

From Packet to Process: Disrupting DNS C2 with AI and eBPF in Linux Kernel for cloud environments

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\$whoami



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Research Interests:

Kernel security, hardening, eBPF, cloud and system security



Agenda

- ☐ DNS a critical backdoor for enterprise networks
- DNS Exfiltration Attack Vectors
- □ DNS C2 Attack Infrastructure
- **☐** Existing Approaches and Challenges
- ☐ Al-Driven Linux Kernel Enforced Endpoint Security
- ☐ Cloud Deployment Architecture at scale to combat DNS C2 infrastructures
- □ Demo (disrupt Sliver, DNSCat2)
- ☐ Key Takeaways & Future Directions
- □ Q&A



They Breach Through DNS — Almost Every Time

Compromise Supply Chain:

APT29 (Cozy Bear) — SolarWinds

Breach Cloud & Hyperscalers:

• UNC2452 (APT29)

Damage Critical Infrastructure:

Volt Typhoon

Harvest Credentials at Scale:

APT28 (GRU), Sea Turtle

Exploit Shared Offensive Tools:

APT41, FIN7


DNS-Based C2 and Tunneling Attacks Timeline

2014	2017	2018	2020	2021	2024
APT32 (Oceanletus) Vietnam	Sea Turtle	Cozy Bear Russia	Cozy Bear Russia	(Cozy (Nobel)	Volt Typhoon China
DNS tunneling at SEA governments	DNS hijacking; global tld/registar	DNS-based DGA (early research stage)	DNS-based DGA EU/NATO targets	Living-off- land + proxy DNS beaconing	KV-botnet intrusien & disruption



DNS a Blind spot to compromise networks

- Unencrypted by Default
- Logs Rarely Monitored
- > Firewall Blindspot
- Stateless Protocol





DNS: Not Just For Name Resolution Anymore. Next channel deliver zero-day attacks.

- DNS C2 Uses DNS to embed commands, data in queries and responses to maintain covert communication with remote C2 attacker infrastructure.
- Distring Encapsulates arbitrary data, other protocols within DNS packets to bypass network restrictions.
- DNS Raw Exfiltration Leaks sensitive data files directly in DNS queries.

RCE & Shellcode – Exploiting memory bugs, dropping payloads

Script & File Attacks – Scripted execution, file corruption

Side-Channel Process Abuse: Processing Injection Hallowing

Persistent Backdoors: Rootkits, ransomware stealth persistence.

Network Pivoting: Port Forwarding, reverse tunnels



DNS Protocol Specifications

DNS	Limit
UDP Packet Size	512 bytes (default) Up to 4096 bytes (with EDNS0)
Max Domain Question length	255
Max number of labels per query	127 labels
Max Label Length	63
Max Response Size	512 bytes, except 4096 for EDNS0
DNS Header Size	Limited by packet size
Query Section Size	Limited by packet size



DNS Question Record




What Makes DNS Query contain C2 or exfiltrated data


- ☐ High Entropy QNAME
- **☐** Long or Excessive Labels
- No Dictionary Tokens
- **□ DGA-style Patterns**
- □ NXDOMAIN Abuse and Ghost domains flood



DNS C2 Attack Infrastruct

Redirector
Fleet for
L3 shield C2
Botnet Army





DGA {L7,L3}

Mutation

Powered

C2

Botnet Army

C2 Infrastructure



DGA (L7) and IP (L3) Mutation

- ☐ Evade Detection Generates thousands of reflectors, IPS, domains to avoid static and policy blocklists.
- ☐ Resilience If one domain is taken down, others remain reachable.
- □ No Hardcoded domains Domains are algorithmically created on both attacker and implant sides.

Time-Based DGAs

Date +
SystemClock
fkeo12jdn7z.com
sk9qpdmx43a.com

Seed-Based DGAs

Seed + shared math functions bhack1.com bhack2.com

Wordlist DGAs

Wordlist dictionary catsun.net reddog.org

Character-Based or Randomized DGAs

Pseudo random chars sdas232.bleed.io

#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents




Existing Approaches

- Semi-Passive Analysis
 - DNS Exfiltration Security as Middleware (DPI as middleware)
- Passive Analysis
 - Anomaly Detection (Traffic Timing / Volume)
 - Threat Signatures, Domain Reputation scoring



Time

DNS Traffic Anomaly Detection and Prevention Pipeline





Challenges with current approaches

- ☐ Slow Detection, Slower Response: Stealthy mutable Implants survive
- ☐ Slow and easy bypass to Advanced DNS C2 Attacks
- ☐ Lack robust protection over Domain Generation Algorithms, IP mutation
- ☐ Unwanted latency for proxy-based DPI on benign traffic
- **□** Dynamic Threat Patterns


Proposed Solution:

✓ Reactive Kernel EDR at Ring 0 — closest to the wire, at the implant source, beyond reach of userland evasion .



eBPF

- Reprogram the Linux kernel in safe way.
- Runs BPF virtual machine inside kernel
- Custom BPF bytecode
- CPU architecture and Linux kernel version agnostic (BTF)





EDR Agent Linux Kernel eBPF Hooks

BPF XDP

Kernel Kernel Network Stack Attachr **Kernel MAC (Access Control) Attachments Process** scheduler Userspace Userspace BPF Kprobes/ System Call Interface **Tracepoints** LSM (Linux Security Modules) **BPF LSM** BPF Cgroups/ Sockets Sockops Kernel Core Kernel Subsystems RAW **DNS Sockets** Keyring, LSM **Process** Egress DPI Strong eBPF **BPF Netfilter** Link Layer of DNS from program SKB integrity Traffic Shaping **BPF TC**

Netdevice/ Drivers



Kernel Enforced Endpoint Security for DNS

Agent based Endpoint Security


Continuous Security Enforcement Loop

Userspace

- eBPF Agent
- eBPF Agent Caches
- Quantized Deep Learning Model
- Events malicious metrics exporters


Linux Kernel

- eBPF Ring Buffers
- Access Control Layer (LSM)
- Syscall Layer (Tracepoints)
- Network Stack (TC, Sockets)






EDR Active Process Security Enforcement





EDR Agent Passive Process Security Enforcement





DNN based DNS Data Obfuscation Detection (Features)

	imit	s for	DPI	in	Ker	nel
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☐ Limits for DPI in Kernel	number_of_periods	Number of dots (periods) in the hostname.
	total_length	Total length of the domain, including periods/dots.
	total_labels	Total number of labels in the domain.
	query_class	DNS question class (e.g., IN).
	query_type	DNS question type (e.g., A, AAAA, TXT).

Feature

subdomain_length_per_label

Usersp	ace F	=eatu	res
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
Feature	Description
total_dots	Total number of dots (periods) in DNS query.
total_chars	Total number of characters in DNS query, excluding periods.
total_chars_subdomain	Number of characters in the subdomain portion only.
number	Count of numeric digits in DNS query.
upper	Count of uppercase letters in DNS query.
max_label_length	Maximum label (segment) length in DNS query.
labels_average	Average label length across the request.
entropy	Shannon entropy of the DNS query, indicating randomness.

Description

Length of the subdomain per DNS label.




DNN fueled DNS Data Obfuscation Detection Model






Framework
Deployment in
Cloud to Combat
DNS C2
Infrastructure






Demo





Response Speed with Precision





Next Steps

- □ Kernel TLS Fingerprinting and Encrypted Tunnels: eBPF for TLS fingerprinting to detect, hunt and kill exfiltration over TLS and kernel encapsulated traffic (wireguard).
- □ Advanced Intelligence, Process Correlation: eBPF kernel program and endpoint agent correlate cross-protocol exfiltration attempts to the originating process and block them.
- □ Al-Driven Model Evolution: Real-time drift detection, online learning, and confidencebased updates and deeper kernel behavior with GAN+LSTM emerging DNS obfuscation tactics.
- □ eBPF Endpoint Agent a built-in guard for DNS DDoS attacks: DNS NXDOMAIN flood at endpoint.



Black Hat Sound Bytes

- Real-Time Kernel Threat Hunting & EDR Boost: Hunt C2 implants dynamically inkernel, accelerating user-space EDR with precise signals to stop C2 and breaches.
- Al-Driven Kernel Enforcement: Pair Al with eBPF to adaptively reprogram the kernel to combat mutating C2 implant activity.
- Dynamic Kernel powered EDR fuels Cloud NACL's: Enforce L3 filters at the endpoint and sync with cloud firewalls to disrupt DGA and evolving C2 infrastructure.
- Deep OS Telemetry powers SIEM/SOAR: Kernel-powered visibility feeds rich behavioral signals into upstream SIEM, SOAR.



Thank You



Framework Codebase: https://github.com/Synarcs/DNSObelisk

Framework WhitePaper: https://shorturl.at/42dVC