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CIRCOM: A Robust and Scalable Language for Building Complex Zero-Knowledge Circuits

Marta Bellés-Muñoz, Miguel Isabel, Jose Luis Muñoz-Tapia, Albert Rubio, and Jordi Baylina

Abstract—A zero-knowledge (ZK) proof guarantees that the result of a computation is correct while keeping part of the computation details private. Some ZK proofs are tiny and can be verified in short time, which makes them one of the most promising technologies for solving two key aspects: the challenge of enabling privacy to public and transparent distributed ledgers and, enhancing the scalability limitations of distributed ledgers. Most practical ZK systems require the computation to be expressed as an arithmetic circuit that is encoded as a set of equations called rank-1 constraint system (R1CS). In this paper, we present CIRCOM, a programming language and a compiler for designing arithmetic circuits that are compiled to R1CS. More precisely, with CIRCOM, programmers can design arithmetic circuits, and the compiler outputs (i) a file with the R1CS description, (ii) WebAssembly and C++ programs to efficiently compute all values of the circuit. We also provide an open-source library called CIRCOMLIB, with multiple circuit templates. Moreover, CIRCOM can be complemented with SNARKJS, a tool for generating and validating ZK proofs from R1CS. Altogether, our software tools abstract the complexity of the proving mechanisms and provide a friendly interface to model low-level descriptions of arithmetic circuits.

Index Terms—zero-knowledge proof, circuit, programming language, compiler, blockchain.



1 INTRODUCTION

A *zero-knowledge* (ZK) protocol allows a *prover* to prove a statement to a *verifier* without revealing any knowledge beyond the fact that the statement is true [1]–[3]. For example, with a ZK proof one can prove the knowledge of a private key associated to a certain public key or the knowledge of the preimage of a particular hash value. The important fact about these proofs is that they do not leak any information about the statements being proved. In the previous examples, that would be information about the private key or the preimage of the hash. ZK proofs were introduced 30 years ago as theoretical objects, but since then, there has been a lot of research into developing secure and efficient protocols that could be used in practice. In general, efficiency is measured considering three parameters: the computational cost of generating a proof, the size of the proof, and the time required to verify it. In the context of distributed ledgers, it is specially important to have small proof sizes and short verification times.

The most popular, efficient and general purpose ZK protocols are *ZK succinct arguments of knowledge* (ZK-SNARKs) [4]–[6]. A prominent application of ZK-SNARKs is Zcash [7], a public blockchain based on bitcoin that uses these proofs in its core protocol for verifying that private transactions (named *shielded* transactions) have been computed correctly while providing complete anonymity to the participants of the network. In particular, a shielded transaction can be verified without revealing the payment source, destination, or amount, but still ensuring that there are enough funds to do it, and that the transfer is sent by the owner of the funds.

Efficient ZK protocols are also very convenient for distributed ledgers with the capability of executing *smart contracts*. Smart contracts are programs that allow developers to define a logic for processing transactions. Adding the capability of processing transactions that include the verification of a ZK proof opens up a wide range of possibilities for smart contracts. For example, with ZK proofs, smart contracts can check logic statements while keeping certain

details private, which is crucial for the adoption of public distributed ledger technology by enterprises. An example of such privacy-preserving scheme can be found in [8]. Recently, ZK protocols are also used in conjunction with smart contracts for enhancing the scalability of distributed ledgers, giving rise to what is known as *layer-2 solutions*. An example of a layer-2 solution is a *ZK-rollup*, a mechanism in which thousands of transactions are bundled into a single batch transaction [9]. This way, a smart contract can check the processing of large amounts of transactions by simply verifying a ZK proof of few bytes. The key of ZK-rollups is that ZK proofs are smaller and faster to verify than doing so with each individual transaction [10].

ZK-SNARK protocols are used mainly to prove the correctness of a computation. In this context, the way of expressing a computation is by defining it as an *arithmetic circuit* [4], [11], [12]. An arithmetic circuit is a circuit built with addition and multiplication gates, and wires that carry values from a prime finite field \mathbb{F}_p , where p is typically a very large prime number. A prover uses a circuit to prove that he knows a valid assignment to all wires of the circuit, and if the proof is correct, the verifier is convinced that the computation expressed as a circuit is valid, but learns nothing about the wires' assignment. The common encoding of this type of circuits consists of a set of equations called *rank-1 constraint system* (R1CS), which is later used by the ZK-SNARK protocol to generate the proof. A valid proof shows, without revealing secret values, that the prover knows an assignment to all wires of the circuit that fulfill all the constraints of the R1CS. An issue that appears when applying ZK protocols to complex computations, like a circuit describing the logic of a ZK-rollup, is that the amount of constraints to be verified is extremely large (up to hundreds of millions of constraints). In these cases, it is clear that it is impossible to define the circuits manually.

In this article, we present CIRCOM, a novel programming language for defining arithmetic circuits and its associated

compiler written in Rust language [13], [14]. Programmers can use the CIRCOM language to define arithmetic circuits and the compiler will generate a file with the set of associated R1CS constraints and a program (written either in C++ or WebAssembly) to efficiently compute a valid assignment to all wires of the circuit. One of the main particularities of CIRCOM is that it is a modular language that allows the definition of parameterizable small circuits called *templates*, which can be instantiated to form larger circuits. The idea of building circuits from small individual components makes it easier to test, review, audit, or formally verify large and complex CIRCOM circuits. In this regard, CIRCOM users can create their own custom templates, but they can also use templates from CIRCOMLIB [15], a publicly available library that counts with hundreds of circuits such as comparators, hash functions, digital signatures, binary and decimal converters, and many more.

The architecture behind CIRCOM not only provides a simple interface to model arithmetic circuits and generate their corresponding constraints, but it also abstracts the complexity of the underlying ZK proving mechanism. In particular, the output files of CIRCOM can be used directly by SNARKJS [16], which is a ZK-SNARK tool we developed to automatize the generation and verification of this type of proofs. This way, our architecture decouples the circuit definition (CIRCOM) from the proving system (SNARKJS). We would like to stress that both CIRCOM and SNARKJS have been successfully used for building several projects currently in production within the Ethereum network including payment mixers like Tornado cash [17], anonymous multi-asset pools like Zeropool [18], ZK signaling gadgets like Semaphore [19], and ZK-rollups, like Hermez [20], that use circuits described by hundreds of millions of constraints.

The present work is structured in four main sections. In Section 2, we give a general overview of ZK proofs, with special focus on arithmetic-circuit based protocols. In Section 3, we introduce the characteristics of CIRCOM and give several examples of a correct use of the language. In the following Section 4, we present some practical applications that illustrate the power of the CIRCOM language. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of CIRCOM in large circuits described by millions of constraints. In Section 6, we define the concepts of *correct* and *safe* CIRCOM programs that can help programmers understand the philosophy of the language and help them improve the writing of CIRCOM circuits. Finally, we compare our work with state-of-the-art tools in Section 7, and we conclude in Section 8.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Informally, *zero-knowledge* (ZK) proofs are cryptographic protocols that allow one party to prove that he knows some secret without leaking any information about it. More specifically, ZK proofs enable one party, called *prover*, to convince another one, called *verifier*, that a statement is true without revealing any information beyond the veracity of the statement [1], [3]. In this context, we understand an *statement* as a relation between an *instance*, a public input known to both prover and verifier, and a *witness*, a private input known only by the prover, which belongs to

a language \mathcal{L} in the *nondeterministic polynomial time* (NP) complexity class [2].

The first generation of ZK protocols consisted in three interactions between the prover and the verifier: first, the prover would commit to some information, then the verifier would send some challenges to the prover to check if she really knows the secret information, and finally the prover would answer to those challenges but his answers would not allow the verifier to reconstruct any part of the secret. More specifically, a ZK protocol satisfies that a verifier will accept a proof if it is generated by an honest prover (*completeness*), and will not accept proofs from dishonest provers (*soundness*). These two properties protect the verifier against malicious provers. On the other hand, ZK proofs must ensure that the proofs do not leak any information beyond the veracity of the statement being proved (*zero-knowledge*), guaranteeing this way the privacy of the prover's secret information against malicious verifiers [1]. In 1986, Fiat and Shamir [21] presented a technique to convert three-round interactive protocols into non-interactive. This way, the prover can generate all the proof himself without the need to interact with the verifier.

Non-interactive ZK proofs are very suitable for blockchain applications because blockchain users can act as provers and send proofs as part of a transaction to a smart contract, who will act as a verifier. Note that with non-interactive protocols, provers can generate the proof in advance without receiving any challenge from the smart contract. Finally, the smart contract can perform some action depending on whether the proof is valid or not. Since the proof is included as part of a transaction, it is crucial that its size is small. Moreover, since the smart contract acts as a verifier, it is important that the verification time is also short. This type of non-interactive protocols that have succinct proof size and constant verification time are called *ZK succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge* (ZK-SNARKs).

2.2 ZK-SNARKs

ZK-SNARKs [4]–[6] belong to a group of ZK proofs known as *arguments of knowledge*. The difference between a ZK proof and a ZK argument of knowledge is that while a proof allows to prove the *existence* of a witness in a language \mathcal{L} ; arguments of knowledge prove that, with very high probability, the prover does *know* a concrete valid witness in \mathcal{L} [12]. An argument of knowledge is considered a SNARK if it is non-interactive and, regardless of the size of the statement being proved, has succinct proof size (e.g. [6]-proofs are ≈ 200 bytes). Most ZK-SNARKs also guarantee short verification time [6], [22].

The main downside of these protocols is that they need an initial phase called *trusted setup*. This step requires the generation of some random values that need to be immediately destroyed. In fact, if the random values are ever exposed, the security of the whole scheme is compromised. To enhance the security of this setup phase, most implementations make use of a *multi-party computation* (MPC), which allows multiple independent parties to collaboratively construct the trusted setup parameters. In this process, it is enough that one single participant deletes its secret counterpart of the contribution to keep the whole scheme secure

[23]. Our software SNARKJS has a framework for generating and verifying MPCs, providing a holistic architecture for building privacy-enabled applications.

Like most ZK systems, ZK-SNARKs operate in the model of arithmetic circuits, meaning that the language \mathcal{L} is that of satisfiable arithmetic circuits. An assignment to the wires is *valid* if and only if for every gate, the value on the output wires matches that gate's operation and the values on its input wires [24].

2.3 Arithmetic Circuits

The most widely studied language in the context of non-interactive ZK proofs is the NP-complete language of *circuit satisfiability* [4], [11], [12]. Essentially, a *circuit* consists of a set of wires connected to gates that perform some operation. Circuit satisfiability is a classical problem of computability theory that consists of determining whether a given circuit has an assignment of its inputs that makes the output true. If that is the case, the circuit is called *satisfiable*. Otherwise, the circuit is called *unsatisfiable*.

In cryptographic implementations of this problem, we use a particular type of circuits called *arithmetic circuits* (from now on, simply called "circuits"). The gates of an arithmetic circuit consist on additions and multiplications modulo p , where p is typically a large prime number of approximately 254 bits [25]. The wires of an arithmetic circuit are usually called *signals*, and they can carry any value from the prime finite field \mathbb{F}_p . As with electronic circuits, we can distinguish between *input*, *intermediate*, and *output signals*.

Usually, there is a set of public signals known both to prover and verifier, and the prover proves that, with that public information, he knows a valid assignment to the rest of signals that makes the circuit satisfiable. From now on, we extend the meaning of the word *witness* to an assignment to all signals of the circuit, both public and private.

Example 1. Circuit C from Fig. 1 is an arithmetic circuit defined over the prime finite field \mathbb{F}_{11} that, given four private inputs s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4 , it outputs the result of the operation

$$s_1 \times s_2 \times s_3 + s_4.$$

To perform the calculation, the circuit uses two multi-




Figure 1: Representation of an arithmetic circuit C defined over the finite field \mathbb{F}_{11} that outputs the result of the operation $s_1 \times s_2 \times s_3 + s_4 \mod 11$.

plication gates and one addition gate, which requires two intermediate signals s_5, s_6 , and an output signal s_7 . Hence, C is a circuit defined by the set of signals

$$S = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7\}.$$

An example of a witness for C is $w = \{2, 3, 3, 9, 6, 7, 5\}$.

Recent years have seen a concentration of efforts towards different encodings of arithmetic circuits [26]. In the following, we define a classical form for encoding circuits in an algebraically useful way called *rank-1 constraint system* (R1CS). An R1CS encodes a program as a set of conditions over its variables, so that a correct execution of a circuit is equivalent to find a satisfiable variable assignment. Due to the transformability of arithmetic circuits into R1CS, programs specified in R1CS are often referred to as *circuits*, and their variables as *signals*.

Formally, a *quadratic constraint* over a set of signals $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ is an equation of the form

$$(a_1 s_1 + \dots + a_n s_n) \times (b_1 s_1 + \dots + b_n s_n) - (c_1 s_1 + \dots + c_n s_n) = 0,$$

where $a_i, b_i, c_i \in \mathbb{F}_p$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. In short, we write a constraint as $\mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{b} - \mathbf{c} = 0$, where \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{c} are linear combinations of s_1, \dots, s_n . A *rank-1 constraint system* (R1CS) over a set of signals $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ is defined as a finite collection of quadratic constraints over S .

Example 2. We can represent the circuit C from Fig. 1 as the following R1CS over S :

$$\begin{cases} s_1 \times s_2 - s_5 = 0 & \text{mod } 11 \\ s_5 \times s_3 - s_6 = 0 & \text{mod } 11 \\ s_6 + s_4 - s_7 = 0 & \text{mod } 11 \end{cases}$$

Note that all expressions of the system above are quadratic or linear. In fact, we could compact last two constraints into one, resulting in an equivalent R1CS defined over $S \setminus \{s_6\}$:

$$\begin{cases} s_1 \times s_2 - s_5 = 0 & \text{mod } 11 \\ s_5 \times s_3 + s_4 - s_7 = 0 & \text{mod } 11 \end{cases}$$

Compressing all constraints into a single one would not result in an R1CS, since we would end up with a non-quadratic equation:

$$s_1 \times s_2 \times s_3 + s_4 - s_7 = 0 \mod 11.$$

Hence, in this example, any R1CS arithmetic representation of C will always have at least two quadratic constraints.

Since arithmetic circuits are composed by additions and multiplications, the representation of arithmetic circuits as R1CS is a natural transformation. Moreover, a valid witness for an arithmetic circuit translates naturally into a solution of the R1CS representing the circuit. This way, we say that an arithmetic circuit is *satisfiable* if there exists a solution to the R1CS representing the circuit. Checking satisfiability in R1CS encoded form requires to check all gates of a circuit. Most ZK protocols use aggregation techniques, such as *quadratic arithmetic programs*, to check all gates at once [4].

Although there have been tremendous efforts into understanding, developing and improving ZK protocols and ZK-SNARKs, not much work has been done towards formalizing, standardising and optimising the construction of arithmetic circuits. In fact, designing and implementing specific circuits is still a very handcraft procedure that can entail security flaws if done incorrectly, compromising any ZK machinery applied later on a circuit. For this reason, we developed the CIRCOM circuit programming language. With

CIRCOM, programmers can implement arithmetic circuits, and the compiler takes care of the R1CS encoding and the rest of elements needed to compute ZK-SNARK proofs.

3 CIRCOM

CIRCOM [14] is a *domain-specific language* (DSL) and a compiler that allows programmers to design and create their own arithmetic circuits for ZK purposes. The CIRCOM compiler is mainly written in Rust and it is open source¹. It is designed as a low-level circuit language, close to the design of electronic circuits, in which developers can create their arithmetic circuits and later on, apply ZK tools [13]. In particular, CIRCOM can be complemented with SNARKJS, which allows the generation and validation of ZK-SNARK proofs. SNARKJS is our JavaScript implementation of most popular protocols, such as [4], [6], [22].

3.1 Introduction

CIRCOM allows programmers to define the constraints of an arithmetic circuit in a friendly way. Recall that arithmetic circuits consist of operations in a finite field \mathbb{F}_p that can be expressed as constraints of the form $\mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{b} - \mathbf{c} = 0$, where \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{c} are linear combinations over a set of signals $\{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$. Given a circuit, the CIRCOM compiler outputs the constraints defined by the programmer, but it also generates a program that, given a set of input values, computes an assignment to the rest of signals of the circuit.

Example 3. Before going into details, we first illustrate how CIRCOM works with a circuit that will allow us to prove that the product of two secret input signals are equal to a certain public output.

```
1 pragma circom 2.0.0;
2
3 template Multiplier () {
4   // declaration of signals
5   signal input a;
6   signal input b;
7   signal output c;
8   // constraints
9   c <== a * b;
10 }
```

The first line of this code is a `pragma` instruction that specifies the version of the CIRCOM compiler that is used to ensure that the circuit is compatible with the compiler version indicated after the `pragma` instruction. If it is incompatible, the compiler throws a warning. All files with the `.circom` extension should start with such `pragma` instruction, otherwise, it is assumed that the code is compatible with the latest compiler's version.

In line 3, we use the reserved keyword `template` to define the configuration of a circuit, in this case called `Multiplier`. Inside the template definition, we start by defining the signals that comprise it. Signals can be named with an identifier, in our example, these are identifiers `a`, `b` and `c`. In this case, we have two input signals `a` and `b`, and an output signal `c`.

1. The CIRCOM compiler can be installed following the instructions from <https://docs.circom.io/getting-started/installation>. The source code has more than 43K lines of Rust, WebAssembly and C++ and is available at <https://github.com/iden3/circom.git>.

After declaring the signals, we write the constraints that define the circuit. In this example, we used the operator `<==`. The functionality of this operator is twofold: on the one hand, it sets a constraint that expresses that the value of `c` must be the result of multiplying `a` by `b`; and on the other hand, the operator instructs the compiler in how to generate the program that computes the assignment of circuit signals. The compiler also accepts the operator `==>` with the same semantics, but for simplicity, from now on, we will always use the right-to-left operator `<==`.

3.2 Creating a Circuit

Templates are parametrizable general descriptions of a circuit that have some input and output signals and describe, sometimes using other subcircuits, the relation between the inputs and the outputs. In the previous snippet of CIRCOM code, we created the template called `Multiplier`, but to actually build a circuit, we have to *instantiate* it. The template `Multiplier` does not depend on any parameter, but as we show in future examples, it is possible to create generic parametrizable templates that are later instantiated using specific parameters to construct the circuit. In CIRCOM, the instantiation of a template is called *component*, and it is created as follows (line 10):

```
1 pragma circom 2.0.0;
2
3 template Multiplier () {
4   signal input a;
5   signal input b;
6   signal output c;
7   c <== a * b;
8 }
9
10 component main = Multiplier();
```

By means of the declaration of components and templates, CIRCOM allows programmers to work in a modular fashion: defining small pieces and combining them to create large circuits that can entail millions of operations.

3.3 Compiling a Circuit

As we said in Section 3.1, the use of the operator `<==` in the template `Multiplier` had a double functionality: it captures the arithmetic relation between the signals, but it also provides a way of computing `c` from `a` and `b`. In general, the description of a CIRCOM circuit also keeps this double functionality. This way, the compiler can easily generate the R1CS describing a circuit but also the instructions to compute the intermediate and output values of a circuit. More specifically, given a circuit with the `.circom` extension the compiler can return four files. For example, we can compile `multiplier.circom` with the next options:

```
1 circom multiplier.circom --r1cs --c --wasm --sym
```

With the previous options, we are telling the compiler to generate a file with the R1CS constraints (*symbolic task*) and the programs for computing the values of the circuit wires in C++ and WebAssembly (*computational task*). The last option tells the compiler to generate a file of symbols for debugging and printing the constraint system in an annotated way.

After compiling a circuit, we can calculate all the signals that match the set of constraints of the circuit using the C++ or WebAssembly programs generated by the compiler. To

do so, we simply need to provide a file with a set of valid input values, and the program will calculate a set of values for the rest of signals of the circuit. Recall that a valid set of input, intermediate and output values is called *witness*.

3.4 Generating a ZK Proof

Imagine we want to show that we know two numbers a and b such that $a \times b = 33$, while keeping a and b private. For that, we can use the previous template `Multiplier` by setting the inputs a and b as private signals of the circuit, and the output c as a public signal. Nonetheless, by default, the inputs of a CIRCOM circuit are all considered private signals, whereas outputs are always public signals. Hence, we can use the template `Multiplier` already as it is.

In Figure 2 we show the complete process of generating and validating a ZK proof with our architecture. As we can see, we should first create a file containing the inputs written in the standard JSON format: `{"a": 3, "b": 11}`. Next, we pass the file with the inputs to the C++ or WebAssembly program generated by the compiler, which will generate a file containing the witness in binary format. After compiling the circuit and running the witness calculator with an appropriate input, we will have a file with extension `.wtms` that contains all the computed signals and, a file with extension `.r1cs` that contains the constraints describing the circuit.

With the witness and the R1CS files, we can compute and verify ZK proofs using SNARKJS. All ZK protocols implemented in SNARKJS require a trusted setup. In some cases, it is possible to reuse a trusted setup, like in [22], whereas in others, it is necessary to generate a new trusted setup per circuit, as in [4] and [6]. For this reason, SNARKJS already provides the necessary commands to create MPC ceremonies for generating the trusted setup and also verify that an existing trusted setup has been computed correctly. From the R1CS and the MPC, SNARKJS produces a generation and a verification key for the circuit. Finally, with the generation key and the witness, the prover can generate a ZK-SNARK proof and send it to a verifier, who uses the verification key and a file with the public signals of the circuit to check if the prover's proof is valid².

Note that we could have started the process choosing different input values. For example, we could have used `{"a": 1, "b": 33}` as input and generated a valid proof for our circuit. Hence, a proof for the circuit `Multiplier` would not really show that we know how to factor 33. In Section 3.10, we will use a template that checks if a signal is zero to modify the template `Multiplier` to only accept inputs that are not 1.

3.5 The Main Component

The CIRCOM compiler needs a specific component as entry point. This initial component is called `main` and, as we did in Example 3, it needs to be instantiated with some template.

Unlike other intermediate components that we will introduce later, the `main` component defines the global input and output signals of a circuit. As mentioned in Section 3.4,

2. For further information about the creation of a trusted setup and the generation and verification of ZK-SNARK proofs with SNARKJS, we refer the reader to <https://github.com/iden3/snarkjs>.




Figure 2: Our architecture for generating and verifying ZK-SNARK proofs using CIRCOM and SNARKJS software tools.

by default, the global inputs are considered private signals while the global outputs are considered public. However, the `main` component has a special attribute to set a list of global inputs as public signals. The general syntax to specify the `main` component is the following:

```
1 component main {public [s1,...,sn]} = templateID(v1,...,vn);
```

The `{public [s1,...,sn]}` part is an optional argument that specifies the list of public signals of the circuit. Any other input signal not included in this list is considered a private signal.

Example 4. Let us illustrate the use of public signals following the previous example. For simplicity, we will no longer start our code with the `pragma` instruction.

```
1 template Multiplier() {
2   signal input a;
3   signal input b;
4   signal output c;
5   c <== a * b;
6 }
7
8 component main {public [a]} = Multiplier();
```

In this code snippet, we declare the `main` component with the global input a as a public input signal, whereas b remains as a global private input signal of `Multiplier`.

Recall that the prover needs all signals (private and public) to generate a ZK proof, while the verifier only needs the public signals to verify a proof, which in this case are signals a and c .

3.6 Connecting Templates

CIRCOM is a modular language that allows the definition of small circuits called *templates*. Then, these templates are instantiated to form larger circuits. The idea of building large and complex circuits from smaller parts makes it easier to test, review and audit large CIRCOM circuits.

Example 5. Let us illustrate how to connect templates by continuing our previous example. In Example 3, we created a template for a multiplier of two signals. In this case, we will extend this idea by connecting two of these 2-input multipliers to get a multiplier for three signals.

```
1 include "multiplier.circom";
2
3 template Multiplier3() {
4   signal input in1;
5   signal input in2;
6   signal input in3;
7   signal output out;
8
9   component multiplierA = Multiplier();
10  component multiplierB = Multiplier();
11
12  multiplierA.a <== in1;
13  multiplierA.b <== in2;
14  multiplierB.a <== multiplierA.c; // in1 * in2
15  multiplierB.b <== in3;
16  out <== multiplierB.c; // (in1 * in2) * in3
17 }
18
19 component main {public [in1, in2]} = Multiplier3();
```

In line 3, we create a template called `Multiplier3` that has three inputs called `in1`, `in2` and `in3`, and one output called `out`. Notice that in the instantiation of the template (line 19), we specify that `in1` and `in2` are public, and `in3` is private. To build the multiplication of the three input signals, we create two subcomponents that are 2-input multipliers (lines 9 and 10). To do so, we have to import the definition of the 2-input multiplier template from a separate file using the keyword `include` (line 1). Then, we connect the inputs `in1` and `in2` to the input wires of the first subcomponent `multiplierA` using the dot (`.`) operator. Next, we use the second subcomponent to do the other multiplication by connecting the output of the previous 2-input multiplier (line 14) and `in3` (line 15). Finally, to provide the multiplication of the three inputs, we assign the output of the second 2-input multiplier to the output of `Multiplier3` (line 16).

Remark. From a template, we can only access the inputs and outputs of its direct subcomponents.

3.7 Debugging

The CIRCOM language provides a small logging function that is called with `log(arg)`. This function can greatly help users debug their circuits. The `log(arg)` function can be called with a fixed value as argument (from the field \mathbb{F}_p), with values of signals, or expressions. This way, when the witness computation program is executed, the console will print the logged values.

Example 6. Following our previous example we use the logging function to show a fixed value 444444444444 and the value of the signal `multiplierA.c`. The fixed values are typically used to have visual references for reading the values of the signals, which will be mostly what the user is going to be interested in.

```
1 include "multiplier.circom";
2
3 template Multiplier3() {
4   signal input in1;
5   signal input in2;
6   signal input in3;
7   signal output out;
8
9   component multiplierA = Multiplier();
10  component multiplierB = Multiplier();
11
```

```
12 multiplierA.a <== in1;
13 multiplierA.b <== in2;
14 multiplierB.a <== multiplierA.c; // in1 * in2
15 multiplierB.b <== in3;
16 log(444444444444); // log a fixed value
17 log(multiplierA.c); // log the value of a signal
18 out <== multiplierB.c; // (in1 * in2) * in3
19 }
```

3.8 Building More Complex Circuits

In our previous example, we created a template composed of different subcomponents. The capability of building large circuits from smaller pieces is far more powerful in CIRCOM. For instance, we can create parametrized templates using flow control structures like `for` loops and `if` statements, include variables for using them, and even define *arrays of signals* and *arrays of subcomponents*.

Example 7. Let us illustrate how to build these more complex circuits by generalizing Example 5 to an n -multiplier. That is, we will create a parametrized template that allows the instantiation of circuits that can verify the multiplication of n input values.

```
1 include "multiplier.circom";
2
3 template MultiplierN(n) {
4   signal input in[n];
5   signal output out;
6
7   component multiplier[n-1];
8
9   multiplier[0] = Multiplier();
10  multiplier[0].a <== in[0];
11  multiplier[0].b <== in[1];
12
13  for(var i=1; i<(n-1); i++){
14    multiplier[i] = Multiplier();
15    multiplier[i].a <== in[i+1];
16    multiplier[i].b <== multiplier[i-1].c;
17  }
18
19  out <== multiplier[n-2].c;
20 }
21
22 component main = MultiplierN(4);
```

In the previous code snippet, we create a template called `MultiplierN` which depends on a parameter n . The template uses an array called `in` of n elements to describe the template inputs (line 4). Then, we create $n-1$ `Multiplier` subcomponents (line 7), which are referenced with an $n-1$ -dimensional array called `multiplier`. Then, we appropriately initialize the first subcomponent (lines 9, 10 and 11). Next, we use a `for` loop with a control variable called `i`, which is created using the keyword `var`. Notice how inside the `for` loop we create subcomponents and wire the connections between them.

Remark. It is important to highlight that building a circuit with CIRCOM is like building an electronic circuit. We mean that, to build a circuit, the compiler must know all the required parameters of the circuit. As a result, in loops that involve constraints (*symbolic* part), CIRCOM only allows to define the loop condition based on the template parameters. In our previous example, the loop condition used `n` which is perfectly valid. For further information, see Section 3.13.

3.9 Splitting Between Computation and Constraints

In this section, we explain what happens when the calculation of a signal does not come from a quadratic formula. To give some intuition, we start with an example of a template that performs a division.

Example 8. A division $c = a/b$ is an operation that cannot be computed using a quadratic formula but it can be checked using the quadratic expression $a = b \cdot c$.

```
1 template Divider() {
2   signal input a;
3   signal input b;
4   signal output c;
5   c <-- a/b;
6   a == b * c;
7 }
```

In this case, we have to split the *computational task*, which instructs the compiler in how to compute signals, from the *symbolic task*, which instructs the compiler in how to create constraints that verify a computation. As we can see in the code, the computational task is expressed using the individual operator `<--` (line 5). The language also accepts the left-to-right operator `-->` with the same semantics. On the other side, the symbolic task is expressed separately using the individual operator `==`, which adds a constraint that captures the quadratic relation between signals (line 6).

As an implementation detail, just mention that the `==` operator also adds an *assert* to the program that computes the witness. As expected, if after computing a witness there is an *assert* instruction that is not satisfied, the program stops and returns an error. Therefore, the `==` operator also plays a small role in the computational task.

At this point, it should be clear that the following templates A and B are equivalent:

```
1 template A() {
2   signal input in;
3   signal output out;
4   out <-- in;
5   out == in;
6 }
```

```
1 template B() {
2   signal input in;
3   signal output out;
4   out <-- in;
5   out == in;
6 }
```

Templates A and B are equivalent, since their compilations will produce the same R1CS and the code of the witness computation program will be the same except for the fact that the code from template A will have an extra *assert* instruction with respect to the code generated from template B. Anyway, in this particular case the *assert* will always be fulfilled, so the witness computation programs are effectively equivalent.

In general, the *dual operator* `<==` is preferred whenever possible, because it always guarantees the equivalence between the computed witness and the constraints that check the computation. Notice that, if not handled with care, the use of the *individual operators* `<--` and `==` might produce a situation in which the witness does not fulfil the constraints or in which the constraints are unconnected to the witness.

Example 9. Let us look at the following template, which given two inputs a and b , it outputs $c = a+b$.

```
1 template Incorrect() {
2   signal input a;
3   signal input b;
4   signal output c;
5   c <-- a+b;
6   c == a * b;
7 }
```

In this template, the computational program will output $c = a+b$, but the R1CS describing the template will consist of the constraint $c = a \cdot b$. Therefore, given two inputs, the witness computed by the witness computation program will not be correct in general. In this case, only inputs such that

$a+b = a \cdot b$ will be valid inputs for the circuit. Circuits in which a computation is not reflected as an equivalent constraint, are considered *incorrect* circuits.

To avoid these cases, individual operators must only be used in cases in which the dual operator cannot express a computation like it happened in Example 8. In Section 6, we analyse these situations in greater detail.

Remark. Neither the operator `==` nor `<==` can be used with signal expressions that are not quadratic.

3.10 Checking If Zero

Now that we know the basic syntax of the CIRCOM language, we present the template `IsZero`, which has some subtleties. `IsZero` checks if a certain signal in a circuit is zero or not. In this case, the output signal `out` is 1 if the input signal `in` is zero, and `out` is 0, otherwise.

```
1 template IsZero() {
2   signal input in;
3   signal output out;
4   signal inv;
5   inv <-- in!=0 ? 1/in : 0;
6   out <== -in * inv + 1;
7   in * out == 0;
8 }
9
10 component main = IsZero();
```

First, we use an intermediate signal `inv` to compute the inverse of the input signal `in`. Since signals of CIRCOM circuits are elements of a prime field \mathbb{F}_p , the only element that has no inverse is 0. Hence, if `in` is not 0, we can assign to `inv` the inverse of `in`. In the other case, where such inverse does not exist because `in` is zero, we assign 0 to `inv`. Note that the value of the signal `inv` depends on a conditional expression and hence, we cannot use the operator `<==` and we use the individual computational operator `<--` instead.

After that, we assign the value $-in \cdot inv + 1$ to the signal `out` (line 6), which will be 1 if `in = 0` and 0, otherwise. Since we do the assignment using the dual operator `<==`, the constraint $out = -in \cdot inv + 1$ is also added.

Observe that the previous constraint ensures that `out` is 1 if `in` is zero, but if `in` is not zero, the value of `inv` is not captured in any constraint, since its assignment is done only with the individual computational operator. Hence, `inv` could be manipulated to take any value. For this reason, if we want to enforce that `out` is really 0 when `in` is not zero, we add a new constraint $in \cdot out == 0$ in line 7.

Note that when `in` is 0, we decided to assign 0 to `inv`, but in fact, we could have chosen any other value. Indeed, when `in` is zero, both constraints (lines 6 and 7) are satisfied. In this case, we say that the circuit is *safe*, but not *strongly safe*, since there is more than one valid solution for `inv`. We analyse this type of situations in greater detail in Section 6.

Example 10. The template `IsZero` is used very frequently. An illustrative example, is to use it to modify our first template `Multiplier` from Example 3 to enforce that none of its inputs is 1. For that, we use the fact that a is not 1 if and only if $a-1$ is not zero, and the same stands for b .

```
1 include "iszero.circom"
2
3 template Factorization() {
4   signal private input a;
5   signal private input b;
6   signal output c;
```



```

7
8   component isz1 = IsZero();
9   component isz2 = IsZero();
10
11  isz1.in <== a-1;
12  isz2.in <== b-1;
13  isz1.out == 0; // enforce that a-1 != 0
14  isz2.out == 0; // enforce that b-1 != 0
15
16  c <== a * b;
17 }
18
19 component main = Factorization();

```

3.11 Functions and Constants

The CIRCOM language also allows the usage of *functions* to encapsulate computation logic. Functions in CIRCOM have a syntax similar to functions in the C programming language. In the body of a function, we can use control flow statements and variables. However, functions should only be used for computational purposes, so contrary to circuit templates, functions cannot create new constraints or use signals.

Example 11. An example of a basic function is the following one, which adds one to a given value:

```

1 function my_function(x) {
2   return x+1;
3 }

```

The use of functions is not strictly necessary to define circuit templates and their main usage in CIRCOM is to define global constants. The reason for this, is that CIRCOM does not admit the definition of global constants. Thus, whenever we want to have a global constant we can just define a function that always returns the same value, and call it every time we need it in our circuit.

Example 12. The following function will be later used in Section 4.2 and it returns a parameter of an elliptic curve.

```

1 function baby_const_a() {
2   return 168700;
3 }

```

3.12 Symbolic Variables

In Section 3.8, we explained several uses of the variables when building circuits. However, variables have another important use, which is to store symbolic expressions when building the constraints. We call *symbolic variables* to those variables that contain symbolic expressions on signals.

Example 13. Let us analyse an example of a template that uses symbolic variables. The following template implements a multiAND circuit that depends on a parameter n . That is, MultiAND is a template that takes an array of n binary inputs and outputs one if and only if all inputs are one.

In the following code snippet, we implement an AND gate for four binary inputs (line 15). To do so, we add the values of the inputs and check if the result is equal to the number of inputs by subtracting and checking if the result is zero. If the result is zero, the output should be one and zero, otherwise.

```

1 include "iszero.circom"
2
3 template MultiAND(n) {
4   signal input in[n];
5   signal output out;
6   var sum = 0;

```

```

7
8   for(var i=0; i<n; i++) {
9     sum = sum + in[i];
10  }
11
12   component isz = IsZero();
13
14   sum - n ==> isz.in;
15   isz.out ==> out;
16 }
17
18 component main = MultiAND(4);

```

Notice that we used two variables: i and sum . The variable i is a regular index variable used in the `for` loop, while sum is a symbolic variable that is used to create a constraint in which we add up the values of the n input signals. Inside the loop, the symbolic variable sum is used to create the sum of signals $in[0] + \dots + in[n-1]$. In line 9, sum is finally used to generate the constraint:

$$in[0] + \dots + in[n-1] - n = isz.in.$$

Example 14. In the following example, we analyse a template that given an input signal in , it outputs the binary representation of in as an n -array of signals called $out[n]$. For a given number n , we could use the following list of quadratic constraints:

```

1 out[0] * (out[0]-1) == 0
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 out[n-1] * (out[n-1]-1) == 0
6
7 out[0] * 2^0 + ... + out[n-1] * 2^(n-1) - in == 0

```

The first lines guarantee that all elements of the array out are binary, and the last line, that out is indeed the binary representation of the input in . We can rewrite the previous code using a loop:

```

1 signal input in;
2 signal output out[n];
3 var bsum = 0;
4 var exp2 = 1;
5
6 for (var i = 0; i<n; i+=1) {
7   out[i] * (out[i]-1) == 0;
8   bsum += out[i] * exp2;
9   exp2 *= 2;
10 }
11
12 bsum == in;

```

Note that, in the previous code, we used the individual symbolic operator `==`. We cannot use the dual operator because the constraints to check the binary representation of in cannot be computed using quadratic expressions. For this reason, we need to build the constraints without providing a way to compute their values. This has to be done separately with the following simple algorithm that extracts one by one the bits of in :

```

1 for (var i = 0; i<n; i+=1) {
2   out[i] <-- (in >> i) & 1;
3 }

```

Notice how we used the individual operator for computation `<--` to assign computed values to signals without generating new constraints.

Now, putting the two pieces together, we can implement a circuit template called `Num2Bits(n)` that outputs the bit representation of up to n bits of an input signal.

```
1 template Num2Bits(n) {
2   signal input in;
3   signal output out[n];
4   var bsum = 0;
5   var exp2 = 1;
6   for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
7     out[i] <= (in >> i) & 1;
8     out[i] * (out[i]-1) == 0;
9     bsum += out[i] * exp2;
10    exp2 *= 2;
11  }
12  bsum == in;
13 }
```

Note that in the body of control flow statements we can have both symbolic and computational expressions (lines 7-10). In general, CIRCOM programmers can write constraints and signal computations together, even when the symbolic and computational descriptions differ.

3.13 Dealing with the unknown

When writing CIRCOM programs, it is useful to think of them as physical circuits of wires and gates. As with physical circuits, CIRCOM circuit descriptions cannot depend on the value of its wires. That is, the R1CS of any CIRCOM program must be the same for any set of inputs. In fact, the compiler builds the R1CS without knowing the values of the inputs, and hence, it considers the values of the signals *unknown* at compilation time.

As a result, since Boolean expressions on conditional expressions and loops can only depend on values known at compilation time (i.e. template parameters but no signal values), if we try to add a constraint inside a conditional or a loop that depends on unknown expressions, CIRCOM will output a compilation error to inform the programmer about this situation.

Formally, a block of code is unknown if it depends on a Boolean expression which is unknown at the program point where it was evaluated. For instance, the body of a loop is unknown, if its condition depends on the value of an input. An expression is unknown at a program point pp , if there is a variable involved in the expression which is unknown at pp . Finally, a variable x is unknown at pp , if (for the given instantiation of the template) there exists a path in the control-flow graph ending at pp , in which for the last assignment modifying x , the new value depends on an unknown expression or such an assignment belongs to an unknown block.

Notice this definition is recursive and thus, the CIRCOM compiler performs a fixed-point analysis to detect the unknown variables present in the program. A hint for the programmer when getting a compilation error for an unknown variable is to pay attention to two common situations:

- 1) The addition of a constraint that depends on a Boolean condition involving an unknown variable.
- 2) The addition of a constraint with an array access using as index an unknown variable or a signal.

Example 15. Let us see an example of a CIRCOM program that does not compile because of the unknown.

```
1 template ErroneousTemplate1(n) {
2   signal input in;
3   signal output out1;
4   signal output out2;
5   for (var i=0; i < n; i++) {
6     out1 <= in * in;
7     if (in >= 0) {
8       out2 <= in + 2;
9     }
10  }
11 }
12
13 component main = ErroneousTemplate1(4);
```

When compiling this program, we obtain an error derived from the instruction in line 8, where we are trying to add a new constraint to the R1CS only if the value of signal `in` is greater or equal to 0. In this case, the compiler detects that the execution of line 8 depends on the condition in line 7, but signal `in` has an unknown value at compilation time, and hence, the compiler throws an error. Notice that line 6 is correct, since it is inside the loop from line 5, whose Boolean condition depends on the value of n , which is a template parameter known at compilation time.

Example 16. In this other example, we illustrate the situation in which, to create a constraint, a symbolic variable (unknown) is used to access an array.

```
1 template ErroneousTemplate2(n) {
2   signal input in[5];
3   signal output out;
4   var aux;
5
6   if (n > 0)
7     aux = in[0] + 3;
8   else
9     aux = 2;
10  out <= in[aux];
11 }
12
13 component main = ErroneousTemplate2(4);
```

Notice that at line 10, the variable `aux` is unknown, since for the given instantiation of the template ($n = 4$), `aux` is modified (line 7) and its new value depends on the value of the signal `in[0]`. Therefore, we will get a compilation error, since the constraint `out = in[aux]` cannot be added to the R1CS without knowing the value of `aux` used to index the array `in`.

3.14 CIRCOMLIB

As we have explained in the previous sections, the use of templates allows CIRCOM developers to build large circuits from smaller individual subcircuits. In this regard, CIRCOM users can create their own custom templates, but in addition to the language and the compiler, we also provide an open-source library of CIRCOM templates called CIRCOMLIB [15], which contains hundreds of circuits.

On the one side, CIRCOMLIB has the implementation of basic operations, such as binary logic gates, comparators, conversions between field elements and their binary representations, and multiplexers. On the other side, the library contains more complex circuit structures that are used in the context of distributed ledgers and cryptocurrencies, such as digital signatures, elliptic curve-based cryptographic schemes, hash functions, and Merkle tree structures.

In the following Section 4, we will present some practical applications of CIRCOM, where we will make use of some templates from CIRCOMLIB.

4 APPLICATIONS

In this section, we present some practical examples that illustrate the potential of the CIRCOM language. In Section 4.1, we give an example on how to prove that you know the preimage of a hash value using templates from the CIRCOM library. In Section 4.2, we introduce templates that implement the arithmetic operations on an elliptic curve called Baby Jubjub [27]. In Section 4.3, we explain how to use the previous curve operations to verify that a private key corresponds to a public key without revealing such private key. Finally, in Section 4.4 we explain how to verify a signature with templates from CIRCOMLIB, and give an example of a circuit that verifies that a given message has been signed by a public key from a pair of authorized public keys, but without revealing which of the two.

4.1 Hashing

A *cryptographic hash function* is a deterministic one-way function that maps data of an arbitrary size to a bit array of a fixed size. Hash functions are widely used in authentication systems to avoid storing plaintext passwords in databases, but are also used to identify and validate the integrity of files, documents and other types of data. One of the main uses of hash functions is in digital signatures, in which the hash is used to create a cryptographic digest of the data being signed (see Section 4.4).

CIRCOMLIB provides circuits of several hash functions. For example, the template `Sha256(nBits)` is an implementation of SHA-256, which is defined as a hash function

$$\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^{n\text{Bits}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}.$$

The next example shows a circuit that you can use to prove that you know the preimage of a given hash without revealing it. The following piece of code creates a circuit that takes a binary array `in` of 448 bits and returns `out = H(in)`.

```
1 include "sha256.circom";
2
3 template Main() {
4   signal input in[448];
5   signal output out[256];
6
7   component sha256 = Sha256(448);
8
9   for (i=0; i<448; i++){
10     sha256.in[i] <== in[i];
11   }
12
13   for (i=0; i<256; i++){
14     out[i] <== sha256.out[i];
15   }
16 }
17
18 component main = Main();
```

In line 8, we instantiate the template `Sha256` with `nBits = 448`. In this case, we have to assign the values of the signal array bit by bit (line 11). Finally, we set each bit of `out` to each bit of the output of component `sha256` (line 15).

Classical hash functions, such as the family of SHA functions [28], are heavy on bit operations, which makes them very inefficient to implement inside arithmetic circuits. For example, the previous template `sha256` from CIRCOMLIB is described by more than 59,000 constraints. Recently, there have been efforts to develop new hash functions that optimize their representation inside arithmetic circuits. In this regard, CIRCOMLIB also contains the implementation

the Pedersen hash [29] (`pedersen`), two hash functions from the MiMC family [30] (`mimc`, `mimc_sponge`), and Poseidon [31] (`poseidon`).

4.2 Elliptic-Curve Arithmetic

A classical use of ZK protocols is to prove ownership of a public key without revealing the secret key. For that, we need to be able to write the logic of verifying that a given secret key corresponds to a given public key inside an \mathbb{F}_p -arithmetic circuit. This logic is usually implemented by means of arithmetic operations of an elliptic curve. In this section, we show how to implement the arithmetic operations of an elliptic curve called *Baby Jubjub* [27], used in the Ethereum blockchain to implement elliptic-curve cryptography inside circuits [25].

Definition of parameters of the curve

Baby Jubjub is an elliptic curve defined over the prime field \mathbb{F}_p with

$$p = 218882428718392752222464057452572750885 \\ 48364400416034343698204186575808495617,$$

and described by equation

$$ax^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2, \quad (1)$$

with $a = 168700$ and $d = 168696$. More precisely, Baby Jubjub is defined as the set of points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2$ that satisfy Eq. (1) together with a special point, called *point at infinity*, which does not satisfy the equation but still belongs to the curve, and which is typically represented by the point $(1, 0)$.

To avoid replicating the values of a and d from Eq. (1) in every template related to the curve, it is useful to define them only once. As we explained in Section 3, CIRCOM does not admit the definition of global constants and, instead, we have to define two functions that always return these values.

```
1 function baby_const_a() {
2   return 168700;
3 }
4
5 function baby_const_d() {
6   return 168696;
7 }
```

This way, we can always call these functions every time we need the coefficients of the elliptic curve.

Checking if a point belongs to the curve

We start by checking if a pair of coordinates (x, y) correspond to a point on the curve that satisfies Eq. (1). For that, we create a template called `BabyCheck()`, that verifies if a pair of x and y are a solution to the equation.

```
1 template BabyCheck() {
2   signal input x;
3   signal input y;
4   var a = baby_const_a();
5   var d = baby_const_d();
6   signal x2;
7   signal y2;
8   x2 <== x * x;
9   y2 <== y * y;
10  a * x2 + y2 == 1 + d * x2 * y2;
11 }
```

In the previous template, first, we declare two input signals x and y , one per each coordinate. Then, we get

the values of the coefficients a and d from the functions we previously defined, and assign them to two variables a and d , respectively. In this case, we cannot write directly the constraint

$$a*x*x + y*y == 1 + d*x*x*y*y,$$

as in Eq. (1), since it is not a quadratic expression. Instead, we use two new intermediate signals, $x2$ and $y2$, to represent x^2 and y^2 . Once these signals are defined, we can check if the point (x, y) belongs to the curve using the quadratic constraint

$$a*x2 + y2 == 1 + d*x2*y2.$$

Alternatively, we can define a signal u , enforce $u <== x*y$, and then use u to rewrite the curve equation using an equivalent constraint of the form

$$a*x2 + y2 == 1 + d*u*u.$$

Addition of points in the curve

Now, we define how to operate in the elliptic curve group. For that, we use that the addition of two points $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$ and $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ on Baby Jubjub [27] is defined as a third point $P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$ with coordinates

$$x_3 = \frac{x_1y_2 + x_2y_1}{1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2} \text{ and } y_3 = \frac{y_1y_2 - ax_1x_2}{1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2}. \quad (2)$$

The following piece of code consists of a template, called `BabyAdd`, that takes two points and outputs their addition using the formula from Eq. (2).

```
1 template BabyAdd() {
2   signal input p1[2];
3   signal input p2[2];
4   signal output pout[2];
5
6   signal beta;
7   signal gamma;
8   signal delta;
9   signal tau;
10  var a = baby_const_a();
11  var d = baby_const_d();
12
13  beta <== p1[0] * p2[1];
14  gamma <== p1[1] * p2[0];
15  delta <== (-a * p1[0] + p1[1]) * (p2[0] + p2[1]);
16  tau <== beta * gamma;
17
18  pout[0] <-- (beta + gamma) / (1 + d * tau);
19  (1 + d * tau) * pout[0] == (beta + gamma);
20
21  pout[1] <-- (delta + a * beta - gamma) / (1 - d * tau);
22  (1 - d * tau) * pout[1] == (delta + a * beta - gamma);
23 }
```

In this template, we define points using 2-dimensional arrays of signals. In particular, we have two points as input signals (`p1` and `p2`), and a third point as output signal (`pout`). We also have four intermediate signals (`beta`, `gamma`, `delta`, and `tau`), and two variables (`a` and `d`) with the coefficients from Eq. (1). Since both expressions from Eq. (2) involve a division by signals, we cannot use the dual operator `<==` and write the formulas directly as defined in the equation. Instead, we first use the individual computational operator `<--` to compute the denominators, and then, we use the individual symbolic operator `==` to enforce a multiplicative relation between numerator and denominator.

To illustrate the definition of public input signals, let us suppose that we want to use circuit `BabyAdd` to prove that given an initial point P_1 and a final point P_{out} , we know

the point P_2 such that $P_1 + P_2 = P_{out}$, where all the points belong to the curve.

```
1 component main {public [p1]} = BabyAdd();
```

We indicate that the first point `p1` is public thanks to the tag `public` that precedes the list of public input signals in the declaration of the `main` component. An array of signals must have all elements public or all elements private. Notice that, in this case, both signals of `p1` (`p1[0]` and `p1[1]`) are public. The two coordinates of the output point `pout` are also public, since they are the output signals. Finally, the two coordinates of the second point `p2` remain private, since they do not appear in the previous list.

4.3 Public-Key Cryptography

To build public-key cryptography using elliptic curves, the participants must agree on a publicly known point called *generator*. In this setting, a private key is a randomly chosen scalar and its corresponding public key is computed by multiplying the generator point by the private key. This scheme achieves the properties of public-key cryptography because point multiplication by a scalar can be efficiently computed with algorithms like double-and-add [32, Algorithm 7.6], while computing the private key from the generator and the public key point is computationally unfeasible. This computational problem is widely known as the *discrete logarithm problem* [32, Problem 7.1]. In the following code snippet, we use the `ScalarMulFix` template from CIRCOMLIB to compute a public key from a private key provided as input.

```
1 template BabyPbk() {
2   signal input in;
3   var GEN[2] = [
4     52996192406415512816348655835182970302
5     82874472190772894086521144482721001553,
6     16950150798460657717958625567821834550
7     301663161624707787222815936182638968203
8   ];
9   signal output Ax;
10  signal output Ay;
11  component pvkBits = Num2Bits(253);
12  pvkBits.in <== in;
13  component mulFix = ScalarMulFix(253, BASE8);
14  var i;
15  for (i=0; i<253; i++) {
16    mulFix.e[i] <== pvkBits.out[i];
17  }
18  Ax <== mulFix.out[0];
19  Ay <== mulFix.out[1];
20 }
21 component main = BabyPbk();
```

Let us see the main parts of this template. We have an input signal `in`, which is the scalar (private key) used to generate the new point (public key); the generator point `GEN[2]`; and two output signals, `Ax` and `Ay`, which are the coordinates of the public key point generated from multiplying `GEN[2]` by `in`.

After these definitions, we declare a component to transform the scalar in its 253-bit representation (`Num2Bits`) and we assign the scalar to its input signal. Right after, we declare a new component to perform the multiplication of the generator by the scalar (`ScalarMulFix`). Details about how this multiplication is performed can be found in [15]. In line 16, each of the bits from the representation of the scalar are set to its corresponding input of the component. Finally, we assign the output signals of this component to the final output signals `Ax` and `Ay`.

If we compile the program without declaring any input signal as public, then they all remain as private signals. In particular, `in` is a private signal whose value should not be known because it is a private key. Finally, note that `BabyPbk` only has two public output signals, `Ax` and `Ay`, which are not explicitly declared as public, since the output signals of the main component are always considered as public signals.

4.4 Digital Signatures

A popular elliptic curve-based signature scheme is the *Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm* (EdDSA) [33], which is a digital signature scheme based on twisted Edwards curves, such as Baby Jubjub. Given a public key as defined in Section 4.3, and a message, the EdDSA protocol uses a public cryptographic hash function to bind the signature to a given message and public key.

CIRCOMLIB contains different implementations of EdDSA based on Baby Jubjub which differ in the hash functions used. The template `eddsa` uses the Pedersen hash, `eddsamimc` is implemented using MiMC, and `eddsaposeidon` is a variation with Poseidon. All these templates output 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.

Users can use these templates to validate that a signature in a message is valid, but also to prove more complicated statements, such that a message has been signed with a public key from a list of authorized public keys but without revealing which specific one. In the following example, we define a template that validates if a message has been correctly signed by one of two public keys `pk1`, `pk2`.

```

1 include "eddsa-simplified.circom";
2
3 template VerifyAuthorizedSignature() {
4   signal input pk1[2]; // public key 1
5   signal input pk2[2]; // public key 2
6   signal input msg; // message
7   signal input sig; // signature
8
9   signal out1;
10  signal out2;
11
12  component verify1 = EdDSAVerifier();
13  component verify2 = EdDSAVerifier();
14
15  // verify signature with pk1
16  verify1.pk <== pk1;
17  verify1.msg <== msg;
18  verify1.sig <== sig;
19  out1 <== verify1.out;
20
21  // verify signature with pk2
22  verify2.pk <== pk2;
23  verify2.msg <== msg;
24  verify2.sig <== sig;
25  out2 <== verify2.out;
26
27  out1 + out2 == 1;
28 }
29
30 component main {public [pk1[0], pk1[1], pk2[0], pk2[1], msg]}
31   = VerifyAuthorizedSignature();

```

Notice that we used the `EdDSAVerifier` template as a black box that returns a signal that determines if a signature is valid for a given message and public key. Since we need to verify the signature twice, one per each key, the template `EdDSAVerifier` is instantiated in two different components (`verify1`, `verify2`). The constraint `out1 + out2 == 1` imposes that either `verify1` or `verify2` is 1. That is, the message has been signed with one of either `pk1` or `pk2` keys, which are public input signals of the circuit (line 30).

5 CIRCOM PERFORMANCE ON LARGE CIRCUITS

It is clear that one of the main advantages of CIRCOM lies in its modularity. With CIRCOM, users can define parameterized independent templates that can later be instantiated and combined to produce large circuits describing complex operations. However, combining components significantly increases the number of constraints describing the circuit. Specially, when connecting the output of a component as an input of another component, the developer needs to introduce constraints that capture this binding. This problem is aggravated when working with large circuits, which can entail hundreds of millions extra constraints.

To reduce the amount of constraints describing a circuit, the CIRCOM compiler uses classical simplification techniques, such as the substitution method for solving linear systems. Essentially, the compiler divides the set of constraints in clusters of related constraints, and then applies the substitution method over each of these clusters in parallel to detect and get rid of most redundant constraints. This way, the compiler optimizes the representation of the constraints describing the circuit.

5.1 ZK-Rollup Circuits

To evaluate the performance of CIRCOM with large circuits, the language and the compiler have been tested with the ZK-rollup circuits of the *Hermes* [20] project. A ZK-rollup [9] is a construction intended to increase the scalability of Ethereum by performing calculations off-chain, rolling many transactions up into a single batch, and sending it to the main Ethereum chain for processing in one action. In more detail, a ZK proof is generated off-chain for every batch of transactions and the proof proves the validity of every transaction in the batch. This means that it is not necessary to rely on the Ethereum main-chain to verify each signed transaction.

The key of ZK-rollups is that they allow verification to be carried out in constant time regardless of the number of transactions in the batch. This ability to verify proofs both efficiently and in constant time is at the heart of all ZK-rollups. In addition to this, all the data of the transactions can be published cheaply on-chain, so that anyone can reconstruct the current state and history from this on-chain data. In the following section, we present some results for *Hermes* ZK-rollup circuits of different sizes (transactions per batch).

5.2 Performance Results

In Table 1, we show the number of generated constraints, the size of the R1CS file and, the compilation time for different instances of ZK-rollup circuits. We also show their corresponding gains and losses before and after applying the simplification of constraints. The results have been obtained from an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 3990X 64-Core Processor with 270GB of RAM (Linux Kernel 5.4.0-80-generic).

As the experimental evaluation shows, in circuits this large, the compiler's optimizations are crucial to handle the huge amount of constraints. For instance, for ZK-Rollup-256, CIRCOM without simplification generates 134,267,317 constraints whose file size is 15.7GB and the time needed

Circuit	Number of constraints			Size of .r1cs file			Compilation time		
	no-simpl.	simpl.	gain	no-simpl.	simpl.	gain	no-simpl.	simpl.	overhead
ZK-Rollup-256	134,267,317	24,301,347	81.9%	15.7GB	8.5GB	45.9%	12.1min	38.9min	$\times 3.22$
ZK-Rollup-512	197,926,325	37,792,099	80.9%	23.4GB	13.7GB	41.5%	17.5min	58.3min	$\times 3.33$
ZK-Rollup-1024	325,244,341	64,773,603	80.1%	38.8GB	24.1GB	37.9%	28.4min	111.2min	$\times 3.92$
ZK-Rollup-2048	579,880,373	118,736,611	79.5%	69.5GB	44.6GB	35.8%	50.6min	512.5min	$\times 10.14$
ZK-Rollup-2341	652,925,030	134,203,765	79.4%	78.4GB	51.1GB	34.8%	56.5min	618.9min	$\times 10.95$

Table 1: Comparison of different Hermes ZK rollup circuits before and after the CIRCOM compiler applies optimization techniques to reduce the number of constraints describing the circuits.

for the compilation is 12.05min. On the other hand, the simplification allows us to reduce the number of constraints up to 24,301,347, whose file size is 8.5GB and the compilation time is increased up to 38.92min. Note that in this case, the reduction on the number of constraints is close to 82%, whereas the size of the .r1cs file is not reduced in the same proportion. This is due to the fact that constraint simplification often implies the addition of new variables in the remaining constraints.

The cost of simplification is that compilation time increases slightly more than three times. In the other circuits, the gain is similar, a reduction of around 80% in the number of constraints and 40% in the file size, but compilation time increases considerably more when dealing with more than 500 millions of constraints. The reason for this, is that the amount of RAM memory needed in the simplification process reaches a peak of around 750GB, which is far larger than the memory of the used machine, which has 270GB of RAM, and hence, a lot of swap memory needs to be used. This fact notably affects the performance. In this sense, the job of the compiler is to keep a right balance between constraints reduction and the time needed for it.

Note that with circuits from Table 1, CIRCOM produces around 100 million constraints (500 million without simplification). With these numbers, ZK-rollups can handle around 2,000 transactions. Take into account that the software used afterwards to generate and validate ZK-SNARK proofs may also have bounds. In fact, thanks to simplification, we can handle up to 2,341 transactions without exceeding the limit of 2^{27} constraints that SNARKJS can handle. Processing a batch of this size needs less than 2.1 million gas, so with this amount of transactions per batch and the current Ethereum gas limit per block of 30 millions, we have that we can process 32,774 transfer transactions per block, which is around 23 times more transfers than if they were executed directly in the Ethereum blockchain.

The performance evaluation shows how current simplifications applied by the compiler are crucial for the use of CIRCOM in industrial circuits describing real-world problems. However, the simplification previously described only tackles the redundancies among linear constraints, even though there can be non-linear constraints which can be also reduced. This is a far more complex problem and remains as future work to be studied and integrated within CIRCOM.

6 ANALYSIS

To start our analysis, we have to introduce the concept of *correct* CIRCOM program. Before giving the formal definition,

we set some notation. Let $\mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m}$ be the set of all circuits that can be programmed in CIRCOM with n input signals, t intermediate signals, and m output signals. Given a circuit $C \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m}$, we denote by $\mathcal{C}(C)$ to the set of constraints generated by CIRCOM. Let $W : \mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m} \times \mathbb{F}_p^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p^t \times \mathbb{F}_p^m$ be a partial function that takes a circuit $C \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m}$ and n values for the input signals, such that it returns the t values of the intermediate signals and the m values of the output signals. This function describes the computation made by the executable code obtained from compiling C after the input values are given. Note that W is a partial function, since not every input of a circuit produces a valid output.

Definition 17 (Correct CIRCOM program). A CIRCOM program $C \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m}$ is said to be *correct* if for every given values $\vec{i} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ for the n input signals of C , we have that: if $\mathcal{C}(C)$ replacing the inputs signals by \vec{i} is satisfiable, then $W(C, \vec{i}) = (\vec{t}, \vec{o}) \in \mathbb{F}_p^t \times \mathbb{F}_p^m$ and $(\vec{i}, \vec{t}, \vec{o})$ is a solution to the system $\mathcal{C}(C)$. Otherwise, we say that C is *incorrect*.

However, correct circuit programs are not enough to ensure that a CIRCOM program is adequate to be used in the context of security protocols. In many cases, we need the R1CS constraint system to have a unique solution once the values of the input signals are set. A CIRCOM program is called *strongly safe* when the values computed by the executable code are the unique solution to the R1CS constraint system. In a correct and strongly safe CIRCOM program, both the R1CS constraint system and the executable code describe the same set of solutions: since the computation of the executable code is deterministic, by correctness and uniqueness the constraint system can only be satisfied by the intermediate and output values produced by the code and a set of inputs. Since both the code and the constraints of a correct and strongly safe CIRCOM program provide the same relation among inputs and intermediate and output signals, we can safely use them in a ZK tool.

Sometimes this notion of safety involving all signals including the intermediate ones could be too strong for some components as it happens with the `IsZero` circuit from Section 3.10. Notice that when the value of signal `in` is 0, the computation sets the intermediate signal `inv` also to be 0, but `inv` can take any value according to the constraints in the template. For these reasons, there is an alternative weaker notion of safety, which only requires the constraints and the code to meet on inputs and outputs, but not necessarily on the intermediates. When safety is proved in a modular way, that is to say, using the fact that subcomponents are already been proved to be safe, then

both notions are very similar and the intermediate signals locally used in the subcomponents are the only ones that are not considered. Let us provide a precise definition for these concepts.

Definition 18 (Safe CIRCOM program). A CIRCOM program $C \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times t \times m}$ is said to be *strongly safe* if for every given values $\vec{i} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$ for the n input signals of c , we have that: if $W(C, \vec{i}) = (\vec{t}, \vec{o}) \in \mathbb{F}_p^t \times \mathbb{F}_p^m$, then $(\vec{i}, \vec{t}, \vec{o})$ is the only solution of $\mathcal{C}(C)$, and it is said to be *safe* if all solutions of $\mathcal{C}(C)$ are of the form $(\vec{i}, \vec{t}', \vec{o})$. Otherwise, the program is called *unsafe*.

Notice that every strongly safe CIRCOM program is also a safe program. A safe program can always be converted into a strongly safe program by adding new constraints which enforce that, given the input values, the intermediate and output signals are a unique solution for the program. For instance, template `IsZero` can be converted into a strongly safe template by adding the constraint `inv * out === 0` to the R1CS constraint system.

Lemma 19. *A strongly safe CIRCOM program is deterministic.*

Proof. From definition 18, we deduce that, given a safe CIRCOM program C and an input \vec{i} for this program, if there exists an output \vec{o} and an intermediate \vec{t} for C , then it must be unique. \square

The following results show that many times both kinds of safety are guaranteed by construction.

Lemma 20. *A CIRCOM program is strongly safe if it is written without using `<--` and `-->` and all its intermediate and output signals are the target of an assignment operation.*

Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume the program only uses right-to-left operators. If a program does not use operator `<--`, the value of a signal can only be assigned using operator `<==`. At the computational level, this instruction is translated as an assignment where the signal on the left obtains the same value as the value of the expression on the right. At the constraint level, this instruction introduces a new constraint where both sides must have the same value. Consequently, this constraint is guaranteed once the assignment is executed and, since signals are immutable, and they can only have one single value assigned, this constraint remains true. Furthermore, the executable code generated by CIRCOM is deterministic, then, given the same inputs, each signal always obtains the same value. Then, there must be only one solution.

Apart from `<==`, the operator `===` also adds new constraints to the constraint system, and an *assert* in the computational level. As a result, either the program has no result for the input or the constraints are guaranteed to be satisfied by the result. \square

Circuits programmed using `<--` or `-->` are considered unsafe if not proved otherwise. Currently, there are no automatic tools that can prove safety of CIRCOM programs. In general, using unsafe circuits inside our own circuits should be avoided, since it could contain errors that could compromise the cryptographic security.

A template is said to be safe if all its possible instantiations are safe circuits. All templates defined in the CIRCOM libraries have been manually proved to be safe. Note that this is not a trivial task.

The previous safety result can be easily extended to the case where the circuit is programmed using only safe templates and new code not containing `<--` or `-->`. Hence, many circuits are guaranteed to be safe by construction. Moreover, these modularity results ease the task of manually checking the safety property of a circuit as it can be locally proved template by template, assuming inductively that its subcomponents are safe. That is, if a circuit C is composed only by strongly safe subcomponents C_1, \dots, C_n , then C is also strongly safe.

7 RELATED WORK

The appealing properties of ZK-SNARKs set off the development of different software that allow the generation and verification of these proofs. The first practical implementation was LIBSNARK [34], a library from 2017 with several ZK-SNARK proving schemes. LIBSNARK was developed by the Succinct Computational Integrity and Privacy Research Laboratory (SCIPR Lab) and it is written in C++. The same year, Zcash released BELLMAN [35], a Rust crate for building ZK-SNARK circuits that provides circuit traits, primitive structures, and basic gadget implementations. Both LIBSNARK and BELLMAN work very well in desktop/server applications and can be used in the Ethereum blockchain, but they do not have Solidity support.

For the last few years, there has been efforts towards new programming languages that not only facilitate the generation and verification of ZK-SNARK proofs, but focus on arithmetic circuit constructions and constraint encodings. In this regard, in 2018, the Technical University (TU) of Berlin developed ZOKRATES [36], a programming language and a toolbox for ZK-SNARKs on Ethereum written in Python. The software was intended to help programmers use verifiable computation in their *decentralized application* (DApp) from the specification of a program in a high-level language in order to generate proofs of computation and verify those proofs in Solidity. ZOKRATES is a good DSL for web applications with Solidity support. The downside of ZOKRATES is that it is only meant to be used with Ethereum.

ZINC [37] is a DSL from MatterLabs which borrows the Rust syntax and semantics with minor differences due to the particularities of R1CS representations. It is a Turing-incomplete language, as it does not allow recursion and variable loop indexes. ZINC code is always compiled to the most efficient circuit representation possible. A common aspect between ZOKRATES and ZINC is that both languages are high-level with respect to circuit constructions, which allows the programmer to abstract the technicalities of building R1CS circuits. In comparison, CIRCOM is conceived as a low-level programming language, which gives developers the advantage of being more flexible in the level of precision for describing a circuit.

Another programming language that deals with arithmetic circuits in a low level is SNARKY [38, Sec. 8.1], an OCaml-based language with a back end based on LIBSNARK. It was developed by O(1)-Labs together with the

New York University (NYU) and it is used in CODA, a project building a succinct blockchain via recursive composition of ZK proofs. SNARKY is a library for writing verifiable programs in both OCaml and ReasonML functional languages. The main difference between CIRCOM and SNARKY is the programming paradigm they use. While CIRCOM is an imperative DSL based on the syntax of C, SNARKY has a functional nature that can be challenging for many developers.

To sum up, CIRCOM was conceived to keep a fair balance between the flexibility and full control of the circuit designs written in a low-level language like SNARKY, and the easiness and developer-friendliness of high-level languages like ZOKRATES and ZINC. This way, CIRCOM is reliable and simple at the same time, and can be quickly learned by most software developers.

8 CONCLUSION

In this article we present CIRCOM, a new language for describing circuits for generating ZK proofs and its associated compiler. CIRCOM allows programmers to describe arithmetic circuits using a C-like language. The compiler is responsible for generating all the necessary material to, later, produce ZK-SNARK proofs about instances of that circuit using another automatic tool. In particular, CIRCOM can be complemented with SNARKJS, a tool that implements different ZK-SNARK protocols such as [4], [6], [22].

Over the last few years, many ZK protocols have emerged to improve different efficiency and security aspects. However, certain tools that were initially developed had fixed structures that were incompatible with some of the techniques and circuit encoding used by the new wave of improved protocols. The novelty of CIRCOM is that it was conceived from the beginning as a compiler adaptable to other arithmetic-circuit encodings, and also, that it decouples the description of the computational problem from the specific ZK protocol. As a result, the logic of CIRCOM still holds with other encoding and future ZK protocols.

The philosophy of CIRCOM is that programmers have full control over the exact construction of arithmetic circuits. Sometimes, CIRCOM developers may introduce more constraints than needed, deteriorating the efficiency of the compiler. Another source of inefficiency is due to modularity, which may introduce redundant linear constraints capturing the relationship between inputs and outputs of different subcomponents of a circuit. Our performance evaluation shows that the simplification process alleviates these problems and helps the compiler optimize the representation of the constraints describing large circuits.

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