



# Protocol Audit Report

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Prepared by: SyncAudit

# ThunderLoan Audit Report

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# About SyncAudit

## Disclaimer

The SyncAudit team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the solidity implementation of the contracts.

## Risk Classification

Impact				
		High	Medium	Low
High		H	H/M	M
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
Low		M	M/L	L

## Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990
```

## Scope

```
src/interfaces/
--- IFlashLoanReceiver.sol
--- IPoolFactory.sol
--- IThunderLoan.sol
--- ITSwapPool.sol
src/protocol/
--- AssetToken.sol
--- OracleUpgradeable.sol
--- ThunderLoan.sol
```

# Protocol Summary

The ⚡ ThunderLoan ⚡ protocol is meant to do the following:

- 1. Give users a way to create flash loans
- 2. Give liquidity providers a way to earn money off their capital

Liquidity providers can **deposit** assets into **ThunderLoan** and be given **AssetTokens** in return. These **AssetTokens** gain interest over time depending on how often people take out flash loans!

## Roles

- Owner: Is the only one who should be able to set and access the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

# Executive Summary

## Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	4
Medium	3
Low	3
Info	4
Gas Optimizations	3
Total	17

# Findings

## High

## [H-1] Mixing up variable location causes storage collisions in `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` and `ThunderLoan::s_currentlyFlashLoaning`

**Description:** `ThunderLoan.sol` has two variables in the following order:

```
uint256 private s_feePrecision;  
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
```

However, the expected upgraded contract `ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol` has them in a different order.

```
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee  
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

Due to how Solidity storage works, after the upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. You cannot adjust the positions of storage variables when working with upgradeable contracts.

**Impact:** After upgrade, the `s_flashLoanFee` will have the value of `s_feePrecision`. This means that users who take out flash loans right after an upgrade will be charged the wrong fee. Additionally the `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` mapping will start on the wrong storage slot.

### Proof of Code:

#### ► Code

```
// You'll need to import `ThunderLoanUpgraded` as well  
import { ThunderLoanUpgraded } from  
"../src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol";  
  
function testUpgradeBreaks() public {  
    uint256 feeBeforeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();  
    vm.startPrank(thunderLoan.owner());  
    ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();  
    thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));  
    uint256 feeAfterUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee();  
  
    assert(feeBeforeUpgrade != feeAfterUpgrade);  
}
```

You can also see the storage layout difference by running `forge inspect ThunderLoan storage` and `forge inspect ThunderLoanUpgraded storage`

**Recommended Mitigation:** Do not switch the positions of the storage variables on upgrade, and leave a blank if you're going to replace a storage variable with a constant. In `ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol`:

```

- uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
+ uint256 private s_blank;
+ uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
+ uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;

```

## [H-2] Unnecessary `updateExchangeRate` in `deposit` function incorrectly updates `exchangeRate` preventing withdrawals and unfairly changing reward distribution

**Description:** In the ThunderLoan system, the `exchangeRate` is responsible for calculating the exchange rate between assetTokens and underlying tokens. In a way, it's responsible for keeping track of how many fees to give to liquidity providers.

However, the `deposit` function, updates this rate, without collecting any fees!

```

function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
    AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
    uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
    uint256 mintAmount = (amount *
assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate;
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);
@>    uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
@>    assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);
    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount);
}

```

**Impact:** There are several impacts to this bug;

1. The `redeem` function is blocked, because the protocol thinks the owed tokens is more than it has
2. Rewards are incorrectly calculated, leading to liquidity providers potentially getting way more or less than they deserved.

### Proof of Concept:

1. LP deposits
2. User takes out a flash loan
3. It is now impossible for LP to redeem.

### ► Code

```

function testRedeemAfterLoan() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits {
    uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10;
    uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(
        tokenA,
        amountToBorrow
    );
}

```

```

        vm.startPrank(user);
        tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), calculatedFee);
        thunderLoan.flashloan(
            address(mockFlashLoanReceiver),
            tokenA,
            amountToBorrow,
            ""
        );
        vm.stopPrank();

        uint256 amountToRedeem = type(uint256).max;
        vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider);
        vm.expectRevert();
        thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, amountToRedeem);
        vm.stopPrank();
    }

```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the incorrectly updated exchange rate lines from `deposit`.

```

function deposit(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) external
    revertIfZero(amount) revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) {
    AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
    uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate();
    uint256 mintAmount = (amount *
assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION()) / exchangeRate;
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, token, amount);
    assetToken.mint(msg.sender, mintAmount);
    -   uint256 calculatedFee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount);
    -   assetToken.updateExchangeRate(calculatedFee);
    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(assetToken), amount);
}

```

[H-3] By calling a flashloan and then `ThunderLoan::deposit` instead of `ThunderLoan::repay` users can steal all funds from the protocol

**Description:** For a user to take out and repay flashloan from the `ThunderLoan` contract, he is expected to

1. call `ThunderLoan::flashloan` function to take out the loan
2. call `ThunderLoan::repay` function to repay the loan.

However, a malicious user or contract can

1. call `ThunderLoan::flashloan` function to take out the loan;
2. call `ThunderLoan::deposit` function to deposit the loaned amount to the protocol;
3. call `ThunderLoan::redeem` function to steal all the tokens in the contract.

**Impact:** All the tokens in the liquidity pool get stolen by a hacker.

**Proof of Concept:**

## ► Code

**Recommended Mitigation:** Refactor the `ThunderLoan::flashLoan` function . Use [Uniswap V3 flashloan implementation](#) as reference.

[H-4] `getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth` uses the TSwap price which doesn't account for decimals, also fee precision is 18 decimals

## Medium

[M-1] Centralization risk for trusted owners

### Impact:

Contracts have owners with privileged rights to perform admin tasks and need to be trusted to not perform malicious updates or drain funds.

*Instances (2):*

```
File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
```

```
223:     function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external  
onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) {
```

```
261:     function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal  
override onlyOwner { }
```

### Centralized owners can brick redemptions by disapproving of a specific token

[M-2] Using TSwap as price oracle leads to price and oracle manipulation attacks

**Description:** The TSwap protocol is a constant product formula based AMM (automated market maker). The price of a token is determined by how many reserves are on either side of the pool. Because of this, it is easy for malicious users to manipulate the price of a token by buying or selling a large amount of the token in the same transaction, essentially ignoring protocol fees.

**Impact:** Liquidity providers will drastically reduced fees for providing liquidity.

### Proof of Concept:

The following all happens in 1 transaction.

1. User takes a flash loan from `ThunderLoan` for 1000 `tokenA`. They are charged the original fee `fee1`. During the flash loan, they do the following:
  1. User sells 1000 `tokenA`, tanking the price.
  2. Instead of repaying right away, the user takes out another flash loan for another 1000 `tokenA`.
    1. Due to the fact that the way `ThunderLoan` calculates price based on the `TSwapPool` this second flash loan is substantially cheaper.



```

        function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) {
            address swapPoolOfToken =
IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
@>        return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
        }

```

3. The user then repays the first flash loan, and then repays the second flash loan.

I have created a proof of code located in my `audit-data` folder. It is too large to include here.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Consider using a different price oracle mechanism, like a Chainlink price feed with a Uniswap TWAP fallback oracle.

[M-3] Fee on transfer, rebase, etc

## Low

[L-1] Empty Function Body - Consider commenting why

*Instances (1):*

```

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

261:     function _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal
override onlyOwner { }

```

[L-2] Initializers could be front-run

Initializers could be front-run, allowing an attacker to either set their own values, take ownership of the contract, and in the best case forcing a re-deployment

*Instances (6):*

```

File: src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol

11:     function __Oracle_init(address poolFactoryAddress) internal
onlyInitializing {

```

```

File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol

```

```
138:     function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer {
138:     function initialize(address tswapAddress) external initializer {
139:         __Ownable_init();
140:         __UUPSUpgradeable_init();
141:         __Oracle_init(tswapAddress);
```

[L-3] Missing critial event emissions

**Description:** When the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated, there is no event emitted.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Emit an event when the `ThunderLoan::s_flashLoanFee` is updated.

```
+     event FlashLoanFeeUpdated(uint256 newFee);
.
.
.
    function updateFlashLoanFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner {
        if (newFee > s_feePrecision) {
            revert ThunderLoan__BadNewFee();
        }
        s_flashLoanFee = newFee;
+     emit FlashLoanFeeUpdated(newFee);
    }
```

Informational

[I-1] Poor Test Coverage

Running tests...

File		% Lines		% Statements		%	
Branches	% Funcs						
-----		-----		-----		-	
-----							
src/protocol/AssetToken.sol		70.00% (7/10)		76.92% (10/13)			
50.00% (1/2)	66.67% (4/6)						
src/protocol/OracleUpgradeable.sol		100.00% (6/6)		100.00% (9/9)			
100.00% (0/0)	80.00% (4/5)						
src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol		64.52% (40/62)		68.35% (54/79)			
37.50% (6/16)	71.43% (10/14)						

- [I-2] Not using `__gap` [50] for future storage collision mitigation
- [I-3] Different decimals may cause confusion. ie: AssetToken has 18, but asset has 6

[I-4] Doesn't follow <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3156>

**Recommended Mitigation:** Aim to get test coverage up to over 90% for all files.

## Gas

[GAS-1] Using bools for storage incurs overhead

Use `uint256(1)` and `uint256(2)` for true/false to avoid a `Gwarmaccess` (100 gas), and to avoid `Gsset` (20000 gas) when changing from 'false' to 'true', after having been 'true' in the past. See [source](#).

*Instances (1):*

```
File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
```

```
98:     mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private
    s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
```

[GAS-2] Using `private` rather than `public` for constants, saves gas

If needed, the values can be read from the verified contract source code, or if there are multiple values there can be a single getter function that [returns a tuple](#) of the values of all currently-public constants. Saves **3406-3606 gas** in deployment gas due to the compiler not having to create non-payable getter functions for deployment calldata, not having to store the bytes of the value outside of where it's used, and not adding another entry to the method ID table

*Instances (3):*

```
File: src/protocol/AssetToken.sol
```

```
25:     uint256 public constant EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

```
File: src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol
```

```
95:     uint256 public constant FLASH_LOAN_FEE = 3e15; // 0.3% ETH fee
```

```
96:     uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
```

[GAS-3] Unnecessary SLOAD when logging new exchange rate

In `AssetToken::updateExchangeRate`, after writing the `newExchangeRate` to storage, the function reads the value from storage again to log it in the `ExchangeRateUpdated` event.

To avoid the unnecessary SLOAD, you can log the value of `newExchangeRate`.

```
s_exchangeRate = newExchangeRate;  
- emit ExchangeRateUpdated(s_exchangeRate);  
+ emit ExchangeRateUpdated(newExchangeRate);
```