
SimPPL

Network Science Reimagined.



Trigger Warning: Discussion of Online Abuse

You can skip 1 slide.


Online Platforms have

governance problems.

01

Disinformation

Spread of misleading and malicious content by networks of coordinated actors who [game algorithms and policies](#) to manipulate the public.



02

Online Abuse

Racist, identity, and sexual attacks targeting minorities are at historic highs. Child sexual abuse material is rising astronomically [despite safeguards](#).



01 Disinformation is undermining democracy.

72%

Americans report
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misleading info. online

60%

US adults report
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18%

Reduction in knowledge
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Black And Latino Voters Flooded With Disinformation In Election's Final Days

October 30, 2020 · 7:49 AM ET

Fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media, higher trust in government when your side is in power

Misinformation on Facebook got six times more clicks than factual news during the 2020 election, study says

Fake news spreads faster than true news on Twitter—thanks to people, not bots

Tweets containing falsehoods were 70% more likely to be retweeted than truthful tweets

Dealing with Misleading Content and Activities



Identification

What information is being shared online?

Dealing with Misleading Content and Activities



Identification

What information is being shared online?



Assessment

Is this misleading?
Is this coordinated?

Dealing with Misleading Content and Activities



Identification

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Actioning

What can we do to limit its harms?

We make Identification and Verification Easier



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Operationalize Metrics to Augment
Disinformation Identification and
Verification by Anyone

Case Study: Russian state-backed media is a major part of its "pillars of disinformation"

01 Official Govt. Communications

U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE

02 State-funded Global Messaging

03 Proxy Sources

GEC Special Report:

04 Social Media

Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem

05 Cyber-enabled Disinformation

RT.com and Sputnik News

Known sources of disinformation and influence operations.

We track 8000 articles posted since 2021.



Some believed to be manipulated.

GEC Special Report
KREMLIN-FUNDED MEDIA:
RT AND SPUTNIK'S
ROLE IN RUSSIA's DISINFORMATION
AND PROPAGANDA ECOSYSTEM

Weaponising news: RT, Sputnik and targeted disinformation


By Foo Yun Chee

EU bans RT, Sputnik over Ukraine disinformation



How to help Identify Manipulative Narratives?

headline	publication_date	article_content	article_url	source
Great Britain Imposes Sanctions Against Sputnik's Head Anton Anisimov	2022-03-31	London has expanded its sanctions list by making 14 additions, the web site of the British government says. ... (text truncated)	https://sputniknews.com/20220331/great-britain-imposes-sanctions-against-sputniks-head-anton-anisimov-1094354237.html	sputnik
Hindu Group Marches to Support Russian Military Op, Slams Zelensky as Ukraine's No1 Enemy - Video	2022-03-31	Although the US and its allies imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the military operation in Ukraine, India's government has refused to give in to pressure...	https://sputniknews.com/20220331/hindu-group-marches-to-support-russian-military-op-slams-zelensky-as-ukraines-no1-enemy-video-1094367263.html	sputnik
US tells citizens in Russia and Ukraine to leave immediately	2022-03-31	State Department says Russia is targeting Americans after basketball star is jailed on drug charges...	https://www.rt.com/russia/553074-state-department-americans-leave-immediately/	rt



RT and Sputnik News Articles

Understand the spread of the post


Collect Real-time Data

Tweets about the Article


**Accounts Posting the Tweets,
Account Tweet History, Metrics**

**Account Followers,
Account Followers Tweet History**

**Favoriting, Retweeting,
and Quote Tweeting Accounts**



Influential Accounts Created Years Ago are still Active!



Content-level analysis isn't enough to tell apart potentially coordinating accounts




Find Interesting Groups: Signal from Noise

Accounts that share potentially manipulated narratives (RT, Sputnik)

Accounts that follow 1 – 3 blue accounts

Accounts that follow 4+ blue accounts



Identify Narratives Among these Groups




Find Connections between Narratives

List of Topics


topic_nr	top_10_words	topic_size
0	impeachment, democrats, impeached, impeach, republicans, bidens, inquiry, obstruction, quid, impeaching	662
1	normandy, agreements, minsk, format, contact, lugansk, ceasefire, donbass, agreed, subgroups	520
2	imposed, sanctions, embargo, agricultural, imports, products, introduced, restrictions, goods, exports	499
3	think, really, do, don, sort, necessarily, certainly, perhaps, kind, going	485
4	civilians, militants, shelling, joins, jihadists, hama, injured, killing, residential, killed	480
5	it, but, is, understand, this, rather, that, serious, confrontation, not	462
6	nazi, nazis, wwii, collaborators, nationalists, upa, galicia, heroes, bandera, nazism	444
7	nord, stream, pipeline, uniper, project, engie, wintershall, allseas, omv, liquefied	425
8	proposals, guarantees, eastward, eastwards, expansion, written, nato, ryabkov, expand, alliance	419
9	exercises, drills, troops, military, presence, exercise, rotational, zapad, deployment, deployed	415
10	votes, timoshenko, poroshenko, elections, vote, election, rada, petro, party, parliament	401
11	prepayment, cubic_x, naftogaz, cubic, gazprom, gas, gas_x, oettinger, prodan, transit	398
12	jit, mh, buk, crash, downed, malaysian, dutch, dubinsky, dsb, malaysia	383
13	issg, sar, syrian, jabhat, nusra, settlement, damascus, syria, al, astana	355
14	invasion, imminent, invade, hysteria, amassing, reports, incursion, kremlin, massing, troops	338
15	lethal, assistance, stinger, equipment, javelin, provide, aid, providing, portable, systems	329
16	precision, konashenkov, artillery, destroyed, civilian, residential, donetsk, dpr, forces, civilians	285
17	match, midfielder, finals, tournament, football, lewandowski, game, fans, league, cristiano	272
18	membership, alliance, nato, joining, bloc, join, hoop, jaap, accession, scheffer	269
19	crosstalking, soundcloud, rttv, crosstalk, clear, sleboda, talk, political, babich, podcast	269

Hierarchical Clustering



Identify the most "Impactful" Accounts


	username	follower_count
44	RT_com	3087851
49	SputnikInt	356111
47	ZANewsFlash	29907
23	AdsumP	21122
80	MendesOnca	14952



Impact = Mean Toxicity x log(follower count)



Some User Groups Share a LOT of Articles

How often do users share an article




Heatmap showing user groups (x-axis) and chronologically ordered articles (y-axis) indicating a marked uptick in sharing of news around the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (late 2021–2022)

Analysis Reveals Coordination Patterns



Identify Candidate Narratives with Unusual Trends


toxicity/tweet trend with time (size represents no. of tweets)



Ukraine Aid Bill is a License to Kill

**Russian Officials Speculating
on FIFA Decision**

Detecting Propaganda in the Content



Russian pranksters trick UK Home Secretary (VIDEO)

rt - 2022-03-24 00:00:00

Priti Patel told the NAME_CALLING,LABELING pranksters that Britons " clearly " are n't afraid of taking in Ukrainian NAME_CALLING,LABELING neo - Nazis A pair of Russian pranksters posted a video on Thursday in which one of the duo , impersonating Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmygal , told British Home Secretary Priti Patel that he hoped Britons were fine with Ukrainian NAME_CALLING,LABELING " nationalists " settling in their country . Patel said the British public was n't worried about it . In a video call the duo – known as Vovan and Lexus – say took place on March 15 , the caller impersonating Shmygal tells Patel , " I hope that the families will not be afraid from FLAG-WAVING our nationalists , as Putin tried to make them fear . " Patel at first replied that " we launched the sponsorship scheme yesterday , just for people to express their interest in housing Ukrainian nationals . " " No , I mean people who are nationalists , as

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Making Identification and Verification Easier

Governance

How to go about all 3 steps
in a principled manner?



Identification

What information is
being shared online?



Verification

Is this misleading?
Is this coordinated?



Actioning

What can we do to
limit its harms?

Discover Optimal Policies with Simulations

Problem

It's an Adversarial Space

Platforms slowly make policies that bad actors quickly adapt to bypass, undermining public trust and safety.

Solution

Adaptive Governance

Anticipate adversarial behavior from coordinated networks.
Use simulation intelligence to test policy effectiveness and plug loopholes.



Better Governance against Online Harms

01 Track Superspreaders

Identify inorganic content-sharing behavior to track superspreaders of misinformation.

02 Model Information Flows

Probabilistic AI recreates algorithm-driven information propagation across online communities.

03 Predict Future Risks

Detect emergent narratives in fringe and alt communities going beyond mainstream media.

04 Deploy Interventions

Determine when and where to intervene in order to optimally counter influence operations.

Help Newsrooms and Policymakers Understand Audiences

r/politics	10	8.1m
r/blm	8	4.8k
r/AskReddit	4	35.9m
r/ragecomics	3	48.1k



Community Membership

Estimate what communities are at risk for polarized debate and disinformation.


Demographic Variance

Model trends, preferences, and topics of conversation for each demographic via cohort analysis.

Social Media Analysis


Track what other content audiences like to engage with to personalize content.

Help Defend the Public against Information Operations



Track Misleading Cliques

Identify actors that frequently participate in the promotion of policy-violating content.



Analyse Bad Actor Behavior

Find patterns within strategic behavior exhibited by coordinated networks of actors.




Deploy Countermeasures

Provide safeguards and improve defense against information operations.

Market Opportunity



Next Steps



Newsrooms

1

Working with journalists to make it easy to track the impact of digital publications.

Disinformation Tracker

2

Help organizations like the Wikimedia Foundation track coordinated behavior propagating misleading information online.

Cyberdefense Operations

3

Calibrate and deploy simulation models to track influence ops in the wild, online abuse working with defense agencies.

Team



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Shwetanshu Singh
DS @ Leaf Logistics



Harshit Agarwal
Health ML @ Twitter



Founding Team

Early Team / Tech. Advisors

What's Next

IPPEN.MEDIA 

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THE SUNDAY TIMES

Journalism 

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POLIS
Journalism at LSE

Google
News Initiative

Team Parrot

Release public tool to
track and analyse
online propaganda.



Govt. Funding

Non-dilutive funding
for cutting-edge
technology ventures.



CENTER FOR SOCIAL
MEDIA AND POLITICS



Research

Deploy and publish our
simulator to study
online disinformation.



Cyber Defense

Scale our product to
automate detection of
information operations.