Mass Preferences for Financial Bailout: Evidence from the US Banking Crisis

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Abstract

What determines individual support for financial bailouts? Existing studies in the Eurozone context highlight both cultural and economic explanations. This paper examines public opinion on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a cornerstone policy of the 2008 financial recovery in the United States. Consistent with previous research, I find that support for TARP is associated with both social and economic factors, including education level, income, and partisanship. However, contrary to expectations, I do not find evidence that homeowner status predicts support for TARP, a surprising result given the centrality of mortgage defaults to the financial crisis.

1 INTRODUCTION

What drives societal divisions over financial policies? These cleavages often stem from the uneven distribution of gains and losses resulting from government intervention in the market. The 2008 financial crisis in the United States triggered sweeping changes in the domestic economy. In response, the US Treasury introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which enabled the government to purchase equity in US banks and other financial institutions (Chinn and Frieden, 2011; Sorkin, 2010) The program sparked intense debate across the political spectrum, drawing criticism from Democrats, Republicans, homeowners, and the broader public. By October 2010, a Pew Research survey revealed that 42 percent of participants believed the government loans to troubled banks and financial institutions had failed to prevent a more serious crisis (Pew Research Center, 2010). Additionally, a majority of respondents expressed the view that the program did not contribute to the recovery of the U.S. economy.

To examine public opinion on TARP, I draw on the empirical strategies commonly used in the mass IPE literature, which analyze public attitudes toward trade and immigration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001*b*,*a*; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007). Specifically, I utilize data from the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) to investigate the individual-level determinants of support for TARP (American National Election Studies, 2013). While the ANES is conducted during each presidential election cycle, the 2008 survey did not include questions about the bailout due to its timing, coinciding with the McCain-Obama presidential election in November 2008. Consequently, the 2012 ANES is the first and only iteration of the survey to feature a question directly addressing the TARP program. Similarly to Pew Resarch, approximately 40 percent of respondents in the sample expressed opposition to TARP, compared to about 15 percent who indicated their support.

Although TARP was broadly unpopular according to both the NES data and Pew Research

polls, there is limited evidence examining public opinion on TARP based on social and economic demographics. One unpublished study suggests that gender, education, and party affiliation are strongly correlated with support for TARP in a Pew Research poll (Hoffman, 2012). However, this study is limited by its small and unrepresentative sample and overlooks potentially critical factors such as homeownership and income.

This paper examines homeownership and income more closely for substantive reasons. For example, homeowners may have resented the program due to the widespread perception that it prioritized financial institutions over individuals (Frieden, 2015). Moreover, recent research suggests a growing tendency among middle-class individuals to support financial bailouts, reflecting evolving attitudes toward economic interventions (Chwieroth and Walter, 2019).

Despite the important role that the housing market played in the crisis, I find no evidence that homeowners were more or less likely to support the program. I report results that support for TARP is associated with both social and economic factors, including education level, income, and partisanship, all of which align with previous literature on financial bailouts Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014); Curtis, Jupille and Leblang (2014), as well as the general partisan politics of the US financial crisis (see Section 2).

This study also contributes to our understanding of individual preferences during the 2008 financial crisis, connecting implicitly to the growing body of literature on populism that has emerged over the past decade or so in the United States and much of Europe (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). In the US, the Wall Street bailout provoked anger across the political spectrum. On the left, the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement gained attention but quickly lost momentum, whereas the right-leaning Tea Party movement was quickly provided with direction and resources by free market conservatives, leading to its lasting impact on US politics (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2013).

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the role of the TARP program in the US financial recovery and discusses three plausible explanations for how and

why the US population would split on TARP. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results and discusses their interpretation. Section 5 concludes.

2 MASS PREFERENCES FOR BAILOUT: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The financial crisis in the United States originated from a housing crisis in the subprime lending market. In September 2008, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson went to Congress to plead for the enactment of TARP, which would inject almost $ 700 billion into the financial system. Government purchases were claimed to prop up markets and stop the financial crisis (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2013). The Treasury would use the $ 700 bilion to purchase troubled assets, especially those based on subprime mortgages, allowing banks and other financial institutions to offload toxic assets from their balance sheets Chinn and Frieden (2011). Nonetheless, Congressional support for the measure was varied. Paulson faced an uphill battle to get Congressional approval for the program, with waning support from both parties. A managing director of a New York firm told the *New York Times* that TARP should stand for the "Total Abdication of Responsibility to the Public" (Sorkin, 2010). As Paulson was a former Goldman Sachs member, congressional Democrats claimed that he was simply lining the pockets of those on Wall Street, while Republicans felt that it was an example of governmental over-extension in the economy (Sorkin, 2010).

And yet, the financial industry lobbied hard for the adoption of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which included the program (Chinn and Frieden, 2011). The EESA was defeated in Congress on September 29, 2008, by a vote of 228 to 205. It was opposed by two-thirds of Congressional Republicans, along with more than a third of Democrats. Paulson and his team continued to face blowback from both liberals and conservatives, with liberals claiming that Paulson was treating the Treasury as a "branch office of Wall Street", whereas Republicans decrying the bailout as "financial socialism" and "un-American" (Chinn and Frieden, 2011).

A revised bill came before Congress in early October 2008. This version mandated that firms that were bailed out would give government a stake in their business, and that assisted financial institutions impose restrictions on executive pay (Chinn and Frieden, 2011). On October 3, lawmakers passed the Act, 263 to 171.

Despite widespread public opposition to the program, economists and policymakers recognized it as a crucial measure to stabilize the US economy. A Congressional Oversight Panel (chaired by US Senator Elizabeth Warren) reflected on its mixed legacy in 2009, highlighting both its achievements and shortcomings. On the one hand, TARP received praise from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and independent economists for playing a pivotal role in preventing the complete collapse of the US financial system (Panel, 2009). On the other hand, Warren and other authors criticized the program for falling short in addressing the needs of struggling homeowners, particularly in preventing foreclosures and defaults:

> "Since the TARP was authorized in October 2008, 7.1 million homeowners have received foreclosure notices. Since their pre-crisis peaks, **home values have dropped 28 percent, and stock indices—which indicate the health of many Americans' most significant investments for college and retirement—have fallen 30 percent.** In short, although the TARP provided critical government support to the financial system when the financial system was in a severe crisis, its effectiveness at pursuing its broader statutory goals has been far more limited" (Panel, 2009) (emphasis added, pages 3-4).

Despite its broader macroeconomic successes, TARP faced significant controversy, largely due to a perception that it prioritized rescuing banks over aiding homeowners and the general public. The next section examines three potential pathways through which economic and cultural factors may have influenced public support for the program

2.1 *Education channel*

Previous research in the mass IPE literature has identified education as a key explanatory variable for attitudes toward both trade and immigration. Generally, individuals with higher levels of education are found to be more supportive of free trade (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001*b*; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006).

In the context of TARP, education likely serves as a proxy for both economic and cultural concerns. On the economic side, higher education is often associated with higher income, suggesting an economic channel for support. Culturally, education may correlate with values that favor government intervention in markets or reflect more altruistic or cosmopolitan perspectives.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between education and support for TARP, using data from the American National Election Studies (2013).[1] The figure reveals that among respondents with less than a college education, the predominant response was "Neither favor nor oppose." As education levels increase, respondents become increasingly likely to take a definitive opinion on TARP, with both support and opposition increasing in their responses. Notably, the only group where approval surpasses opposition is individuals with doctorate degrees, suggesting that those with the highest levels of education may be aligned with support for the program.

[1] Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the data and estimation process.

TARP Support | Education in 2012



Figure 1: *TARP Support* | *Education in 2012*. Data is sourced from the American National Election Studies (2013).

2.2 *Income channel*

Income is another channel through which preferences over governmental intervention in the economy become salient. Studies on the Eurozone have yielded mixed findings regarding the impact of income (or assets more broadly) on support for bailouts. Following the 2008 US financial market crash, Europe grappled with its own banking and debt crises. Greece and Iceland, in particular, were overwhelmed by unsustainable debt levels. By 2009, concerns mounted among investors about Greece's ability to repay its obligations, which had ballooned under a conservative government in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Chinn and Frieden, 2011). As the European currency faced significant depreciation, the rest of the Eurozone confronted a critical decision: whether to bail out struggling countries like Portugal and Greece, whose precarious finances posed a threat to the region's financial stability. Ultimately, European and international taxpayers bore the cost of a 100 billion (in euro) bailout for Greece, creating

divisions within the more prominent lender nations, such as Germany.

Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014) study mass preferences for providing such a bailout to Greeks among the German population. Using a survey experiment, they find that survey that individuals' cultural attributes are better predictors of support for the bailout than economic attributes. *Ex ante*, the authors had predicted that those with higher incomes would be less likely to support the bailout toward Greeks, in part because they would have to bear the brunt of the economic cost (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2014). Further, voters on the lower-end of the income spectrum, who rely on the German government for economic security, may also be less likely to support the policy. Nonetheless, these predictions do not hold empirically.

During this period, Iceland faced a similar to crisis to Greece. Its own debt troubles originated out of three principal banks, which borrowed tens of billions from foreign investors and financial institutions (Chinn and Frieden, 2011). During the financial crisis, Iceland's banking sector became essentially insolvent due to the highly risky assets it held on its balance sheets (Curtis, Jupille and Leblang, 2014; Chinn and Frieden, 2011). In turn, European governments (primarily the British and the Dutch) compensated their own depositors for losses tied to the Icelandic banking collapse, thereby holding the Icelandic government responsible for repayment. In 2011, the Icelandic government put the terms of a bailout to a mass referendum. Curtis, Jupille and Leblang (2014) study mass opinion on the 2011 Icelandic "Icesave 2" referendum, rare example of a financial bailout decision being put directly to a public vote on a highly specific issue. The authors show evidence that economic self-interest may have influenced voting behavior. Specifically, individuals with higher personal debt – who were more likely to suffer from potential interest rate increases – were more inclined to support the bailout terms on offer. Cultural factors, such as cosmopolitanism and altruism, played a less central role compared to a direct pocketbook effect

In the context of TARP, it is unclear how the US population might be divided. Household

income may correlate with other asset-based investments, including investments in the housing or stock market. Highest income earners may be more likely to support the program as it purported to stabilize financial markets. Conversely, it is possible that higher income earners felt threatened by the possibility of paying a greater proportion of the taxpayer money that supported banks and financial institutions, as hypothesized by Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014). However, the legislation enacting TARP required that assisted financial institutions would ultimately repay their own assistance to the federal government, and the government has both recouped and gained from its initial investments in failing financial institutions (Calomiris and Khan, 2015).[2] It seems less likely that higher income earners would be less supportive of TARP simply on account of their taxable income.

Figure 2 shows support for TARP conditional on household income. Respondents from households earning less than $ 40,000 were more likely to state that they neither favored nor opposed the program. However, as household income increased above $ 85,000 annually, respondents are increasingly likely to indicate that they favor the program. This may provide evidence of a income-based channel of support for TARP.

[2]See also the report from *The Congressional Budget Office:* "In September 2023, the last remaining investment made by the Treasury through the TARP was repaid, thereby ending the program. The Treasury no longer holds any assets related to the program and is not authorized to make further disbursements... **Taken together, other transactions with financial institutions yielded a net gain to the federal government from dividends, interest, and capital gains**" (emphasis added) (Office, 2023).

TARP Support | Household Income in 2012



Figure 2: *TARP Support* | *Household Income in 2012.* Data is sourced from the American National Election Studies (2013).

2.3 *Homeowner channel*

The final channel through which economic characteristics may influence support for TARP is homeownership. In Scheve and Slaughter (2001*b*), the authors use homeownership as a potential indicator in examining trade preferences. However, this measure has largely fallen out of the recent literature on mass preferences in IPE.

And yet, as homeowners were disproportionately impacted by the housing crisis in the 2008, it is plausible that support for TARP would split along this dimension. Between 2005 and 2008, the aggregate default rate on mortgages increased from under 3 percent to over 8 percent (Mian and Sufi, 2010). In addition, home prices declined by 31 percent between their peak in 2006 and 2010, and the US Department of the Treasury was forced to nationalize the mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in September 2008 given their enormous losses on subprime mortgage-backed securities (Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010). Accordingly,

many homeowners likely viewed TARP with disdain due to the widespread perception that it prioritized bailing out financial institutions over themselves (Frieden, 2015). As shown in Figure 3, respondents that either paid mortgages or owned their homes outright were overwhelmingly opposed to TARP.

TARP Support | Homeownership in 2012



Figure 3: *TARP Support* | *Homeownership in 2012*. Question asks: "Do you pay rent for your home, make monthly mortgage payments for your home, own your home outright with no payments due, or have some other living arrangement?" Data is sourced from American National Election Studies (2013).

The housing crisis hit different areas disproportionately. In Los Angeles, Miami, and San Diego home prices dropped between 50 and 60 percent. In Las Vegas, lower-tier home prices in 2009 were worth less than they were in 2000. According to Chinn and Frieden (2011):

> "In places like [Las Vegas, San Diego and elsewhere], half to two-thirds of all mortgages were underwater, and half of all house sales were of foreclosed properties. And the recession that began in December 2007 hit hardest precisely those regions and the people who were already having the most trouble meeting their payments"

(pg. 89).

In Section 5, I discuss a possible way to revist the ANES data in light of the geographic heterogeneity of the crisis.

3 DATA AND ESTIMATION

The exhibits in the previous sections are based on the following question from the 2012 ANES: "Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008, or TARP, also known as the Wall Street bailout?" Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of public support for TARP based on this survey.



Figure 4: *Distribution of Support for TARP, 2012.* The respondent is asked: "Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the Troubled Asset Relief Program of 2008, or TARP, also known as the Wall Street bailout?" Data is sourced from American National Election Studies (2013).

A potential limitation of using survey data is the possibility that some respondents were

unfamiliar with the TARP program, leading to relatively random responses. However, as shown in Appendix Figure A.1, NES respondents who opposed TARP were overwhelmingly supportive of the conservative Tea Party movement. This finding aligns with scholars' understanding of the Tea Party's political ideology and its opposition to government intervention (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022).

Further analysis of the data reveals a correlation between the *TARP Support* variable and blame attributed to Wall Street for the financial crisis. Specifically, individuals who placed significant blame on Wall Street were more likely to oppose TARP. This finding aligns with the prevailing sentiment that TARP was too lenient on banks. The distribution of blame, conditional on *TARP Support*, is displayed in Appendix Figure A.2.

To systematically analyze support for TARP, I construct a dichotomous dependent variable, *TARP Support*, coded as 1 for responses that favored TARP and 0 for those opposed. Responses of "neither favor nor oppose" are treated as missing, following the approach of Scheve and Slaughter (2001*b*) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006). The mean value of this binary variable is approximately 0.28.

Following Scheve and Slaughter (2001*a*), I use **income** as one main explanatory variable, **education** as another (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), and a new third variable unique to this context, **homeownership**. All three variables are dichotomized.[3] For simplicity, I call these three explanatory variables *Economic Channel*. I also collect additional data on gender, race, interest in politics, vote choice in 2008 (Obama or McCain), age, and stock ownership. Descriptive statistics on all variables in the dataset are shown in Appendix Table A.1. Conditional expectations based on covariates are shown in Appendix Figures A.3-A.8.

I estimate the following logit regression:

[3]The dummy variable *Some College* takes the value (1) if the respondent attended some college. The dummy variable *HH Income > 100k* takes the value (1) if the respondent's household earns more than $ 100,000 annually. Finally, the binary variable *Homeowner* takes the value (1) if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments.

$$\Pr(\textit{TARP Support}_i = 1) = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{Economic Channel}_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where the variable *TARP Support* takes the binary value of 0 or 1, the economic channel refers to one of three binary explanatory variables (dichotomized education, income, and home ownership) and $\mathbf{X_i}$ is a vector of all other covariates. The $\mathbf{X_i}$ variable is included in preferred specifications but omitted in baseline. Robust standard errors are included.

4 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Table 1 presents the main findings of the analysis. Specifications (1) and (2) examine the education channel, revealing that individuals with some college education are more likely to support TARP. Specifications (3) and (4) focus on the household income channel, showing larger effect sizes that are both statistically significant. In contrast, specifications (5) and (6) test the homeowner channel, but the results are inconclusive, with no significant effects detected. To provide a clearer interpretation of these findings, I show marginal effect plots for each of the baseline specifications ((1), (3), and (5)).

	TARP Support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Some College	0.487***	0.273***				
	(0.092)	(0.105)				
HH Income > 100k			0.444***	0.446***		
			(0.098)	(0.114)		
Homeowner (Binary)					0.041	0.012
					(0.085)	(0.102)
Male		0.455***		0.450***		0.457***
		(0.089)		(0.089)		(0.089)
Black		0.488***		0.526***		0.465***
		(0.153)		(0.153)		(0.153)
Interest in Politics		0.148***		0.163***		0.163***
		(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.043)
Support McCain (2008)		−1.685***		−1.705***		−1.704***
		(0.091)		(0.091)		(0.091)
Age (Brackets)		0.010		0.004		0.002
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Stock Ownership		0.253***		0.212**		0.312***
		(0.093)		(0.094)		(0.093)
Controls	–	✓	–	✓	–	✓
BIC	3723.920	3223.957	3733.250	3215.535	3753.006	3230.766
AIC	3736.009	3272.234	3745.340	3263.812	3765.096	3279.043
N	3118	3086	3118	3086	3118	3086

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on three explanatory variables: (1) Education, (2) Household Income, and (3) Homeownership. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes a college education indicator. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, age, political interest, partisanship, and stock ownership. Models (3) and (4) replace education with a household income indicator (1 if income exceeds 100k). Models (5) and (6) use a homeownership indicator. This takes the value 1 if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments to it. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table 1: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, logit specifications.*



(a) Predicted Probability of *TARP Support* based on Some College.



(b) Predicted Probability of *TARP Support* based on Household Income.



(c) Predicted Probability of *TARP Support* based on Homeownership.

Figure 5: Predicted Probability of *TARP Support*: Education, Income, and Homeowner Status

These findings highlight several important points. Firstly, individuals with higher levels of education were more likely to support TARP. This aligns with findings from Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006), which show that support for trade liberalization increases with higher levels of education. It is plausible that more educated individuals supported TARP not primarily for normative reasons but because they recognized its necessity for stabilizing the US economy.

Similarly, individuals with household incomes exceeding $100,000 annually were also more likely to support the bailout. This finding contrasts slightly with Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014), who found that higher-income Germans were less likely to support debt relief, possibly because they anticipated bearing a greater share of the burden. In specifications (5) and (6), the coefficient for homeownership is null and not statistically significant. This result is moderately surprising given the pattern observed in the descriptive statistics.

The coefficients for each covariate offer additional insights. Notably, male respondents were more likely than female respondents to support TARP, a somewhat unexpected finding that suggests several interpretations. One possibility is that men perceive financial risk differently, which may make them more inclined to back interventions like TARP. Additionally, men might have been more integrated into the workforce during this period, leading them to see the bailout as a crucial step in stabilizing the job market. It is also plausible that men, on average, hold greater financial assets than women, prompting them to view TARP as essential for their own economic interests.

Black respondents were, all else equal, more likely to support the bailout. This effect is also somewhat puzzling. According to research from the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Black homeowners were disproportionately targeted for subprime lending in the years leading up to the crisis, with subprime loans five times more likely in Black neighborhoods than in white ones (Housing and Development, 2000). And ethnographic evidence has suggested that Black tenants – and Black women in particular – have faced the greatest effect of evictions following the housing market crisis in the early 2010s (Desmond, 2016).[4]

Moreover, respondents with a higher interest in politics were more likely to support the bailout, potentially reflecting their exposure to media that emphasized its importance for

[4]Notably, the race variable in the ANES is operationalized solely on the basis of Black respondents, in part due to the substantive reasons listed above. But Appendix Figure A.4 indicates that there is greater variation in responses based on race, which could be pursued in further detail.

US financial stability. In addition, respondents who voted for and supported McCain in the 2008 election were significantly less likely to back the bailout. This could be attributed to McCain supporters being inherently more free-market conservative and less inclined toward government intervention in the economy. An alternative explanation is that the TARP program increasingly became associated with the Obama Administration, with Democrats and Republicans increasingly sorting into supporting and protesting the program based on partisanship over time.

The coefficient on age is not statistically significant and is close to zero in magnitude, indicating no observable association between age and support for TARP. This result suggests that age may not have a played a meaningful role in shaping attitudes toward the program. Unlike issues such as climate change, which often divide along generational lines, TARP may have been seen as a relatively short-term policy, minimizing age-based differences in perception.

Stock ownership was associated with greater support for the program, aligning with the asset-based channel. This finding echoes evidence from Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014), who observed similar patterns in the German-Greek context. It also falls in line with other economic accounts in the mass IPE literture, including Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014), which highlights the role of debt in the Icelandic context. In Appendix Figure B.2, I replicate these results using ordinary least squares estimation. This robustness check produces similar findings regarding the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients. I also conduct the analysis separately for the face-to-face and online versions of the NES, as shown in Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4.[5] The results of the face-to-face survey are less robust than those of the online-only survey.

I also examine whether the homeownership results are influenced by respondents who own a home but have fully paid off their mortgage. To test this, I create an additional binary

[5]The face-to-face ANES did not include questions on education level, so these specifications are excluded.

indicator for mortgage-payers only, as they may have been more vulnerable to losing their homes during the crisis. Appendix Figure B.5 shows that this variable remains insignificant.[6]

In Appendix Figure B.6, I re-estimate the logit regressions, focusing only on respondents who supported McCain in 2008. In this subset, the effects of income and education are no longer statistically significant. This suggests that partisanship plays a critical role in shaping support for TARP. Among McCain supporters, partisan attitudes and ideological preferences—such as skepticism toward government intervention—may overshadow other factors like income or education in influencing their views on the program.

5 CONCLUSION

This study sheds light on the individual determinants of support for the US government's bailout of the economy through TARP. I find evidence that respondents with higher education and income levels were more likely to support TARP, a result consistent with findings in the Eurozone context. I also examine partisanship more explicitly, finding a significant effect among Republicans, many of whom likely became supportive of the conservative Tea Party movement.

There are several promising directions for future research, particularly by incorporating the geographic distribution of support for TARP. While the ANES currently restricts access to zip code-level and state-level respondent data, obtaining such data could reveal regional patterns of TARP support. Incorporating geography might also uncover a homeownership effect, which could vary spatially based on the housing markets most affected by the crisis, including parts of Nevada, California, and Florida. Furthermore, some scholars have considered the main drivers for Congressional support for TARP and other financial deregulation (Mian and Sufi, 2010; Broz, 2005), but it would be interesting to see if this maps to constituency support for

[6]This measure still has limitations, as respondents identifying as renters in 2012 may have already lost their homes during the crisis and thus harbor greater resentment, while those still holding mortgages in 2012 might feel they navigated the crisis relatively well and retrospectively support the program.

the program as well.

Taken together, these findings reinforce results from the mass IPE literature, highlighting the influence of pocketbook- and educational drivers in shaping public opinion on important questions of political economy.

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A DATA DESCRIPTIVES



Figure A.1: *TARP Support | Tea Party.* Respondent was asked "Do you support, oppose, or neither support nor oppose the Tea Party movement?"

Table A.1: Shows descriptive statistics for dataset.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
tarp_support	3,118	0.289	0.453	0	1
some_college	5,914	0.639	0.480	0	1
above_100k_hh	5,914	0.150	0.357	0	1
own_home	5,914	0.573	0.495	0	1
mortgage_only	5,914	0.386	0.487	0	1
male_indicator	5,914	0.481	0.500	0	1
labor_force_status	5,914	0.609	0.488	0	1
black_indicator	5,914	0.094	0.291	0	1
interest_politics_cont	5,911	3.369	1.118	1	5
mccain_vote_2008	5,914	0.543	0.498	0	1
own_stock	5,914	0.402	0.490	0	1
age_group_1_13	5,854	7.434	3.329	1	13

TARP Support | Blame Banks



Figure A.2: *TARP Support* | *Blame Banks*. Respondent is asked: "How much are Wall Street bankers to blame for the poor economic conditions of the past several years? [A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all? / Not at all, a little, a moderate amount, a lot, or a great deal?]"

Tarp Support | Gender



Figure A.3: *TARP Support* | *Gender*.

TARP Support | Race



Figure A.4: *TARP Support* | *Race*.

TARP Support | Interest in Politics



Figure A.5: *TARP Support* | *Interest in Politics*. Respondent is asked: "How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?"

TARP Support | Partisanship (in 2008)



Figure A.6: *TARP Support* | *Partisanship (in 2008)*. IF indicated that they knew for sure whether they vote in 2008, respondent is then asked: "Which one [McCain, John McCain, or other] did you vote for?"

TARP Support | Age



Figure A.7: *TARP Support* | *Age*.

TARP Support | Stock Ownership



Figure A.8: *TARP Support* | *Stock Ownership*. Respondent is asked: "Do you personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market right now – either in an individual stock or in a mutual fund?"

B SUPPORTING RESULTS

	TARP Support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Some College	0.095***	0.044***				
	(0.017)	(0.017)				
HH Income > 100k			0.096***	0.081***		
			(0.022)	(0.021)		
Homeowner (Binary)					0.008	0.003
					(0.017)	(0.018)
Male		0.078***		0.076***		0.078***
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)
Black		0.095***		0.102***		0.092***
		(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.034)
Interest in Politics		0.024***		0.026***		0.027***
		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Support McCain (2008)		−0.320***		−0.322***		−0.324***
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Age (Brackets)		0.001		0.001		0.000
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.003)
Stock Ownership		0.043***		0.036**		0.053***
		(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Controls	–	✓	–	✓	–	✓
N	3118	3086	3118	3086	3118	3086
R2	0.009	0.154	0.007	0.157	0.000	0.153

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on three explanatory variables: (1) Education, (2) Household Income, and (3) Homeownership. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes a college education indicator. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, age, political interest, partisanship, and stock ownership. Models (3) and (4) replace education with a household income indicator (1 if income exceeds 100k). Models (5) and (6) use a homeownership indicator. This takes the value 1 if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments to it. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.2: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, OLS specifications.*

	TARP Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Some College	0.300**	0.120		
	(0.141)	(0.165)		
Homeowner (Binary)			0.160	0.065
			(0.134)	(0.159)
Male		0.397***		0.390***
		(0.147)		(0.146)
Black		0.386**		0.384**
		(0.172)		(0.172)
Interest in Politics		0.164**		0.174**
		(0.069)		(0.068)
Support McCain (2008)		−1.312***		−1.320***
		(0.154)		(0.153)
Age (Brackets)		0.022		0.017
		(0.024)		(0.024)
Stock Ownership		0.194		0.205
		(0.159)		(0.160)
Controls	–	✓	–	✓
BIC	1328.078	1170.395	1331.230	1170.762
AIC	1338.010	1209.878	1341.162	1210.245
N	1060	1028	1060	1028

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on two explanatory variables: (1) Education, and (2) Homeownership. Household income was not reported in the face-to-face version of the survey. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes a college education indicator. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, political interest, partisanship, and stock ownership. Models (3) and (4) use a homeownership indicator. This takes the value 1 if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments to it. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.3: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, face to face, logit specifications.*

	TARP Support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Some College	0.665***	0.409***				
	(0.124)	(0.139)				
HH Income > 100k			0.624***	0.598***		
			(0.106)	(0.125)		
Homeowner (Binary)					0.024	0.020
					(0.113)	(0.133)
Male		0.490***		0.507***		0.507***
		(0.113)		(0.114)		(0.113)
Interest in Politics		0.151***		0.165***		0.165***
		(0.056)		(0.056)		(0.056)
Support McCain (2008)		−1.903***		−1.939***		−1.925***
		(0.115)		(0.116)		(0.115)
Age (Brackets)		0.011		0.007		0.001
		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)
Stock Ownership		0.330***		0.236**		0.408***
		(0.116)		(0.119)		(0.117)
Controls	–	✓	–	✓	–	✓
BIC	2385.902	2048.357	2383.492	2034.420	2417.160	2057.153
AIC	2397.161	2087.763	2394.751	2073.827	2428.419	2096.560
N	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058	2058

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on three explanatory variables: (1) Education, (2) Household Income, and (3) Homeownership. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes a college education indicator. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, political interest, partisanship, and stock ownership. Models (3) and (4) replace education with a household income indicator (1 if income exceeds 100k). Models (5) and (6) use a homeownership indicator. This takes the value 1 if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments to it. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.4: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, online, logit specifications.*

	TARP Support	
	(1)	(2)
Mortgage (Binary)	0.028	−0.014
	(0.079)	(0.089)
Male		0.456***
		(0.089)
Black		0.464***
		(0.152)
Interest in Politics		0.163***
		(0.043)
Support McCain (2008)		−1.704***
		(0.091)
Age (Brackets)		0.003
		(0.015)
Stock Ownership		0.317***
		(0.091)
Controls	–	✓
BIC	3753.109	3230.755
AIC	3765.199	3279.032
N	3118	3086

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on an indicator for whether the respondent has a mortgage. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes an indicator for whether the respondent has a mortgage. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, age, political interest, partisanship, and stock ownership. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.5: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, Mortgage-Only.*

	TARP Support					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Some College	0.230	0.198				
	(0.152)	(0.164)				
HH Income > 100k			0.223	0.251		
			(0.173)	(0.182)		
Homeowner (Binary)					−0.128	0.099
					(0.148)	(0.174)
Male		0.456***		0.447***		0.457***
		(0.149)		(0.149)		(0.149)
Black		1.102***		1.105***		1.114***
		(0.297)		(0.297)		(0.303)
Interest in Politics		−0.058		−0.049		−0.048
		(0.068)		(0.068)		(0.068)
Age (Brackets)		−0.047**		−0.051**		−0.055**
		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.023)
Stock Ownership		0.154		0.155		0.180
		(0.155)		(0.155)		(0.155)
Controls	–	✓	–	✓	–	✓
BIC	1401.200	1360.879	1401.927	1360.503	1402.808	1362.023
AIC	1412.108	1398.988	1412.835	1398.613	1413.716	1400.132
N	1727	1710	1727	1710	1727	1710

This table presents regressions of *TARP Support*, a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent approves of the program, on three explanatory variables: (1) Education, (2) Household Income, and (3) Homeownership. Data are subset to only those who reported that they supported McCain in 2008. Data are from the 2012 ANES Survey. Model (1) includes a college education indicator. Model (2) adds controls for gender, race, political interest, and stock ownership. Models (3) and (4) replace education with a household income indicator (1 if income exceeds 100k). Models (5) and (6) use a homeownership indicator. This takes the value 1 if the respondent indicated that they either have paid off their mortgage or still make payments to it. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table B.6: *Predictors of TARP Support in ANES 2012 Survey, Republican only, logit specifications.*