens or hundreds) had to be deployed, the system would select suitable hardware from the pool of “inventory” systems, power them on, send them through the initial stage again – since it was possible that a lot of time had passed since they were first provisioned, additional firmware updates might have been necessary – and then enter the OS-specific installation phase.

In this phase, the server was configured for its final purpose: the correct OS and network configuration was installed, software packages were deployed according to the systems’ profiles, user accounts added and finally the system registered in the central database as being ready for production traffic.

We programmed this system from afar, but the first time we went to a datacenter to see it in action, we were pleasantly surprised how well it worked: without any physical interaction, we could see racks of servers suddenly power up, install, reboot and start taking traffic based on a simple hardware provisioning request.

Arthur C. Clarke once remarked that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic”, and so we proudly named the project “Magic Deployment”. Three years later, the system was obsoleted by a new, more flexible system, re-written from scratch, ready to adapt to the evolving requirements of this large company...

5.4.3 OS Installation Details

The list of phases outlined in the previous section can be further refined. It is clear that a number of these steps are likely (and necessarily) dependent on and intricately intertwined with a number of your organization’s infrastructure components, such as an inventory system or a database keeping track of configuration types or service roles, for example.

This integration into the larger infrastructure ecosystem of a company tends to be complicated, which is why most of these organizations end up writing their own custom software for this purpose. However, eventually all of these systems, be they custom, proprietary, public, open source, developed by the OS provider or by a third party – all of them have to perform the same basic steps to actually get the OS onto the disks. Most installers hide the details of these steps from the ordinary end-user, but, hey, we’re system administrators – let’s take a look under the hood!

1. **Boot the system.**⁴ This entails a decision of which media to boot from. Manual installations tend to be performed by booting from a CD/DVD, while automated, unattended installs have for years relied on booting the system from the network using the *Preboot eXecution Environment (PXE)*, which utilizes a combination of protocols such as *DHCP*, *TFTP*, *NFS* and/or memory-based filesystems to load a small version of the OS – such as, for example, the Linux *initial ramdisk (initrd(4))* – which then performs all the steps to actually install the final system.
2. **Identify disk(s).** Once booted, the install process needs to identify all available disks. This requires the “miniroot” to include or be able to load any drivers required to access the storage devices in question.
3. **Create partition table(s).** Before the system can be installed, the disks identified in the previous step need to be partitioned. This includes both the creation of a suitable BIOS partition table (via e.g. `fdisk(8)`) and/or the OS-specific disk label such as `disklabel(8)`.

⁴Note: with an eye towards security, we should mention in this context the concepts of *trustworthy computing* and e.g. *hardware attestation*, which may provide assurance that the system has not been tampered with prior to our booting it. We will revisit this important topic in some detail in Chapter 11.

At this step, we also need to decide on which of the available disks will become the target root device, i.e. which will contain the root file system, and where the other disks and partitions will be mounted later on.

4. **Create file system(s).** Each partition defined in the previous step needs to be formatted for its respective file system. It is important to pass the correct flags to `mkfs(8)/newfs(8)` since, as we discussed in Section 4.7, most file system features cannot (easily) be tuned at run time.
5. **Make the system bootable.** At some point after the disks have been partitioned and before the host is rebooted for the first time, it needs to be made bootable.⁵ The details depend again on the OS in question, but generally involve the installation of the disk bootstrap software in the MBR and the configuration of the first and second stage boot loader, for example via `installboot(8)` or `grub(1)`.
6. **Install the OS.** Finally we have reached the point where the actual OS is installed. This generally requires the retrieval of the system’s base packages or archive files from a CD or DVD, via NFS from another server or (perhaps via FTP) from a remote host (an approach which brings with it a number of security implications – how do you verify source authenticity and integrity? – and in which case initial network configuration of the miniroot system is a pre-requisite).

After the data files have been retrieved, they are extracted or the necessary packages installed into the target root device. Many interactive installers allow the user to select different sets of software to install and/or will automatically identify additional packages as required.

7. **Install add-on software.** After the base OS has been installed, any optional software may be added, based on either the system’s configuration or interactive user input. Depending on the installer, this step may be combined with the previous step. We explicitly note this as a separate step, since “add-on” software here may not only include optional packages from our OS vendor, but also your own software, such as your

⁵The order of this step is not important, but leaving it out will yield a server unable to start up without manual intervention.

configuration management system, third-party applications licensed to your organization, or your software product or serving stack.

8. **Basic system configuration.** As we mentioned before, any server requires ongoing maintenance that, in large part, is performed by automated systems performing configuration management. But regardless of whether or not such a (complex) system is integrated into the OS installation process, there are a few things that need to be defined at install time. This usually includes a host's network configuration and hostname, timezone, NTP and syslog servers, root password, and services started at boot time, to name just a few examples.
9. **Reboot.** Finally, after the system has been installed and basic configuration performed, it needs to be rebooted. At this time, the host boots the way it would under normal circumstances and enters a "first boot". This stage in a host's deployment process tends to be significantly different from a normal boot: a number of services are run for the first time, and further initial system configuration and system registration (as noted above) is likely to take place.

Since this initial boot sequence may install software upgrades and change the runtime configuration, it is advisable to reboot the host *another* time after this "first boot". This ensures that the system does in fact come up in precisely the same state as it would in the future.

Listing 5.4 shows the most basic steps to perform a minimal OS installation. It is interesting to analyze each of them (and contrast the sequence for different operating systems), as doing so often illustrates a number of assumptions made about the use of the software. The ease with which an OS installation can be automated (at scale!) shows how much the OS provider has prepared their system for a wide variety of use cases. System defaults, such as what services are enabled and started by default, speak volumes about general design philosophies. Similarly, the selection of software bundled with the OS reflects on the target audience for a given OS.

Deploying a new host requires more than just installing an operating system, however. The system needs to be incorporated into our larger infrastructure, which may entail updates to a number of inventories or databases that keep track of an organizations assets or the various hosts' purposes. This integration is necessarily very different from site to site and unfortunately

```

# fdisk -f -u -0 -s 169/63/4194241 /dev/rwd0d
# fdisk -f -c /usr/mdec/mbr /dev/rwd0d
# fdisk -f -a -0 /dev/rwd0d
# disklabel -e -I wd0
[...]
4 partitions:
#      size    offset  fstype [ fsiz bsize cpg/sgs ]
a: 4194241        63 4.2BSD    0     0     0 # (Cyl.      0*- 4161*)
c: 4194241        63 4.2BSD    0     0     0 # (Cyl.      0*- 4161*)
d: 4194304         0 unused    0     0     0 # (Cyl.      0 - 4161*)
#/sbin/newfs -O 2 /dev/rwd0a
/dev/rwd0a: 2048.0MB (4194240 sectors) block size 16384,
fragment size 2048 using 12 cylinder groups of
170.67MB, 10923 blks, 21504 inodes.
super-block backups (for fsck_ffs -b #) at:
32, 349568, 699104, 1048640, 1398176, 1747712, 2097248, 2446784,
.
.
.
# mount -o async /dev/rwd0a /mnt
# for pkg in base comp etc games man misc modules text kern-GENERIC; do
    tar zxf /i386/binary/sets/${pkg}.tgz -C /mnt
done
# cp /mnt/usr/mdec/boot /mnt/boot
# /usr/sbin/installboot -v -o timeout=5 /dev/rwd0a \
    /mnt/usr/mdec/bootxx_ffsv2
File system:          /dev/rwd0a
Primary bootstrap:  /usr/mdec/bootxx_ffsv2
Boot options:        timeout 5, flags 0, speed 9600, ioaddr 0, console pc
# cd /mnt/dev && ./MAKEDEV all
# shutdown -r now

```

Listing 5.4: Manual installation of NetBSD using the `fdisk(8)`, `disklabel(8)`, `newfs(8)`, and `installboot(8)` commands.

frequently not suitably abstracted into a general API that an installer might integrate with. As a result, most system administrators do end up writing their own deployment system and/or helper tools, calling into the various operating systems' specific installers, and adding their own customizations.

One of the many customizations included in any software deployment system includes the extent to which add-on software is controlled. Getting the right software onto the machine is part of the installation process, but there is more to managing applications and configuration files than copying files from one place to another. In the next section, we will take a closer look at this topic.

5.5 Package Management Systems

Even though software installation methods across different Unix versions can generally be achieved using the same set of manual commands, most third-party software is added using the operating system’s native package management tools to ensure a tight integration with the OS as well as a consistent and predictable file system hierarchy.

As we discussed earlier, almost all Unix systems have a distinction between what they consider to be part of the “base OS” and what is considered an “add-on” application. For some versions, such as the BSD derived systems, this distinction is clear and extends to the way that the software is installed and maintained: the core operating system is provided in software archives or built from source, while all other software is installed through the use of a set of specific, native tools managing a system-wide package inventory.

Other Unix versions take a different approach: in order to better express software dependencies on the OS and its capabilities, as well as to make it easier for system administrators to manage *all* software, including OS or core-component upgrades using the same set of tools, they break all software into individual packages. This provides the benefit of a more consistent user experience in controlling software across all layers of the stack, but it is easy to lose the distinction of which parts are essential components of the operating system, and which are optional. As many vendors strive to provide an OS suitable for many different purposes, including as a general Unix workstation, a desktop system, or a web server, more and more software is included in a given OS release – a lot of it unnecessarily so.

5.5.1 “Manual” Software Installation

Regardless of which package management system is provided by the OS vendor, across all Unix versions system administrators may at times choose to install software “by hand”, that is, by manually downloading and possibly building the software before copying it into the desired location. With a plethora of available open source software, it is the rule more than the norm that an application you wish to install is available only in source form, not as a binary package. The sequence of commands to install most such software (`./configure; make; make install`) has become a ubiquitous part of a system administrator’s life, but unfortunately this approach does not scale

well: a package management system not only *installs* software, but, as the name suggests, *manages* it. That is, it provides tools that can identify which files belong to which package, that allow you to delete a package (and only do so if the files provided by this package are not required by other software), and to pull in additional software to meet prerequisites.⁶

Nevertheless, at times there are good reasons to choose a manual installation method, if only for evaluation purposes of the software or perhaps as a first step prior to deployment on a larger scale. These include:

- **Availability.** There are tens of thousands of applications and libraries available, but not all software providers package their software. In other words, you may simply have no choice but to (initially) build the software from source by hand.

Nowadays a lot of software developers target almost exclusively specific Linux versions for their releases, so that even if a package may exist for this platform, you still have to build your own if you are running any other system.

- **Customization and Optimization.** By using pre-compiled binary packages, you give up a certain amount of control over the installed software. When building from source, you have the option to specify configuration options (such as including support for certain features normally disabled) or to create executables that are specifically optimized for your target platform.
- **Adding Support for your OS.** Sometimes software provided to you will not work correctly, not work at all, or not even build on your specific OS⁷. With access to the source code, you can – often with minimal effort – port the software to your platform.
- **Adding/removing features.** Binary packages are built to target the largest user base possible. As a result, they tend to include built-in

⁶Commercial software tends to be provided in binary packages, where one does not have the liberty to configure either its prerequisites or final installation destination. We still have to identify and ensure the availability of all software that this product relies on.

⁷A famous quote, often referred to as *Sturgeon's revelation*, says: “90% of everything is crud.” It refers to the fact that within any domain, only a small percentage of the work exhibits excellence. This most certainly seems to hold for software, and if you are not running the most popular and latest Linux version, you often find yourself having to patch and fix the software you are installing.

support for all possible features, including those that you may not have any use for or that may actually be undesirable in your environment.

Along the same lines, you may be able to fix or eliminate security vulnerabilities that have been discovered, but not yet included in an official package.

- **Use of latest version.** Sometimes you may be interested in using the latest release of a given piece of software, for example to take advantage of a new feature or a bug fix. If binary packages are not yet provided for this version, then building the software yourself may yet be an option.
- **Security.** If you download and install binaries from the internet, you are inherently trusting the sites from which you retrieve the executables as well as the transport mechanisms by which you did retrieve them. You are implicitly trusting the build system and the access restrictions of the software provider.

Now all of these are good reasons to compile the software from source, and system administrators routinely do build applications “by hand”, tuning the configuration and specifying preferred installation prefixes, but this step is only the prerequisite to finally *packaging* the software such that your systems can be managed consistently using a small set of tools.

It is imperative to not consider the process of downloading and compiling software without the use of a package manager a reasonable software management or deployment solution. We cannot maintain a coherent and reliable system in this manner: when the time comes to update or remove the software, there will be no telling what other system components might be relying on its presence in this particular version.

5.5.2 Software Installation by Package Manager

System administrators know the package managers in use on their systems inside and out: they juggle RPM .spec or Debian .deb files, create FreeBSD *ports* or add build files to a cross-platform package build system like *pkgsrc*; they rip open vendor provided installers and re-package software provided in one format using another. If this sounds like a lot of work to you... it is. But in doing so, you can take advantage of the many benefits a consistently used package management system provides:




Figure 5.5: Dependency graph for the “Wireshark” package, a popular network protocol analyzer. Package management systems help track such intricate dependencies.

- **Easy package installation.** The most obvious and frequent use of the package manager is to install software. These tools usually allow you to only specify a name, and they will fetch all required files (including prerequisites) from the Internet, your intranet, or a local storage medium and install all the files with the right permissions in the right places.
 - **Automatic resolution of software dependencies.** Most software relies on specific libraries to be present on a system in order to run. Sometimes the requirements are restricted to an operating system, a kernel version or another core system component, but more often than not a piece of software requires you to install other packages in order to be able to use it.

These software dependencies quickly grow complex: consider the requirements expressed in the graph shown in Figure 5.5: in order to be able to use a single piece of software, thirty (!) other components needed to be installed. Updating any one of these could lead to problems further down in the graph – and this is only a subgraph of the entire system’s dependency tree!

Package management systems keep track of these dependencies and allow you to automatically add pre-requisite software packages as well as prevent you from accidentally removing a component relied on by other packages.

- **Package inventory.** As software is installed, the package manager keeps track of which packages are added, allowing you to get a full list

of all software names and version numbers in use on any given host. This, in turn, makes it easy for you to identify any required updates, as package managers allow you to check whether or not newer versions of any given package might be available.

Some systems even integrate security checks: by comparing the list of installed packages to one or more lists of publicly known software vulnerabilities, you can get alerted when an exploit affecting your hosts has been announced. Even if a fix has not yet been released, this information is invaluable, as often you are able to take other measures to mitigate the risk.

- **File inventory.** One of the most essential properties of any package manager is that it tracks which files belong to which package, allowing you to easily identify the purpose of any file or to at least lead you to more information about it.
- **File integrity.** Since the package manager already maintains a file inventory, it is trivial to also track checksums for all files that are installed – in fact, most already do. This can be used as the basis for a simple host-based intrusion detection system.
- **Security.** By downloading source code and compiling it on your systems, you are inherently trusting the sites from which you retrieve the code as well as the transport mechanisms by which you did retrieve them. You are implicitly trusting the remote code repository and access restrictions on those systems. That is, you win no security assurances unless you manually audit all code paths and all dependencies. This is simply not practical. Using signed binaries or packages provided by the software project maintainers overcomes many of the issues here.

(It is no coincidence that this last bullet point reflects the security concerns we noted in the previous section.)

By using a package management solution, we can build a central software inventory, which we can then map to a host's function. By defining conceptual roles a host may perform, the software (and in particular what versions of the given software) to be installed becomes a configuration option that can easily change at runtime. This in turn gives us significant advantages in our three desired key areas: scalability, simplicity, and security. In order to

```
$ sudo yum install screen
Password:
Setting up Install Process
Resolving Dependencies
[...]
Updated:
  screen.x86_64 0:4.0.3-16.el6

Complete!
$ rpm -ql screen
/etc/pam.d/screen
/etc/screenrc
/usr/bin/screen
[...]
$ rpm -qf /usr/share/man/man1/screen.1.gz
screen-4.0.3-16.el6.x86_64
$
```

Listing 5.5: Example invocations of the *rpm/yum* package manager to add a package, list its files and identify the name of a package a given file belongs to.

ensure system consistency across large numbers of hosts, we can more easily integrate binary packages into our service inventory and deployment system (“hosts functioning as web servers will get the `apache-2.4.3` package installed”) and software upgrades or patches can consistently be applied using the same set of tools; we significantly simplify virtually all operations that require a lookup of what files are present on which hosts, what version of what software is running at a given time and how to perform upgrades with both simple or complex dependencies; by tracking all software versions and the files the packages contain, we can easily check for known vulnerabilities and quickly patch the software.

None of this is possible without the use of a package management system, but these benefits come with a price: the packaging system must be used consistently for *all* software. The act of adding a piece of software outside this mechanism opens up the possibility for a broken dependency graph and often triggers future “forced” installations of packages (i.e. overriding warnings about unmet dependencies, since the packaging system has no way of knowing what we installed outside of its catalog) and finally the loss of a coherent inventory.

```
$ pkg_add wireshark pkgdepgraph graphviz
$ pkg_info -n wireshark
Information for wireshark-1.8.3:

Requires:
gtk2+>=2.24.12nb3
glib2>=2.32.4nb1
pcre>=8.30nb1
lua>=5.1.4nb1
libsmi>=0.4.5nb1
libgcrypt>=1.4.6nb2
gnutls>=3.0.17

$ pkgdepgraph -S ++wireshark | \
    dot -Tpng > wireshark-dependencies.png
```

Listing 5.6: Example invocations of the *pkgsrc* package manager and related tools to visualize package dependencies. Figure 5.5 was created using these commands.

Hence it is crucial to be consistent and perform the at times tedious and frustrating work of (re-)packaging software in the format that best integrates with your deployment and management solutions. This gets increasingly difficult, as individual programming languages nowadays come with multiple (!) language-specific package managers of their own (see Figure 5.6), as each language develops its own ecosystem of software components that their creators cannot provide for *all* possible package managers.

Finally, need to make sure to *also* build packages for all of the software that we do not retrieve from other sources, for our own software. That is, when we build software, we have to package it up and integrate it into our software inventory. As we will see in Chapter 9, system administrators write a *lot* of software: we write small and simple tools just as we write large and complex infrastructure components; all of these need to be installed, updated, maintained. Our own software is no different from software provided by others, and so we owe it to ourselves to package it properly as well.



Figure 5.6: Screengrabs of tweets illustrating the circular dependencies of language-specific package managers ca. 2014.

5.5.3 Inherent Security Risks

When we install any software, no matter which method we use, we are exposing our system to the risk of a software Trojan, the accidental installation of a backdoor, a piece of malware. In an ideal world, we would verify the integrity of the software and review what it does, what resources it utilizes and what information it accesses, receives or sends. Unfortunately, doing this for all the software we download and install is simply not possible, and so we routinely fetch code from the Internet, compile it and install the resulting executable.

When we perform these steps, we trust that the code we are about to install is not malicious because... well, we just assume that if it was, surely somebody else would have noticed. And besides, the website we downloaded it from looked rather nice, too. But suppose that even if we knew that the software we want to download is not malicious, how do we know that we are in fact getting it from the website that we *think* it's coming from?

In theory, we can ensure the integrity of the download by only using secure transport mechanisms (over TLS, for example) and by verifying a checksum published on the website in question after the download. In practice, doing this work does, once again, not scale: there simply is too much software released without any such information. Fortunately for us, a good package manager can help in this area, too!

The build process for most software package management systemsulti-

mately requires a human to decide what sources to build the software from, and so we are, when using the resulting binary packages, shifting our trust from the software provider to the software *package* provider. Often, these two are the same person or within the same organizations, but in some cases, the party providing the package is not the owner or developer of the software in question. Just think of the thousands of RPM or Debian packages provided by RedHat or Ubuntu, or the software re-packaged by the FreeBSD *ports* or NetBSD *pkgsrc* systems.

What's more, all software package management systems need to be able to not only install files, but to run certain commands required for the proper installation and configuration of the software in question. To this end, they provide the capability for a given package to execute an arbitrary shell script provided in the package, with the privileges of the invoking user – commonly the superuser.

In other words, it is important to understand that any time we use a package manager to retrieve and install software for us from the Internet, we effectively let it fetch and execute unknown code on our systems. That is, not only do we trust the package manager locally – as well as the software author(s) – we *also* (and implicitly) trust the people who run and maintain the package repositories. These repositories are managed by system administrators like ourselves – mere mortals, as highly as we may think of ourselves – and every once in a while mistakes are made, and accounts are compromised, putting at risk users of the software hosted there worldwide.⁸

Then what is the solution to this problem? Well, unfortunately there simply isn't a solution. We can build more and more complex systems that provide better authenticity and better assurance of integrity, but at the end of the day, we still have to place trust into systems built and maintained by others. Ken Thompson's Turing award acceptance speech “Reflections on Trusting Trust”[4] cannot remain unmentioned in this context. If you are not familiar with this short paper, look it up on the Internet – it's Zen-like moral will change how you regard system security.

Despite our having to trust so many components outside our control, and despite the fact that we cannot eliminate all risks involved, it is important

⁸In 2003, the GNU Project's primary FTP server was compromised. The possible impact of this is staggering, given the number of projects that are relying on the software provided there. During the clean-up after the event, every software package had to painstakingly be verified against known good checksums, which in many cases were missing and had to be first identified from other sources.

that we are aware of them. A good package manager will provide you with reasonable options to automatically determine updates from trusted sources and optionally even apply them. This requires a significant reliance on the trustworthiness of the package manager, and only when we understand the risks can we make informed decisions. Perhaps we'll be even a little bit more careful and observant about how and where our package management system retrieves its data from or what other resources we allow it to use.

5.6 Managing Software Updates and Patches

Despite the security concerns, we have praised package management systems in the previous section as a reasonable solution to many problems. Unfortunately, updating software remains fundamentally difficult and carries significant risk. Every time you change a system component, you are introducing new elements into your environment and the probability of unexpected side-effects increases the larger the change set is.

“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” has become many a system administrator’s mantra, meaning that unless you have a *very* good reason to change something on a system that is currently running and not experiencing any problems, you shouldn’t do so. This simple lesson needs to be learned over and over again by every system administrator, and it appears it cannot be learned without a modicum of self-inflicted pain.⁹

At the same time, we require agility and high confidence in our ability to apply significant changes, to perform package and OS upgrades on a regular basis. These conflicting goals – stability and agility – will be part of our discussion of managing system services in Chapter 12.

The benefit of a package manager’s dependency resolution has the often undesired result that a number of pre-requisites or dependencies further down the graph need to also be updated when a simple software change to a single package was desired. Therefore, *all* software updates need to be treated with great care.

The conservative stance hence remains to leave your system running as is instead of chasing every new software release, every minor OS update or even

⁹Part of this lesson is to understand that a security problem may very well require us to judge the software as “broken” as any functional bug or a decrease in usability.

to not bother applying patches if a software vulnerability appears to not directly impact you. Unfortunately, this will make it the more likely that *when* an upgrade finally is required, it will pull with it a significant number of other changes. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem; every system administrator has to make these decisions for themselves according to their specific environment. Until experience allows you to confidently make this call, it is probably wise to consider any known security issue to at least warrant very careful analysis of the possible impact.

When evaluating the need to upgrade a piece of software, it is important to consider a number of factors:

- **Be aware of software updates.** In order to be able to judge whether or not your software needs to be updated, you first need to know when new releases are available and what features they might include. Most operating systems provide a channel with regular information about release updates – make sure to subscribe to these. Likewise, you probably should track the development process of all your major infrastructure components or important products (inside or outside your organization).
- **Track security updates and announcements.** Your software provider (OS or otherwise) is likely to have a mailing list or other information channel dedicated to security updates for their software. You should follow these and make sure to evaluate all updates with particular attention.

In addition, you should subscribe to some of the mailing lists where vendor-neutral public security announcements are posted.¹⁰ It is not uncommon to first hear about a vulnerability for one piece of software here, only to find out later on that it also applies to other variations you might be running.

- **Consider privilege escalation possibilities.** Sometimes there are vulnerabilities that do not seem to apply to your specific environment, but that can become severe when combined with another low-risk vulnerability. Make sure to consider all aspects of how your systems might

¹⁰The “Bugtraq” and “Full Disclosure” mailing lists are two examples. Searching the Internet for these terms should quickly yield the right results.

be accessed or used when assessing the severity of any known vulnerability in the software that you run. (We will cover this in more detail in chapter 11.)

- **Consider the impact of updating *shared libraries*.** The benefit of using shared libraries (no need to update all software components using these libraries) can become a drawback when a widely used library needs to be updated. As much as software providers attempt to provide backwards compatibility, sometimes it is (intentionally or coincidentally) broken. Software using this library may suddenly start to behave erratic or completely stop to function. Other upgrades may even be known to break certain dependent systems.

It is important to test your software upgrades to ensure at least the most basic compatibility is preserved, but since it is impossible to exercise all possible code paths, you should also weigh the possible impact the upgrade may have against the benefits provided by the upgrade.

- **Consider the impact of updating *static libraries*.** This may generally be thought of as a less frequent use case, but some components may be provided to you or installed on your systems using statically linked libraries. However, in the last couple of years (between 2012 and 2017), we have seen a tremendous influx of the use of the “Go” programming language (which produces statically linked binaries) as well as – effectively – by way of containers. Here, the update of a package providing the library has no effect on the applications using this library or the software running inside a container – in order for the change to take effect, these applications would need to be re-linked, the containers to be restarted.
- **Restart applications after the software update.** In order to ensure that all updates have actually taken effect, it is usually necessary to restart at least the application(s) in question, if not reboot the entire system (such as in the case of a kernel or core library upgrade). This implies a service disruption of anywhere from a few seconds to several minutes or even longer.¹¹

¹¹This brings with it the problem of system-wide atomicity of software upgrades: it is generally not advised to run a given service using different versions of their software across multiple systems. Upgrading all hosts at the same time, however, carries the risk

- **Verify the integrity of your updates.** When you receive software updates, it is important to verify that they are in fact updates provided by your provider. Most software distributors cryptographically sign all their releases (including software patches), making it easy for you to check the integrity of the update.

Similarly, and depending on the scale of your organization, your own infrastructure tools used to roll out updates should automatically check all software updates in this manner.

- **Create your own patches.** At times, you will find yourself in a situation where you need to update a piece of software, but the provider has not (yet) released a patch. In some cases you may be able to avoid the problem at hand by removing or restricting certain functionality; other times, you may be able to fix the problem yourself.

If you are able to create a patch for a given vulnerability, to add a desired feature, or to merge another update from a different source, please consider contributing it back to both the original software creators, as well as to the general public community around the software. Others will surely appreciate this help!

As you can tell, the above considerations suggest that determining when, or even *if*, you can upgrade software is far from easy and requires an intimate understanding of all the details of the running system. Even though you can automate the updates of your software across even hundreds of thousands of hosts, you cannot automate making the decision to upgrade. As a system administrator, this burden is on you.

5.7 Conclusions

In this chapter we have taken a closer look at how software is installed on a system. As we reviewed the boot process, we distinguished between different types of software, and identified a few distinct categories: firmware and device drivers, the kernel managing all hardware and interfacing with the

of breaking functionality (not to mention overall service down time). Deploying such upgrades in a controlled manner across large numbers of systems is beyond the scope of this chapter; in fact, it easily warrants an entire book by itself. We'll scratch that surface in Chapter 12.

drivers, a number of core system components such as essential system tools and libraries, basic applications and utilities required to make the system usable, and finally entirely optional add-on applications. The distinction between these categories has proven to be difficult to make, which is why we have further divided types of software by their place in the file system hierarchy into the four categories of being “shareable”, “unshareable”, “static” or “variable”.

We have looked at the steps required to install an operating system and discussed the need for a package management solution to keep track of all files on the system, as well as the implications of any required software upgrades. A package management system, a requirement for addressing a number of problems when maintaining large systems with many pieces of software installed, does not come without its price, however. As we have stressed, it is important to make *consistent* use of the chosen package manager, but this has become increasingly difficult: on the one hand, configuration management tools are able to manipulate files “owned” by the package management system; on the other, not all software you need to install is available in the given format.

Building your own packages from sources is laborsome. What’s more, it can be frustrating, as you are duplicating work already done by others to some extent. This holds especially true with respect to many programming languages and the many smaller components or modules available for them. Almost every modern programming language nowadays includes its own preferred way of installing language modules (including the search for and retrieval of the “right” version from an online repository). There is an old joke in which people lamenting the existence of too many competing standards get together to create the one true solution only to end up with just one more competing standard with limited adoption. We can see this holding painfully true when we look at how different language developers have all solved the same set of problems (slightly) differently:

Perl has used its CPAN infrastructure for decades; Python uses its pip installer; software written in the Ruby language is often provided as so-called “gems”; Node.js uses its own package manager, called npm; PHP applications or extensions are distributed using the PEAR framework and so on. Each of these tools allows a package to easily express its requirements on other language components, but none of these integrates really flawlessly with other, non language-specific package managers. (See again Figure 5.6 People using the RedHat Package Manager (RPM), for example, end up having to re-

packaging these modules or risk breaking their package consistency model.

Others choose to let yet another tool control the deployment of their software: more than once did we have to note that defining what software packages or versions need to be installed on a system is not a one-time act performed at OS installation time. Instead, controlling what software is added or removed, updated, activated or in other ways manipulated is part of an ongoing process and easily becomes part of the larger topic of Configuration Management. In fact, many configuration management solutions – systems that apply software configuration changes at runtime – include functionality to either require software packages to be present or are even able to install them as needed. We will revisit some of these aspects in coming chapters.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Observe the boot process of various systems in your environment. What kind of firmware, boot loaders and system software is involved? Do you have different boot options leading to a running system with a different kernel or support for different features?
2. Review the manual pages (and/or other documentation) of the boot loader(s) used in your environment. How hard or easy is it to modify the boot process?
3. Review the `hier(7)` manual page on your preferred Unix version. Identify which components are specifically designated for single- and which for multi-user operations of the system. Does the manual page hint at a separation between shareable and unshareable, static and variable data? Compare to two other Unix systems.
4. Cross-reference the examples in Table 5.1 to your system's manual page or build your own matrix to help yourself identify how the traditional Unix file system hierarchy applies this model. Identify three directories for each combination.
5. Considering file system and OS implications, identify the hardware and software requirements for each of the following systems. Research and compare common performance requirements and real world use cases to your suggested solutions.
 - (a) a number of web servers, able to efficiently serve tens of GB of small static files

- (b) a number of web servers, able to efficiently serve dynamic content (using any of the various popular languages and frameworks, such as PHP, Ruby on Rails, Scala, ...)
 - (c) a central server hosting a source code repository (very large amounts of small files with frequent changes, requiring lots of fast I/O and high data redundancy requirements)
 - (d) a general purpose workstation / desktop system
6. Perform a basic OS installation of your Unix flavor of choice on a hard drive (or in an emulator on a disk image). Note the default values chosen by the OS, such as partitioning schema, file system choice, number of packages installed, services enabled and user accounts created. What type of system is the OS optimized for? Do the default installation choices make this OS more or less suitable for any specific use case? Consider the use of the system as a desktop system, a scientific work station, and a generic Internet facing server.
 7. Perform a basic OS installation of your Unix flavor of choice on a hard drive (or in an emulator on a disk image) without using the OS provided installer. That is, perform the steps needed to install an OS on a disk: partition the hard drive, create a new file system, install a boot loader, extract the basic OS sets or install the basic OS packages onto the new disk, add user accounts as needed, enable system services as needed, etc.
 8. Identify the package manager running on your systems and make yourself familiar with it.
 - (a) List all packages installed on your system with version numbers. Identify packages that have other packages depend on them as well as “leaf” packages (those without any other package depending on them). Which package has the most dependencies, which one is the most depended-upon?
 - (b) What are the commands to install a piece of software? To delete a package? To upgrade a package? To downgrade a package?
 - (c) What are the commands to list the files installed by a given package? Given a file name, how do you identify what package it belongs to?

9. Create virtual OS instances of a few different operating systems, such as NetBSD, FreeBSD, different Linux versions, and Solaris.
 - (a) Compare their default installations. What kind of packages are installed on each system? What kind of services are enabled by default?
 - (b) Using their default package management system, install the latest versions of the following software: gcc, perl, python, gnupg, screen, sudo. How does the software installation procedure differ? How can you upgrade or remove the software?
 - (c) Using the *pkgsrc* cross platform package manager, again install the same software into a different prefix. How does the software installation procedure differ from the native package manager? How does it differ across the different systems? How can you upgrade or remove the software?
 - (d) Download the source for the same software from their respective repositories and install it a third time, this time using no package manager at all. That is, follow the installation instructions found in the software package, possibly using the common `./configure; make; sudo make install` sequence. How does the software installation procedure differ across the various systems? How can you upgrade or remove the software?
10. Identify a piece of software you commonly use, but that is not packaged for your primary platform. Create a package for it, then contribute your changes back to the original author(s) of the software.
11. All package management systems have certain drawbacks. Eventually, a lot of people conclude that the only solution to their problems is to write their own. Regardless of the correctness of this conclusion, let us assume you are in this position. How would you design a package manager? Write down the hard requirements it needs to meet, the challenges it needs to overcome, and identify any optional features.
12. Review a recently identified security vulnerability in a popular piece of software. How were the patches or updates made available? Can you verify their authenticity and integrity?

Bibliography

- [1] Abram Silberschatz, Greg Gagne, Peter B. Galvin *Operating System Concepts*, John Wiley & Sons, 2011
- [2] Daniel Quinlan, Paul Russell, Christopher Yeoh (Editors) *Filesystem Hierarchy Standard*, Filesystem Hierarchy Standard Group <http://www.pathname.com/fhs/pub/fhs-2.3.html> (visited November 13, 2012)
- [3] Evi Nemeth, Garth Snyder, Trent R. Hein, Ben Whaley *UNIX and Linux System Administration Handbook*, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, 2010
- [4] Ken Thompson *Reflections on Trusting Trust*, Communication of the ACM, Vol. 27, No. 8, August 1984, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.; also available on the Internet at <http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html> (visited December 5th, 2012)

Chapter 6

Of Users and Groups

We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:

- #1) *Respect the privacy of others.*
 - #2) *Think before you type.*
 - #3) *With great power comes great responsibility.*
- Output of `sudo(8)` upon first invocation.

6.1 Introduction

As was noted in Section 2.2.3, Unix was designed as a multi-tasking, *multi-user* system, allowing simultaneous access by different people. This concept, also found in all of today’s mainstream operating systems as well, demands important safeguards to prevent both accidental as well as intentional (i.e. malicious) access by unauthorized parties. Since this property affects virtually all aspects of system administration – ranging from account management to the way different software components interact with one another – it is important to fully understand the implications of the nature of a multi-user system.

In this chapter, we will discuss the different types of users and groups as well as talk about user authentication on our systems. Note that even though there are many parallels to authentication by remote clients against a service we may offer (such as users logging into our website), in this chapter we restrict ourselves to the “local” systems and how we access them internally.

Even if you are comfortable with the Unix multi-user model, you may still

find that explicitly identifying its inherent requirements and trust models will help in formalizing your access control requirements so as to express and apply them using your configuration management system, as we will discuss in the Chapter 7.

As one of our Pillars of Exceptional System Design, the topic of security weaves through this book like a red thread, and multi-user principles and the implications of different access- and trust levels necessitate a look ahead at topics and ideas discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.1. Hence, discussing the core concepts of *authentication* and *authorization* is a natural requirement and we will attempt to broadly cover them in this chapter as well. But let's not get ahead of ourselves.

6.2 Types of Users

Allowing more than one person access to the resources of a system requires the computer to be able to *distinguish* between different users, which of course is done by providing distinct *user accounts*. When a user wishes to use the system, she identifies herself to the computer (for example by entering her login name), upon which the system authenticates her (for example by prompting her for a password). Upon successful authentication, she is then granted access to her files and/or is allowed to run certain programs. But this simple association of human beings to computer accounts – in the Unix world implemented using numeric *user-IDs* – does not paint a complete picture.

It is easy to assume that different “users” refer to distinct people accessing the resources, and ideally we’d want to keep the mapping between the two sets (“persons”, “accounts”) to be of a 1-to-1 (and *onto*) nature. But we quickly run into problems:

On a typical Unix system, you will find a perhaps surprising number of accounts that are *not* associated with actual human beings at all. To illustrate this, Listing 6.1 displays excerpts of the standard Unix password database, the `/etc/passwd` file, on a NetBSD system. Reviewing the first few rows, we find most of them reference so-called *system accounts*, present to allow specific services to run with only the permissions they need, a concept known as privilege separation or the *Principle of Least Privilege*. This ensures, for example, that a software error in one daemon cannot accidentally lead to access or deletion of files owned by another user.

In addition to these system accounts, we also frequently find what has

```

root:*:0:0:Charlie &:/bin/csh
toor:*:0:0:Bourne-again Superuser:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:*:1:1:The devil himself:/sbin/nologin
bin:*:3:7:Binaries Commands and Source:/sbin/nologin
postfix:*:12:12:& pseudo-user:/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin
named:*:14:14:& pseudo-user:/var/chroot/named:/sbin/nologin
ntpd:*:15:15:& pseudo-user:/var/chroot/ntpd:/sbin/nologin
sshd:*:16:16:& pseudo-user:/var/chroot/sshd:/sbin/nologin
_pflogd:*:18:18:& pseudo-user:/var/chroot/pflogd:/sbin/nologin
nobody:*:32767:39:Unprivileged user:/nonexistent:/sbin/nologin
www:*:1003:1000:apache www user:/nonexistent:/sbin/nologin
spamd:*:1004:1001:Spamd User:/var/chroot/spamd:/sbin/nologin
deploy:*:1234:1234:& User:/var/app:/usr/local/bin/app-update
jschauma:*:1000:100:Jan Schaumann:/home/jschauma:/bin/ksh
alice:*:1001:100:Vincent Damon Furnier:/home/alice:/bin/ksh
bob:*:1007:100:Nesta Robert Marley:/home/bob:/bin/sh

```

Listing 6.1: Excerpt of a typical /etc/passwd file on a NetBSD system

become to be known as *role accounts*: accounts that, while not specifically tied to a single person, are used to allow multiple people to initiate certain well-defined actions. A common example is a role account to allow for automated updates to a given service or application.

In order to manage the resources to be made available to different users, to control the system, to add or remove software etc., we require the use of an omnipotent account, known as the superuser. This account is commonly called the **root** account, and is identified by the numeric user-ID 0.¹ In order to gain superuser privileges, a user needs to either log in as **root**, assume the superuser’s identity via the **su(1)** command, or make use of, for example, the popular **sudo(8)** utility (which also offers some more fine-grained control over who may gain what privileges).

¹As user privileges on a Unix system are only identified by the *effective user-ID* of a given process, the system does not care one bit whether or not the string mapped to the UID 0 happens to be “root” or “bob” or “susan”. That is, superuser accounts with other names are entirely possible; “root” just happens to be one of those old Unix conventions we’ve all grown so accustomed to. It is good practice – and part of most standard security scans – to periodically check for the existence of “other” accounts with UID 0.

Of Headless Users and Privilege



Role Accounts may be known by a variety of names, depending on the history of the organization: “service account”, “headless users” (because no human is associated with the account), or, frequently, by the name of the company or organization. Now a funny side-effect of using a service account intended for privilege separation to automate certain tasks is that this account becomes more and more powerful with time: every task it needs to accomplish (such as installing or updating software, starting or stopping services, monitoring services or alerting on conditions) requires the user to have the necessary privileges.

Take a look in your `/etc/passwd` – if you work at company “Gizmo App, Inc.”, chances are the most powerful user (besides `root`, of course) is “`gizmo`”, and `gizmo`’s access credentials are shared across multiple systems. We will discuss this dilemma and some possible ways to mitigate it in Chapter 11.

Perhaps somewhat paradoxically – usually, we wish to have a unique mapping from exactly one person to exactly one user-ID – access to this superuser account is shared: all system administrators within an organization need to have this kind of access by necessity.²

Reviewing these access rules, we can identify mappings of zero, one or more people to a given account (Figure 6.1), as well as a single person with access to multiple accounts. From the system’s perspective the differences are irrelevant (all process privileges are granted solely based on the UID), but as system administrators, we have to treat each class of users differently. As a general rule of thumb, we want to ensure, for example, that only those accounts used by people have an interactive login session. All other accounts should be restricted such that they can only execute specific commands or access specific files³. This becomes difficult quickly especially when using role

²A discussion of the limitations in the traditional Unix permissions model that make this shared superuser account a virtual necessity would be beyond the scope of this chapter. For completeness’s sake, however, we should mention that more modern access semantics, such as *mandatory access controls* (MAC), *role-based access controls* (RBAC), or POSIX “capabilities” can be added, albeit at the cost of increased complexity.

³On some Unix systems, it is possible to restrict a given process to a specific subset

accounts, as often a certain set of interactive commands need to be allowed. Care must be taken to correctly identify and enforce the restriction to just these commands.

If you look closely at the example password file shown in Listing 6.1, you may notice that in addition to the `root` account there is a second account with UID 0, called `toor`. This account, often found on the BSD derived Unix variants, does in fact offer a second superuser account: it is usually given a different login shell to provide for a way to repair the system in case `root` is unable to log in (for example due to a broken login shell as a result of a software upgrade). This illustrates that it is possible for a Unix system to have multiple usernames mapping to the same UID, though it should be noted that generally speaking that is not a good idea and likely to be an error.




Figure 6.1: The set of users mapping to the set of account names is neither bijective (or “one-to-one”), nor surjective (or “onto”): some accounts are not used by an actual user, while others may be used by more than one user. Users are associated with local groups on a given host, and group membership may imply specific privileges across a set of hosts.

of the file system – see, for example, the `chroot(8)` command. In the past, assigning a user a so-called *restricted* shell was another method of limiting what actions a user may perform.

6.3 Groups of Users

In addition to different *types* of users, we can also identify different *groups* of users. Privilege separation is a fundamental best practice in the area of system administration: every user should be given exactly the level of access they require, with elevated or superuser privileges being particularly strictly controlled. But even outside this special group, there are a number of users who need to share resources with one another. The nature of the environment you are in plays an important role here, as (implicit) trust or lack thereof create vastly different use cases. For the purposes of this discussion, let us define a group of users as a number of people who are either collaborating in some capacity – meaning they will wish to share read and write access to certain resources – or require similar execute privileges, for example to start, stop, or otherwise control a specific service.

In a small commercial environment, such as a start-up, the good will and intent to collaborate for all users of your systems is implied. In such environments all users do frequently require the same or at least similar access to all systems, as responsibilities are shared and job duties overlap. As a result, you will find few distinct groups here, and getting access to one system tends to simultaneously get you (the same broad) access to all systems.

As the environment grows in size, however, you will find that you need to group accounts more carefully. For example, all developers on a given software project require access to systems on which to build the software, write access to the central source revision control repository and the like, and so are grouped together; they do not require – nor should they have – access to the systems processing credit card payments or which contain payroll information.

In even larger companies, you may find that groups sharing access to the same set of servers may have competing resource requirements, even if we assume that every user has been given an account for the ultimate benefit of the organization at large. In addition, the larger your organization grows and the more users you have, the higher the risk of any one account getting compromised becomes. Recall our earlier discussion of well-defined and documented policies in Section 3.3.2; it is no surprise to find a requirement for very specific access policies, that spell out in detail who should be granted what level of access on the one hand and for a complete audit trail of who was given said access on the other.

In contrast to these use cases, now consider the different groups of users present in an academic environment, such as a large university. Access to computing resources is made available to students, faculty, staff, and possibly visiting researchers. Even disregarding any outside compromise, you have at times almost directly conflicting privacy requirements: students should not be able to access faculty resources or files (and yet may have an explicit interest in doing so!), but students working as teaching or faculty assistants sometimes should; student homework assignments done on shared servers should not prevent research jobs from running; faculty may collaborate with each other on some projects, with outside researchers on others.

Finally, if you are maintaining public systems for an Internet Service Provider (ISP), you may find yourself trying to manage hundreds or thousands of completely unrelated user accounts with little to no collaboration amongst them.

Group definitions exist in every organization, and are often drawn outside the system administrator's purview; it is not uncommon for computer systems to inherit a group structure by mapping the organization's functional hierarchy into different user groups. However, sooner or later you will run into limitations and require more fine-grained control. A careful analysis of the different types of users, the different groups based on requirements and needs, and a directory service that allows you to easily create (possibly intersecting) sets of users are needed to allow your systems to grow with and adapt to the needs of whichever type of environment you are in. We will get back to this concept of grouping users and mapping them to similarly grouped sets of hosts in our next chapter.

All users are equal...



In almost every organization, there are a few users who have `root` who... shouldn't: there's the ex-system administrator, who now works in a different area but who occasionally is called upon when tribal knowledge from the olden days is required; there's the com-

petent software developer who always needed special resources and who finally managed to convince one of the system administrators to let him have superuser access to fix his own systems; there's the CEO who simply "requires" superuser access to all machines, even though the last time he opened a terminal was 10 years ago when he updated the

single web server of his then-fledgling start-up.

And then there's the start-up founder, who not only routinely tinkers with the OS kernel and system configurations, but oversees the hardware allocation requests in what has become an Internet giant with tens of thousands of hosts in data centers across the globe:

While working at Yahoo!, I continually tried to keep small the number of people whose accounts were included in the OS images. As an initially large number was slowly reduced (often only after many discussions, assurances of emergency failover procedures, and arguments), I finally had to tell David Filo (one of Yahoo!'s founders) that I intended to remove his account as well. After a few discussions, assurances of emergency failover procedures, and arguments, we eventually agreed to have it removed from the OS images, but to let our configuration management systems add it as necessary. To the best of my knowledge, Filo, as he is known to all employees, still logs into production servers to analyze and challenge current resource usage whenever engineers request new hardware, and he still traces and fixes kernel bugs that require him to have access to most, if not all, systems.

Every system administrator I know has a similar story to tell; they frequently end with “Well, he doesn't *need* access, but he's the boss, so...”.

Some users are more equal than others.

6.4 User Authentication

We mentioned earlier (albeit somewhat tersely) that the system authenticates the user at login time. Seeing how this is a rather important aspect of a multi-user system, let us spend a little bit of time to make sure we understand what exactly happens. As we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 11, when we are authenticating a user, we are ensuring that user is who they claim to be. More precisely, we are verifying that whoever is identifying themselves as user “alice” can in fact provide the credentials which we assume only Alice

to have access to.⁴

Authentication (frequently referred to as *AuthN*) is the act of providing a proof of identity, not a proof of *authorization* (*AuthZ*). Although frequently entangled, the former only answers the question “Are you really who you say you are?”, while the latter concerns itself with the question “Are you allowed to perform this action?”. There are many different ways of providing a proof of authentication; we generally divide them into the following three classes⁵:

- *something you know*, for example a password
- *something you have*, for example a physical key or a hardware token
- *something you are*, a biometric factor, such as e.g. a fingerprint

Each authentication method has its own strengths and weaknesses, with usability and convenience being important factors upon the final security they may provide: passwords that are easy to remember are also easy to guess or crack, physical tokens can be lost or stolen, and biometric factors are near impossible to replace or change in case of a compromise.

In many cases, it is desirable to combine some of these authentication methods to yield the desired level of security and usability. So-called “two-factor authentication” or *2FA* has recently become a popular protection mechanism used by many internet sites: in order to gain access to a service, the user needs to provide e.g. a password (*something you know*) as well as a code generated by an app on their smartphone (the phone thus being *something you have*). It is entirely possible – and at times desirable – to add more factors or vary combinations of factors, which is why the more general term “multi-factor authentication” (MFA) is more precise.

Lastly, let us note that even though we frequently only consider authentication of one party, *mutual authentication* is an often desired or even required property of a secure system: when a user logs into a system, the system wishes to authenticate the user, but the user also needs to have assurance that the system they are logging in to is the system they think it is.

⁴Unlike the system administrator in charge, the computer does not care if Alice gives her credentials to Bob and allows him to log in as her.

⁵Cynical information security professionals, always happy to point out weaknesses in any system, like to refer to these categories as “something you forgot, something you lost, something you stopped being”.

```
NetBSD/amd64 (SERVER) (console)

login: jschauma
password: ****
NetBSD 7.0.2 (SERVER) #2: Tue Jan 24 02:33:13 EST 2017

Welcome to NetBSD!
hostname$
```

Listing 6.2: Password authentication on the system console on a NetBSD server.

```
$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/mykey server
The authenticity of host 'server (192.0.2.12)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is 19:af:35:01:0b:2a:ee:3d:30:0f:69:11:cc:55:7c:20.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
NetBSD 7.0.2 (SERVER) #2: Tue Jan 24 02:33:13 EST 2017

Welcome to NetBSD!
hostname$
```

Listing 6.3: An example of mutual authentication by way of SSH keys.

6.4.1 Authentication Examples

To illustrate the many different ways we may use or encounter authentication in our day to day operations, let us look at a few examples:

Listing 6.2 illustrates the most simple example: password authentication on the system console of a NetBSD server. The user provides their username and password; if the password matches (see below), the user is logged in.

Listing 6.3 shows another method of authentication so frequently used that we hardly ever think about it. Here, we see asymmetric key cryptography as a means of authentication, effectively using a *something we have* (a private SSH key). But note that at the same time, the server also offers *us* a way to authenticate *it*: the SSH hostkey fingerprint presented on the first connection allows us to verify that the server is in fact the one we intended to connect to. If we know the server's expected hostkey fingerprint (which itself is derived from the private hostkey that presumably nobody else would have access to), then we can compare and match them, thereby authenticating the server.⁶

⁶Unfortunately, the distribution of known hostkey fingerprints and changing identities in a large scale environment have lead most people to blindly accept any hostkey fingerprint

```
$ kinit
Password for jschauma@DOMAIN: ****
$ klist
Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_ttypa
Default principal: jschauma@DOMAIN

      Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
          02/13/17 13:50:21  02/13/17 21:50:20  krbtgt/KDC@DOMAIN
$ ssh somehost
somehost$
```

Listing 6.4: Mutual authentication via a central Kerberos service.

Listing 6.4 illustrates the use of a central authentication service by way of the Kerberos protocol. Here, we are authenticating ourselves to the central service using a password (*something we know*). We then use a time-based token (a “ticket” in Kerberos lingo, i.e. *something we (now) have*) to authenticate ourselves to the server we wish to access. At the same time, the Kerberos network authentication protocol also takes care of authenticating the server to us. This setup thus includes multiple authentication methods as well as an example of mutual authentication.

Listing 6.5 finally illustrates the use of several strong factors combined with time-based access credentials to form a particularly strong example of authentication. Here, we are making use of a Certificate Authority (CA) for use with SSH to issue short-lived access credentials. In order to receive such a certificate, the user must first authenticate to the `sshca` service, which requires both a password (again: *something we know*) as well as a cryptographic One-Time Password (OTP) generated by a hardware token (*something we have*). In addition to the client certificate we received from the CA, the server we are finally accessing also implements another form of two-factor authentication, offering to send a message to the user’s cell phone and requiring an interactive acknowledgement. If the cell phone in question requires a finger-print to unlock, then we are even adding a biometric factor (*something we are*). Phew, that is one tough system to access!

presented. Doing so is an example of *Trust on First Use (TOFU)*. We will get back to this problem in later chapters.

```

localhost$ ssh sshca
YubiKey for 'jschauma': ****
Password: ****
localhost$ ssh-add -l
2048 SHA256:TzwuHGc5BKBe+VJSnGoVyh92J8XKBukaL7MGQn8ML0Y (RSA)
2048 SHA256:TzwuHGc5BKBe+VJSnGoVyh92J8XKBukaL7MGQn8ML0Y (RSA-CERT)
localhost$ ssh somehost
Duo two-factor login for jschauma

Enter a passcode or select one of the following options:

1. Duo Push to XXX-XXX-0712
2. Phone call to XXX-XXX-0712
3. SMS passcodes to XXX-XXX-0712

Passcode or option (1-3): 1
Success. Logging you in...
Last login: Thu Jan 26 17:39:30 2017 from 10.1.2.3
somehost$
```

Listing 6.5: An example of very strong authentication: the use of a certificate authority, combined with a password and multiple physical tokens.

6.4.2 The Problem with Passwords

Despite the variety of authentication methods available, password authentication remains the lowest common denominator and is worth looking at in a little bit more detail.

More often than not, the credentials used to authenticate at login time are simply a password of often pitiful complexity. Much like you may have not let your sister (or her friends) climb into your tree house unless they knew the secret passphrase, the Unix system will not let you log in without you entering the correct string of characters.

It is important to understand at this point that the Unix system does not actually compare the string you entered to the string it has stored in a database, but that instead it operates on password *hashes*. That is, the string you entered (together with a few bits of additional data known as the *salt*) is transformed via a one-way function that produces a fixed-length string of (different) characters, which are then stored and compared against at the time of authentication. Since this transformation is a *one-way* function, it is impossible for anyone to reproduce the original password from the hash – an important cryptographic property of the function used. If this password hash matches the one on record, access is granted, and you are logged in.

From that moment on, regular Unix semantics and permissions will apply to decide whether or not access to a given resources (e.g. the ability to write to a file) is granted.

Passwords are an easy and convenient way for users to authenticate to a system. However, there are quite a few drawbacks that it is important to be consciously aware of.

As noted above, we do not actually store clear text passwords in a database, as this would mean that anybody (and any process) able to access this database had access to all users' passwords. Instead, the use of a hash ensures that even using a privileged account, we cannot see the users' clear text passwords. Still, we wish to protect the password hashes from prying eyes, which is why our Unix systems no longer store them in the world-readable `/etc/passwd` database, but instead in a separate, protected file (such as `/etc/master.passwd` on BSD derived systems or `/etc/shadow` on many System V derived Unix versions).

But, and this is one of the problems when using passwords for local authentication, this data has to exist on all the hosts a user wishes to log in on. That, in turn, means that if a single host in the environment is compromised, the attacker gets their hands on *all* users' password hashes. Once retrieved, they can then perform so-called offline dictionary attacks on the password hashes or look them up in widely available *rainbow tables*, large pre-computed mappings of common strings to their hashes.

The solutions, or rather, the efforts to at least partially address these issues include the use of a password *salt*, the previously mentioned small amount of data added to the user's password prior to the application of the hash function, thereby yielding a different hash on unrelated systems despite the password being the same and thus defeating simple rainbow table look ups.

Another approach used frequently is to not make the password hash locally available on each host and instead rely on an authentication system where the actual password hashes and additional user information is stored in a central place and is accessed over the network. The *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)* is an example of this approach. However, it should be noted that the benefits of a central location of this information carries a certain prize, as well: if the host(s) providing this service becomes unavailable, thousands of hosts can become unusable or see debilitating errors. This problem can of course be defined in a more general statement: as an environment increases in size, relying on a central service poses an increasing risk of

becoming a *Single Point of Failure* (often abbreviated as “SPOF”), while distributing data across thousands of servers poses its own data replication and synchronization challenges while simultaneously increasing the probability of it being compromised.

What’s more, passwords are an inherently insecure means of authentication, largely due to human nature: most people are rather terrible at remembering complex passwords (which are harder for computers to crack) and hence tend to use and reuse across different sites a small set of a simple passwords. This means that accounts on your systems may get compromised by password leaks in another, completely different and independent environment!

Many solutions or improvements to this dilemma exist, ranging from multi-factor authentication protocols to randomly generated passwords stored and managed by specific password management tools. We will discuss some of these in our chapter on security later in the book.

6.4.3 Sharing root

As noted in Section 6.2, the `root` account is commonly shared, meaning multiple people know the password to authenticate as the superuser. This, however, poses a number of problems. When a system administrator leaves the organization, the `root` password needs to be changed, all systems need to be updated with the new password hash, and the new password has to be communicated to all members of the team. Despite many best practices of sharing or storing shared secrets like this, the more people who require said access, the larger the risk of accidental exposure of the password or its hash.

Secondly, since the `root` account is a *system* account, it may not be included in any central user directory (such as your LDAP service), and instead be managed either via your configuration management system, or your OS image. This may lead to the password hash being available in additional places, such as the configuration management’s repository or the OS image build system. Again: the more places such important access credentials are stored, the more likely it is that they can be accessed by unauthorized parties.

Finally, by mapping multiple people to a single account you lose an important audit-trail: no longer is it possible to identify who performed a given task; all we can do is identify a (possibly large) group of people who could have done so. Given the powers of the superuser account, this is particularly bothersome.

It is common best practice to disable logins from `root` over the network⁷, requiring users to first log in with their usual account, and then to use the `su(1)` or `sudo(8)` utility to perform certain actions with elevated privileges. Since this tool logs all invocations, we nicely solve the problem of the missing audit trail; in addition, we gain much finer grained control of what access is given to which users.

Note, however, that this solution is no panacea: it is easy to fall into a false sense of security when restricting superuser privileges to a few explicit commands while forgetting that many of these commands allow a skilled user to invoke or otherwise trick the system into executing other, non-sanctioned commands.⁸ As a general rule of thumb, you should consider the use of `sudo(8)` primarily for its audit-trail capabilities and only grant its use to trusted users.

Secondly, this approach only works on actual server operating systems. Networking equipment, such as switches, routers, or load balancers, where the TACACS+ and RADIUS remote authentication protocols allow well-defined control of remote access do, for the most part, still follow an all-or-nothing access model locally. The access credentials for the privileged accounts on these devices (as example might be the “enable” password, used to enter privileged mode on a router or switch) need to be managed and shared with the same care that a `root` password would be.

6.5 Summary

Even though taken for granted nowadays, the nature of a *multi-user* system has had from the beginning a number of important implications for overall system security and operational procedures. The impact of these implications grows near exponentially as your environment scales up, which is why we make a point of identifying them explicitly in this chapter.

Users fall into a number of well-defined categories, or *types* of users. In particular, we distinguish for good reasons between user accounts used by ac-

⁷It is also possible to completely disable the `root` account, though that may have implications on your ability to recover the system without physical access in the case of a severe failure.

⁸Most Unix editors, for example, allow a user to invoke a shell; dynamically linked executables can be tricked into loading custom libraries; the possibilities to exploit access to a small number of tools running with superuser privileges are too numerous to account for.

tual humans and so-called system accounts. Different users (of either kind) have at times conflicting requirements and impose very specific trust models on the environment. Access privileges need to be defined and enforced, and authentication methods need to be considered. We briefly mentioned passwords as the most common form of authentication and noted a few of the problems associated with them; we also covered some of the implications of sharing `root` access with your peers.

More generally speaking, though, we looked at what it means for a system to support multiple users. System administrators with experience managing deployments in diverse environments are able to recognize and apply these general rules:

- *All users are equal.* We need to be able to accommodate different use cases and equally enable many different types of requirements. All groups of users should be treated with the same professionalism and their needs appropriately addressed.
- *Some users are more equal than others.* While all users' needs should be addressed, there are, in any system, some users who have more specific requirements; who need certain elevated privileges; whose computing demands exceed those of others.
- *All users are to be given precisely the access rights they need, but no more.* The principle of least privilege needs to be rigorously applied, as any one account may become compromised, and the possible damage deriving from this scenario needs to be limited as much as possible.
- *Trust does not scale.* When building your infrastructure, remember that while you may trust all users in your organization *today*, you will eventually grow to a size where this no longer holds. It is near impossible to later on put in place restrictions on users' privileges, just as it is to anticipate the possibly sudden departure of trusted employees.
- *You will always face tradeoffs.* No matter which authentication mechanism you choose, there are downsides. Eliminating single points of failure may increase your infrastructure's complexity or increase the risk of exposure of confidential information. (This holds for many other aspects of system administration, too, but the impact may be most obvious when it comes to authentication of users.)

When you manage a sufficiently large or diverse group of systems, you will learn to abstract individual users (and their requirements) into more conceptual *groups of users*. These groups may then be translated to access privileges on a given host, or, as you scale up your environment, to mappings of privileges to *sets of hosts*.

Controlling only a few hundred machines, it is easy to think in terms of individual hosts. However, today's Internet giants tend to operate by utilizing tens or hundreds of thousands of hosts. At this scale, services are defined not by which individual machines, but by which *datacenter* handles the requests. Individual hosts become irrelevant, even though access control, by and large, still follows the same model, even if operating on a different scale.

Due to this shift in scale, a distinct trend away from managing user access on an individual host basis and instead shifting towards a *Service Orchestration* model has formed in the last couple of years. In this world, interactive logins to any single host are unnecessary and imply a systemic failure, as unavailable hosts should automatically be taken out of a production-serving rotation and overall load be distributed to the remaining, working hosts.

Services are run as so-called system accounts unassociated with actual users. Nevertheless, regular multi-user semantics apply. The principles of how access to any given resource is granted, how services (or users) are authenticated, and how a clear separation of privileges provides the foundation for overall system security is not different when applied to user accounts that end up being mapped to humans versus those that are not.

A multi-user system implies the existence of a privileged account, which, by necessity, is shared amongst multiple people. The fact that this account is also – by definition – a system account embodies the paradoxical complexity of managing *all* user accounts (whether or not they may be mapped to people or service roles). The only way to retain a modicum of sanity when managing these many-to-many mappings of privilege in a large environment is a clear definition of host and user access groups. As we will see in the following chapter, creating and operating on these sets of resources in the abstract is best done using a configuration management system.

Looking towards the future (as we will in Chapter 17) – and catching up a bit with developments since I first started writing this chapter back in 2012 – we should also note that as the industry moves further towards more ephemeral systems, such as through the use of containers and virtualization

technologies, the overall headache of managing local user accounts may well be a thing of the past: systems are defined in a descriptive way and spun up or torn apart as needed. Nevertheless, as experienced system administrators, we are well aware that new headaches may well lie hidden here, and the *concept* of authenticated access by multiple users (for humans and services alike) continue to apply.

Thus, the burden of *identifying* the proper access model, however, remains with the system administrators. Let's make sure that we understand the implications of multi-user access on all of our systems as we do!

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Review the `passwd(5)` manual page and make sure you understand what each field is used for. Is this password database used on the systems you have access to, or is authentication done by way of a central system, for example via LDAP? If so, what additional information can you find in this system?
2. Review the accounts present on your systems. How many of these are system accounts, and how many are user accounts? What different types of users can you identify? Are there any role accounts?
3. Review the different groups present on your systems. Identify the groups with the most users in it and what it is used for. What resources on the system are accessible only by belonging to a specific group?
4. Identify whether or not `sudo(1)` is used on the systems you have access to. Can you find out which users have which privileges? Which, if any, commands can you think of that might be dangerous to allow untrusted users to invoke? Try to think of non-obvious ways to circumvent the given restrictions.
5. Compare the default `/etc/passwd` file on a few different Unix versions. What kinds of differences do you notice? What kinds of accounts are present on one but not another?
6. Consider some of the online services you use. What types of authentication do they require? Which offer multi-factor authentication? What kinds of factors do they use?

7. Search the Internet for a list of the most popular passwords in use (such as, not surprisingly, “password”).
 - (a) Generate hashes for each password using the following digest algorithms: DES (as used by the Unix `crypt(3)` family), MD5 and SHA1. Can you find the resulting strings in any rainbow tables on the Internet?
 - (b) Repeat the previous exercise, but add a salt to the password. What do you notice about the results?
8. Write a tool to create a new account on a remote system. The tool should take as input the username of a local account; the account on the remote system should be identical with regards to UID, GID, supplementary groups, login shell etc. to that on the local system.

Bibliography

- [1] Æleen Frisch, *Essential System Administration*, O'Reilly Media, 2002
- [2] Mark Burgess, *Principles of Network and System Administration*, Wiley & Sons, 2nd Edition, 2004
- [3] Evi Nemeth, Garth Snyder, Trent R. Hein, Ben Whaley *UNIX and Linux System Administration Handbook*, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall, 2010

Chapter 7

Configuration Management

The entropy of an isolated system never decreases.

– Second Law of Thermodynamics

7.1 Introduction

As much as we would like them to be, computer systems are not static: files are created, modified, or removed; users log in and run commands; services are started or terminated. In addition, the requirements of the systems, dictated at least in part by evolving business needs or emerging technologies are changing all too frequently as well. This leads to new software being added, patched or upgraded; user accounts are added or removed; jobs are scheduled or their frequency changed; interactions with other systems are enabled or prevented. In other words, our systems do continuously undergo change.

On a single host, such changes are made by local modification of system configuration files, invocation of specific commands, and the installation or tuning of different applications. As we configure our machines, we may create detailed documentation about how to set up a given service, and the more systems we have, the more often we have to repeat the same steps to configure them, to upgrade software, or to rebuild them when they inevitably fail. Updating documentation to reflect the changes we may have made after the latest software update is tedious and error prone – it would be much easier to initially identify the changes, document them, and then have them be applied so that our hosts' configuration reflects the documentation, not the

other way around.

Taking this approach even further, we begin to build not only a document outlining what commands to execute, but a central inventory of what hosts perform which functions, which services are running and which software needs to be installed to produce, for example, a running web server suitable for serving production traffic.

We rarely operate on a single host only, and the larger our infrastructure, the more important it becomes to be able to discover systems by their attributes. For example: in order to apply a security update to our web servers, we need to first know exactly which of our many hosts are running the vulnerable version, and then perform the same steps of upgrading the service on them. Since we cannot possibly keep track of hundreds of changes across thousands of systems ourselves, we delegate the task of applying well defined sets of changes to (possibly very large) numbers of systems to a class of software known as Software Configuration Management (SCM) systems, or “CMs”.

We have hinted at the capabilities of such solutions before: near the end of Chapter 5, we explained that by the time the OS is installed on a host, we already have to perform at least a minimal amount of custom configuration. We also noted that in order to be able to add software on a host, CM requires a tight integration with the system’s package manager.

Following that, we discussed user accounts in the previous chapter, another example of our system’s changing characteristics: the set of users that should be allowed access to a given host changes regularly and frequently as people join or leave the organization.¹ Regardless of whether you use an LDAP or Active Directory (AD) service or whether you push changes to each hosts’ `/etc/passwd` file, certain modifications are necessary on each server.

It is the ironic fate of many a system administrator to have, at one time or another, written a set of programs to allow changes to all of their machines. These programs tend to start out as simple shell scripts that loop over all hostnames in the inventory, using `ssh(1)` and `rsync(1)` to copy files from one host to many, but as the environment grows, the painful realization that

¹Depending on the size of the organization, this data needs to be tightly integrated with a larger staff directory as well as various other systems such as payroll, your benefits related databases, or perhaps an external index of who should get keycards for the offices. Integration of these services, many of which are nowadays outsourced to third party providers, is well beyond the scope of this chapter, however. Once again, we’re scratching the surface of additional complex topics.

this approach does not scale starts to set in. We begin to understand that configuration management is not only about shuffling files around, but it tracks and enforces *state* on a system. We also need to be able to control running services and react to changes in the environment.

Fortunately, a number of mature and flexible CM solutions have emerged over the last few years. Today's junior system administrators are already likely to start out using tools like *CFEngine*[1], *Chef*[2], *Puppet*[3], or *Ansible*[4] to automate configuration changes across both small and large sets of hosts. But even the most advanced solution requires a fair amount of customization to be integrated into your environment as you scale up, and you will almost certainly learn valuable lessons as you try to avoid writing your own CM system.

Being able to fully take advantage of configuration management requires, not surprisingly, an initial learning curve as well as some careful consideration of how to organize and categorize your data as well as your physical assets. In this chapter, we will take a look at how best to do this. We will discuss the principles on which configuration management systems operate, as well as the significant benefits they provide.

While reading this chapter, it may be useful to remember the Second Law of Thermodynamics, quoted at the beginning: our systems are in fact constantly approaching an increased state of disorder. Let us find out, how configuration management systems can counter this effect and help to restore order...

Danger! Acronym Overload!



The acronym *SCM* may also be used for *Source Control Management*, i.e. the tracking of code changes in a repository. Since we are talking entirely about *Software Configuration Management*, and in an attempt to minimize confusion, we will use the acronym *CM* for both the terms “configuration management” as well as “configuration management systems” throughout this book. When talking about revision control, we will use the acronym (for Version Control System). Admittedly, it doesn’t help that often times our CM files are stored in a VCS such as CVS...

7.2 Services, not Single Points of Failure

In many large environments, it used to be common to find at least one or two ancient systems that system administrators were afraid to touch. Often these servers provided a number of critical services, and their configuration was as equal parts custom scripts, undocumented dependencies, combined with some black magic. Making *any* change on such a system required tribal knowledge, manual editing of configuration files, could wreak havoc, and cause significant downtime.

You still find symptoms of this approach to system administration in many organizations, but – necessity being the mother of invention – most organizations nowadays have found ways to make their services slightly more resilient (although certainly no less complex). “Cattle, not pets” is a common phrase expressing this shift in mindset: instead of grooming and coddling individual systems, we should regard any one server as replacable, easy to tear down and recreate on a moment’s notice. Instead of focusing on any individual host, we now begin by defining a *service*, identifying its requirements and then applying the required changes to any suitable hardware system. What used to be a unique, fragile, Single Point of Failure (SPOF) becomes a flexible, easily repeatable process to recreate the functionality provided by any given host.

Consider the example of a single server providing authentication services to your organization. Since it is such a crucial component of the infrastructure, carefully maintained with custom scripts developed over the years we may be averse to changing anything on the host so as not to impact the reliability of the service it provides.

We may provide added availability by installing a failover instance or using a fault-tolerant protocol allowing communication with multiple such hosts, but downtime is eventually unavoidable, and hardware failure may strike at any time. Rebuilding such special “snowflake” systems – a term often used to convey both their uniqueness and fragility – is painful and time consuming. On the other hand, if we have a well-defined procedure to build an authentication server, we can easily replace it at any time with minimal effort.²

²Experience has shown us that *any* process that carries increased risk ought to be automated and performed *frequently*. This may initially seem paradoxical, as our instincts tell us to avoid risk. However, the less frequently we perform a given task, the more likely we are to make mistakes; on the flip side, the more often we perform it, the more likely we

Shifting your perception away from *host* to *service* management allows you to abstract requirements and define behaviour in a scalable manner. This way, fault tolerance improves, since in case of an emergency another host can quickly be bootstrapped into providing the given service in a short amount of time. Hosts become expendable rather than individual, irreplaceable components, that can be put into (or out of) production use through other automated means. Advanced systems that combine system deployment, configuration management and service monitoring react to fluctuations in traffic demands or individual components' uptime by shifting traffic to and from these parts, or they may possibly initiate the instantiation of additional service nodes. This process is sometimes referred to as "Service Orchestration" (more on that in Section 15.2); configuration management is an integral part of such larger system.

7.3 Defining Services and Requirements

System administrators tend to be very practically oriented and are likely to start out setting up a new service by installing the required software to evaluate, tune it, change it, adapt it to the needs of the environment and in this fashion end up with a functional server. If we wish to document this process, so as to allow us to repeat it in the future or possibly to automate it altogether, it is necessary to trace back the decisions made in the process, identify the changes made to the software and its configuration files and codify all of this in a repeatable manner.

This takes discipline and practice. Documenting the steps taken, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, is a good start. We often are able to use this documentation as both a way to double-check our process as well as a template from which to derive instructions for our configuration management system. The tricky part is making explicit the various assumptions we make about the capabilities of the server on which the service is to run. Let us consider a few examples.

are to develop a routine, to automate the task to be completed unattended, a non-event. This is a critically important point, which we will repeat in Chapter 8.

7.3.1 Example Service: Syslog

To illustrate how a service might be defined, let us walk through a simple, yet common example: every organization needs a way to collate, correlate and monitor all sorts of different events, a topic we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 14. A common solution involves the use of a central `loghost`, running the ubiquitous `syslogd(8)` daemon or perhaps one of its more modern variants , such as the `syslog-ng` or `rsyslog` software.

In its simplest setup, the daemon accepts incoming messages over the network via UDP port 514 and writes them to local files with different permissions or ownerships, based on its configuration. In order to be able to accomodate the high volume of messages typically seen by a syslog server, the OS may require a larger network buffer queue than the other systems in the environment. Finally, all the data needs to be stored somewhere, so we require a large file system to be mounted and log files to be periodically compressed and archived.

Using these high-level requirements, we can identify a few configuration steps necessary for this service that may then get translated into a service definition in the CM system’s *Domain Specific Language (DSL)*. As an example, a *Puppet* “manifest” for the *syslog* service might look as shown in Listing 7.1. This description of requirements is of course non-exhaustive, but it suffices to illustrate the general approach we would like to take: all we need is to let the CM system – *puppet*, in this case – take these steps and translate them into the commands to execute on the target host. With that in place, we can easily and reliably bring up a new host to perform the “syslog” service.³

³Note that all of these steps are by and large independent of the particular Unix flavor the CM runs on. By abstracting the individual steps, such as the installation of a package from their implementation (i.e. *how* to invoke the package manager), we gain the flexibility to repeat this as needed in different environments.

```

class syslog {
  include cron
  include logrotate

  package {
    'syslog-ng':
      ensure => latest,
      require => Service['syslog-ng'];
  }

  service {
    'syslog-ng':
      ensure => running,
      enable => true;
  }

  file {
    '/etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf':
      ensure => file,
      source => 'puppet:///syslog/syslog-ng.conf',
      mode   => '0644',
      owner  => 'root',
      group  => 'root',
      require => Package['syslog-ng'],
      notify  => Service['syslog-ng'];

    '/etc/logrotate.d/syslog-ng':
      ensure => file,
      source => 'puppet:///syslog/logrotate-syslog-ng',
      mode   => '0644',
      owner  => 'root',
      group  => 'root',
      require => Package['logrotate'];
  }
}

```

Listing 7.1: Excerpt of a Puppet “manifest” defining the ‘syslog’ service.

7.3.2 Example Requirements: LDAP Client Configuration

Our “syslog” example illustrated the definition of a single service. Despite our efforts to make this service easy to replicate, we anticipate only a small number of servers to be providing this service. On the other hand, we can also identify requirements that will be applicable to a very large set of hosts, quite possibly to every single host in our environment.

Let us consider the use case of account management in an environment using a central LDAP directory. We need to ensure that every host is configured

to authenticate local access against the central service. Our high-level configuration steps include the installation of the LDAP client package, changes to the authentication module’s configuration file to accept (and require) LDAP authentication, and a configuration file pointing to the central LDAP server. Listing 7.2 illustrates the translation of these steps into a *Chef* “recipe”.

As before, all of these steps apply to all different operating systems or OS flavors. What is different about this example is that it may well apply to other hosts, including the previous *syslog* example. It is useful to identify each of the specific cases and define them independently instead of trying to create monolithic definitions for every single host. In particular, we often define a “base” configuration for all of our systems, including default packages, security settings, authentication methods and the like; individual service definitions depend on this base configuration and bring in new requirements applied to only those hosts providing the given service.

That is, system and service definitions are *additive*, and configuration management systems determine and apply the appropriate final union of settings needed for any combination.

```
package "ldap-utils" do
  action :upgrade
end

template "/etc/ldap.conf" do
  source "ldap.conf.erb"
  mode 00644
  owner "root"
  group "root"
end

%w{ account auth password session }.each do |pam|
  cookbook_file "/etc/pam.d/common-#{pam}" do
    source "common-#{pam}"
    mode 00644
    owner "root"
    group "root"
    notifies :restart, resources(:service => "ssh"), :delayed
  end
end
```

Listing 7.2: Excerpt of a Chef “recipe” defining LDAP client authentication configuration. Note the conceptual similarities to the Puppet DSL shown earlier.

7.3.3 CM Requirements

Different CM systems allow you to specify your service requirements in different ways. Due to their particular evolution, choice of programming language, and internal architecture, they differ significantly in detail, but exhibit conceptual similarities. Effectively, each CM system uses its own DSL, and you will have to get used to the proper syntax to express your requirements.

Looking at the previous two examples, we can identify some required concepts in configuration management systems. Generally speaking, the following (OS agnostic) capabilities are required:

Software Installation

The CM needs to be able to install software on the hosts it manages. More specifically, it needs to be able to assure that software of a given version is installed (or perhaps *not* installed). It does not need to duplicate the capabilities of the package management system – rather, it relies on the package manager as a tool to accomplish the desired result.

The system administrator provides a definition of which packages need to be present on the system, optionally specifying the exact version or perhaps simply requesting the “latest” available version. In order to accomplish this, the CM needs to have support for the package manager in use on the target system.

However, as we discussed in Chapter 5, it is important to avoid introducing conflicts if you allow the CM to install the “latest” version of a package, possibly introducing a non-backwards compatible change – keep your configuration files in sync with the software version they target!

Service Management

The CM needs to be able to define which software services are supposed to be running on a given host. A machine functioning as a web server, for example, had better be running an HTTP daemon. In order for some configuration changes to take effect, this daemon may need to be restarted, and in order to make certain other changes, one may need to (temporarily) shut down a service.

As starting, stopping, restarting and generally *supervising* running processes is both software- and OS dependent, the CM may fall back on the

package manager or system provided service management mechanisms, such as `/etc/rc.d` or `/etc/init.d` scripts, as well as more modern frameworks such as Solaris’s “Service Management Facility” or Mac OS X’s `launchd(8)`.

Coordinating service restarts across multiple systems may require additional capabilities or settings within the CM systems. As noted above, CM may develop or integrate with more formal service orchestration functionality across a larger infrastructure.

File Permissions and Ownerships

The CM needs to be able to set file permissions and ownerships. If these are not explicitly defined for a given resource, then most systems will simply use the OS defaults. In the Unix world, this means falling back on the default *umask* for permissions and inheritance of ownership from the parent directory via standard Unix semantics.

It is worth noting that asserting file ownerships has additional implications: the user- and/or group-ID of the given file owner need to be present on the system. Some CMs allow you to also manage user accounts (they may add or remove users), while other systems merely assert the existence of a given account and produce an error if a specified file owner is not present on the host in question.

That is, user management by itself may be performed by the CM directly (that is, the CM systems adds or removes users, adjust their account settings, creates home directories etc.), or it may be handled via a central account management system which the CM system configures the host for. Listing 7.2 illustrates the latter case: Chef configures the host to use LDAP for account management, and does not further concern itself with account creation.

In addition, the distinction between “regular” user accounts and service accounts – see Chapter 6.2 – may further play a role here: a central authentication service such as LDAP may only provide information about “regular” users, and system accounts not included in the base OS may be added by e.g. the package manager. As you can tell, the interactions between all these systems is becoming quite complex.

Installation of static files

The CM needs to be able to install a given, static file on all hosts. This is an obvious requirement: the management of local files lies at the heart of every

CM system, but it is worth identifying a few distinct use cases. Here, we provide a single file that will be identical across all systems. For example, let us assume that you wish to provide a list of SSH host keys as a system-wide `known_hosts` entries under `/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts`. The contents of this file will be the same across all of your individual systems.

The CM system ensures that this file will be installed – as provided, with no further modifications – on the hosts. If any local modifications were made since the last time the CM ran, those will be overwritten.

The ability to modify an existing file on the target system may seem like an important requirement for any CM, as this is how we configure our systems manually. However, this approach carries significant complexity: For many different configuration files, it requires an understanding of that file’s syntax, and the risk of conflicts introduced by letting local modifications remain in place.

With our strong preference of simpler solutions over more complex ones, it is a better approach to let the CM completely “own” all the files it manages. That is, define the contents of a file as derived from the target system’s properties (such as hostname, network segment, etc.) and generate a new, static file in a central place.

Generation of host-specific data

The CM needs to be able to install host-specific files. For example, you may have different DNS or Syslog servers available to your servers based on the subnet they are deployed in. Or you may wish to add some information determined at runtime on the system itself. For example, you might want to include the current `uptime(1)` in the file `/etc/motd`.

That is, some of the changes to a given file can be determined in advance by the software, as in the case of the DNS server setting: by knowing the IP address of the host, you know which DNS server to write to `/etc/resolv.conf`. Other changes cannot be known in advance: unless you are logged in on the server in question, you can’t well know the uptime it would report.

To allow the system administrator to define dynamic files with variable sections and actions, the CM needs to provide a templating language as well as a means of expanding these templates either prior to deployment based on certain properties of the host (e.g. the subnet it will reside on) or at execution time on the system itself.

Some systems allow the use of a general purpose programming language in building these templates. This has the advantage of being able to provide great flexibility in data generation. On the other hand, it also opens up room for unneeded complexity and may reduce the readability or maintainability of the templates. The use of a DSL can help avoid common pitfalls and stir the user into the best direction to solve a given problem. “Constraints are friends.”[9]

As a general rule of thumb, it is desirable to have these templates be applied and the resulting files be generated centrally, rather than on the hosts themselves. It is easy to assume that a CM needs to execute within a host’s context in order to take into account that particular system’s full state to apply the correct settings. However, when managing more than just a few hundred hosts it actually becomes reasonable (and less error prone!) to have configuration management dictate the state on the host *completely*. While this requires the CM to have full knowledge of a lot of the target systems’ state, this reduces the probability of any errors or unpredicted events interfering with or changing the state of the host, yielding undesired results.

Nevertheless, it remains a core requirement to be able to generate a host-specific configuration file on the target system, which is why all CM systems do provide this functionality. See Listing 7.3 for an example of a change description that dynamically expands a template on the host in question, conditionally restarting the given service if (and only if!) the resulting file was modified.

Command Execution

The CM needs to be able to run a given command. This is about as generic a requirement as we can define, but at the same time it is both one of the most important as well as one of the most dangerous. In order to perform system configuration, the software needs to run with superuser privileges, so any command it may run could have disastrous consequences (especially when run on every single host in your organization).

The majority of the commands a CM needs to run are well-defined and abstracted within its DSL. That is, we can express the desired outcome without detailed knowledge of the implementation, the commands that are actually executed on the target system. For example, we ensure packages are installed not by running the actual package manager commands, but simply by using the DSL expression, such as e.g. `require => Package['logrotate']`.

```

bundle agent sshd {
    files:
        "/tmp/sshd_config tmpl"
            perms      => mog("0600", "root", "root"),
            copy_from  => remote_dcp("/templates/etc/ssh/sshd_config",
                                      "cf-master.example.com");

        "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
            perms      => mog("0600", "root", "root"),
            create     => "true",
            edit_line  => expand_template("/tmp/sshd_config tmpl"),
            classes   => results( "bundle", "sshd_config" );

    services:
        sshd_config_repaired :: sshd
            service_policy => "restart";
}

```

Listing 7.3: An “agent bundle”, CFEngine’s way to express user defined change descriptions that install an `sshd_config(5)` file by way of copying a template from the configuration master to the local system and expanding it in place before finally restarting `sshd(8)` if necessary.

Still, there will always be cases where we need to run an arbitrary command.⁴ By allowing the system administrator to centrally define commands to execute on groups of hosts, the CM allows for powerful control of large groups of hosts across your entire infrastructure. The more rapidly a change propagates from the central source of truth to all controlled systems, the more impactful this feature becomes. But beware: with this great power does indeed come great responsibility!

Finally, let us note a related, but easily overlooked requirement for the CM in this context: it needs to be able to collect and report back the output of a command it ran. All too often do we need to execute a set of commands to collect some information about (a subset of) our systems. Doing so allows the CM to gather important information about the state of the system as well as to discover important metrics. We’ll get back to this topic in Chapter 14, when we discuss system monitoring and gaining visibility into the state of our systems.

⁴By using the term “arbitrary”, we mean a command that was not previously defined within the configuration management system’s DSL, rather than a “random” command.

7.4 Of States and Sets

All problems in computer science can be solved by another level of indirection.

– David Wheeler

7.4.1 States

In the previous section we talked about making changes to a running system, but upon further consideration, we are not so much interested in *making changes*, as we are in the results, the outcomes of these changes. Some of the changes we have defined may not be necessary on a given host. What we really care about is the current *state* of the system. That is, we want to answer the question of whether the host is configured correctly, and then apply only those changes necessary to get it to that state. The CM’s primary goal is therefore *asserting state*; making (optional) changes to a system just happens to be the method by which this is accomplished.

We wish to control the effects of (software) entropy on the systems such that it is consistently brought back into a well-defined and desired state. Throughout its lifetime, a host may then go through a number of distinct states as illustrated in Figure 7.1:

Unconfigured

A host in this state does not have a CM system installed or the installed CM has never run. The most common example of hosts in this state is new hardware that does not yet have an OS installed. Large environments often have pools of new hardware delivered, racked, and set up in their data center, awaiting allocation. Such systems are frequently in this *unconfigured* state.

Configured

The CM has run successfully and applied all required changes for the given system. All required packages are installed, configured properly, and all services on the host are running. The system is ready for production.

In Service

The host has been put into production. That is, it accepts traffic, provides the service for which it was configured, and is relied upon; it is in active use. Technically speaking, this is a subcategory of the “configured” state; a host may be put into service by other systems than the CM – we mentioned the concept of “Service Orchestration – but only a “configured” host may enter this state.

Out of Service

The system has explicitly been taken out of service; it is no longer serving production traffic. Unlike the remaining states, this is a well-defined and known state. The CM is running and may even have placed the system into this state as a reaction to a system or network failure, possibly one outside of




Figure 7.1: Different states a host may be in. The CM tries to counter the effects of Entropy, while Service Orchestration controls e.g. whether a host takes traffic. Monitoring of the systems may allow us to discover an “unknown” state or trigger a removal from service, while rebuilding a host allows us to “start from scratch”.

this host. That is, this state is also a subcategory of the “configured” state. Once again, the host may be taken out of service by another system than the CM.

Deviant

The host is no longer in the desired configuration state. Entropy has taken its toll: changes made to the system either manually or as a side-effect of the traffic it takes, from individual users or possibly even through a mistake in the CM state model itself have caused a faulty configuration. In this case, the configuration management system may need to revert or otherwise correct these changes to revert to the previous state. Storing the rules for the CM in a Version Control System makes such a “roll back” easier.

Unknown

The CM may have stopped running on the host or may erroneously be applying the wrong configuration. The host may have been shut down, the network disconnected, an intruder may have taken over control, or rats may have gnawed through the power cable. We simply don’t know. What’s worse, we may not even know that this host is in an unknown state! Not all failures are immediately obvious.

Describing a service in detail, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, and then applying the required changes to a new host covers the steps to get a system from the “unconfigured” state towards “in service”. This involves a set of well-defined steps, and the system remains in equally well-defined and known states.

Much more challenging for both the CM as well as the system administrators in charge are the prevention and detection of the last two states, “deviant” and “unknown”. In order to recover and return the system back to production, the software needs to be able to identify error conditions and determine the steps to correct them. Automatic recovery from certain failure scenarios is possible, and in fact what we wish for our CM to provide. However, most software solutions can only handle previously defined error scenarios; the nature of our systems inevitably leads to unexpected failure modes. Being able to *detect* such deviant states is by itself a huge win, as we can move from here into the much preferred “out of service” state before

resolving the root cause and finally returning the host back into production. In some cases it may be easier and/or faster to reinstall the host from scratch to bring it into a compliant state.

7.4.2 Sets

Running any CM requires system administrators to create and maintain a complex model of how services are defined, what changes are required to enable or disable a given component, and to keep track of all of your systems in different environments with different requirements. The key to solving this puzzle is to *simplify*: we take a step back and attempt to identify the essential logical components of the system.

In the previous section we have classified the different *states* that our systems may be in, and we have said that the role of a CM is the assertion of a given state. But before we can express the changes required to bring a host into a given state, we need to have defined the role of each system.

Different CMs use different terms in their application of several concepts that we borrow from Set Theory: each solution allows for the grouping of certain resources that can be combined using unions, intersections, set differences, etc. For example, sets of changes or service definitions may be called “manifests”, “promises”, or “recipes”, while sets of hosts may be referred to as “roles”, “node groups”, or they may be defined through the use of “attributes” or “tags”.

I’ve found it useful to remember the visual description of defining these sets as “drawing circles around things”: this is quite literally what developers and system administrators often end up doing on their whiteboards. Looking at these whiteboards or state diagrams immediately conjures the Venn Diagram, an easy way for us to visualize relationships between different groups.

As we define services as a set of changes, or hosts as being grouped together by certain attributes, we can build an inheritance model using further and further abstraction of common properties into subsets. By performing set operations such as unions, intersections and set differences, we gain significant flexibility in determining common and service specific definitions.

Let us take a look at the different kinds of resources we might draw circles around:

Sets of changes

Moving beyond maintenance of a few individual hosts, we realize that changes made on our systems fall, broadly speaking, into two categories: those that need to be applied to *all* systems⁵ (as might be the case illustrated by our LDAP Client Configuration example from Section 7.3.2), and those that need to be applied to only a *subset* of systems, possibly a subset of one. This realization is fundamental: we begin to view system configuration no longer as a task performed on an individual host, but as *defining the changes* that may need to be applied.

In addition, there are changes that are made to all system *in exactly the same way* (e.g., the `/etc/sshd_config` file is updated on all hosts to disable `PasswordAuthentication`) as well as changes that are made taking specific properties of the target environment into account (e.g. the use of a different default route or DNS server depending on the network the system is in). The astute reader will recognize parallels to the four classes of data we identified earlier: “static”, “variable”, “shareable” and “unshareable” (compare Table 5.1).

It is important to be consistent in the application of this model: even a single service running on a single host should be well-defined and explicitly described as such a set – a set of one. This allows us to easily recreate the service in case of emergency, when more resources are added, or when an additional instance of the service is created, for example in a new data center.

Figure 7.2 shows how different change sets can be combined via an inheritance model to help define more complex services.

Sets of hosts

Any host may, at any point in time, perform multiple roles, offer multiple services, or meet multiple requirements. Grouping hosts according to their properties, attributes, or functionality makes it possible to apply the previously identified sets of changes. But groups of hosts are not only defined by the services they provide; you can also categorize hosts by different criteria even within a single service definition. It is common (and good practice) to

⁵Ok, we are cheating a bit here: there rarely are properties applying to absolutely *all* your systems. In System Administration in large scale environments, exceptions are the single universal rule.




Figure 7.2: An illustration of how abstract change sets help define different services. Common modules are included in more complex definitions before being applied to groups of hosts. Some “base” modules (ssh and ldap in this example) are included on all hosts.

have for each service a small number of hosts – some of which do not take any production traffic – on which to test any changes that we plan on rolling out. Many organizations use the terms “dev” (development), “qa” (quality assurance), “testing”, “staging” or “canary”, and “prod” (production) for the different stages of software development. Likewise, it may be useful to group hosts by geographical location to allow for a carefully staged deployment on a global scale.

Software deployment – an inherently risky business, as we are willfully introducing entropy into a running and stable system – can thus be carefully orchestrated through the use of a CM and clearly defined roles.

In fact, CMs themselves usually allow you to *branch* your changes in the same way that a software development project may track different development efforts before merging changes back into the main line. In order to take advantage of this approach, divide your hosts into sets that are on a different branch: a relatively small number of hosts would receive all changes immediately, allowing the system administrators to rapidly test all their changes; a

larger host sample (ideally including a cross section of all possible host group definitions) should follow the “staging” branch to which changes which need to be tested would be deployed. All remaining hosts track the “stable” or “production” branch, receiving changes only after they have gone through the previous stages and found to be without errors.

See Section 7.5.1 for a more detailed description of this approach.

Sets of users

Finally, account management is perhaps the most obvious application of the principles of set theory within configuration management.

As noted in Section 6.3, user accounts may be grouped together by their required access privileges. Regardless of whether user accounts are managed centrally via a directory service or whether individual accounts are explicitly created on each system, the decision to grant access is based on a user’s group membership ; user groups are then mapped to different sets of hosts as previously illustrated in Figure 6.1a.

Note that different users can be simultaneously members of multiple groups. In our previous example, we showed how users in the `wheel` group were given full `sudo(1)` privileges on all hosts, while members of the `dev` group might only get user level access to a small subset of all hosts. These mappings are non-exclusive: a user may well be in both the `dev` and the `wheel` groups at the same time.

7.5 Fighting entropy

Configuration management asserts state. That is, we try to keep a system from deteriorating into an undefined state and to (re-)establish more order. We continuously fight entropy. But we are also introducing change, and the changes we apply may have side-effects. CMs have the potential to completely bring down an entire infrastructure if the wrong kinds of changes are introduced. It is therefore important to look at a few safeguards and techniques that allow us to prevent such disaster scenarios.

7.5.1 Deployment roles

Managing infrastructure code, as it turns out, is not very different from traditional software development. The final product needs to be tested before




Figure 7.3: An illustration of the different deployment roles a host may be in. Of all hosts in the “web server” group, some are in the “development” environment, some are in the “test” and “staging” environments, and some are serving production traffic. Of those, a small subset performs the role of the “canary”.

it is shipped to the customers. In the context of configuration management, this might be a service definition that has to be verified to not inadvertently break the systems on which it should be deployed, including new releases of the service software.

As a result of this similarity, we usually employ similar strategies and create development, test, and pre-production environments on which to iterate through a series of assertions to ensure the correctness of the installation and configuration. In the previous section we already mentioned the grouping of hosts into these conceptual roles – and the number of stages you require a change to propagate through before it reaches production may depend on the size of your environment – but in general, it is a good idea to have the configuration management development process to include the following deployment roles. As you read through the description of these roles, reference Figure 7.3 for an illustration.

Development

These hosts serve as the playground where all prototypes are initially set up as proofs of concept before being properly packaged and turned into a

defined services. All new changes are initially developed and tested in this environment. Hosts in this role are often in a state of flux, and it is not uncommon for a system administrator to break a service in the process of testing a new configuration management module. For this reason, these systems do not serve production traffic.

Test

A small number of hosts on which to perform end-to-end tests after initial development make up the test environment. Once we have defined a new service, created a new package, or made any other changes to our CM, we let them be applied in this environment. The most important difference to the “development” environment is that *we do not perform any manual changes here*: everything goes through the full configuration management cycle. This allows us to make sure that the module we put together does in fact include all required changes, can be applied by the configuration management software, and does not cause any obvious problems.

In a heterogenous environment it is import to ensure that all major operating system versions are represented in this group.

Pre-Production

Once testing has determined that the changes we plan to roll out do indeed yield the desired state, we can push them into the pre-production environment, sometimes referred to as “staging”. This group consists of a representative sample of all production serving hosts, including different hardware configurations and different operating systems. For each major service, a sample of hosts are placed into this role to ensure compatibility of any new changes within the given software stack.

Systems in this role do not usually take full production traffic, but may be used internally to test your products. In some environments, a small percentage of actual production traffic is shifted to these systems to ensure that all crucial code paths that might be encountered once the change is deployed are executed.

Often times we define automated checks and tests that run against these hosts to ensure no unexpected side effects were introduced by the changes we made.

Production

All hosts serving production traffic or providing a crucial (possibly internal only) service. Any changes made here should have gone through the previous stages, and in some cases may require explicit “change management” practices, including advance notification of all stakeholders, service owners, and customers.

Since this group of systems can range in size from only a handful of hosts (for a particular service) to literally hundreds of thousands of machines (providing multiple services), deployment of any changes is inherently risky and needs to be coordinated carefully. Especially in very large environments these changes are often deployed in a staged manner: starting with a small number of machines the percentage of all hosts that will receive the change is slowly ramped up.

Canary

Sometimes it is difficult to account for all eventualities, and experience has shown that some errors cannot (easily) be reproduced or triggered in a controlled staging environment. This is largely due to the fact that actual production traffic is so difficult to simulate. Hence, it may be a good idea to create a so-called “canary” role as a special method of detecting possible errors in your configuration: individual hosts that are part of the actual production environment and that do take production traffic will get code deployments earlier than the bulk of the production hosts. This way, errors can be detected before they might be deployed everywhere else. Like the canary in the coal mine, these hosts serve as an early warning system for potentially dangerous changes.

Security Roles



Please note that the definitions given here are also helpful in deciding access control as well as traffic flow from a security perspective. For example, hosts in a *development* role may be accessed by all developers, while production systems may not. Similarly, traffic may be allowed from hosts in the “test” role to other hosts in the same role only, but access of production data may be restricted to production systems only.

Even though there is a certain overlap in defining deployment roles and in defining roles related to security, they are not always congruent. While access restrictions may be derived from the deployment model, finer grained control and additional restrictions or definitions are often necessary. Nevertheless, the model of *sets* applies here as well. Only this time, we are, for example, drawing circles around host- and network based ACL and intersecting these security roles with host- and user groups.

7.5.2 Idempotence and Convergence

Configuration management asserts state. To this end, it must reliably produce a defined state without side-effects and needs to be able to run under different circumstances, yet yield the same outcome. If you run your CM on an unconfigured system, it will produce the same end-result as if you run it repeatedly, over and over, in its final, configured state.

Operations that can be performed multiple times yet always produce the same result are called *idempotent*. To illustrate, unary mathematical operations are idempotent if the following definition holds:

$$f(f(x)) \equiv f(x)$$

That is, a function applied twice to any value will produce the same result as if applied only once. A common example here is taking the absolute value of x :

$$|| - 1 || \equiv | - 1 |$$

How does this property translate into practical applications within the scope of configuration management? As we are moving the system from one state to another, we are applying certain changes. Executing these steps must not yield different results depending on the previous system state. Reviewing the required capabilities we identified as CM requirements in Section 7.3.3 – software installation, service management, file permissions and ownerships, installation of static files, generation of host-specific data, and command execution – we find that each may or may not be implemented in a manner that satisfies this requirement. As one example, assertion of an existing file's ownership and permissions, is an inherently idempotent operation: no matter

```

$ cd etc
# not idempotent
$ rm resolv.conf
# idempotent
$ echo "nameserver 192.168.0.1" > resolv.conf
# idempotent
$ echo "nameserver 192.168.0.2" >> resolv.conf
# not idempotent
$ chown root:wheel resolv.conf
# idempotent
$ chmod 0644 resolv.conf
# idempotent

```

Listing 7.4: Idempotent and non-idempotent commands.

how often you execute these commands, and no matter what the permissions and ownership on the file were before, the end result will be the same.

Other typical tasks within configuration management are not quite as obviously idempotent, and some – updating an existing file on a host with parameters determined at runtime, for example – may in fact not be. For any command executed within a configuration management system, you can ask yourself the question of whether or not the outcome will be the same if you either run the command under different circumstances, or if you repeat the command over and over. See Listing 7.4 for a few trivial examples. Note that sometimes a command may behave idempotently only if a special flag is given, and that under some circumstances the only thing that makes a command *not* idempotent may be the exit status. (We will revisit the importance of idempotence within the context of building scalable tools again in Chapter 9.)

In many cases the CM may aid in defining actions in such a manner as to preserve idempotence – *CFEngine*, for example, explicitly discourages the use of free shell commands and leads the user to abstract their requirements into so-called “promises”[10] – but in the end it is up to the system administrator to carefully evaluate the service definitions and change sets she creates and applies to ensure that no side-effects are possible.

Idempotence goes hand in hand with the philosophy of asserting state, rather than making changes. Writing system tools and defining changes that are idempotent takes great care and consideration, especially when one considers the possibility of simultaneous execution of commands or programs outside of our control. The time and effort spent on identifying these and creating a tool that can cope with these factors yield significant benefits: System stability increases as we are able to reliably repeat the same commands without fear or unwanted side-effects.

It is important to note that idempotence does *not* imply that an operation

is *only* performed when it is necessary, only that the *outcome* will remain the same. That is, idempotence does not guarantee efficiency nor necessarily continuous service availability. Consider two systems, one brand new and unconfigured, one already in a desired state, i.e. a production service. In order to get the first system into the state of the second system, the CM needs to make a lot of rather intrusive changes: software packages have to be installed, configuration files updated, and the host may need to be rebooted, possibly multiple times. Performing all of these steps again when the end state would be the same as the current state seems like a bad idea. At best, we'd be wasting CPU cycles; at worst, we'd introduce temporary instability or service downtime.

This is where the concept of *convergence* comes into play: A configuration management system should only perform those operations and apply only those changes that are necessary. Idempotence and Convergence are easily conflated, and within a CM, both are desired properties. But it is important to be aware of the difference:

Consider the `chown(8)` and `chmod(1)` example code from Listing 7.4. Despite being idempotent, running the commands may not be necessary at all if the permissions and ownerships are already as desired. That is, the configuration management system could first test for the desired end-state, and then only execute the steps missing. In this particular example, the difference is negligible, but the practice of checking whether commands actually need to be executed becomes more important when we consider how our system may assert the presence of a certain software package.

That is, if a package of the required version is already installed, the CM (possibly by way of the package manager it invokes) will likely perform a no-op instead of fetching the same package and re-installing it. This is *not* the same as performing the installation again: for example, all too frequently poorly packaged software may overwrite your carefully tuned existing configuration file with a new template or example file. A good package manager, and a carefully written package, may be able to prevent this from happening, but you cannot always rely on this.

Different CMs provide different features, and being able to use them all to your advantage requires practice. In some systems, the responsibility of defining convergent operations is pushed on the system administrator; other CMs go to great lengths to avoid unnecessary changes. Idempotence is crucial for all operations within a CM, but allowing the system to reach the end state in a convergent manner improves stability and reduces the possibility for

service interruptions on the way from state A to state B. Both principles are often fully understood and appreciated only after a lot of practical experience and a perhaps a few “interesting” error scenarios, but try to keep them in mind as you develop and deploy your CM solution.

7.5.3 **Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?**

The latin phrase “*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*” – translated: “Who will guard the guards themselves?” – expresses a fundamental dilemma we encounter when we give full control to any person, government body or, in our case, a piece of software. That is, configuration management asserts state, but what ensures that the configuration management system functions properly?

In fact, CM systems usually control *themselves*. After all, configuration management is a software service just like any other, and needs to be controlled and monitored the same way. This, however, introduces a rather significant risk factor, as changes made to the CM itself have the ability to either wreak havoc across the entire infrastructure or to simply halt any progress if it breaks down.

For this reason, it is important to put in place safeguards and practices to reduce the probability of such errors. The risk of potential disaster is one of the side effects of a high degree of automation. We will discuss this and a number of possible risk mitigating techniques in detail in Chapter 8.

7.6 Even more formal process definitions

Today’s CM systems exhibit a noticeable overlap with concepts discussed in the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)[5], a set of practices underlying the first international standard for IT Service Management, ISO/IEC 20000. As a formalized standard trying to cover generally applicable practices, these documents offer a far from thrilling reading experience and have seen limited voluntary adoption in the private sector. The main criticisms are similar to those applied to similar standard documents and regulations (such as the notorious PCI DSS): good intentions and sound general advice is lost amidst lengthy rationale and overly bureaucratic and much too broad definitions.

As perhaps a form of social commentary, one might be further inclined

to seek parallels between modern CM systems and a general Silicon Valley startup culture of rapid invention and quick iteration versus an as “old and stuffy” dismissed IT process represented by the formality of ITIL. As so often, software systems reflect the organizational and cultural hierarchies under which they are developed⁶; most System Administrators with sufficient experience will find some humor in the fact that nevertheless, even these different methodologies become eventually convergent.

That is, despite being easily dismissed as not flexible enough for practical application, many of the recommendations or best practices outlined in ITIL do underly or correlate to the operations of modern CMs. For example, large scale configuration management has evolved to effectively implement or require a repository of all information about the various systems in an organization, the Configuration Management Database (or CMDB). When you read up on this topic, you will hopefully be able to relate those documents to a number of concepts discussed here.

7.7 Summary

We have covered a lot of ground in this chapter, much of it theoretical. The examples shown were taken from some of the more popular configuration management solutions currently in use: CFEngine, Chef, and Puppet. All three implement their own Domain Specific Language, with striking similarities amongst them.

We identified as one crucial concept in configuration management the idea that services are abstracted from the hosts that provide them. This abstraction allows us to define not individual changes, but rather self-contained change sets describing what is required to provide a given functionality. These change sets, in turn, can be applied to groups of hosts; with those sufficiently abstracted and clearly defined, we are able to combine attributes of host groups and describe its members’ final state using set operations. Much like on a white board or the proverbial paper napkin in a restaurant, we draw circles around things. Giving those circles descriptive names, configuration management then becomes a question of creating unions or intersections of service descriptions with host collections.

Using this model, we determined that configuration management is really not about *applying changes*, but about *asserting state*, ensuring that a host

⁶See “Conway’s Law”, derived from [16].

meets a certain set of criteria. We have looked at the functional requirements any CM needs to provide in order to yield a desired state as well as the essential concepts of idempotence and convergence: all changes we make must have well-defined and predictable outcomes that do not change if applied repeatedly; at the same time, we only want to perform those changes that are necessary.

When building our infrastructure we face a choice between a custom, home-grown system that integrates perfectly with other system components, and deploying an “Off The Shelf” solution. Many commercial products exist that promise to manage all of your systems with ease. Some of them offer free versions; some systems are available as open source software, while others are closed.

Knowing our infrastructure needs inside and out, we often fall into the trap of writing our own solutions. In small environments, the benefits of a complex product do not seem worth the cost of adapting our infrastructure to abide by the product’s configuration model. It is for this reason that every growing company inevitably undergoes a phase during which large parts of the initial infrastructure are ripped out and replaced by more scalable solutions – including a mature configuration management system.

In very large environments, on the other hand, our requirements are so unique as to not likely to be matched trivially by any available solution; we will need to write a significant amount of “glue” code around the product anyway – why not just implement our own system? But therein lies a frequent fallacy: as any software engineer knows, the best code is the one we do not have to write ourselves.

Fortunately, development on a number of flexible CMs has yielded several viable solutions for almost any scale. A small environment benefits from the rigorous structure imposed by a mature configuration management system able to grow with the infrastructure; in large environments, it is useful to be able to rely on a proven technology and focus on the end point integration with other systems.

The area of configuration management has become one of the most important fields in large scale system administration and has opened up room for a lot of interesting research. As this chapter hints at, there is significant overlap between configuration management, software provisioning, and the many related tasks in ensuring reliable service availability. All of these moving parts are sometimes referred to as “Service Orchestration”, by now




Figure 7.4: Configuration Management overlaps and intersects several other areas of System Administration, many of which depend on a central asset database and comprehensive service definitions.

its own field of research covering the theory of how complex systems fail, in how far we can achieve automatic recovery or guarantee service availability, and the concept of autonomous state configuration across large scale deployments with literally hundreds of thousands of hosts. See Figure 7.4 for an illustration of these relationships.

As so often, we can only focus on the fundamental concepts with just enough references to more advanced topics to entice the reader to continue their research. We will revisit some of these topics in section 15.2, when we try to catch up on missed topics and tie together some of our loose ends.

Throughout this chapter, we have focused primarily on configuration management of host-type systems. But our infrastructure consists of more than just “hosts”: we have large amounts of network equipment as well as a number of appliances that sit somewhere in between the traditional networking gear and a “normal” host: we have routers and switches, load balancers and firewalls, storage devices and intrusion detection systems... the list goes on. All of these devices *also* require configuration management, and it is unfortunate that integrating them into your existing CM is often difficult, if not impossible.

Our approach to divide resources into grouped sets and describe changes

as service definitions does in fact translate to non-host systems as well. All we need is for a programmatic method to access them – ideally, though not necessarily via a programmable interface such as a well-documented API – and we can add support for them to our CM. A positive development in recent years has lead some of the configuration management tools we mentioned to now allow you to manage at least some non-host type systems, even though we are still a ways from the same level of control.

The fundamental value configuration management provides as we move from individual systems to easily replicated services is perhaps best summarized by this quote:

“The test we use when designing infrastructures is ”Can I grab a random machine that’s never been backed up and throw it out the tenth-floor window without losing sysadmin work?” If the answer to this was ”yes”, then we knew we were doing things right.”[15]

Granted, one would hope that people entering your datacenter and throwing machines out of the window is not a regular event. But Murphy’s famous law – commonly cited as “Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.” – acts as viciously, and we must view software failure as the functional equivalent. All software has bugs, and it is only a question of time until your complex service encounters a fatal error. Similarly, hardware fails as well – and not too infrequently. This becomes painfully obvious in very large environments with hundreds of thousands of machines, as the probability of encountering a hardware failure increases proportionally to the number of hosts in service. “One in a million is next Tuesday.”[17]

With properly defined services, correctly grouped hosts, and a well running CM individual hosts do become expendable. Any system-, software-, or hardware failure has significantly reduced impact on our overall service availability. In other words: configuration management lies at the heart of any well-managed infrastructure and makes large scale deployments ultimately maintainable.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Review your own environment, your infrastructure, and your essential services. Do you think they could be rebuilt from scratch? With how much effort? Which components seem completely and easily replaceable, and which would you fear most to lose?
2. Identify the configuration management system currently in use on the systems you have access to. Can you determine which components or services are controlled by the CM in question and which resources are not? Contact your system administrator and ask her about details.
3. Review the documentation for one of the popular CMs. Most of them can quickly and easily be tried out using just a few virtual machines. Set up a CM and try to define a simple service. How does this system implement the features and concepts we discussed?
4. Pick a popular service provided in your environment – for example a DNS-, web- or file server – and create a complete service definition for it. Make sure to identify the smaller required modules this service relies on. How far does it make sense to abstract the individual components?
5. When deploying a new service, identify the different categories into which each step falls. Is software installation sufficiently covered by executing the right commands using your package manager? Do additional files need to be created or existing configuration files modified? Does the configuration file differ from host to host within a service group?

6. Review how your existing package management system handles reinstallation of a package of either the same or a different version. How are configuration files handled? Are these actions idempotent?
7. Consider the agent bundle shown in Listing 7.3. What kind of parameters in the `sshd_config` file would you expect to be expanded when this code is executed? Using CFEngine's online documentation, create a suitable template.
8. Review the commands shown in Listing 7.4. Do you agree with their classification as being idempotent or not? Try to argue for or against their classification.
9. Consider the command “`mv this there`” – under what circumstances is this particular invocation idempotent? Is it ever? What, if any, checks or changes can you add to a script that includes this command to ensure the outcome *is* idempotent?
10. A common test of a new CM consists of updating the `/etc/motd` file with information from the running host. This operation incurs a very small risk, as no application relies on this file, yet it can easily show that the system is running and operating properly.

Create a script or command to update the `/etc/motd` file on a system to include the hostname of the system, the time since the host was last rebooted, and the time this script was last executed. Can you translate this script into a template in the DSL of your configuration management system?

11. Review the different states your systems may go through. How do you currently define a properly operating host? How would you go about identifying a *deviant* host?
12. Every System Administrator has a virtual tool chest full of scripts, commands, and utilities used during the configuration and maintenance of their systems. Review your peers' tools as well as your own and identify in how far they assure *idempotence* or *convergence*. Compare these to the common tools provided by your Unix systems (such as the scripts found under `/etc/rc.d` or `/etc/init.d`) or shipped with a given software package.

Bibliography

- [1] Mark Burgess, *A Site Configuration Engine*, USENIX Computing systems, Vol8, No. 3, 1995; on the Internet at <http://cfengine.com/markburgess/papers/paper1.pdf> (visited February 22, 2013)
- [2] “An Overview of Chef”, on the Internet at http://docs.opscode.com/chef_overview.html (visited February 23, 2013)
- [3] James Turnbull, Jeffrey McCune, *Pro Puppet*, Apress, 2011
- [4] “Ansible Documentation”, on the Internet at <https://docs.ansible.com/> (visited March 18, 2017)
- [5] Cabinet Office, *ITIL Service Operation 2011 Edition (Best Management Practices)*, The Stationery Office, 2011
- [6] Mark Burgess, *Computer Immunology*, Proceedings of the Twelfth Systems Administration Conference (LISA 100) Boston, Massachusetts, December 6-11, 1998, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 1998; on the Internet at http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa98/full_papers/burgess/burgess.pdf (visited January 29, 2013)
- [7] Steve Traugott, Lance Brown, *Why Order Matters: Turing Equivalence in Automated Systems Administration*, Proceedings of the USENIX Large Installation System Administration conference, Philadelphia, PA Nov 3-8, 2002, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 2002; on the Internet at <http://www.infrastructures.org/papers/turing/turing.html> (visited January 29, 2013)
- [8] Mark Burgess, *Configuration Management, Models and Myths*, Originally published in Usenix ;login: 2006-2007; on the Internet at <http://cfengine.com/markburgess/cm.html> (visited January 29, 2013)
- [9] Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., *The Design of Design*, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2010

- [10] *CFEngine Documentation*, on the Internet at <https://cfengine.com/manuals/>
- [11] Mark Burgess, *Promise you a Rose Garden*, On the Internet at <http://cfengine.com/markburgess/rosegarden.pdf> (visited January 29, 2013)
- [12] Cory Lueninghoner, *Getting Started with Configuration Management*, Originally published in Usenix ;login: April 2011, Volume 36, Number 2; on the Internet at <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/105457-Lueninghoener.pdf> (visited January 29, 2013)
- [13] Mark Burgess, *Testable System Administration*, in *ACM Queue*, January 2011, Vol. 9 No. 1, ACM, New York, NY; on the Internet at <https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1937179> (visited January 29, 2013)
- [14] Alva Couch, Yzihan Sun, *On the Algebraic Structure of Convergence*, in *Proc. 14th IFIP/IEEE International Workshop on Distributed Systems: Operations and Management*, Heidelberg, Germany, Springer-Verlag, Inc, pp. 28-40
- [15] Steve Traugott, Joel Huddleston, Joyce Cao Traugott, *Best Practices in Automated System Administration and Infrastructure Architecture: Disaster Recovery*; on the Internet at <http://www.infrastructures.org/bootstrap/recovery.shtml> (visited March 09, 2013)
- [16] Melvin E. Conway, *How Do Committees Invent?*, in *Datamation magazine*, April, 1968; on the Internet at <http://www.melconway.com/Home/pdf/committees.pdf> (visited April 04, 2017)
- [17] Larry Osterman, *One in a million is next Tuesday*, March 30, 2004; on the Internet at <http://blogs.msdn.com/b/larryosterman/archive/2004/03/30/104165.aspx> (visited April 04, 2017)

Chapter 8

Automation

The first rule of any technology used in a business is that automation applied to an efficient operation will magnify the efficiency. The second is that automation applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the inefficiency. – Bill Gates



8.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we have discussed how configuration management systems allow us to create abstract service definitions and apply the required changes on the desired sets of hosts. CM systems thus remove the need for manual configuration on individual hosts – we have automated the steps, and in the process improved the reliability and scalability of our services within the infrastructure.

Similarly, we have hinted in Section 5.4 at systems capable of performing OS installations across large numbers of hosts without human intervention. Knowing all the individual steps needed to install an operating system, adding the required software, and performing initial host configuration (before we finally let our configuration management engine take control) allows us to use software to repeat a previously tedious manual procedure hundreds of times a day with great ease.

Both of these admittedly complex systems are prime examples of what system administrators do best: being inherently “lazy” – a virtue, as we will discuss a bit more in a minute – we automate any conceivable task such that it can be performed at the push of a button, or perhaps more likely, the press of the *return* key.

In this chapter, we will take a small step back from these large infrastructure components and review the motivation of the more general concept of “automation”. Given the incredible variety of job descriptions and environments a system administrator might find herself in, it is not surprising that the idea of letting computers do our bidding has found a number of different practical approaches. We see evidence of automation as much in a system administrator’s shell aliases or custom scripts as in the regularly scheduled `cron(8)` jobs or manually invoked tools.

It has been an old joke that the goal of any great system administrator is to automate themselves out of a job, just as we like to suggest to our colleagues or peers that they should stop bothering us, lest we replace them with a small shell script. The use of this language reflects how we approach automation: our goal is to not have to perform certain tasks ourselves, and anything that can be automated, will be.

Unlike humans, computers do not seem to mind performing boring, repetitive tasks. This chapter looks at how we can take advantage of this fact, how automation can help you stop wasting your time, and put to greater use the most valuable resources in any organization (your engineers’ minds). But automation is no panacea, so we necessarily identify a number of possible pitfalls and risks as well.

8.2 Of Laziness And Other Virtues

System administrators are notoriously lazy. We don’t want to have to manually swap backup tapes every other day – we’d much rather let a robot perform this task. We don’t want to download, extract, build, and install software packages, hunting down dependencies in the process – we’d much rather let our package manager take care of this. And we certainly do not want to sit there all day typing the same set of commands over and over, when we could instead apply our, in our humble opinion, significant intellect to solving mankind’s greatest mysteries, such as why the label maker always

runs out of tape in the middle of cabling a new rack.¹

But being lazy is a virtue – in this case, anyway. In order to develop a solution that will save us tedious work in the long run, we are willing to invest significant resources up front. We write scripts that will take into account a variety of circumstances in order to allow us to run just one command instead of a dozen, we schedule checks and implement monitoring solutions to be notified of events before they become error conditions, and we write tools that react to these alerts and which will automatically avert impending doom.

Eileen Frisch identified[1] – only slightly tongue-in-cheek – a number of “administrative virtues”: Flexibility, Ingenuity, Attention to Detail, Adherence to Routine, Persistence, Patience, and Laziness. While these traits come into play in almost any of a system administrator’s varied duties, there are particularly strong parallels to the features that allow us to create reliable automation tools:

We need *flexibility* and *ingenuity* to identify new and perhaps not entirely obvious solutions to the problems we encounter.

We need to pay *attention to detail*, to the nuances in the ways our systems may differ, when we analyze and identify all the possible edge cases, or how invoking a command under certain circumstances can lead to unexpected results.

We need a strict *adherence to routine* to produce reliable results, to collect usable data, and to keep our systems maintainable. We need to follow our own processes even when we are under pressure and inclined to take shortcuts, because we trust the routine we identified earlier more than we trust our stressed out brains.

We need *persistence* and *patience* when we write software, when we debug our tools, when we collect enough data to be able to identify our outliers and averages, and we need persistence and patience when we deploy our new systems, our infrastructure components, or when we slowly, carefully, replace a much needed service with different software.

But what impacts most of our practical work turns out to be *laziness*. As soon as we run a lengthy command a second or third time, or as we repeat a series of complex steps to complete a specific task, we start to wonder how

¹We could, of course, write a quick script that periodically checks the inventory system and orders new label maker tape online whenever the stock supply of label maker tape drops below a given threshold...

we can script this. Sure, we may end up spending a lot of time getting our automated jobs just right, but we gain productivity in the long run. And so our laziness pays off.

8.3 Benefits of Automation

When we look at large infrastructure components that help automate a complex process or workflow such as the deployment of a new host, it is immediately obvious that we reap significant benefits from having developed such a system. But even on a much smaller scale do we discover the same advantages, even though we may initially begin the process of automating a given task with the only goal being to save ourselves some typing. The primary benefits we derive from implementing an automated solution – even in the small – include the following.

8.3.1 Repeatability

Typing the same set of commands over and over is tedious. A few years ago, while maintaining a heterogenous environment of NetBSD/i386 and IRIX/mips systems, I had to try to keep in sync the latest version of the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), standardizing it to fit into our environment, enabling only the required languages but at the same time ensuring the build of a 64-bit binary².

Normally, you would have your package manager perform this installation. However, as discussed in Section 5.5.1, there are situations where installing software “by hand” is your only option. This was one of them: the native package manager did not provide a 64-bit version of this compiler, and what might otherwise seem like a routine task – building a new compiler – required the setting of a number of environment variables and command-line options to the `./configure` script. In order not to have to remember all the right settings, I wrote myself a trivial script (see Listing 8.1).

²Certain 64-bit capable IRIX systems supported both a 32-bit and a 64-bit Application Binary Interface (ABI); in order to use the more performant 64-bit interface, the application would have to be compiled with support for and be linked against the 64-bit libraries. Even though less common today, you can still find a number of tools that cannot (easily) be built as 64-bit binaries.

```
#!/bin/sh
export CC=cc CXX=CC CFLAGS="-64 -mips4 -r10000" LDFLAGS="-64"
mkdir gcc-build
cd gcc-build
../gcc-3.3.3/configure --prefix=/usr/pkg/gcc-3.3.3 \
    --enable-languages=c,c++,java --enable-libgcj \
    --disable-shared --enable-threads=posix \
    --enable-version-specific-runtime-libs \
    --enable-haifa --disable-c-mbchar \
    --disable-checking --disable-nls
gmake bootstrap
```

Listing 8.1: Building a 64-bit version of the GNU Compiler Collection on an old IRIX system. Even if done rarely, storing these commands in a rudimentary script can help repeat the process more easily. (With plenty of room for improvement, Problem 4 will ask you to turn this into a more reliable, more readable tool.)

A few months later, when a new version of `gcc(1)` became available, I had to repeat the same process. Instead of wasting time trying to remember all the options I needed, what environment variables I had to set, etc., I was able to build it using this trivial script.

We often use automation as a way to remember the correct steps. Even a task that is not performed frequently – in our example above, perhaps twice a year – benefits from us creating even a simple script to repeat it easily without having to think twice about every detail. Detailed documentation explaining *why* certain parameters need to be passed may be ideal, but providing a simple script to repeat a cumbersome process is still a win.

Guaranteed repeatability allows us to ignore *how* a task is performed. Even simple scripts can thus hide unnecessary complexity from us, making the task at hand easier in the process.

8.3.2 Reliability

Being able to repeat the same process easily without having to recall the details of every step is a great advantage, not only because it saves us a lot of typing or because we don’t waste time recreating previously known information. One of the key benefits of an easily repeatable process lies in its *reliability*. When we run commands interactively, we may change the order

or detail of invocation as we run through the end-to-end process. We easily make mistakes, mistype a command, accidentally redirect output to truncate a file instead of appending to it, accidentally slip in an additional character, execute a command from the wrong directory, or we simply skip a step (by accident or because we deem it unnecessary).

Every time we invoke a script, on the other hand, it will run the same commands in the same order. If we are careful when we automate a task and create a tool executing idempotent commands only (hopefully combined with copious error checking), we need not worry about how it is invoked. We can treat it like any other system utility and rely on it running either to completion or produce meaningful error messages that allow us to diagnose the problem.

Automation provides reliability not only through consistency, but also in terms of quality: as soon as we begin to automate a task, we begin to move beyond just stashing individual commands in a script (such as the one given as an example above). Instead, we build our tool with reliability in mind, fine tuning the steps and beginning to think more about how they are executed. Just like documentation, we are more likely to consider in more detail the implications of each command when we create an automated job. As a result, the final utility is more robust and executes more reliably than any manual process ever would.

Some tasks need to be performed repeatedly with a certain regularity, system backups being a prime example. For starters, the backup process needs to be run on a daily basis. Defining the command required to initiate this task and then scheduling it via the `cron(8)` daemon is about as mundane yet important a task as you may encounter in any system administrator's life. But being able to rely on the tool is a pre-requisite, and automating the steps to allow them to be scheduled in the first place does provide this required reliability.

Robots to the rescue!



Automation can not only be achieved by scripting or programming. Several years ago, it was not uncommon for small sites to use a single tape library, storing backups on a rotating set of backup tapes. This meant having to change the tape on a daily basis, as otherwise you would overwrite the previous day's backup. It turns out that most humans are fairly bad at remembering

such tasks – at one time, I had the backup system email me a daily reminder in the afternoon to rotate the tapes; I still forgot to do it every now and then.

As our systems grew and disk capacity increased, so did the requirements for backups. Eventually, upgrading our backup system became unavoidable. At that point, we invested into a significantly larger (albeit substantially more expensive) tape library able to hold dozens of backup tapes and to rotate them automatically by means of an internal robotic tape switcher.

Once set up correctly, the entire backup process became completely automated, not requiring any human intervention whatsoever. Every so often, “throwing money at the problem” may turn out to be the best solution. The satisfaction of seeing a robot do one’s manual work should also not be underestimated. But all automation solutions, including robots, can experience unexpected failures. At Yahoo!, we once received an incident notification that read: “Two robots collided, one arm pulled off.” Fortunately, the appendage in question belonged to one of the robots, not a datacenter technician.

8.3.3 Flexibility

As we develop our tool, it often becomes obvious that we are not, as initially assumed, solving one specific problem, but that we are facing a particular instance of an often more generic set of problems. In our previous example, we set out to build a script that would let us easily create a 64-bit version of version 3.3.3 of the `gcc(1)` tools. We hard-coded both the ABI as well as the software version into our simplistic script, meaning that the next time a new version is released, we need to edit the source to build the software. What’s more, some of our machines do *not* support the 64-bit ABI, and we need to build 32-bit versions as well. In other words: we need a more flexible tool that allows us to specify both the ABI as well as the software version.

Once identified as a candidate for automation, we quickly begin to view the problem at hand in a different context. By spending a little bit of time up front, we can anticipate future requirements and make our tool useful in a variety of circumstances. For example, we may allow the user to specify

different options on the command-line or let the tool react to certain environment variables.

But flexibility is not only exhibited by allowing different invocations. A good tool is also flexible in the way in which it handles certain error conditions. This may be achieved by verifying any of the assumptions made, or by failing early and explicitly. This behaviour reflects the concepts of *Idempotence* and *Convergence*, which we discussed in Chapter 7; we will go back to these and other desirable features of scalable tools in Chapter 9. For now, suffice it to say that even if somewhat paradoxically a tool being more strict about how it runs may actually provide greater flexibility: it allows us to run it under different circumstances with predictable outcomes. What's more important: it may allow us to build other tools *around* it.

8.4 Who benefits from automation?

The evolution of individual, trivial scripts into more generally useful utilities and tools is inevitable, and one of the key benefits of committing to automation of your routine tasks early on. Frequently we start out just trying to save ourselves a few keystrokes and end up writing a program which many other people rely on for their day to day work. Figure 8.1 illustrates this evolution of system administrators' tools from e.g. a shell alias into a full-fledged service or widely used tool. Note that the more mature your tool becomes, the more likely it is that others have begun customizing it or written scripts that depend on it. This implies a stability requirement in more mature tools: the more users depend on it, the harder it is to make significant changes.

It is thus a good idea to remember who we are automating a task for, as that helps us define exactly how to shape our tools. Broadly speaking, we often automate tasks for ourselves, for our peers (other system administrators within or outside of our organization), and finally for other users in general. As the number of possible users of our tools in these three groups increases, the number of assumptions we can safely make about how the tool is used, or the environment in which it runs, goes down.

Each category exposes significantly different inherent complexity, but the resulting benefits tend to increase as well. Much as with documentation, as we discussed in Chapter 3, clearly identifying your target audience (or user base in this case) is an important prerequisite to building a new automation solution.

8.4.1 Ourselves

Often we begin automating a task by customizing our own environment. We all have our own shell aliases, functions, or custom little scripts stored in our home directory or a private location in our PATH.

The script we used in the previous section is a good example: we did not anticipate anybody else to have to perform this task, and so we took the liberty of making a few assumptions about the environment in which it might be executed.

As system administrators, we should be careful not to create tools that only benefit ourselves, as this approach does not scale well. In any but the smallest organizations, we share responsibilities with others and operate in sufficiently diverse environments to not be able to rely on too many customizations.

It is not uncommon for senior system administrators in large organizations to have the most bare-bones shell startup files of all users, despite being the perhaps most advanced users. Not relying on assumptions about and customizations of the shell environment is something learned and appreciated with experience. In fact, just being consciously *aware* of the assumptions we make is often a sign of a senior system administrator.

8.4.2 Our Peers

Even the little scripts we create for ourselves tend to evolve into larger programs as we share them with our peers. As the number of users increases, so do the requirements. We need to start to accommodate different use cases and different environments.

In many organizations, system administrators create their own tools to automate every conceivable task of their daily routine. In larger environments, this may become a specialization of some members of the sysadmin team, and yet others may even provide a team dedicated to the development of these tools.

If you work in a small environment, try to think within the context of a significantly larger scale about the various tasks you perform and have undoubtedly automated for yourself. If you work in a large environment, try to think how the many tools you use regularly have evolved. One of the key differences in these two points of view is the target audience.

Also note that developing tools for system administrators to automate




Figure 8.1: SysAdmin tools often evolve with time. Complexity increases with the number of users, while the number of assumptions you can safely make about the environment in which the tool is invoked decreases.

their very specific and often complex tasks requires a very specific background. System administrators are power users, who have high expectations of their tools; we tend to quickly dismiss anything that does not meet them.

8.4.3 All Users

Recall from the introductory chapter of this book that one of the definitions of a system administrator is “one who, as a primary job function, manages computer and network systems *on behalf of another*.“ The main reason for the systems we maintain to exist is so they can perform a specific service. That is, their purpose implies a number of users who take advantage of the system’s resources. These users may be actual user accounts on the systems or external users interacting with the systems over the network.

In order to allow our users to get the most out of our systems, we frequently put together tools that automate common tasks or interactions on behalf of all users. This may be a simple tool to allow a user to retrieve or request one of their files from backup, a program to facilitate access to an internal database, or perhaps a utility to let users receive system or software updates.

As we develop these tools, we need to keep in mind the requirements of the user interface, as well as – again – what assumptions we make about the

user's environment and even abilities. It is also worth noting that, depending on the size of the environment you work in, the difference between automating a system administrative task and developing a large infrastructure service quickly become rather fuzzy. As noted above, in some organizations, dedicated teams are created to provide and maintain custom tools for use in the administration of the systems. Some of these tools are open sourced and distributed outside of the company, yielding a massively increased user base.

8.5 Levels of Automation

Automation is a term with many different meanings. Within System Administration, we often encounter a mantra that any conceivable task, if repeated only twice, should be automated. But the outcomes and level of effort required vary significantly depending on exactly how far we want to take this approach. Earlier, we cited the examples of Host Deployment and Configuration Management to illustrate what it means to automate a very complex task from end to end; throughout this chapter, we have used a much simpler example to show how we may also benefit quickly from trivial automation.

As we can see, there are obvious differences in the level to which we may take automation. Writing a small script to avoid having to repeat the same tasks is perhaps the simplest version of automation, yet it often evolves into a more complex solution, expanding with the problem scope. After completing a task, we often realize that it was just one step of a longer process, and that we may well automate the remaining steps as well.

Automation is rarely completely autonomous. By this, we mean that we define specific subsets of tasks that are performed by a computer on our behalf, but the overall operation, divided into answering questions about the *what*, *how*, *when*, and, ultimately, *why* of a given problem solution, are to be answered by the system administrators in charge.

Tools written to save typing efforts, even if they include logic that provides flexibility to yield different outcomes depending on certain circumstances, by and large provide answers to the question of *how* to solve a problem by having a human describe detailed instructions. That is, we describe the steps necessary to be executed in their specific order. In our previous example, we identified the goal of the tool ("Build a new version of the `gcc(1)` compiler.") and provided a script describing the method of accomplishing it ("Set these environment variables. Run the `configure` script with these options. Run

the `make` command.”).

The level of automation reached here is fairly low, but it has the advantage that the solution is simple. As we move beyond this first stage of automation, we begin to define the problem in more general terms, allowing us to describe only *what* we wish to accomplish without having to care about *how* this is done. In our example, a generic package manager might serve as the automated solution: we can specify that we need a new version of a package, without having to know (or care!) about how the system actually builds it. Despite increased complexity, the benefits are significant. In addition, we still control *when* actions are taken interactively.

Configuration management takes automation to the next level: here, system administrators only describe the *what*: which packages should be installed, which files should be added, updated, or removed, etc., without always specifying exactly *how* this is done, nor *when* these steps are to be executed.³ That is, the configuration management system is more autonomous, as it applies its own rules of which steps to perform at what time to yield eventual convergence to the defined state.

Similarly, monitoring tools that trigger actions based on pre-defined thresholds or events are a way to automate the *what* and *when* of some system recovery tasks, but they may leave the *how* to either humans (in the case of alerting) or another system. As we combine these different levels of automation, we can – sometimes – approach the golden grail of system administration: autonomous, self-healing systems. At this stage, the software decides on its own what actions to perform based on the input of its various subsystems or components. It may still inform its system administrators of the steps executed, but no longer require human interaction for the majority of events. In some cases, there is even hope to allow systems to become more adaptive and to execute different steps based on data collected from previous instances of the same event – it may “learn”.

The thought of self-adapting, autonomous computers managing large systems without human interaction may sound futuristic or even a bit concerning, and it carries significant risks: at each step, complexity increases manifold, and the opportunities for catastrophic failures may indeed multiply. We discuss some of these disadvantages in the next section.

³To be fair, writing the rules of a configuration management system may frequently include a specification of the *how*, but with sufficient abstraction, such as by way of carefully crafted templates, these details become less important for routine configuration tasks.

8.6 Automation Pitfalls

So far we have praised automation for all its benefits: increased reliability, flexibility, for allowing us to schedule tasks and then – for the most part, anyway – forget about them, knowing that they will run and Do The Right Thing. But automation is no panacea; as so many things in life, it involves trade-offs.

Most obviously, taking a complex task and defining it in such a way that it can be automated requires a thorough understanding of the problem and its possible pitfalls, of any possible side-effect, how much variance your environment exhibits, and how much you wish to be able to accommodate with the automated solution. This is still a *benefit* of automation, as you begin to more clearly understand the problem space, and are more likely to identify a more reliable solution.

But performing this analysis and then implementing (and debugging!) the tools to automate the task at hand takes time and effort. In addition, one needs to remain aware that applying the results of our automation efforts to build further tools may trap us in what is known as “confirmation bias”: as we measure what we can, we may erroneously dismiss what we could not or did not measure. Trusting our automated tools can lead us to overlook or dismiss factors not accounted for in these solutions. We will take a closer look at this effect and related risks when we discuss monitoring in more detail in Chapter 14.

8.6.1 Increased Complexity and Impact

Automation often introduces or increases complexity. Unless carefully implemented and meticulously documented, an automated system can become a black box to your peers. Fewer people will understand how the task is actually accomplished or where to look when things inevitably break. “Complex systems fail in complex ways.” [5]

Automation also vastly increases the impact of any failure you may encounter, as it allows us to perform tasks across the entire infrastructure. While a manually executed command may well be mistyped, it will often have a limited impact. After all, this is often precisely *why* we wanted to automate the given task! But now consider the failure scenario: accidentally removing a user account from a single machine, for example, is easy to fix and may not impact that system’s operations; accidentally removing all user

group associations from all of your infrastructure’s hosts, on the other hand, may cause wide spread system failure and be much harder to revert.

Well-written tools prevent such catastrophic failures – or at least, they will try to. But at the end of the day, these tools are written by ever-fallible humans, and so bugs sneak in. A simple typo in a wide-spread tool can wreak havoc on an impressive scale.

The Impact of a Single Character



Software installation and upgrades are frequently automated (whether by way of a package manager or a `Makefile`) using simple scripts that perform the necessary steps. For example, a package owning the files under the `/usr/lib/mumble` directory might delete those files when it is upgraded or removed.

In 2011, users of a specific software package noticed that upgrading from one version to another rendered their system completely unusable. Looking at the install script of the software, it was found to contain the following command:

```
rm -fr /usr /lib/mumble
```

If you look closely, you will notice that there is an erroneous space between the `/usr` and `/lib/mumble` components of the pathname. The package had intended to remove only the subdirectory containing files it previously installed, but proceeded to recursively remove all files under `/usr`, a critical and sizeable part of the operating system!

Recall from Section 5.5.3 the inherent risk of trusting your package manager (or any third-party software whose install scripts you run with superuser privileges without careful inspection) – this example helps illustrate that point as well as the possible impact a single character in the wrong place may have.

Even though this particular error was quickly detected and fixed, imagine your automated software deployment system pushed an upgrade of this specific package to all of your hosts, and you will quickly understand how automation can magnify any failure exponentially.

8.6.2 Loss of Audit Trail

Any but the most simple of infrastructures requires operations on a number of different resources: information about host groups are stored in and accessed from one database, subsets of hosts are accessed in order to manipulate resources in another segregated access zone, and so on. For human interactions, all of these actions are (hopefully) explicitly authenticated and logged, allowing us to track who initiated what changes where and when.

When we add automation into the mix, we frequently have to create a so-called “service account”, an account that is not associated with a person, but that exists to allow automated tools to perform certain actions. We noted in Section 6.2 that the mapping of real people to user accounts is neither subjective nor bijective; these service accounts are but one example thereof.

Odds are that a fictional company named “Weeble” does in fact have a Unix user-ID “weeb” on virtually every single host, which is likely used for software deployment or system administrative tasks. Many automated solutions will use this account to access systems or internal resources, and even though considered an “unprivileged” account, it probably has sufficient access permissions to cause significant damage. What’s more, it’s unlikely that actions by this user can (easily) be tracked back to a human, an important auditability requirement.

In this case, the ability to orchestrate complex changes across large sets of hosts may lead to a loss of the audit trail. Granted, it is possible to retain the ability to track commands and actions, but even when that is not flat out neglected, with every added level of automation this becomes more and more cumbersome. Identifying who specifically initiated a chain of events, and ascertaining whether the correct access was applied becomes increasingly difficult.

8.6.3 Loss of Accountability

Even if we may not be able to track every single command executed by any automated system, we need to be able to identify on a higher level what changes were *initiated* by whom. In today’s massive infrastructures, automated systems make decisions about which servers to shut down, which ones to direct production traffic to, or which IP addresses or networks to automatically block. These decisions are made automatically, based on traffic patterns, system monitoring, and a number of other factors.

While we need to allow for this level of automation in order to meet the rapidly rising demands on our infrastructure, we *also* have a conflicting requirement of accountability. Every action performed on our systems need not be tied directly to a human, but the decision engine that automatically applies the given heuristics needs to regularly be reviewed and allow for an audit trail.

Remember: due to the ease with which our automated tools allow us to administer large numbers of machines, the size and impact of any outages will be significantly increased as well! Untangling the web of decisions made that led to a system wide outage becomes harder and harder due to the increased complexity of both the run-time systems as well as the failure modes. In the end, we need to be able to identify exactly *why* the system failed in the way that it did. What was the *root cause*?⁴

Similarly, from a security perspective, it is imperative to be able to tell who initiated a certain action – not in order to “blame” that person for causing an outage, but to be able to identify a possibly compromised account or e.g. overly broad access permissions. Government issued guidelines or regulations may require your organization by law to be able to provide a full audit trail of certain actions. With the help of automation, we can actually improve our auditability and accountability, but these factors do need to be considered and integrated into the tool or product right from the beginning.

8.6.4 Safeguards

The complexity we inherit as a by-product of all the benefits of automation should not be underestimated. With every additional automated step, we broaden the possible impact of our tool. Not only can more things go wrong, but failure may propagate or escalate at scale. As a result, the need for safeguards together with the discovery of and alerting on error conditions increases at the same rate.

Simple tools rarely require human interaction, but may at times allow for confirmation from the user before taking a particular action; as an example, consider the `-i` flag to the `cp(1)`, `mv(1)`, and `rm(1)` utilities. As we combine

⁴It turns out that trying to pinpoint failures to a *single* “root cause” is often overly simplistic. A more thorough understanding of how complex systems interact, and how human decision making processes contribute and may be built into such systems is becoming an interesting field of study all by itself. Look for works by Allspaw, Cook, Dekker et al on the topic of Root Cause Analysis and “Human Error”.

such tools (or write our own) to provide more automation, such safeguards are often seen as a hinderance, and we avoid them where possible. After all, the whole point of automating a task is to avoid human interactions. But as we do so, we also increase the risk of more widespread damage when (not *if!*) things do go awry. Smart tools make use of well-defined thresholds when applying large changes: a tool may allow you to update or delete records in your inventory database without interaction (assuming proper authentication), but may ask for additional confirmation or even higher privileges when performing the same action on *all* records.

Lessons from an Amazon Service Outage



On Christmas Eve 2012, Amazon suffered a major outage of their “Elastic Load Balancing” (ELB) service[6]. A significant amount of state data tracking which hosts should receive traffic was accidentally deleted from the load balancers in Amazon’s largest region. This event had a cascading effect that was particularly disastrous for one of Amazon’s biggest Amazon Web Services (AWS) clients, Netflix, on a day when traffic is expected to be at peak times.

The root cause of this outage was, as so often, determined to be “human error”: developers accidentally initiated data deletion commands against the production- instead of their maintenance infrastructure. The effects of this action trickled down to each customer, leading to confusing API errors in the service. It took Amazon several hours to fully understand why the errors occurred and before a restoration of the service could even be attempted. Given the complexity and size of the infrastructure at hand, this is not very surprising.

We can see a number of parallels to the pitfalls of automation we have discussed. First, the complexity of the systems meant that engineers spent hours troubleshooting the failures, slowly tracing cause and effect back to human initiated actions. Second, the impact of the changes applied by the developers was magnified by multiple layers of automation, and not limited to Amazon themselves: many of Amazon’s customers were directly affected (in dramatic ways), and had no, or only limited, means to mitigate their losses. Finally, missing safeguards allowed the changes to be applied without required approval.

Since it is always easy to identify in hindsight the parts where our tools should have had safeguards it is not uncommon to encounter such safety measures only after an undesirable incident has occurred. This is not surprising: our tools evolve with time, and what is obviously necessary in a large scale solution is easy to dismiss as overhead in a simple script. But at the same time, adding safeguards, error-checking, privilege separation, logging, event correlation, and monitoring is so much easier to do when developing a small tool; refactoring a complex system already in production use to add these essential features is significantly harder. This is why it is important to be aware of the possible pitfalls of automation right from the start. We need to build our tools in a scalable manner and with the foresight and understanding that they may well evolve into a much larger service or component of a bigger solution.

Yet we need to be careful not to hamper productivity with pointless requirements for human interactions: requiring sign-off by a peer or supervisor before issuing routine commands is not only demotivating and tedious, it becomes unsafe when users find ways around the restrictions. Any safeguard that users do not understand, or that ultimately get in the way of them getting their job done, will eventually be circumvented. We will revisit this dilemma when we discuss general security principles in Chapter 11, but the question how, when and where to add the necessary safeguards without impacting effectiveness remains one of the fundamental conflicts when developing an automated solution.

8.7 Summary

Automation is an essential part of every system administrator's life. We encounter it on a daily basis in small tools as well as in large and complex infrastructure components. We noted, half jokingly, that laziness is an inherent trait, a virtue, of every good system administrator, which paradoxically may lead us to go to great lengths and significant efforts to have computers perform the tasks we would otherwise need to repeat ourselves.

We have looked at the explicit benefits automation of even trivial tasks provides: we gain the ability to repeat complex command invocations without having to remember all required options or environment settings; we begin to rely on our tools as they grow and allow us to ignore the implementation details, knowing that a carefully written script or program can be trusted

to perform the right sequence of steps; we gain flexibility in the execution of many tasks as we apply some abstraction and build tools that solve not just one specific problem, but allow us to address more general classes of problems.

Parallel to these benefits, we noted that different users benefit in different ways from the tools we create. Just as we increase flexibility through abstraction, so do we improve the usefulness of our tool as its userbase grows. But automating administrative tasks for all users of our systems or our peers requires a different understanding of the problem space than if we were merely jotting down a quick script to help ourselves save a few keystrokes. As with documentation, we need to understand our target audience.

As we began to realize that even our simple example script has already started to show signs of evolving into a larger solution, we noted the different levels of automation. The more advanced the system, the more autonomously the computer makes decisions and issues commands, the higher the degree of automation. At the lowest level we find a simple, human provided description of individual steps of *how* to reach a desired outcome. The larger and more abstract question of *what* we wish to accomplish is initially outside our scope, but quickly becomes the central goal as we grow our initial tool into a more generally useful application.

We cited automated deployment and configuration management systems as examples of a high degree of automation. In some of these cases, we need only state the abstract goal, allowing the computer to decide autonomously which steps are necessary to execute as well as when to execute them.

As these systems grow more complex, they become more autonomous and powerful. As noted by John Allspaw, the value of automation “is extremely context-specific, domain-specific, and implementation-specific” [4]. It is therefore important for us to be acutely aware of the specific needs which a given solution was designed to meet as well as the many risks associated with increased levels of automation. The benefits automation may provide come at a (non-negligible) cost; automation for automation’s sake is risky.

We looked at the possible downsides or pitfalls of automation and identified within this context the increased complexity, repeatedly called out as our nemesis throughout this book, and impact of any possible failure, the possible loss of auditability and accountability, as well as the greater need for safeguards. As system administrators, we have to be aware of the explicit – and more often: implicit – trade-offs we make as we apply or create automated solutions. In the next chapter, we will take these lessons and attempt

to turn them into more concrete, practical advice for developing scalable tools.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Take a look at your shell’s history file, e.g. `~/.bash_history`. Which commands do you run most frequently? Can you create aliases or shell functions that save you some typing?
2. Identify a routine task you perform on a regular basis. How can you automate this task? Can it be broken into smaller independent subtasks that can be automated?
3. Ask your peers, your local system administrators, or search the Internet for examples of simple scripts and custom tools they use. How flexible are these tools? What assumptions do they make about their environment? Can you improve one of them?
4. Consider the example script from Listing 8.1. What assumptions does it make? How would you change the script to improve its reliability and flexibility?
5. Review the exercises 9 and 10 from Chapter 5. What kind of automation do the different package managers provide? What kind can/did you apply in solving the problems?
6. Identify the methods by which your systems are maintained and updated, including the configuration management, software deployment and service monitoring systems. Which steps are performed manually? What level of automation can you identify?
7. Search the Internet for a recent, significant service outage. What did you learn about the root cause of the failure? What role did automation

play? What kinds of safeguards were triggered, missed, or added after the fact?

8. Think about automation outside the context of system administration. Do the same principles we discussed here still apply? Can you identify different levels of automation or its pitfalls in the so-called “real life”?

Bibliography

- [1] Æleen Frisch, *Essential System Administration*, O'Reilly Media, 2002
- [2] Lisanne Bainbridge, "Ironies of Automation", *Automatica*, Vol. 19, No. 6, Pergamon Press Ltd. 1983; on the Internet at
<http://www.bainbrdg.demon.co.uk/Papers/Ironies.html> (visited April 1st, 2013)
- [3] David D. Woods, "Decomposing Automation: Apparent Simplicity, Real Complexity", *Automation and Human Performance: Theory and Applications*, CRC Press, 1996.
- [4] John Allspaw, "A Mature Role for Automation: Part I", on the Internet at
<http://www.kitchensoap.com/2012/09/21/a-mature-role-for-automation-part-i/> (visited April 1st, 2013)
- [5] Richard I. Cook, "How Complex Systems Fail", on the Internet at
<http://www.ctlab.org/documents/How%20Complex%20Systems%20Fail.pdf> (visited April 2nd, 2013)
- [6] "Summary of the December 24, 2012 Amazon ELB Service Event in the US-East Region", on the Internet at
<https://aws.amazon.com/message/680587/> (visited March 27th, 2013)

Chapter 9

Building Scalable Tools

Software Engineering might be science; but that's not what I do. I'm a hacker, not an engineer.
– Jamie Zawinski



9.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we talked about our desire to automate any conceivable task, and we gave examples ranging from a very simple script building a piece of software to complex systems orchestrating changes across thousands of machines. All of these have one thing in common: they are software written by system administrators. Even though many sysadmins may not think of themselves as software developers, we all end up writing our fair share of it.

The programs we create are in many ways different from a typical software project like a word processor or similar standalone applications. System administrators frequently refer to their tools as “duct tape”; they tend to consist of little helper tools, of glue scripts, small programs that are used to interface with each other, with more complex software systems, or simply intended to munge data into a new format. They often present a simple command-line interface and operate on plain text input.

These system tools usually consist of no more than just a few hundred, rarely up to a few thousand lines of code. In other words, they're comparatively small, and we think of them as “simple”, even as we take pride in the solutions we've come up with and the automation they provide us with.

In this chapter, we will look at how system administrators develop software, building on the concept of evolving software as illustrated in the previous chapter (see Figure 8.1). We begin by outlining a distinction between “scripting”, “programming” and full fledged software product development before we present ways of improving our tools and methods that allow us to build system components which can be used with the same confidence we have in the common utilities included in the operating system. Approaching automation with these principles in mind, we will be able to create solutions that scale with our requirements, and even though in this chapter we will keep our focus on small to medium sized programs, we will apply lessons learned from the profession of software engineering as well as our own experience as advanced users with a deep understanding of how our systems (ought to) work.

One of the key insights you can gain from years of working in different environments, on different operating systems, and using software tools written by many different people with many different programming styles or philosophies is the value of *simplicity* and *flexibility*. The best and most reliable tools are those that we do not have to think a whole lot about, the ones we use day in and day out, and that we can combine with other tools in ways not predicted by the original author of the software.

As system administrators, we strive to create equally reliable tools; as software developers (albeit not in title), we understand and appreciate the Unix Philosophy. We are aware of the differences in our anticipated user base, as well as of the fact that we *cannot* predict all possible uses of our software. This chapter covers all of this as well as a few general design principles. Even if you do not currently think of yourself as somebody who writes a lot of software, internalizing these lessons may help you understand the decisions behind software you already use on a regular basis and hopefully will help you build better tools yourself in the future.

9.2 How Software evolves

Software is a curious thing. Brought into existence by its creator as a stream of ones and zeros, it quickly takes on a life of its own. Software seldom remains unchanged: bugs are identified and fixed, new features are added, and previous behaviour changed or discarded altogether. All the while, software remains uniquely reflective of its creator and current maintainer. Each person has their own style, and asking two people to write the same program usually produces two very different results, even if both may follow the same requirements or behaviour.

Writing software is hard, in part because we are effectively unbound by constraints. Existing software can be changed; what does not yet exist, can be created. Job descriptions for positions in system administration usually include a required familiarity with some “scripting languages”, suggesting that we do not write software to produce full featured products. What we create is often regarded as “just a script”, a little program, a tool we put together to automate a workflow.

But *simple* does not mean *unimportant*. If our little tool is actually useful, it will quickly sprout new features, adapt to being used in other environments and by different people, integrated into routine tasks, and eventually relied upon. Software is alive; it grows and ultimately escapes your control. Scripts become programs, which in turn become infrastructure components or stand alone software products.

Even though the boundaries between them are fluid, we can identify an evolution of three approaches to creating software: scripting, programming, and formal software development. It is important to understand the difference in scope, usability, and implications resulting from each approach. Being aware of which step on the latter you find yourself allows you to more clearly understand the requirements and appropriate solutions. Let us look at these three stages in more detail.

“Scripting Languages”



It is worth noting that we use the terms “script” and “program” (both as nouns or as verbs) in a rather language agnostic manner. “Shell scripts” are often a collection of commands with limited control flow, most commonly written using Bourne(-like) shell syntax. They tend to evolve out of actual command pipelines ex-

ecuted interactively, combining the common Unix tools such as `awk(1)`, `grep(1)` or `sed(1)`.

A number of general purpose programming languages that are sometimes referred to as “scripting languages” facilitate the development of quick prototypes due to a number of features such as being interpreted from source code (versus a compiled language), having extensive support for file system interfaces, requiring little structure, and being intuitive to use. Perl, Python, or Ruby are often cited as examples of “scripting languages”.

But it is dangerous to make the mistake of calling something a “script” just because it was written using a given language. It is certainly possible to create complex programs in shell, just as it is possible to write the most simplistic scripts in, say, Python. And while you can write full-fledged, reliable and scalable products in Perl or Ruby, using any one language does not impart code maturity or superiority upon your solution. Our discussion of these terms focuses on how we choose to approach the development process and the resulting implications on the user interface and robustness of the tool in question, not the language in which it was written.

Describing a “scripting language” as aiding in the development of a *prototype* is more useful in the definition of what a “script” is than what the language itself is capable of. Outside of the customization of your own environment, scripts are most useful to rapidly develop a program prototype, a proof of concept, a first stab at figuring out how to solve a problem programmatically. From this prototype evolves, eventually, a more robust program, which may be written in the same, or a different language..

9.2.1 Scripts

“Scripts” are primarily defined by the language we use to describe them: we “throw together a quick script”, or we “whip up a few lines of shell code”. The results reflect this attitude. Our scripts are – initially anyway – not more than a collection of commands, stored in a file to save us the hassle

of having to remember and type them repeatedly. Our code example in the previous chapter (Listing 8.1) is a good illustration of this approach. As a simple solution to a problem we don't anticipate to be used by other people, we make a number of assumptions about the user's environment, the invocation, user input, and so on. All of these assumptions tend to be implicit or hidden, and we only become fully aware of them when they no longer hold and the program misbehaves.

Scripts tend to be used for very simple tasks, and they often rely heavily on the environment. Spanning just a few dozen lines or so, they expect certain variables to be set, a directory hierarchy to follow a specific layout, or they may attempt to write to files in the current working directory. Due to a lack of error checking, online help or documentation, they often really are only suitable for use by the person who wrote them.

These little helper scripts may start out as shell aliases or functions, or are stored in a private directory in one's PATH and used primarily to customize your own environment and automate a few of your most common tasks. But if what we whipped up there is actually useful, it will invariably evolve into a larger program. With every additional user, it will grow new features, assumptions about the environment it executes in will be removed or turned into assertions. We may add command-line option parsing, explicit error checking and reporting, fix bugs, and increase overall robustness. Before you know it, what started out as a few dozen commands stashed away in a file somewhere becomes a reliable program.

9.2.2 Programs

All but the most simple scripts see some ongoing development as their user base increases. Frequently we start out whipping up a script – there it goes again, this phrase – only to come back to it (not much) later, adding features and extending its functionality. In fact, we often throw out our initial prototype and rewrite the tool, possibly in another language. Even though it is difficult to willingly discard an existing solution into which time and effort have gone, this is, after all, the main purpose of a *prototype*: to allow you to learn the details of the problem and to provide a proof of concept implementation on which to model your later program.

In the process of writing a prototype, you will identify new desirable features, figure out what works and what doesn't, as well as discover hidden requirements and dependencies. Growing in complexity as well as maturity,

a program developed from a prototype becomes a more reliable tool.

In contrast to simple scripts, programs make use of common toolkits, software libraries or modules to combine existing frameworks and implement new functionality. They provide a more consistent interface, account for differences in the environment and may be able to handle larger input data, for example. Programs range from a few hundred to a few thousand lines of code; they may consume or provide an API to a service and interface with various other components without human interaction.

Programs and scripts are, for the most part, what many of us System Administrators are creating when we write software. We put tools together that range from trivial to moderately complex, targeting as our intended users people like us, our peers, possibly other people within our organization but rarely outsiders with entirely different environments or requirements.

System administrators are known to half-jokingly refer to themselves as duct tape slingers, experts in stringing together systems and programs in ways previously unimagined and perhaps unintended; our tools function as glue, to bind together independent system components. But here, too, the language we choose reflects the attitude we have towards our tools, and using the proper terms helps develop greater confidence and a sense of pride in our creation.

What began as a set of simple scripts may have developed into a number of complex programs used across numerous systems. Without realizing, we may have developed a core infrastructure component upon which our organization relies. At this point, the software is likely to have advanced to into the stage of being a full-featured, self-contained application, requiring ongoing maintenance, development and support. We have crossed the boundary from “program” to product, often without being aware of it.

The larger our infrastructure grows, the more complex become the programs we use to hold it together. At some point, we need something stronger than duct tape. That is, we need to change our attitude to treat the software we create on this particular layer of the infrastructure ecosystem as requiring – deserving – a more professional approach.

9.2.3 Software Products

On the far end of the spectrum of software evolution from a simple script or prototype lie complete, self-contained “products”. Typical examples from outside the world of System Administration might include a word processor

with a graphical user interface, a music player, a multi-user game, or perhaps a mobile app. The range of what these applications do is unbound, but what they have in common is that we regard them to be, by and large, self-contained. We often use words such as “polished”, or “full-fledged” to express a certain level of professionalism or completeness.

We imagine a team of software developers creating such a product with a clear vision of features, requirements, specifications, and measurable goals all following good and sound software engineering approaches. We envision product meetings, heated discussions around implementation details and algorithms, concentrated developers scribbling away on a whiteboard and user-interface experts designing what the application will look like. We certainly do not think of these products as “whipped up” in an afternoon, or even over the course of a week or two.

But consider some of the software we use routinely, such as a configuration management system or a package manager. Despite being self-contained, large, complex, and far from being a small little program or a collection of scripts, these software products frequently *did* evolve out of smaller components, initially written by system administrators to, as they say, “scratch an itch”, to solve a very specific problem encountered by the author. As noted before, the distinctions between different types of software are far from clear cut, and system administrators may well become “system engineers” or “system programmers” and shift their primary focus on the development of such products.

Full products require a dedicated team of engineers to not only write the code or to add features, but to provide the necessary support and maintenance of the product throughout its life cycle: it is commonly estimated that the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) of any software product consists to approximately 75% of ongoing maintenance and bug fixes!¹

But even though system administrators may well play an important role in the design of internal infrastructure components and applications, we will focus on the development of smaller tools and more typical system utilities in this chapter. Even if you end up building more complex software components, hopefully you will find some useful information in the following sections.

¹System Administrators tend to agree that installation and operational maintenance of the product make up the remaining 75%.

Open Source as Quality Assurance



Companies nowadays routinely release many of their system tools as Open Source, often benefitting significantly from outside feedback and contributions. However, as a pre-requisite to being adopted by others, these programs already tend to exhibit many of the desirable features we describe later in this chapter. This is partially a result of good programming practices inside the company or by the engineers in question, but another significant factor is the fact that any open sourced program reflects directly on the authors and organization with which it is associated.

As a result, programs released to the world often undergo significant additional scrutiny, detailed code reviews, and developers are asked to provide useful documentation alongside the product. All of these things should of course be mandatory for internal tools as well, but for internal releases they are easy to neglect. Paradoxically, we are often willing to bet our infrastructure, our product, and our business on software we are afraid might be criticized in public. Ruslan Meshenberg noted in 2012:

“[At Netflix] We’ve observed that the peer pressure from ‘Social Coding’ has driven engineers to make sure code is clean and well structured, documentation is useful and up to date. What we’ve learned is that a component may be ‘Good enough for running in production, but not good enough for [Open Source].’ ” [1]

With this in mind, it behooves us to develop *all* of our software with the intention of making it public. The prospect of releasing our code as Open Source to the world will aide as a significant Quality Assurance factor.

9.3 Principles of Developing Robust System Tools

A large number of System Administrators remain – unconsciously and unintentionally – stuck in “scripting mode”. That is, their software reflects the mindset and language previously described, and the resulting tools are at times lacking in reliability or portability, even though they may work well in

the specific environment they were developed in. But today’s infrastructures are growing exponentially in size and complexity, and we often find that what used to be “good enough” isn’t any longer.

One of the most important methods of improving this status quo is to change how we view our own software tools. In order to improve stability, reliability, portability (and thus flexibility and scalability), we need to stop distinguishing our tools from those provided by the operating system or other providers. We should hold the software we write to the same standards in terms of quality, usability, and documentation as any other product. In other words: always write your tools such that they could be widely distributed, as if they were core components of your OS distribution.

With this approach, you will observe a shift in focus away from solving just your own, very specific problem in your own, unique environment towards creating general solutions. This allows you to continue to use or adapt your tools as your infrastructure changes.

In this section, we will discuss a number of principles that will guide you in this change of viewpoints and development practices. You may already be familiar with some of them, as we may have mentioned them previously in this book, while others are common recommendations for any type of professional software development.

For example, the Python programming language includes as a so-called “easter egg” its own programming philosophy, known as the “Zen of Python”, which we show in Listing 9.1. Throughout this chapter, we will reference parts of the Zen of Python, and you will find that it applies equally well to other programming languages and software development principles.

As you read on, try to think about how you would apply the principles discussed here to your own software. That is, do not regard them as rules or guidelines for large scale software development only, but as general advice applicable also and *especially* to small(er) system tools. You will be able to identify many of them as underlying the programs and utilities you already use on a daily basis, and hopefully begin to view your own software as no different.

9.3.1 Unix Philosophy and User Interface

One of the most important aspects of any tool you may write is its user interface. The way in which the program is invoked and interacts with its

```
$ echo "import this" | python
The Zen of Python, by Tim Peters

Beautiful is better than ugly.
Explicit is better than implicit.
Simple is better than complex.
Complex is better than complicated.
Flat is better than nested.
Sparse is better than dense.
Readability counts.
Special cases aren't special enough to break the rules.
Although practicality beats purity.
Errors should never pass silently.
Unless explicitly silenced.
In the face of ambiguity, refuse the temptation to guess.
There should be one— and preferably only one —obvious way to do it.
Although that way may not be obvious at first unless you're Dutch.
Now is better than never.
Although never is often better than *right* now.
If the implementation is hard to explain, it's a bad idea.
If the implementation is easy to explain, it may be a good idea.
Namespaces are one honking great idea — let's do more of those!
$
```

Listing 9.1: Sound programming advice that transcends language specifics.

users determines whether or not it can become a core component of the system administrator’s toolkit, if it remains a special purpose utility, if it will be forgotten, unused, or cursed. Many different factors define the user interface, but the most dominant convention for robust and scalable tools here remains the ubiquitous Unix Philosophy:

Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Write programs to work together. Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a universal interface.[2]

We already discussed this elegant and succinct definition early on in this book. Now it would be silly for us to repeat here all the fine text from our earlier chapter, so why don’t you go ahead and flip back to Section 2.2.4 and reread it – it won’t take too long! (Reuse of modular components to avoid duplication of code is, incidentally, also sound programming advice; we hope it translates equally well to writing.)

Entire books have been written on this approach to programming and tool design, several of which are considered must-reads for any system administrator or software engineer ([3], [4], and [5] are certainly among them), but let us review the three key aspects of the Unix Philosophy here as well. The discussion of software development principles within system administration wouldn’t be complete without.

Simplicity

Write programs that do one thing and do it well. Design your tools to be as simple as possible. Writing software is *hard!* The more functionality you attempt to implement, the more code you have to write, and more code inevitably translates to more bugs. Given this widely accepted understanding, shouldn't it be easy to write *simple* tools, to eschew the added complexity of additional non-essential features? Unfortunately, identifying only the necessary features and restraining oneself from adding functionality can be quite difficult.

In order to write a program, we have to understand the problem we're trying to solve well enough to be able to *explain it to a computer*. The more we think about a problem, the more corner cases we discover, the more features we envision as useful, and as we write our code, we begin to expand the scope of the program. The more users our tool has, the more requests we get to implement new features as well. Within the Software Engineering discipline, this phenomenon is known as "creeping features", and it takes a strong mind to keep a project within its original scope.

When we build software, we are in control. We determine exactly how the program will behave, how the user will interact with it. Wishing to remain in full control, we frequently fall into the trap of writing our own modules or to implement functionality that exists in other tools, because we grossly underestimate the time and effort required to do so. Frequently these other tools don't follow our own mental model or are inconvenient to interface with, and reading other people's code, program specification or documentation is very difficult – and no fun!

All of this leads to increased complexity in the software we write, and simultaneously tends to restrict its flexibility, as we impose our own perception of how to interact with the tool upon our users.

As we develop scalable system tools, we strive to simplify code, interfaces, and logic as much as possible, but we need to remain aware that certain parts may remain complex (albeit not *complicated* or *convoluted!*). That is, at some point a tool cannot be simplified any further: Any program you write has what Fred Brooks terms "essential complexity" as well as "accidental complexity" [7]. *Essential complexity* is inherent to the task the software performs and cannot be reduced; *accidental complexity* depends on how we implemented the tool. For example, the ability of many of our tools to be

able to process input one line at a time might be *essential complexity*, but implementing file I/O (and handling well all the various failure scenarios in doing so) would be *accidental complexity*: you'd most likely be better off simply reading input from `stdin`.

Applying this concept of identifying and only writing the code that you really need to while reducing the (accidental) complexity of both the interface as well as the implementation lies at the heart of the Unix philosophy, and is echoed in the Zen of Python:

Simple is better than complex.
Complex is better than complicated.

Tools as Filters

As the author of a program, we consider ourselves the ultimate authority on how it might be used. We define the interfaces of our tools, and thereby prescribing possible usage. But it is important to realize that we cannot possibly foresee all the ways in which our program may be used. Any program we write may end up being utilized in ways *not* anticipated by us.

The advice to *write programs to work together* embodies this awareness. Because we cannot know how users will take advantage of the functionality our program provides we need to allow them to combine it with great flexibility. Since you cannot presume all use cases, begin by writing your tools such that they accept input from `stdin` and generate output to `stdout`. As shown above, this allows you to simplify your program by eliminating all the complexities of file I/O for these cases. But what's more important: your tool can now be used as a *filter*. Your users gain significant flexibility, as they can now combine other tools to prepare input for or post-process output from your program with great ease.

This approach leads to a few practical considerations. For example, it is often a good idea to process input in chunks (most commonly one line at a time) rather than attempt to store all input in a data structure before handling it. This allows you to handle arbitrarily large input, as you are not bound by the amount of available memory. Your program will also become more responsive, as the user won't have to wait for all input to be read before your program can begin processing it.²

²Of course there are exceptions: certain programs require all input to be present before they can produce a result (the `sort(1)` utility is one such example), but as a general rule

Treating your program as a filter also forces you to make a very explicit distinction between the desired output it produces and any error- or diagnostic messages it may generate. Since the expected output may need to be further processed by other commands, Unix tools have a long tradition of printing such notifications to `stderr`, allowing you to process the valid output generated while at the same time displaying errors to the user.

Likewise, do not assume that your program is invoked interactively. That is, you cannot require input from the user. For example, it is a common mistake to prompt the user for confirmation of certain actions (“Continue? (y/n)”). To make matters worse, inexperienced programmers often attempt to read a response from `stdin`: if your program is used as a filter in a pipe, then `stdin` contains the data it is supposed to consume and cannot be used for interactions with the user!

In cases where interactions with the user cannot be avoided, your program should read input from the controlling terminal directly (via `/dev/tty` or the terminal identified via the `tty(1)` command or `ttyname(3)` library function), but be aware that any interactive usage blocks the entire pipe until the user has provided the required input. Unix tools that allow for interactive use often have an explicit command-line switch to turn this behaviour on (commonly `-i`) or off (commonly `-f`), and you may wish to consider following that convention.

Finally, you should carefully evaluate the error conditions under which your program terminates. As a filter, it is not uncommon to process large amounts of input and have many other tools depend on the output you generate. If your program aborts upon encountering any error condition, the entire pipe is interrupted. For example, if your program expects input to be in a certain format, aborting if data does not conform to this format may be a bad idea. Instead, it might be desirable to instead issue a warning (on `stderr`) and proceed to the next line of data.

This behaviour is an application of what is known as the *Robustness Principle*, also known as *Postel’s Law*, described in an early specification of TCP:

Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept
from others.[8]

of thumb line-based processing of input data makes for a simpler approach and a more useful filter.

```
$ grep '^[^#].*= ' /etc/rc.conf | sort
apache=YES
dhclient=YES
dhclient_flags="xennet0"
hostname=panix.netmeister.org
ip6mode="autohost"
ntpd=YES
postfix=YES
rc_configured=YES
rtsol="YES"
rtsol_flags="xennet0"
sshd=YES
syslogd_flags="-snvv"
$
```

Listing 9.2: The BSD *rc(8)* system uses simple key=value pairs as a means of configuration, making it trivial to process using common Unix tools.

That is, your program should tolerate malformed input, but produce well-defined output. Note, however, that it is a common misinterpretation of Postel’s Law to suggest that a program should always try to *process* all input as if it was valid, even if it is not. This can be dangerous, as acting on malformed input can lead to a number of security problems, such as e.g. accidental code execution as a result of interpreting or evaluating input in an executable context. Proper input validation is still required; it may be sufficient for your tool to warn the user on invalid input before moving on to the next chunk of data rather than aborting altogether.

Text Streams

Unix tools have a long tradition of operating on plain text. Consider the various commands you use on a daily basis: `awk(1)`, `grep(1)`, `head(1)`, `sed(1)`, `sort(1)`, `tail(1)`, `uniq(1)`, `wc(1)`, ... all of them process data or generate output by reading and writing text streams, described by Douglas McIlroy as “a universal interface”, and their ubiquity is tied directly to the use of these tools as filters.

But data structures frequently are complex representations of the author’s own mental model, and programs regularly need to translate representations of data for other tools to process or to retain state information in between

invocations.

Many programming languages allow for *serialization* of objects into a binary representation that can be read from or written to a file without the (at times significant) overhead of parsing text, matching patterns, and reconstructing a complex object. This approach, while often the most efficient, would, however, limit your program's ability to be combined with other tools. It could no longer function as a filter, as any command generating input would need to produce the specific format required, and any output could only be processed by tools capable of understanding this format.

The *eXtensible Markup Language (XML)* and the *JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)*, are two examples of data representation that attempt to strike a compromise between binary formats and completely unstructured text streams. For many system tools, however, text streams remain preferable, as they provide a consistent user interface across the environment and very clearly put the focus on who the primary consumer of the data is: the user! The person running the commands needs to be able to make sense of their input and output. It is preferable to be wasteful with computing resources and have your program require a few clock cycles more to process the data than to waste your users' time and energy, as they try to make sense of the format.

In the Unix world, we have a thriving Open Source ecosystem of tools and libraries; utilities written by one person or organization are often used and extended by others, possibly in ways not imagined by the original author. A stricter data model imposes restrictions on how the tool may be used, extended, or built upon; encoding the structure in the input or output format aids other programs, while text streams are helpful for human consumers. The humility to put the user before the program, to understand that it is *people* our tools interact with primarily and whose job they should make easier leads us to favor text streams.

9.3.2 Principle of Least Astonishment

As system administrators, we have enough excitement and unexpected events occurring in our daily life. We do not appreciate our tools surprising us. In fact, one of the most important features that makes our preferred tools reliable is the fact that they are *predictable*. Not only do they perform the task they were designed to do well, but we can rest assured that they will behave unsurprisingly under even unanticipated circumstances.

We already mentioned Postel’s Law as sound advice, and in previous chapters we have discussed *idempotence* as an important property of a reliable system. In addition to these traits, and perhaps more than just being robust and predictable, we want our tools to be *boring*. Our users should never be surprised by the outcome of invoking our program, nor should we attempt to surmise the user’s intentions. This concept is referred to as the *Principle of Least Astonishment* or POLA.

Our tool should be explicit and specific in both its success- as well as error-cases. When determining your program’s logic, ask yourself what the user would most likely anticipate the outcome to be. For example, if you were to move a file from one partition to another, the normal outcome is that in the end the file no longer exists in the first location, but does in the second. One approach to perform this task might be to first open the original file, read its contents into memory, remove the file, then write the contents from memory to the new location. But what if something goes wrong in the process of writing the data and you are forced to abort the program? The original file was already removed, which would come as a rather unpleasant surprise to the user. The Principle of Least Astonishment would demand that the file *only* be removed from the original location if the copy was successfully written.

Unfortunately, it is not always this obvious to anticipate what may or may not surprise your users. Destructive actions, such as removing or overwriting files, or discarding input data can lead to significant frustrations when they occur unexpectedly. As you write your program, carefully consider the way you yourself interact with existing, similar tools, and what your expectations are of them, then translate this behaviour to your own programs.

9.3.3 Explicit and predictable failure

Even though Postel’s Law asks us to be liberal in what we accept, it is often preferable to fail early and explicitly due to a known error condition rather than to trot along and run the risk of entering an undefined state with possibly disastrous consequences. Remember, as long as you know there was an error, you can still control the resulting process flow and yield predictable outcomes. This includes *predictable failure*!

It is imperative that the user can easily determine whether or not your program succeeded. But since Unix tools are often used as filters or building blocks of larger programs, it is not sufficient to generate an error message.

Any program building on your tool would have to parse this output and react to it accordingly. Instead, the convention is to indicate success or failure via an exit code, typically 0 on success and any value larger than 0 if an error was encountered. This allows programmatic use of your tool without the overhead involved in inspecting text output. The combination of processing text streams, of generating error messages to `stderr`, and to return a meaningful exit code allows your program to behave predictably and reliably in success and failure mode equally.

As noted before, the principles which allow us to build reliable tools are reflected in the Zen of Python, applying equally to how we may structure our code as well as how we design our user interfaces:

Explicit is better than implicit.

In the face of ambiguity, refuse the temptation to guess.

Create boring tools. Your users will thank you by being able to rely on them.

9.3.4 There's no such thing as a temporary solution.

System administrators often operate under significant pressure: when our production site is experiencing an outage, it is our job to bring it back up as soon as possible, and so we regularly patch systems with quick, temporary fixes to “stop the bleeding”, with the honest intention to later revisit the issue and put in place a permanent, correct solution. But “good enough” often isn’t: once the emergency is over, we rarely find the time to actually revisit the problem, and if what we put together in haste actually works sufficiently to not cause any major problems, it takes great discipline to address what doesn’t seem like a pressing issue any longer.

This has lead to a well known rule: *There's no such thing as a temporary solution*. If it doesn't break immediately, other systems or users will begin to rely on it, and the more time passes since it was put in place, the less likely you are to go back and rework it. But the “quick fix” is invariably flawed, restrictive, cumbersome to enhance or extend. These shortcomings are not always immediately obvious, even though many times you may find comments in the code of such solutions that read “*This should be changed.*” or “*Fix me later.*”. The existence of such comments is actually a good sign, as it indicates an awareness of the fact that this solution will require changes; unfortunately,

the comments tend to linger with the code for a long time, until something breaks anew, and the next person reviews the code, wondering why the right solution was never implemented in the first place.

Knowing that the awareness of the flaws in a “quick fix” does not necessarily make you more likely to fix them later, always try to make time to do the Right Thing whenever possible; if you are operating in an emergency scenario, make sure to include in the post-mortem analysis a highly prioritized action item or ticket for yourself or your team to revisit the issue within a narrow time frame. Sometimes it helps to limit a “temporary” solution such that it will fail explicitly in the near future. The more complete, thorough, or correct solution requires more time, care and effort than a quick fix. But this investment will pay off in the long run.

9.3.5 Readability counts

We don’t operate in a vacuum, and nor do we develop software all by ourselves. Even though system administrators often write their tools individually, it is important to remember that just like we inherit other people’s projects or work our way through open source code, so will people besides ourselves have to read and understand our software eventually.

Therefore, it is important to always write your code with the assumption that it is public, that its clarity and elegance reflects on you as well as your organization, and with an explicit goal of readability and maintainability in mind. Although perhaps common advice, this bears repeating; fully internalizing this approach often implies investing significantly more time and effort than if you quickly hack up a script for your own use only. It’s too easy to think that you can take shortcuts (in both readability or logic) if you’re the only person ever to maintain or read the code in question, but be aware that, a few months down the road, reading your own code will seem as foreign to you as any other code written by somebody else. “Boring and obvious” beats “clever” any day!

Your program should be easy to understand, its logic and process flow easy to follow. You should include comments where necessary; code that does not require any additional comments because it is self-explanatory is better yet. I try to make a habit of including a longer comment describing what the program itself does near the top of the file. Wherever possible, the code itself should be expressive enough to allow the reader to understand it. This may at times require you to choose a simpler, clearer structure or logic

```
>>> nums = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
>>> print list(map(lambda x: x**2), nums)
[1, 4, 9, 16, 25]
>>>
>>> squared = []
>>> for x in nums:
...     squared.append(x**2)
...
>>> print squared
[1, 4, 9, 16, 25]
>>>
```

Listing 9.3: The two python code snippets shown here are functionally (almost) equivalent. But for non-advanced users, the second is easier to read and more intuitive to understand.

over the shortest, most efficient implementation.

That is, I prefer to err on the side of readability over compactness. For example, many imperative programming languages allow you to map functions or code blocks to lists of objects in a manner reminiscent of functional programming paradigms. This allows you to write terse and elegant code, but in order to understand it, the reader needs a certain proficiency in the given language.

Consider the code in Listing 9.3, showing two methods of squaring the numbers in an array. Even though the first solution is notably shorter (and perhaps more fun to write), it is harder to follow. Remember that your code often needs to be understood by people who may not have your same level of expertise in the given programming language. As system administrators, we often have to debug tools we are not intimately familiar with, written in programming languages in which our proficiency varies. For us, it is more important that our peers are able to read and understand our program than it is for us to show others how well we know the language's different constructs. Accompanying our code with useful comments can help significantly, but comments tend to fall out of sync with the code they are supposed to explain. It is better to have the code be simpler and self-explanatory.

Readability counts.

9.3.6 Of Buses and Windows

Code that only requires a minimum amount of commentary is easy to understand, but it is still important to explain your program to your colleagues. In doing so, you often find design flaws, discover bugs, or realize that certain assumptions may not hold – that is, it helps you understand your own code better:

- If the implementation is hard to explain, it's a bad idea.
- If the implementation is easy to explain, it may be a good idea.

But raising awareness amongst your peers how the systems you create or maintain work has other beneficial side effects. All too often organizations only find out how much they rely on a single person when a long-running or widely relied-upon tool suddenly (and spectacularly) breaks down, and nobody can be found who can make heads or tails of the code in question. Other system administrators then need to reverse engineer previous design decisions and attempt to understand how the given program works – or, more often, how it *doesn't* work – when somebody with a better understanding could quickly have solved the problem.

Making sure that other people in your organization understand your code helps avoid creating an inherent dependency on you as an individual. Creating thorough documentation and run books is one important aspect of this, but often this is not sufficient to help somebody else really understand the code and debug it in case of an emergency. For that, you need to actually explain your code to your peers, an approach sometimes referred as “decreasing your Bus Factor”: you should ensure that even if you were to suddenly disappear (because, for example, you were run over by a bus) there would be others who could debug, troubleshoot, update and maintain your tools. In return, you can take your well-deserved vacation and enjoy the sunset on the beach in Hawai‘i, sipping a Mai Tai, without the risk of getting paged because you're the *only* person who understands how a given program works.

The more people understand your codebase, the better. In addition, knowing that your code will be scrutinized by others immediately makes you focus more consciously on the quality, clarity and expressiveness of your program. (See our previous note about “Open Source as Quality Assurance”.)

But just like you need to seek other people's feedback and ensure their understanding of your tools, it is equally important for you to keep up with

your peers' programs and tools, to understand the problems they're solving, and to follow their implementations.

Unfortunately, code reading is not something that is commonly taught in computer science programs, and it takes quite a bit of practice and a fair amount of discipline. Often it may seem much easier to write your own code than to fully immerse yourself in somebody else's and understand it. We easily dismiss a program because the style differs from one's preferred way of writing code or because it is structured in a way that seems counterintuitive to us.

Many organizations have a common coding standard for this reason – if all code is (at least visually) structured in the same manner, it becomes easier for everybody to read and understand each other's work. Such standards cover not only things like indentation of code blocks, line width, or function- and variable names, but often also prescribe certain common behaviour, such as what command-line options a program or what interfaces a library should implement.

Coding standards will never find universal agreement – the debate over whether one should use tabs or spaces to indent has been ongoing for decades now, with no resolution in sight³ – but it is in the interest of improving the readability of your code and making it easier for everyone in the organization to easily understand each others programs, it is important to follow them all the same.

When you encounter non-compliant code, even if it is not “your” code, you should feel free to correct the problems. The same holds for certain bad coding practices or cosmetic changes, such as spelling mistakes in comments or error messages. Doing so ensures maintenance of a high quality standard throughout the code base, a translation of the “Broken Windows” theory[9][10] originating in crime prevention: just like a building with graffiti or broken windows invites further vandalism, so does poorly written or maintained code over time deteriorate. The more meticulously the code is maintained, on the other hand, the more likely future feature additions or other code changes are to meet the high standard.

³Tabs, of course.

9.3.7 Code Reviews

Understanding that peer review is an important and efficient method to ensure quality, many organizations require code review for certain changes. That is, before code can be committed in a repository, it requires somebody else to sign off. So-called “commit hooks” in a code repository can enforce this by requiring the commit messages to include the works “reviewed by: username”. In order to allow reasonably efficient and agile development, this system requires occasional exceptions, and so we do often find bogus usernames or rubber-stamp reviews in our code repositories. Nevertheless, the idea to require others to sign off on code changes is appealing, and a number of software systems have been developed to automate and facilitate this process.

Another approach to raise awareness amongst peers is to hold group meetings dedicated entirely to presenting and reading each others code. In such sessions, individuals may present a small or medium sized project and walk the attendants through it, carefully explaining the process flow. This helps the author of the code in question ensuring that they really understand their own code, ensures that colleagues are at least conceptually aware of how the program works, and helps enforce coding guidelines. At the same time, it can be a thoroughly enjoyable experience and may reinforce positive team bonds.

Finally, some organizations have more informal “code reading” groups, in which participants get together to read large and complex software components outside of their own projects. Analogous to a book club, those taking part work through the code in question on their own before sharing insights with each other. Good (and bad) software development practices are discussed, lessons are learned and inspiration is taken from other people’s code. Either of these different approaches may work for your organization – but all become more enjoyable the more readable the code in question is!

9.4 Additional Guidelines

Writing clear, understandable code and developing scalable system tools is something that can only be learned with practice, but there are many good guidelines and recommendations to follow in the process.

One of the best guiding principles to improve one’s projects’ quality and

usability is to approach and develop them as an integral part of the operating system or environment you’re deploying. Always compare your program to those provided by the OS, and which you rely on day in and day out. What is the default behaviour for these tools? What do they have in common? How do they handle input, command-line options, and environment flags? If your tool was included in the OS, would it fit in?

Keeping this principle in mind, you actively focus on simplicity, maintainability, quality, as well as on the availability and usefulness of accompanying documentation. The following short guidelines may help you consciously consider your own development approach and your own tools in comparison:

Write meaningful commit messages. As you collaborate on a project with your colleagues and peers, it is important to be able to understand what changes were made for what reasons. Too often do we see commit messages reading “bug fix”, “update”, or similarly terse and meaningless statements. A good commit message describes the change itself together with the *intention* behind it. This makes it an order of magnitude easier to later on identify when certain bugs or features were introduced, and what the original thought process behind the change was.

Follow a common style. Identify a set of common formatting principles, and adhere to them. Don’t mix tabs and spaces. Line-break code around 80 characters – this ensures that your code can be printed, presented using a smaller screen resolution, read in normal sized terminal windows, copied and pasted into emails or review boards, ... all without the formatting being ruined. As your code grows more complex, this length limit also functions as a good visual guideline as to when to refactor code blocks into their own subroutines.

Value proper spelling. Any messages displayed to the user should be properly spelled and not contain grammatical mistakes. The same holds for code comments or variable names. While this seems like meaningless nitpicking, this is both part of the “broken windows” theory as well as a reflection of the care with which you treat your code. Describing your code (where necessary!) in full sentences makes it easier for others to understand it. Avoid useless comments in favor of expressive code.

Accept common command-line options. Follow the conventions of

other tools and implement common command-line options. For example, `-h` should likely display a terse summary of the available options, but it is no substitute for proper manual page (see below). Allow the user to enable or disable certain behaviour using different switches; if your tool reads a configuration file, allow the user to specify an alternate location. Review and compare how other tools you use frequently utilize such options.

Write the fine manual. Any tool, no matter how simple it may seem, deserves a manual page. `echo(1)`, `true(1)`, and `yes(1)` have manual pages – whatever your program does is likely to be more complex than either of these utilities. Users should not be expected to read through the code itself to understand how a tool works. Writing a manual page helps you clearly define the user interface, how your command is invoked and what the user’s expectations will be.

Package your tool. In Chapter 5.5, we have elaborated at length on the benefits of a Package Manager. Treat your own code just as you would others’. By packaging your software, you explicitly identify the requirements and dependencies and ensure installation of all files into the correct locations. This allows others to build their own tools which may depend on your software. Proper packaging also allows you to clearly version your program, and keep track of changes in relation to feature sets and capabilities. Always remember to increment your version number when you make any changes to ensure the ability to track what code is deployed where.

9.5 Summary

Much can be written about how to write clear, readable code. Much *has* been written in this chapter alone, yet there are hundreds of books, online columns, and blog entries on the topic. We tried to capture some of the most important principles underlying the development of scalable, robust system tools. In the process, we drew a distinction between different approaches to the software development processes typically encountered by system administrators.

The tools we write are often different in scope from the large scale software development projects typically covered by literature. It takes a particular understanding of your environment to write a *system tool*, a utility that fits natively into your operating system and integrates well into the environment.

In order to approach this perfect fit, we put a strong emphasis on the Unix philosophy and strive to adhere to the three main aspects – simplicity, ability to function as a filter, use of text streams for I/O – wherever appropriate.

We mentioned the “Zen of Python”, and noted how the advice given here translates to other programming languages; we covered the *Principle of Least Astonishment*, and noted the importance of dependable, robust behaviour, which must include predictable failure with meaningful error codes and diagnostics. We warned against the pitfalls of developing and deploying so-called “temporary solutions”, knowing all too well that there is no such thing.

We covered (at length) the importance of *readability* of your own code as well as that of others. Sometimes we need to step in and fix a few broken windows to ensure a modicum of code quality, and we must not be too proud to let others review and help improve our own code, which in turn ensures that your colleagues will be able to help debug your program, thereby decreasing your “bus factor”.

Finally, we provided a number of short, general guidelines intended to help you maintain a high standard in your development efforts. But be aware that none of these rules are written in stone: while applicable *in general*, there are always exceptions. Striking the balance between adherence to common guidelines and correctly identifying valid exceptions to the rules is difficult and another skill that can only be learned with time and practice. To quote the “Zen of Python” one last time:

Special cases aren’t special enough to break the rules.
Although practicality beats purity.

The software you write reflects on you, your organization, your company, your peers. It will be relied on and used by other people and systems; it will also break and require debugging by yourself as well as others, by people who understand your tool and by those who have never looked at the code in question up until it broke. It is your responsibility to make it easier for your users to work with your tool.

Problems and Exercises

Problems

1. Earlier in this book we mentioned the “yum” package management tool as well as the “CFEngine”, “Chef”, and “Puppet” Configuration Management systems. “Cacti” and “Nagios” are two solutions related to system monitoring, which we will discuss in a future chapter. Other frequently used tools include `curl(1)` and `rsync(1)`, for example.

What programming language(s) are these tools written in? Why do you think the given language was chosen? What programming language(s) can be used to interface with or integrate custom modules or extensions into these tools?

2. Now review the tools used in your environment to manage systems. (If you did not develop or deploy them yourself, ask your system administrator about them.) Which programming languages were they written in? Was the programming language a deciding factor in the development or deployment of the given solution?
3. Pick some of tools you most frequently use yourself (see Problems 1 and 2).
 - (a) Do they follow the Unix philosophy? In what way? In what way do not follow - and why?
 - (b) Do they abide by the Principle of Least Astonishment? Do they fail explicitly and predictably?
 - (c) Download and carefully read through their code. Is the code easy or hard to read? If it is complex, is it also *complicated*? Does the

code follow a consistent style?

4. Analyze the `rsync(1)` utility and its behaviour based on how the *source* and *destination* arguments are specified. Play with the different command-line options and methods of specifying a directory as an argument (`path` vs. `path/` vs. `path/.`). Does the behaviour always follow your expectations?
5. Look at some of the tools you have written.
 - (a) Would you classify them as “scripts”, “programs”, or larger projects? Who is the target user base?
 - (b) What kind of changes would you like to make to improve their robustness?
 - (c) What, if any, changes would you want to make before sharing them with your peers, your colleagues, your organization, the world?
 - (d) Review the various recommendations made in this chapter – does your software follow them? Would it be worth your time to update existing, working tools?
6. Ask your system administrator – or reach out to an internet community of or forum for system administrators – about “temporary solutions”. Try to identify instances of prototypes which escaped into production in your environment.
7. In your organization, identify human single points of failure. That is, which person appears to have exclusive knowledge of a given systems component or codebase? What can you do to help decrease this person’s “Bus Factor”?
8. Start or join a code reading group, either in your organization, at your university, or possibly on the internet.
9. Review your own interpretation of what makes a “good” program. Do you judge a program by how it performs alone? Do you consider a consistent user interface, availability of documentation, code readability or elegance, etc.? If the tool works and does what you need it to do – should you pay attention to these other things? Argue for and against.

Bibliography

- [1] Ruslan Meshenberg, *Open Source at Netflix*, The Netflix Tech Blog, July, 2012; on the Internet at
<http://techblog.netflix.com/2012/07/open-source-at-netflix-by-ruslan.html> (visited May 1, 2013)
- [2] M. D. McIlroy, E. N. Pinson, and B. A. Tague *Unix Time-Sharing System Forward*, The Bell System Technical Journal. Bell Laboratories, 1978
- [3] Brian W. Kernighan, Rob Pike, *The Practice of Programming*, Addison-Wesley, 1999
- [4] Brian W. Kernighan, Rob Pike, *The UNIX Programming Environment*, Prentice Hall, 1984
- [5] Eric Steven Raymond, *The Art of Unix Programming*, Addison-Wesley Professional, September 2003; also available on the Internet at
<http://catb.org/~esr/writings/taoup/> (visited January 7, 2012)
- [6] Richard P. Gabriel, “Worse is Better”, on the Internet at
<http://dreamsongs.com/RiseOfWorseIsBetter.html.html> (visited February 5, 2012)
- [7] Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., *The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software Engineering, Anniversary Edition*, Addison-Wesley Professional, Anniversary edition (August 12, 1995)
- [8] Jon Postel et al, *RFC761 - Transmission Control Protocol*, January 1980, on the Internet at
<https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc761.txt> (visited May 17, 2013)
- [9] James Q. Wilson, George L. Kelling. *BROKEN WINDOWS: The police and neighborhood safety*, The Atlantic Monthly, 1982; also available on the Internet at
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken-windows.pdf (visited June 12, 2013)
- [10] Andrew Hunt, David Thomas, *The Pragmatic Programmer: From Journeyman to Master*, Addison-Wesley Professional, October 1990;

Extract also available on the Internet at
<http://pragprog.com/the-pragmatic-programmer/extracts/software-entropy> (visited June 12, 2013)

Chapter 10

Networking

Chapter 11

Security

TPMs and physical security; revisit boot strapping trust

11.1 Authentication and Authorization

Part III

Managing Complex Services

Clever Quote Here

Chapter 12

Managing System Services

XXX continous updates / rejuvenation

Chapter 13

Backup, Failover, and Disaster Recovery

13.1 File System Backups and Snapshots

Chapter 14

Monitoring and Visibility

Part IV

Meta Matter

Clever Quote Here

Chapter 15

Everything We Haven't Covered

15.1 Containers

15.2 Service Orchestration

Infrastructure as Code

Chapter 16

Ethics and Legal Issues

Chapter 17

Future Direction of System Administration

Glossary

- ABI** *Association for Computing Machinery* A computer programming interface provided by libraries, for example. This interface promises to the developers a certain behaviour, including the alignment of data types and calling conventions. See also: API 229, 232
- ACL** *Access Control List* A list of permissions, commonly attached to a network or file resources. An defines e.g. what privileges are granted to the object or what sort of network traffic may be allowed. 46, 117, 214
- ACM** *Association for Computing Machinery* A learned society for computing, governing Special Interest Groups, publishing academic journals and sponsoring numerous conferences. 24
- AFP** *Apple Filing Protocol* A network file system / protocol used predominantly by Apple's Mac OS versions (both "Classic" and OS X). Sometimes also referred to as "Apple Share". 79
- AFS** *Andrew File System* A distributed network file system developed at Carnegie Mellon University with certain distinguishing features over other network file systems, including authentication via Kerberos, access control lists and, to some degree, location independence. 80, 108
- API** *Application Programming Interface* A specification describing the interfaces of a given software component. This specification is sufficiently high-level so as to allow the developer of software using this API to not care about *how*, the interface is implemented. See also: ABI 32, 84, 85, 106, 109, 110, 116, 118, 150, 221, 242, 254
- AWS** *Amazon Web Services* Amazon.com's cloud computing platform. 242

- BBS** *Bulletin Board System* The electronic version of a traditional bulletin board and the predecessor of Usenet and, conceptually, todays Internet “forums”. 36
- BIND** *Berkeley Internet Name Domain* The most widely used DNS software, included in various Unix flavors since 4.3BSD. 36
- BIOS** *Basic Input/Output System* The basic firmware found on IBM compatible computers, loaded from read-only memory at system startup and in charge of initializing some of the hardware components before handing control over to the boot loader. 93–96, 130, 134, 147
- BSD** *Berkeley Software Distribution* Commonly refers to a number of UNIX derivatives based on software distributed by the Computer Systems Research Group of the University of California at Berkeley. Open Source versions include NetBSD, FreeBSD and OpenBSD. 30, 37
- CHS** *Cylinder-Head-Sector* An early scheme used to address individual sectors (or blocks) on a hard drive by identifying their location on the disk via the given cylinder (or track), the disk’s read-write heads and finally the individual sector. 94, 95
- CIFS** *Common Internet File System* An application layer network protocol used predominantly by Microsoft Windows systems as a network file system and to communicate with other devices, such as shared printers. Frequently named *SMB/CIFS*, as it was derived from SMB. 79, 108
- CLI** *Command Line Interface* A human-computer interface primarily relying on text-based input whereby the user types commands into a terminal or console interface. The CLI is valued by System Administrators as being widely more efficient and flexible than most graphical interfaces. See also: GUI 48
- CPU** *Central Processing Unit* The actual circuitry (e.g. a microprocessor chip) of a computer performing the arithmetic and logical operations within a computer, possibly comprising multiple computing components or “cores” and nowadays even extending to virtual CPUs. 44
- CSNET** *Computer Science Network* An early network connecting computer science departments at academic and research institutions. 36

CSRG *Computer Systems Research Group* A research group at the University of California, Berkeley, funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to enhance the Unix operating system. 30–32

CVS *Concurrent Versions System* The at one point perhaps most popular open source client-server version control system. (Yes, *CVS* is a *VCS*. One thing we cannot complain about is a lack of acronyms.) In recent years, CVS has lost popularity to the Subversion VCS and newer distributed revision control systems such as Git. 193

DARPA *Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency* Originally known as “ARPA”, this agency of the United States Department of Defense is probably best known for the development of what ultimately became the Internet. 32

DAS *Direct Attached Storage* A storage system in which the disk devices are attached directly, i.e. without any network component, to the server. See also: NAS, SAN 76–78, 80, 81, 86, 89, 106, 118, 120

DNS *Domain Name System* A hierarchical, distributed system to map hostnames to IP addresses (amongst other things). 36

DRAM *Dynamic Random Access Memory* A volatile type of computer storage used for most computers’ and laptops’ main memory. 87

DSL *Domain Specific Language* A language developed for a very specific purpose, such as the configuration of a given piece of software or the representation of information within a certain data model. 196, 199, 202, 223

EBS *Elastic Block Store* Amazon’s block-level cloud storage service. See also: S3 85

EC2 *Elastic Compute Cloud* Part of Amazon’s Web Services, EC2 allows a user to deploy virtual machines or “compute instances” on demand. vii, 12

FCP *Fibre Channel Protocol* A high-speed network protocol primarily used to connect components in a Storage Area Networks. FCP allows for a number of different topologies, most notably connections in a switched fabric. 83

FFS *Fast File System* See: UFS 32, 107, 112

GCC *GNU Compiler Collection* A suite of tools comprising a compiler *chain* provided by the GNU project. Originally referring to the GNU C Compiler, the tools provided include support for many different languages, including C++, Objective-C, Fortran, Java, Ada, and Go. The C compiler, invoked via the `gcc(1)` command, is the de-facto standard and is shipped with most Unix flavors. See also: GNU 229

GNU *GNU’s Not Unix* The GNU project was founded to provide free software and aimed to provide a full operating system. After having adopted the Linux kernel, GNU/Linux become commonly referred to just as “Linux”, much to the chagrin of many GNU proponents. The contributions of the GNU project, however, should not be underestimated. See also: GPL v, 49, 136, 159

GPL *GNU General Public License* A widely used free software license originally written by Richard Stallman for the GNU Project. The license aims to guarantee availability of the source code for the licensed software as well as any derived works. 37, 49

GUI *Graphical User Interface* A human-computer interface primarily relying on interactions with the user through e.g. a mouse or other pointing device, icons, and other visual cues. See also / contrast with: CLI 48

HBA *Host Bus Adapter* A hardware connector, such as a PCI, PCI-X, or PCIe card, connecting, for example, a storage medium to a host system. 88, 89, 127, 134

HDD *Hard Disk Drive* A data storage device using magnetic storage, frequently rotating platters allowing for random access via a magnetic read-write head. See also: SSD 87

HTTP *Hyper Text Transfer Protocol* The ubiquitous application-layer protocol underlying the World Wide Web, allowing for distributed documents to be linked. 36

IaaS *Infrastructure as a Service* A concept in cloud computing whereby infrastructure components are deployed and delivered on demand, frequently by use of virtualization. 84, 145

IANA *Internet Assigned Numbers Authority* An organization responsible for the global coordination of the DNS Root (i.e., maintenance of the DNS root zones), IP addressing (i.e., overseeing global IP address allocation to the regional Internet registries), and other Internet Protocol resources. See also: ICANN 24

ICANN *Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers* A non-profit corporation overseeing Internet-related tasks, such as the operation of the IANA. 24

IEEE *Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers* A non-profit professional organization for the advancement of technological innovation. Publishes countless journals, leads the creation of many standards etc. Some overlap between the IEEE Computer Society and the ACM. 24, 35

IETF *Internet Engineering Task Force* An open, volunteer-based organization responsible for the development and creation of Internet standards. See also: ISOC 24

IoT *Internet of Things* A term describing the internetworking of devices, especially consumer products, previously typically not expected to be connected to the internet. Such devices are frequently referred to as “smart” devices, despite their tendency to be poorly secured and with questionable functionality deriving from their ability to connect to – and be reached from – the public internet. 29

IP *Internet Protocol* The fundamental protocol underlying the Internet, routing datagrams across networks. Together with the Internet Protocol, the suite is commonly referred to as *TCP/IP*. See also: TCP, UDP 108

IPC *Interprocess Communication* Methods for exchanging data between related or unrelated processes on one or more systems. 43

ISOC *Internet Society* An international non-profit organization providing guidance and direction to Internet related standards and policy. Parent organization of the IETF, but contains additionally a strong focus on education. 24

ITIL *Information Technology Infrastructure Library* A set of practices underlying the first international standard for IT Service Management,

ISO/IEC 20000. ITIL covers a series of publications focusing on Service Strategy, Service Design, Service Transition, Service Operation, and Continual Service Improvement. 217, 218

JBOD *Just a Bunch Of Disks* A term describing a simple storage configuration where individual disks are made available in the operating system as separate logical units accessed via separate mount points. 97

JSON *JavaScript Object Notation* An open standard to describe data objects using key-value pairs. Despite its name, the data format is language independent, and libraries to process and generate JSON exist for virtually all common programming languages. 263

LBA *Logical Block Addressing* A scheme used to address individual sectors (or blocks) on a hard drive by iterating over them. 95

LDAP *Lightweight Directory Access Protocol* A common protocol for accessing directory services, such as username lookups, user groupings, password storage, and other such data. Defined in RFC4511. 182, 183, 188, 192, 197, 208

LISA *The USENIX Special Interest Group for Sysadmins* A non-profit organization established to serve the System Administration community. See also: LOPSA. 6, 8, 9, 12

LOPSA *League of Professional System Administrators* A non-profit organization established to advance the profession and practice of System Administration. See also: LISA. 12, 23

LUN *Logical Unit Number* A numerical identifier for a distinct storage unit or volume in a Storage Area Network. 82

LVM *Logical Volume Manager* A tool or technique to allocate and manage storage space across multiple block-storage devices and to present them to the OS as a virtual block device, possibly increasing storage capacity or performance. 77, 80, 97–100, 106, 119

MBR *Master Boot Record* A special boot sector found on the primary boot device, allowing the system to access the file system and transfer control to a second-stage bootloader. 93–95, 130, 148

MILNET *Military Network* The part of the ARPANET designated for unclassified communications of the US Department of Defense. 36

Multics *Multiplexed Information and Computing Service* A time-sharing operating system initially developed in the 1960s in collaboration amongst MIT, General Electric, and Bell Labs. See also: Unics 29

NAS *Network Attached Storage* A storage model in which disk devices are made available over the network by a file server to remote clients. The file server is running an operating system and maintains the file system on the storage media; client access the data over the network using specific network file system protocols. See also: DAS, SAN 78, 80, 108

NFS *Network File System* A distributed network file system developed by Sun Microsystems. NFS has become the de-facto standard in distributed file systems in the Unix world and is supported by virtually all NAS solutions. 32, 79, 108, 148

NSFNET *National Science Foundation Network* A network supporting the initiatives of the National Science Foundation and initially connecting a small number of supercomputing, later on developed into a major part of the Internet backbone. 36

NSI *NASA Science Internet* A multiprotocol wide area network, combining a DECnet and a TCP/IP based network (the Space Physics Analysis Network or SPAN and the NASA Science Network or NSN, respectively). 36

PATA *Parallel Advanced Technology Attachment* An interface standard for connecting storage devices to a host system. Initially named *ATA*, it was renamed *PATA* to avoid confusion with *SATA*. Also frequently referred to as *IDE*. 88

PCI *Peripheral Component Interconnect* A computer expansion bus used to attach a hardware device such as an HBA to a computer. There are different standards (PCI, PCI Express, PCI-X) providing different speeds and features. Not to be confused with *PCI DSS*. 89, 100

PCI DSS *Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard* The information security standard describing the requirements a merchant needs to meet in order to accept credit cards. 61, 217

POLA *Principle of Least Astonishment* A concept of predictability in software tools, following which any invocation should not lead to any surprises by the user. 264

POSIX *Portable Operating System Interface* A family of IEEE standards defining the common API and (command-line) interfaces, primarily used by the Unix family of operating systems. 34

POST *Power-On Self Test* A number of simple routines intended to ensure that the hardware is not obviously faulty, run by most server systems immediately after the system is powered on and before the boot loader is run. 130

PXE *Preboot eXecution Environment* A combination of protocols that allow a computer to determine its network information and boot media dynamically so as to allow for bootstrapping the system over the network. This process is also known as *pxebooting*. 147

RAID *Redundant Array of Independent Disks* A storage technology that allows multiple disks to be combined into a single data container upon which a file system can be created. Different schemas allow for increased data redundancy or I/O performance at the cost of decreased capacity. 75, 77, 80, 98, 99

REST *REpresentational State Transfer* A software architecture granting distributed access to an object model. As the name suggests, the focus is on relaying a given object's current *state* See also: SOAP 84

RFC *Request For Comments* Publications outlining Internet related technologies, research, protocols etc. Some of the RFCs may become actual *standards*; many of them are de-facto standards. 24, 67

S3 *Simple Storage Service* Amazon's object-level cloud storage service. See also: EBS 85, 109

SAN *Storage Area Network* A network providing access to disk devices on the block level. The storage is made accessible to remote clients on a block level; clients can then create a file system on top of these storage blocks. See also: DAS, NAS 78, 81, 86, 97

SATA *Serial Advanced Technology Attachment* An interface standard for connecting storage devices to a host system using high-speed serial cables. See also: PATA 88, 89

SCM *Source Control Management* The task of maintaining changes to a computer system's runtime configuration without manual intervention. SCM systems are able to install software, update existing or create new files, or run commands across large numbers of servers. Some systems include support for non-traditional host systems, including networking equipment. Examples of popular SCM systems are: CFengine, Chef, Puppet. 192

SCM *Source Control Management* The task of tracking changes during software development. Often referred to as *revision control*, performed by a *Version Control System*, (VCS). Examples include CVS, Subversion, Perforce and Git. To avoid confusion with Software Configuration Management, we will use the acronym VCS when referring to source control management. 193

SCSI *Small Computer System Interface* A set of standards for physically connecting and transferring data between computers and peripheral devices. Interfaces for using SCSI are numbersome and range from so-called "Fast SCSI" (parallel) to Fibre Channel. See also: iSCSI 20, 83, 88

SDD *Solid State Drive* A storage device using non-volatile Flash memory to store data. See also: HDD 87

SLA *Service Level Agreement* An agreement between service consumers and providers, outlining the expecations the users of the service may pose and that the provider is obligated to meet. Examples include maximum turnaround time until an issue is resolved, maximum downtime of a service or minimum throughput or bandwidth etc. 61

SMB *Server Message Block* See CIFS. 79, 108

SMTP *Simple Mail Transfer Protocol* An application-level protocol used to exchange electronic messages, or email, amongst mail servers. 36

SNMP *Simple Network Monitoring Protocol* The industry standard protocol used for monitoring network devices, computer, printers and all sorts of other systems. 73

SOAP *Simple Object Access Protocol* A protocol used by many web services to exchange structured information over HTTP using XML. See also: REST 84

SPOF *Single Point of Failure* A common term describing a crucial system component without which nothing works. Note that *people* can easily become a Single Point of Failure if they retain exclusive knowledge about the system infrastructure or the internal details of a given program. 183, 194

SRE *Site Reliability Engineering* A term describing the merging of software engineering with traditional “operations” or system administration, in many ways similar to the term “DevOps”. The term is believed to originate at Google. 4, 24

SSL *Secure Sockets Layer* The predecessor to TLS, initially developed by Netscape. To this day, TLS and SSL are used interchangeably, even though TLS has superseded SSL. 87

TCO *Total Cost of Ownership* In software engineering, the total cost of ownership provides an estimate of what it takes to build or run a system. This includes the initial development or purchase cost as well as the ongoing cost (both monetary as well as in human resources) to maintain, update, patch and debug the software. 255

TCP *Transmission Control Protocol* One of the fundamental protocols underlying the Internet, routing datagrams across networks. Together with the Internet Protocol, the suite is commonly referred to as *TCP/IP*. TCP provides for reliable, connection-oriented connections between e.g. a server and a client. See also: IP, UDP 80

TLS *Transport Layer Security* A protocol to allow for encryption of network traffic on the application layer, currently defined in RFC5246. TLS was initially based on SSL, with which it is frequently used interchangeably. 87, 120

TOFU *Trust on First Use* In secure communications, it may be difficult or impossible to verify the identify of a remote party prior to e.g. establishing a connection. After an initial communication, a trust identifier may be exchanged, which the client might store locally and then report any possible mismatches on subsequent connections. This act of initially accepting the token without explicit verification is then referred to as *Trust on First Use*. A common example might be a user accepting the ssh hostkey fingerprint of a host they have not previously connected to. 180

UEFI *Unified Extensible Firmware Interface* A specification defining the interactions between an Operating System and lower-level firmware. See also: BIOS 130

UFS *Unix File System* A widely adopted file system across different Unix versions, implementing boot blocks, superblocks, cylinder groups, inodes and data blocks. Also called the Berkeley Fast File System (FFS). 32, 71, 107, 112

Unics *Uniplexed Information and Computing Service* The original name of the UNIX operating system, a pun on “Multics”. 29

VCS *Version Control System* A component of software and configuration management, allowing for the tracking of revisions made to a given set of files. See also: CVS, SCM 193

VFS *Virtual File System* An abstraction layer providing applications with a consistent interface to different underlying file systems. Initially developed by Sun Microsystems. The term `vnode` indicates this heritage. 32

WAN *Wide Area Network* A computer network spanning wide-ranging regions, possibly connecting different Local Area Networks, designed to overcome physical proximity requirements. See also: LAN 83

XML *eXtensible Markup Language* A markup language based on free, open standards that is frequently used in web services or by system tools to describe complex configuration attributes of a service. 263

Appendix A

Image Attributions

- Sock Puppet Donkey: ViciousCritic, Wikimedia;
[+http://is.gd/7WdCly](http://is.gd/7WdCly)
- Canadian Pointer: Doglover79, Wikimedia
[+http://is.gd/4PkG04](http://is.gd/4PkG04)
- UNIX “Live Free or Die”: The Open Group;
- Pen: ville_666, OpenClipArt;
http://openclipart.org/detail/46387/pen-by-ville_666
- Box: HarrisonB at Wikipedia;
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:MOVINGBOX.JPG>
- Figure 1.1: Photo by Jan Schaumann
[+http://is.gd/oqu9Dg](http://is.gd/oqu9Dg)
- Figure 1.2: © Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
[+http://is.gd/1F0QGC](http://is.gd/1F0QGC)
- Figure 2.1: Various, Wikipedia;
<http://is.gd/wzDh4c>

- Figure 2.2: TyIzaeL, Wikipedia;
<http://is.gd/sce8Et>
- Figure 2.3: Various, Wikipedia;
<http://is.gd/w2JpbD>
<http://is.gd/8Pg3cy>
<http://is.gd/3a6ea2>
<http://is.gd/boxlwP>
- Figure 4.1b: Zzubnik at Wikipedia;
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hard-drive.jpg>
- Figure 4.3a: Raysonho at Wikipedia;
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HuaweiRH2288HV2.JPG>
- Figure 4.3b: Paul Hammond;
<https://secure.flickr.com/photos/paulhammond/2872913380/>
- Figure 4.6a: Zzubnik at Wikipedia;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Open_hard-drive.jpg
- Figure 4.6b: Photo: Rainer Knäpper, Art License (<http://artlibre.org/licence/lal/en>)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SSD_mPCIe_IMGP1268_wp.jpg
- Figure 4.7a: LionKimbro on Wikipedia;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cylinder_Head_Sector.svg
- Figure 4.10: Wikimedia Commons;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Xserve_RAID.jpg
- Figure 5.1a: Wikimedia Commons;

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:POST_P5KPL.jpg

Figure 5.1b: Wikimedia Commons;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Award_BIOS_setup_utility.png

Figure 5.2a: Wikimedia Commons;
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:GRUB_screenshot.png

Figure 5.6a: @gardaud on Twitter;
Tweet no longer available online.

Figure 5.6b: @BlueBoxTraveler on Twitter;
<https://twitter.com/BlueBoxTraveler/status/453685413115203584>

Figure ??: Max Pixel;
<http://maxpixel.freegreatpicture.com/Computer-Lego-Machine-Robot-Wall-e-Cult-Fig-628572>

Figure ??: Max Pixel;
<http://maxpixel.freegreatpicture.com/Isolated-Army-Blade-Knife-Compact-Cut-Equipment-2186>

All other figures and illustrations: ©Jan Schaumann

Index

/dev/null, 5, 109, 116
/dev/urandom, 116
/dev/zero, 116
/etc/master.passwd, 182
/etc/motd, 201
/etc/resolv.conf, 201
/etc/shadow, 182
RADIUS, 184
TACACS+, 184
UUCP, 36
apache, 36, 156, 172, 262
ash(1), 40
autoconf, 44
automake, 44
awk(1), 134, 252, 262
bash(1), 40
boot(8), 130, 131
cd(1), 35
chroot(8), 174
close(2), 109
cron(8), 227
crypt(3), 189
csh(1), 32, 40
disklabel(8), 95, 122, 147, 150
dmesg(8), 131
emacs(1), 33
exim, 36
fcntl(2), 35, 53
fdisk(8), 94, 122, 147, 150
fsck(8), 107
gcc(1), 33, 229
getrlimit(2), 46
grep(1), 252, 262
grub(1), 148
head(1), 262
hier(7), 110, 138
init(8), 131
installboot(8), 148, 150
ksh(1), 40
launchd(8), 200
login.conf(5), 46
ls(1), 115, 117, 134
mail(1), 36
mkfs(8), 148
mount(8), 141
newfs(8), 114, 148, 150
open(2), 109
passwd(5), 188
postfix, 36
pwd(1), 111
rc(8), 131
read(2), 109
sed(1), 134, 252, 262
sendmail, 36
setuid(2), 46
sort(1), 260, 262
sshd(8), 134, 203
sshd_config(5), 203

stat(1), 116
stderr, 40
stdin, 40
stdout, 40
su(1), 172, 184
sudo(8), 172, 184
sysctl(8), 46
syslogd(8), 134, 196
tail(1), 262
tcsh(1), 40
tty(1), 261
ttynname(3), 261
ulimit(1), 46
uniq(1), 262
uptime(1), 201
vi(1), 32, 43
wc(1), 262
write(2), 109
zpool(1), 97
zsh(1), 40

Acceptable Use Policies, 61
Access Control Lists, 46, 117, 214
Accounts, Role, 172
Accounts, System, 171
Accounts, Types of, 171
ACM, x
Addressing
 Cylinder-Head-Sector, 94, 95
 Logical Block, 95
AFP, 79
AFS, 80
AIX, 32
Android, 29
Apple, 29, 44
Application Binary Interface, 229

ARPANET, 35
AT&T, 30
ATA, 88, 95
authentication, 171, 177
 2FA, 178
 multi-factor, 178
 mutual, 178
authorization, 171
AWS
 EC2, vii, 12
 Elastic Block Store, 85
 S3, 85, 109
 Simple Storage Service, 85

B-tree file system, 100
BBN Technologies, 32
BBS, 36
Bell Laboratories, x, 30, 43, 106, 112
Bias, Confirmation, 238
BIOS, 93, 130
boot loader
 primary, 130
 second-stage, 130
boot sector, 93
boot signature, 93
bootloader, 95
Broken Windows Theory, 269
BSD, v
 License, 32, 37, 43
Btrfs, 100
Bus Factor, 268

C, 30, 44
Carnegie Mellon University, 40, 108
CentOS, viii, 33
certificate authority, 180

- change management, 213
- CIFS, 79
- Cloud Computing, 3, 20, 84
- Cloud Storage, 71, 80, 83
- code readability, 266
- commit messages, 271
- Complexity
 - accidental, 19
 - essential, 19
- complexity
 - accidental, 259
 - essential, 259
- Computing Policy Documents, 62
- Configuration Management, 71, 144, 165, 171, 191, 192
- Configuration Management Database, 218
- console, 131
- containers, 38, 127
- Convergence, 214, 216
- convergence, 233
- Copy-on-Write, 99
- CPAN, 164
- CPU, 44
- cryptography, 18
 - asymmetric, 179
- CSNET, 36
- cylinder groups, 90, 113
- dæmon, 36
- DARPA, 32
- data privacy, 86
- Debian GNU/Linux, viii, 33
- devfs, 106
- device driver, 128
- DevOps, 21, 24
- DHCP, 146
- Direct Attached Storage, 76
- Disks
 - Partitions, 93
- Domain Name System
 - root servers, 36
- DRAM, 87
- DSL, 196
- email, 36
- ethics, 6
- EUID, 46
- failure, 264
- FAQ, 62
- Fast File System, 32, 107
- Fedora, viii
- FFS, 112
- Fibre Channel, 77, 81, 88
 - over Ethernet, 83
 - Protocol, 83
 - SAN, 89
- File Systems, 106
 - Andrew File System/AFS, 108
 - Device, 109
 - Disk, 107
 - Distributed, 108
 - ext2, 107
 - ext3, 107
 - ext4, 107
 - Extended attributes, 46
 - Google/GFS, 108
 - Hadoop/HDFS, 108
 - HFS+, 107
 - JFS, 107
 - Network, 32
 - NFS, 79, 108
 - reiserfs, 107
 - Special Purpose, 109
 - Tahoe Least-Authority, 109

- Temporary, 109
- UFS, 107
- Union, 109
- Unix, 112
- Userspace/Fuse, 110
- Virtual, 32
- XFS, 107
- Filesystem Hierarchy Standard, 138
- firmware, 127, 134
- FreeBSD
 - ports, 153
- GNU
 - C Library/glibc, 33
 - Compiler Chain, 33
 - coreutils, 33
 - Project, v, 33
- GNU/Linux, v, 33
- Google, 29
- Google Docs, 65
- government access, 120
- GPL, 33, 37
- GRUB, 130
- hardware attestation, 147
- HDD, 87
- head crash, 90
- Help Desk, 62
- Hewlett-Packard, 32
- Host Bus Adapter, 76, 88
- hot swapping, 88, 101, 103
- HOWTO, 60
- HP-UX, 32
- HTTP, 128
- hypervisor, 129
- I/O redirection, 40
- IBM, 32
- IDE, 88
- Idempotence, 214
- idempotence, 233
- IEEE, x
- IEEE 1003, 35
- Information Technology, ii
- Information Technology Infrastructure Library, 217
- Infrastructure
 - As a Service, vii, 3, 84, 145
- inode, 107, 110, 114
- Internet of Things, 29
- iOS, 29
- IPC, 43
 - FIFO, 116
 - Unix domain socket, 116
- IPMI, 146
- IPsec, 87, 120
- IRIX, 32, 44, 104
- iSCSI, 81, 83, 88
- ISO/IEC 20000, 217
- JBOD, 97
- job control, 41
- JSON, 263
- Kerberos, 108, 180
- kernel, 128
 - loadable modules, 38
 - monolithic, 38
- law enforcement, 120
- Laziness, 227
- LDAP, 182, 192, 197
- Least Privilege, Principle of, 171
- link
 - hard, 115
 - symbolic, 116

link aggregation, 143
Linux, v, viii, 29, 30
Linux Foundation, 138
Logical Volume Manager, 75, 77
Logical Volumes, 97
login classes, 46
login shell, 41
LVM, 80, 97
 logical extent, 98
 physical extent, 98

Makefile, 44
malware, 158
Manual Pages, 42, 55, 272
Master Boot Record, 93, 130, 148
MD5, 189
Mean Time to Recovery, 103
microkernel, 38
microservices, 73
Microsoft, 32
MILNET, 36
MINIX, 33
Multics, 29
Murphy's Law, 221

NetBIOS, 35
NetBSD, viii, 39, 43, 95
Network Attached Storage, 78
NFS, 79
NNTP, 36
npm, 164
NSFNET, 36
NSI, 36

Open Source, v, 30, 37, 256
OpenBoot, 130
OpenStack, 85, 145
OS X, 29, 44

packet switching, 35
partition, 90
 extended, 93
 primary, 93
 table, 93
partition boot sector, 95
Partitions
 BIOS, 93
passwords
 one-time, 180
PATA, 88
pathname, 110
PCI DSS, 217
PCI Express, 89
PCI-DSS, 61
PDP-11, 44
PDP-7, 29, 44
pip, 164
pipe, 30
pkgsrc, 153
Plan 9, 106
POSIX, 34
POST, 130
Postel's Law, 261
predictable failure, 264
Principle of Least Astonishment,
 264
privilege escalation, 46
privilege separation, 171
procfs, 106
Provisioning, 219
Puppet, 196
PXE, 147
pxeboot, 146, 147

RAID, 75, 77, 99
 Hardware, 100
 Hot Spare, 103

Level 0, 100
Level 1, 101
Level 5, 102
Software, 100
rainbow tables, 182
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, 33
RedHat, viii, 159
Remote Procedure Calls, 108
REST, 84
revision control, 4, 64, 65, 175, 193
Robustness Principle, 261
root account, 45
Root Cause Analysis, 241
rotational latency, 91
RPM, 153, 164
RubyGems, 164
runbook, 60
salt, 182
Samba, 108
SAN, 81, 86, 97
SAN Zones, 82
Santa Cruz Operation, 32
SATA, 88, 89
Scripting Languages, 252
SCSI, 83, 88
SDD, 87
Security
 Principle of Least Authority, 46
Service Level Agreement, 61
Service Management, 199
Service Orchestration, 72, 186, 195, 205, 219
SGI, 32
SHA1, 189
shell
 Bourne, 39
 Bourne-again, 40
short stroking, 92
Simplicity, 259
Single Point of Failure, 183
Single UNIX Specification, 34
SMB, 79
SMTP, 36
snapshots, 99
SNMP, 73
SOAP, 84
Sockets, 32
Software
 Add-on, 134
 Dependency Tree of, 154
 Distinction between different types of, 135
 System Utilities, 134
 Third-Party, 134
 Types of, 128
Solaris, viii, 32
Solid State Drive, 92
Source Control Management, 193
Spam, 29
SRE, 4
SSH, 120
SSL, 87
Stevens Institute of Technology, ii
Storage Area Network, 78, 80, 81
Storage Models, 74
Sturgeon's Law, 152
Sun Microsystems, 32, 100, 108
SunOS, 32
superblock, 112
superuser, 172
SVR4, 31

Syslog, Example Service Definition VCS, 193
 of, 196
System Administration
 Profession, 7
system calls, 38, 134
system deployment, 145
system documentation, 55
System III, 31
System V, 31
tape library, 231
TCP/IP, 32, 88
Terms of Service, 61
The Open Group, v
tl;dr, 59
TLS, 87
Total Cost of Ownership, 75, 255
Trust on First Use, 180
trustworthy computing, 147
Ubuntu, viii, 33, 159
UEFI, 130
UFS, 112
umask, 200
Unics, 29
unikernel, 38
UNIX, v, 34, 47, 112
Unix
 culture, 46
 epoch, 29
 Heritage Society, 31
 Philosophy, 40, 46, 66, 250,
 257
Unix File System, 32, 71, 112
Unrecoverable Read Error, 123
USB, 77
Usenet, 36
USENIX, 6
Version 7 Unix, 31
virtual machine, 129
Virtualization, 20
volume boot record, 95
Wide Area Network, 83
Wiki, 65
Windows NT, 44
Worse is Better, 47
Xen, 129
 dom0, 130
 domU, 130, 132
Xenix, 32
XML, 263
Zen of Python, 257
ZFS, 97, 100
Zone Bit Recording, 90, 91

Name Index

- Adams, Douglas, 29
Allchin, Jim, 126
Allspaw, John, 241, 244
- Bernstein, Lawrence, x
Bourne, Steven, 39
Brooks Jr., Frederick P., 202, 259
- Carnegie, Dale, 58
Clarke, Arthur C., 146
Conway, Melvin E., 218
Cook, Richard, 241
- de Saint Exupéry, Antoine, 20
Dekker, Sydney, 241
- Filo, David, 177
- Gabriel, Richard P., 47
Gates, Bill, 226
Gwyn, Doug, 47
- Hollis, Billy, 13
- Jobs, Steve, 48
Joy, Bill, 32, 40
- Karr, Jean-Baptiste Alphonse, 21
Kernighan, Brian W., 29, 30, 46
Korn, David, 40
- Lance, Bert, 160
- McIlroy, Douglas, 29, 46, 47, 262
McKusick, Marshall Kirk, 75, 112
Meyer, Bertrand, 65
- Ossana, Joe, 29
- Perkins Gilman, Charlotte, 71
Pike, Rob, 46
Postel, Jon, 261
- Raymond, Eric S., 46
Richard Stallman, 37
Ritchie, Dennis M., 28–30
- Silberschatz, Abram, 75
Stallman, Richard, 33
Stevens, W. Richard, 43
- Tanenbaum, Andrew S., 35
Thompson, Ken, 29, 159
Torvalds, Linus, 33
- Venema, Wietse, 55
- Wheeler, David, 204
- Zawinski, Jaimie, 249