Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation Alex Ress- Jones

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Abstract

Alex Rees-Jones (2018) "Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation" Review of Economic Studies (2018) 85, 12511278

- Presents the effects of loss-aversion from the evidence of US taxpayers.
- Taxpayers are engaged to persue tax reduction activity especially when they have some positive due near the date of payment.
- Distribution of reported tax bill has excess mass around the border whether they must pay or not.

Institutional Background

- In the US, one's tax payment in each year is determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), based on the difference between the reported taxable income and the her/his payment in advance: "balance due."
- If the balance due (denoted by b) is positive, the tax filer must that amount to the IRS, and if negative, then s/he can receive a refund.
- Balance due can be "manipulated," by reporting donation they did, or enrollment in charitable contribution.
 - ⇒ Loss-Averse affects the tax filers' behavior according to their initial balance due, resulting in the bunching of the reported (observed) payment.



Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation

contribution

This paper contributes in three ways:

- Illustrate robust and observable features of the presence of lossaversion with minimal assumptions.
- Estimate the impact of loss-aversion measured in dollers.
- Specify the way to apply similar settings: loss-averse individual is able to manipulate an observable outcome.



Sequential Manipulation

Given b_{PM}: balance due prior to manipulation, taxpayers face a sequense of manipulation opportunities, each of which is charactarized by the parameters : {m_i, c_i}^J_{i=1}
 m_i denotes the tax reduction by the *i*th manipulation
 c_i is the intrinsic cost

Cost by manipulation

Taxpayers consider their benefits and costs to decide whether to make efforts to tax manipulation.

- Blumenthel and Slemrod (1992)
 It spend on average 27 hours documenting and reporting for tax reduction
- Benzarti (2015)
 They dislike tasks for tax 4.2 times as that for working with same time length

Ordinary gain-loss function:

$$\Phi(x|r) = \begin{cases} x - r & \text{if } x \ge r \\ \lambda(x - r) & \text{if } x < r \end{cases}$$

 Applying this structure, loss-averse taxpayers' evaluattion of the benefit from each manipulation:

$$V(m_i|b,r) = \Phi(-b+m_i|r) - \Phi(-b|r)$$

$$= \begin{cases} m_i & \text{if } -b \ge r \\ \lambda(r+b) + (m_i-b-r) & \text{if } -b \in [r-m_i,r] \\ \lambda m_i & \text{if } -b \le r - m_i \end{cases}$$

Gain-Loss Function

