Assignment3 Team6 Report

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1 Analyze the malware's code

We used Ghidra to analyze the malware code. All C-style decompiled codes mentioned below can be found in Appendix A.2.

1.1 Start

We found it difficult to find the code that implements the encryption directly from the entry point, so we started to search defined strings in the program. Then we found the AES encryption function AES_Encrypt_140007080(), whose function call tree ends at the entry point, as shown in

Figure 1. For ease of analysis, we have changed some names in the code and added comments to important parts.

```
SFunction Call Trees: AES_Encrypt_140007080 - (mYSCpPoHAih)
Incoming Calls

f Incoming References - AES_Encrypt_140007080

Sf AES_Encrypt_140007080

Ff AES_Encrypt_140007590

Ff EncryptAndRenameFiles_140007590

Ff RansomwareProcessor_140008240

Ff RansomwareProcessor_140008240

Ff RansomwareProcessor_140008240

Ff FID_conflict:WinMainCRTStartup

Ff FID_conflict:WinMainCRTStartup

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Ff FID_conflict:WinMainCRTStartup
```

Figure 1: Function call trees

1.2 The AES encryption function in ransomware

The function **AES_Encrypt_140007080()** is an AES encryption function, which is the core function of the ransomware.

We analyzed its implementation. The function has two parameters: the path to read the file 'input_path' and the path to write the file 'output_path':

```
void AES_Encrypt_140007080(LPCWSTR input_path,LPCWSTR output_path)
```

It calls some functions of Win32 APIs to read, encrypt and write files. It loops through the following steps until all the bytes of the file have been read.

• Open the input file and create the output file by calling CreateFileW().

```
HANDLE local_f8;
HANDLE hFile;
local_f8 = CreateFileW(input_path,1,1,(LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)0x0,3,0x80,(HANDLE)0x0);
hFile = CreateFileW(output_path,2,1,(LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)0x0,4,0x80(HANDLE)0x0);
```

• Write 16-byte IV to the output file. 'IV_140086010' is a pointer to the memory address of the IV.

```
BOOL BVar2;
uint lpByteNum [2];
BVar2 = WriteFile(hFile,IV_140086010,0x10,lpByteNum,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0)
```

• Read 1008 (0x3f0) bytes from the input file into the buffer, and write the actual number of bytes read (i.e. the size of unencrypted block) to the output file. In general, the actual number of bytes read is 1008 except for the last one, which can be less than 1008.

```
undefined8 *buffer;

HANDLE local_f8;

uint *local_f0;

buffer = (undefined8 *)_malloc_base(0x3f0);

BVar2 = ReadFile(local_f8, buffer,0x3f0,lpByteNum,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0);

*local_f0 = lpByteNum[0];

BVar2 = WriteFile(hFile,local_f0,4,lpByteNum,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0);
```

• Encrypt the buffer with the IV and the key by calling **StartEncryption** 140008450().

```
undefined keyScheduleWithIV [192]; /* Address of the key*/
InitEncryption_140008790((longlong)keyScheduleWithIV,0x140086000,(
undefined8 *)IV_140086010);
StartEncryption_140008450((longlong)keyScheduleWithIV,buffer,0x3f0);
```

'0x140086000' is the memory address of the 16-byte key. Then we took a screenshot of the key in Ghidra, as shown in Figure 2.

The key is '8d02e65e508308dd743f0dd4d31e484d'.

```
Key
BYTE_ARRAY_140086000 XREF[2]: 140000264(*),
AES_Encrypt_140007080:...

140086000 8d 02 db[16]
e6 5e
50 83 ...

140086000 [0] 8Dh, 2h, E6h, 5Eh,
140086004 [4] 50h, 83h, 8h, DDh,
140086008 [8] 74h, 3Fh, Dh, D4h,
140086006 [12] D3h, 1Eh, 48h, 4Dh
```

Figure 2: the key in Ghidra

• Write encryted buffer to the output file.

```
BVar2 = WriteFile(hFile,buffer,0x3f0,lpByteNum,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0);
```

Figure 3 proves that we are right. The encrypted file consists of many similar parts (IV[16] + sizeOfBlock[4] + block[1008]).



Figure 3: Part of an encrypted file

From the above analysis, we were still not sure about wether the encryption algorithm is AES-CBC-128-NoPadding or not. Next let's identify the encryption algorithm.

As shown in Listing 1, the first parameter is composed of key[16] + subkey[160] + IV[16] (it's no need to analyze the KeyExpansion funtion). So we renamed it to 'keyScheduleWithIV'.

Listing 1: InitEncryption_140008790

In Listing 2 we observed that the **PlaintextXorIV_14000acb0()** function indicates the plaintext xor the IV, proving it's a CBC mode. The **AESOperation_1400088d0()** function implements the AES encryption operations: XorRoundkey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColomns.

Listing 2: Part of StartEncryption 140008450

As a result, we found that the ransomware uses **AES-CBC-128-NoPadding** encryption algorithm to encrypt files.

Note that the last decrypted block is not the unencrypted block. This is because when encrypting a file, the last encrypted buffer has residual data that has not been overwritten. Therefore, it's necessary to remove the residual data of the last decrypted block when decrypting.

2 Identify what files and directories are targeted

Analyzing the following two functions, we identified the files and directories targeted by the ransomware.

2.1 Identify what files are targeted

The function EncryptAndRenameFiles_140007590(), which calls AES_Encrypt_140007080(), allows us to identify which files are targeted by the ransomware. This function needs to be passed into a directory path pointer.

```
void EncryptAndRenameFiles_140007590(short *dir)
```

Then the function defines a loop, in which all the files in the 'dir' path will be found by calling **FindFirstFileW()**. 264 (0x104) is the maximum length of the path string: MAX_PATH = 0x104.

```
BOOL BVar3;
do{ /*...*/
    WCHAR local_e88[264];
    ConcatWPath_140007b20(dir, 0x104, (short *)"\\");
    CopyWPath_140007bc0(local_e88, 0x104, dir);
    ConcatWPath_140007b20(local_e88, 0x104, (short *)"*");
    local_1110 = FindFirstFileW(local_e88, &local_10e8);
    /*...*/
    BVar3 = FindNextFileW(local_1110, &local_10e8);
} while (BVar3 != 0);
```

The loop executes the following code:

• Exclude directories by determining the file attributes (0x10 for directory).

```
if ((local_10e8.dwFileAttributes & 0x10) == 0)\{/*...*/\}
```

• Compare the first three characters (6 bytes) of the filename with the string '~en', and then exclude the file if they are same.

```
wchar_t local_e98[8];
copy_14000c700((undefined8 *)local_e98, (undefined8 *)local_10e8.
cFileName, 6);
iVar2 = wcscmp(local_e98, L"~en");
if (iVar2 != 0){/*...*/}
```

• Retrieve the path of the executable file of the current process by calling **GetModule-FileNameW()**, and then exclude this file (i.e. ransomware) .

```
WCHAR local_858[264];
GetModuleFileNameW((HMODULE)0x0, local_858, 0x104);

_Str2 = PathFindFileNameW(local_858);
iVar2 = wcscmp(local_10e8.cFileName, _Str2);
if (iVar2 != 0){/*...*/}
```

• Encrypt the original file by calling **AES_Encrypt_140007080()**. Prefix the filename of encrypted file with '~en' (e.g. 'sample.md' to '~ensample.md'). Delete the original file by calling **DeleteFileW()**.

```
CopyWPath_140007bc0(local_648, 0x104, dir);

output_addr = local_648;

ConcatWPath_140007b20(output_addr,0x104,L"~en");

ConcatWPath_140007b20(output_addr, 0x104, local_10e8.cFileName);

AES_Encrypt_140007080(input_addr, output_addr);

DeleteFileW(input_addr);
```

After the above loop is completed, the second loop renames all the encrypted file to the original filenames by calling the **MoveFileW()** function (e.g. '~ensample.md' to 'sample.md').

```
MoveFileW(local_10f0, local_10f8);
```

In summary, for a given directory 'dir', the ransomware does **NOT** target: subdirectories and files in them, encrypted files and the ransomware itself. However, there is one exception. If a file's original filename is prefixed with '~en', it will not be encrypted, but the file will lose its prefix '~en' after the ransomware runs.

But what is 'the given directory'? Let's next locate it.

2.2 Identify what directory is targeted

The function RansomwareProcessor_140008240() get the current directory by calling the function GetCurrentDirectoryW(), and passes it as a parameter to EncryptAndRenameFiles_140007590(). Thus, the ransomware only targets the current directory.

Listing 3: Part of RansomwareProcessor_140008240

In conclusion, the ransomware only runs on Windows OS (because it uses Win32 APIs), and targets: all the files (not the subdirectories and their files) in the current directory, except the ransomware itself and all files prefixed with '~en'.

3 Decrypt Hank's files.

The tool to decrypt Hank's files is 'assinment3-team6-data/AES_decrypt.py'.

To use this python tool, first install pycryptodome.

```
1 pip3 install pycryptodome
```

Then replace the following line with YOUR directory of the files to be decrypted, and DO NOT add a '/' to the end of your directory.

```
1 FILE_DIRECTORY = "HanksBackup"
```

A Appendix

A.1 The Ghidra zip file

The Ghidra project file is 'assinment3-team6-data/mYSCpPoHAih.gzf'.

A.2 The C-style decompiled codes

All the complete codes for the above C-style decompilations can be found in the directory 'assinment3-team6-data/C-style decompiled code'.

In addition, there are some functions not mentioned above, but which are also valuable (because they are part of the function call tree), listed below:

- entry.c: it calls the function RansomwareEntryPoint_14000afe0().
- RansomwareEntryPoint_14000afe0.c: it calls the function RansomwareProcessor() mentioned above.

A.3 The decrypted files

All decrypted files can be found at: https://github.com/Superior-Josh/FMPT-Assignment3/tree/main/HanksBackup_decrypted

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