



Software security, secure programming (and computer forensics)

Lecture 5: Static Analysis (in a nutshell)

Master M2 on Cybersecurity

Academic Year 2016 - 2017

Static Analysis

Main objective:

statically compute some information about (an approximation of) the program behavior

Examples: given (the source-code of) a program *P*

- ▶ does all executions of P satisfy a property φ?
- does φ satisfied at a given (source) program location ?
- ⇒ Of course, such questions are undecidable ... (why ?)

Possible work-arounds:

- over-approximate the pgm behaviour
 - \rightarrow result is sound (no false negatives), but incomplete (\exists false positives)
- under-approximate the pgm behaviour
 - \rightarrow result is complete (no false negatives), but unsound (\exists false negative)
- non-terminating analysis
 - \rightarrow if the analysis terminates, then the result is sound and complete

What static analysis can be used for ?

General applications

- compiler optimization
 e.g., active variables, available expressions, constant propagations, etc.
- program verification e.g., invariant, post-conditions, etc.
- worst-case execution time computation
- parallelization
- etc.

In the "software security" context

- disassembling
 e.g., what are the targets of a dynamic jump
 (be eax, content of eax?)
- error and vulnerability detection memory error (Null-pointer dereference, out-of-bound array access), use-after-free, arithmetic overflow, etc.

How to proceed?

Typical problems

need to reason on a set of executions (not on a single one)

ex:
$$x = y * z$$

- \rightarrow compute values of x for all possible values of y and z ?
- need to cope with loops

 \rightarrow infer the loop behavior for all possible values of x and y ?

A solution: over-approximate the program behavior

- 1. propagate an abstract state (over approximating the memory content) e.g., x > 0, $p \ne NULL$, $x \le y + z$, p and q are aliases, etc.
 - \rightarrow depends on the properties you want to check !
- **2. safely** merge memory abstract states produced from \neq paths
- 3. make loop iterations always finite

Pb: How to find a suitable abstract domains ? $\to \text{accuracy vs scalability trade-offs} \dots$

A general framework : abstract interpretation

Although this theory has been invented here in Grenoble ...

...let's jump to Dillig's slides (from UT Austin, Texas)!

Analysis example: Value-Set Analysis

Objective:

compute a (super)-set of possible values of each variable at each program location . . .

Env(x, I) = value set of variable x at program location 1

Several possible abstract domains to express these sets:

- bounded value sets (k-sets) ex: Env(x, l) = {0, 4, 9, 10}, Env(y, l) = {1}, Env(z, l) = ⊤
- intervals ex: $Env(x, l) = [2, 8], Env(y, l) = [-\infty, 7], Env(z, l) = [-\infty, +\infty]$
- ▶ differential bounded matrix (DBM) ex : $Env(I) = x y < 10 \land z < 0$
- ▶ polyhedra (conjonction of linear equations) ex: $Env(I) = x + y \ge 10 \land z < 0$
- etc.

VSA with intervals (example 1)

```
1. x := x+y;
if x>0 then
    2. y:= x + 2
else
    3. y:= -x
4. fi
5. return x+y
```

Asumming (pre-condition) that:

$$x \in [-3, 3], y \in [-1, 5]$$

compute Env(x, I) and Env(y, I) for each program location I what is the set of return values ?

Computing intervals on expressions

Syntax of expressions

$$e \rightarrow n \mid x \mid e + e \mid e \times e \mid \dots$$

Computation rules

Val(e, Env) is the interval associated to e within Env

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \mathit{Val}(n, \mathit{Env}) &=& [n, n] \\ \mathit{Val}(x, \mathit{Env}) &=& \mathit{Env}(x) \\ \mathit{Val}(e1 + e2, \mathit{Env}) &=& [a + c, b + d] \text{ where} \\ && \mathit{Val}(e1, \mathit{Env}) = [a, b] \land \mathit{Val}(e2, \mathit{Env}) = [c, d] \\ \mathit{Val}(e1 \times e2, \mathit{Env}) &=& [x, y] \text{ where} \\ && \mathit{Val}(e1, \mathit{Env}) = [a, b] \land \mathit{Val}(e2, \mathit{Env}) = [c, d] \\ && x = \mathit{min}(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d) \\ && y = \mathit{max}(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d) \\ \end{array}$$

Intervals propagation

Propagation rules along the statement syntax:

assignment

$$\{Env1\} \times := e \{Env2\}e$$

where

$$Env2(x) = Val(x, Env1) \land Env2(y) = Env1(x)$$
 for $y \neq x$

sequence

where

$$\{Env1\} \ s1 \ \{Env3\} \land \{Env3\} \ s2 \ \{Env2\}$$

conditionnal

$$\{Env\}$$
 if (b) then s1 else s2 $\{Env'\}$

where

- ► {Env ∩ Val(cond, Env)} s1 {Env1}
- ► {Env ∩ Val(¬ cond, Env)} s2 {Env2}
- ► Env' = Env1 \sqcup Env2 (Env'(x) is the smallest interval containing Env1(x) and Env2(x), \forall x)

Iteration ? (example 1)

```
1. x := 0 ;
while (x < 2) do
  2. x := x+1
3. end
4. return x</pre>
```

compute Env(x, I) for each program location I ...

Iteration ? (example 2)

```
1. x := 0;
while (x < 1000) do
   2. x := x+1
3. end
4. return x</pre>
```

Compute Env(x, I) for each program location I ...

What happen if x is initialized to 2000 instead of 1000 ?

Widening

For a lattice (E, \leq) , we define $\nabla : E \times E \rightarrow E$

 ∇ is a (pair-)widening operator if and only if

1. Extrapolation:

$$\forall x, y \in E. \ x \le x \nabla y \land y \le x \nabla y$$

2. Enforce the convergence of $(X_n)_{n\geq 0}$:

$$y_0 = x_0$$

$$y_{n+1} = y_n \nabla x_{n+1}$$

 $(Y_n)_{n\geq 0}$ is ultimately stationnary . . .

ightarrow open "unstable" bounds (jumping over the fix-point) !

Widening on intervals

Definition

$$[a,b] \nabla [c,d] = [e,f]$$
 where,

- e = if c < a then $-\infty$ else a
- ▶ $f = if b < d then +\infty else b$

Examples

- **▶** [2,3] ∇ [1,4] ?
- **▶** [1,4] ∇ [2,3] ?
- **▶** [1,3] ∇ [2,4] ?

Back to the previous example

```
1. x := 0;
while (x < 1000) do
  2. x := x+1
3. end
4. return x
      Env(x,2)_{n+1} = Env(x,2)_n \nabla (Env(x,1)_n \sqcup Env(x,3)_n)
                    Env(x,2)_1 = [0,0]
                    Env(x,2)_2 = [0,1]
                    Env(x,2)_3 = [0,+\infty]
```

 \rightarrow stable solution ... but not precise enough ?

$$Env(x,3)_3 = [1000, +\infty]$$

Narrowing

lattice
$$(E, \leq)$$
, $\triangle : E \times E \rightarrow E$

 \triangle is a (pair-)narrowing operator if and only if

1. (abstract) intersection

$$\forall x, y \in E. \ x \cap y \leq x \triangle y$$

2. Enforce the convergence of $(X_n)_{n\geq 0}$:

$$y_0 = x_0$$

$$y_{n+1} = y_n \triangle x_{n+1}$$

 $(Y_n)_{n\geq 0}$ is ultimately stationnary . . .

ightarrow refines open bounds !

Narrowing on intervals

$$[a,b] \triangle [c,d] = [e,f]$$
 where,

- e = if $a = -\infty$ then c else a
- ▶ $f = if b = +\infty$ then d else b

Examples

- ▶ $[2,3] \triangle [1,+\infty]$?
- ▶ $[1,4] \triangle [-\infty,3]$?
- ▶ [1,3] \triangle $[+\infty, -\infty]$?

Back (again !) to the previous example

```
1. x := 0 ;
while (x < 1000) do
   2. x := x+1
3. end
4. return x</pre>
```

$$\textit{Env}(x,2)_{n+1} = \textit{Env}(x,2)_n \bigtriangleup (\textit{Env}(x,1)_n \cup \textit{Env}(x,3)_n)$$

$$Env(x,2)_1 = [0,+\infty]$$

 $Env(x,2)_2 = [0,1000]$

 \rightarrow stable solution . . .

$$Env(x,3)_2 = [1000, 1000]$$

Challenges for static analysis

Accuracy vs scalability trade-off ...

- ▶ inter-procedural analysis (+ recursivity . . .)
- multi-threading
- dynamic memory allocation
- modular reasonning
- ► libraries (+ legacy code)
- etc.

Application to vulnerability detection?

Clearly may provide some useful features:

- out-of-bounds array access
- arithmetic overflows
- incorrect memory access (null pointer, mis-aligned address)
- use-after-free
- etc.

But still some limitations:

- exploitability analysis (beyond standard program semantics) ?
- relevant and accurate memory model (for heap and stack)
- self-modifying code (e.g., malwares)
- binary code analysis (see next slide!)

Rk: some useful information on the CERT webpages . . .

Static analysis on binary code

Static analysis relies on a (clear) program semantics

- can be done at the assembly-level (or IR)
- but disassembling is undecidable . . .
- ... and disassemblers may rely on static analysis! (to retrieve the program CFG)

Static analysis on low-level code is difficult

- ▶ no types (a single type for value, addresses, data, code, ...)
- address computation is pervasive . . .

```
ex: mov eax, [ecx + 42]
```

- ▶ function bounds cannot always be retrieved → many un-initialized memory locations
- sacalability issues
- etc.

Tool examples

Disclaimer: non limitative nor objective list! (see wikipedia for more info)

Source-level tools

- Astrèe
- Coverity, Polyspace, CodeSonar, HP Fortify, VeraCode
- ► Frama-C, Fluctuat
- ▶ etc, etc, ...

Some binary-level tools

- x86-CodeSurfer
- VeraCode
- ► Angr
- BinSec plateform
- ► etc?