

Midterm Report

Andreas Bauer
andi.bauer@tum.de

Chung Hwan Han
hanc@in.tum.de

July 2021

1 Objective

This paper details our intermediate progress on the progress of the *Gossip-10* team project as part of the *Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security* course. The Gossip module is part of the *VoidPhone* Voice over IP system. VoidPhone provides anonymity and unobservability to voice communication facilitated through a peer-to-peer architecture. The Gossip module is used to spread information like availability information among communicating peers. Other modules from other teams might rely on the Gossip module to spread information required for their operations through the network. For this purpose, the project specification defines a socket-layer API for inter-module communication. The protocol spoken between Gossip instances is the core product of this project work. We follow the material and contents taught in the lecture – considering best practices, common attacks, and security measures – for the instantiation of our P2P protocol.

2 Requirements

Within the work spent on the project, we derived several requirements set against the system. This section provides an overview of what the Gossip is supposed to do and what we identify as essential for our ongoing design decisions.

As roughly outlined above, Gossip is responsible for spreading information in the peer-to-peer network. To do so, Gossip establishes connections with several other members of the network. Each peer maintains a public-private key pair¹ – referred to as *hostkey* – which is used for peer identification and trust verification. By specification, we assume that the public keys of the hostkeys are exchanged out-of-band beforehand between all members.

Our developed protocol can currently be divided into two phases: *handshake* and *knowledge-spreading*. For the handshake, we identify the following requirements:

- Verify the identity and authenticity of the remote peer.
- Establish a secure channel, providing confidentiality and integrity to the communication and preventing typical attacks like message replays.
- Ensure that as much meta-information as possible is protected (e.g., outside attackers can't easily trace who is communicating/connecting with whom except through information leaked by lower layers).

While knowledge-spreading is specified to be best-effort and doesn't need to make any guarantees, we nonetheless want to deliver the best possible performance and protection against typical attacks. Some attacks are already out-ruled by design by the specification (e.g., information is always validated by the upper layer before continuing to spread information; or knowledge

¹A 4096-bit long RSA keypair.

is spread to the whole network and not to single identities). Still, information may be lost if an Eclipse attack is staged and participating attacker peers drop all messages of a particular data type. Therefore, measures must be taken so that attackers don't have significant enough control over who is initiating a connection to whom. For routing itself, we must consider that we are maintaining an unstructured network and therefore need to take measures that routing packets aren't traveling forever in cycles.

Other modules interact with Gossip through the specification-defined TCP socket interface. API consumers will register data types they are interested in to be notified about. They may announce data into the network for those registered data types. For incoming data, Gossip delivers it to all registered API clients. Once each of those validated the data, information will be spread further into the network.

3 Architecture

In this section, we will detail the architecture of our implementation. Figure 1 provides a rough overview of our project's architecture. It uses UML-like syntax to highlight the core components of the module and its interfaces between each other and the outer world. Each of these components are explained in detail in the following subsections.




Figure 1: UML-like component diagram depicting a rough subsystem decomposition of our system. It highlights the fundamental structure and architecture of our project.

3.1 Networking

The **Networking** component is built on top of the *Netty* 5² networking framework. It provides common abstractions used by both the API and the Gossip component. Namely, it handles packet encoding and decoding, and connection establishment.

Packet serialization and deserialization can be implemented by conforming to the `OutboundPacket` or `InboundPacket` interfaces (defining a respective `InboundPacketHandler`, respectively). The set of supported packets can then be built using `ProtocolDescription` by supplying the packet implementations and their corresponding packet ids.

²<https://netty.io>

Together with an `EventLoopGroup` instance, `ProtocolDescriptions` can be used to instantiate a `TCPClient` or `TCPServer` to bind the respective TCP socket. `EventLoopGroup`³ is a concept provided by Netty, which manages a thread pool to handle incoming connections and serialization of traffic asynchronously.

3.1.1 Common Packet Format

The `ConnectionInitializer` (automatically set up within the `TCPClient` or the `TCPServer`) constructs the channel pipeline for each connection. The resulting channel pipeline is depicted in Figure 2. Incoming traffic passes through the `LengthFieldBasedFrameDecoder`⁴ (parsing the *size* field) and the `PacketDecoder` (parsing the *packet id*, assembling the typed packet instances) to the `InboundHandler`, calling the corresponding user code to handle the packet. Outbound traffic passes the `PacketEncoder` (serializing the packet contents and writing the *packet id*) and the `LengthFieldPrepender` (writing the *size* field).

The illustrated channel pipeline results in the general packet header depicted in Figure 3. The *size* field is an unsigned 16-bit integer, resulting in a maximum packet size of 65535 bytes (including the header size).




Figure 2: Diagram of the Channel Pipeline of a open connection.

3.2 API Interface

The **API Interface** implements the TCP socket-based API used by other modules to interact with Gossip (see section 2). Packet definitions are provided for the four API messages `ANNOUNCE`, `NOTIFY`, `NOTIFICATION`, and `VALIDATION`, as outlined in the specification. The component relies on the networking abstractions introduced in subsection 3.1.

Incoming API message calls are forwarded to the `GossipModule`, which is part of the *Gossip Protocol* component. The module is provided with a connection handle to send out potential notifications later.

³<https://netty.io/4.1/api/io/netty/channel/EventLoopGroup.html>

⁴Provided by Netty: <https://netty.io/4.1/api/io/netty/handler/codec/LengthFieldBasedFrameDecoder.html>




Figure 3: Packet header layout used within all packet types.

3.3 Gossip Protocol

The **Gossip Protocol** component implements the protocol spoken between individual Gossip peers. We rely on TCP to create a strongly connected network and rely on retransmissions and congestion control.

As outlined in the project specification, hostkeys are distributed out-of-band. Therefore, we currently don't consider identity exchange (see subsection 4.1). Known identities with their respective public keys and last known connection information are stored on disk inside the **identities** folder controlled by the **IdentityStorage** component. For testing purposes, we supply the `generateHostKey.sh` script to generate hostkeys for testing purposes.

Our protocol consists of two phases, the initial *handshake* phase and the *knowledge-spreading* phase for established connections. The **DISCONNECT** is the only packet valid in both phases and which might be sent at any time. Its structure is depicted in Figure 4. It consists of a single *reason* field describing the disconnect reason. We currently maintain the following possible reasons: **NORMAL**(0), **UNSUPPORTED**(1), **AUTHENTICATION**(64), **UNEXPECTED_FAILURE**(65), and **CANCELLED**(66).




Figure 4: GossipPacketDisconnect

The two protocol phases are described in detail in the following two subsections.

3.3.1 Handshake

For the handshake, we recall the requirements set in section 2. The primary purpose of the handshake is to create a secure channel for communication and verify and authenticate identity claims of the peers mutually.

We rely on *TLS 1.3*, serving us with a reliable, secure, and well-tested secure channel implementation. Consequentially, we employ ECDHE (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman with an Ephemeral key) for the key exchange, providing perfect forward secrecy for ongoing traffic. For application-data, encryption we configure the AEAD cipher *ChaCha20-Poly1305* supporting our confidentiality and integrity security goals.

Our TLS layer is configured to do mutual authentication, meaning both the server and the client provide respective certificates. The root of trust for a peer's certificate chain is derived from its hostkey (a self-signed certificate containing the public part of the hostkey). This certificate acts as a Certificate Authority to an intermediate certificate used within the TLS authentication phase. Within our **TrustManager** implementation, we verify the integrity of the certificate chain

and ensure that the root certificate is self-signed with the expected hostkey identity.⁵ Certificate transmissions are encrypted with TLS 1.3. Therefore, this doesn't leak the peer's identity at the connection establishment. Each peer verifies that the TLS session was established with the expected hostkey ensuring that no man-in-the-middle attack is in progress.

After completing the TLS handshake, we continue with the actual gossip handshake to verify possession of the hostkey's private key.

Handshake Hello While the hostkey-based TLS certificate proves that the peer was at some point in possession of the hostkey, we want to verify that the remote owns the hostkey right now. Therefore, we employ a simple challenge-response procedure.

After the TLS handshake completes, the connection-initiating peer sends the **HANDSHAKE HELLO** (see Figure 5) packet to the server. The packet specifies the used protocol *version* (currently always **VERSION_1(1)**). Lastly, the packet contains a random 64-bit challenge with the request to be signed with the server's hostkey.




Figure 5: GossipPacketHandshakeHello

Identity Verification 1 The **IDENTITY VERIFICATION 1** packet is the response to the **HANDSHAKE HELLO**. The packet structure is depicted in Figure 6. The 512-byte long *signature* field contains the server's response to the client-imposed challenge (signs the hash of the concatenation of a common prefix, the imposed challenge, and the hostkey identity). The *client challenge* is a random 64-bit challenge with the request to be signed with the client's hostkey.

At this point, the client has successfully verified the server's identity. In case of signature errors, the connection will be terminated after sending a corresponding **DISCONNECT** packet.




Figure 6: GossipPacketHandshakeIdentityVerification1

⁵To our best knowledge, we can't use an RSA-based certificate directly with TLS 1.3. Therefore, we employ this certificate chain. Within the below-outlined handshake process, we validate that the remote peer is in possession of the hostkey's private key through a challenge-response procedure.

Identity Verification 2 The client sends the IDENTITY VERIFICATION 2 packet in response to IDENTITY VERIFICATION 1. The packet structure is depicted in Figure 7. It contains the *signature* (512 bytes) to the challenge imposed in the previous packet.

At this point, the server has successfully verified the client’s identity. In case of signature errors, the connection will be terminated after sending a corresponding DISCONNECT packet. The server confirms the handshake by sending a HANDSHAKE COMPLETE packet to the client and switches to the *Knowledge-Spreading* phase.




Figure 7: GossipPacketHandshakeIdentityVerification2

Handshake Complete The HANDSHAKE COMPLETE (Figure 8) is the explicit signal to the client that the previous authentication steps were successful and that the client should also switch to the *Knowledge Spreading* phase.




Figure 8: GossipPacketHandshakeComplete

3.3.2 Knowledge Spreading

Once clients complete the *Handshake* phase, they reside in the *Knowledge Spreading* phase and are active participants in the Gossip peer-to-peer network.

Once an API consumer subscribes to a data type (see subsection 3.2), it may announce data into the network. To do so, we overtime propagate the SPREAD KNOWLEDGE packet to all connected peers (see Figure 9). For each announced data point, we generate a random 64-bit *message id*. In combination with the *tll* field (defined by the API consumer and decremented at every hop), it provides means to avoid cycles in packet routing.

On arrival of a SPREAD KNOWLEDGE, we provide the data contents to all API connections subscribed to the data type. If there are none, we discard the packet. Otherwise, we only forward the packet further into the network if all subscribed API connections report validity of the packet contents. This ensures that we don’t propagate manipulated information into the network.

4 Future Work

This section details future work we see necessary to view the project as completed.




Figure 9: GossipPacketSpreadKnowledge

4.1 Gossip Protocol

The Gossip protocol isn't yet fully implemented and still in the state of a draft pull request⁶. There are currently essentials missing, like full test coverage and source code documentation.

Further, the knowledge spreading process is only nearly completed. Specifically, concerning packet routing, we have to think about how to prevent attacks against the *message id* field of the KNOWLEDGE SPREADING packet (see Figure 9). We rely on it to identify cyclic packets. We may either impose some cool-downs or impose another method of detecting cycles.

Lastly, as specified, hostkeys are assumed to be exchanged out-of-band. Nonetheless, we are interested in researching solutions for session onboarding and spreading information about known peers into the network. It would require us to think about how to counter Eclipse attacks effectively. Though, it is noted that we see this as an optional milestone.

4.2 Project Related Improvements

More test cases have to be added to guarantee system functionalities. Currently, the code coverage is 63% for commands and 42% for branches (see Figure 10). This figure means that improvement on the test case is needed. In particular, for the most recently written P2P package follow-up work is required. In addition to improving code coverage, end-to-end tests should also be written on whether the module meets all the requirements.

4.3 Infrastructure Related Improvements

The project needs some infrastructure-related adjustments. We currently don't employ a proper logging system which we plan to implement using *log4j*. This milestone includes revisiting our error handling and ensuring user-readable errors are generated where necessary.

5 Workload Distribution

We would refer to the milestones from the previous initial report to explain our workload distribution.

- **Project Setup:** Andreas has set up the Java project with the Gradle build configurations. Andreas also built the CI pipeline to automate the tests and ensure the build integrity. PR-template was written by Andreas, which helps to make pull requests easier.

⁶https://gitlab.lrz.de/netintum/teaching/p2psec_projects_2022/Gossip-10/-/merge_requests/8

Code Coverage		
Element	Instructions	Branches
de.tum.gossip	56%	50%
de.tum.gossip.api	14%	0%
de.tum.gossip.api.packets	87%	50%
de.tum.gossip.crypto	81%	64%
de.tum.gossip.net	81%	55%
de.tum.gossip.net.packets	50%	n/a
de.tum.gossip.p2p	51%	20%
de.tum.gossip.p2p.packets	50%	30%
de.tum.gossip.p2p.protocol	54%	43%
de.tum.gossip.p2p.util	0%	0%
Total	63%	42%

Figure 10: Code coverage

- **API:** Andreas has designed and implemented overall structures of the core networking layer, which are used by API and P2P connections. Chung Hwan implemented the serializing and deserializing methods for the API message formats.
- **P2P Protocol:** Andreas designed the handshake protocol and implemented it with writing packet formats and handler classes. Andreas also designed the packet format and the handler logic, which is used for the notification system and is implemented in the Gossip module.
- **Tests:** Chung Hwan wrote the in-memory test cases for the packet decoding and encoding. Andreas wrote the end-to-end test cases to ensure the network layer works as intended.
- **Documentation & Reports:** Chung Hwan and Andreas co-worked writing the midterm report.

5.1 Individual efforts

Andreas: Since the initial report, I have roughly spent 55 hours in total on the project. This metric is provided by the time tracking tool of my IDE (code and reports). It, therefore, doesn't account for time spent outside the IDE (e.g., time spent with research, lecture material or online material around the topic or tools).

Chung Hwan: I invested about 30 hours for this project after submitting the initial report. Since this metric is calculated from commit history, it includes only the time the code was written.

6 Changes

With the current project state, we didn't identify any severe deviations from the project architecture we anticipated in the initial report.

However, there were slight changes in the list of dependencies we used within the project. Namely, we added the following new dependencies:

- **Guava**⁷ is a commonly used utility library developed by Google, which we use in several locations.
- **Caffeine**⁸ is a high-performance, near-optimal caching library that builds upon the Guava

⁷<https://guava.dev>

⁸<https://github.com/ben-manes/caffeine>

Cache API. We use it within the `GossipModule` for data structures to enforce a time- or space-based expiry on its contents.

- **commons-cli**⁹ is a library from the Apache Software Foundation to parse command-line options in Java applications easily.

⁹<https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-cli/>