


# PROBLEM SET - Lucas Stokey (1983)

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## Part One

Question 1 -  $t \geq 1$


(a) Plot the history-independent and time-invariant tax  $\tau(\phi)$



(b) Plot the history-independent and time invariant allocations  $\{c(\phi, g), n(\phi, g)\}$

We compute the allocations from the star equation and the resource constraint using a non-linear solver.

$$\begin{cases} (1 + \phi)(u_c(g) + u_n(g)) + \phi(u_{cc}(g)c(g) + n(g)u_{nn}(g)) &= 0 \\ c(g) + g &= n(g) \end{cases}$$



(c) Write the implementability constraint recursively to find  $\{b(\phi, g)\}$  and plot debt policies as a function of  $\phi$

From the IC we have

$$u_c(g)c(g) + u_n(g)n(g) + \beta \sum_{g'} \Pi(g'|g)u_c(g')b(g') = u_c(g)b(g)$$

We rewrite the problem in matrix form to solve the linear system and because it makes it easy to compute  $b$  for larger vector of states. We have

$$b = Ab + k$$

Where

$$b = [b_{g_1} \dots b_{g_n}]' \tag{1}$$

$$A = \beta((U_c)^{\odot -1} U_c') \odot \Pi \tag{2}$$

$$U_c = [u_{c,g_1} \dots u_{c,g_n}]' \tag{3}$$

$$\Pi = \begin{bmatrix} \pi(g_1|g_1) & \dots & \pi(g_n|g_1) \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \pi(g_1|g_n) & \dots & \pi(g_n|g_n) \end{bmatrix} \tag{4}$$


$$k = \begin{bmatrix} c_{g_1} + \frac{u_{n,g_1}}{u_{c,g_1}} n_{g_1} \\ \vdots \\ c_{g_n} + \frac{u_{n,g_n}}{u_{c,g_n}} n_{g_n} \end{bmatrix} \tag{5}$$

Where  $\odot$  is the Hadamard product (or *elementwise* operator)

The solution to compute debt for each states at a given value of  $\phi$  writes

$$b = (I - A)^{-1}k$$

Bonds in function of lagrange multiplier



**(d) What can you say about the relationship between  $\phi$  and  $\tau$ ? Between  $\phi$  and  $c$ ?**


$\Phi$  is the Lagrange multiplier of the implementability constraint in the Ramsey plan. It is a measure of the distortion implied by the tax. Hence, it is straightforward to have a positive relationship between the two.

We observe a negative relationship between  $\phi$  and  $c$ . This is explained by the substitution effect implied by the tax, which lowers the labor supply and hence the revenue and the consumption.

### Question two - $t = 0$

**(a) Compute allocations  $\{c_0(b_0, \phi), n_0(b_0, \phi)\}$**


As before, we use the resource constraint and the star equation, but in time zero. We get  $c_0$  and  $n_0$  as a function of the initial debt  $b_0$  and the lagrange multiplier  $\phi$ .



**(b) Use the bisection method to find  $\phi(b_0)$**

In order to compute  $\phi(b_0)$  we use a bisection algorithm on the implementability constraint. We have  $IC = F(\phi, b_0, c_0(\phi, b_0), n_0(\phi, b_0)) = F(\phi, b_0)$ . For a given value of  $b_0$ , written  $\bar{b}_0$ , we find  $\phi$  with the following algorithm:

- Initialization
  - Define a lower bound  $\phi_L$  and upper bound  $\phi_U$  on  $\phi$
  - Define a tolerance level  $\epsilon$
- While  $|IC(\phi_U, \bar{b}_0) - IC(\phi_L, \bar{b}_0)| > \epsilon$ 
  - $\phi_M \leftarrow \frac{\phi_L + \phi_U}{2}$
  - If  $IC(\phi_M, \bar{b}_0) = 0$ 
    - \* BREAK
  - Else if  $IC(\phi_M, \bar{b}_0) \times IC(\phi_L, \bar{b}_0) > 0$ 
    - \*  $\phi_L \leftarrow \phi_M$
  - Else
    - \*  $\phi_U \leftarrow \phi_M$



**(c) What can you say about the relation between  $b_0$  and  $\phi$**


The initial debt  $b_0$  and the distortion measure  $\phi$  are positively related. This is because the debt need to be repaid with distortionary taxes. We see that  $\phi$  is positive even with no initial debt, because the government needs to finance public expenditures in  $t = 0$ . The distortion disappears for  $-b_0 = g_0 = 0.1$ , that is when the government can fully finance public expenditures using its initial wealth.

## Part Three

Simulating the economy is now straightforward. Fixing  $b_0$  allows the computation of  $\phi(b_0)$  which itself allows for the computation of allocations at time zero and for  $t \geq 1$


**(a) Assume  $b_0 = 0$ . Simulate the economy for 100 periods.**

The tax rate is constant in every periods. If  $b_0 = 0$ , then  $t = 0$  is not different from any other period because  $(\star) = (\star_0)$




**(b) Assume  $b_0 = 0.1$ . Simulate the economy for 100 periods.**

In  $t = 0$  the tax rate is below its value at  $t \geq 1$ , it is also greater than the case where  $b_0 = 0$ , this is due to the fact that the government needs to finance debt. The government sets  $\tau_0$  lower than  $\{\tau_t\}_{t \geq 1}$  to incite households to supply labor. This creates a time inconsistency issue because one should expect the government to repeat this behavior at each period.



(c) Assume  $b_0 = -0.1$ . Simulate the economy for 100 periods.

The government has enough assets to finance its expenses so it doesn't need to tax labor, thus  $\tau_t = 0 \forall t$



**(d) Extension, AR(1) process for  $g$  using Tauchen method**

In this extension, we use the Tauchen method to simulate an AR(1) process of  $g_t$ .

