


Public-Key Infrastructure



Question

How to confirm the **correct** public key

Matching Identity with Public Key

- ▶ **Bind** an identity with a key.

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- ▶ Kohnfelder, 1978: Use a *certificate*

Certificates

- ▶ A statement containing
 - ▶ Identity (e.g. University of Birmingham)
 - ▶ Public Key
 - ▶ Timestamp
 - ▶ Other Informations.
- ▶ Authentication of Certificate: **Signed by** a certifying authority (eg.GEANT, Google CA)

Communication using Certificate

- ▶ Suppose our browser is Bob and University of Birmingham webserver be Alice.
- ▶ Bob obtains Alice's certificate.
- ▶ If Bob knows GEANT's (Certifying Authority) public key then verify the signature.
- ▶ Now Bob has Alice's Public Key.

Communication using Certificate

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Communication using Certificate


- ▶ If Bob does not know CA's public key
 - ▶ Repeat the process for CA's public key.
 - ▶ How long should we go?
 - ▶ Create certificate signature chains (tree like hierarchy) with public key of the root hard coded in browser. (X.509 certificate signature chains)

X.509 certificate

www.birmingham.ac.uk		GEANT OV RSA CA 4	USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
Subject Name			
Country	GB		
State/Province/Country	West Midlands		
Organisation	University of Birmingham		
Common Name	www.birmingham.ac.uk		
Issuer Name			
Country	NL		
Organisation	GEANT Vereniging		
Common Name	GEANT OV RSA CA 4		
Validity			
Not Before	Tue, 07 Dec 2021 00:00:00 GMT		
Not After	Wed, 07 Dec 2022 23:59:59 GMT		
Subject Alt Names			
DNS Name	www.birmingham.ac.uk		
DNS Name	birmingham.ac.uk		
Public Key Info			
Algorithm	RSA		
Key Size	4096		
Exponent	65537		
BE 82 6C CF 89 36 D9 43 D8 73 88 3F 83 75 38 44 C7 10 OC 51 65 2E 9 2 38 07 0C DA AD 56 83 E4 3F A0 FA 04 86 05 00 66 89 4B 3A 80 C0 A 2 C7 54 D3 40 84 71 22 AB 49 D3 3E 7E 4B 31 5F 0D 74 6C FA 3D 3D 25 7 9 D6 0F 90 CB 4C 6E E2 46 9C 82 47 FF B1 B3 AD 9F 5F 39 CF 15 F2 E3 0 F 39 7A DB B6 B8 1D 29 61 EA 72 24 79 94 50 F3 FE E8 CF 0F 7B 48 0 7 82 90 1D 46 94 C6 44 DC 6A 5A 4F 93 90 AC 1E 53 30 87 FB 7C 4E 2 1 81 17 8A 9F 31 52 36 E5 63 BE 2D FF 00 90 4E A5 B3 F2 43 28 11 60 47 0B 76 58 49 24 C8 A6 D2 71 B4 BE 08 F2 97 F6 C7 F4 53 00 97 69 06 15 FE 09 7B 9D AB 81 DA 76 6F 6B 96 6A 23 84 83 F7 45 DC 87 5D 2B D5 8 E D2 05 E7 1A A7 C6 38 6E D6 77 4B 96 20 00 33 0D 14 3E 17 C8 0B 85 2 D 2B E7 CC AC A6 47 9F 60 86 07 B1 E3 A2 6A 73 5D 35 14 83 03 27 7B E 6 84 53 DC 41 AB 51 11 80 BC 1B 18 FC B8 1F 58 E9 29 57 10 56 16 13 CC 26 85 38 51 C1 27 C4 6A 5A 6A ED C8 AD 7C 2B 9F 6D 0B B6 68 4C D F 1A E9 4B 14 96 E8 87 10 A6 96 22 F7 26 D8 07 55 28 67 1F 3D 36 A2 8 9 50 30 58 68 AD 0B 2B 14 1A 5F EA BD 4D 79 35 76 4D 50 85 FA 2D 2E C9 EE 7B 8D E7 C5 ED 3C D4 8F 46 59 0B C8 B8 32 3E 86 D3 3D 89 15 0 8 6C D8 0F B7 54 AD 07 45 9D 06 D2 7E 63 10 81 1B C6 10 A4 C8 D6 3C 4C 8C D0 04 21 8D 8B F4 AD 79 AD 01 F6 ED C0 A0 7B 6E 8C 9F 2C 05 8 C 02 8A E3 93 BE D1 FC AD 37 46 86 2F 8E 19 AD 93 48 8A FC 15 15 83 7 E 87 4C C6 09 D6 20 1F 79 65 0B E8 67 0E 1A 68 E3 F4 15 BC 8A E2 77 C 8 16 E3 58 EA 5A 05 5A 0E 97 C5 E1 09 DC C6 21 4C AD E3 68 92 F9 F9 7 1 95 C2 EA 66 85 C4 56 C6 71 FA 9F 4F 93 9F 83 93 75 F7 14 3D 7B BA 5 7 FB 01 8F A1 27 42 14 B5 3F			
Modulus			
Miscellaneous			

Miscellaneous	
Serial Number	4E BC E2 46 48 00 43 6E 1B 7E ED 63 92 00 76 82
Signature Algorithm	SHA-384 with RSA Encryption
Version	3
Download	PEM (cert) PEM (chain)
Fingerprints	
SHA-256	FB 80 FC 2A 29 AD 27 1D 3F 87 94 DA 12 BC AA D8 BB 94 BA FC 7A CC ...
SHA-1	45 D4 37 C7 47 01 6E B1 BA C3 1F 29 AF F2 3B 6E F7 11 4B 58
Basic Constraints	
Certificate Authority	No
Key Usages	
Purposes	Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
Extended Key Usages	
Purposes	Server Authentication, Client Authentication
Subject Key ID	
Key ID	EC FB 41 87 39 7F DE 6D 79 EF 61 71 AC 6F F9 90 3F 97 F6
Authority Key ID	
Key ID	6F 1D 35 48 10 6C 32 FA 58 A0 9E BC BA E8 1F 95 BE 71 7A 0C
CRL Endpoints	
Distribution Point	http://GEANT.crl.sectigo.com/GEANTOV/RSA4CA.crl
Authority Info (AIA)	
Location	http://GEANT.crl.sectigo.com/GEANTOV/RSA4CA.crl
Method	CA Issuers
Location	http://GEANT.ocsp.sectigo.com
Method	Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Certificate Policies	
Policy	Statement Identifier (1.3.6.1.4.1)
Value	1.3.6.1.4.1.6449.1.2.2.79
Qualifier	Practices Statement (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1)
Value	https://sectigo.com/CPs
Policy	Certificate Type (2.23.140.1.2.2)
Value	Organization Validation

Public Key Infrastructure



Revoked Certificates

- ▶ CA may revoke certificates.
 - ▶ Certificate Expiration (Very Common)
 - ▶ Compromised Private key
 - ▶ User Details changed.

Key Recovery and Key Escrow

- ▶ Unaccessible keys can be recovered in principle (from Key Recovery Server).
- ▶ Human Entity (Key Recovery Agent); often more than one is required.
- ▶ Copies of private key is often kept in a key archival system too.
- ▶ Requested by law enforcement with proper court order.