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Pattern Enhanced Multi-Turn Jailbreaking: Exploiting Structural Vulnerabilities in LLM

Ragib Amin Nihal[1,2,a)] Rui Wen[1] Kazuhiro Nakadai[1] Jun Sakuma[1,2]

Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly become central to modern AI applications, yet their security remains a pressing concern. Despite progress in safety alignment, LLMs remain vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreaking attacks, where adversaries exploit conversational context to bypass safety constraints gradually. These attacks target different types of harmful content (categories like malware generation, harassment, or fraud) through distinct conversational approaches (patterns such as posing as educational discussions, sharing personal experiences, or creating hypothetical scenarios). Existing multi-turn jailbreaking methods often rely on heuristic or ad hoc exploration strategies that perform random walks through conversational space, providing limited insight into the underlying weaknesses of these models. The relationship between conversation patterns and model vulnerabilities across harm categories remains poorly understood. In this work, we propose Pattern-Enhanced Chain of Attack (PE-CoA), a systematic framework that improves jailbreak success while uncovering behavioral vulnerabilities in LLMs. PE-CoA incorporates five conversation patterns to construct highly effective multi-turn jailbreaks through natural dialogue. We evaluate PE-CoA on twelve open-source and closed-source LLMs across three benchmarks spanning ten harm categories, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Our analysis shows that models exhibit distinct vulnerability profiles, and that robustness to one pattern does not generalize to others. Additionally, models from the same family tend to share similar failure modes, suggesting that architectural and training similarities shape their susceptibilities. These findings highlight the limitations of current safety training and point toward the need for pattern-aware defenses as a foundation for more secure LLM deployment.

1. Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate significant capabilities across diverse applications, including healthcare, search engines, code synthesis, and knowledge-intensive professional tasks [1, 2, 3]. Despite these advancements, LLMs remain vulnerable to various security threats, such as prompt injection, data leakage, and adversarial manipulation. One of the most concerning of these is the class of *Jailbreak attacks*, adversarial techniques that bypass safety alignment to produce harmful outputs. These attacks matter because they enable the misuse of LLMs by undermining safety training techniques like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [4], constitutional AI [5], and other alignment mechanisms [6, 7, 8]. As LLMs expand into more applications, this security arms race increases the need to understand and address these vulnerabilities.

Existing jailbreak research focuses primarily on single-round attacks, where adversaries craft individual prompts to exploit model vulnerabilities in one interaction [9, 10, 11]. However, these approaches can be detected by modern safety systems [12, 13]. Additionally, they cannot adapt based on model responses, lack progressive context-building capabilities, and ignore conversational dynamics where users refine requests across multiple turns. As safety mechanisms improve, these limitations reduce attack success rates below 5% in commercial systems [14]. As a result, researchers have started to pay more attention to multi-turn attacks.

Multi-turn attacks [15, 16] address these limitations by gradually guiding models toward harmful outputs through *conversational context*. These attacks leverage three key characteristics: (1) *context dependency* – responses build incrementally toward harmful content, (2) *safety mechanism adaptation* – individual prompts appear harmless when examined separately, and (3) *conversational naturalness* – structured dialogue patterns avoid triggering safety filters.

Despite their effectiveness, current multi-turn attacks exhibit limitations that constrain both their practical application and theoretical understanding of LLM behaviour. These methods rely on *ad hoc* exploration strategies, performing random walks through conversational space without a guiding framework. This randomness makes attack success highly dependent on the prompting model's biases, training data, and generalization behavior. Attackers risk missing vulnerabilities that their specific models are not biased to find, while defenders cannot anticipate and protect against the full range of conversational attack patterns. The absence of systematic analysis makes it difficult to determine why some attacks are successful. Furthermore, existing attacks fail to account for how different types of harmful content may require different conversational approaches, treating all jailbreak objectives as semantically equivalent targets.

Our empirical study highlights a key insight: *conversational patterns strongly influence jailbreak success.* We identified that successful attacks rarely use direct harmful requests but instead employ distinct conversational strategies that align with natural human dialogue patterns, such

[1] Institute of Science Tokyo
[2] RIKEN AIP
[a)] ragib@ra.sc.e.titech.ac.jp



Fig. 1: Multi-turn jailbreaking attacks following different conversation patterns, showing progression toward harmful content.

as personal storytelling or hypothetical reasoning. LLMs are trained to respond helpfully to these different communication styles: personal narratives activate empathetic behaviors, and hypothetical scenarios elicit detailed rationale. When these helpful behaviors conflict with safety constraints, models may prioritize conversational appropriateness over caution, creating systematic vulnerabilities. Based on these, we introduce **Pattern Enhanced Chain of Attack (PE-CoA)**, a framework integrating conversation patterns for both attack generation and vulnerability analysis. PE-CoA extends the semantic-driven Chain of Attack methodology [17] by incorporating five empirically validated conversation patterns (detailed in Table 1). Each pattern has defined stages and progression metrics that balance pattern adherence with semantic progression toward harmful objectives. Figure 1 shows an example of how conversation patterns can lead to the same harmful outcome through distinct multi-turn conversational trajectories.

To understand the mechanisms underlying these pattern-specific vulnerabilities and their implications for AI safety, we investigate three research questions: **RQ1**: Do different LLM architectures exhibit distinct vulnerability profiles to specific conversation patterns? **RQ2**: How do pattern vulnerabilities interact with task categories? **RQ3**: How do pattern vulnerabilities interact with pattern-specific defenses? These questions help us understand why certain conversational structures create systematic vulnerabilities and how these insights can inform defensive strategies.

This work resolves three key technical challenges for the first time: (a) **Pattern Formalization:** We introduce a method for structuring multi-turn attacks using conversation patterns, replacing ad hoc exploration with organized vulnerability analysis. (b) **Pattern-Category Interaction Mapping:** We analyze how conversational patterns interact with harm categories, identifying previously unrecognized attack surfaces. For instance, we can investigate for a specific LLM, whether technical patterns are more effective for malware objectives or hypothetical scenarios better suit illegal activity requests. (c) **Model-Specific Vulnerability Profiling:** We demonstrate models exhibit distinct vulnerabilities where robustness to one pattern doesn't extend to others. Shared architectural traits cause similar failure modes within model families, enabling pattern-specific defenses instead of generic safety measures.

2. Problem Formulation

2.1 Problem Statement

LLMs process sequential text inputs to generate contextually appropriate outputs. Given an input prompt u_t and conversation history $\mathcal{H}_{t-1}$, let $\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}$ be a target LLM that generates response r_t at turn t:

$$r_t = \mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}(u_t \mid \mathcal{H}_{t-1}), \quad \mathcal{H}_{t-1} = \{(u_1, r_1), (u_2, r_2), \ldots, (u_{t-1}, r_{t-1})\}.$$

A multi-turn attack uses input sequence $\mathcal{T} = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_m\}$ over m turns, to elicit harmful responses. Success occurs for target objective $\mathcal{O}$ (e.g., illegal instructions) when any r_t satisfies $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) > \tau$, where $\mathcal{E}$ measures objective fulfillment and τ is the threshold. The attack seeks sequences maximizing:

Pattern	Core Mechanism	Key Stages	Vulnerability Target
Technical Educational	Academic framing	Concept→Application→Implementation	Helpfulness in educational contexts
Personal Experience	Narrative empathy	Sharing→Relating→Requesting	Empathetic response training
Hypothetical Scenario	Fictional distancing	Setup→Development→Application	Fictional engagement protocols
Information Seeking	Knowledge requests	General→Specific→Implementation	Information provision training
Problem Solving	Goal-oriented reasoning	Problem→Analysis→Solution	Task completion objectives

Table 1: PE-CoA Conversation Pattern Taxonomy



(a) Claude-3-haiku (b) GPT-4o-mini (c) Gemini-2-flash (d) Deepseek-chat (e) Llama2-13b (f) Vicuna-13b (g) Mistral-7B

Fig. 2: Pattern vulnerability profiles across target models evaluated using judge-based success criteria on GCG50 dataset

$$\mathcal{T}^* = \arg\max_{\mathcal{T}} \left\{ \max_{1\leq t\leq|\mathcal{T}|} \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) \right\},$$

where r_t is the response obtained at turn t during the sequential execution of $\mathcal{T}$, and $|\mathcal{T}|$ denotes the sequence length. The inner max operation evaluates all responses $\{r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{|\mathcal{T}|}\}$ during execution.

2.2 Threat Model

2.2.1 Attacker's Capabilities:

We consider the most restrictive threat model [18]: attackers access only text outputs without logits or confidence scores. The attacker can conduct multi-turn conversations through standard interfaces, using knowledge of conversational patterns and semantic evaluation of objectives. This reflects real-world conditions where adversaries interact with commercial LLMs via public APIs or web interfaces. The attacker's advantage lies in systematic exploration of conversation patterns rather than computational resources or model-specific knowledge.

2.2.2 Attacker's Goals:

The attacker aims to find conversation sequences that successfully elicit harmful responses while maintaining conversational naturalness. The attacker aims to maximize the success probability: $P(\text{Success} = 1 \mid \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}, \mathcal{O})$, where Success $= 1$ indicates at least one response r_t satisfies the objective $\mathcal{O}$. Success follows judge-based evaluation:

$$\text{Success}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{O}) = \mathbf{1}\left\{\exists t \leq |\mathcal{T}| : J(r_t, \mathcal{O}) = 1\right\},$$

where $\mathbf{1}\{\cdot\}$ is the indicator function that returns 1 if the condition is true and 0 otherwise. J is an evaluation model that determines whether response r_t fulfills harmful objective $\mathcal{O}$.

3. Method

3.1 Main Intuition of PE-CoA

Our approach is based on the following intuitions:

Intuition 1: **Alignment Dataset Structural Blind Spots**: Safety alignment relies on red-teaming datasets that underrepresent conversational structures [19]. These datasets focus on direct harmful requests while overlooking patterns that appear benign individually but enable harmful outcomes through context accumulation. If Π is all possible conversation structures, pretraining data samples from distribution π_P, while safety datasets concentrate on direct attacks ($\Pi_{\text{direct}} \subset \Pi$). This creates gaps:

$$\Pi_{\text{gap}} = \{p \in \Pi : p \in \text{Support}(\pi_P) \wedge p \notin \text{Support}(\pi_S)\}$$

Our patterns target Π_{gap}, including educational progressions, personal narratives, and hypothetical scenarios.

Intuition 2: **Task-Pattern Coupling**: Different harm categories vary in vulnerability to conversational patterns due to pretraining co-occurrences [20]. Models learn associations between task categories and contexts through pretraining [21]. Let $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k\}$ be harm categories and patterns $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_m\}$. Vulnerability function:

$$\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}, p_j, c_i) \gg \mathcal{V}(\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}, p_l, c_i) \text{for pattern pairs } (j, l) \text{ and } c_i$$

Intuition is, during pretraining, certain task-pattern combinations occur with more: malware discussions in educational contexts, illegal activities in hypothetical scenarios.

3.2 Pattern-Guided Attack Formulation

We extend the multi-turn attack problem (Section 2), by incorporating conversation patterns $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k\}$. Each pattern p_i structures dialogue through stages $\{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_l\}$, where stage s_j defines conversational goals, linguistic features, and progression rules. The attack problem seeks sequences and patterns maximizing:

$$(\mathcal{T}^*, p^*) = \arg\max_{\mathcal{T}, p\in\mathcal{P}} \left\{ \max_{1\leq t\leq|\mathcal{T}|} \mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{O}, r_t, u_t, p) \right\},$$

where $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{O}, r_t, u_t, p) = \lambda \cdot \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) + (1-\lambda) \cdot \mathcal{A}(u_t, p, s_j(t))$ combines semantic correlation with pattern adherence. $\mathcal{A}(u_t, p, s_j(t))$ measures how well prompt u_t aligns with the current stage $s_j(t)$ of pattern p at turn t, while λ balances objective progression and pattern consistency.

3.3 Pattern-Based Vulnerability Analysis

To analyze how different models respond to various conversation patterns, we define vulnerability function $\mathcal{V} : \mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}} \times \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{C} \to [0, 1]$, where $\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}, p, c)$ is the empirical success rate of pattern p against model $\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}$ for task category c. Here, $\mathcal{C}$ denotes the set of harm categories (e.g., illegal activity, hate speech). This enables analysis at multiple levels: individual pattern effectiveness, task category susceptibility across patterns, and Pattern-category interactions (e.g., technical patterns for malware objectives).



(a) Task category vulnerability profiles for closed-source models

(b) Task category vulnerability profiles for open-source models

(c) Pattern effectiveness profiles for closed-source models

(d) Pattern effectiveness profiles for open-source models

Fig. 3: Pattern-task category vulnerability analysis across model architectures

3.4 Conversation Patterns

Based on our vulnerability intuitions (Section 3.1), we formalize patterns using conversation analysis theory [22], speech act theory [23], and social engineering research [24]. Five patterns resulted from analyzing conversational structures, successful attacks, and model validation. Pattern selection criteria: (1) **Coverage Completeness** - Target distinct Π_{gap} regions exploiting safety blind spots (Intuition 1), (2) **Coupling Optimization** - Leverage frequent content-pattern associations from pretraining (Intuition 2). Table 1 presents five primary patterns, each systematically derived to exploit specific combinations of the identified intuitions.

3.5 PE-CoA: Pattern Enhanced Chain of Attack

Combinational Approach: PE-CoA extends CoA's semantic-driven method [17] by incorporating structured conversation patterns to guide multi-turn attacks. Unlike CoA, which relies solely on semantic correlation, PE-CoA combines semantic metrics with pattern adherence, maintaining both objective progression and conversational flow.

3.5.1 Language Models:

PE-CoA employs models: (1) **Attack Model** $\mathcal{M}_{\text{atk}}$ Generates pattern-aligned prompts; (2) **Target Model** $\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}$ is the system being attacked; (3) **Judge Model** $\mathcal{M}_{\text{judge}}$ determines if responses fulfill harmful requests; (4) **Semantic Correlation Model** $\text{SEM}(\cdot,\cdot)$ measures similarity between responses and target objectives using SIMCSE [25].

3.5.2 Pattern Manager:

Maintaining a repository of conversation patterns with their stage definitions, transition rules, and examples of patterns, this component coordinates by:

1. Pattern Selection: Tests all $p \in \mathcal{P}$ against objectives $\mathcal{O}$ across task categories $c \in \mathcal{C}$ to measure vulnerability function $\mathcal{V}(\mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}, p, c)$.

2. Stage Progression Monitor: Tracks current stage $s_j(t)$ using transition rules and context. Patterns define progression conditions based on conversation flow and goals.

3. Pattern Adherence Assessment: It computes adherence function $\mathcal{A}(u_t, p, s_j(t))$ by measuring similarity between generated prompts and stage-specific templates.

3.6 Attack Process

PE-CoA follows five steps:

Step 1: Pattern-Enhanced Chain Initialization. For each pattern $p \in \mathcal{P}$, the Pattern Manager guides the Attack Model to generate multiple candidate attack sequences, each following the selected pattern's stage progression. For example, Technical patterns progress: s_1 (concepts) $\rightarrow s_2$ (applications) $\rightarrow s_3$ (implementation). Each candidate receives a score of semantic progression and pattern coherence. The system selects the highest-scoring sequence as the initial $\mathcal{T}$.

Step 2: Contextual Chain Execution. PE-CoA executes the attack sequence sequentially, where each prompt u_t builds upon accumulated conversation context $\mathcal{H}_{t-1}$ while conforming to current pattern stage s_i. Each prompt is submitted to target model: $r_t = \mathcal{M}_{\text{tgt}}(u_t \mid \mathcal{H}_{t-1})$, and conversation history updates: $\mathcal{H}_t = \mathcal{H}_{t-1} \cup \{(u_t, r_t)\}$.

Step 3: Evaluation. The system evaluates chain effectiveness using the combined function $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{O}, r_t, u_t, p) = \lambda \cdot \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) + (1-\lambda) \cdot \mathcal{A}(u_t, p, s_j(t))$, where $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) = \text{SEM}(\mathcal{O}, r_t)$ and $s_j(t)$ is the current stage. The Judge Model $\mathcal{M}_{\text{judge}}$ evaluates whether the chain has successfully elicited harmful content, returning binary success determination with explanatory reasoning.

Step 4: Chain Updating Walking Strategy. Based on chain progress metrics-semantic change $\Delta\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_t) - \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{O}, r_{t-1})$ and pattern adherence $\mathcal{A}(u_t, p, s_j(t))$, the Decision Engine selects: Next Walk (advance to next turn), Regen Walk (try alternative prompts in current turn), Back Walk (return to previous turn), or Pattern Switch.

Step 5: Iterative Chain Refinement. If judge evaluation indicates success, return the complete attack sequence $\mathcal{T}^* = \{u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_t\}$. Otherwise, continue until maximum turns or switch patterns if current approach fails consistently. The complete algorithm is provided in Appendix.

4. Experimental Results

4.1 Setup

Datasets: We combine JailbreakBench [26], HarmBench [27], AdvBench [14], and original objectives to form 300 harmful objectives (30 per category) across 10 categories: Harassment/Discrimination, Malware/Hacking, Physical Harm, Economic Harm, Fraud/Deception, Disinformation, Sexual/Adult Content, Privacy, Expert Advice, and Government Decision-Making. We include GCG50 [14], the 50 most toxic objectives by OpenAI moderation scores, as challenging test cases.

Models: We use Vicuna-13b-v1.5-16k as attack model $\mathcal{M}_{\text{atk}}$ for its minimal safety restrictions, 16k context, and reproducibility. We evaluate against 12 target LLMs: closed-

Category	Before Fine-tuning					After Fine-tuning				
	Hyp	Info	Pers	Prob	Tech	Hyp	Info	Pers	Prob	Tech
Disinfo	96.7	90.0	93.3	90.0	93.3	76.7	10.0	46.7	46.7	56.7
Economic	83.3	86.7	83.3	83.3	76.7	46.7	20.0	46.7	40.0	36.7
Expert	80.0	76.7	76.7	83.3	86.7	46.7	26.7	56.7	26.7	60.0
Fraud	86.7	90.0	76.7	86.7	80.0	50.0	26.7	40.0	56.7	30.0
Harass	86.7	93.3	83.3	80.0	83.3	70.0	60.0	40.0	66.7	56.7
Malware	90.0	93.3	90.0	100.0	83.3	50.0	30.0	46.7	76.7	40.0
Harm	76.7	63.3	56.7	76.7	76.7	46.7	40.0	40.0	50.0	50.0
Privacy	93.3	86.7	93.3	90.0	90.0	40.0	16.7	30.0	26.7	20.0
Sexual	90.0	96.7	73.3	96.7	80.0	66.7	46.7	46.7	66.7	60.0
Govt	76.7	83.3	76.7	76.7	83.3	36.7	30.0	46.7	46.7	40.0

Table 2: Attack Success Rates Before and After Pattern-Specific Fine-tuning (%)

source models (Claude-3-haiku, Gemini-1.5-flash, Gemini-1.5-pro, Gemini-2.0-flash, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5-turbo) and open-source models (Llama2-7b, Llama2-13b, Llama3-8b, Deepseek-chat, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Vicuna-13b-v1.5-16k). All models are accessed as black-box systems.

Evaluation: GPT-3.5-turbo serves as judge model $\mathcal{M}_{\text{judge}}$ for its reliable harmful/benign content distinction and cost efficiency across large-scale evaluation. Following the GOAT protocol [28], we maintain constant evaluation conditions to demonstrate relative success rate improvements despite potential variation in violation definitions. Our primary metric is Attack Success Rate (ASR): **ASR@any** measures success when any of five patterns succeeds, while **ASR@best** reports the highest-performing individual pattern's success rate. Detailed on Section 4.6.

Hyperparameters: Maximum 4 conversation turns, 20 attack iterations, pattern adherence weight $\lambda = 0.7$, temperature 1.0 for attack model and 0.0 for judge, top-k sampling 0.9, SIMCSE for semantic correlation.

4.2 Architecture-Specific Vulnerability Profiles

Our empirical investigation validates **RQ1** that LLM architectures exhibit distinct vulnerability profiles to conversation patterns, as illustrated in Figure 2. This analysis was conducted on the GCG50 dataset, containing the most challenging toxic objectives ranked by OpenAI moderation scores. The profiles exploit key architectural differences. *Vicuna-13b* is highly vulnerable to Problem-Solving patterns (80%) but less vulnerable to Personal patterns (64%). This suggests its training and alignment proocess prioritized task completion, potentially weakening safety in goal-oriented contexts. In contrast, *GPT-4o-mini* is most vulnerable to Personal patterns (60%) and least vulnerable to Hypothetical scenarios (50%), indicating alignment focused on empathetic responses may have reduced safety for fictional reasoning. Simillarly, *Deepseek-chat* and *Gemini-2.0-flash* show contrasting vulnerabilities. Deepseek is highly vulnerable to Hypothetical patterns (70%) but less vulnerable to Personal patterns (62%). Gemini is vulnerable to Personal patterns (58%) but shows lower vulnerability to Technical and Information patterns (42% each). *Claude-3-haiku* and *Llama2-13b* show the strongest defenses but use different strategies. Claude maintains low vulnerability to most patterns, though it remains more susceptible to Information-seeking approaches (28%). This pattern-specific response implies its safety systems recognize conversation types. Llama2 exhibits higher overall resistance but greater vulnerability to Problem-Solving patterns (50%) than Technical ones (30%). This suggests Meta's safety alignment counters most conversational threats while partially preserving task-completion focus. *Mistral-7B* shows high vulnerability to all conversation patterns, with little variation. These vulnerability profiles indicate safety alignment strategies vary significantly across architectures.



(a) Gemini family

(b) GPT family

(c) Llama family

Fig. 4: Model family vulnerability inheritance patterns across conversational patterns and task categories.

4.3 Pattern-Category Interactions

Our **RQ2** analysis of 300 objectives across 10 task categories shows vulnerabilities can originate from both harmful data type (task categories) and conversational patterns, as illustrated in Figure 3. This framework exploits attack surfaces that single-dimension methods overlook. Attack surface expansion occurs through multiplicative effects. Instead of 10 category-based defenses, pattern interactions create 50 distinct attack vectors (10 categories $\times$ 5 patterns) with varying effectiveness. From our experiments, we see models show **task-specific pattern** preferences, matching our intuitions. Claude shows low vulnerability to Hypothetical patterns in physical harm scenarios but high vulnerability to the same pattern in harassment contexts. Simillarly, Personal patterns achieve strong success for privacy violations but weak performance in government decision-making tasks. These results demonstrate conversational context influences model behavior by task domain.

On the other hand, Vulnerability distributions differ by task type also. Information-oriented categories (disinformation, privacy) show substantial pattern sensitivity, with success rates varying by approach. Action-oriented categories (physical harm) maintain more consistent resistance across patterns. This suggests current safety mechanisms detect direct harmful instructions more effectively than harmful information extraction within conversational flows.

Competing objective activation validates our intuition about training conflicts. Models display some inverse vulnerability relationships: strength against one pattern-category combination corresponds to weakness in related

Model	ASR@any(ours)↑	ASR@best(ours)↑	Best Pattern	Other Method 1↑	Other Method 2↑	Other Method 3↑
Claude-3-haiku	**75.00**	36.67	Information	X-Training: 67.9	ActorAttack: 66.5	Crescendo: 50.0
Gemini-1.5-flash	**98.00**	70.67	Problem Solving	–	–	–
Gemini-1.5-pro	**97.67**	76.67	Hypothetical	Siren: 88.0	X-Training: 87.4	ActorAttack: 42.1
Gemini-2.0-flash	**97.00**	71.33	Technical	X-Training: 87.4	ActorAttack: 42.1	–
GPT-4o-mini	**96.92**	73.29	Information	X-Training: 94.3	GOAT ASR@10: 87.9	ActorAttack: 84.5
GPT-3.5-turbo	**96.67**	79.00	Information	X-Training: 94.3	GOAT ASR@10: 91.6	GALA: 91.0
Llama2-7b	**89.67**	66.33	Hypothetical	–	–	–
Llama2-13b	**91.67**	59.00	Hypothetical	CoA: 32.0	PAIR: 4.0	GCG 2.0
Llama3.1-8b	**97.59**	76.21	Hypothetical	GOAT ASR@10: 96.5	X-Training: 91.8	GALA: 87.0
Deepseek-chat	**98.67**	84.00	Problem Solving	X-Training: 98.1	ActorAttack: 68.6	–
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	**100.00**	95.33	Personal	Siren: 89.8	–	–
Vicuna-13b-v1.5-16k	**98.86**	86.69	Problem Solving	CoA: 96.0	PAIR: 44.0	–

ASR@any: Success when any pattern succeeds; **ASR@best**: Best individual pattern success; **ASR@10**: Success within 10 attempts

Table 3: Attack Success Rates (ASR) and Comparative Method Performance Across Models

domains. These findings provide systematic **vulnerability mapping** that enables targeted defensive strategies, focused fine-tuning efforts, and pattern-aware safety implementations.

4.4 Pattern-Specific Defense Effectiveness

To investigate whether targeted defenses can address specific pattern vulnerabilities, we fine-tuned Vicuna using LoRA [29] with Information pattern examples in disinformation scenarios, balanced with harmless examples. We found that fine-tuning against Information patterns substantially lowered defenses against Information-based attacks while offering smaller reductions against other patterns (Table 2). For instance, Problem-Solving pattern attacks against disinformation increased from 90.0% to 46.7%, showing improvement but not as dramatic as the targeted Information pattern. However, harassment and sexual content categories showed different results. Here, Information pattern fine-tuning caused smaller defense reductions than in other categories. This suggests inherent resistance to certain pattern manipulations in these domains, likely due to either stronger baseline safety measures or mismatches between conversational structures and content types. The findings show that pattern-specific defenses can be highly effective but require targeted approaches for each pattern-category combination rather than broad defensive strategies.

4.5 Model Family Vulnerability Inheritance

Our analysis shows models within the same family display similar vulnerability patterns. This suggests architectural designs and training methods create consistent vulnerability signatures across model versions. In Figure 4, Gemini models have nearly identical shapes for disinformation, privacy, and sexual content categories, indicating shared approaches in Google's development. GPT models also show strong consistency, having nearly identical vulnerability profiles across patterns and categories (correlation around 0.9 for most combinations). However, Llama family evolution reveals both consistency and divergence. While Llama2-7b and Llama2-13b maintain similar profiles Llama3-8b shows higher vulnerability. This suggests Meta's modifications in Llama3 introduced new attack surfaces despite capability improvements. Models sharing pipelines, safety datasets, and alignment procedures tend to share vulnerabilities.

4.6 Comparative Result

Although primarily designed for vulnerability analysis, PE-CoA proves highly effective as an attack method. We compared PE-CoA against established multi-turn jailbreaking techniques: ActorAttack [30], Crescendo [15], GALA [31], GOAT [28], Siren [32], PAIR [10], and X-Training [33]. Since previous methods did not conduct experiments across all LLMs in our evaluation set, we compare against the top 3 performing methods for each model where comparative data is available (Table 3). We report both ASR@any and ASR@best. ASR@any measures success when ≥ 1 of five patterns succeeds against a target. This represents PE-CoA's full capability with all integrated patterns deployed, mirroring attackers who try multiple approaches until success. ASR@best is the success rate of PE-CoA's single strongest pattern per target. PE-CoA achieves ASR@any rates of 75-100%, outperforming alternatives. While X-Training matches PE-CoA on some models (98.1% vs. 98.67% for Deepseek), our method identifies which conversational patterns work best per model.

5. Conclusion

Our initial intuition that LLMs exhibit vulnerabilities to specific conversational patterns has been conclusively validated through PE-CoA. Vulnerability differences across architectures and patterns create distinct attack surfaces missed by current safety measures, with weaknesses persisting across model families due to shared training approaches. The key findings challenge current safety assumptions. First, robustness to one conversational pattern does not generalize to others. Targeted fine-tuning against Information patterns reduced disinformation attacks from 90% to 10%, yet less protection against others. Second, pattern combinations create multiplicative vulnerabilities, generating 50 distinct attack vectors from 10 harm categories and 5 conversation patterns rather than simple additive effects. Third, PE-CoA achieves 75-100% attack success rates across diverse architectures, demonstrating that conversational structure can bypass safety mechanisms designed for content-based threats. These discoveries carry important implications for AI safety. Defensive strategies should account for the complex interplay between helpful conversational behavior and potential misuse.

Acknowledgement

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