Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation

Alex Ress-Jones

Reviewd by Reio TANJI

Osaka University

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Abstract

Alex Rees-Jones (2018) “Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation”
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- Presents the effects of *loss-aversion* from the evidence of US taxpayers.
- Taxpayers are engaged to persue tax reduction activity especially when they have some positive due near the date of payment.
- Distribution of reported tax bill has excess mass around the border whether they must pay or not.

Institutional Background

- In the US, one's tax payment in each year is determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), based on the difference between the reported taxable income and the her/his payment in advance: "balance due."
- If the balance due (denoted by b) is positive, the tax filer must that amount to the IRS, and if negative, then s/he can receive a refund.
- Balance due can be "manipulated," by reporting donation they did, or enrollment in charitable contribution.

  $\Rightarrow$ Loss-Averse affects the tax filers' behavior according to their initial balance due, resulting in the bunching of the reported (observed) payment.

contribution

This paper contributes in three ways:

1. Illustrate robust and observable features of the presence of loss-aversion with minimal assumptions.
2. Estimate the impact of loss-aversion measured in dollers.
3. Specify the way to apply similar settings:

   loss-averse individual is able to manipulate an observable outcome.