How to be civil about political loss – The importance of good loser messages

Supporting Information

2020-08-04

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1 Preface

This is the Supplementary Material for the manuscript entitled How to be civil about political loss - The importance of good loser messages.

We pre-registered Study 2 and Study 3 at aspredicted.org.

When not otherwise stated, we followed the pre-registration.

We deviated from it in the following ways:

- 1. Exclusion criteria. While we registered to exclude individuals that raced through the survey in Study 2, we have since then learned that exclusion based on such a post-treatment variable can bias the obtained effects (Montgomery et al, 2018). Accordingly, we present the analysis on the full sample in the main text. The analysis using the reduced sample can be found in this Appendix (see section 7.4).
- 2. For study 2, we pre-registered a hypothesis that predicts an interaction between the good loser norm and the good loser message. Since there is little variance on the good-loser norm variable, this analysis is less insightful than we had anticipated. We therefore do not present this analysis in the main text but in the Appendix (see section 7.1.3).
- 3. For study 3, we pre-registered that we would use two indicators of fairness perceptions. To keep the dependent variable comparable across studies we have later on decided to only present the analysis with the item: 'How fair was the decision-making procedure?' for all three studies. The analysis using the additional item 'How reasonable do you think the decision was?' is included in the robustness check analysis in the paper (Table 2).
- 4. For study 3, we missed to specify that there are two good loser message like in study 2 (for which we have the same expectations): A generic and a specific good loser message.
- 5. While we use the wording good loser prime in the pre-registration, we have later decided to use good loser message in the manuscript.

2 (PART) STUDY I

The experiment for Study I was fielded in Sweden in the fall of 2017 and spring of 2018 as an add-on to the fifth wave of the European Values Survey (EVS, PI Susanne Wallman Lundåsen). EVS is based on a probability sample of the Swedish population age 18 or older (n = 1194). Interviews were face-to-face. The fieldwork organization was IPSOS, Sweden. For a detailed documentation we refer to https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/ (https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/). Study 1 was one of three experiments included in a paper and pencil leave behind. The return rate of the questionnaire was 85% (n =1019).

3 Pre-treatment measures and experimental vignette

The statistics are displayed for the respondents of interest in this study, which is the respondents who end up with observing an unfavorable decision outcome in the experiment.

3.1 Pre-treatment measures

3.1.1 Ban on begging - opinion

(#tab:1031_pre_begging)What is your opinion on a ban on begging in your municipality?

Value	N	Percent
Against ban	215	45
For ban	266	55

3.1.2 Ban on begging - importance

(#tab:1031_pre_begging2)How important is the issue of ban on begging to you personally?

Value	N	Percent
1 Not important at all	37	8
2	72	15
3	76	16
4	103	21
5	83	17
6	55	11
7 Very important	55	11

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "How important is the issue of ban on begging to you personally?" is 4.06, and the standard deviation is 1.76

3.2 Experimental vignette

Experimental vignette.

Imagine that your municipality is about to decide whether begging on the streets should be banned or allowed within the municipal borders. The decision can be made in different ways: One option is that the local political representatives make the decision. Another option is that the citizens of the municipality decide through a referendum. Please image how you would react if this scenario occurred in your municipality: After a debate in the media, the local political representatives decide to ban begging in the municipality. *Treatment text follows*.

(#tab:1031_vignette)Vignette treatments and texts, Swedish vignette experiment

Treatment	Text
No prime	Imagine that your municipality is about to decide whether begging on the streets should be banned or allowed within the municipal borders. The decision can be made in different ways: One option is that the local political representatives make the decision. Another option is that the citizens of the municipality decide through a referendum. Please image how you would react if this scenario occurred in your municipality: After a debate in the media, the local political representatives decide to ban begging in the municipality.
Lamenting politician	Imagine that your municipality is about to decide whether begging on the streets should be banned or allowed within the municipal borders. The decision can be made in different ways: One option is that the local political representatives make the decision. Another option is that the citizens of the municipality decide through a referendum. Please image how you would react if this scenario occurred in your municipality: After a debate in the media, the local political representatives decide to ban begging in the municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong.
Generic good loser prime	Imagine that your municipality is about to decide whether begging on the streets should be banned or allowed within the municipal borders. The decision can be made in different ways: One option is that the local political representatives make the decision. Another option is that the citizens of the municipality decide through a referendum. Please image how you would react if this scenario occurred in your municipality: After a debate in the media, the local political representatives decide to ban begging in the municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that's how it is like living in a democracy.

3.3 Post treatment measures

3.3.1 Fairness

(#tab:1031_outcome_measures_fairness)What do you think about the way the decision was made?

Value	N	Percent
1 Not fair at all	74	15
2	52	11
3	77	16
4	114	24
5	54	11
6	46	10
7 Very fair	64	13

The mean score for the post treatment measure "What do you think about the way the decision was made?" is 3.86, and the standard deviation is 1.91.

4 Effects on losers

Treatment effects on experimental subjects who find the decision outcome to align unfavorably with their own preferences.

4.1 Fairness

In the manuscript, we mention that the Generic good loser message for the respondents with an unfavorable outcome is on par with the outcome favorability effect (difference in fairness perceptions between winners and losers). The table below displays the outcome favorability effect, and table 'tab: 1055_post_fairness' further below displays the treatment effect of the Generic good loser message.

(#tab:1050_int_outfav)Conditional effect of outcome favorability on Generic good loser message treatment, Study 1

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Intercept	4.79	0.08	62.18	0
Unfavorable outcome	-0.93	0.11	-8.28	0

Figure 2 in the manuscript:

(#tab:1055_post_fairness)Treatment effects on fairness perceptions of decision, Study 1

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Not shown	3.46	0.16	22.32	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.27	0.21	1.26	0.21
Generic good loser message	0.88	0.21	4.15	0.00

4.1.2 Fairness II

Lamenting politician as reference category




(#tab:105_post_fairness)Treatment effects on fairness perceptions of decision, Study 1

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Intercept	3.73	0.15	25.41	0.00
Not shown	-0.27	0.21	-1.26	0.21
Generic good loser message	0.61	0.21	2.96	0.00

Note:

Lamenting politician set as reference category.

4.2 Willingness to accept



(#tab:105_post_accept)Treatment effects on willingness to accept decision, Study 1

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Not shown	4.31	0.17	24.95	0.00
Lamenting politician	-0.22	0.24	-0.93	0.35
Generic good loser message	0.13	0.24	0.57	0.57

5 (PART) STUDY II

The experiment for Study II was fielded in Norway during the spring and fall of 2017 during the 9th and 10th waves of Norwegian Citizen Panel (https://www.uib.no/medborger). This is a research-purpose internet panel with over 6000 active participants. It is based on a probability sample of the general Norwegian population above the age of 18 drawn from the Norwegian National Registry. The survey is based on a online questionnaire with postal recruitment. Panel members complete a questionnaire three times a year of 15 minutes each. The survey panel is a core component of The Digital Social Science Core Facilities (DIGSSCORE), and was established in 2013 as a collaboration between several departments at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Bergen and NORCE – Norwegian Research Centre. We refer to the documentation report

(Data/ncp-wave13-documentation.pdf) for further details on technical aspects of the survey, panel recruitment, response rates of the 13th wave, and representativeness. For details about the data collected in this project and the survey panel at large, we refer to the codebook for the Waves 1-13 (Data/ncp-wave13-codebook.pdf).

6 Pre-treatment, vignette, post-treatment

The statistics are displayed for the respondents of interest in this study, which is the respondents who end up with observing an unfavorable decision outcome in the experiment.

6.1 Pre-treatment measures

6.1.1 Good loser norm I

(#tab:2031_pre1)What is your opinion - how important is it to accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted?

Value	N	Percent
Not important at all	9	1
Slightly important	46	4
Somewhat important	263	25
Important	577	56
Very important	110	11
NA	30	3

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "What is your opinion – how important is it to accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted?" is 3.73, and the standard deviation is 0.75.

6.1.2 Good loser norm II

(#tab:2031_pre2)To what extent do you think people in Norway are willing to accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted by politicians and the authorities?

Value	N	Percent
Not at all	2	0
Low degree	39	4
Some degree	369	36
High degree	510	49
Very high degree	56	5
NA	59	6

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "To what extent do you think people in Norway are willing to accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted by politicians and the authorities?" is 3.59, and the standard deviation is 0.67.

6.1.3 Good loser norm III

(#tab:2031_pre3)What about you personally – do you live up to this standard (i.e., accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted by politicians and the authorities)?

Value	N	Percent
Not at all	9	1
Low degree	33	3
Some degree	291	28
High degree	582	56
Very high degree	72	7
NA	48	5

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "What about you personally – do you live up to this standard (i.e., accept the decisions about important social issues after they have been adopted by politicians and the authorities)?" is 3.68, and the standard deviation is 0.7.

6.1.4 Ban on begging - opinion

(#tab:2031_pre4)What is your opinion on a ban on begging in your municipality?

Value	N	Percent
	17	2
Anti	326	31
Pro	692	67

6.1.5 Ban on begging - importance

(#tab:2031_pre5)How important is this issue to you personally?

Value	N	Percent
Not important at all	57	6
Slightly important	350	34
Somewhat important	334	32
Important	195	19
Very important	77	7
NA	22	2

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "How important is this issue to you personally?" is 2.89, and the standard deviation is 1.03.

6.2 Experimental vignette

(#tab:2031_vignette)Video vignette treatment dimensions and values.

Preference	Treatment	Text
Pro ban on	No prime	The majority votes against a ban on begging. That means the council will not ban begging in your municipality.
begging	Lamenting politician	The majority votes against a ban on begging. That means the council will not ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong.
	Generic good loser prime	The majority votes against a ban on begging. That means the council will not ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that's how it is like living in a democracy. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose.
	Specific good loser prime	The majority votes against a ban on begging. That means the council will not ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that it was a fair fight where both sides had the chance to defend their positions.
	Winner	The majority votes for a ban on begging. That means the council will ban begging in your municipality.
Against	No prime	The majority votes for a ban on begging. That means the council will ban begging in your municipality.
ban on begging	Lamenting politician	The majority votes for a ban on begging. That means the council will ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong.
	Generic good loser prime	The majority votes for a ban on begging. That means the council will ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the parties who where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that's how it is like living in a democracy. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose.
	Specific good loser prime	The majority votes for a ban on begging. That means the council will ban begging in your municipality. After the decision, the leader of one of the partieswho where in favor of a ban states that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that it was a fair fight where both sides had the chance to defend their positions.
	Winner	The majority votes against a ban on begging. That means the council will not ban begging in your municipality.

¹ Intro to all respondents: Imagine that your municipality is about to decide whether begging on the streets should be banned or allowed within the municipal borders in the future. This is a controversial decision: Some inhabitants and politicians strongly support the ban, while other inhabitants and politicians are equally strongly against such a ban on begging. Some parties propose a ban on begging. The decision will be made in the municipal council, and follows the normal decision-making procedure. The proposal is first debated in the council, where all members are welcome to express their position and their arguments. The debate is public, and journalists are present to report on the debate. In the end, the politicians vote on the proposal.

² Video voice over text (video was subtitled).

6.3 Post-measures

6.3.1 Fairness

(#tab:2031_exp_post1)Fairness: What do you think about the way the decision was made?

Value	N	Percent
Not at all fair	17	2
Not very fair	36	3
Quite fair	136	13
Fair	576	56
Very fair	164	16
NA	106	10

The mean score for the post treatment measure "What do you think about the way the decision was made?" is 3.9, and the standard deviation is 0.8.

6.3.2 Acceptance

(#tab:2031_post2)Acceptance: When you think about the actual outcome of the decision, how willing are you to accept the decision?

Value	N	Percent
Not at all willing	25	2
Not very willing	90	9
Quite willing	141	14
Willing	465	45
Very willing	114	11
NA	200	19

The mean score for the post treatment measure "When you think about the actual outcome of the decision, how willing are you to accept the decision?" is 3.66, and the standard deviation is 0.94.

6.3.3 Trust in politicians

(#tab:2031_post3)Trust in politicians: Based on what you saw in the video, how much confidence do you have in the politicians who made the decision?

Value	N	Percent
No trust at all	18	2
Low trust	113	11
Some trust	406	39
High trust	325	31
Very high trust	35	3
NA	138	13

The mean score for the post treatment measure "Based on what you saw in the video, how much confidence do you have in the politicians who made the decision?" is 3.27, and the standard deviation is 0.81.

6.3.4 Recording check

(#tab:2031_post4)What was the recording like?

Value	N	Percent
I had both sound and images	816	79
I had images, but no sound	112	11

Value	N	Percent
I had neither sound nor images	68	7
I had sound, but no images	6	1
Something else prevented me from playing the video	22	2
NA	11	1

6.3.5 Manipulation check

(#lab:2031_post5)Proportion that correctly or incorrectly identify whether or not the decision outcome was in line with their own preferences.

Value	N	Percent
Correct	658	64
Do not know	50	5
Do not remember	31	3
Incorrect	162	16
NA	134	13

7 Effects on losers

Main effects with ITT sample of respondents who receive an unfavorable outcome.

7.1 Fairness


Figure 3 in the manuscript:

 $(\# tab: 205_post_fairness) Treatment\ effects\ among\ losers\ on\ fairness\ perceptions\ of\ decision,\ Study\ 2$

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.74	0.05	70.22	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.03	0.08	0.35	0.72
Generic good loser message	0.32	0.07	4.37	0.00
Specific good loser message	0.24	0.07	3.28	0.00

7.1.1 Fairness II


Lamenting politician as reference category




(#tab:2055_post_fairness)Treatment effects among losers on fairness perceptions of decision, Study 2

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Intercept	3.77	0.05	70.55	0.00
Generic good loser message	0.29	0.07	4.00	0.00
Not shown	-0.03	0.08	-0.35	0.72
Specific good loser message	0.21	0.07	2.92	0.00

7.1.2 Fairness moderated by issue importance






(#tab:2050_importance_treatment_fairness)Moderating effects of issue importance on experimental treatment, Study 2

Factor	Issue importance	AME	SE	z-statistic	p value	Lower	Upper
Generic good loser message	1	0.33	0.15	2.13	0.03	0.03	0.63
Generic good loser message	2	0.33	0.10	3.42	0.00	0.14	0.52
Generic good loser message	3	0.34	0.07	4.56	0.00	0.19	0.48
Generic good loser message	4	0.34	0.11	3.13	0.00	0.13	0.55
Generic good loser message	5	0.34	0.17	2.04	0.04	0.01	0.67
Lamenting politician	1	0.10	0.16	0.65	0.52	-0.21	0.41
Lamenting politician	2	0.06	0.10	0.62	0.53	-0.13	0.25
Lamenting politician	3	0.02	0.08	0.26	0.80	-0.13	0.17
Lamenting politician	4	-0.02	0.12	-0.18	0.86	-0.25	0.21
Lamenting politician	5	-0.06	0.18	-0.34	0.73	-0.42	0.30


Note:

Sample: Respondents with unfavorable outcome.

7.1.3 Fairness moderated by good loser norm



Conditional effect of good loser norm on Generic good loser message treatment.




 $(\# tab: 2050_norm_treatment_fairness) \\ Moderating \ effects \ of \ norm \ importance \ on \ experimental \ treatment, \ Study \ 2$

Factor	Norm importance	AME	SE	z-statistic	p value	Lower	Upper
Generic good loser message	1	0.43	0.29	1.50	0.13	-0.13	1.00
Generic good loser message	2	0.39	0.19	2.03	0.04	0.01	0.76
Generic good loser message	3	0.35	0.11	3.29	0.00	0.14	0.55
Generic good loser message	4	0.30	0.08	3.91	0.00	0.15	0.46
Generic good loser message	5	0.26	0.15	1.79	0.07	-0.03	0.55
Lamenting politician	1	-0.28	0.29	-0.98	0.33	-0.84	0.28
Lamenting politician	2	-0.16	0.19	-0.85	0.39	-0.54	0.21
Lamenting politician	3	-0.05	0.11	-0.43	0.66	-0.26	0.16
Lamenting politician	4	0.07	0.08	0.87	0.39	-0.09	0.23
Lamenting politician	5	0.19	0.15	1.26	0.21	-0.10	0.48

Note:

Sample: Respondents with unfavorable outcome.

7.2 Willingnes to accept




(#tab:205_post_accept)Treatment effects among losers on willingness to accept decision, Study 2

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.53	0.07	51.98	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.06	0.10	0.60	0.55
Generic good loser message	0.25	0.09	2.74	0.01

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Specific good loser message	0.18	0.09	1.96	0.05

7.3 Trust in politician

Treatment effects on trust in politicians, Study 2. Sample: Respondents who receive an unfavorable outcome



(#tab:205_post_trust)Treatment effects among losers on trust in politician, Study 2


Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.22	0.06	57.66	0.00
Lamenting politician	-0.01	0.08	-0.07	0.94
Generic good loser message	0.08	0.08	1.00	0.32
Specific good loser message	0.13	0.08	1.68	0.09

7.4 Main effects with reduced sample

Main effects with sample that excludes respondents who fail manipulation check

7.4.1 Fairness

Treatment effects on fairness perceptions of decision, Study 2




(#tab:2045_post_fairness)Treatment effects on fairness perceptions of decision, Study 2. Sample: Respondents who pass manipulation check

Treatment value	EstimateStd	Errort-	statisticp	value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.76	0.07	53.77	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.04	0.10	0.41	0.68
NA	0.36	0.09	3.89	0.00
Specific good loser message	e 0.25	0.09	2.64	0.01

7.4.2 Willingnes to accept

Treatment effects on willingness to accept outcome, Study 2.




(#tab:2045_post_accept)Treatment effects on willingness to accept decision, Study 2. Sample: Respondents who pass manipulation check.

Treatment value	EstimateStd.	Errort	-statisticp	value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.45	0.09	37.95	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.06	0.13	0.47	0.64
Generic good loser message	0.34	0.12	2.80	0.01

7.4.3 Trust in politician

Treatment effects on trust in politicians, Study 2.



(#tab:2045_post_trust)Treatment effects on trust in politician,

Study 2. Sample: Respondents who pass manipulation check.

Treatment value	EstimateStd.	Errort	-statisticp	value
Not shown (Intercept)	3.17	0.07	42.71	0.00
Lamenting politician	0.02	0.11	0.21	0.83
Generic good loser message	0.16	0.10	1.65	0.10
Specific good loser message	0.25	0.10	2.49	0.01

8 (PART) STUDY III

The third study was also run online on a representative sample of adult Norwegians. We conducted a conjoint experiment with a rating assignment embedded in the 2018 fall wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel.

The conjoint design allows us to explore scope conditions of findings. The advantage of conjoint designs, a method increasingly used in experimental political science research (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020), is the possibility to include a large number of experimental treatments and estimate their effects simultaneously (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The stimulus material for each respondent consists of randomly combined levels of the given features, resulting in sufficient observations for each feature while only a small share of the possible combinations is actually shown to participants. This enables us to include context variables into our design and to test our relationships of interest across a range of other factors that could potentially interfere with the treatment. As a result we gain insights into generalizability and robustness of our findings. Our conjoint design is presented as a text vignette with rating outcome measures like in studies 1 and 2. For similar applications in conjoint designs, see for example Huff and Kertzer (2018).

9 Pre-treatment, vignette, post-treatment

The statistics are displayed for the respondents of interest in this study, which is the respondents who end up with observing an unfavorable decision outcome in the experiment.

9.1 Pre-treatment measures

9.1.1 Ban on begging - opinion

(#tab:3031_pre1)What is your opinion on a ban on begging in your municipality?

Value	N	Percent
In favor	836	60
Oppose	553	40
NA	5	0

9.1.2 Ban on begging - importance

(#tab:3031_pre2)How important is the issue of begging ban to you?

Value	N	Percent
Not important at all	79	6
Slightly important	251	18
Somewhat important	447	32
Important	517	37
Very important	100	7

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "How important is the issue of begging ban to you?" is 3.55, and the standard deviation is 5.94.

9.1.3 Toll on diesel cars - opinion

(#tab:3031_pre3)What is your opinion on an increase in the tolls for diesel cars in your municipality?

Value	N	Percent
In favor	359	26
Oppose	1026	74
NA	9	1

9.1.4 Toll on diesel cars - importance

(#tab:3031_pre4)How important is the issue of increased tolls for diesel cars to you?

Value	N	Percent
Not important at all	230	16
Slightly important	377	27
Somewhat important	382	27
Important	302	22
Very important	99	7
NA	4	0

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "How important is the issue of increased tolls for diesel cars to you?" is 3.24, and the standard deviation is 6.96.

9.2 Experimental vignette

Table 9.1: Vignette treatment dimensions and values

Preference	Treatment	Text
Issue	Ban on begging	in the future, begging on the streets will be banned or permitted in the municipality. This is a controversial decision. Some residents are strong in favour of a ban (the "Yes" side), while other residents are strongly against a ban (the "No" side). Some
	Diesel car road toll	in the future, diesel cars will pay increased tolls. This is a controversial decision. Some residents are strongly in favour of such an increase (the side), while others are strongly against an increase (the "No" side). Some parties propose such an
Outcome	Yes	The Yes side won the vote
	No	The No side won the vote
Winning	Not shown	
margin	Small margin	with a slight majority.
	Large margin	with a large majority.
Winner's	Not shown	
gloating	Yes	Following the decision, a politician on the winning side says that it was a good decision and that common sense prevailed.
Messenger	Not shown	
and prime	Politician, no prime	The leader of one of the parties that was against the decision says that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong.
	Politician, specific good loser prime	The leader of one of the parties that was against the decision says that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that it was a fair fight where both sides had the opportunity to argue in favour of their views.

Note

Experimental vignette (treatments in {curly brackets}): Below, we have described a hypothetical situation. Please read through the situation carefully and then answer the three questions that follow. Imagine that your municipality must decide on {Issue} The decision will be taken by the municipal council and follow the usual procedures. The proposal will initially be debated by the municipal council where all the members will have the opportunity to express their opinions and arguments regarding the issue. The debate will be public, and journalists will be in attendance to report on the debate. In the end, the politicians will vote on the issue. {Outcome} {[Winning margin} {Winner gloating} {Messenger and prime}

Preference	Treatment	Text
	Politician, generic good loser prime	The leader of one of the parties that was against the decision says that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that is what living in a democracy is all about. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose.
	Newspaper, no prime	The local newspaper – which was against the decision – writes in an editorial that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong.
	Newspaper, specific good loser prime	The local newspaper – which was against the decision – writes in an editorial that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that it was a fair fight where both sides had the opportunity to argue in favour of their views.
	Newspaper, generic good loser prime	The local newspaper – which was against the decision – writes in an editorial that they are disappointed and that the decision was wrong, but that is what living in a democracy is all about. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose.

Note:

Experimental vignette (treatments in {curly brackets}): Below, we have described a hypothetical situation. Please read through the situation carefully and then answer the three questions that follow. Imagine that your municipality must decide on {Issue} The decision will be taken by the municipal council and follow the usual procedures. The proposal will initially be debated by the municipal council where all the members will have the opportunity to express their opinions and arguments regarding the issue. The debate will be public, and journalists will be in attendance to report on the debate. In the end, the politicians will vote on the issue. {Outcome} {[Winning margin} {Wenner gloating} {Messenger and prime}

9.3 Post treatment measures

Please note that the the respondents were randomly assigned to either a worded answer scale, or a numbered answer scale. This accounts for the high share of NA's in the post treatment distribution tables.

9.3.1 Evaluation

(#tab:3031_post1)What do you think about the way the decision was made?

Value	N	Percent
Not fair at all	104	7
Slightly fair	417	30
Somewhat fair	110	8
Fair	61	4
Very fair	33	2
NA	669	48

(#tab:3031_post1)What do you think about the way the decision was made?

Value	N	Percent
1 Not fair	252	18
2	190	14
3	135	10
4	42	3
5 Most fair	36	3
NA	739	53

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "What do you think about the way the decision was made?" is 48.71, and the standard deviation is 47.9 for the worded answer scale. For the numbered answer scale, the mean score is 52.44, and the standard deviation is 47.97

9.3.2 Acceptance

(#tab:3031_post3)When you think about the actual outcome of the decision, how willing are you to accept the decision?

Value	N	Percent
Not willing at all	81	6
Slightly willing	345	25

Value	N	Percent
Somewhat willing	159	11
Willing	106	8
Very willing	36	3
NA	667	48

(#tab:3031_post3)When you think about the actual outcome of the decision, how willing are you to accept the decision?


Value	N	Percent
1 Not willing	185	13
2	204	15
3	150	11
4	59	4
5 Most willing	54	4
NA	742	53

The mean score for the pre treatment measure "When you think about the actual outcome of the decision, how willing are you to accept the decision?" is 48.71, and the standard deviation is 47.86 for the worded answer scale. For the numbered answer scale, the mean score is 52.61, and the standard deviation is 47.93

10 Effects on losers

Treatment effects on experimental subjects who find the decision outcome to align unfavorably with their own preferences (N = 1394)

10.1 Fairness perceptions




(#tab:305_post_fair_loser)Average Marginal Component Effect – Study 3

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Winning margin				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Slight majority	-0.03	0.07	-0.37	0.71

0.00	0.07	-0.04	0.97
0.00			
0.00			
0.00	0.00	NA	NA
-0.02	0.06	-0.29	0.77
0.00	0.00	NA	NA
0.22	0.10	2.28	0.02
0.27	0.10	2.79	0.01
0.30	0.10	3.04	0.00
0.00	0.00	NA	NA
-0.03	0.07	-0.46	0.64
0.00	0.00	NA	NA
-0.44	0.06	-7.88	0.00
0.00	0.00	NA	NA
-0.20	0.06	-3.47	0.00
	0.00 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.00 -0.03	-0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.10 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.44 0.06	-0.02 0.06 -0.29 0.00 0.00 NA 0.22 0.10 2.28 0.27 0.10 2.79 0.30 0.10 3.04 0.00 0.00 NA -0.03 0.07 -0.46 0.00 0.00 NA -0.44 0.06 -7.88


10.1.1 Conditional AMCEs



(#tab:306_post_fair_losers_intimportance)Average Marginal Component Effect – Study 3

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value	Issue importance	
Winning margin						
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important	

reatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value	Issue importance
Slight majority	-0.10	0.13	-0.73	0.46	Important
Large majority	-0.10	0.13	-0.73	0.47	Important
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Slight majority	0.01	0.08	0.11	0.91	Not important
Large majority	0.06	0.08	0.75	0.45	Not important
Vinner gloating					
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important
Winning politician gloats	0.07	0.11	0.62	0.53	Important
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Winning politician gloats	-0.06	0.06	-0.98	0.33	Not important
Good loser message					
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important
Lamenting politician	0.04	0.19	0.23	0.82	Important
Specific good loser message	0.14	0.19	0.72	0.47	Important
Generic good loser message	0.26	0.19	1.35	0.18	Important
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Lamenting politician	0.33	0.11	3.09	0.00	Not important
Specific good loser message	0.35	0.11	3.30	0.00	Not important
Generic good loser message	0.32	0.11	3.04	0.00	Not important
Messenger					
Local newspaper	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important
Political leader	-0.09	0.14	-0.65	0.51	Important
Local newspaper	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Political leader	-0.02	0.08	-0.22	0.83	Not important
ssue					
Ban on begging	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important
Road toll increase of diesel cars	-0.53	0.11	-4.73	0.00	Important
Ban on begging	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Road toll increase of diesel cars	-0.29	0.06	-4.61	0.00	Not important
Vording of answer scale					
Numbered	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Important
Worded	-0.14	0.11	-1.28	0.20	Important
Numbered	0.00	0.00	NA	NA	Not important
Worded	-0.22	0.06	-3.53	0.00	Not important




(#tab:305_post_fair_loser_issue) Average Marginal Component Effect – Study 3

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Winning margin				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Slight majority	-0.07	0.08	-0.83	0.40
Large majority	0.07	0.09	0.86	0.39
Winner gloating				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Slight majority	0.03	0.11	0.30	0.76
Good loser message				
Large majority	-0.07	0.11	-0.63	0.53
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	N/
Winning politician gloats	0.01	0.07	0.21	0.83
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Messenger				
Winning politician gloats	0.00	0.09	-0.03	0.98
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Issue				
Lamenting politician	0.18	0.12	1.50	0.14
Specific good loser message	0.08	0.12	0.65	0.51
Wording of answer scale				
Generic good loser message	0.18	0.12	1.53	0.13
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Lamenting politician	0.29	0.15	2.01	0.05
Specific good loser message	0.42	0.15	2.78	0.01

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Generic good loser message	0.40	0.15	2.72	0.01
Local newspaper	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Political leader	0.02	0.09	0.21	0.84
Local newspaper	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Political leader	-0.13	0.11	-1.10	0.27
Numbered	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Worded	-0.16	0.07	-2.24	0.03
Numbered	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Worded	-0.25	0.09	-2.86	0.00

10.2 Willingnes to accept



8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0
Marginal effect, willingnes to accept decision

(#tab:305_post_accept_loser)Average Marginal Component Effects – Study 3

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Winning margin				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Slight majority	-0.05	0.07	-0.68	0.50
Large majority	-0.06	0.07	-0.80	0.42
Winner gloating				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Winning politician gloats	0.03	0.06	0.57	0.57
Good loser message				
Not shown	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Lamenting politician	0.08	0.10	0.80	0.43
Specific good loser message	0.18	0.10	1.78	0.08


Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Generic good loser message	0.16	0.10	1.60	0.11
Messenger				
Local newspaper	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Political leader	0.02	0.08	0.28	0.78
Issue				
Ban on begging	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Road toll increase of diesel cars	-0.36	0.06	-6.08	0.00
Wording of answer scale				
Numbered	0.00	0.00	NA	NA
Worded	-0.17	0.06	-2.84	0.00

11 Outcome favorability effect across the three experiments

Figure 1 in the manuscript:

(#tab:402_outfav_fair)The outcome favorability effect in three experiments

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value
Study 1	-0.66	0.08	-8.28	0.00
Study 2	-0.12	0.06	-1.97	0.05
Study 3	-0.30	0.04	-8.15	0.00



(#tab:4044_outfav_issue)The outcome favorability effect in three experiments

Treatment value	Estimate	Std. Error	t-statistic	p value	Issue
Unfavorable outcome	-0.15	0.05	-3.18	0	Ban on begging
Unfavorable outcome	-0.45	0.06	-7.97	0	Road toll increase of diesel cars

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Huff, Connor, and Joshua D Kertzer. 2018. "How the Public Defines Terrorism." American Journal of Political Science 62 (1): 55–71.

Leeper, Thomas J, Sara B Hobolt, and James Tilley. 2020. "Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments." *Political Analysis* 28 (2): 207–21.