

Forensics, Malware and Penetration Testing

Disk Forensics

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Outline

1. Disk forensics* ←
2. Log file forensics
3. Network forensics
4. Memory forensics
5. Mobile devices (Android)

* May need RAM forensics, e.g., in case of full-disk encryption



Books? (without warranty)

- File System Forensic Analysis by Brian Carrier
- NTFS Forensics: A Programmers View of Raw Filesystem Data Extraction by Jason Medeiros
- Forensics Wiki:
https://forensicswiki.xyz/page/Main_Page

Disk and file forensics what?



Block devices vs filesystems

Block device

- Visible as a list of blocks to the operating system
- Usually supports random access
- May have “weird” properties for access times

Filesystem

- View on / namespace for storage resources
- Stores contents of objects (files, dirs) with associated metadata

Supported features

Filesystem ← → Block device

undelete

snapshots

access rights

encryption

redundancy


access logs

compression

deduplication

checksums

Storage architecture



Quick note: Every layer loses information

- **Storage controller:**

Number of writes per sector, contents of defective blocks, contents of backup blocks

- **Storage layer:**

Contents of faulty drive, contents of spare sectors

- **File system:**

Contents of deleted files, previously used filenames, fragmentation pattern

File system forensics

- Main goal: Determine what is *currently* stored in a filesystem
- Determine how and when that state was created
- Possibly determine *previous* contents of the storage
- Make sure this state was not fabricated
- Look for anomalies in the system
- Under *no circumstances*: **MODIFY ANYTHING!**

Really forbidden!!!



How NOT to do it

- ~~Boot the machine, copy all files to USB disk~~
- ~~Put the disk(s) into second PC, mount filesystem, copy files~~
- ~~Put the disk(s) into second PC (running “normal” OS), mount, take image~~

How to DO it: Common practice

- Document state of system, peripherals, serial numbers, location, date/time, internal connection of disks
- Shut the powered system down
- Remove drives
- Use a hardware write blocker
- Use second system to image with dedicated software
- Take an image of each disk separately
- Store hash of the image, write it down
- Run your full analysis only on the images you took, reassemble RAID or similar storage in software

Read-only access to a filesystem

- **Just don't modify something willingly**
(Your operating system will still modify the access time of the files)
- **Mount the filesystem read-only**
(might still trigger something like auto-defragmentation)
- **Use write-barriers on the operating system**
(The OS might still change power-management settings on the storage)
- **Add a hardware write blocker**
(A hardware RAID controller after the blocker might start a rebuild)
- **Bypass hardware RAID controller, take images**
(The disk itself might still start to shuffle around free/unused blocks)
- **Bypass storage controller on the hardware**
(That's pretty good, but often difficult)

Write blockers



- Prevents writes to a medium being imaged by filtering respective commands
- Often combined with imaging options
- Example: Tableau TX1

(<https://www.guidancesoftware.com/tableau/hardware/tx1>)

BROAD MEDIA SUPPORT



The TX1 can forensically image a broad range of media, including PCIe and 10Gb Ethernet devices, and supports up to two active forensic jobs at a time (simultaneous imaging). When imaging, TX1 outputs to raw .DD and .dmg formats, .e01 (compressed), or .ex01 (compressed), and features extensive file system support (ExFAT, NTFS, EXT4, FAT32, HFS+).



A word of warning



THS

@_ths_

Folgen



Maybe interesting for #forensics investigators and lawyers: i just managed to write to the drive connected to this guy, w/o turning off the green light.



12:08 - 24. Nov. 2017

328 Retweets 652 „Gefällt mir“-Angaben



A quick example ...

Tableau Forensic Imager TX1



[Where to Buy »](#)

 [TECH SUPPORT](#)

 [FAQ](#)

[KIT CONTENT](#) [+](#)

[LATEST FIRMWARE](#) [+](#)

[RETURNS & WARRANTY](#) [+](#)

A quick example ...

Tableau Forensic Imager (TX1)

Tableau Firmware Update (TFU)

Since the release of our first-generation Tableau products, we knew that it would be essential to make firmware updates available on a regular basis. Long-term product support is one of the commitments we make to our customers, and we are proud to still be providing free Tableau firmware updates as a value-add after the sale to this day. These updates make it possible to introduce new product features, improve device compatibility and performance, and even fix newly discovered bugs after the initial launch of the product.

The Tableau Firmware Update (TFU) utility is a simple-to-use tool for Microsoft Windows that can update the firmware in your Tableau hardware devices (e.g., Forensic Duplicators and Forensic Bridges). TFU automatically identifies the model of the Tableau device connected to the host computer and applies the appropriate update on command. There is no need for you to match firmware files with the corresponding device.



Installer

 [Tableau Firmware 21.1](#)
305 MB

Revision History

[TFU Release Notes](#)

A quick example ...

2019

vs

2021

Microsoft.VC90.CRT	17.01.2019 09:44	Dateiordner	
tab1394	17.01.2019 09:44	Dateiordner	
tabload	17.01.2019 09:44	Dateiordner	
taboxusb	17.01.2019 09:44	Dateiordner	
anzu_sdcard.exe	29.01.2018 17:37	Anwendung	6.261 KB
anzu-firmware-2.1.0.pkg	16.11.2018 13:01	PKG-Datei	131.170 KB
libTDM.dll	19.11.2018 15:27	Anwendungserwei...	60 KB
mfc120.dll	05.10.2013 02:38	Anwendungserwei...	4.321 KB
msvcp120.dll	05.10.2013 02:38	Anwendungserwei...	445 KB
msvcr120.dll	38	Anwendungserwei...	949 KB
tabquery.dll	27	Anwendungserwei...	70 KB
tabup.exe	27	Anwendung	22.067 KB
td3_sdcard.exe	17	Anwendung	5.161 KB
td3-update-2.0.0.zip	48	ZIP-komprimierter...	57.622 KB
yetiFirmwarePackage.bin	16.11.2018 14:46	BIN-Datei	13.632 KB



```
neko3@thinkat:~/dwls/tableau
→ tableau ll
total 308M
drwx----- 2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Apr 18 14:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 neko3 neko3 4.0K Apr 18 14:40 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 156M Feb 23 14:02 anzuFIRMWARE
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 10M May 28 2020 anzu_sdcard
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreconsolel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoredatetimel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoredebugl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreerrorhandlingl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 15K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorefilel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorefilel120
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorefilel210
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorehandlel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreheapl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreinterlockel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorelibraryloaderl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 14K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorelocalizationl120
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorememoryl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorenamedpipel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 13K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreprocessenvironmentl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 14K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreprocessthreads1110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreprocessthreads1111
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreprofilel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincortlsupportl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincorestringl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 14K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoresynchl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoresynchl120
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 13K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoresysinfo110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoretimezonel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 11K Dec 6 2019 apimswincoreutill110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtconiol110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 15K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtconvertl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtenvironmentl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 13K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtfilesysteml110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtheapl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtlocalel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 22K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtmathl110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 19K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtmultibytel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 65K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtprivatel110
-rw-r--r-- 1 neko3 neko3 12K Dec 6 2019 apimswincrtprocessl110
```

A quick example ...

2019

vs

2021

C:\Users\david\Downloads\Setup_Tableau_Firmware_Update_7.26\Tableau\Tablet

Name	Größe	Gepackte G...	Zugriffsrech...	Geändert am	Ers
bin	2 747 492	2 828 288	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
boot	3 026 653	3 047 424	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
dev	0	0	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
etc	1 474 478	1 526 784	drwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...	
include	9 143	10 240	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
lib	11 717 968	11 933 696	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
lost+found	0	0	drwx-----	2016-07-07...	
mnt	0	0	drwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...	
proc	0	0	drwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...	
root	4 394	6 144	drwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...	
sbin	2 574 815	2 626 560	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
sys	0	0	drwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...	
tmp	0	0	drwxrwxrwt	2016-06-01...	
usr	114 489 341	116 472 832	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
var	0	0	drwxr-xr-x	2016-07-07...	
[SYS]	4 194 304	4 211 712			
init	11	0	lrwxrwxrwx	2016-07-07...	
linuxrc	11	0	lrwxrwxrwx	2016-07-07...	

```
neko3@thinkat:~/dwls/tableau/_anzuFIRMWARE.extracted/squashfs-root
→ squashfs-root ll
total 64K
drwxrwxr-x 15 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 .
drwxr-xr-x  4 neko3 neko3 4.0K Apr 18 14:21 ..
drwxrwxr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Nov 11 17:31 bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 dev
drwxr-xr-x 25 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 etc
-rwxr-xr-x  1 neko3 neko3 177 May 31 2019 init
-rw-r--r--  1 neko3 neko3   0 Sep 24 2019 .init_enable_core
drwxrwxr-x  6 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:08 lib
lrwxrwxrwx  1 neko3 neko3   3 Jul 10 2020 lib64 -> lib
lrwxrwxrwx  1 neko3 neko3  11 Jul 10 2020 linuxrc -> bin/busybox
drwxr-xr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 proc
drwx----- 2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:00 root
drwxrwxr-x  3 neko3 neko3 4.0K Jul 10 2020 run
drwxrwxr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:08 sbin
drwxr-xr-x  2 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 sys
drwxrwxrwt  3 neko3 neko3 4.0K Jul 10 2020 tmp
drwxrwxr-x 12 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:00 usr
drwxrwxr-x  5 neko3 neko3 4.0K Feb 23 20:16 var
→ squashfs-root
```

A quick example ...

2019


vs

2021

C:\Users\david\Downloads\Setup_Tableau_Firmware_Update_7.26\Tableau\Tableau Firmware Update\td3-update-2.0.0\							
Name	Größe	Gepackte G...	Zugriffsrech...	Geändert am	Erstellt am	Letzter Zug...	iNode
inittab	777	1 024	-rwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	3253i
issue	15	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3255i
ld.so.cache	10 338	11 264	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3258i
ld.so.conf	0	0	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3260i
logrotate.conf	322	1 024	-rwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	3252i
logrotated.conf	494	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	3253i
memstat.conf	164	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3254i
mke2fs.conf	801	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3254i
moduli	125 811	126 976	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	3252i
mtab	242	1 024	-rwxr-xr-x	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	3258i
passwd	136	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	3257i
pointercal	43	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	
profile	712	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	
scsi_id.config	666	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	
services	16	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	
shadow	113	1 024	-rw-----	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	
smartd.conf	6 706	7 168	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	
sshd_config	3 398	4 096	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	
ssh_config	1 555	2 048	-rw-r--r--	2016-07-07...		2016-07-07...	
syslog.conf	170	1 024	-rw-r--r--	2016-06-01...		2016-07-07...	

```
neko3@thinkat:~/dwls/tableau/_anzuFIRMWARE.extracted/squashfs-root/etc
→ etc ls
anzu          hosts          mtab          sensors3.conf
bashrc        init.d         netconfig     sensors.d
bindresvport.blacklist  inittab       netdata       services
bluetooth     inputrc       network       shadow
ctdb          iproute2      nfsmount.conf shells
cwiid         irqbalance   nsswitch.conf smartd.conf
dbus-1        iscsi         ntp.conf      smartd_warning.d
dhcpcd.conf  isns          os-release    smartd_warning.sh
dircolors    issue         passwd        ssl
exports      ld.so.conf.d  profile       sudoers.d
fonts        libnl         profile.d     tgt
fstab        lighttpd      protocols     timezone
group        localtime    resolv.conf   wpa_supplicant.conf
hostname     mke2fs.conf  samba
```

A quick example ...



sshd_config - Editor

Datei Bearbeiten Format Ansicht Hilfe

```
#SyslogFacility AUTH
#LogLevel INFO

# Authentication:


#LoginGraceTime 2m
PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
```



shadow - Editor

Datei Bearbeiten Format Ansicht Hilfe

```
root:$1$hE5Am4vg$IMHTNJcZfwdyCZW54qPTW.:15043:0:99999:7:::
sshd:!:14909:0:99999:7:::
nobody!:47050:0:99999:7:::
```



neko3@thinkat:~/dwls/tableau/_anzuFIRMWARE.extracted/squashfs

```
→ etc cat shadow
root:$1$fMxhn0E3$NuA68PJHGjYgKrtA1JwyS/:10933:0:99999:7:::
daemon*:10933:0:99999:7:::
bin*:10933:0:99999:7:::
sys*:10933:0:99999:7:::
sync*:10933:0:99999:7:::
mail*:10933:0:99999:7:::
www-data*:10933:0:99999:7:::
operator*:10933:0:99999:7:::
nobody*:10933:0:99999:7:::
dbus*::::
→ etc
```


A quick example ...

Dictionary cache built:

```
* Filename...: ..\john179w2\john179\run\wordlist.txt
* Passwords..: 907684
* Bytes.....: 9054991
* Keyspace...: 907684
* Runtime....: 0 secs
```

And the password is ...

```
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Type.....: md5crypt, MD5 (Unix), Cisco-IOS $1$ (MD5)
Hash.Target.....: $1$he5Am4vg$IMHTNJcZfwdyCZW54qPTW.
Time.Started.....: Thu Jan 17 10:10:45 2019 (1 sec)
Time.Estimated...: Thu Jan 17 10:10:46 2019 (0 secs)
Guess.Base.....: File (..\john179w2\john179\run\wordlist.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#3.....: 834.3 kH/s (10.10ms) @ Accel:256 Loops:250 Thr:32 Vec:1
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests, 1/1 (100.00%) Salts
Progress.....: 778240/907684 (85.74%)
Rejected.....: 0/778240 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 737280/907684 (81.23%)
Restore.Sub.#3...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:750-1000
Candidates.#3....: recorders -> sharkoon
Hardware.Mon.#3...: Temp: 42c Util: 88% Core:1784MHz Mem:3504MHz Bus:16

Started: Thu Jan 17 10:10:36 2019
Stopped: Thu Jan 17 10:10:48 2019
```

... secret

A quick example ...

And in 2021...

```
gcrs-1% ./run/john --wordlist=../rockyou.txt --pot=../hashes/tableau.pot ../hashes/tableau.hash
Warning: detected hash type "md5crypt", but the string is also recognized as "md5crypt-long"
Use the "--format=md5crypt-long" option to force loading these as that type instead
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (md5crypt, crypt(3) $1$ (and variants) [MD5 128/128 AVX 4x3])
Will run 24 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
secret          (root)
lg 0:00:00:00 DONE (2021-04-18 14:19) 1.351g/s 1556p/s 1556c/s 1556C/s one:sjcwo
z3r..boston
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
gcrs-1%
```




Analysing disk images

Analysing disk images

1. Reorder physical drives to logical groups (RAID, LVM) if necessary
2. Recover partition tables
3. Identify file systems
4. Determine content of file systems
5. Use logfiles to create a timeline of events
6. Check for possibly deleted files
7. Check for abnormalities

File forensics (overview)

- Similar approach to file system forensics
- File type can be determined by extension/metadata/content
- Find suitable viewers for files (native applications do not show everything)
- (Maybe) look for old versions of the file
- Tools often support searching for known hashes and for file contents

Possible anomalies

- Partition tables with alignment not used by the OS installer:
Maybe the partition was fabricated with another tool
- Unusual ordering of data on the drive:
Data may have been copied there in one go
- No fragments of old data in the free space:
Drive maybe cleaned and cloned from other system
- Access pattern of file groups not in sync:
Files put in browser cache, but not the cache index
- Unusual speed/times:
Files in the download folder downloaded with the speed of a USB3 HDD while user had slow DSL connection
- Least significant bits of timer values are biased

Tools ...



Command line tools

- `dd` **for imaging**
- `sha1sum`, `sha256sum` **for hashing**
- `fdisk` **for viewing partitions**
`fdisk -lu disk.img`
- `mount` **for mounting (loopback)**
`mount -o loop,ro,noexec disk.img /mnt/img`
- `ls` / `find` / `grep` / ... **for finding files**
- **Additional tools like** `photorec`, `testdisk`,
...

Analysis: Sleuth Kit / Autopsy

Open Source Digital Forensics



Autopsy® is an easy to use, GUI-based program that allows you to efficiently analyze hard drives and smart phones. It has a plug-in architecture that allows you to find add-on modules or develop custom modules in Java or Python.



The Sleuth Kit® is a collection of command line tools and a C library that allows you to analyze disk images and recover files from them. It is used behind the scenes in Autopsy and many other open source and commercial forensics tools.

Autopsy / TSK: Features

- The Sleuth Kit (TSK) <http://wiki.sleuthkit.org/>
 - Collection of command line tools
[http://wiki.sleuthkit.org/index.php?title=TSK Tool Overview](http://wiki.sleuthkit.org/index.php?title=TSK_Tool_Overview)
 - Supports wide range of filesystems: ext2/3/4, (ex)FAT, HFS, ISO 9660 (CD), NTFS, UFS 1/2, YAFFS2
 - Open-source: <https://github.com/sleuthkit/sleuthkit>
- Autopsy: Graphical front-end to TSK
- Both installed in Forensics VM
- Alternative: <https://www.sans.org/tools/sift-workstation/>

Summary

- Disk forensics is well supported by tools nowadays (command line and GUI)
- We can only cover a subset of all available tools and focus on open source software
- Many commercial tools (e.g. EnCase, Belkasoft Evidence Centre) used in practice
- **A good forensics tool never modifies the image under any circumstances**

**Next part: Log File
Forensics**