

Reference Dependence and Monetary Incentive -Evidence from Major League Baseball-

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Many empirical studies have revealed the existence of reference-point dependent preference in field settings, including cases from professional sports players' decision making, whose performance is observed by the manager and is evaluated as their monetary rewards. If there is some incentives, or discontinuous in their rewards that lead the individuals to take behavior that "appears" to be driven by the reference dependence, then we should rather think it is caused by the design of the contracts. In this paper, we picked up the case of Major League Baseball players, which Pope and Simonsohn (2011) reported have reference-point dependent preferences about the number of their batting-average. Then, we confirmed the evidences for manipulation in batting-average and other performance indexes, and tested if there exist any monetary incentives that encourage the players to do so. We found three implications: first, there actually exists manipulation in the players' batting-average. Second, surprisingly, there were little evidences that supports the monetary-incentive hypothesis. Third, among the variable indexes, .300 of batting-average was a solid benchmarks for the plays.

1 Introduction

Reference-point dependence is one of the most important concepts to evaluate outcomes, and it affects agents' following economic behavior. Classical economic models assume that economic agents evaluate their choices/prospects according to the absolute value of (expected) return. On the other hand, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) introduced the behavioral assumption: reference-point dependent preference consider outcomes by the relative value to some target value of the outcomes, reference points. That is, subjects regard the possible outcome as gain or loss from the target. For example, workers feel happy if her/his wage goes up to \$15 per hour, but vice versa if it goes down to \$15, although the absolute value of \$15 is actually the same. In this case, s/he evaluates their new wage with the reference point of the previous one.

In this paper, we deal with the case that outcomes occurs as nonmonetary ones, and then evaluated as monetary rewards: professional sports. In Major League Baseball (MLB), players evaluate the nonmonetary outcomes: indexes that measure the players' performance, with the reference dependent outcomes. We analyzed their contracts with the team they play for, to see if they are designed in order to incentivize the players to take such behavior. As a result, it turned out that there is no monetary incentives there.

Prospect theory consists of two main characteristics: one is the probability weighting function, and the other is the reference dependence, mentioned above. It enabled us to interpret phenomena that seem inconsistent with the traditional microeconomic theory, and made it possible to understand them with some additional assumptions. Thus, a lot of following researches have been conducted in field and laboratory settings.

Reference dependence is also observed in the behavior of athletes. Pope and Schweizer (2011) found that professional golf players regard “per,” the standard number of shots determined according to the difficulty of each hole, as reference points. Also, Allen et al. (2016) argued that marathon runners adjust their finish times before the round number times (just three or four hours), the reference points. Similarly, Pope and Simonsohn (2011) showed the existence of the reference dependence in the MLB, a professional baseball league of America.

MLB position players evaluate themselves by nonmonetary outcomes, the indexes that measure their performance. Moreover, they seem to have some reference points in their self-evaluation, about their batting performance indexes: .300 of batting average. Pope and Simonsohn (2011) have shown that there exists bunching just above .300 of the distribution of this index.

The case of Pope and Simonsohn (2011) differs the former two papers, however, because players receive monetary rewards determined according to their performance.

Suppose the case of the professional golf player. Golf is essentially competition of the total number of shots they needed to finish the whole tour, regardless of that of each single hole, or whether s/he saves per or not in the hole. Rank of order is determined according to the number of shots, and those with better scores are rewarded. Then, there appears a question that what if there is some monetary incentive to make effort to save per. Or it considers the following situation: when every time s/he saves per in each hole, then s/he can get some additional bonus separated from their total score. In this case, then, making effort to save per can be interpreted as sufficiently “rational” choice for the player, although the observed behavior itself appears to be evidence of the reference dependence. In the case of golf, however, there usually does not exist any additional monetary rewards such as “Save-Per-Bonus.”

On the contrary, in MLB, it is natural to think of such a story. It might not be sufficient to prove that the bunching is caused by reference point dependent utility function about their performance indexes: team managers may assign some monetary incentives for the players to adjust their aspiration level to meet those points, as we described in the example above.

Our most important contribution is this: to conduct analysis that reveals the observed behavior to be in fact reference dependence. First, we confirmed the evidence for the manipulation of the performance indexes around the round numbers, by using McCrary (2008)’s method to test manipulation. We include analysis of not only .300 of batting average, but also other points of batting-average and other indexes, such as homerun or stolen-bases. Second, we made examinations to answer the question, “Is this observed manipulation truly driven by the reference dependence of the players?” We applied regression analysis using the data of the players’ salary.

Our paper found three important results. First, our examination for manipulation sup-

ported the previous study. There observed evidence to show there in fact exists seemingly reference point dependent behavior, where .300 of batting-average works as a reference point. Similar results were obtained about other round numbers of batting-average, and other batting indexes such as on-base percentage or homerun. Second, we found that as a whole, there does not exist any monetary incentive for them: for their fixed part of the salary contract, their monetary rewards are continuous in the each performance index. That is, they behave as they consider these round numbers as reference points, even though they do not receive any additional payment by achieving them. Furthermore, we complement our results, discussing some alternative interpretation about other types of monetary incentives: the part of incentivised contract, and relation with contract length. And the third, there exist serial changes about the players' index manipulation. .250 of batting-average does not work as a reference point in relatively recent years, while 20 of homerun does only in the recent players. Among them, .300 of batting-average seems to be a solid benchmark for the players.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the Section 2, we review some literature and verify the standpoint of my paper. Section 3 describes the data we availed. Section 4 presents theoretical framework and empirical way to specification, and make some conjecture. Section 5 shows the results of the analysis. Discussion about some alternative interpretation and non-statistical data are included in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Literature Review

Tversky and Kahneman (1992) mentioned reference point dependence as one of the two distinct respects of their prospect theory. The most primitive form of reference dependent utility function is:

$$u(x|r) = \begin{cases} x - r & \text{if } x \geq r \\ \lambda(x - r) & \text{if } x < r \end{cases}$$

where x denotes a certain outcome, and r is one of the reference points (Figure 1). This agent evaluates the outcome by the difference from the reference point. In addition, they assume "loss-aversion" of the individual, or $\lambda > 1$. Those who have this type of utility function, then they regard same absolute amount of outcome in different way, depending on s/he faces gain or loss situation. "Diminishing sensitivity," which is concave in facing gain and convex in facing loss is an advanced form of this specification (Figure 2).

Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008)'s "aspiration level" model added discontinuity assumption: that is, a utility function that "jumps" at the reference point (Figure 3). When there exists jump in their utility function, then individuals try to manipulate outcome level, paying additional cost which was not accepted in the standard continuous utility function. And as a result, there is observed excess mass or bunching around or just above the reference point. As mentioned below, we exploit this assumption to our model in this paper.

Individuals with such reference-point dependent utility try to adjust their effort level so as to achieve their internal target, or reference point. There is a number of empirical

literature that specifies the existence of reference dependence in the field or lab studies. Farber(2008) applied this model to the labor supply of New York cab drivers to show that as soon as they reached daily target sales, they considers to quit, even when they reached it early in each day. Jones(2018) made analysis on the system of American tax payment. He showed that individuals try to manipulate their real payment by substituting it by donation or other charitable action, and that especially when facing losses, they make more effort. This observation is also caused loss-aversion, with the reference point of zero-payment threshold.




Figure 1: primitive gain-loss function




Figure 2: diminishing sensitivity




Figure 3: jump at the reference point

Reference dependence also occurs in the cases of sports. One of the most well-known papers among them is Pope and Schweizer (2011). They obtained the data of professional golf players, to point out that in each hole, players behave as they take “per” as the reference point. Specifically, they succeeded their putts, significantly better when the putt was one to save per than when it was one to get “eagle” or “birdie.” Similarly, Allen *et al* (2016) specified the existence of reference point dependence of marathon runners, using data about the finish time of enormous number of race in the United States. In this case, the distribution of finishing time has excess mass around every 30 minutes. Note that these cases are common in that the outcomes themselves are nonmonetary ones, and even if they achieve their internal goals, they do not receive any monetary reward for their success. Professional golf players are awarded according to the total number of shots through the whole tour, not to the number of pers they saved.

Pope and Simonsohn (2011) mention a seemingly similar case. They picked up three empirical evidences of round numbers that work as reference points: SAT (a standardized test for college admission in the United States) scores, laboratory experiment, and baseball. In their section of baseball, they picked up the evidence of Major League Baseball (MLB) players. They argue that the players have reference dependent preference in evaluating themselves by a nonmonetary outcome, or their performance index: batting-average (AVG). According to their paper, the position players (batters) pay attention to their batting-average (AVG) especially to finish each season with their batting average of just above .300. They obtained MLB season individual AVG data from 1975 to 2008 and

observed position players (= players except for pitchers) with at least 200 at-bats in each season. Then, they found that their distribution of the batting-average has excess mass just above .300, which reveals the existence of manipulation there. Furthermore, they found that players with batting-average of just below .300 are more likely to hit a base-hit and less likely to get a base-on-balls. Both base-hits and base-on-balls avoid the batter from being gotten out, so for the team he belongs to, base-on-balls also have important value to win the game. However, batting-average does not count base-on-balls as the element to raise the number (For the definition of performance indexes, see Appendix), so they prefer getting hit to base-on-balls. Thus, observed behavior they claims is sufficient evidence that shows the existence of round-number reference point dependent preference of the MLB players.

It is true that there is observed behavior similar to the cases of Allen *et al* (2016): bunching. However, one important thing we have to take care of is that they are professional athlete, and so there exists procedure of contract between the player and the team manager: those who evaluate the player. They propose the players contracts in the next year, after observing the performance they had shown. In other words, the observed excess mass may owe to their monetary value function, not by the preference of themselves. This is the main contribution of my research.

Pope and Simonsohn (2011) stated in their own paper that they conducted analysis only for batting-average, and following research is to be made. So we first search for the round numbers of various batting indexes manipulated by the players. Then, we test if there exists monetary incentive for the players. The team managers and the players agree the contract that sets fixed additional bonuses, paid when a certain performance index reaching to the point. And then for the players whose indexes are around the cutoff points, making discontinuously large effort, and the following observed bunching can be interpreted as economically rational choice, under the given the contract design. In general, players with their performance index just above these cutoff point and those just below the point have almost same ability as a baseball player. At least, it is natural to think there is no reason to treat players discontinuously better, only because he achieve the cutoff. Then, it is interpreted that it is rather the team manager than the players themselves who have the reference-point dependent preference, which makes the players encouraged to meet their goals. Also if such a type of evaluation is utilized, then the managers can get players that are as skilled as those with .300 of batting average, by relatively reasonable contracts.

On the other hand, if there exists no evidence that team managers evaluate the players by the achievement of the cutoff, then we can say that the observed behavior is truly drawn by their own reference dependence. In addition, the consistency is so strong that even there exists no rational reason, they try to reach there. Analysing this and verify which hypothesis is my main contribution of this paper.

3 Data Description

In order to make empirical research, we need information about players' performance, contracts and other details. Then, we obtained panel data that contains these specific information from some open data-source. Each sample consists of indexes of a player at the end of a single season. Here we explain the specific information about the dataset.

First, Performance data are obtained from baseball fan website: *fangraphs* and *Baseball References*. We collected information since 1957 season, the year when the qualified number of plate-appearances is regulated. It is the cutoff point to be eligible for the title of leading hitter, the player with the highest batting-average. Stats in each season contains that of only during the regular season, not that of Spring-Training or postseason games. The full-sample is $N = 54469$.

Note that we then restrict the sample to the players who appear to the plate in MLB games enough to be tested, because those with little number of plate-appearances are likely to be evaluated by other elements than their batting skills ... pitching or fielding, performance at the minor leagues, or those who injured at the season. Especially about batting-average and on-base percentage, those of players with few plate-appearances are not be regarded as reliable. Pope and Simonsohn (2011) set the cutoff at 200 of at-bats, but alternatively we use 200 plate-appearances as the required number to be considered in our analysis. This is because at-bat does not count the number of base-on-balls or sacrifice bunts in the denominator, even though they surely appears to the plate and made something to their teams. On the other hand, plate-appearance stands for the number of that their coaches gave him chances of batting. Restricting the sample reduces the number of the sample $N = 18143$.

The dataset includes the players' plate-appearance, batting-average, on-base percentage, homerun, stolen-base, runs-batted-in, base-hit, all of them are the main indexes of interest in this paper. Also, for the regression analysis, we obtain additional indexes: batting, fielding, and BaseRun, the estimated contribution to the team expressed in the runs they produced, and WPA, or winning percentage added. For further explanations used in our analysis, see Appendix.

Then, here we describe the nature of the indexes. Baseball batting indexes are roughly divided into two types. One is that simply indicates the number of a certain plays, and another is calculated using these numbers, which indicates the rate or the expected number of the plays. Here we call the former "cumulative index," and the latter "rate index." Cumulative indexes are for example "base-hit" or "homerun," or "stolen-bases." Cumulative indexes are irreversible and so they are monotonically increasing in their appearances. That is, so once the players reached a certain number of cumulative indexes such as 20 homeruns, then it does not matter how their performance goes afterward. On the other hand, rate indexes can fluctuate: even once they reached their internal goals, it may fall if their performance get worse. Batting-average and on-base percentage are sorted to this type.

Second, we mention the salary data. Salary data are obtained from *USA TODAY* and *Baseball References*. We collected annual salary data of the position players who are registered in MLB Roaster at the beginning of each season. It also contains information

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Sample A

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
PA	18,143	456.477	152.836	200	320	591	778
AVG	18,143	.264	.032	.135	.242	.285	.394
OBP	18,143	.331	.039	.174	.305	.356	.609
HR	18,143	11.811	9.747	0	4	17	73
RBI	18,143	51.882	26.912	4	31	69	165
SB	18,143	7.846	10.869	0	1	10	130
H	18,143	108.941	42.933	29	72	143	262
Age	18,143	28.506	4.042	18	25	31	46

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample B

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Age	8,915	28.714	3.901	19	26	31	46
PA	8,915	471.946	150.890	200	342	605.5	778
AVG	8,915	.268	.031	.146	.248	.289	.394
OBP	8,915	.337	.038	.174	.311	.360	.609
HR	8,915	13.446	10.213	0	6	19	73
RBI	8,915	56.339	27.621	5	35	74	165
SB	8,915	8.534	10.851	0	1	11	109
H	8,915	114.232	42.481	30	78	148	262
+WPA	8,915	8.715	3.471	2.030	5.820	11.430	19.160
-WPA	8,915	-8.270	2.610	-15.050	-10.420	-6.060	-2.740
Bat	8,915	3.257	16.139	-44.200	-7.300	11.100	116.800
Fld	8,870	.304	7.482	-36.100	-4.000	4.400	37.000
BsR	8,915	.092	2.712	-12.600	-1.200	1.200	14.300
Salary	8,915	3,487,838	4,487,344	62,500	512,750	4,658,334	29,200,000
FA	8,915	.168	.374	0	0	0	1

about other player-specific characteristics: age, position (such as catcher, 1st-baseman, left-fielder, designated hitter and so on), the teams they signed, and the possession of free agency. We merged this with the play stats in the previous year, because salary is as usually determined based on the performance of the previous season. Because of lack of disclosed information, this dataset contains only that since 1987. Also, because we regard the players' performance as reflected to their annual reward in that of the next year, we cannot merge the stats dataset of 2018. So the latest available season of this is 2017. The aggregated number of the panel is $N = 13226$, and the restriction of 200 plate-appearances reduces the number to $N = 8915$. Then, here we conduct analysis with two datasets: one that contains salary data (we call this Sample B), while the other does not (Sample A). As we explain in the next section, we use two main analysis: manipulation of performance index (only use play stats) and design of the contracts (needs information about salary). In the former we use Sample A, and in the latter Sample B. The descriptive statistics of each sample are described in Table ?? and Table 2, respectively.

4 Theoretical Frameworks and Way of Specification

4.1 Frameworks

Baseball is so rich in performance indexes, that records the plays in variable viewpoints. Performance indexes are interpreted as reliable proxies for the skills of the players, so we assume that the players are trying to make them as good as possible. Performance indexes work as clear and valid benchmarks to signal their ability, and team managers evaluate them according to them (also, they include the player-specific characteristics: age, position and so on). Their evaluation is reflected to monetary rewards to the players, so the players benefit function is described as follows:

$$F_{it} = F(X_{it}, Z_{it})$$

where F stands for the monetary reward function to the player i at time t , and X_{it} and Z_{it} expresses the value of the index and other player characteristics, respectively. Players make decision according to this benefit function, and adjust their effort to maximize their utility.

Moreover, each player evaluate himself as an athlete: players directly yield utility by their value of the performance indexes. An alternative explanation is derived by this. That is, players make decision making according to their utility function

$$U_{it} = U(X_{it})$$

In this model, players no longer pay attention to their future monetary rewards, and the same in the first model, players decide their effort level to maximize their utility.

Here we assume that before our analysis, we cannot determine which model is proper to interpret the observed behavior of the players: excess mass or bunching around the possible referene points. Our interest is in whether there exists any monetary incentives to lead bunching: Concretely, whether the players' benefit function has discontinuity in a certain performance index. Following Allen *et al* (2016), we first use the assumption of the utility function of Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008)'s "aspiration level" model. The model presents the form of the utility function with "notch,"

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} U_r(r + \epsilon) \neq \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} U_r(r - \epsilon)$$

This form of utility function is discontinuous at the reference point r .

Also, we consider the possibility that the discontinuous design of the contracts. Similarly to the utility function, notch in the benefit function is expressed as follows:

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} F_r(r + \epsilon) \neq \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} F_r(r - \epsilon)$$

Anyway, the important assumption is that players evaluate their performance index using referene-dependent utility function of themselves or the team manager, and manipulate it in order to maximize their utility. This aspiration results in odd distribution of the index at the end of the season: excess mass around the possible referene point.

In Allen *et al* (2016), they assumed that it is the runners themselves that have the discontinuous utility function occurs as excess mass around the reference points. On the other hand, we suppose there may be another story. That is, discontinuous utility function of the managers emerges as discontinuous evaluation of the players: salary scheme jumps, depending on whether a certain performance index is above or below the reference point. Then, it modifies the income function of the players discontinuous, which results in bunching as the best response of them.

4.2 Empirical Method

4.2.1 Test for Bunching

First, we test if there is observed any behavior that seems to be related to reference dependent preference. As we explained in the previous sections, manipulation is verified by the observation of bunching, or an excess mass around the possible reference point. To specify the excess mass, we apply the method of regression discontinuity design (RDD).

RDD is a way to measure the effect of a treatment, such that whether the treatment is assigned or not depends on the threshold of a certain variable (called “running variable”). Then, comparing the samples just above and just below the threshold is sufficient examination of the treatment, since they are in almost same states except for the existence of the treatment.

However, there is an important assumption for this specification to be valid (Lee and Lemieux, 2010): continuity of the running variable around the threshold. In other words, individuals must not be able to manipulate the running variable so as to be above the cutpoint. This is because if there exists manipulation, then there occurs selection bias problem, that those who try to be assigned the treatment can adjust their running variable. Therefore, there are some empirical way to test the manipulation of a variable, which is the very method I apply in our analysis. One of the frequently applied methods for this specification is McCrary(2008)’s local linear density estimation. We avail this to our specification of bunching.

This test of the manipulation at the cutoff point c , proceeds in two steps. First, define $f(\cdot)$ be the density function of the variable x to be tested (here we use the performance indexes). Then we undersmooth the observed density: determine the binsize b of x , and obtain the histogram. And finally, we conduct local linear approximation to both just above and below the cutoff point. Note that the optimal bandwidth is to be selected by the fourth order polynomial approximation. Then, we estimate the frequency at the cutoff point, $\hat{f}(r)$, by fitting the estimated density function from both below and above the cutoff, \hat{f}^+ and \hat{f}^- , respectively. Finally, we take the difference between $\ln \hat{f}^+$ and $\ln \hat{f}^-$ to calculate the statistics θ . With θ and its estimator of standard deviation, t -tests can be constructed to specifying manipulation.

4.2.2 Monetary Incentive

Then, We examine the existance of the monetary incentive. We employ the method of sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD): local linear regression around the possible reference point as the cutoff.

$$w_{it} = \beta_0 X_{it} + \beta_1 \text{ABOVE}_{it}$$

For each player i in the season t , w_{it} is loggarithm of their annual salary in next season $t + 1$. X_{it} are the value of performance index (batting-average, on-base percentage,...). ABOVE_{it} is an indicator of the achievement of their goals for the index. That is, if he finished his season with a certain index with above the possible reference point, it takes 1, and otherwise 0, so this is the variable of interest. The bandiwidths in each analysis were selected according to the optimization of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), using polynomial approximation.

Estimation was conducted in two ways: one only includes the index term and the dummy for achieving their goals in the model, while the other includes term Z_{it} , which consists other elements to affect their annual salary. Concretely, it includes player-specific characters (age, team he signed, position,...), and other performance indexes that controls the aspects that covers the players' residual skill, where the performance index X_{it} does not argues. For further explanation, please see Appendix.

As we mentioned above, usually this method is not applied in this kind of analysis, since RDD can be invalid when individuals can manipulate the running variable, because if they can intentionally control this variable, then anyone who know or want to receive treatment are to manipulate it and so observed sample can be biased. In this research, however, we are interested in the existance itself of the treatment: monetary incentive, so it does not matter if the players did know the (possible) reward or not. Therefore, we regard this way to specification appropreate one to our interests.

As well as OLS, team, position, or individual fixed effect model estimation was also conducted.

5 Result

5.1 Excess Mass Around The Reference Point

In this section, we present our main results of analysis. First, we show the results that verifies bunching. Table 3 includes the summary of McCrary (2008)'s manipulation tests about the performance indexes that say there is some manipulation occurs. Consistent with Pope and Simonsohn (2011), there actually occurs excess mass around .300, and in addition .250 of batting-average. Also, manipulation was also observed in some of other round numbers of other indexes: .350 of on-base percentage, 20 of homeruns, 100 of runs-batted-in, 30 and 40 of stolen-bases, and 200 of base-hits.

Table 3 shows parts of results that denies the existance of excess mass. For precise estimation of bunching, we set the binsizes of undersmoothing artificially: .001 for batting-average and on-base percentage, 1 for homerun (HR), stolen-base (SB), plate-appearance




Figure 4: Histogram of Batting-Average




Figure 5: Discontinuity at .300 of AVG




Figure 6: Discontinuity at .250 of AVG




Figure 7: Histogram of On-Base Percentage




Figure 8: Discontinuity at .350 of OBP




Figure 9: Histogram of Homerun




Figure 10: Discontinuity at 20 of HR




Figure 11: Histogram of Runs-Batted-In




Figure 12: Discontinuity at 100 of RBI




Figure 13: Histogram of Base-Hit




Figure 14: Discontinuity at 200 of Base-Hit




Figure 15: Histogram of Stolen-Base




Figure 16: Discontinuity at .300 of AVG




Figure 17: Discontinuity at .250 of AVG

index	type	cutpoint	binsize	bandwidth	θ	z
AVG	rate	.300	.001	.019	.499 (.067)	7.442***
		.250	.001	.024	.212 (.042)	5.061***
OBP	rate	.350	.001	.024	.139 (.049)	2.854**
HR	cumulative	20	1	5.309	.259 (.075)	3.465***
RBI	cumulative	100	4	15.423	.311 (.094)	3.295***
SB	cumulative	30	1	10.000	.529 (.124)	4.274***
		40	1	11.505	.481 (.174)	2.764**
PA	cumulative	500	1	.003	.160 (.063)	2.515*
H	cumulative	200	1	18.922	.453 (.178)	2.547 *

Note ***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.
Bandwidth is optimized following the method of McCrary(2008).

Table 3: Test for Manipulation, leastPA = 200

(PA), and base-hit (H), and 4 for runs-batted-in (RBI). Batting-average (AVG) and on-base percentage (OBP) are usually shown by three decimal digits, rounding the fourth decimal digit, so strictly batters with .2995 of batting-average are taken as .300. As we mentioned in Section 3, homerun, stolen-base, plate-appearance, and base-hit stand for the number of plays in interest, and so take integer and they earn one for each plate appearances or such a chance to manipulate. Runs-batted-in is also an integer-index, but they can get at most 4 at one plate-appearance, so we set it 4. To confirm the robustness of our results, we repeated this test with various binsize, but we yield essentially same results. Bandwidths are optimized by calculation, following McCrary (2007).

For batting-average, extending sample size from Pope and Simonsohn (2011) yields similar results: Players manipulate their batting-average. The difference between the estimated frequency according to the approximation below .300 and that of above .300 was significant at .1% ($z = 7.442$) level.

In addition, bunching occurs also in .250 ($z = 5.061$, $p < 0.1\%$). It was not reported in Pope and Simonsohn (2011): for their sample, there was no bunching observed in any other round numbers of batting-average, so it can be related to that the sample size is extended to further old ages. We specifically analyzed this in Section 6.4. Replicating analysis with larger binsizes: .002 and .005 also yields similar results.

On-base percentage, on the other hand, showed similar tendency in .350, although the significance level was 5% level ($z = 2.854$). Pope and Simonsohn (2011) reported that they are less likely to get base-on-balls when facing marginal range of batting-average and so

they feel of more importance in batting-average than on-base percentage. However, when they face marginal point of on-base percentage, they may try to get more base-on-balls in order to achieve .350.

Bunching also occurs in cumulative indexes. Cumulative ones are irreversible, and so players may feel these indexes are easier to manipulate. As same as batting-average and on-base percentages, however, such manipulation was observed in only limited numbers: not in all the round numbers. For Homerun, bunching occurred only in 20 ($z = 3.465, p < 0.1\%$): there may be diminishing sensitivity: 20 is located on above the 75 percentiles of the whole Sample A. Also, stolen-base and base-hit have shown bunching, at 30 ($z = 4.274, p < 0.1\%$) and 40 ($z = 2.764, p < 1\%$) of stolen-base and 200 in base-hit ($z = 2.547, p < 5\%$). Stealing-bases are skills that are talented to limited number of the players, but succeeds with the probability of 60% to almost 100%, so those who are evaluated by their number of stolen-bases, it may certain be relatively accessible number to manipulate. 30 and 40 of stolen-bases are also far above the 75 percentiles of all the players.

Base-hit is also manipulated, but the confidence level of the discontinuity was lower than that of batting-average ($z = 2.547, p < 5\%$). Base-hit is a close index to batting-average, for both indexes increase by getting base-hits. It may because the number of base-hit is not regarded as important as batting-average (In most TV live on baseball, they introduce player with his batting-average, not the number of base-hits.) Furthermore, it can be related to that for cumulative indexes, it is not worth “keeping” indexes. If a player reaches .300 of batting-average, for example, then he can keep it by not attending the rest of plate-appearances or games. In fact, Pope and Simonsohn (2011) describes that players with just above .300 are more likely to be replaced their last scheduled plate-appearance. On the other hand, if he get the 200th base-hit, then he does not have to care about the number of base-hits and attend the games to get better performance.

And surprisingly such manipulation occurs also in runs-batted-in ($z=3.295, p<0.1\%$). Compared to other indexes, runs-batted-in is harder to manipulate, since the number of that depends on the performance of his teammates, and the number they can earn at a single plate-appearance varies from 1 to 4. As in Table 3, the test said that there occurs the evidence in plate-appearances. However, it may insufficient because the optimized bandwidth was smaller than one, even though the number of PAs takes only integers. Setting bandwidth larger than 1, then the result went insignificant, so we regard it as not supportive results for manipulation. (In fact, there certainly exists monetary incentives for plate-appearances. We come back to here in Section 6.1.)

Summarizing the results, there in fact exists manipulation of the batting indexes and they are possible reference point of the players. However, it does not occur in all the round numbers of all the indexes. In the case of marathon runners, Allen et al. (2016), there occurred bunching in every round numbers of the goal time, although the size of discontinuity monotonically decreased. That is, it should be considered that the reference points are not determined only because they are round numbers as Pope and Simonsohn (2011) argued. That is, the nature of the reference points are likely to be close to “per” in Pope and Schweizer (2011), or the well-known standards that is related to the image of “skilled players,” rather than round numbers; or well, these numbers are monetarily incentivised goals by the team managers. So next, we examine whether there is any monetary bonus

in their contract.

5.2 Existence of Monetary Incentive

In Section 5.1, we found that there actually exists the player's manipulation for some of the representative indexes. Then in this section, we show whether they are led to aim these goals by their reference dependence, or by their design of the contracts with monetary incentive.

Table 4 describes the results of RDD analysis on logarithm of their salary next year, with the cutpoint of each possible reference point. Column "Other Control" indicates if the model includes other variables (other performance indexes, player's age, WPA and dummy for possession of the right of free agency). "bw type" indicates the bandwidths used in the model: "LATE" includes the sample that are in the optimal bandwidth calculated by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (), while "Half-BW" and "Double-BW" are using a half and a twice of the LATE bandwidth, respectively. As a whole, there is no evidence that supports the existence of monetary incentive to make effort for their observed goals. There is no essential difference between the cumulative indexes and rate indexes.

Also, to confirm the robustness of our analysis, we made regression analysis with an interaction term of X_{it} and $ABOVE_{it}$, which considers the change in average return of the index in argument to their annual salary when the value of the index is above the cutoff point. Each model includes the players that are included in RDD analysis, or those who are located within the optimal bandwidths in RDD. Table 5 to 10 show the results of this analysis for each possible reference points. Consistent with RDD, they give us no evidence of jump of their fixed rewards, except for stolen-bases.

Here we consider each indexes respectively.

First, for batting-average, RDD analysis denied the existence of any additional monetary bonus for achieving either .300 or .250. Although estimated jump at each cutoff points were positive, but their standard errors are large and so the difference were insignificant. The same results were obtained in the model with interaction terms: dummies for achieving their internal goals are all insignificant. That is, players with their batting-average around .250 and .300 make effort to meet them just above these numbers, even though there is no monetary reward to do so. These findings support the assumption that preferences of the players are reference dependent, even when evaluating nonmonetary outcomes.

On-base percentage shows similar tendency. For this index, the estimated jump takes negative, although the estimator is insignificant. As is mentioned in Section 6, on-base percentage is considered as more important index: it is closer correlation with the winning-average of the team than batting-average. Thus, it can be the case that team managers evaluate on-base percentage more than batting-average and think of paying players with higher number more. However, our results are against this hypothesis.

Table 4: RDD Test for Monetary Incentives

index,cutpoint	Other Control	bw type	bandwidth	Observations	Estimate	Std. Error	z
AVG, .300	No	LATE	.084	8514	.047	.061	.773
		Half-BW	.042	5599	.088	.075	1.174
		Double-BW	.170	8915	.067	.056	1.184
	Yes	LATE	.045	5930	.034	.056	.615
		Half-BW	.023	3005	.061	.077	.788
		Double-BW	.090	8605	.016	.045	.354
AVG, .250	No	LATE	.036	6110	.019	.068	.286
		Half-BW	.018	3496	.015	.092	.161
		Double-BW	.072	8539	.034	.054	.636
	Yes	LATE	.048	7271	.070	.052	1.340
		Half-BW	.024	4402	.066	.069	.953
		Double-BW	.096	8810	.075	.044	1.713
HR, 20	No	LATE	3.32	1315	.071	.175	.406
		Half-BW	1.66	562	.073	.127	.576
		Double-BW	6.64	2582	-.004	.109	-.034
	Yes	LATE	3.30	1307	-.002	.141	-.015
		Half-BW	1.65	560	.030	.102	.299
		Double-BW	6.61	2558	-.032	.088	-.364
OBP, .350	No	LATE	.044	6440	-.038	.065	-.592
		Half-BW	.021	3542	-.076	.089	-.849
		Double-BW	.087	8656	-.029	.051	-.570
	Yes	LATE	.045	6525	-.013	.049	-.272
		Half-BW	.022	3673	-.055	.069	-.807
		Double-BW	.089	8637	.004	.039	.107
RBI, 100	No	LATE	4.08	393	.072	.289	.250
		Half-BW	2.04	228	.282	.400	.707
		Double-BW	8.16	714	.008	.185	.043
	Yes	LATE	4.04	390	.018	.209	.086
		Half-BW	2.02	227	-.042	.324	.130
		Double-BW	8.07	708	.056	.127	.435
H, 200	No	LATE	3.173	75	-.786	.396	-1.985*
		Half-BW	1.587	35	.386	.271	-1.421
		Double-BW	6.347	137	-.061	.309	-.199
	Yes	LATE	3.175	75	-.420	1.042	-.403
		Half-BW	1.587	35	-4.779	.576	-8.288**
		Double-BW	6.349	137	-.109	.413	-.265
SB, 30	No	LATE	3.39	282	.962	.372	2.585**
		Half-BW	1.70	134	.920	.263	3.492***
		Double-BW	8.16	714	.008	.185	2.941**
	Yes	LATE	3.40	282	.379	.297	1.271
		Half-BW	1.70	134	.290	.249	1.163
		Double-BW	6.79	533	.408	.180	2.260*
SB, 40	No	LATE	3.16	134	-1.276	.453	-2.818**
		Half-BW	1.58	56	-.736	.383	-1.924
		Double-BW	6.32	245	-.712	.313	-2.274*
	Yes	LATE	3.16	134	-.346	.396	-.875
		Half-BW	1.58	56	-.313	.429	-.730
		Double-BW	6.33	245	-.115	.244	-.472

Note:

***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.

Bandwidth is optimized following the method of Imbens-Kalyanaraman.

Table 5: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .300

	Dependent variable:						
	Sal						
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	feim (7)
Constant	11.166*** (.423)	9.728*** (.399)	-6.616*** (.665)	-5.049*** (.673)	-5.161*** (.669)		
AVG	11.513*** (1.537)	11.604*** (1.405)	11.620*** (1.209)	4.232*** (1.212)	4.083*** (1.204)	4.221*** (1.201)	3.898** (1.189)
AVG_300	-.169 (1.050)	-.455 (.954)	-.413 (.821)	-.261 (.789)	-.213 (.784)	-.142 (.780)	-.069 (.706)
FLD		.004 (.002)	.006*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.008*** (.002)
BsR		-.014** (.005)	.009* (.005)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.005)	.020*** (.005)
AGE			1.005*** (.039)	.983*** (.037)	.984*** (.037)	.997*** (.037)	
AGE_sq			-.015*** (.001)	-.014*** (.001)	-.014*** (.001)	-.014*** (.001)	
AVG:AVG_300	.663 (3.429)	1.689 (3.118)	1.428 (2.681)	.930 (2.577)	.791 (2.560)	.540 (2.549)	.160 (2.312)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects							
Observations	5,960	5,930	5,930	5,930	5,930	Position 5,930	Individual 5,930
R ²	.035	.215	.420	.464	.471	.478	.744
Adjusted R ²	.035	.210	.416	.461	.468	.473	.660
Residual Std. Error	1.286 (df = 5956)	1.164 (df = 5894)	1.001 (df = 5892)	.962 (df = 5890)	.956 (df = 5889)	.950 (df = 5880)	.764 (df = 4459)
F Statistic	71.983*** (df = 3; 5956)	46.134*** (df = 35; 5894)	115.152*** (df = 37; 5892)	130.803*** (df = 39; 5890)	131.204*** (df = 40; 5889)		

Note:

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 6: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .250

	Dependent variable:					
	Sal					
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	12.039*** (.501)	10.292*** (.457)	-6.061*** (.632)	-5.288*** (.632)	-5.513*** (.624)	
AVG	8.003*** (2.145)	9.795*** (1.926)	8.623*** (1.636)	2.156 (1.621)	1.906 (1.599)	1.554 (1.592)
AVG_250	-.684 (.618)	-.250 (.555)	-.597 (.471)	-.771 (.459)	-.783 (.452)	-.923* (.450)
FLD		.003 (.002)	.004** (.002)	.006*** (.002)	.005*** (.001)	.006*** (.001)
BsR		-.027*** (.005)	-.001 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	-.006 (.005)
AGE			1.021*** (.034)	1.013*** (.033)	1.019*** (.033)	1.030*** (.033)
AGE_sq			-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)
AVG:AVG_250	2.836 (2.520)	1.098 (2.262)	2.591 (1.922)	3.383 (1.871)	3.409 (1.845)	3.957* (1.836)
WPA				X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects						
Observations	7,307	7,271	7,271	7,271	7,271	7,271
R ²	.032	.231	.445	.476	.490	.735
Adjusted R ²	.031	.227	.442	.473	.487	.655
Residual Std. Error	1.271 (df = 7303)	1.135 (df = 7235)	.964 (df = 7233)	.937 (df = 7231)	.924 (df = 7230)	.758 (df = 5590)
F Statistic	79.391*** (df = 3; 7303)	62.031*** (df = 35; 7235)	156.664*** (df = 37; 7233)	168.232*** (df = 39; 7231)	173.678*** (df = 40; 7230)	.918 (df = 7221)

Note:

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 7: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .350

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	10.793*** (.516)	9.117*** (.472)	-7.002*** (.666)	-6.993*** (.689)	-7.081*** (.683)			
OBP	10.357*** (1.574)	11.155*** (1.421)	10.183*** (1.228)	5.580*** (1.258)	5.445*** (1.248)	5.346*** (1.242)	6.739*** (1.212)	7.368*** (1.467)
OBP_350	-.132 (.888)	-.625 (.801)	.103 (.691)	.080 (.676)	.103 (.670)	.130 (.667)	-.832 (.620)	-.625 (.788)
FLD		.006** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.008*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.008*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)	.007*** (.002)
BsR		-.022*** (.005)	.002 (.004)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.004)	-.0003 (.005)	.022*** (.005)	-.020*** (.005)
AGE			1.016*** (.036)	1.021*** (.035)	1.021*** (.035)	1.037*** (.035)		
AGE_sq			-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)		
OBP:OBP_350	.356 (2.516)	1.783 (2.269)	-.237 (1.960)	-.188 (1.915)	-.274 (1.898)	-.321 (1.889)	2.166 (1.760)	1.790 (2.232)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X	X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	6,656	6,620	6,620	6,620	6,620	6,620	6,620	6,620
R ²	.036	.231	.427	.453	.462	.470	.733	.260
Adjusted R ²	.035	.227	.424	.450	.459	.466	.650	.255
Residual Std. Error	1.267 (df = 6652)	1.135 (df = 6584)	.980 (df = 6582)	.957 (df = 6580)	.949 (df = 6579)	.943 (df = 6570)	.764 (df = 5042)	1.114 (df = 6572)
F Statistic	81.971*** (df = 3; 6652)	56.520*** (df = 35; 6584)	132.495*** (df = 37; 6582)	139.690*** (df = 39; 6580)	141.515*** (df = 40; 6579)			

Note:

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 8: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 20 HR

	Dependent variable:						
	OLS			Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	14.429*** (1.092)	12.592*** (1.045)	-6.385*** (1.381)	-5.374*** (1.425)	-5.750*** (1.409)		
HR	.014 (.061)	.036 (.057)	.076 (.046)	.076 (.045)	.074 (.045)	.083 (.045)	.070 (.054)
HR_20	-1.154 (1.393)	-.474 (1.313)	.008 (1.055)	-.142 (1.035)	-.051 (1.022)	-.003 (1.025)	.993 (1.248)
FLD		.005 (.004)	.010*** (.003)	.010** (.003)	.010*** (.003)	.010*** (.003)	.006 (.004)
BsR		-.032** (.011)	.001 (.009)	-.011 (.009)	-.012 (.009)	-.022* (.010)	-.007 (.015)
AGE			1.109*** (.073)	1.107*** (.072)	1.123*** (.071)	1.127*** (.071)	
AGE_sq			-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	
HR:HR_20	.061 (.073)	.025 (.069)	-.005 (.055)	.0004 (.054)	-.003 (.054)	-.007 (.054)	-.052 (.065)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy							
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects							
Observations	1,315	1,307	1,307	1,307	1,307	1,307	1,307
R ²	.009	.172	.467	.488	.501	.508	.806
Adjusted R ²	.007	.149	.452	.473	.485	.489	.610
Residual Std. Error	1.203 (df = 1311)	1.114 (df = 1271)	.894 (df = 1269)	.877 (df = 1267)	.867 (df = 1266)	.864 (df = 1257)	.755 (df = 1259)
F Statistic	3.882** (df = 3; 1311)	7.543*** (df = 35; 1271)	30.087*** (df = 37; 1269)	31.023*** (df = 39; 1267)	31.805*** (df = 40; 1266)		

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 9: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 30 SB

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	13.466*** (3.672)	8.006* (3.191)	-4.126 (3.586)	-3.729 (3.651)	-2.949 (3.675)			
SB	.029 (.132)	.167 (.114)	-.036 (.099)	-.041 (.099)	-.052 (.099)	-.067 (.096)	.075 (.185)	.145 (.113)
SB_30	12.468** (4.569)	13.567*** (3.972)	2.544 (3.531)	2.234 (3.526)	1.579 (3.541)	.816 (3.464)	7.200 (6.586)	12.144** (3.947)
FLD		.003 (.007)	.007 (.006)	.007 (.006)	.007 (.005)	.008 (.005)	.013 (.011)	.005 (.006)
BAT		.028*** (.003)	.023*** (.003)	.015** (.006)	.014* (.006)	.017** (.006)	.019 (.010)	.021** (.007)
AGE			1.142*** (.174)	1.150*** (.174)	1.105*** (.176)	1.132*** (.172)		
AGE_sq			-.018*** (.003)	-.018*** (.003)	-.017*** (.003)	-.017*** (.003)		
SB_SB_30	-.391* (.158)	-.444** (.137)	-.071 (.122)	-.061 (.122)	-.039 (.122)	-.013 (.119)	-.230 (.229)	-.397** (.136)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy		X			X	X	X	X
Season dummies			X		X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	282	282	282	282	282	282	282	282
R ²	.075	.472	.628	.633	.636	.675	.915	.523
Adjusted R ²	.065	.397	.571	.573	.576	.608	.651	.430
Residual Std. Error	1.229 (df = 278)	.988 (df = 246)	.833 (df = 244)	.830 (df = 242)	.828 (df = 241)	.796 (df = 233)	.751 (df = 68)	.960 (df = 235)
F Statistic	7.559*** (df = 3; 278)	6.276*** (df = 35; 246)	11.110*** (df = 37; 244)	10.684*** (df = 39; 242)	10.537*** (df = 40; 241)			

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 10: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 40 SB

Dependent variable: <i>Sal</i>								
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	<i>felm</i> (7)	(8)
Constant	.097 (6.865)	2.795 (6.575)	-6.186 (6.345)	-5.258 (6.781)	-3.914 (6.974)			
SB	.392* (.182)	.287 (.174)	.191 (.155)	.183 (.158)	.148 (.163)	.148 (.163)	.679* (.265)	.187 (.182)
SB.40	20.483* (8.497)	7.339 (8.171)	5.634 (7.281)	5.543 (7.430)	5.082 (7.461)	7.669 (7.511)	37.152** (12.783)	7.632 (8.367)
FLD		.003 (.009)	.005 (.008)	.005 (.008)	.005 (.008)	.008 (.009)	.021 (.020)	.005 (.009)
BAT		.025*** (.005)	.023*** (.004)	.020* (.009)	.020* (.009)	.021* (.009)	-.001 (.020)	.017 (.010)
AGE			.763** (.239)	.751** (.242)	.751** (.243)	.745** (.245)		
AGE.sq			-.011** (.004)	-.011** (.004)	-.011** (.004)	-.011* (.004)		
SB.SB.40	-.537* (.218)	-.205 (.210)	-.152 (.187)	-.149 (.191)	-.134 (.192)	-.198 (.194)	-.956** (.328)	-.203 (.215)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
EA dummy		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Season dummies								
Fixed effects								
Observations	134	134	134	134	134	134	134	134
R ²	.062	.519	.634	.636	.638	.665	.949	.559
Adjusted R ²	.041	.353	.499	.490	.488	.494	.645	.348
Residual Std. Error	1.158 (df = 130)	.951 (df = 99)	.837 (df = 97)	.845 (df = 95)	.846 (df = 94)	.841 (df = 88)	.705 (df = 19)	.955 (df = 90)
F Statistic	2.875* (df = 3; 130)	3.137*** (df = 34; 99)	4.674*** (df = 36; 97)	4.363*** (df = 38; 95)	4.257*** (df = 39; 94)			

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 11: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 100 RBI

	Dependent variable:					
	OLS			Sal		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant	17.552* (7.013)	13.364* (6.189)	-3.577 (5.256)	-3.767 (5.174)	-3.797 (5.183)	
RBI	-.023 (.072)	.001 (.063)	-.017 (.052)	-.007 (.051)	-.007 (.051)	-.011 (.050)
RBI_100	-11.458 (8.459)	-3.512 (7.492)	-2.428 (6.115)	-1.810 (5.971)	-1.692 (6.001)	-2.447 (5.966)
FLD		-.0002 (.005)	.004 (.004)	.004 (.004)	.004 (.004)	.007 (.004)
BsR		-.035* (.014)	.001 (.012)	-.008 (.012)	-.008 (.012)	-.016 (.013)
AGE			1.185*** (.127)	1.195*** (.125)	1.195*** (.125)	1.187*** (.126)
AGE_sq			-.018*** (.002)	-.018*** (.002)	-.018*** (.002)	-.018*** (.002)
RBI_RBI_100	.115 (.086)	.036 (.076)	.026 (.062)	.019 (.060)	.018 (.061)	.026 (.060)
WPA				X	X	X
FA dummy		X			X	X
Season dummies			X	X	X	X
Fixed effects						
Observations	393	390	390	390	390	390
R ²	.015	.345	.569	.592	.592	.614
Adjusted R ²	.007	.281	.523	.546	.545	.559
Residual Std. Error	1.033 (df = 389)	.880 (df = 354)	.717 (df = 352)	.699 (df = 350)	.700 (df = 349)	.690 (df = 340)
F Statistic	1.984 (df = 3; 389)	5.333*** (df = 35; 354)	12.547*** (df = 37; 352)	13.012*** (df = 39; 350)	12.654*** (df = 40; 349)	.596 (df = 124)
						.841 (df = 342)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note:

Also for the cumulative indexes, observed results are almost the same: 20 of homerun, 100 of runs-batted-in, and 200 base-hits does not discontinuously raise the players' salary. Homeruns produce at least one score to the team, and are take one of the most "attractive" aspects of baseball, so there may exists additional positive effect for the team: it may bring a lot of audience, which profits them by stadium fees. Nevertheless, discontinuous scheme of the salary was not observed. Regressions with the interaction term reported the same results.

Stolen-base, however, shows different results. In RDD for the cutpoint of 30, including no other controls yields significant discontinuity in every bandwidth. Also, the results are consistent in some models of the interaction term. Compared to the other indexes, there were observed evidence that are for the monetary incentives. However, we do not regard them as sufficient support. First, for RDD, controlling other player-specific characteristics, their significance level drastically goes down. Also, in interaction-term analysis, the estimated values are mixture of significant ones and not significant ones, and they fluctuate from .816 to 13.567. And finally, for 40 stolen-bases, the results of RDD estimation showed negative jump, inconsistent with that of 30, even though these results argue the same index. Thus, we conclude these results cannot support the counter hypothesis that denies discontinuity of the salary contracts, but either vice versa. Especially in this point, we require further analysis.

One possible alternative interpretation is that there exists the players that sign the contracts that includes plural-year service. Such a player plays receive fixed salary regardless of their single-year performance. Thus, we conducted a supplemental analysis that restricts the sample to those who have the free-agency, which enables them to negotiate with any MLB or other professional baseball teams. These players cannot play for the MLB without signing a new contract, which always reflects his performance of the previous year. In the analysis above, we consider the possession of the right of free agency by adding the dummy variable that indicates whether he holds the right or not.

Table 12 shows the results of RDD, with the restricted sample to free-agent players. This is consistent with the main results: there does not exist evidence that supports the additional reward at each cutoff points. Analysis about stolen-bases were not conducted because of lack of players around there.

In summary, we find that players does not have monetary incentives at their observed internal goals. That is, they adjust their effort level to make their performance indexes just above the reference points, because of their reference point dependent: discontinuous at the reference point preferences. In the next section, we consider other alternative explanations by conducting additional analysis, and empirical evidences.

6 Alternative Interpretation and Some Evidence

In section 5, our analysis presented that there in fact exists manipulation in some of the batting indexes, but no evidence observed in their contracts, which supports the assumption these observations are driven by the reference dependence of the players themselves. Here we consider some possible alternative and additional discussion about our results.

Table 12: RDD Test for Discontinuity, Only Including FA Players

index,cutpoint	Other Control	bw type	bandwidth	Observations	Estimate	Std. Error	z
AVG, .300	No	LATE	.025	503	-.175	.197	-.888
		Half-BW	.013	252	-.307	.302	-1.016
		Double-BW	.052	1043	-.180	.141	-1.271
	Yes	LATE	.026	509	-.253	.138	-1.832
		Half-BW	.013	266	-.209	.212	-.986
		Double-BW	.052	1038	.199	.102	-1.938
AVG, .250	No	LATE	.056	1366	.074	.102	.721
		Half-BW	.028	910	.147	.133	1.099
		Double-BW	.114	1501	.067	.090	.735
	Yes	LATE	.058	1367	.084	.082	1.020
		Half-BW	.029	923	.149	.107	.398
		Double-BW	.117	1480	.070	.072	.964
HR, 20	No	LATE	3.48	211	-.302	.300	-1.007
		Half-BW	1.74	96	-.123	.226	-.543
		Double-BW	6.96	387	.045	.203	.224
	Yes	LATE	3.50	206	-.273	.296	-.924
		Half-BW	1.75	95	-.156	.278	-.560
		Double-BW	7.00	439	-.098	.174	-.565
OBP, .350	No	LATE	.045	1103	.034	.129	.262
		Half-BW	.023	597	-.106	.172	-.620
		Double-BW	.092	1469	.024	.105	.225
	Yes	LATE	.043	1044	.021	.107	.196
		Half-BW	.021	566	-.085	.153	-.558
		Double-BW	.086	1435	.016	.084	.194
RBI, 100	No	LATE	4.90	50	-.100	.559	-.179
		Half-BW	2.45	30	-.095	.949	-.101
		Double-BW	9.80	102	.256	.333	.770
	Yes	LATE	4.93	49	.195	.433	.449
		Half-BW	2.46	30	-1.360	1.295	-1.050
		Double-BW	9.86	100	.398	.160	2.481*
H, 200	No	LATE	4.498	107	-.070	.447	-.156
		Half-BW	2.249	61	-.439	.726	-.605
		Double-BW	8.996	218	-.025	.293	-.086
	Yes	LATE	4.512	106	.649	.355	1.824
		Half-BW	2.256	61	1.084	.963	1.125
		Double-BW	9.024	240	.264	.243	1.087

Note:

***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.

Bandwidth is optimized following the method of Imbens-Kalyanaraman.

For stolen-bases, it cannot be calculated because of lack of samples.

6.1 Incentivised Contract

One most possible explanation that may interpret our result is the incentivised design of the contract. So far, we checked monetary incentive for the player, analyzing only the fixed parts of the contract. However, players often sign contracts with additional bonus according to their performances. Even though the results in Section 5.2 did not support the existence of incentives in fixed salary, it may occur as this additional reward. Here we present that this story is hard to be applied, showing the specific contracts of some players.

Table 13 shows the specific contents of the MLB position players' contracts, quoted by *Cot's Baseball Contracts* from *Baseball Prospectus*, a fan's website that discloses information about that. In addition to signing bonus, fixed payment (we made analysis for this part), and other optional bonus or service, players receive some monetary incentives according to their performance. They are roughly grouped into two: award bonus and bonus for reaching certain number of their indexes. While the former includes winning Gold Glove or All-Star Game selection (a match between the two big leagues of MLB, each of which is composed by players selected by the manager and the fan's vote), the latter consists of only round numbers with plate appearances or games they attended, not batting-average, on-base percentage or homeruns. In addition, there are at most 2 or three position players who sign such contracts. Pitchers are more likely to agree ones with performance bonuses, whose trigger indexes are also related to attendances: number of games appeared, or innings pitched. Therefore, we can conclude that in the additional bonus parts of their contracts, there are no incentives that lead them to manipulating their batting-average, on-base percentage or other batting-indexes.

Team managers have to design the contracts with the limited budget constraints. Plate appearances given to single teams are on average constant through the year, because they play the same number of games, so players are to distribute the fixed numbers of plate appearances. That is, managers can guess how many players at most achieve their goals. On the other hand, the total numbers of the players that achieve some round numbers of batting-average or homerun are hard to estimate. If almost all of the players reached the benchmarks, then even if they led the team to win, managers have to owe additional expenditure. This point can be a supportive discussion of our results.

6.2 Contract Length

Skilled players often sign contracts with plural-year duration. This is related to why we supplied analysis with the sample of players who had the right of free agency. Furthermore, we should also take care of their contract length, that is, until when the players are insured to play for the team they signed, because it can be some substitution for the additional monetary bonus.

Krautmann & Oppenheimer(2002) conducted research about this point. They used the salary dataset of MLB from 1990 to 1994 seasons, and regressed log salary on an interaction term of the performance proxy and the contract years they signed.

Table 13: Descriptions of the Contract of the Specific Players

- Ichiro Suzuki, Outfielder, 4-year contract with Seattle Mariners (2004-'07)
 - signing bonus- \$6M
 - fixed payment- 04:\$5M, 05:\$11M, 06:\$11M, 07:\$11M
 - performance bonuses- \$1.25M in performance bonuses for plate appearances
 - * \$50,000 each for 400 PAs, 2004-06
 - * \$0.1M each for 500 & 600 PAs, 2004-06
 - * \$0.1M for 400 PAs, 2007
 - * \$0.2M each for 500 & 600 PAs, 2007
 - award bonuses: \$50,000 each for Gold Glove, All Star selection
 - trade-Protection (Veto for moving the team without his acceptance):
limited no-trade clause (may block deals to 10 clubs)
 - Other
 - * housing allowance: \$28,000 in 2004, \$29,000 in 2005, \$30,000 in 2006, \$31,000 in 2007
 - * interpreter, trainer, transportation for spring & regular season
 - * 4 annual round-trip airline tickets from Seattle to Japan
- Eric Sogard, 2nd-baseman, single-year contract with Milwaukee Brewers (2018)
 - fixed Payment- \$2.4M
 - performance bonuses- : \$0.15M each for 30, 50, 70, 90 games. \$50,000 for 120 games
- Alex Avila, Catcher, two-year contract with Arizona Diamondbacks (2018, 2019)
 - Fixed Payment- 18:\$4M, 19:\$4.25M
 - annual performance bonuses: \$25,000 each for 350, 400 plate appearances. \$50,000 each for 450, 500 PA. \$0.1M for 550 PA.

$$\ln(SAL_{it}) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 PERF_{it} + \beta_3 (PERF_{it} * LENGTH_{it}) + \beta_4 LENGTH_{it}$$

The model is quoted from Krautmann & Oppenheimer(2002). According to their results, the coefficient of the interaction term, β_3 , was estimated to be negative. In other words, the longer the contract years at once stretched, the less the return to their performance goes. This is caused, they claimed, by the player's risk-averse preference that dislikes the risk of being fired. Introducing this to our model, it can be the case that those who achieved their goals are in fact receive additional bonus, but instead of getting higher baseline salary, they choose to sign the contract with longer duration. For the team manager, it is profitable to propose such contracts, which may enable them to hold highly skilled players with relatively reasonable costs. These days, it is usual that players sign the plural-year package contracts with the right to opt-out: the player or the manager nullify the contract while it is under duration, for the players to get some better contract, or for the manager to modify the contract or release the player. So it might require more complicate model to describe this situation, but it helps us to consider these nonmonetary bonus.

6.3 By-Time Analysis

Our research used data from wide range of time: 62 years for bunching, 31 years for monetary incentives. Through such a long time, techniques of the players or the quality of instruments must have evolved, which leads to change in mean or the standard value of the indexes: that is, unlike the reference point "per" of golf, the reference point of baseball might move through its history. Also, it is natural to think there may have been a lot of change in the design of the contract they agreed. Here we consider time-variable elements in our analysis. specifically, there are two main possible effect that changes the contract design: one is the relative market power of the players, and another is change in relative importance of each performance index.

Relative market power has direct relation to the contract. Before the system of free agency was introduced, players are forbidden to move to other teams without permission by the team they belong to. '94 strike by the Players Association of Major League Baseball, against the team owners to request improvement of their treatment, also may have great influence on their contracts (See Appendix about the specific information about free agency and the Strike).

Relative importance captures the change in evaluation of each index. Through the history of baseball, there have been invented a lot of indexes that measures the performance/ability of the player, and it has been argued which index is the most efficient one to evaluate them. One of the most important revoution was the publication of '*Moneyball*'(2003), written by Michael Lewis, a financial reporter. In this book, he described that batting-average is not as appropreate measure: there is more close correlation with total runs the team earns in the season in on-base percentage. In practice, Oakland Athletics applied strategy to form the menber of the team, and won the playoff. This story was widely spread and changed the sense of view about the baseball index.

The impact of this publication was such a great one that it was evaluated in an economic article. Hakes and Sauer (2006) tested the Lewis's claim in econometric specification. They stated that on-base percentage gives us the better explanation about the winning-percentage of the team than batting-average, but team managers had been taken batting-average of more importance when evaluating players. After *Moneyball* published, however, their evaluation revolved. In 2004, a year after its publication, the estimated return to on-base percentage for the players increased, compared to the previous 4 years.

Then, one possible question occurs: "Does the tendency of manipulation/discontinuous contract design also change through the history of baseball?"

In this section, we replicate the methodologies conducted in the previous sections, but sorting the sample into periods below:

1. Before Free Agency (1957 - 1975)
2. After Free Agency and Before Strike (1976 - 1994)
3. After Strike and Before *Moneyball* (1995 - 2003)
4. After *Moneyball* (2004 - 2017)

Sample B does not include data from 1957 to 1986, so in the section of monetary incentive, We conducted tests for only three parts except for "Before Free Agency." From here, we mention the three important batting indexes: batting-average, on-base percentage, and homerun.

6.3.1 Bunching

Table 14 shows the results of the McCrary (2008)'s manipulation tests, for each grouped samples. Compared to the full-sample analysis conducted in Section 5.1, we observed partly different results for each index.

First to describe, .300 of batting-average, is the most solid benchmark of the players. Each subsamples show the significant discontinuity at the cutoff point. There are no other indexes that show such a consistent tendency among the samples.

On the other hand, .250, seems not to be regarded not as important after *Moneyball*, as other previous days. In this term, the discontinuity at .250 becomes no more insignificant one. Compared to the samples of the old days, recently the average level of the batting-average have been increasing. The mean value of each samples are .259 (samples of '57-'75), .264 ('76-'94), .271 ('95-2003), .263 (2004-2018), respectively, median values of which are almost the same. Note that in fact, restricting the sample to the years until 1965, then the manipulation test shows no statistical significance at .300 ($z = 1.577, p = 11.45\%$). So as we mentioned in Section 5.1, it may be because we extended our data range to '57, that .250 works as a reference point. For samples before '65, bunching at .250 was significant at 5% level ($z = 2.12$).

Discontinuity of homerun was significant only in the latest subsample. In addition, on-base percentage, surprisingly, showed no evidence for jump in the subsample level.

Table 14: Manipulation Test for the Grouped Sample by Time

index, cutpoint		'57-'75	'76-'94	'95-2003	2004-	full sample
AVG, .300	bw	.023	.020	.022	.019	.019
	θ	.573 (.146)	.566 (.120)	.310 (.130)	.403 (.120)	.499 (.067)
	z	3.934***	4.732***	2.393*	3.376***	7.442***
AVG, .250	bw	.028	.028	.032	.027	.024
	θ	.250 (.080)	.151 (.069)	.306 (.094)	.121 (.076)	.212 (.042)
	z	3.149**	2.188*	3.242**	1.595	5.061***
OBP, .350	bw	.031	.030	.036	.030	.024
	θ	.137 (.089)	.149 (.081)	-.035 (.093)	.137 (.082)	.139 (.049)
	z	1.538	1.846	-.380	1.672	2.854**
HR, 20	bw	6.313	6.677	10.165	7.273	5.309
	θ	.222 (.150)	.214 (.123)	.145 (.129)	.315 (.112)	.259 (.075)
	z	1.479	1.751	1.117	2.819**	3.465***

Note

***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.

Bandwidth is optimized following the method of McCrary(2008).

Thus, compared to .300 of batting average, players think consider these indexes as less important ones to evaluate players. Otherwise, there may have exist some different design of contracts. In the next section, we describe analysis of these results, that state there also be any monetary incentive to achieve these points.

6.3.2 Monetary Incentive

Table 15 shows the results of the RDD conducted in Section 5.2 for the restricted samples. On the contrary, they are consistent with the ordinary analysis for all the indexes: Any discontinuity in the players monetary rewards, covariates with each index. OLS and fixed effect least square regressions with interaction terms yield the same results. Also, we describe the same analysis for the players with free agency in Table 16 that again show the same results. All the statistics that stand for the discontinuity are insignificant or significant to be negative effect to their fixed part of the salaries. Therefore, we repeat the same conclusion as Section 5: there are no monetary incentives that verify the reason that players manipulate their indexes.

In sum, we obtain the additional conclusion of our article: there may have some factors that cause change in the players' attitude to their index about manipulation, but it is not likely because the team managers propose the incentivised contract that pay them additional bonus. That is, it is actually caused by the players' reference point dependent preferences, supporting Pope and Simonsohn (2011)'s interpretation.

Table 15: RDD for the Grouped Sample by Time

index, cutpoint	bw, type		'87-'94	'95-2003	2004-	full sample
AVG, .300	LATE	bw	.024	.042	.030	.045
		Obs.	697	1806	1872	5930
		estimate	-.034 (.137)	.064 (.092)	.066 (.103)	.034 (.056)
		z	-.250	.697	.637	.615
AVG, .250	LATE	bw	.036	.043	.075	.048
		Obs.	1482	1806	3991	7271
		estimate	.154 (.084)	.064 (.092)	.076 (.060)	.070 (.052)
		z	1.825	.697	1.277	1.340
HR, 20	LATE	bw	4.183	3.685	2.46	3.30
		Obs.	341	371	475	1307
		estimate	-.255 (.228)	-.348 (.218)	.343 (.264)	-.002 (.141)
		z	-1.122	-1.600	1.300	-.015
OBP, .350	LATE	bw	.031	.025	.027	.045
		Obs.	1098	1281	2042	6525
		estimate	.109 (.106)	-.151 (.120)	-.030 (.093)	-.013 (.049)
		z	1.031	-1.262	-.323	-.272

Note:

***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.

Bandwidth is optimized following the method of Imbens-Kalyanaraman.

Table 16: RDD for the Grouped Sample by Time, Only Including FA Players

index, cutpoint	bw, type		'87-'94	'95-2003	2004-	full sample
AVG, .300	LATE	bw	.060	.032	.039	.026
		Obs.	218	229	354	509
		estimate	-.026 (.247)	-.309 (.182)	-.186 (.182)	-.253 (.138)
		z	-.108	-1.700	-1.020	-1.832
AVG, .250	LATE	bw	.018	.023	.078	.058
		Obs.	123	227	716	1367
		estimate	.425 (.281)	.293 (.230)	.047 (.103)	.084 (.082)
		z	1.512	1.272	-.448	1.020
HR, 20	LATE	bw	5.35	3.504	3.566	3.50
		Obs.	47	70	102	206
		estimate	.004 (.284)	-.701 (.492)	-.337 (.513)	-.273 (.296)
		z	-1.600	-1.423	-.657	-.924
OBP, .350	LATE	bw	.034	.042	.031	.043
		Obs.	154	344	395	1044
		estimate	.080 (.291)	-.174 (.179)	.115 (.188)	.021 (.107)
		z	.276	-.971	.616	.196

Note:

***: $p < 0.1\%$, **: $p < 1\%$, *: $p < 5\%$.

Bandwidth is optimized following the method of Imbens-Kalyanaraman.

Table 17: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .300 (Before 1994)

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	12.194*** (2.026)	11.645*** (1.919)	-1.113 (2.322)		.922 (2.306)	.917 (2.305)		
AVG	5.130 (7.089)	4.726 (6.702)	9.079 (5.977)		.891 (5.839)	.530 (5.841)	-404 (5.837)	5.004 (5.919)
AVG_300	-3.292 (3.601)	-2.067 (3.398)	-1.271 (3.023)		-1.856 (2.910)	-2.054 (2.911)	-1.456 (2.906)	-2.129 (2.879)
FLD		.0005 (.005)	.001 (.004)		.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.001 (.005)
BsR		.077*** (.019)	.083*** (.017)		.062*** (.017)	.063*** (.017)	.062*** (.017)	.041 (.021)
AGE			.699*** (.099)		.690*** (.096)	.695*** (.096)	.692*** (.096)	
AGE_sq			-.010*** (.002)		-.010*** (.002)	-.010*** (.002)	-.010*** (.002)	
AVG:AVG_300	11.428 (11.958)	7.355 (11.288)	4.333 (10.043)		6.289 (9.665)	6.955 (9.670)	5.047 (9.653)	6.977 (9.588)
WPA					X	X	X	X
FA dummy								
Season dummies		X	X		X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	703	697	697		697	697	697	697
R ²	.031	.174	.348		.400	.402	.413	.849
Adjusted R ²	.027	.159	.335		.386	.387	.393	.697
Residual Std. Error	1.026 (df = 699)	.955 (df = 684)	.850 (df = 682)		.816 (df = 680)	.816 (df = 679)	.812 (df = 673)	.919 (df = 675)
F Statistic	7.539*** (df = 3; 699)	11.988*** (df = 12; 684)	26.031*** (df = 14; 682)		28.385*** (df = 16; 680)	26.867*** (df = 17; 679)		

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 18: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .300 ('95' - 2003)

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	10.414*** (.717)	9.677*** (.718)	-8.332*** (1.250)	-5.706*** (1.242)	-5.673*** (1.227)			
AVG	13.708*** (2.594)	14.833*** (2.583)	13.943*** (2.280)	4.183 (2.269)	3.672 (2.242)	3.604 (2.238)	.837 (2.182)	3.979 (2.569)
AVG_300	-1.285 (1.696)	-1.084 (1.679)	-.554 (1.482)	-.969 (1.407)	-1.009 (1.390)	-1.241 (1.387)	-.816 (1.226)	-1.631 (1.593)
FLD		.002 (.003)	.005 (.003)	.006* (.003)	.006* (.003)	.006* (.003)	.007* (.003)	.004 (.003)
BsR		.020 (.013)	.040*** (.011)	.031** (.011)	.031** (.011)	.033** (.011)	.029* (.012)	.018 (.013)
AGE			1.142*** (.073)	1.092*** (.069)	1.088*** (.068)	1.107*** (.069)		
AGE_sq			-.017*** (.001)	-.017*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.017*** (.001)		
AVG:AVG_300	4.259 (5.555)	3.544 (5.497)	1.861 (4.852)	3.258 (4.607)	3.470 (4.551)	4.216 (4.544)	2.874 (4.023)	5.344 (5.218)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X	X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	1,878	1,867	1,867	1,867	1,867	1,867	1,867	1,867
R ²	.062	.099	.299	.370	.385	.392	.766	.197
Adjusted R ²	.060	.093	.294	.364	.379	.384	.657	.187
Residual Std. Error	1.166 (df = 1874)	1.148 (df = 1853)	1.014 (df = 1851)	.962 (df = 1849)	.950 (df = 1848)	.947 (df = 1842)	.707 (df = 1271)	1.087 (df = 1844)
F Statistic	41.081*** (df = 3; 1874)	15.715*** (df = 13; 1853)	52.680*** (df = 15; 1851)	63.750*** (df = 17; 1849)	64.330*** (df = 18; 1848)			

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 19: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .300 (2004 Afterward)

Dependent variable:									
Sal									
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	feim (7)	(8)	
Constant	14.252*** (1.163)	13.060*** (1.155)	-4.948*** (1.392)	-3.925** (1.415)	-3.852** (1.409)				
AVG	2.257 (4.111)	5.079 (4.067)	7.693* (3.399)	1.969 (3.333)	2.193 (3.320)	1.946 (3.312)	.332 (3.374)	-1.304 (4.010)	
AVG_300	-732 (2.357)	-034 (2.327)	-1.023 (1.945)	-166 (1.880)	.129 (1.874)	.275 (1.869)	-1.570 (1.757)	.395 (2.264)	
FLD		.0001 (.004)	.006 (.003)	.007* (.003)	.007* (.003)	.008* (.003)	.002 (.004)	.003 (.004)	
BsR		-.031*** (.008)	-.0001 (.006)	-.005 (.006)	-.004 (.006)	-.006 (.007)	.013 (.009)	-.037*** (.008)	
AGE			1.034*** (.067)	1.026*** (.065)	1.013*** (.065)	1.032*** (.065)			
AGE_sq			-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.014*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)			
AVG:AVG_300	3.198 (7.782)	.745 (7.683)	3.577 (6.421)	.711 (6.209)	-.269 (6.187)	-.759 (6.169)	5.210 (5.813)	-.736 (7.473)	
WPA				X	X	X	X	X	
FA dummy									
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Fixed effects									
Observations	1,880	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	1,872	Position
R ²	.013	.056	.342	.387	.392	.403	.776	.124	
Adjusted R ²	.011	.047	.335	.379	.384	.393	.640	.109	
Residual Std. Error	1.273 (df = 1876)	1.250 (df = 1853)	1.044 (df = 1851)	1.009 (df = 1849)	1.005 (df = 1848)	.998 (df = 1839)	.769 (df = 1165)	1.209 (df = 1841)	
F Statistic	8.204*** (df = 3; 1876)	6.103*** (df = 18; 1853)	48.083*** (df = 20; 1851)	52.968*** (df = 22; 1849)	51.809*** (df = 23; 1848)				
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001								

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 20: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .250 (Before 1994)

Dependent variable: Sal								
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	feim (7)	(8)
Constant	11.622*** (1.047)	11.080*** (1.022)	-1.923 (1.306)	-1.853 (1.315)	-2.264 (1.314)			
AVG	6.412 (4.422)	6.379 (4.298)	4.973 (3.690)	-329 (3.640)	-057 (3.625)	-302 (3.615)	3.633 (3.479)	.208 (4.244)
AVG_250	-743 (1.333)	-662 (1.293)	-601 (1.110)	-790 (1.081)	-677 (1.076)	-681 (1.074)	-281 (1.016)	-872 (1.261)
FLD		.004 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.005* (.003)	.005 (.003)	.005 (.003)	.006* (.003)	.007* (.003)
BsR		.027 (.017)	.031* (.015)	.015 (.014)	.015 (.014)	.012 (.015)	.002 (.017)	.010 (.017)
AGE			.811*** (.067)	.815*** (.065)	.834*** (.065)	.836*** (.065)		
AGE_sq			-.012*** (.001)	-.012*** (.001)	-.012*** (.001)	-.012*** (.001)		
AVG:AVG_250	3.425 (5.390)	3.103 (5.233)	2.981 (4.491)	3.770 (4.371)	3.306 (4.355)	3.323 (4.343)	1.649 (4.120)	4.007 (5.100)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X	X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects						Position	Individual	Position
Observations	1,521	1,510	1,510	1,510	1,510	1,510	1,510	1,510
R ²	.038	.112	.347	.383	.389	.396	.770	.166
Adjusted R ²	.036	.105	.340	.377	.382	.387	.642	.154
Residual Std. Error	1.004 (df = 1517)	.969 (df = 1497)	.832 (df = 1495)	.809 (df = 1493)	.805 (df = 1492)	.802 (df = 1486)	.613 (df = 972)	.942 (df = 1488)
F Statistic	19.883*** (df = 3; 1517)	15.715*** (df = 12; 1497)	56.641*** (df = 14; 1495)	57.955*** (df = 16; 1493)	55.828*** (df = 17; 1492)			
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001							

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 21: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .250 ('94 - 2003)

Dependent variable: <i>Sal</i>								
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	<i>feim</i> (7)	(8)
Constant	10.767*** (1.070)	10.285*** (1.057)	-7.056*** (1.403)	-5.992*** (1.384)	-6.050*** (1.347)			
AVG	12.553** (4.553)	12.610** (4.498)	10.263** (3.905)	2.621 (3.818)	2.395 (3.717)	1.963 (3.705)	5.558 (3.607)	4.376 (4.415)
AVG.250	.703 (1.270)	.448 (1.253)	- .148 (1.088)	-.289 (1.049)	-.183 (1.021)	-.322 (1.018)	1.007 (.965)	.359 (1.213)
FLD		.006 (.003)	.006* (.003)	.007** (.003)	.006* (.003)	.006* (.003)	.007* (.003)	.007* (.003)
BsR		-.016 (.014)	.011 (.012)	.0003 (.012)	.004 (.012)	.004 (.012)	.019 (.012)	-.020 (.014)
AGE			1.117*** (.073)	1.119*** (.071)	1.107*** (.069)	1.135*** (.069)		
AGE.sq			-.017*** (.001)	-.017*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.017*** (.001)		
AVG:AVG.250	-2.668 (5.206)	-1.685 (5.136)	.700 (4.459)	1.339 (4.299)	.980 (4.185)	1.537 (4.171)	-3.777 (3.963)	-1.228 (4.970)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy			X	X	X	X	X	X
Season dummies		X						
Fixed effects						Position	Individual	Position
Observations	1,934	1,927	1,927	1,927	1,927	1,927	1,927	1,927
R ²	.038	.079	.307	.357	.391	.398	.764	.144
Adjusted R ²	.036	.073	.302	.351	.385	.391	.646	.134
Residual Sd. Error	1.174 (df = 1930)	1.151 (df = 1913)	.999 (df = 1911)	.963 (df = 1909)	.938 (df = 1908)	.933 (df = 1902)	.712 (df = 1282)	1.112 (df = 1904)
F Statistic	25.188*** (df = 3; 1930)	12.648*** (df = 13; 1913)	56.445*** (df = 15; 1911)	62.241*** (df = 17; 1909)	67.973*** (df = 18; 1908)			
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001								

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 22: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .250 2004 Afterward

	Dependent variable:						
	OLS			Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	13.563*** (.550)	12.692*** (.553)	-5.106*** (.846)	-4.164*** (.850)	-4.177*** (.841)		
AVG	3.865 (2.379)	5.769* (2.389)	5.847** (1.971)	-.646 (1.961)	-1.249 (1.941)	-2.190 (1.941)	-3.109 (1.853)
AVG.250	-1.645* (.652)	-1.423* (.645)	-1.371* (.539)	-1.575** (.526)	-1.717*** (.520)	-1.979*** (.518)	-1.574** (.484)
FLD		.001 (.003)	.004 (.002)	.006** (.002)	.006* (.002)	.006** (.002)	.005* (.002)
BsR		-.036*** (.006)	-.006 (.005)	-.009 (.005)	-.008 (.005)	-.010 (.005)	.017** (.006)
AGE			1.068*** (.048)	1.053*** (.046)	1.056*** (.046)	1.072*** (.046)	
AGE_sq			-.016*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	
AVG:AVG.250	6.660* (2.688)	5.787* (2.659)	5.801** (2.222)	6.738** (2.166)	7.256*** (2.144)	8.315*** (2.135)	6.612*** (1.993)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy					X	X	X
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects							
Observations	4,008	3,991	3,991	3,991	3,991	Position 3,991	Position 3,991
R ²	.039	.079	.358	.394	.407	.418	.733
Adjusted R ²	.038	.075	.355	.391	.404	.413	.644
Residual Std. Error	1.233 (df = 4004)	1.209 (df = 3972)	1.010 (df = 3970)	.981 (df = 3968)	.971 (df = 3967)	.963 (df = 3958)	.750 (df = 2995)
F Statistic	53.573*** (df = 3; 4004)	19,000*** (df = 18; 3972)	110.623*** (df = 20; 3970)	117.455*** (df = 22; 3968)	118.457*** (df = 23; 3967)		

Note:

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 23: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .350 (Before 1994)

Dependent variable: Sal								
	(1)	(2)	OLS (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	fdm (7)	(8)
Constant	9.531*** (1.440)	9.212*** (1.377)	-1.887 (1.643)	-1.753 (1.676)	-1.986 (1.672)			
OBP	11.761*** (4.320)	10.736** (4.125)	10.050** (3.743)	4.791 (3.708)	4.747 (3.695)	4.464 (3.695)	8.332* (3.756)	5.986 (4.149)
OBP_350	2.549 (2.347)	.982 (2.246)	1.389 (2.039)	1.382 (1.971)	1.492 (1.964)	1.407 (1.966)	.372 (1.851)	.809 (2.207)
FLD		.006 (.004)	.004 (.003)	.006 (.003)	.006 (.003)	.005 (.003)	.006 (.003)	.007 (.004)
BsR		.046** (.017)	.054*** (.016)	.035* (.015)	.036* (.015)	.033* (.016)	.041* (.018)	.031 (.018)
AGE			.693*** (.077)	.712*** (.074)	.724*** (.074)	.725*** (.074)		
AGE_sq			-.010*** (.001)	-.010*** (.001)	-.010*** (.001)	-.010*** (.001)		
OBP:OBP_350	-7.008 (6.683)	-2.664 (6.393)	-3.751 (5.803)	-3.731 (5.608)	-4.036 (5.589)	-3.781 (5.594)	-1.182 (5.285)	-2.166 (6.279)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy								
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	1,108	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	Position 1,098	Individual 1,098	Position 1,098
R ²	.037	.146	.300	.348	.354	.359	.791	.188
Adjusted R ²	.035	.137	.291	.339	.343	.345	.646	.172
Residual Std. Error	1.000 (df = 1104)	.949 (df = 1085)	.860 (df = 1083)	.831 (df = 1081)	.828 (df = 1080)	.827 (df = 1074)	.608 (df = 646)	.929 (df = 1076)
F Statistic	14.308*** (df = 3; 1104)	15.464*** (df = 12; 1085)	33.159*** (df = 14; 1083)	36.120*** (df = 16; 1081)	34.756*** (df = 17; 1080)			
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001							

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note:

Table 24: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .350 (1995 - 2003)

	Dependent variable:						
	OLS			Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	5.281* (2.095)	4.395* (2.066)	-10.795*** (2.189)	-10.617*** (2.185)	-10.635*** (2.151)		
OBP	26.125*** (6.221)	27.294*** (6.122)	21.250*** (5.482)	15.192** (5.390)	15.684** (5.306)	15.472** (5.317)	8.583 (5.469)
OBP_350	2.589 (3.080)	3.439 (3.036)	4.426 (2.714)	4.651 (2.627)	4.763 (2.585)	4.693 (2.598)	-1.519 (2.561)
FLD		.005 (.004)	.009** (.003)	.007* (.003)	.008* (.003)	.008* (.003)	.007 (.004)
BsR		-.0002 (.015)	.021 (.014)	.019 (.013)	.020 (.013)	.021 (.014)	.042** (.015)
AGE			1.078*** (.084)	1.079*** (.082)	1.055*** (.080)	1.077*** (.081)	
AGE_sq			-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	-.016*** (.001)	
OBP_OBP_350	-8.245 (8.815)	-10.629 (8.688)	-12.975 (7.766)	-13.572 (7.516)	-13.929 (7.398)	-13.714 (7.434)	3.634 (7.347)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy							
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects							
Observations	1,285	1,281	1,281	1,281	1,281	1,281	1,281
R ²	.031	.084	.269	.317	.339	.342	.781
Adjusted R ²	.029	.074	.261	.308	.330	.329	.622
Residual Std. Error	1.165 (df = 1281)	1.139 (df = 1267)	1.018 (df = 1265)	.985 (df = 1263)	.969 (df = 1262)	.970 (df = 1256)	.728 (df = 743)
F Statistic	13.839*** (df = 3; 1281)	8.922*** (df = 13; 1267)	31.083*** (df = 15; 1265)	34.517*** (df = 17; 1263)	35.987*** (df = 18; 1262)		1.115 (df = 1258)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 25: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around .350 (2004 Afterward)

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	13.575*** (1.653)	12.636*** (1.622)	-6.244*** (1.687)	-6.180*** (1.741)	-6.325*** (1.728)			
OBP	3.505 (4.914)	5.128 (4.806)	9.240* (4.004)	5.879 (4.020)	6.451 (3.990)	7.316 (3.961)	6.127 (3.983)	2.449 (4.826)
OBP_350	-2.396 (2.526)	-1.247 (2.468)	.506 (2.056)	.985 (2.027)	1.377 (2.013)	1.736 (1.999)	-2.266 (1.961)	-593 (2.436)
FLD		.010* (.004)	.012*** (.003)	.012*** (.003)	.012*** (.003)	.011*** (.003)	.007* (.003)	.010** (.004)
BsR		-.030*** (.007)	.001 (.006)	.001 (.006)	.002 (.006)	.004 (.007)	.023** (.009)	-.027** (.008)
AGE			1.052*** (.066)	1.047*** (.065)	1.039*** (.064)	1.067*** (.064)		
AGE_sq			-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)	-.015*** (.001)		
OBP*OBP_350	7.097 (7.210)	3.920 (7.045)	-1.321 (5.868)	-2.730 (5.787)	-3.892 (5.746)	-4.923 (5.709)	6.108 (5.607)	2.030 (6.954)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy								
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	2,075	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063	2,063
R ²	.013	.077	.361	.381	.391	.404	.772	.113
Adjusted R ²	.011	.069	.355	.375	.384	.395	.639	.100
Residual Std. Error	1.258 (df = 2071)	1.221 (df = 2044)	1.016 (df = 2042)	1.001 (df = 2040)	.993 (df = 2039)	.985 (df = 2030)	.761 (df = 1300)	1.201 (df = 2032)
F Statistic	8.919*** (df = 3, 2071)	9.436*** (df = 18, 2044)	57.728*** (df = 20, 2042)	57.141*** (df = 22, 2040)	56.931*** (df = 23, 2039)			

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 26: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 20 HR (Before 1994)

	Dependent variable:						
	OLS			Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	11.805*** (1.091)	11.894*** (.993)	-.144 (1.697)	.298 (1.819)	.303 (1.824)		
HR	.125* (.063)	.076 (.057)	.040 (.048)	.044 (.048)	.044 (.048)	.035 (.048)	.050 (.061)
HR_20	2.620 (1.547)	.239 (1.409)	-.242 (1.193)	.007 (1.182)	.005 (1.184)	-.376 (1.196)	-.019 (1.384)
FLD		.0004 (.005)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.004 (.006)
BsR		.108*** (.031)	.110*** (.026)	.092*** (.026)	.092*** (.027)	.087** (.027)	-.003 (.046)
AGE			.774*** (.100)	.759*** (.100)	.758*** (.100)	.753*** (.101)	
AGE_sq			-.011*** (.002)	-.011*** (.002)	-.011*** (.002)	-.011*** (.002)	
HR:HR_20	-.141 (.080)	-.019 (.073)	.009 (.062)	-.005 (.061)	-.005 (.061)	.014 (.062)	-.010 (.073)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy		X	X	X	X	X	X
Season dummies							
Fixed effects							
Observations	348	341	341	341	341	341	341
R ²	.015	.261	.475	.490	.490	.500	.830
Adjusted R ²	.006	.234	.452	.465	.463	.464	.617
Residual Std. Error	.948 (df = 344)	.837 (df = 328)	.707 (df = 326)	.699 (df = 324)	.700 (df = 323)	.700 (df = 317)	.591 (df = 151)
F Statistic	1.727 (df = 3; 344)	9.641*** (df = 12; 328)	21.051*** (df = 14; 326)	19.443*** (df = 16; 324)	18.243*** (df = 17; 323)		

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 27: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 20 HR (1995 - 2003)

	Dependent variable:						
	OLS			Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	13.328*** (1.798)	12.700*** (1.836)	-10.122*** (2.908)	-9.386*** (2.990)	-9.889*** (2.921)		
HR	.071 (.100)	.085 (.102)	.180* (.086)	.182* (.084)	.182* (.082)	.191* (.083)	.132 (.102)
HR.20	.324 (2.340)	.046 (2.400)	1.417 (2.014)	1.419 (1.984)	1.535 (1.937)	1.684 (1.967)	6.165** (2.361)
FLD		.004 (.006)	.010* (.005)	.011* (.005)	.013* (.005)	.013** (.005)	-.002 (.006)
BsR		.035 (.030)	.053* (.025)	.029 (.026)	.022 (.025)	.005 (.026)	-.034 (.033)
AGE			1.323*** (.159)	1.318*** (.156)	1.338*** (.152)	1.328*** (.155)	
AGE_sq			-.020*** (.003)	-.020*** (.003)	-.020*** (.003)	-.020*** (.003)	
HR*HR.20	-.021 (.122)	-.009 (.125)	-.089 (.105)	-.091 (.104)	-.097 (.101)	-.106 (.103)	-.307* (.123)
WPA				X	X	X	X
FA dummy							
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects							
Observations	374	371	371	371	371	Position 371	Position 371
R ²	.006	.046	.336	.365	.397	.409	.873
Adjusted R ²	-.002	.011	.308	.334	.366	.368	.663
Residual Std. Error	1.071 (df = 370)	1.066 (df = 357)	.892 (df = 355)	.875 (df = 353)	.854 (df = 352)	.852 (df = 346)	1.047 (df = 348)
F Statistic	.744 (df = 3, 370)	1.327 (df = 13, 357)	11.971*** (df = 15, 355)	11.929*** (df = 17, 353)	12.849*** (df = 18, 352)		

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 28: Regression on Log-Salary, Including Interaction Term: around 20 HR (2004 Afterward)

	Dependent variable:							
	OLS				Sal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Constant	19.239*** (3.381)	18.618*** (3.382)	-1.330 (3.119)	-1.373 (3.159)	-2.020 (3.139)			
HR	-229 (.184)	-198 (.184)	-182 (.135)	-141 (.133)	-123 (.132)	-125 (.132)	-103 (.190)	-151 (.181)
HR_20	-5.545 (3.871)	-4.512 (3.877)	-4.699 (2.840)	-4.220 (2.798)	-3.460 (2.785)	-3.979 (2.788)	-3.839 (3.955)	-4.799 (3.840)
FLD		.005 (.008)	.014* (.006)	.013* (.006)	.013* (.006)	.012* (.006)	-.0005 (.010)	.002 (.008)
BsR		-.042** (.016)	.002 (.012)	-.007 (.012)	-.008 (.012)	-.016 (.014)	-.006 (.025)	-.062*** (.018)
AGE			1.144*** (.123)	1.182*** (.121)	1.195*** (.120)	1.200*** (.121)		
AGE_sq			-.016*** (.002)	-.017*** (.002)	-.017*** (.002)	-.017*** (.002)		
HR:HR_20	.301 (.204)	.248 (.205)	.254 (.150)	.224 (.148)	.187 (.147)	.211 (.147)	.204 (.209)	.253 (.203)
WPA				X	X	X	X	X
FA dummy								
Season dummies		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Fixed effects								
Observations	475	475	475	475	475	475	475	475
R ²	.009	.052	.494	.513	.522	.535	.894	.112
Adjusted R ²	.003	.015	.472	.489	.498	.501	.665	.052
Residual Std. Error	1.247 (df = 471)	1.240 (df = 456)	.908 (df = 454)	.893 (df = 452)	.885 (df = 451)	.882 (df = 442)	.723 (df = 150)	1.216 (df = 444)
F Statistic	1.491 (df = 3; 471)	1.388 (df = 18; 456)	22.182*** (df = 20; 454)	21.625*** (df = 22; 452)	21.436*** (df = 23; 451)			

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

7 Conclusion

So far, we have considered monetary incentives that exists behind the behavior that appears to be related to reference dependent preference. For the case of MLB, we conclude that there are no clear observations that supports the the existance of monetary incentives, at least in the fixed part of their contracts. Although there remains a room for discussion in stolen-bases, players manipulate their own performance indexes to achieve their internal goals, even though they cannot receive any additional bonus by doing so. That is, these observed efforts are likely to be led by their own reference dependent preferences. Especially, .300 of batting-average showed so solid evidence for manipulation through the history of MLB.

Our results indicate that professional sports players seem to have preferences that yield utility not only by the monetary rewards, but also by their own performance situationally. In many articles of analysis on professional sports, we have considered that the players' benefit consists only of the contract package itself, so it may support interpreting their decision making more prescicely by introducing additional assumptions. For the team managers, on the other hand, our analyses help make better contract packages that attract the skilled players more, or search the player relatively underestimated, to get the players more "efficiently." Also, we had better pay attention to the oppsite-side approach: whether there exists discontinuous design of the contracts that does not affect the players manipulation behavior. Although players does not feel of importance as their reference points, there may be some cutoff points that the team managers regard as reference points for evaluating players.

Simaltaneously, as we described, we are required to continue analysis about monetary incentives for performance indexes. In Section 6.1, we suggested that contract duration be substituted into direct monetary rewards. Also, it is possible that rewards work in the stage before signing contracts: players who achieve the cutoff points may be likely to be offered by MLB teams than those who do not. Furthermore, although we do not include them in this paper, it might also be the case that their achievements are to be rewarded after their retirement: "reaching .300 of batting-average 4 times in his career," should be some outstanding signals to get jobs as a coach of baseball team, or a commentator in the TV show.

Relative importance of the indexes with expected runs or winning-percentages, however, differs one another. For example, On-base percentage is more closely correlated to them than batting-average. In addition, the number of stolen base has little correlation with them (Section 6.2 and Appendix argue this theme more specifically). For the team managers, then, players' too much adherence to the indexes that does not affect winning-percentage, or ones that may be tradeoff-relation with more important indexes (for example, batting-average and on-base percentage). In order to prevent such inefficiency, they are sometimes required to make contracts that lead players to pay more attention to the prior indexes. Of course, our analysis present some implication to them.

In addition, we here argue that analyzing professional sports can contribute to the economics. Professional athletes produce observable intermediate products: performances. Their performance is evaluated by the managers or principals, and it is converted to the

monetary rewards. As we mentioned above, they also “play” the game and so the performance indexes themselves have important meaning to them. That is, they are motivated by their own internal goals to do better works. To describe these settings will make it possible to interpret those who seems to behave “irrationally” by the traditional economic approach. Furthermore, as described in the previous paragraph, by analyzing them, we may learn how to motivate individuals in an organization.

In particular, when it comes to MLB, the performance indexes have been recorded for almost 150 years, and thanks to the community of the fans, we can fairly compare the players played in the different generations. As we used in this paper, rich information about their contracts is published. Also, there exists room for international comparison: Many countries around the world, Japan, Germany, Italy or Australia and so on, have their own professional leagues. Of course, there are a number of amateur players, those who does not receive any reward for their plays, there also exists room for comparison among them.

To conclude our paper, we state that it is worth continuing analysis about baseball, both for the sports itself and economics.

8 Appendix

8.1 Reference to the indexes

Here we describe the details of the indexes used in the paper.

- Definition

- Batting-Average (AVG)

$$AVG = \frac{\text{Base-Hit}}{\text{At-Bat}}$$

The rate of base-hit. At-Bat(AB) is calculated as $AB = PA - \text{Base-on-Balls} - \text{Hit-by Pitch} - \text{Sacrifice-Bunt} - \text{Catcher-Interference}$.

AVG depends only on the number of base-hit, so when players intend to manipulate AVG, they try to get base-hit, not base-on-balls. Moreover, AVG does not identify the number of bases they get at one base-hit: single, double, triple, and homerun.

- On-Base Percentage (OBP)

$$OBP = \frac{\text{Base-Hit} + \text{Base-on-Balls} + \text{Hit-by-Pitch}}{\text{PA} - \text{Sacrifice-Bunt} - \text{Catcher-Interference}}$$

OBP is different from AVG in that it takes base-on-balls and hit-by-pitch into account. *Moneyball* and Society of American Baseball Research (SABR) argues that OBP is more correlated to the runs the team earns than AVG.

- Batting, Fielding, BaseRun

SABRmetrics, which considers baseball by the scientific approaches, have been argued that which player is more important for the team. Players’ contribution is measured in the following procedure:

1. Convert each play (base-hit, strike-out, sacrifice-bunt, ...) into runs-value.
2. Convert runs-value into contribution to the number of wins the team obtain from contribution of the player.

Batting, Fielding, and BaseRun stands for the first step of the identification: the estimated number of runs the player produce by his batting, fielding and base-running above the average. For the team they play for, they are kinds of clear indicator of the players contribution.

– WPA (Win-Probability-Added)

By the statistics of the games, SABRmetrics have obtain the winning percentage at each specific situation of the game: scores (2-runs forward, 3-runs behind and so on) inning, runners on-base. Then, we can define the change in win-percentage generated by the single play. WPA is a cumulative index that stands for the summation of this change that a single player produced.

Most studies by SABRmetrics evaluate only the result of each play, excluding the context then: for example, if players hit a homerun, then we treat it equally. That is, it does not matter the homerun was a walk-off homer occurred when the game was tied, or solo-homer when the game had been broken. This is because this type of skill, called “clutch” does not correlates between year to year.

However, it may be the case that team managers evaluate this type of skills in the contracts, so our regression analysis for monetary incentives (Section 5.2 and 6.3.2), we employed WPA as a regressor. In fact, we include the index, distinguishing positive (raises the winning-percentages) plays and negative (decline) ones, and each values devided by the plate-appearance. And actually, results of each regressions supported that these terms affect the monetary rewards.

8.2 Important Events Related to Section 6.4

- Free Agency

Free agency, the right for a players to negotiate and choose any teams he wants, was regulated in 1975. Until then, players were forced to play for the team serving, except for the manager fired him. Thanks to this rule, now any players who have been serving in MLB for about 6 seasons, are eligible to get free agent. By this procedure, they are free from the monopsony contract with the team playing for. And so, players got more likely to be evaluated in proper way with his actual skills. The right to arbitration is the same kind of this.

- Strike by the Players Association (1994)

In 1994, the Players Association of MLB declared to make Strike, in order to stop the owners' cartel. In these days, because of the increasing salary of the skilled players, they are suffered from keep their payroll in their budget constraint. So in order to resist this, they are tried to make cartel that refrain from proposing any or sufficient contract to the superskilled players. In fact, this results in such cases that players who has enough skills chose to go to Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB).

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