On-board Credentials with Open Provisioning

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ABSTRACT

Securely storing and using credentials is critical for ensuring the security of many modern distributed applications. Existing approaches to address this problem fall short. User memorizable passwords are flexible and cheap, but they suffer from bad usability and low security. On the other hand, dedicated hardware tokens provide high levels of security, but the logistics of manufacturing and provisioning such tokens are expensive, which makes them unattractive for most service providers. A new approach to address the problem has become possible due to the fact that several types of general-purpose secure hardware, like TPM and M-shield, are becoming widely deployed. These platforms enable, to different degrees, a strongly isolated secure environment. In this paper, we describe how we use general-purpose secure hardware to develop an architecture for credentials which we call *On-board Credentials* (ObCs). ObCs combine the flexibility of virtual credentials with the higher levels of protection due to the use of secure hardware. A distinguishing feature of the ObC architecture is that it is *open*: it allows anyone to design and deploy new credential algorithms to ObC-capable devices without approval from the device manufacturer or any other third party. The primary contribution of this paper is showing and solving the technical challenges in achieving openness while avoiding additional costs (by making use of already deployed secure hardware) and without compromising security (e.g., ensuring strong isolation). Our proposed architecture is designed with the constraints of existing secure hardware in mind and has been prototyped on several different platforms including mobile devices based on M-Shield secure hardware.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

D.4.6 [**Software**]: Operating Systems—*Security and Protection*; K.6.5 [**Computing Milieux**]: Management of Computing and Information Systems—*Security and Protection*

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General Terms

Security

Keywords

Trusted computing, credentials, secure hardware, provisioning protocols

1. INTRODUCTION

Cryptographic protocols play an essential role in protecting distributed applications like access to enterprise networks, on-line banking, and access to other web-based services in general. These protocols make use of *credentials*, consisting of items of secret data, like keys, and associated algorithms that apply cryptographic transforms to the secret data. Secure installation, storage and usage of credentials is critical for ensuring the security of the applications that rely on them.

Existing approaches to address this problem fall short. The most prevalent approach currently used for user authentication is based on user passwords and requires users to memorize passwords. This suffers from bad usability and is vulnerable to phishing. Although various identity management systems supporting Single Sign-On would minimize the number of passwords a user has to remember, it is unlikely that all the services a user wants to use would rely on the same trust domain. In other words, a user will need to be able to authenticate to many different trust domains. "Password managers", such as those found in popular web browsers, ease the usability problem somewhat, but are open to software attacks, like Trojans that steal passwords.

At the other extreme, dedicated hardware tokens provide high levels of security. The most widespread example of a hardware security token is the smart card containing the subscriber identity module (SIM) used for authenticating access to Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) cellular networks. However, the logistics of manufacturing and provisioning hardware tokens are expensive, which makes it unattractive for most service providers to issue their own hardware tokens. Although multi-application smart cards exist, and can support different credentials on the same card, they are not in widespread use with credentials from *multiple sources*. This is primarily because applications have to be authorized with respect to a finite set of trust domains (e.g., the smart card issuer's domain) pre-loaded on the card. Although sometimes such restrictions are policy decisions, in some cases, they are crucial

to the security of the system. An example of the latter is the case of JavaCards that do not have a bytecode verifier. The consequence of such restrictions, technical or otherwise, is that a service provider who wants to use an existing installed base of multi-application smart cards has to obtain permission from the card-issuer in order to deploy new credentials to them. Such procedural obstacles, in turn, makes it unattractive for service providers to share the hardware tokens issued by others. This has led to a situation that in practice, users end up having to carry several different hardware tokens to authenticate to different services.

Thus, on the one hand we have a cheap, flexible but not very secure software-only solutions like password managers, and on the other hand we have more secure, but expensive, inflexible, and usually dedicated solutions like hardware tokens.

In the last decade or so, several types of general-purpose secure hardware have been incorporated into end user devices and are starting to be widely deployed. These include Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) [20] and Mobile Trusted Modules (MTM) [7] specified by the Trusted Computing Group and other platforms like M-Shield [17] and ARM TrustZone [1]. All these platforms enable, to different degrees, a strongly isolated secure environment, consisting of secure storage, and in some cases supporting secure execution where processing and memory are isolated from the rest of the system. TPMs are already available on many high-end personal computers. Several mid-range and high-end Nokia phones utilize hardware security features based on the M-Shield platform.

In this paper, we first describe how we use such general-purpose secure hardware to develop an architecture for credentials which we call "On-board Credentials" (ObCs) and then focus on secure provisioning of ObCs. ObCs combine the flexibility of virtual credentials with the higher levels of protection due to the use of secure hardware.

Our contribution in this paper is to define an architecture for credentials that is *simultaneously*

- **inexpensive** to deploy, by making use of existing general-purpose secure hardware rather than designing and provisioning new hardware tokens,
- **open**, so as to allow any service provider to provision new credential secrets as well as new credential algorithms to a user's device without having to co-ordinate with or obtain permission from any third party, and
- **secure** enough such that the credentials are protected from software and hardware attacks to the extent permitted by the underlying secure hardware.

We begin by describing our assumptions about the underlying secure environment and the requirements for an open credential architecture. We then give an overview of the ObC architecture followed by a more detailed description of the provisioning architecture which allows anyone to design and deploy credential algorithms without any third-party screening or approval, while still protecting malicious credential algorithms from stealing other credentials on the same device. After that, we briefly describe our current implementation. We conclude with an informal security analysis and a short review of current and related work.

2. ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

2.1 Assumptions

We assume the availability of a general-purpose *secure environment* with the following features:

- *Isolated secure execution environment:* It must be possible to execute trusted code in a strongly isolated fashion from untrusted code executing on the same device. Preferably the secure execution environment
  - is supported by the secure hardware itself so that it is isolated even from the general-purpose operating system on the device, and
  - can use on-chip runtime memory, because in contemporary computing platforms, and especially mobile ones, externally located memory and unprotected memory buses are a commonly used attack vector for breaking the isolation of programs and their data.
- *Secure storage:* It must be possible for trusted code to securely store persistent data so that their confidentiality and integrity can be assured. It is not necessary to store all sensitive data within the secure environment itself. Typically, if a unique, device-specific secret is available only in the secure execution environment, it can be used to protect data which can be stored in untrusted external storage. Persistent data must also be protected against roll-back attacks. This can be achieved, for example, by using device-specific trusted counters or a secure clock reference.
- *Integrity of secure environment:* Secure storage naturally implies that there must be a way to ensure the integrity of the secure environment so that persistently stored data is accessible only by the secure environment. Additionally, a remote party may want to either send some confidential data to trusted software executing in the secure environment or may want a proof that a certain computation was actually carried out within the secure environment. Both of these require the means to ensure the integrity of the secure environment. This can be achieved using secure boot (only authorized software is allowed to be loaded during the secure environment boot process) or authenticated boot (any software can be loaded during the boot process, but a secure record of the loaded software is retained and can be used for access control or reporting).

2.2 Example Secure Environments

M-Shield: Texas Instruments' M-Shield is an example of a general-purpose secure environment that meets these assumptions. M-Shield is a security architecture available for the OMAP platform used in mobile devices. It has a secure environment consisting of a small amount of on-chip ROM and RAM, as well as one-time programmable memory where unique device key(s) can be maintained. All of these are only accessible in a secure execution environment implemented as a special "secure processor mode" of the main CPU. This secure processor mode could be viewed as a *Ring -1* privilege level. Special trusted applications, called "protected applications" (PAs), are the only software permitted to run in the

secure environment. Ordinary software, including the device operating system, is therefore isolated from the secure environment. M-Shield supports secure boot so that only authorized software (device OS as well as protected applications) can be run on the device. For more detailed information on M-Shield, see [17]. M-Shield-like secure environments can be built on top of the ARM TrustZone architecture as well.

TPM: TPMs [20] are usually separate hardware modules with their own processor. They enable secure storage (in the form of sealed data that can be bound to a specific configuration) and authenticated boot. A TPM only allows a set of predefined cryptographic algorithms to be executed within the TPM itself; it does not provide an execution environment for arbitrary code within the TPM. Thus a TPM-based secure environment has to rely on the operating system to provide secure execution. This provides a lower level of isolation than in the case of environments like M-Shield because the entire operating system kernel becomes part of the trusted computing base. Dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) technology for TPMs as implemented by Intel and AMD processors can be used along the lines described in [14] to minimize the part of the operating system that needs to be trusted. Nevertheless the secure execution environment has to use the main memory as its runtime memory and is vulnerable to attacks on main memory [10], unlike in the case of M-Shield-like secure environments where secure execution can use on-chip memory.

Hypervisor: A hypervisor can also be used to provide an isolated secure execution environment along the lines described in [8]: the normal device operating system and other untrusted software will run as one guest of the hypervisor while the secure execution environment can run as a separate guest. The hypervisor can be combined with TPM-enabled authenticated boot. Again, the level of isolation of secure execution is lower than in M-Shield-like secure environments because of the use of main memory.

As we noted already, Nokia phone models using hardware security features of the M-Shield platform already exist. Hence, this has been the primary target environment for our implementation of the ObC architecture although it can, and has been, implemented on top of other secure environments such as an off-the-shelf, TPM-enabled Linux PC and a virtualized environment on a Nokia N800 Internet Tablet using a commercial secure hypervisor (see [6]).

2.3 Terminology

Before we go on to describe the requirements, let us fix some terminology. As we mentioned in Section 1, our objective is to design an inexpensive, open, and secure platform for credentials by leveraging on-board secure environments. A credential consists of *credential secrets* such as keys, and an algorithm that operates on these secrets known as a *credential program*. In the context of ObC architecture, we sometimes refer to credential programs as *ObC programs* and credential secrets as *ObC secrets*. We refer to a realization of the ObC architecture as an *ObC system*. We will explain other terminology as they are introduced.

2.4 Requirements

Our initial goal is to minimize the cost of implementing and deploying an ObC system. To achieve this, we *re-use existing secure environments* like M-Shield hardware security features rather than design a new one. The design should therefore take the constraints of the existing secure environments into account. For example, in secure environments with on-chip memory, the amount of memory available for an ObC system is very small: as little as ten(s) of kilobytes of RAM, and ROM sizes limited to hundreds of kilobytes at most. Thus, our first requirement is that an ObC system should have a minimal code and memory footprint. Although not every secure environment would have such stringent resource limitations, we still chose to consider the minimal footprint requirement rather than design different types of ObC architectures for different secure environments.

The second goal is to keep the system open: it should be possible for anyone to develop and deploy new ObC programs or provision secrets to existing ObC programs without having to obtain the permission of the device manufacturer or any other third party. Yet, such *openness must not compromise the third goal of a secure ObC system*. Recall that credential programs will execute in the secure environment. An ObC system must therefore be designed so that a malicious or errant credential program cannot harm or abuse the resources in the secure environment. This leads to two requirements: the design must ensure the protection of

- sensitive data of the secure environment, such as device-specific keys, should be isolated from credential programs, and
- resources, such as memory and CPU time, consumed by credential programs must be controlled.

Similarly, an entity relying on one credential program does not necessarily trust other credential programs. Thus, a further requirement is that credential programs must be isolated from one another both during run-time and in their access to persistent data.

By default, this last requirement implies that a credential program will not be able to access persistent data of another credential program. However, there are situations where such sharing of persistent data is essential. For example, when a new version of a credential program is installed, it should be able to have access to the same data as its predecessors (programs with lower version numbers). Also, the need to minimize the footprint of an ObC system imposes constraints on the size of credential programs or their data, implying that the intended credential functionality may need to be split between two or more programs. Because of such cases, the ObC architecture must provide a way to define a group of programs that can share access to confidential persistent data.

Finally, we have two requirements on provisioning. First, an issuer of credentials needs a way to encrypt the credential secrets so that they are accessible *only* to a specific group of credential programs on one or more specific devices. This requirement is not addressed by any of the existing provisioning protocols, such as the standardized key transport protocols [15, 3] or device management protocols [16]. Second, if the credential program itself is confidential, then a similar mechanism is needed to encrypt the confidential program so that it can be decrypted only inside the secure environment of specific devices.

To summarize, we have identified that the code- and memory footprint is crucial requirement for an ObC system in order to meet the objective of reusing existing secure environments. In addition, we have identified the following security requirements for an ObC system:



Figure 1: ObC architecture

- **isolation of credential programs**:
  - isolation of secure environment resources from credential programs
  - control of resource consumption by credential programs
  - isolation of credential programs from one another, both at runtime as well as in access to persistently stored data
- **authorized sharing of credential secrets** by a group of programs
- **security of provisioning**:
  - provisioning credential secrets so that they are only accessible to a specific group of credential programs on specific devices
  - provisioning confidential credential programs so that they can be only decrypted within the secure environment of specific devices

3. OBC ARCHITECTURE

Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of our proposed ObC architecture. We describe the components by stating our main architectural design decisions and explaining the rationales behind them.

ObC interpreter: Isolating credential programs from the secure environment resources can be achieved by providing a virtualized environment where the programs can be run.

Our minimal footprint requirement aiming at very limited RAM usage, rules out the use of a general-purpose virtualized execution environment because they cannot be made to fit into the space available. For example, in our primary target environment based on M-Shield, only tens of kilobytes of runtime memory is available within the secure environment. However, a simple bytecode interpreter can be designed to run even within these constraints. Thus we chose to use a bytecode interpreter as the primary component of the ObC architecture. The footprint restrictions rule out popular bytecode interpreters like JavaCard [11]. Still, we wanted to base the credential program development process for our ObC system on an existing programming language so that third-party developers could use familiar development tools. In the end, we decided to use a slimmed down version of the Lua (v2.4) language [13] for which we wrote a clean-slate interpreter. In addition to the language constructs, our interpreter also provides an interface for commonly used cryptographic primitives.

The ObC interpreter runs in the secure environment. Credential programs are scripts that can execute on the interpreter.

ObC Platform Key: Only one credential program is allowed to execute on the ObC interpreter at any given time. Therefore, the primary issue in isolating credential programs from one another is with respect to their ability to access persistently stored data.

The ObC interpreter has exclusive access to a device specific master key called the *ObC platform key* (OPK). OPK is one of the two secrets protected by the secure storage in the secure environment (the other secret is private part of the device key pair SK_D which is used in provisioning and explained in Section 4). How the OPK is initialized depends on the specific secure environment being used. For example, it can be derived from a one-time programmable (E-Fuse) persistent on-chip key [17] as in the case of M-Shield or a physically uncloneable function as in the AEGIS secure processor [18].

The ObC interpreter provides a sealing/unsealing function for ObC programs. The programs can use it to protect secret data to be stored persistently outside the secure environment. The key used for sealing/unsealing is derived by applying a key-derivation function to OPK and a digest of the code of the credential program which invokes sealing/unsealing, thereby inherently isolating persistently stored data of one credential program from another. In Section 4, we describe how this basic sealing/unsealing functionality is extended to support data sharing among a group of co-operating programs and for provisioning secret data from external provisioning entities.

Credentials Manager: Client applications use ObCs via the Credentials Manager. The Credentials Manager has a simple "secure user interface" which the user can recognize by customizing its appearance. It also manages the ObC database where sealed credential secrets and credential programs can be stored persistently. We assume that only the Credentials Manager is allowed to communicate with the ObC interpreter. The actual means of enforcing this depends on the particular operating system in which the Credentials Manager is running. For example, in Symbian Series 60 devices, we make use of Symbian OS platform security. Applications can claim a "vendor ID" if they have been verifiably signed. Only those applications with the manufacturer's vendor ID are allowed to communicate with protected applications in the secure environment. We present a more detailed description of the design and implementation of the ObC interpreter and the Credentials Manager in a technical report [6]. In the rest of this paper, we focus on the provisioning of ObCs.

We chose to separate provisioning functionality from the interpreter for two reasons. First, this separation increases reusability. The provisioning scheme could be used with different kind of interpreter and vice versa. Secondly, this approach better suits the limited memory available in the secure environment. Because provisioning and execution (in-

terpreter) are separate components they need not be running concurrently within the secure environment. This reduces the footprint of the interpreter and thereby allowing more space for ObC programs.

4. PROVISIONING

We designed the ObC provisioning system with our "openness" goal in mind: namely we want to allow *any* entity to provision secret data to a group of credential programs on a device. A necessary sub-goal is a mechanism to allow authorized sharing of credential secrets (provisioned or locally created) by a family of programs.

We assume the availability of a unique device-specific key pair. The private part of this key (SK_D) is available only inside the secure environment. The public part (PK_D) should be certified by a trusted authority as a key pair belonging to a compliant ObC system. Typically the device manufacturer will carry out this certification during the device manufacturing process.

Recall that the requirements for provisioning calls for a system that allows any provisioner the ability to provision credential secrets to a group of credential programs on a device. A trivial solution would be to just encrypt the data to be provisioned using the device public key PK_D. However, this obvious approach has two drawbacks.

First, the provisioner could not control which programs would have access to certain provisioned secrets. We need to provide a means by which the provisioner can specify the programs that can access the provisioned secrets. Second, this approach would imply that every piece of provisioned data must be packaged separately for every individual device. This is unoptimal, and unacceptable, in cases where the data being provisioned is actually shared by a group of devices. For example a content broadcast service needs to provision the same content decryption key to a large number of devices. In general, the network structure (broadcast), application structure, or the business model may necessitate the sharing of secret data by multiple devices. Therefore, we adapted a hybrid approach as follows.

4.1 Provisioning to families

We define a *family* as the group of programs and the secret data they share. This secret data can either be credential secrets generated externally and provisioned to the family, or it can be data locally generated by the programs during execution on the ObC system. A provisioner can create a new family by creating a family *root key* (RK). RK is a symmetric key and can be provisioned to devices by encrypting RK with a device public key PK_D. The resulting message is the ObC provisioning initialization message denoted as **ObCP/Init**. To begin provisioning, the provisioner (typically a provisioning server) acquires PK_D of the target device in a trustworthy manner. For example, the provisioner can obtain PK_D by receiving it from the target device itself along with a device certificate issued by the device manufacturer or by retrieving PK_D via an authenticated channel from a database maintained by the device manufacturer.

From RK we diversify two other symmetric keys. One is called *endorsement integrity key* (IK). The other is called the *confidentiality key* (CK). CK is used to protect secret data so that it can be securely transferred to target devices. The resulting secure data transfer message denoted as **ObCP/Xfer**. Once a family is provisioned with an ObCP/Init message, any number of pieces of data can be added to the family, possibly over time, by sending only ObCP/Xfer messages.

When the provisioner wants to authorize a particular ObC program to have access to the "family secrets", he has to issue an *endorsement* of the program. He can do this by constructing a message authentication code over the program identifier using IK. The resulting endorsement message is denoted **ObCP/Endorse**. Programs are identified (statistically) uniquely by referring to a cryptographic hash of the program text.[1] Using a cryptographic hash of the program text as the program identifier also implies that there is no need for an authority to manage and maintain the namespace for program identifiers. This is in keeping with the openness requirement that anyone should be able to develop and deploy new credential programs without needing permission or approval from any third party.

Our family concept is outlined in Figure 2. The immediate advantage of using families is shown in the picture; only the family key needs to be protected by the device-specific public key. The rest of the provisioning messages can be protected by keys that are cryptographically bound to RK. This makes it possible to separate the provisioning function into several components – a service that identifies devices to be ObC-compliant, and if so, provisions a root key for the family by sending a unique ObCP/Init message to each unique recipient device. Thereafter ObC program endorsements and encrypted ObC secrets can be retrieved from a publicly available service. The credential programs could even be distributed in a peer-to-peer fashion.

The family root key RK defines the scope of data sharing. All secrets provisioned under a common RK can be used by all credential programs *endorsed* by the RK in question. (This is subject to an additional check to ensure that endorsements and secrets correspond to the same "family version", which is explained further in Section 4.4). When a program is updated, the updated version can also be endorsed to the same family so that it continues to have access to the secrets used by the previous version of the program. The extent of these families is completely under the control of the provisioner who can use them to meet a variety of different security and provisioning needs. As an example, a secret may be provisioned for a single device, for a group of devices that need to share secrets or even for all devices in the system.

Most ObC programs are not likely to be confidential. Their integrity is indirectly assured, since all their persistent critical data should be sealed and a modified ObC program would not able to unseal data sealed to the original one unless the modified version has a corresponding ObCP/Endorse. However, a confidential program can be provisioned in encrypted form in an ObCP/Xfer message just like credential secrets so that they can be decrypted and used only within the secure environment of designated devices. Unlike encrypted credential secrets, encrypted credential programs

[1]In our current implementation, IK is also used to protect the integrity of payload of ObCP/Xfer messages. Similarly, CK is used to encrypt the ObCP/Endorse message as well so that program identifiers are not exposed in the clear. This is important in the case where programs themselves are not public. We are currently revising the provisioning protocol so that only one cryptographic primitive, authenticated encryption, is used to protect both ObCP/Xfer and ObCP/Endorse.



Figure 2: ObC Provisioning - key hierarchy and provisioning messages

are intended for the ObC system as a whole and not to any specific credential programs. Therefore, there is no need for any corresponding ObCP/Endorse message.

When a ObCP/Init is used to provision confidential programs we use the notation RK_P (and similarly use RK_S when it is used to provision credential secrets). Using different root keys for programs and secrets is often motivated by the business model; e.g. for access control and authentication mechanisms, the keys needed to decrypt the confidential programs are most likely managed by the supplier of the access control system, whereas keys needed for authentication are provisioned by the owner of the service that is being access controlled.

If the same RK is used for multiple devices, a side effect of using a symmetric key (IK) to endorse programs is that if an attacker compromises one device and learns RK, he can create and endorse new programs that can potentially compromise other devices. Endorsement using digital signatures as described in Section 6 avoids this risk. We chose symmetric key based endorsements for our implementation to keep the code footprint as small as possible.

4.2 Provisioning messages

Now we describe the formats of the provisioning messages in more detail.

ObCP/Init message is intended to securely transport the family root key RK to the secure environment. It is of the form:

$$\text{ObCP/Init} = PK_D(RK|PID)$$

where $PK_D()$ refers to a secure public key encryption scheme using PK_D as the encryption key, and PID is a "provisioning identifier" that can be used to set up disjoint families from the same root key, to distinguish different generations of the ObC system.

ObCP/Xfer message contains a *tag* (which identifies the payload as either a confidential ObC program or ObC secret), the payload itself and a version number defining the generation of the family that this secret payload belongs to. This data is encrypted using CK and integrity-protected using IK. In our current implementation, we use AES-CBC as the encryption algorithm $ENC()$ and HMAC-SHA1 as the integrity protection algorithm $MAC()$.

$$\text{ObCP/Xfer} = EncMac(tag|payload|version)$$

$$EncMac(data) = ENC_{CK}(data)|MAC_{IK}(ENC_{CK}(data))$$

ObCP/Endorse message contains the program identifier, obtained by taking a cryptographic hash of the program code, similarly encrypted and integrity protected using CK and IK respectively. The version number defines the generation of family secrets that this program is authorized to access. Our current implementation uses SHA1 as the cryptographic hash function $H()$.

$$\text{ObCP/Endorse} = EncMac(H(program)|version)$$

At the time of writing, we are switching to using AES-EAX as the single cryptographic primitive for protecting both ObCP/Endorse and ObCP/Xfer. Such a uniformization helps in keeping the provisioning subsystem footprint as small as possible.

In remote-provisioning scenarios we assume that these message elements are provisioned to devices using some standardized (key) provisioning protocol like OMA-DM [16], CT-KIP [15] or equivalent, which define the transport mechanisms as well as specify how the user is authenticated during provisioning. The ObC provisioning message elements are still self-contained in terms of security, and therefore are agnostic to the means of transmission.

4.3 Local data sealing

As we discussed in Section 3 (see Figure 1) one of the reasons for separating the provisioning subsystem and the interpreter is to minimize the footprint of the interpreter. The interpreter does not use the device private key (SK_D) or understand the provisioning messages. Therefore, the provisioning subsystem needs to transform the provisioning messages into local device-specific secure packages for credential secrets as well as programs to be used later by the ObC interpreter. We now describe these data packages and their formats.

The sensitive data (both secrets and confidential programs), is stored outside the secure environment (in Credentials Manager database) encrypted. The data is usable only in the local device as the keys used are device specific. We call the operation of converting data to the local storage format *sealing* and the complement operation *unsealing*.

The seal/unseal operations all use a single cryptographic primitive in the form of AES-EAX authenticated encryption using a template consisting of a fixed-length header and randomizer. The notation $AE_k()$ stands for AES-EAX authenticated encryption using this fixed template and a key k. A key derivation function $KDF_k()$ is used to derive new keys from a key k using a diversifier as input. To keep the code footprint small also $KDF()$ is based on AES-EAX: by using k as the key and the diversifier as one input to the AES-EAX computation while fixing the rest of the inputs to AES-EAX to be constant bit strings, and taking the message integrity code output from AES-EAX as the output of $KDF()$.

The provisioning subsystem seals family secrets using a family-specific sealing key called *local family key* (LFK). LFK is derived from the root key for secrets RK_S, the provisioning identifier and the family version number using OPK.

$$\text{LFK} = KDF_{OPK}(RK_S|PID|version)$$

The provisioning subsystem encrypts LFK for each program endorsed for membership in the family by using a program-specific key called *local endorsement key* (LEK) which is derived from the program identifier:

$$\text{LEK} = KDF_{OPK}(H(program))$$

The LFK is encrypted using LEK resulting in an *endorsement token* (ET). A program can only access family secrets with proper endorsement token.

$$\text{ET} = AE_{LEK}(LFK)$$

When a program is executed and it needs to handle family specific secrets, it needs as input an endorsement token. The interpreter first derives LEK, uses it to decrypt ET in order to get LFK, and then retains it within the secure environment for subsequent sealing and unsealing family secrets. If a program is not endorsed for membership of any family, then the interpreter uses LEK for sealing and unsealing (which means that the sealing/unsealing is program specific and not family specific).

Although confidential programs are provisioned through the family mechanism, the sealing of programs is not family specific. Confidential programs are sealed using *local program key* (LPK) that is the same for all programs and families in one device.

$$\text{LPK} = KDF_{OPK}(\text{“}SecretCod''\text{)}$$

Although it is possible to execute any confidential program with any family specific data, it is still not possible to use sealed data belonging to a certain family without the program being properly endorsed. In short, when a confidential program handles sealed data belonging to a family the course of events is as follows:

1. The Credentials Manager invokes the ObC interpreter with the sealed program, an endorsement token, and sealed data as input.

2. The interpreter detects a sealed program, derives device specific LPK, and decrypts the program.

3. The interpreter calculates a hash of the decrypted program, and derives the program specific LEK from the hash.

4. The interpreter recovers family specific LFK by decrypting endorsement token ET using LEK.

5. LFK can now be used for sealing/unsealing data.

The local data sealing formats were designed with the assumption that credential programs are executed as a whole. In related work [5] we are investigating the possibility of piece-wise execution of credential programs. The scheduling architecture for piece-wise execution imposes certain changes to local data sealing formats, as described in [5].



Figure 3: Provisioning messages - an example

4.4 Provisioning version control and naming

ObC secrets are assigned a *minimal* version identifier indicating the earliest family version that the secret is allowed to belong to. For ObCP/Endorse messages, the version number indicates the *maximum* version, i.e. the latest family version that a given program can gain access to. In practice this means that a provisioning operation will be successful if the version of ObCP/Xfer is not greater than the version of ObCP/Endorse. Versioning may be extended for credential life cycle management so that, for example, once an ObCP/Xfer message is accepted, the provisioning subsystem will refuse to accept older ObCP/Xfer messages for the same secret. However, this would require that secrets are named, and that the name and version information of the secrets are stored along with the secrets in local persistent storage. Neither of these is true for our current implementation.

As can be seen from the provisioning messages, there is no support for naming secrets or even linking messages that are to be used together. This is an intentional design choice in the interest of simplicity – credential naming and management metadata can be part of the provisioning protocol, or be known to participating parties in some other way.

4.5 Provisioning example

A simple example may help to clarify the provisioning concepts. Let us assume that a provisioner has a functionality that consists of two ObC programs $prog_1$ and $prog_2$ that need to share secret data (e.g, the programs might be pipelined to achieve a desired end result). Let us also assume that the provisioner wants to keep the algorithm in $prog_1$ secret and therefore wishes to transmit $prog_1$ in encrypted form. The programs operate on two pieces of secret data, $data_1$ and $data_2$.

The provisioner gets hold of a certificate containing the device public key PK_D. The provisioner will produce two ObCP/Init packages: one of these packets contains the root key for provisioning secrets (RK_S) and the other root key for provisioning confidential programs (RK_P). Both are randomly generated keys that should be kept secret. Figure 3 shows the different ObC provisioning messages needed for this scenario and the relationships between them. For sim-

plicity, we do now show confidentiality keys (CK) or endorsement integrity keys (IK) explicitly but always refer only to the corresponding root key.

The confidential program $prog_1$ is transferred by constructing an ObCP/Xfer message based on the root key RK_P to encapsulate the encrypted bytecode for $prog_1$. $prog_2$ is not confidential and can be transferred directly. Each program requires an ObCP/Endorse based on the root key RK_S. This will ensure that the secrets for the family defined by RK_S will be accessible by that program. If the provisioner wants to provision more secrets for the already endorsed program, the provisioner creates new ObCP/Xfer packages using the same RK_S.

There are two noteworthy issues. First, in this example there are two families: one for confidential programs (rooted on RK_P) and the other for credential secrets (rooted on RK_S). Both programs are endorsed to be members of the latter family so that they have shared access to the secret data automatically.

Second, only indirectly related to provisioning, the local sealing function is compatible only between programs that have been endorsed to the same family and the same family version number, i.e. in the scenario outlined above, the programs should always be distributed as sets with the equivalent version numbers if sealed data from one program is to be read by another.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

As our main implementation target we selected Nokia N95 mobile phone which runs Symbian OS v9.2 operating system on 300 MHz OMAP 2420 platform and it is, like many other Nokia mid-range and high-end phones, based on hardware security features of M-shield.

We have implemented a complete ObC system based on the architecture described in Section 3. The interpreter and the provisioning subsystem were implemented as separate M-Shield protected applications and written in C (in compiled format 5 kB in size each). The operating system level component Credentials Manager was implemented using C++ for Symbian OS. Credentials Manager uses typical Symbian client-server model and it has an SQL database for credential storage. All of these can be distributed to and installed on off-the-shelf phones in the form of standard Symbian OS software packages.

In this section, we describe our provisioning subsystem implementation, one example application built on top of the implemented ObC system, and our developer tools. For more details about implementations for other platforms see [6].

5.1 Provisioning subsystem implementation

The provisioning subsystem interface provides the following services: 1) converting provisioned secrets and confidential programs into locally sealed data, 2) endorsing programs to families, and 3) transferring confidential data between programs.

Confidential program: Confidential ObC programs need to be provisioned encrypted. The provisioning subsystem converts the provisioned program into a locally sealed data structure. The needed inputs are: ObCP/Init (containing RK_P) and ObCP/Xfer (containing the encrypted program). The provisioning subsystem returns the program encrypted using local program key (LPK).[2]

Credential secret: Securely provisioned secrets must be processed by the provisioning subsystem as well. The needed input data for provisioning a secret are: ObCP/Init (containing RK_S) and ObCP/Xfer (containing the encrypted secret). The provisioning subsystem returns a secret encrypted with LFK.

Endorsing a program: The input for endorsing an ObC program to access family secrets are: ObCP/Init (containing RK_S) and ObCP/Endorse (containing the encrypted hash of the program). The provisioning subsystem produces the endorsement token ET (LFK encrypted using LEK). Each ObC program needs its own ET in order to be able to access encrypted family secret, i.e. every program in a family needs to be separately endorsed.

Transferring confidential data between programs: Data sealed by an ObC program may need to be transferred to a (set of) ObC program(s) belonging to the same family which constitute(s) a newer version. The required inputs for this operation are: ObCP/Init (containing RK_S), ObCP/Endorse containing hash of the previous version ObC program, ObCP/Endorse containing hash of the new version ObC program, and sealed credential secret belonging to the previous version (encrypted using the previous version LFK). The provisioning subsystem produces sealed secret belonging to the new version (encrypted using the new LFK, since the version changed).

The subsystem checks that the new version number is the same or higher than the old one. This prevents data transfers to older, possibly vulnerable program versions. Regarding cases where there are several ObC programs belonging to each version, it is sufficient that each sealed data element is transferred to the next version, and that each ObC program authorized to handle the next version sealed data gets its own ObC program specific ET.

5.2 One-time token ObC

As an example of an ObC we briefly describe a widely used one-time password (or "token code") scheme that has been implemented using our ObC system. The credential program, consisting of the actual token generation algorithm was implemented as a Lua script by a research partner. The token application was written in C++ for Symbian OS and it has two components.

The first component is a provisioning client. When the token application is started, the provisioning client checks if the phone already has an installed token. If not, the phone connects to a provisioning server (implemented by the research partner) and sends the certified device public key PK_D. The server replies with two sets of provisioning messages[3]. The first consists of ObCP/Init and ObCP/Xfer messages containing the encrypted credential program for token generation. The second set consists of ObCP/Init, ObCP/Xfer and ObCP/Endorse that contain: 1) an encrypted token secret, and 2) an endorsement that grants

[2]Note that the developer of the ObC program may decide to use the same RK_P for many devices. In this case, the actual encrypted ObC program in ObCP/Xfer may have been sent to the device ahead of time, e.g., as part of the system image, or a separately available installation package common to all devices.

[3]Each set could also come from a different provisioning server.

the token generation program access to the secret. The token generation algorithm is proprietary. Therefore the token generation program is a confidential credential program and is provisioned to the device in encrypted form.

The second component of the application is a simple token UI that periodically calculates a new token code (short numeric string) using the provisioned program, provisioned secret and a PIN code which is requested from the user. The resulting token code is simply displayed to the user.

5.3 Developer tools

We have created tools to help third-party development of ObCs. First, we provide a Windows emulator of the secure environment. Essentially, the tool is a debugger, where credential program bytecode can be executed in a step-by-step fashion. Secondly, we have an ObC implementation that enables testing of credential provisioning and execution in both Symbian phones where M-Shield secure environment is not available and Symbian emulator on PCs. Both of these tools are available from the authors on request.

6. ANALYSIS

In this section, we revisit the objectives for the ObC architecture identified in Sections 1 and 2, and informally reason how well the ObC system meets those objectives.

The first objective was that the system should be inexpensive to deploy. We achieve this by leveraging existing already available hardware security environments. Our prototype implementation can be distributed as a standard add-on software package and can be installed and used on already deployed devices.

The second objective was openness in provisioning. In traditional code-signing the target device is pre-configured with a finite number of trust domains. Our concept of families allows trust domains to be created dynamically. Hence, it meets the goal of openness in that any provisioner, be it hobbyists, small organizations, user groups, or large corporations, can define and implement secure services based on the ObC architecture independently without having to obtain permission or enter into contractual obligations with the device manufacturer, network operator or any other third party.

The third objective was security, which we elaborated further by identifying three classes of security requirements in Section 2.4. We now consider those requirements.

6.1 Isolation of credential programs

In our current design, only one credential program can execute in the secure environment at any given instance. A program in execution runs until it finishes execution or is terminated by the interpreter. No interleaved execution of credential programs is possible. Thus the primary concern in isolation is with respect to persistently stored credential secrets. Secrets are sealed before being stored in the Credentials Manager database. The sealing key is derived from the program code using OPK as the key. A credential program cannot access sealed data of another credential program if the following hold true:

- OPK remains secret,
- the key derivation algorithm KDF used to derive the program-specific sealing keys (LEK) is one-way,
- the hash function $H()$ used to calculate statistically unique program identifiers is collision-free,
- the implementation of the interpreter is correct, and
- the authenticated encryption algorithm AE used to construct seals does not leak information about the plaintext.

We are currently extending the ObC interpreter to allow for on-demand paging and in-line subprogram calls for credential programs [5]. This is done in order to remove the constraint on the size of credential programs. However, piecewise execution mediated by the operating system will leak some information regarding program state. We intend to investigate ways of helping developers identify potential leakage as well as techniques to minimize the leakage.

6.2 Authorized sharing of credential secrets

The family concept allows authorized sharing of credential secrets. In order to access family secret, a program must be able to access the local family key LFK. A program can access LFK if there is a valid endorsement token ET for that program. The provisioning subsystem produces valid ET only as a result of correct ObCP/Endorse package and if there is no ET for a program it cannot access family secrets as long as the conditions for the isolation of credential programs hold.

6.3 Security of provisioned data

The security of provisioned data depends on three factors: the data is provisioned to the device of the correct user, to a valid secure environment within that device, and is accessible to the correct set of programs executing within the secure environment.

- *correct user:* the ObC provisioning system does not address user authentication. However, the use of the device public key PK_D uniquely identifies the target device. Thus, the provisioning protocol used to provision the ObC provisioning messages can correctly bind user authentication to the right PK_D.
- *correct secure environment:* ObCP/Init is encrypted for PK_D. The root key protected by ObCP/Init and the keys derived from RK to protect provisioned data will remain within the secure environment if the following hold true:
  - the corresponding SK_D remains within the secure environment,
  - the process of certifying PK_D as a valid public key is correct,
  - the provisioner has securely obtained the necessary keys needed for verifying the certificates on PK_D (such as a manufacturer's signature verification key),
  - the implementation of the provisioning subsystem is correct, and
  - the encryption schemes used in ObCP/Init and ObCP/Xfer are correct.



Figure 4: Endorsement using a digital signature

- *correct set of programs:* ObCP/Endorse enables a program to access data provisioned to a family. If the conditions listed above for provisioning the data to the correct secure environment hold, then the endorsement integrity key IK will remain within the secure environment. In this case, a program that is not intended by the provisioner cannot access family secrets as long as the message authentication code $MAC()$ used for endorsements remains one-way.

Instead of using a shared symmetric key IK to endorse programs, it is also possible to use digital signatures. The basic principle of endorsement is that the endorsement key must be cryptographically bound to the encryption key used to provision credential secrets. Suppose a provisioner has a signing key pair PK_S/SK_S. He can use SK_S to digitally sign the programs to be endorsed. In order to do this, he must include PK_S in the ObCP/Init message so that it is cryptographically bound to RK. Figure 4 shows how ObCP/Init and ObCP/Endorse are modified when digital signatures are used for endorsement.

As explained in Section 4.4, we intentionally chose to avoid naming provisioned secrets in order to keep the ObC system minimal. This choice forces the developer to correctly include and check identification information in the parameter itself whenever a secure parameter is sensitive to e.g. parameter position in the set of input parameters or to the processing program in the set of credential programs for a given family. As this is a typical feature, explicit interpreter support for parameter naming could be added. Also, allowing provisioning messages to be linked via an opaque token may be a useful feature, e.g. to help in securely binding user authentication to provisioning.

In Section 4 we made the assumption that each device has unique key pair and the public part of that key pair (PK_D) has been certified by a trusted authority, such as the device manufacturer. Note that this is very different from public key infrastructures (PKIs) which certify public keys of end users: for example, naming and enrollment are much simpler in a device PKI compared to an end-user PKI. There are already several systems (such as WiMAX device identification [21]) where device certification infrastructures are in use.

7. CURRENT WORK

In our current work, we are investigating several extensions to the ObC architecture. We briefly describe two of the most important ones. The first extension is to introduce the possibility of executing a credential program in pieces. This is motivated for a number of reasons. Chief among them is need to remove restrictions on the size of the credential program imposed by memory limitations in the underlying secure environment. Further details of the design of piece-wise execution will be described elsewhere [5].



Figure 5: SKAE style key pair attestation

The second extension is to support credential programs based on asymmetric cryptography. The current ObC provisioning system described in Section 4 is geared towards symmetric key credentials. The provisioning protocol allows the provisioner to securely transport the shared symmetric key(s) to the correct set of programs and the correct device. In contrast, asymmetric key credentials are typically created on the device itself. The essential key management step is to enroll the public part of the asymmetric key credential with a provisioner (and possibly obtain a certificate for it). Thus the provisioner's requirement is the following: given a public key for enrollment, how can the provisioner verify that the corresponding private key resides within the ObC secure environment of a correct device and is accessible to the correct set of credential programs within the device.

We can do this along the lines of the *subject key attestation evidence* (SKAE) [19] extension for X509.v3 certificates, defined by the TCG Infrastructure Group. A SKAE extension is essentially an assertion signed by a certified TPM key (the Attestation Identity Key AIK). The signed data contains a public key and the platform configuration in the presence of which the TPM will unseal and use the corresponding private key.

The ObC device-specific key pair PK_D/SK_D can be used in the same way as the TPM AIK (see Figure 5). We can foresee three possible types of asymmetric key ObCs:

1. The underlying platform may have additional device-specific key pairs (and corresponding device certificates) available for use by general-purpose applications on the device. Note that these are similar to, but *cannot be the same* as PK_D/SK_D.

2. A key pair for an asymmetric algorithm supported by the extended crypto library.

3. A key pair for an asymmetric algorithm implemented entirely in a credential program itself.

In case #1, the device certificate itself will serve as attestation evidence. In case #2, the attestation evidence will be a binding between the public key in the key pair, the identity of the credential program that created the key pair, and the identity of the credential program that requests the attestation evidence. The identity of a program is a pair consisting of $H(program)$ as well as a public identifier of the family to which the credential belongs. The public identifier of a family is deterministically derived from the family root key RK (or the endorser's public key PK_S, in the case described in previous section). In both of these cases, the attestation evidence is a statement by the ObC system that

the private key corresponding to the public key is protected by the platform. In case #2, the assertion also identifies the credential programs that have the right to use the corresponding private key.

In case #3, the ObC system cannot make a similar assertion because it cannot relate the public key to the private key. Therefore, instead of using a subject key attestation evidence, we need to provide the means for a more generic data attestation evidence which is an assertion signed with SK_D and binds some arbitrary data provided by a credential program to the identity of that credential program. A credential programs using asymmetric crypto algorithms can generate a key pair and include the public key as part of the data for which they obtain the data attestation evidence from the ObC system. Any verifier who trusts the credential program and knows the semantics of the data can infer that the private key is indeed protected by the ObC system.

8. RELATED WORK

From an architectural viewpoint, ObC is close to the Small Terminal Interoperable Platform (STIP) by the GlobalPlatform consortium [9], in that both aim to provide an open, well specified platform complete with provisioning support to be used for security services in mobile devices. However STIP is built around smart card technology whereas ObC is intended to be deployed without the need for additional hardware by making use of existing secure environments. A second difference is that STIP applications must be certified by the card issuer while the ObC provisioning system is designed for open provisioning.

McCune et al. [14] describe how the support for dynamic roots of trust in modern processors can be used in conjunction with a TPM to implement a secure execution environment as an isolated software module without having to trust the device operating system. Our architecture can be implemented using this approach: the isolated software module will consist of the ObC interpreter and the provisioning subsystem.

Gajek et al. [8] describe combining a TPM with a virtual machine monitor so that a "wallet" can be implemented as a trusted guest virtual machine. The ObC system is a generalization of the wallet and can be implemented in the same way. In [6], we describe an ObC system where isolation is based on virtualization.

Our approach of using program-specific derived keys to isolate programs from one another is similar to the "secret sharing" approach taken in AEGIS [18]. In AEGIS, the response for a given challenge depends on the physically uncloneable function on the device as well as the particular software configuration (program requesting the response and the security kernel currently executing) on the device. The response is given to the program which can use it as a secret key. In our design, the sealing key of an ObC program depends on OPK and the program itself. However the program only gains the right to use the key for sealing/unsealing. The actual program-specific key is never given out to the program.

Lee et al. describe a hardware-assisted architecture for protecting "critical secrets" in microprocessors [12, 4]. "Critical secrets" in their terminology is similar to our notion of credential secrets. However, Lee et al. focus on designing new microprocessor features whereas our focus is on *re-using* existing general-purpose secure environments. They also do not support the notion of isolating credential programs from one another or facilitating families of co-operating programs – the only software allowed to operate on critical secrets are the "trusted software modules" which are authorized by the device owner or issuer.

The related work closest to ours is the Trusted Execution Module (TEM) [2]. The motivations behind TEM are identical to ours. The TEM architecture has several similarities to the ObC architecture as well: for example, TEM also uses a bytecode interpreter executing within a secure environment and each TEM device has a unique device-specific key pair similar to PK_D/SK_D. The primary difference between TEM and ObC is in how the persistently stored data of credential programs is protected. This in turn results in different provisioning systems.

TEM uses a persistent global store with a very large address space. A piece of mutable persistent data is assigned a random address at the time of compiling a TEM program (called "closure" in TEM terminology). The address of a variable also serves as the capability to access that variable and hence must be kept confidential. The address of a given variable in a TEM program is the same on every TEM where that program runs. When a TEM program is packaged (in the form of "bound SECPacks" in TEM terminology) for a target device the addresses of persistent data it needs to use are put in a binding table which is then encrypted using the device public key. Authenticated sharing of data among TEM programs can be achieved by including the address of a variable that holds the data in the binding table of all the programs that need access to that data. Since the binding table is included at compilation time, the TEM architecture makes the implicit assumption that the same entity provisions both the TEM code and any secret data used by that code. This has two implications.

First, bandwidth and storage usage is not optimal because a device will have to receive and store multiple copies of commonly used algorithms (e.g., HTTP Digest authentication). Second, and more important, the assumption does not always hold. For example, the credential program in the example we described in Section 5.2 is a proprietary algorithm by a leading provider of one-time token systems. For that algorithm, a shared secret to authenticate a particular use to a service is chosen and provisioned by the service provider. Although the system provider could provision a bound SECPack to a device, he cannot choose the (global) address of the shared secret for the binding table because the secret is confidential to each service provider. On the other hand, the service provider cannot provision an algorithm kept secret by system provider.

The ObC provisioning architecture, as described in Section 5.2, naturally lends itself to the case where code and data come from different sources. A secondary difference between the two architectures is that unlike in ObC, there is no separate installation step in TEM. The price for not having a separate installation step is that asymmetric cryptography (decryption using SK_D) is needed every time a TEM program is executed.

Our work is also related to existing key provisioning protocols. CT-KIP [15] is an IETF standard that specifies a protocol for initialization of cryptographic tokens (hardware devices connected to computers or software modules). CT-KIP provides a mechanism to transfer secret data to a token securely. However, if credential programs from different

providers are executed within the same token, CT-KIP does not enable the provisioner to control which programs are allowed to access the provisioned secret data. Our provisioning mechanism provides more fine-grained access control for the provisioner by allowing it to provision secret data only to a selected subset of programs within the target token or device.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Although there has been significant research and development of multi-application smart cards or "white-cards", they have never been widely adopted to support credentials from multiple sources to co-exist in the same device. A likely reason is the high barrier for entry for new service providers to use cards that have been already deployed by some other issuer. As a result, the current situation is that either hardware security tokens are not used, or the user is compelled to carry separate hardware tokens for each different service provider who requires them.

Our On-board Credentials architecture addresses this issue in a manner that may stimulate larger-scale deployments of credentials. The architecture is designed so that it can be realized on secure environments that are already widely deployed for other purposes. The openness of provisioning will allow small-scale service providers to build their authentication and authorization mechanisms around ObCs for securing their services independently of device manufacturers or other stakeholders. However, the ObC architecture, solves only the first pieces of this puzzle. Several open issues remain. First, techniques for determining and describing the level of security in the secure environment on the target device are needed. Second, the provisioning server needs ways to specify policies on how the provisioned credentials are to be accessed and used locally on the target device. Third, both the security and the usability of ObC system need to be more rigorously validated.

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