# 17.00 mm 17.

### Faculty of Science

IT-security: User Authentication

Access control

Identity and Access Management

Passwords and SSO

**Biometrics** 

Social engineering

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Department of Computer Science



IAM - ACL

An access control list (ACL) is a list of permissions attached to an object.

An ACL specifies which users or system processes are granted access to objects, as well as what operations are allowed on given objects

Alice: read, write; Bob: read




IAM

Role Based Access Control (RBAC)

Peter er ansat, Peter er Administrator Mia er er ansat, Mia har adgang til Navision Hans er ikke ansat, Hans har Guest-adgang

Jens har sagt op, han var ansat som administrator, har han stadig adgang?





### Subjects, Objects, and Access Rights

### Subject

An entity capable of accessing objects

#### Three classes

- Owner
- Group
- World

### Object

A resource to which access is controlled

Entity used to contain and/or receive information

# **Access** right

Describes the way in which a subject may access an object

#### **Could include:**

- Read
- •Write
- Execute
- Delete
- •Create
- Search



### **Access Control Policies**

## Discretionary access control (DAC)

 Controls access based on the identity of the requestor and on access rules (authorizations) stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do

## Mandatory access control (MAC)

 Controls access based on comparing security labels with security clearances

# Role-based access control (RBAC)


 Controls access based on the roles that users have within the system and on rules stating what accesses are allowed to users in given roles

# Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

 Controls access based on attributes of the user, the resource to be accessed, and current environmental conditions

### UNIX - File Access Control

- Unique user identification number (user ID)
- Member of a primary group identified by a group ID
- Belongs to a specific group
- 12 protection bits
  - Specify read, write, and execute permission for the owner of the file, members of the group and all other users
- The owner ID, group ID, and protection bits are part of the file's inode



### Traditional UNIX - File Access Control

- "Set user ID"(SetUID)
- "Set group ID"(SetGID)
  - System temporarily uses rights of the file owner/group in addition to the real user's rights when making access control decisions
  - Enables privileged programs to access files/resources not generally accessible
- Sticky bit
  - When applied to a directory it specifies that only the owner of any file in the directory can rename, move, or delete that file
- Superuser
  - Is exempt from usual access control restrictions
  - Has system-wide access
  - AWS Roles



IAM

An <u>administrative process</u> coupled with a <u>technological solution</u> which <u>validates</u> the identity of individuals and allows owners of data, applications, and systems to either maintain centrally or distribute responsibility for granting access to their respective resources to anyone participating within the IAM framework.

IAM refers to the processes, technologies and policies for managing digital identities and controlling how identities can be used to access resources

IAM – Identity Life Cycle Management



IAM

**Identity:** Who are you (you or a computer): UserIDs, Certificates, cards...

**Authentication:** Prove your identity: challenge-response: Passwords, Private keys, PINs...
Your possession of the secret proves you are who you claim to be.

**Authorization:** the system controls which resources you're allowed to access. Typically through the use of a token or ticket mechanism. allows you to access only that which the administrators have determined is necessary, thus enforcing the *principle of least privilege*.

IAM

Password	

Password is used by another user


	Provided by	Answers	Attributes	Uniqueness
Identity	principal	"Who are you?"	public assertion	yes, locally
Authentication	principal	"OK, how can you prove it?"	secret response	no
Authorization	*C000_00.00	11.00E _1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	token or ticket	7-7-8
	system	"What can I do?" -	access control	(n/a)

Netflix, Google, Facebook...

NemID - identities and auth?



### Identity, authentication, authorization



Service Provider provides access to services based on their own risk assessment



Du arbejder på et internt projekt til udvikling af nyt økonomisystem til din virksomhed.

Projektlederne fortæller, at for at overholde tidsplanen skal der ikke bruges bruger-id'er. Systemet skal i stedet have et stærkt hardcodet password (17 tegn incl. specialtegn) Alle der skal have adgang til økonomisystemet vil få oplyst koden hvis de har brug for adgangen.

Hvad siger du til projektlederen?



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Hvad siger du til projektlederen?









Tre faktorer+ til autentificering

Noget man **ved**, noget man **har** og noget man **ér** 

Noget man har glemt, noget man har tabt og noget man har været

Noget man gør, hvor man er




### Angreb imod brugerens passwords

- 1. Hvad er dit password? (spørge)
- 2. Gætte / default passwords
- 3. Dictionary Attack
- 4. Brute Force (f.eks. imod LanMan hash)
- 5. Rainbow Tables



### Password cracking

### **Hashcat:** <a href="https://hashcat.net">https://hashcat.net</a>



```
HwMon.Dev.#2....: Temp: 55c Fan: 30% Core:1010Mhz Mem:1250Mhz Lanes:16
HwMon.Dev.#3....: N/A
Started: Wed Nov 30 10:48:18 2016
Stopped: Wed Nov 30 10:48:43 2016
```

```
MD5
Half MD5 (left, mid, right)
9 SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
SHA-3 (Keccak)
SipHash
RipeMD160
Whirlpool
DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
0 3DES (PT = $salt, key = $pass)
@ GOST R 34.11-94
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 256-bit
@ GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) 512-bit
Double MD5
Double SHA1
md5($pass.$salt)
md5($salt.$pass)
md5(unicode($pass).$salt)
md5($salt.unicode($pass))
md5(sha1($pass))
md5($salt.md5($pass))
md5($salt.$pass.$salt)
md5(strtoupper(md5($pass)))
sha1($pass.$salt)
sha1($salt.$pass)
sha1(unicode($pass).$salt)
sha1($salt.unicode($pass))
sha1(md5($pass))
sha1($salt.$pass.$salt)
9 sha1(CX)
```



### Password cracking

**2009:** "most people aren't going to have access to these sorts of clusters"

2014: AWS G3 1,536-core GPU: \$0.26/time





Baggrund

# Passwords er den nye firewall – risikovurdering

Tokens, smart cards, biometrics

Password hash, hash og salt, scrypt/bcrypt



### Baggrund

# Password hash hash og salt, scrypt/bcrypt

### Password Reminder

There was a recent password request from our webs

Here is your login information for your account.


Login Email: bigbob @mailinator.com

Login Password: 123456

Check the "manage account" page to change your page

login instantly

or click here to change your passwor



### Baggrund

# Password hash, hash og salt, scrypt/bcrypt

Don't store the password, store a hash of the password

There was a recent password request from our website.

Here is your login information for your account.

ogin Email. bigbob @mailinator.com

Login Password: 123456

Check the "manage account" page to change your password.


login instantly

or click here to change your password



### Salt

aaa





Password hash?

Direkte off-line adgang til password hash eller
Online - forbinde til serveren hver gang?

- Begrænsninger på antallet af forsøg?
- Time-delay mellem sign-in attempts, brug af penalty period (f.eks. 1 time) hvis forkert password er indtastet for mange gange
   f.eks. 10 gange

### Password hash?

A hacker can hack the password "alpine fun" in only 2 months if he is able to attack your server 100 times per second. But, with the penalty period and the 5 second delay, the same password can suddenly sustain an attack for 1,889 years.

No of attacks	Password	Time	Security level
100 times per sec	alpine fun	2 months	Low risk
1 time every 5 sec	alpine fun	63 years	Secure
1 time every 5 sec with a 1 hour penalty period after 10 attempts	alpine fun	1,889 years	Secure forever

Se f.eks. "The Usability of Passwords"

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/password-security-usability og

"The Usability of Passwords FAQ":

http://www.baekdal.com/tips/the-usability-of-passwords-faq



### **Apple**

Apple default: 80ms per password attempt delay Enforced by tamper resistant hardware

### Exponential growth:

# characters	[0-9]	[0-9a-z]	[0-9a-zA-Z]
1	0.8 seconds	2.9 seconds	5 seconds
2	8 seconds	1.7 minutes	5.1 minutes
3	1.3 minutes	1 hour	5.3 hours
4	13 minutes	1.6 days	2 weeks
5	2.2 hours	8 weeks	2.3 years
6	22 hours	5.5 years	140 years
7	1.3 weeks	200 years	9 thousand years
8	13 weeks	7 thousand years	550 thousand years
9	2.5 years	260 thousand years	34 million years
10	25 years	9 million years	2 billion years





Brugernes passwords er altid dårlige

Opfylder kun lige akkurat de tekniske krav der stilles

Dvs. password regler styrker passwords, men kun op til den tekniske grænse løsningen tvinger brugerne til

Med mindre vi bliver tvunget - eller undervist - i andet, så vælger vi alle password efter dette mønster:



### 1. Ingen koder

Hvis man giver en bruger frit valg vil alle brugere selvfølgelig, alt andet lige, vælge at ikke bruge passwords, fordi det er det mest brugervenlige (dvs. letteste)

### 2. Almindelige ord

Hvis systemet tvinger til at bruge et kodeord, er første problem hvordan man selv husker sin kode.

Så man vælger i første omgang sin kode ud fra, om man tror man kan huske den, ikke fordi man tænker på "sikkerhed"

- brugerens risikovurdering

### Mental models – "noget man tit tænker på"

You Retweeted



Gene Spafford @TheRealSpaf · 22 Sep 2014

"@shariv67: Had I known I was going to need this many passwords, I would have had a lot more pets."











You Retweeted



George Takei @GeorgeTakei · 23 Jul 2014

Every time I change my password, I have to get a new pet.







1K





I changed all my passwords to 'incorrect'. So my computer just tells me when I forget.





### Systems:

But we use the same systems – otherwise we cannot remember the passwords:

- If both upper-case and lower-case letters are required people only use one upper-case letter – and it is always first: The password becomes "Password", not "pAssword"
- If numbers are also required, they are always last: "Password12"
- Non-alfabetic are the very last part, if they are required.
   So the "super-strong" password would be "Password12!"
- On smartphones we make patterns, such as "1234", "1122", "1111" or years/dates such as "1945", the PIN should be at le 8 characters – and consider biometrics

### Two passwords

### Password123dec

hY6%%#2873GH/GtAQ?08-dPe2>S

- Guessing the first PW means all future PWs can be guessed
- The user can remember the first password no.2 will be written down somewhere because of password change rules
- Nr.2 is impossible to break, no.2 is not

- Which password is best now?
- Which password is best next month?



"The password must be impossible to remember and nowhere written down"

Peter Gutmann




Må man skrive sine passwords ned?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Srh\_TV\_J144



#### Password reuse

# Model2: samme password på mange sites Er det et problem?



Password reuse: https://haveibeenpwned.com



# Hvor langt skal et password være? Hvad med special tegn?

http://howsecureismypassword.net



HOW PASSWORD LENGTH WINS THE INTERNET

Passwords 102



### Password huskere

Overvej password managers som <u>1password</u>, <u>Roboform</u>, og <u>Password Safe</u>.

Kan beskytte koderne og kan give adgang til de gemte koder med et "super-password".

Autogenere stærke koder. Genbruger aldrig vigtige passwords på forskellige sider.

Selv stærke passwords kan mistes på sites med sikkerhedsproblemer.



Password managers

Undgår password genbrug Stærke passwords over det hele

Problemer?



### Two Factor Authentication (2FA)







Se f.eks.:

https://www.yubico.com

https://duo.com





13.57





Mon, 8 Feb, 12.00

G-743835 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Tue, 9 Feb, 08.47

G-493534 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Wed, 10 Feb, 08.22

G-840743 er din bekræftelseskode til Google.

Mon, 20 Jun, 12.15

●●●○○ TDC 令



13.57





Text Message Sat, 26 Nov, 07.36

Din personlige engangskode er: 1527

Bemærk! Engangskoden udløber om 12 timer.

### Two Factor Authentication (2FA) – nogle termer

#### **Push notification**

Verify identity by approving a push notification, for instance in an app

#### Phone callback

Require you to pick-up a phone call and for instance press a specific key, or any key, before you are provided access

### **Challenge-response**

Requires you to enter data back to the system to verify a transaction is correct

#### **Token**

A hardware device, after pushing a button to generate a code, the code is then typed into the password prompt



### Two Factor Authentication (2FA) – nogle termer

### SMS passcode

A code is sent to your phone via SMS and must be typed into the two-factor prompt

### One-Time Password/One-Time Pad (OTP)

Can only be used one time



## Biometri?





Hvor tit skal password skiftes?

Ikke kritisk – afhængig af hvor man indtaster passwords

Krav om skift f.eks. hver 90 dage kan være et problem fordi folk så typisk vælger svage passwords.

=> "Password06" eller "PasswordJuni"



Overvej det hvis det er muligt at bruge 2faktor authentication på en site

Næsten altid en forbedring af sikkerheden

Support er dyrt
 Pas på "secret questions"
 Backup systemet for glemte passwords må ikke være svagere end dit password.

Meget lavere sikkerhed


# Pick a secure password:

"0k5ijU)=2w8VAiqxozKyB"


Now, in case you forget it, what's your favorite color? "Blue"




### Hvad er et godt password? (længde > kompleksitet)
















THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

# Eksempel på dårlige passwords: Amerikanske Dankort maskiner



ATM hacket, tror indeholder 5\$ sedler i stedet for \$20 => udbetaler 3x for meget

Pre Paid Card

9 dage før kunder rapporterede



## http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmW\_4R81jVU


#### **CNN Report: Robber Tricks ATM machine**



#### **CNN Report: Robber Tricks ATM machine**









Encrypted Pin Pad (EPP)
Triple DES compliant








## **Knowledgebase:**

The ATM is programmed with the passwords that the distributor requests when the order is placed to program a new ATM. When special passwords are not requested they are left at the factory default (see your mini-bank operators manual) Every new ATM that is shipped from Tranax has a copy of the print setup included in the "open me first" box or envelope. The master password is hand written at the top of the print setup for the convienence of the installer.



# Tranax manual inurl:pdf



### **Thranax:**

Master = 555555Service = 222222Operator = 111111

### **Triton:**

12345


## Lipman:


Merchant = 2222222 Technician = 1111111


### GTI:

1234














### Strong passwords

## **Kort sagt:**

2FA er næsten altid bedre

Brug en password manager

Lange passwords er bedre end komplekse passwords (passphrases over 14 tegn)

Brug mange forskellige passwords

Back dine passwords op

Lange passwords er bedre end hyppige skift med mindre der har været risiko for aflytning



#### **Passwords**

Strong passwords is a combination on length and complexity - that is how difficult it is for someone to guess your password.

You can test various types of passwords at <a href="http://howsecureismypassword.net">http://howsecureismypassword.net</a>

The most important tips for choosing strong passwords are:

- Make it long, not just a single word
- Make it hard to guess
- Don't re-use your passwords

Consider a password manager, such as <a href="https://www.dashlane.com">https://www.dashlane.com</a>, 1Password or Falck password manager to create and remember your passwords.



#### The advice

- Long passwords are everything else equal better than complex passwords. But do not just use a single word (for instance "DIKU") or lazy combinations, such as "DIKU12"
- Strong passwords are better than frequent password changes, unless there is a risk the password has been compromised (hotels, airports etc)
- Use many different password, never the same password on different services
- Use a password manager
- 2-factor is almost always better than your password today, use it when you can





#### Faculty of Science

### Pause



## **Biometrics**



Noget man ved Noget man har **Noget man er** 

Biometri bør altid kombineres med BrugerID/password

ID samles typisk i en hash



Er biometri identity eller authentication?

Public or private?


Man efterlader biometri-data over alt

AI/Deep-fakes (stemme, ansigt osv)

Biometri som authentication – uden andre faktorer – er potentielt et problem (risiko vurdering!)



Husk threatmodel



To biometriske målinger er aldrig helt ens, derfor er der altid element af usikkerhed:

## **False Acceptance Rate:**

Rate at which someone other than the actual person is falsely recognized.

## **False Rejection Rate:**

Rate at which the actual person is not recognized accurately.



## Fingeraftryk og håndscanner

Optical scanner med lys (klassisk) Træk fingrene over pladen, ellers efterlades fingeraftrykket

Capacative (semiconductor), finger bryder delvis isoleringen mellem to ledende materialer, derved tages billedet

Spyt, opvarmet vingummibamse eller ballon med varmt vand



#### Iris scan

Potential for walk by capture Høj opløsning, HDTV osv.


#### Retina scan

Svært at stjæle - men også svær at bruge (allignment kræver træning og øvelse)




# Basic system

Placering af "request to exit" knapper er vigtig, kan de aktiveres ude fra?






# Anti-Passback system







- 1. Angreb imod data og kommunikation
- 2. Angreb imod templates
- 3. Angreb imod software
- 4. Angreb med sensoren




### Biometri

TABLE 37.1 Overv	Uniqueness	Universality	Permanence	Measurability	Acceptability	
DNA	High	High	High	Low	Low	
Face geometry	Low	High	Medium	High	High	
Fingerprint	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	
Hand geometry	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	
Iris	High	High	High	Medium	Low	
Retina	High	High	Medium	Low	Low	
Signature dynamics	Low	Medium	Low	High	High	
/oice	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	High	

Hvor let er det at stjæle credentials?



### Credential revocation



Fingeraftryk / hånd revokering




## Beskyttelse af biometri-data





#### Biometri



Der findes også default access nøgler til smart cards.

F.eks. kan en MD5 hash af UID og master nøglen give adgang til smartcardet/administrator kortet



# Biometri er også hardware, software og brugervenlighed

Hvor stort er keyspace for hash af templaten? Kan man "bare" forsøge at brute-force - eller sende templates til backend serverne?

Hvor god er match algoritmen, hvem skrev den, hvad bygger den på?
Hvor stor del af finger aftrykket scannes egentlig (er det kun center)?
For meget lys kan ødelægge kameraets billede (dos/angreb)

Bagud kompatabilitet



# Single Sign On (SSO)



#### Authentication/authorization

- Huske brugernavn/PW til mange sites
- Sites skal gemme og administrere id/pw
- Devices, computers, partners, cloud-providers
  - Bruger afgiver alle informationer

SAML
Oauth
OpenID
OpenID Connect
WS-\*



# Identitet og privacy - termer

Silomodeller – Federation (Føderation)


Identity Provider – Udsteder af akkreditiver Service Provider – Serviceudbyder Identity - Bruger

Tokens, assertions eller "billetter"



#### Traditionel fødereret sikkerhed

#### Log på Netbank



Log på uden nøglekort

#### Log på Portalbank



Log på med nøglekort

Akkreditiver: tokens/assertations/billetter (SAML Assertation, x509 certifikater, Kerberos tickets osv)

PKI: certifikatudstedere

SAML: Identity Providers

WS-\*: Security Token Service

Attributtjenester



# Identitet og privacy

Hvordan får man et tilbud på et lån?


Skat

Bank

NemID




# Identitet og privacy – Nemlog-in (SAML) - NemID





# Identitet og privacy

Hvordan får man et tilbud på et lån?



Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based open standard protocol for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties/two security domains, in particular, between an identity provider and a service provider.

Federated identity, f.eks. cloud single sign-on (SSO).

Standard protocol til at kommunikerer identiteter over internettet.

Two federation partners can choose to share whatever identity attributes they want in a SAML assertion (message) payload as long as those attributes can be represented in XML.

Enterprise SAML identity federation use cases often sharing identity between an existing IdM system and web applications.




Tokens i stedet for passwords.

#### Tre entities:


- 1. Identity provider
- 2. Service provider (kan være ekstern, som SalesForce)
- 3. Brugeren, har en konto hos Identity Provider

Bruger autentificerer hos Identity Provider, der udsteder en SAML-token, sendes tilbage til brugeren, der sender videre til Service Provider











Authentication - OAuth 2.0

OAuth (Open Authorization) er en standard for authorization af adgang til ressourcer.

V2.0 dækker både authentication og authorization (Kan outsource authentication til f.eks. Google, Facebook for en applikation (se OpenID Connect)

Standard method for web, mobile and desktop applications

Oauth tokens can be binary, JSON or SAML

HTTP (SSL)



Authentication - OAuth 2.0

OAuth is a framework to allow one application access to one account without giving your account login information.










Brugervenlighed, mindre administration osv...



#### Social login

Hvad (kan) modtageren få at vide om dig når man laver "social login" via Facebook login:





### Oauth 2.0 vs SAML 2.0 – sammenfald i principper

SAML typically used in Enterprise SSO scenarios (inside the enterprise, enterprise to partner, enterpise to cloud)

Enterprise SSO = SAML

Partner, or Customer app, access to portal = SAML Centralized identity source = SAML (OpenID Connect)

Oauth designed for use with applications on the internet: Provide access to ressources (accounts, pictures, files...) = Oauth
Mobile devices typisk = OAuth



### Authentication – OpenID Connect

OpenID Connect is a way to specify one identity for multiple sites so you don't need to register over and over again.


You can log in into multiple websites with a unique account, using OpenID Connect.

Trust the specific OpenID Connect Identity Provider?


Sometimes OAuth and OpenID together



#### Authentication - OpenID Connect vs. Oauth 2.0



Giver navn og mail til mange sites




Opnår adgang uden nødvendigvis at give sites dine id-oplysninger



# Identitet og sikkerhed

## Brugeren er i centrum




# Identitet og sikkerhed

- nowering total control	logies XRI/XDI						1
Empowering total control of users over their privacy	AKI/XDI	ID/WSF	Shibboleth	CardSpace	OpenID	SXIP Higgi	ns
Usability; users are using the same identity for each identity transaction						11166	
Giving a consistent user experience due to uniformity of identity interface							
Limiting identity attacks such as phishing						1	
Expiting reachability/disturbances such as spam							
Reviewing policies on both sides when necessary, identity providers and service providers							
Huge scalability advantages because the dentity provider does not have to get any prior nowledge about the service provider							
ssuring secure conditions when exchanging ta							
coupling digital identity from applications							

# Identitet og sikkerhed

Hvem er det vi vil/skal beskytte – bruger, SP eller IdP?


Hvad er NemID's focus?



## Identitet og Privacy

Privacy by Design

Identity Provider / OpenID Provider osv ved hvor og hvornår du logger ind hos alle Service Providers



#### Summary

#### Digital user authentication principles

- A model for digital user authentication
- Means of authentication
- Risk assessment for user authentication

#### Password-based authentication

- The vulnerability of passwords
- Password selection strategies
- The use of hashed passwords
- Password cracking of userchosen passwords
- Password file access control

#### Token-based authentication

- Memory cards
- Smart cards
- Electronic identity cards

- Biometric authentication
  - Physical characteristics used in biometric applications
  - Operation of a biometric authentication system
  - Biometric accuracy
- Remote user authentication
  - Password protocol
  - Token protocol
  - Static biometric protocol
  - Dynamic biometric protocol
- Security issues for user authentication

# "Cheating": Social engineering



# **IT Security is difficult**

# Intelligent adversaries





#### Kompromittering via Social Engineering

- At narre mennesker til at gøre ting de ellers ikke ville gøre eller udlevere fortrolige oplysninger.
- Kan fører til hacking og identitetstyveri.
- F.eks. ved at optræde som insider med afsæt i viden om virksomheden.

Hvordan kan en angriber få viden om en virksomhed?



#### Hvad sker der?

Nysgerrighed Hjælpsomhed Undgå konflikter Stress



"No matter how low an opinion you have of your users, they will figure out a way to disappoint you."

-Stamos' Law

"We have dumb monkeys who clicks on buttons" - Chris Hoff



# Fremgangsmåden

Informationsindsamling
Opbygning af tillid
Scenariet
Pres for en løsning - "hvad kan vi gøre?"



## Bagrundsviden



# 0. Indformationsindsamling

Internet, sociale netværk, dumpster diving, besøg, opsøge medarbejdere, webmail, linkedin, jobannoncer osv, osv.



# Hej, hvad er dit password?

# 1. Opbygning af tillid

Det er sjældent nok at sige "Hej, hvad er dit password?" eller "Hallo – det er din chef, giv mig Admin passwordet eller du er fyret"

En række venlige, trivielle spørgsmål først (opbygger tillid)



# Hej, hvad er dit password?

# 2. Baggrundsscenariet (pretexting)

Ramme for angreb, kan være en hel identitet (baseret på indledende research)



## "Her er mit billede"

From: Felipe Carlson <a-.zett@ablestik.com> To: Subject: good to hear you Date: Sun, 11 May 2008 10:10:19 +0700 (05:10 CEST) 1 attachment Save Hello! I am tired tonight. I am nice girl that would like to chat with you. Email me at Frida@whoplantcut.cn only, because I am using my friend's email to write this. Mind me sending some of my pictures to you? GIF image attachment (me)



# Hej, hvad er dit password?

## 3. Pres

"Hvordan løser vi det her?"

Kropssprog, stemmeføring, høflig/vred/travl/autoritær osv



## Han er "en af vores"

Samme sprog og jargon Det rigtige tøj

Overbevise folk om man "hører til"



# Påklædning er vigtig

Dress as a DJ: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoIL2x6s">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoIL2x6s</a> IC8

Hvad ville have virket i bussen?




# Man er usynlig i en neon-vest

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFur1-i6BpA



# Praktisk eksempel (September 2018)



## "Pre-loading"

Mange, mange teknikker

Påvirke inden faktiske møde/hændelse Verifikation af identitet



## Fysisk adgang

ID-kort
Piggybacking/tailgating
Telefoner, kopper og pakker
Bude, reparatører, revisorer, journalister
Rygere og andre grupper
Pre-loading

Tyveri, informationsindsamling, trådløse accesspoints, netværksadgang, serverrum

. . .



## Det svageste led i sikkerhedskæden

Telefon, personlig fremmøde, USB, CD, websider, pdf-filer, hacke e-mail, vinde gaver, voice beskeder





## Don't click it - and don't pick it up either!

Ah – og hvis du finder en USB-nøgle på jorden: lad være med at teste den !







## **Phishing**

A phishing attack usually comes in the form of a message meant to convince you to:

- click on a link
- open a document
- install software on your device
- enter your username and password into a website that's made to look legitimate.







Billede 1: Den falske e-mail-login-side sidestillet med den legitime side. De to URL'er er fremhævet nedenunder.







## Someone has your password

Hi William

Someone just used your password to try to sign in to your Google Account <a href="mailto:agmail.com">agmail.com</a>.

#### Details:

Tuesday, 22 March, 14:9:25 UTC IP Address: 134.249.139.239


Location: Ukraine

Google stopped this sign-in attempt. You should change your password immediately.

#### **CHANGE PASSWORD**

Best, The Gmail Team





Be suspicious of all **links** that ask you to log in, regardless of the sender.

And be very careful of all **attached files** – regardless of the sender



By the way - do not "enable content" on documents with macros (.docm)



## Er det svært for dem?



http://deadspin.com/uva-fan-bluffs-his-way-through-the-perfect-acc-title-ga-1547386713

70 dollars i Walmart...



Hvad gør man imod Social Engineering?

# Pain Center



## Forstå truslerne

Jo højere sikkerhed, jo mere sandsynlig er social engineering

Træning og understøttende procedurer – hvad er advarselssignalerne -procedure gør det svært for angriber

Ikke kun telefonen - også mail, chat, hjemmesider og fysisk fremmøde m.m.

"Hvordan kan vi forbedre vores procedurer?"



## Ikke det samme for alle

Rette niveau af paranoia!

Hvis man føler sig *usikker* – "der er et eller andet, der ikke føles rigtigt"



## Forstå truslerne

# O. Informations indsamling

Makuler dokumenter Forsigtig i offentlige rum Information over telefonen, mail o.lign., særligt ved uventede henvendelser

# 1. Opbygge tillid

Meget snakkende Hvorfor taler han om det? Spørg ind ved fejl, hvis fejl fortsætter -> afslut



## Forstå truslerne

## 2. Scenariet

Hvis usikker: gencheck, gencheck, gencheck Tag dig tid og følg proceduren

## 3. Pres

Teknikker der benyttes (awareness)
Giv ikke efter
Henvis til politikker og procedurer
Tilkald en leder hvis usikker (overfør risiko),
tag ikke beslutningen selv



## Mulige tiltag

Anden kanal til at overdrage info, end den der spørges fra, f.eks.

- telefon til voicemail/SMS
- email til leder
- give fysisk til anden person fra afdelingen

Ring tilbage/send mail tilbage (men ikke reply-to)



# Mulige tiltag

Check og bekræft id, også selvom det er svært (eller måske særligt hvis det er svært)

Passwordbeskyttelse af information

Fysisk sikring, f.eks imod tail-gating

Kultur, "Hvorfor har du ikke skilt på?"



# Mulige tiltag

- Awareness
- Opdateret software
- Brug 2FA (og/eller password manager)
- Bekræft med afsender (vha andre kanaler)
- Åben attachments på en sikker måde
- Backup

A sense of urgency is always the first big clue

Giver pretext'en engetlig mening – ville et firma virkelig ringe til dig, eller bede dig om at ringe til dem?

Ville dét firma virkelig bede om den information?



## Social engineering teknikker virker i praksis

Makollig Jezvahted and Levdaroum DeBahzted

My colleague just farted, and left the room, the bastard





# Spørgsmål



