

sectors, at 25%. Many organizations and efforts exist to attempt to narrow these unacceptable gaps in the health workforce. Yet there is less attention paid to how global health itself is practiced, especially as it relates to the world's most marginalized groups, which in many contexts include women.

Because Zika was an infectious disease with complications that were most notably expressed in women, especially pregnant women, the virus presents a unique opportunity for a gendered analysis. Some babies born to a mother infected with Zika during her pregnancy were afflicted with microcephaly, an immediately noticeable condition in which a baby is born with a small head or a head that stops growing; thus, a rapid and observable increase in such births was an immediate cause for alarm for countries affected by Zika, like Brazil. Zika is primarily transferred through mosquito bites, and the conditions that attract mosquitos (like standing water or poor sanitation) are concentrated in poor, urban areas. It was also found to spread through sexual transmission. These characteristics provide interesting opportunities for analysis across socioeconomic and demographic lines that build on previous global health security work done with other infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, measles, and malaria.

The book has several strengths that make it a welcome contribution to the global health literature. Wenham successfully presents her theoretical argument by using Zika as her case study of how women are marginalized in global health security. Zika was widely recognized as a risk to global health security, but across Latin America, where disease incidence was highest, much of the advice to residents about how to handle the virus was highly gendered: "clean your house and don't get pregnant," as described in the title of chapter 5. Wenham notes, "The women that were seen amid the crisis, those who were plastered on the front page at the global and national level were not recognized or conceptualized as women, but as mothers" (pp. 82–83). This framing of women as primarily filling the role of "mother" (including by some women themselves) is commonly seen across emergency settings, but the underlying assumptions and what they say about society are rarely questioned. Wenham does so in a clarifying and engaging manner.

Further, this motherhood framing allows for one of the strongest sections of the book, which is about the broader manifestation and implications of women's "invisibility" in international relations. The response to Zika was heavily paternalistic and securitized (including with respect to military deployment), even though, as Wenham emphasizes throughout the book, Zika and many infectious diseases often disproportionately affect women, both as patients and caregivers. Although Zika precipitated the inclusion of women as research subjects and as the target audience of outreach efforts, it marginalized their efforts in most other aspects and at all levels.

The clinical observations of the local, primarily female, clinicians who first identified microcephaly as it related to Zika were sidelined in favor of the conclusions eventually made in western journals. Domestically, women were largely ignored in terms of policy development regarding Zika, and at the global level, "the global health security regime systematically ignored women's particular needs" (p. 82). This evoked broader calls for a more feminist approach to international relations—when women and women's issues are left out of the policy conversation, the needs of women are often ignored, or they are flattened to those of mothers or women as "referent objects" (p. 173).

The minor weaknesses of the book come where more elaboration would have bolstered the arguments. For example, the concept of intersectionality, which acknowledges that "women are not identical, and gender intersects with other drivers of inequalities and social determinants of health" (p. 93), was only addressed briefly. As a core focus of the current fourth wave of feminism, however, it might have been more explicitly woven throughout the book. Further, as a global health scholar, I was intrigued by a too-brief discussion of rubella as it related to global health security in chapter 4. The gendered aspects of this nearly forgotten epidemic are rarely discussed in the global health literature, and it complemented the Zika discussion in several important ways.

In a way, the timing of this book could not be better. With so much of the current global health literature and discourse focused on COVID-19, it is refreshing to read a book on this topic using a case study of an entirely different, but still quite recent, global health security threat. The characteristics of Zika and the gendered response to it provide an optimal opportunity to argue for a feminist approach to global health security, and Wenham does so ably. This book would be beneficial reading to any scholar in political science, gender studies, or public health.

Democracy, Dictatorship, and Default: Urban-Rural Bias and Economic Crises across Regimes. By

Cameron Ballard-Rosa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 208p. \$99.99 cloth.

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Like most international relations researchers over the past 20 years, **scholars of sovereign debt have been preoccupied with the effects of regime type: democracy versus autocracy.** This is most evident in their quest to prove or disprove the existence of a democratic advantage in sovereign debt markets. Although this work is important, regime type cannot explain all the variance in sovereign

credit outcomes. Consequently, the focus on regime type has constrained the study of this crucial topic. Cameron Ballard-Rosa's book moves past the singular focus on regime type. He spares us additional regressions that seek to identify the effect of this or that national institution on sovereign debt burdens, sovereign creditworthiness, or the probability of sovereign default. Instead, he attempts to explain which democracies and which autocracies are most likely to experience a sovereign default.

Ballard-Rosa's *Democracy, Dictatorship, and Default* points to a seemingly novel variable that helps explain sovereign default in each regime type context: urbanization. Drawing on a rich political economy literature that stresses the importance of the political conflict between land and labor, he develops a theory about how a leader's decision to default is shaped by the regime type they must survive within and the degree of urbanization within the state's borders. Notably, the impact of urbanization is conditional on regime type.

In brief, the book draws on the idea that urbanization conditions the threat that protest and dissent imposes on autocratic leaders. In short, dissent is more threatening in urban locales because an aggrieved population can better overcome collective action and informational problems than those with grievances in rural areas. As such, to avoid urban protests in response to austerity measures (like curtailing food subsidies), the leaders of autocratic countries will have a greater incentive to default on sovereign debt. Austerity, on average, will pose a greater risk to their political survival. In democracies, in contrast, Ballard-Rosa argues that the mobilization advantage of population density is reversed. Because voting, not revolt, is the primary mechanism of leader removal under democracy, the book argues that those with an electoral mobilization advantage will have an easier time defending their interests during an austerity or default trade-off. Notably, the common interests of rural voters relative to a diverse urban constituency mean that leaders will have a harder time cutting off subsidies and spending directed at rural districts. As the electorate grows more rural, the survival advantage of default grows.

The theoretical contribution is notable and is competently supported by rigorous quantitative analysis and five illustrative case studies. Ballard-Rosa finds that urbanization has a large substantive effect on the probability of default in both autocracies (positive) and democracies (negative) in an analysis of within-country variation from 1960 to 2009. The analysis is robust to multiple control variables, including a state's geopolitical alignment, government spending, reliance on a borrowing mechanism (bond or commercial loan), oil rents, repressive capacity, and regime age, among others. Similarly, the cases studies of Zambia, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Turkey provide excellent illustrations of the theory's causal mechanisms in action. In all, Ballard-Rosa presents a strong case

for the importance of urbanization and how it operates through autocrats' sensitivity to food-price-related protests and democracies' concern for the electoral influence of agriculture.

The empirical analysis does leave some lingering questions that the author does not have the space to fully develop in the book; these would be interesting to explore in future research. First, it is not clear what role default plays in regime transition from autocracy to democracy and back again. Given that the evidence is based on within-country variance and the effects are estimated in separate samples of democracies and autocracies, it would be useful to understand how prior default, in conjunction with urbanization, plays a role in selection into these groups. For example, the defaults of Latin American autocracies in the 1980s were followed by both market and political reforms in the 1990s. It would be interesting to tease out how the legacies of these reforms influence a country's demographic development and future probability of default. One possibility is that heavily urbanized autocracies defaulted, which facilitated economic reforms that reduced the probability of future defaults once these states became democracies. Although the analysis controls for a variety of factors, including states having ongoing IMF programs, it does not address the impact of previous reforms on contemporary default probabilities.

In a similar vein, I would have appreciated a deeper conversation about the conditions and political legacies that cause urbanization. Most political economy scholars have a good handle on the correlates of default but less so on the development of urbanization. Absent the latter, I found it difficult to properly assess the identification strategy. For example, urbanization may be a byproduct of government strategies to develop manufacturing sectors. Post-World War II import industrialization strategies quite explicitly incentivized movement to urban environments through the promotion of heavy industry and taxes on agricultural production via marketing boards. Such policies notably led to high deficits and debt burdens; if they are also correlated with regime type, it may be the case that the consequences of import substitution (urbanization and demand for food imports) may confound the relationship between urbanization and default under autocracy. Yet, I stress that this concern is only speculative and meant to demonstrate that urbanization is likely not exogenous but potentially a product of the same policies that influence fiscal politics.

Lastly, quantitative political science is beginning to appreciate the varieties of democracies and autocracies. We have a good idea that large coalition democracies are unlikely to default. Yet, we have little understanding of how the incentives of different autocratic institutions shape default and how they might be influenced by urbanization. If urbanization does condition the political incentives of autocrats as Ballard-Rosa contends, it is

possible that they adopt institutions to insulate themselves from this pressure. As the field begins to explore the impact of variables like urbanization, it might be useful to examine the downstream effects they have on the adoption of institutions, like coup-proofing or succession rules. Such institutions may have a strong impact on economic policies that may have separate effects on debt-related outcomes and other interesting political economy outcomes.

In all, Ballard-Rosa should be congratulated for this creative and thought-provoking contribution. It serves as a model for young scholars to think out of the (regime type) box and explore how more structural factors help shape political incentives. More importantly, it demonstrates the payoff from considering how governments deploy fiscal resources, rather than just assuming that they are spending on private or public goods. There are likely to be intervening factors that place further constraints on both democratic and autocratic leaders' choice sets.

Effective Governance under Anarchy: Institutions, Legitimacy, and Social Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood.

By Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 378p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592722000743

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For more than a decade I have taught a course called “Making Government Work in Hard Places,” and every year my sense is that we have learned little about how to improve public safety and other core services in areas that are distant from population centers, low density, divided, and disrupted by insurgencies, transnational crime, or meddling neighbors. Although most of the course does not focus on service delivery in such extreme settings, the initial idea was to do so. The problem was that there were few examples of success and our theories were too blunt to be useful for policy makers. As a result, when Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse wrote *Effective Governance under Anarchy: Institutions, Legitimacy, and Social Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood*, I was eager to locate a copy.

The book begins with a puzzle. Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are always ranked as failed states in fragility indexes. Yet in Somaliland, where a significant number of Somalis live, and in the eastern DRC, some service delivery takes place and even works fairly well. Defying expectations, these areas are reasonably well governed, Börzel and Risse suggest. They then pose these questions: “How is effective and legitimate governance possible under conditions of limited statehood? How can political rule as well as security and other collective goods be provided when the state is weak or even absent” (p. 2). In other words, “What explains effective governance under anarchy?” By areas of limited

statehood, the authors mean places where “central state institutions are too weak to implement and enforce central decisions and/or to uphold a monopoly on the use of force” (p. 8).

The resulting book is at once an effort to clarify concepts, offer a theory, and assess examples. But perhaps more importantly, it is a magisterial and rather heroic literature review that helps distill the contributions and significance of myriad policy papers, case studies, and broader empirical analyses. The task of sifting through this body of work, organizing it, and extracting gems of insight surely required enormous effort. The book is a very helpful reference for this reason alone.

According to the authors, their book’s “main contention is that the absence of hierarchical governance by the state (anarchy) does not equal chaos” (p. 5). Indeed, in some situations, hierarchical administration—one of the hallmarks of a state—is unhelpful in promoting effective service delivery. Overall, the degree of “stateness” does not correlate as strongly as one might think with the quality of governance, which includes binding rules and “the provision of collective goods and services, such as security, human rights, and the rule of law, democracy, health, education, food security, and others” (p. 5).

The book offers more of a frame than a general theory that yields crisp hypotheses, but it is useful for nudging us to think about the many things that impinge on governance effectiveness, especially in the absence of the state or under “anarchic” conditions. The authors note that there are really two questions we need to answer to account for the observed variation. First, we must explain why non-state actors might want to invest in effective governance and not simply run off with whatever loot they can collect. Why are some stationary bandits, to borrow Mancur Olson’s characterization, more inclined to provide effective governance than others? The book points to a variety of possible motives. For example, disorder may threaten a warlord’s activities or the ability of traditional leaders to fulfill their roles, and bad reputations may jeopardize their ability to engage in some types of financial transactions because of international anti-money laundering rules.

The second question pertains to capacity or effectiveness. Assuming that there is an incentive to invest in service delivery, do the circumstances make it possible to succeed? The authors point to three broad types of supporting conditions, each of which interacts with the others. First, the institutional design must be fit for purpose, and personnel must possess the ability to manage processes and secure “material and ideational resources.” Furthermore, the design must be inclusive and fair—a statement that rests both on an empirical analysis in some of the papers on which the book draws and on a normative thread that runs through the text. Second, the arrangement and leadership must be perceived to be legitimate, and this legitimacy comes from participatoriness,