

CHAPTER # 05

• SQL INJECTION ATTACK

- SQLi is an attack that exploits security vulnerability in the database layer.
- Attackers extract or manipulate 's data

→ Steps involved in SQLi Attack

1. Hacker finds a vulnerability in a custom web app & injects an SQL cmd to a db. The cmd is injected into traffic that will be accepted by the firewall.
2. The webserver sees the malicious code & sends it to the web app server
3. The web app server sees the sends it to DB server
4. The DB server executes the malicious code on DB.
5. The DB returns data from credit table.

→ Injection Technique

var ShipCity;

ShipCity = request.get("ShipCity");

var Sql = "select * from OrdersTable where

ShipCity = " " + ShipCity + " ";

Date _____

Day _____

If ShipCity is Be
if user enters "Karachi" then query becomes

Select * from OrdersTable where
ShipCity = "Karachi"

But if user entered → 'Karachi' ; DROP table

OrdersTable --  added  to indicate
that lines after this
needs to be commented

→ Now the query becomes

Select * from OrdersTable where ShipCity
= 'Karachi';  DROP table OrdersTable --


 This will be executed separately
Separates two commands .



Date _____

Day _____

▷ 3-Tier Architecture



▲ Typical SQL Injection Attack

▷ Main SQLi Attack Avenues

① User Inputs

→ Attacker supplies malicious SQL through form fields
URL parameters (GET), or POST bodies

⇒ Application directly concatenates input into SQL queries without doing any validation on input
 → Defenses:

- ↳ Use parameterized queries
- ↳ Use strong input validation
- ↳ Use ORMs that avoid raw SQL

(2) Server Variables (HTTP / Network Headers)

→ Attacker injects SQL via forged HTTP headers or other env vars that the app sees

→ Why it works: Headers are under attacker control and often assumed trusted by server-side code

→ Defenses:

- ↳ Sanitize & treat server variables as untrusted input

(3) Second-Order Injection

→ Malicious data is stored safely (partially sanitized) but later used unsafely in a different context, causing injection when the data is re-used in a new query

→ Inputs may pass initial checks; later code assumes stored data is safe.

→ Defenses:

- ↳ Always parameterize every query (even if data comes from DB)

Date

Day

(4) Cookies

- Client-controlled cookies are modified to contain SQL payloads, the server builds SQL queries using cookie value
- Example: `[auth = admin' --]` stored in cookie & used directly in `SELECT ... WHERE user = ' + cookie`.
- Defenses:
 - ↳ Treat cookies as untrusted input

(5) Physical User Input / non-web inputs

- Any external input channel (barcodes, QR codes) can carry SQL payloads that are later stored or used in queries
- E.g.: A CSV doc scanned which contains a row having value "`”;DROP table Orders;--`"
- Applications often assumed these data to be safe therefore fails to validate
- Defenses:
 - ↳ Sanitize & validate every external data source.

> SQLi Attack Types

① Inband (uses same channel for injection & results)

- ↳ Attackers inject SQL and see results directly in the application response

- ↳ It has 3 types

i- Tautology

- ↳ Inject SQL that makes a WHERE condition always TRUE

- ↳ Ex: name = '' OR 1=1 -- → return all rows

- ↳ Bypass login checks or retrieve full tables

ii- End of Line Comment

- ↳ Use comment tokens (--, #, /* ... */) to neutralize the rest of the query

- ↳ Often combined with tautology to ignore pwd checks

iii- Piggybacked queries

- ↳ Append extra queries to the intended query

- ↳ Ex: ' ; DROP table users ; --

② Inferential (blind) — attacker learns data by observing behavior

- ↳ No data is directly returned ; attacker infers result by how the application behaves

- ↳ Following are the types incorrect
 - i- Error-based (illegal / logical queries)
 - ↳ Trigger DB errors to learn Schema or types (e.g.: causing a type mismatch or syntax error)
 - ↳ Rely on verbose error messages
- ii- Blind SQLi
 - ↳ Boolean-based: injects queries that evaluate to TRUE / False; Attacker observes page differences
 - Ex: $\text{AND} (\text{SUBSTR}(\text{password}, 1, 1) = 'a')$ → if page shows normal content → 1st character is "a".
 - ↳ Time-based: Use time delays (`SLEEP()`) to infer truth by response latency.
 - Ex: $\text{IF} (\text{condition}, \text{SLEEP}(5), 0)$ → 5s delay → condition is True.

③ Out-of-band (OOB)

- ↳ It is a type of SQLi where the attacker doesn't recv a response from the attacked application on the same communication channel but instead it is able to cause the application to send data to a remote endpoint that they control.

↳ It is only possible if the server that you are using has cmd's that triggers DNS or HTTPS request.

▷ SQLi Countermeasure

- ① Use parameterized queries / prepared statements (never concatenate user input into SQL)
- ② Use ORM or safe DB libraries that separate code from data
- ③ Validate & normalize input
- ④ Avoid verbose DB error messages to users ; log them properly
- ⑤ Use Web Application Firewall (WAF) and monitor for suspicious patterns
- ⑥ Regularly test with safe / unauthorized security testing

▷ SQLi Detection

- ① Signature Based
 - Looks for known attack patterns
 - Fast & accurate for known attacks
 - Needs constant update & misses new/changed attacks
- ② Anomaly - based
 - Learns what "normal" looks like, then flags anything unusual.

Date

Day

- can catch new or unknown attacks

③ Code Analysis

- Runs many automated test attacks against the app to find SQLi holes
- Find vulnerabilities before attackers do
- Needs good test coverage & can miss logic bugs.

● DATABASE Access Control

→ Database access control means managing who can access what in a database

→ The system first authenticates users

→ Then it controls what each user can do — like read, insert, create, update, delete

→ Access can be given at diff levels — to whole DB, to a table or even specific rows/cols.

→ Three main types of administration :

① Centralized — Only a few admins can give or remove access

② Ownership-based — The person who creates a table can give/remove access to others

③ Decentralized — The owner of the table may grant/revoke authorization rights

Page No. to other users -

> SQL Based Access Definition

→ SQL provides GRANT & REVOKE to assign & remove access rights on DB objects

GRANT <privileges> → SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE . . .

ON <object> → DB, table, schema . . .

TO < user | role | PUBLIC >

[WITH GRANT OPTION]

↳ allows the grantee to re-grant that privilege to others

Ex: GRANT SELECT ON Employees TO Samroze

GRANT SELECT (salary) ON Employees TO payroll

GRANT accountant_role TO Samroze ^{role}

REVOKE SELECT ON payroll FROM Samroze

→ The optional IDENTIFIED BY clause is used to specify password that must be used to when creating users/roles

• Cascading Authorization


↳ It happens when a user who has an access right with the GRANT OPTION passes that right to others and those others pass it further down.

↳ So permission spread (cascade) from one user to many.


Date

Day

- Same is for revocation of rights.
- When a user's privilege is revoked, all the rights that originated from that user's grant are also revoked.



→ Ab Agr Bob, David se access rights leta hai
to Ellen or Jim dono ke rights bhi revoke
honge q k Ellen or Jim ke jo David se rights
mile hui wo Bob wale hain. Jabke Frank k
isliye revoke nhi honge q k wale wale rights
Chris k hain.



Date

Day

• Role Based Access Control

① Application Owner

↳ Owns database tables & data for a specific app

② End-user (Non-owner)

↳ Uses the app to access data but doesn't own it

③ Administrator

↳ Manages the database system, roles and security

→ RBAC in a Database must support

- Create / Delete role
- Give permission to roles
- Assign or remove users from roles

→ RBAC makes DB security organized, scalable, and easier to manage by grouping permissions into roles instead of assigning them one by one to users.

Date

Day

• INFERENCE

- A user who has permission to see some data can figure out (infer) other data they are not authorized to see — just by combining or analyzing the allowed data.
- Combining non-sensitive data can reveal sensitive info
- Or data relationships (metadata) can help guess hidden facts


• Prevention Technique

① During Database Design

- Split tables (eg: separate sensitive col)
- Use stricter access rules (eg: RBAC roles)

② At Query Time

- Detect when a user's query might reveal forbidden info & block or modify it



- DATABASE ENCRYPTION

→ Since DB contains an org's most valuable data, it needs strong protection — firewalls, authentication, access control & finally encryption.

→ Disadvantages of DB Encryption

- ① Key Management

- ↳ Every authorized user needs a decryption key
 - ↳ Managing who gets which key is complex, especially with many users & apps

- ② Inflexibility

- ↳ Searching or filtering records becomes harder when data is encrypted
 - ↳ You might have to decrypt everything before searching

→ Levels of Encryption

- ▷ Database level → Whole DB encrypted
- ▷ Record level → Specific Rows
- ▷ Attribute level → Certain cols (like pswd)
- ▷ Field level → individual cells

Date

Day

→ Four Entities are involved

① Data Owner

↳ Creates and encrypts data before sending it to server

② Server


↳ Stores encrypted data (cloud provider)

③ Client (Frontend)

↳ Translates user queries → encrypted queries

④ User

Sends request & views decrypted results



▲ Database Encryption Scheme

Date _____

Day _____

→ Following steps are followed for info retrieval

- ① User makes a query (eg: "get details of employee with ID = 123")
- ② The client system (where the user's query is processed) encrypts that ID (123) using the secret key "k" into "11011101" before sending it to server.
- ③ The server, which only has the encrypted data, uses that encrypted ID to find the correct record and sends it back.
- ④ The client then decrypts the data using its key & shows the readable result to user.

→ The server never sees any user unencrypted data or key, so even if it gets hacked, the attacker only sees encrypted data.

→ This method can be slow & limited.