Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC)

Codebook

Introduction

The Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC) data provides possible attribution of terrorism incidents in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to rebel organizations in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) family of datasets. It is designed to provide flexibility to the researcher in 1) the attribution of incidents to rebel organizations, 2) the definition and measurement of terrorism, and 3) whether to count incidents, fatalities or incidents that reach a selected fatality threshold. TAC provides both a set of procedures for customizing the measures of terrorism to the researcher's own definition, and preset measures that match our own proposed definition of deliberately indiscriminate terrorism.

The rationale for the data's collection and basic information about the process are discussed in [author citation removed]. Please refer to that article before using these data. This codebook provides additional information describing technical aspects of the data collection procedures and the rationale behind some of the decisions made in the process, and identifies the individual variables included in TAC.

TAC draws on information from the most commonly used data set in the study of civil conflict, the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014), and the most comprehensive event data set on terrorism, START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree and Dugan 2007). The UCDP Dyadic Dataset, (v. 1-2014)[1] rebel organizations engaged in civil conflict from 1946-2013. GTD's 2016 data covers incidents that occur between 1970-2016. TAC links armed opposition groups (e.g., rebel organizations, militant groups, etc., identified as *SideB*) in UCDP Dyadic (1-2014) to events in GTD; it covers 409 UCDP rebel organizations active between 1970-2013. These groups are involved in 166 distinct intrastate conflicts in 96 countries.[2] Because GTD begins

[1] These data build on the Armed Conflict Dataset originally created in collaboration between UCDP and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and the work of (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). The version of the data we used to create TAC can be found at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/olddw.html.

[2] This count excludes historical territories, which are subsumed under their contemporary political boundaries (e.g. incidents coded with the location Soviet Union are included under Russia).

only in 1970, we do not have data prior to that year for any conflicts.[3] Because GTD is missing all data from 1993, that year is missing in our data as well.

The UCDP records information about conflicts during "active" conflict: years in which the conflict results in at least 25 battle deaths. But rebel organizations may use terrorism as a precursor to larger scale violence, during lulls in actual battles, and in the aftermath of large-scale conflict. Therefore, TAC includes attacks in GTD attributable to UCDP rebel organizations in a broader time frame, as described below.

Below we describe the procedures used to code matches between actors in GTD and UCDP. These matched data can then be used to create a custom set of measures based on the researcher's own definition, or the researcher can use the preset variables measuring deliberately indiscriminate terrorism. Creation of the latter entailed first using information within GTD to proxy for deliberately indiscriminate terrorism, and then counting incidents and fatalities to create annual measures of terrorism. None of these steps was straightforward, and each involved coding decisions and judgement calls. We have thus created multiple versions of the terrorism count variables in an endeavor to make TAC as flexible as possible. This allows researchers to use the version(s) of TAC variables that best fits their purposes and enables robustness checks on different versions.

Procedure for Linking GTD Incidents to UCDP Rebel Organizations

As described in [author citation removed], linking UCDP rebel organizations to GTD incidents is not a straightforward task. We cast a very wide net to capture all potentially relevant incidents in GTD; that is, all that could possibly be attributed to the rebel organization in question, and then coded them by hand.

This exercise is straightforward for some events, as when *gname* is the same as a *SideB* group in UCDP, although variations in spelling (Hezbollah = Hizballah), acronyms, and translations (Renamo = MNR; JIG in Uzbekistan = Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)), mean that the matching cannot easily be automated. But in many cases, linking events to UCDP groups is difficult. Even for a human coder, determining whether even two very similar names refer to the same group requires case-specific knowledge. Factions in civil conflicts regularly evoke Monty Python's spoof of the distinction between the Judean People's Front and the People's Front of Judea (Jones 1979).For example, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) refer to the same entity, but are distinct from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and none of these should be confused with the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA). Conversely, very different names may represent the armed wing of a rebel organization (e.g, the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the FMLN in El Salvador, or the New People's Army and the CPP in the Philippines).

[3] GTD data are available at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Often GTD lists a group that is a faction or a subset of an UCDP group (e.g., the Haqqani Network vis-à-vis the Taleban; or Beja Congress vis-a-vis the NDA in Sudan; or the Mouhajiroune Brigade vis-à-vis AQIM in Algeria), or more rarely, vice versa (e.g., the umbrella organization Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board in Colombia vis-à-vis FARC, ELN, EPL, and M-19). Similarly, GTD often lists separately groups that, as noted below, are listed collectively in UCDP (e.g., in Thailand UCDP lists the Patani insurgency while GTD identifies: the Pattani United Liberation Organization, Mujahideen Islam Pattani, and Young Liberators of Pattani, among others).

Many of the perpetrators identified in GTD are groups or entities affiliated with UCDP groups, often in complicated and ambiguous ways that researchers may want to count (again, depending on the research project). To give some examples of matches coded as allies/affiliates that are part of the same conflict or movement and are therefore included in versions C and above:

UCDP sideB (country)	GTD perpetrator (gname)	Connection
UFLA (India)	Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)	According to SATP, police sources suggest that the ULFA played a significant role in the formation of the All Adivasi National Liberation Army.
RCSS (Myanmar)	National Democratic Army	Restoration Council of Shan State and the National Democratic Alliance Army of Eastern Shan state historically coordinate their fight
FAR I (Guatemala)	31 January People's Front (FP-31)	Takes actions in support of FAR. Not part of URNG but recognized it as vanguard movement
PFLP (Israel)	Black September	Black September was a faction that shared members with the PFLP
NTC (Libya)	Zintani Militia	The Zintani militias fought on the same side as the NTC in the 2011 conflict, but subsequently refused to join the new armed forces or disarm

As these examples show, in the messy data of civil conflicts, groups often coordinate their action or work together in complicated ways. Actions by these allied and affiliated groups are not necessarily the work of the UCDP actor. But they also are not clearly NOT the work of the UCDP actors. To ignore all that is in GTD that is attributed to these allied and affiliated groups risks discarding valuable information about the overall level of terrorism in a conflict. We thus

see these matches as akin to the factions and umbrellas, but with a bit more uncertainty about the match, or the generic descriptors (but with perhaps greater certainty about the match).

GTD often identifies the perpetrator by a generic descriptor rather than attributing an incident to a specific organization. Some of these generic descriptors are quite possibly describing incidents that were in fact carried out by particular rebel organizations (e.g., "Kurdish separatists" vis-a-vis the PKK). But such an incident could equally have been carried out by other groups or individuals that share the descriptor. In other cases, a generic descriptor clearly does not include a particular group (e.g., Jewish Extremists vis-à-vis Fatah), while in others it is much more uncertain but entirely possible (e.g. "guerrillas" or "terrorists"). In still other cases, *gname* is so generic as to be effectively unidentified ("gunmen," "armed people," or the most common perpetrator in GTD by far: "unknown"). These perpetrator names reflect the lack of available information in the reporting on certain events rather than any certainty that the perpetrators had no affiliation with any armed organizations.

To create TAC, we first manually searched GTD for *gname(s)* that match exactly or obviously the group name or armed wing of each rebel organization (*SideB*) actor in UCDP. We used this information to create a date range for each conflict. This range, and thus the dyad-year panel, begins in the earlier of two dates: 1) the year of the UCDP *Startdate* (first recorded battle death, which may be earlier than the year crossed the 25 battle deaths threshold) *or* 2) the earliest year in which the GTD list an incident perpetrated by a group identified in our manual search as exactly matching the UCDP SideB group. The dyad-year panel extends through the later of two dates: 1) 5 years after the last recorded active conflict year in UCDP *or* 2) the last year of a GTD incident perpetrated by a group exactly matching the UCDP SideB. The full dyad-year panel includes all years within this range, even if the conflict-year did not surpass the 25 battle-death threshold in each of them (that is, it carries on through lulls in the fighting).[4]

Because only some UCDP SideB groups have "exact match" *gnames* prior to the UCDP *Startyear* or more than 5 years after the last year of active conflict, dyad-years outside this range are biased toward terrorism and should be interpreted accordingly. A variable (*extra_years*) denotes these observations so they can easily be excluded where necessary to avoid this bias. The status of group years with respect to UCDP active conflict is marked with the variable *in_ucdp*).

Having established a broad date range, we then "scooped" from GTD all incidents in or targeting the state during this time period. Specifically, we captured all incidents for which the nationality or location of the target is the relevant country (identified as *SideA*) that occurred within the date range. The GTD variable *country_txt* identifies the country in which the attack took place and *natlty1_txt* indicates the nationality of the person or entity targeted by the terrorist attack. For example, a terrorist attack that strikes an American military base in Afghanistan would code the

[4] Note that intentional civilian deaths (as opposed to collateral damage) are excluded from UCDP's evaluation of battle-deaths (see definitions of "battle-related deaths" on the UCDP website (UCDP 2016), so there is not necessarily a correspondence between the civilian fatalities counted in terrorist incidents and battle-deaths, although they may be correlated if more terrorist attacks occur when the war is fought more intensively.

United States of America for *natlty1_txt* and Afghanistan for *country_txt*. We included in our scoop each incident in which *country_txt = SideA* or for which *natlty1_txt = SideA* during the relevant time period.

We then paired each rebel organization with each perpetrator listed in GTD in one or more of these incidents. This process generated a list of over 9,000 possible UCDP SideB-GTD gname pairs.

With the help of research assistants, we manually coded whether, to what extent, and with what certainty, the GTD incident perpetrator (*gname)* matches the *SideB* actor in UCDP. This often required case specific knowledge. We relied on information from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,[5] conflict descriptions in the Non-State Actor database data notes (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013),[6] the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS),[7] and case specific sources as necessary.

Coding Group Matches

We used the following numeric codes to indicate the relationship between UCDP *SideB* and *gname*:

gname_match

0	perfect match (including acronyms, translations, and groups identified by leaders)
1	gname is the armed wing of the *SideB* group (or vice versa)
2	gname is broader (umbrella) than *SideB*
3	gname is a part of or faction of (subset) of *SideB*
4	same conflict/movement and allied or fight together
5	generic descriptor, applies to *SideB* (e.g. “Kurdish separatists” vis-a-vis the PKK)
6	“alliance of convenience” group from separate conflicts/movements, fight together
8	same conflict/movement but do not fight together, or are rivals
10	different group, identified separately in UCDP
11	specific group, not otherwise in UCDP; separate conflict/movement; not allied
12	generic descriptor, does not apply (e.g. “Jewish extremists” vis a vis the PLO)
13	generic descriptor, vague or very general (e.g “unknown” or “individuals”)
-99	insufficient information to code
-98	general descriptor, unclear if applies
-97	connected, not clear how
-96	connected, relationship changes over time
-77	no incidents in GTD (before 1970, very low level or obscure conflict, military coup)

[5] Available at www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/database/

[6] Available at privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

[7] TOPS is affiliated with the GTD project at the University of Maryland’s START and has since been incorporated into the “Big Allied and Dangerous” (BAAD) data project. www.start.umd.edu/tops/

Our coding of all possible pairs, along with coding notes and sources, is available online [author identifying URL removed]. This crosswalk between UCDP and GTD group can then be merged with the incident-level GTD dataset by *gname* to generate a list of events and all the possible UCDP groups that may have perpetrated the attack, with separate observations (rows) for each incident-UCDP group possible match. Users should note that this creates repeated observations for some incidents with generic descriptors in the *gname*. Users must make decisions regarding how to handle these duplicates (or triplicates, or more) when including the events assigned to generic perpetrator names in their analyses, one of the costs of this flexibility. This crosswalk can then be easily collapsed to the appropriate level of analysis, whether it be the UCDP group, the UCDP group-year, the country or country-year level, alternative cross sections or temporal units of aggregation, or the event-level itself.

In addition to decisions regarding how to handle repeated observations for incidents, the user must also make a choice whether and how to include an incident on three dimensions: 1) which types of *gname_match* observations to include, 2) which incidents fit the user's definition of terrorism, and 3) whether to measure terrorism by the (number of) incidents, fatalities, or incidents above a specified fatality threshold. To illustrate how this process may be done, and to give the user a variety of options without having to go through this painstaking process themselves, we walk through the procedure we use for creating rebel organization-year level observations and provide the resulting group-year dataset as an off-the-shelf version for researchers to use in their analyses.

A Note of Caution:

While some versions of the UCDP Actor Dataset include information on which groups are related genealogically through splinters and mergers, these relationships are not easy to incorporate in an analysis that extends these actors' time frames beyond the years in which they are active in UCDP, as TAC has done. For example, in Zimbabwe's war, the ZAPU and ZANU join forces to create the Popular Front in 1976. Attacks with generic *gnames* between 1971-1975 may be assigned to the PF, though the group has yet to form, and those after 1976 may be assigned to ZANU or ZAPU despite their merger.

Comparing TAC to TORG

The TORG Crosswalk (Cousins 2014, Asal, et. al 2015) at the Rockefeller College's Project on Violent Conflict also links non-state actors in UCDP with those in GTD (as well as other data sets). The Table here reports the UCDP rebel organizations (2014 version of the Dyadic Data) linked to GTD perpetrators in both TAC and TORG, noting the overlap and the groups included in only one of the two datasets.

Comparing UCDP-GTD Matches in TAC vs. TORG

	UCDP groups with matches to perpetrators in TAC and TORG			
	TAC Only	TAC & TORG	TORG Only	Neither*
TAC v.A	84	145	4	160
TAC v.B	91	145	4	153
TAC v.C	96	145	4	148
TAC v.F	109	145	4	135

*Note that these cases are nonetheless included in the TAC dataset. Because no match was found to events in GTD, they are coded as perpetrating 0 incidents of terrorism.

To reiterate, TAC's main contribution is to link UCDP rebel organizations to terrorism events that are missing perpetrator information. But importantly, TAC identifies 84 additional UCDP groups with direct links to perpetrators in GTD that are missing from TORG (this accounts for approximately 20% of UCDP groups in civil conflict dyads). These include some prominent cases, in which there is often an unambiguous match between perpetrators listed in GTD and organizations listed in UCDP, for example: the FMLN in el Salvador, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the United Kingdom, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hizb-i-Islami in Afghanistan, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) both in Sri Lanka, as well as Tigray People's Liberation Front and Eritrean People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia, among many others. We identified 21 direct connections included by TORG but not by TAC. In our attempt to verify these TORG links, we were unable to confirm any GTD *gnames* (perpetrator names) that represent direct matches to their respective UCDP groups.

While some of these UCDP-GTD connections missing from TORG are cases in which the rebel organization uses little terrorism, a few are important cases in which the UCDP rebel organization imposes a significant amount of damage through terrorism attacks. The FMLN in el Salvador commits 1665 total attacks fitting our less restrictive definition over its 19 years of inclusion in GTD; 150 of these attacks are fatal, killing 1794 people during the conflict. The PIRA committed 636 attacks over 42 years; 155 of them fatal, killing 288 people. The CPP

committed 383 attacks over 44 years in GTD; 132 of them fatal, killing 666 people. The Contras in Nicaragua killed 1365 people in acts of terrorism in 15 years. Renamo, in Mozambique, killed 1797 people in acts of terrorism over 37 years. Kashmiri insurgents killed 1817 people in 30 years. These are only the starkest examples.

Preset rebel organization-year data

Annual data is provided for all 409 rebel organizations included in the 2014 version of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Dyadic data set that are active between 1970-2013.

The unit of analysis is the dyad-year. In almost all cases, a rebel organization fights only one government so the dyad-year can also be thought of as an organization-year, though in a very few cases, a group is active in civil conflicts in more than one country and is therefore involved in more than one dyad (e.g., AQIM in Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali are each treated as separate dyads). TAC's rebel organization-year off-the-shelf dataset covers 5,653 dyad-years. Note that with the underlying incident-level TAC matches, users can also easily construct rebel organization-level, rather than dyad-level, measures.

1) Attributing GTD incidents to UCDP rebel organizations

First, we define a set of alternative decisions for which *SideB-gname* links to include in a measure of terrorism at the group-year level, drawing upon the *gname_match* variable described above. Codes 0-5 indicate some positive match or possibility thereof, while code 13 and some of the missing value codes (-9x) may also include matches. Which of these a researcher wants to include in counts of terrorism may vary depending on the research question. Similarly, a researcher may wish to know how robust findings are to different decisions about which to include. To facilitate assigning incidents to UCDP rebel organizations for the purposes of generating counts, we thus define 6 increasingly inclusive matching levels, labeled A-F, which include incidents with *gname_match* coded as follows:

Match level

A = 0-1
B = 0-3
C = 0-4
D = 0-4, -96, -97
E = 0-5, -96, -97
F = 0-5, 13, -96, -97

Figure 1 shows the cumulative addition of gname_match categories used to construct these increasingly inclusive levels.

As one moves along the alphabet from version A to version F, one increases the risk of including incidents by actors other than the group in question, and decreases the risk of excluding incidents that are the responsibility of the group. Because generic descriptor and unknown perpetrator incidents (5 and 13) can be applied to more than one group in a civil conflict with several rebel organizations, versions E and F face a problem of double- or multiple-counting of incidents. For example, a 2012 attack in GTD in which the perpetrator is listed only as "Palestinians" would be assigned as possibly linked (coded 5) to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Scholars using

measures that incorporate incidents linked with the 5 and 13 codes should note this issue, and if necessary make additional decisions about how to treat these double counted incidents.

The coding of all GTD perpetrators paired to any dyad-year are listed in TAC's group-year dataset in the text variable *gnames*.

Figure 1. Matching UCDP groups with GTD perpetrators.



2) Identifying Incidents of Deliberately Indiscriminate Terrorism

As described in [author citation removed], a great many of the incidents included in GTD do not fit our definition of deliberately indiscriminate terrorism. We use GTD filtering criteria, attack type, and target type to identify the incidents most likely to fit our definition.

Definition of Indiscriminate Terrorism

While TAC allows researchers flexibility to implement custom definitions, we also provide a standard version of the data following our own definition, optimized to study the use of terrorism by rebel organizations. We define indiscriminate terrorism as *intentionally indiscriminate political violence against public civilian targets to influence a wider audience.*[8]

Our definition excludes discriminate attacks that many include in conceptions of terrorism, particularly assassinations of public civilian figures. We exclude these attacks in part because we think their causes and effects may be very different, but also, more practically, because it is difficult to discern a bright line between such attacks and those on "ordinary" collaborators which are so ubiquitous in civil conflict.

Our conception of indiscriminate includes targeting of particular ethnic or identity groups, so long as it is arbitrary within that group. That is, we would consider an attack on a mosque, for example, or in a predominantly Protestant neighborhood, or a market that is used mostly by Sinhalese, as indiscriminate. Here we follow Walzer's (1977, 200) distinction "between aiming at particular people because of things they have done or are doing, and aiming at whole groups of people, indiscriminately, because of who they are."

Our 1definition also captures what the literature often refers to as the "symbolic" nature of terrorism – that it aims not primarily to influence the victims of the violence but to send a political message to a wider audience (Crenshaw 1981, 373; McCormick 2003, 474). 1An attack on a public market, for example, is not intended to influence shoppers, but rather the larger population, and ultimately the government against which a group fights.

While our data focus on the use of terrorism by opposition groups, in theory the definition itself applies equally to governments.[9] Data limitations in the GTD, which includes only incidents perpetrated by non-state actors, unfortunately precludes equal measurement of the state's use of deliberately indiscriminate political violence against civilians to influence a wider audience.[10]

[8] Note that the term "indiscriminate" sometimes refers to the failure to discriminate between combatant and noncombatant targets. We use the term here to indicate the targeting of civilians at random, as opposed to singling out particular individuals or those whose actions (e.g. providing information to the other side) or occupations (e.g. as government personnel) are the basis for their selection as targets.

[9] For critiques of defining terrorism as something that only non-state actors can commit, see Jackson (2008). See also Moore (2015).

[10] In the larger project for which these data were developed, [authors] examines the relationship between state and rebel terrorism.

1This definition focuses on the *tactics* used by rebel organizations; the types of attacks they carry out, not the *cause* for which they fight. rebel organizations may thus be engaged in "terrorism" and "freedom fighting" simultaneously. And while we can condemn terrorism as a tactic, it is important that we not let our judgements of the morality of a group's cause influence our measurement of whether it uses terrorism.[11] Similarly, while we exclude targeted killings of civilians from our definition, we do not in any way condone such attacks. Discriminate attacks on suspected collaborators or government officials are violations of international humanitarian law, but they are not what we quintessentially think of when we think of terrorist attacks.[12]

To operationalize this definition of terrorism in the data, we include only incidents coded by GTD to meet all three of its filtering criteria:

1. Aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal
2. Evidence of intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to a larger audience than the immediate victims
3. Outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (i.e. outside international humanitarian law, particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants)[13]

Because there is no measure in GTD of indiscriminateness, we use attack and target type as proxies. Because like all proxies, these are imperfect measures, and the inclusion or exclusion of particular categories of attack or target type often represents a judgement call, we created a less restrictive and a more restrictive version. The former may over-count deliberately indiscriminate terrorist incidents, while the latter may under-count.

Table 1 shows all GTD attack and target types, and whether they are included in the less or more restrictive version of TAC variables, or are excluded from both. Note that unknown attack and target type incidents are included in the less restrictive version, but not in the more restrictive version. When an incident combines multiple attack types or multiple targets, the incident is included if at least one attack type and one target type listed fulfill these criteria.

Decisions on what to include and exclude in these two versions were vetted and refined in a process conducted by students in [author reference removed]'s courses on terrorism. This vetting entailed examining a sample of incidents in GTD, both those identified as "terrorism" by TAC and those excluded, and determining based on the qualitative incident description in GTD (such

[11] Similarly, we cannot let associations in the popular imagination, such as a perceived link between terrorism and Islamist-Jihadi ideology color our definition of the phenomenon. A deliberately indiscriminate attack on a public civilian target is an act of terrorism whether it is carried out by a jihadist group, an ethnic group fighting for liberation from an oppressive regime, a right-wing supremacist group, a group fighting to save the environment, or a government (though because we focus on civil wars and collect data for non-state actors, these latter examples do not appear in our data).

[12] Debates over definitions of terrorism can get bogged down in discussions of whether other phenomena are "as bad as" terrorism and thus should be included in the definition, or shy away from defining something as terrorism because it is seen as justified politically. We attempt to specify what distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence without reference to relative morality. See Meisels (2009) for a related discussion.

[13] GTD Codebook (START 2013, 7-8). GTD requires that an incident fulfill only two of these three.

descriptions are available for incidents after 1998), whether the particular incident met the definition of terrorism used here.

3) Creating Count Variables

The final step in compiling the data consisted of aggregating incidents that fulfill the inclusion criteria for the less and more restrictive versions, for each group year.

We used the incident fatality information: *nkill* (total number killed) and *nkillterr* (number of perpetrators killed),[14] in GTD to create four annual count variables aggregating incidents that otherwise fit the criteria described above:

Total incidents: Number of incidents, including fatal and not fatal attacks.

Fatal incidents: Number of incidents with at least one non-perpetrator fatality (*nkill-nkillter*>0)

Mass incidents: Number of incidents with at least five non-perpetrator fatalities (*nkill-nkillter*>4)

Fatalities: Sum of the non-perpetrator fatalities in all incidents.

Note that in the main count variables that use fatality information (that is, all except total incidents), we treat fatalities as 0 for incidents in which GTD is missing information on fatalities. GTD is missing a fatality count for 5.7% of the incidents included in our data. These incidents are excluded from TAC's fatal incident, mass incident, and fatality count variables. However, we create an alternative version of each of these variables (labeled with the extension *_na*) that is coded as missing if any incident in that dyad-year is missing a fatality count in GTD. For about half of all incidents, GTD also records whether any perpetrators were killed in the attack. Where available, this number is subtracted from the total fatality count to determine whether any victims died.

Non-fatal incidents may occur for one of two reasons: because the perpetrator was not trying to kill anyone, for example attacks on empty buildings, or after advance warning to evacuate an area has been given (Brown 2015) or because the perpetrator was trying to kill people, but failed to do so. Unfortunately, GTD's measure of whether an attack was successful does not necessarily distinguish between these, as it codes, for example, whether a bomb went off, not whether a bomb that was meant to kill people actually did. We thus use measures of fatalities, or fatal incidents whether or not they were "successful."

[14] GTD records fractions for *nkill* in some cases. This is the "result of insufficiently specific information in the source materials about casualties across attacks that are reported in aggregate. For example, if an article says '5 people were killed in seven bombings in Baghdad today' but fails to provide location-specific details about the casualties, [GTD will] record fractions to preserve the total numbers in the report. See "preservation of statistical accuracy" section in GTD codebook. Email communication with Erin Miller, Program Manager, Global Terrorism Database, December 15, 2014.

Preset TAC Variables

The combination of matching levels A-F, less and more restrictive versions to proxy for deliberately indiscriminate terrorism, and four quantities counted in the annual measures yields 48 versions of the terrorism variables. The variable names (e.g. *t_a*) for each are denoted in the grid below. An additional 18 variables, for the 6 versions of fatal incidents, mass incidents, and fatalities, use the alternative method of handling missing data in GTD on fatalities. These variables are denoted with an additional suffix: _na (e.g., f_a_na).

Indiscriminate Terrorism Variables

	annual incidents						annual fatalities	
	total incidents (not necessarily fatal)		fatal incidents (non-perp. deaths >0)		mass incidents (non-perp. deaths >4)		total (non-perp.) fatalities in all incidents	
match	less restrict.	More restrict.	less restrict.	more restrict.	less restrict.	more restrict.	less restrict.	more restrict.
A	**t_a**	**tm_a**	**f_a**	**fm_a**	**m_a**	**mm_a**	**k_a**	**km_a**
B	**t_b**	**tm_b**	**f_b**	**fm_b**	**m_b**	**mm_b**	**k_b**	**km_b**
C	**t_c**	**tm_c**	**f_c**	**fm_c**	**m_c**	**mm_c**	**k_c**	**km_c**
D	**t_d**	**tm_d**	**f_d**	**fm_d**	**m_d**	**mm_d**	**k_d**	**km_d**
E	**t_e**	**tm_e**	**f_e**	**fm_e**	**m_e**	**mm_e**	**k_e**	**km_e**
F	**t_f**	**tm_f**	**f_f**	**fm_f**	**m_f**	**mm_f**	**k_f**	**km_f**

The extension *_na* denotes additional versions of these variables that treat as missing any dyad-years for which fatality information is missing for any incident.

ID Variables

dyadid UCDP dyad identification number

year Year

conflictID UCDP conflict identification number

ccode COW country code

gwnoa Gleditsch-Ward country code

sidea Name of SideA / government (UCDP)

sideb Name of SideB / opposition organization (UCDP)

sidebid SideB identification number (UCDP)

startdate2 date conflict crosses 25 battle death threshold (UCDP)

Other variables

gnames lists all GTD gnames paired with SideB, with gname_match coding noted for each

in_ucdp denotes status of given year in UCDP conflict

1 = active conflict year: included in UCDP, >25 annual battle deaths
2 = pre-conflict: years before UCDP's *Startdate2*
3 = lull: years of <25 battle deaths, as coded by UCDP, in between years of active conflict
4 = post-conflict: years after last year of active conflict to in UCDP

extra_years

denotes years outside the range from the year of UCDP *Startdate* (first battle death) to 5 years beyond last year of active conflict

0 = within range from start year to 5 years beyond last year of active conflict
1 = prior start year, or more than 5 years after last year of active conflict

Note: all observations coded as extra_years=1 are in_ucdp 2 or 4 (pre- or post- conflict)

The following variables are also included from UCDP (refer to the UCDP Dyadic Dataset Codebook [Themnér 2014]):

location

incompatibility

territoryname

gwnoloc

region

version [always 1-2014]

sidea2nd

sideb2nd

intensitylevel

startprec

startprec2

gwnoa2nd

gwnob2nd

Notes of Caution:

TAC includes the US-al Qaida conflict (coded by UCDP as an internationalized intrastate war). Researchers may want to drop this case as it is not a civil conflict, and other instances of transnational conflict are not similarly included in UCDP (fatality counts for this dyad are also extreme outliers in 2001). This case can be dropped by excluding ccode = 2 or dyadid = 360.

In a few cases, UCDP data treats as a single organization a number of groups that consist of many organizations. These conglomerate groups are identified as "XXX insurgents" in s*ideb* (e.g., Kashmir insurgents, Syrian insurgents, Sikh insurgents) and should be treated with caution in the data. In these cases, TAC codes as a direct match any named organization that research showed was part of the larger insurgency. Applicable generic descriptor perpetrators, such as "Muslim fundamentalists" are coded as such (and included in version E) just as they are for other groups.

Illustration: African National Congress

The case of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa also helps illustrate the differences between the criteria for counting incidents and fatalities terrorism, and the difference between the more and less restrictive measures described above. It also underlines that nothing about the our own perceptions of the legitimacy of the cause for which a group fights, in this case to upend apartheid, affects our criteria for counting whether the group engaged in terrorism. Table 2 shows TAC's counts of total terrorist incidents, fatal incidents, mass incidents, and the total number killed in terrorist incidents for this case, using both the less and the more restrictive measure to filter for deliberately indiscriminate attacks.

UCDP codes the first battle death (*Startdate*) in this conflict in 1976, active conflict (>25 battle deaths/year) starting in 1981, a brief lull in 1984, and the final active year as 1988. TAC covers 1976 through 1996 in this case because GTD includes no attacks attributed to the African National Congress (South Africa) before 1976, but a number of attacks after 1988, including two in 1996.

The lines in bold are the years for which this conflict is coded as active (over 25 battle deaths/year) in UCDP. As noted above, data for 1993 are missing. The shaded columns represent counts using the more restrictive measure of deliberately indiscriminate attacks, the unshaded columns are the less restrictive measure. All of the counts shown are for version A of the *gname-SideB* matching.[15]

Looking first at the measure in the leftmost column – the count of terrorist incidents under the less restrictive measure – the ANC appears to be a very active user of terrorism as a tactic. After an isolated attack in 1977, there are 5 attacks in 1979 and this grows from 17 to a peak of 25 during the active years of the conflict. After 1988, the number tapers off, but the ANC is still responsible for a few attacks through 1992 (or possibly 1993, we cannot tell as that year is missing). If one restricts the measure to only the attack type and target types that are most likely to pick up deliberately indiscriminate terrorism (the second column), the ANC still appears to be a relatively active terrorist organization; responsible for roughly 4-8 attacks per year in most of the active years of the conflict, with spikes to 10 and 16 in 1983 and 1988. Interestingly the timeline of violence looks rather different, however. 1985, the year that looks like the peak of terrorism using the less restrictive measure, looks much more typical under the more restrictive measure.

Of these attacks, however, only a handful a year at most actually killed anyone. The number of fatal attacks ranges from 0 to a peak of 5 in any given year under the less restrictive measure and 0 to a peak of only 3 under the more restrictive measure. Of those, even fewer were the type of mass attacks (killed 5 or more people) that are most likely to indicate intentionally indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Under all these measures, 1985 reemerges as the peak year of terrorism. The total number of people killed is substantial under the less restrictive measure, as many as 21

[15] In this particular case there is no difference among versions A through E, with higher counts only in version F where unknown and essentially unknown perpetrators are included.

in the peak year of 1985, and a total of 81 over two decades. With the more restrictive measure, the peak is similar (17 in 1985), but the total is only 40 over 20 years.

The overall picture of the ANC that emerges using these various measures is of an organization that conducted a high number of non-fatal terrorist attacks but relatively few fatal ones, and for whom mass attacks were not eschewed entirely but were the exception not the rule.

An examination of some of the individual incidents attributed to the ANC in the larger GTD database from which TAC is drawn also helps illustrate our measures. GTD includes 606 attacks for whom the perpetrator is listed as the African National Congress (South Africa), of which 527 meet all three filtering criteria.[16] Of these, almost three quarters are bombing/explosions (343) or armed assaults (37), that is the attack types included in both measures in TAC. Attack type is used to exclude 69 assassinations, including many attacks on individual politicians (e.g. Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Minister of Parliament Fred Peters, former Mayor Kunene, or unnamed "municipal candidates"), or on South African Police personnel. One or two attacks listed as assassinations appear to be on general civilian targets (e.g. "woman" or "pedestrian") and may have been miscoded by GTD. TAC also excludes one attack coded as a facility infrastructure attack (note that under GTD's hierarchy of attack type coding, this coding applies only when an attack is not already coded as a bombing or armed assault, etc.) and one unarmed assault (in this case against the South African police). Seventy-six incidents are also excluded from TAC's more restrictive measures (but not the less restrictive ones) because attack type is unknown. Reassuringly, all but 6 of these incidents would be excluded on other grounds as well, as they target the police or government targets. Five target transportation (train/train tracks), and of these only one includes fatalities. The sixth is an attack on business (target subtype missing), target listed as "truck" in which no one was killed.

This discrepancy between the conclusions one might draw about the ANC from these different measures accords with discrepancies in the way the ANC is discussed in the terrorism literature. Databases of terrorist incidents and organizations (and therefore scholarship based on them) generally include the ANC as a terrorist organization. For example, according to the description of the ANC in the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS) data base:

> After nearly 50 years of nonviolent protest, the ANC adopted terrorist tactics in the early 1960s. ANC terrorism would continue until the group was legalized in 1990.[17]

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[16] Those which do not are either attacks on military targets (e.g. "military unit/patrol/convoy" of the South African Defense Forces listed as "insurgency/guerilla action") that fail to meet criterion number 3 ("outside the context of legitimate warfare activities," i.e. targeting civilians or non-combatants) or attacks on the Inkatha Freedom Party listed as "intra/inter-group conflict" that fail to meet criterion number 2 (evidence of intention to influence a wider audience). Two incidents fail to meet criterion number 1 (political goal). One is a landmine attack in 1981 against a power substation about which very little information is listed, but no one was killed (incident #198111120015). The other (#198703110006) was an armed assault on the South African Police in which only the perpetrator was killed. In neither case is it clear why GTD codes crit1 as 0, especially given the "bake sale" rule noted above.

[17] TOPS profiles are no longer available on the BAAD website. A capture from the "wayback machine" is available at:

However, qualitative work on terrorism tends to discuss the ANC as a case that deliberately eschewed or rejected terrorism as a form of armed struggle (see, e.g. Goodwin 2006, 2033; Crenshaw 2011, 210).

https://web.archive.org/web/20160226172121/http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=305. RAND's Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents also includes a number of incidents attributed to the ANC ("RAND | NSRD | Projects | RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents" 2016).

Table 1. Attack and Target Types included in TAC's Less and More Restrictive Measures

Attack	(attacktype1)	Less	More
1	Assassination		
2	Armed Assault	✓	✓
3	Bombing/Explosion	✓	✓
4	Hijacking	✓	
5	Hostage Taking (barricade)	✓	
6	Hostage Taking (kidnapping)	✓	
7	Facility/Infrastructure		
8	Unarmed Assault		
9	Unknown	✓	

Target	(targtype1)	Subtype	(targsubtype1)	Less	More
1	Business	1	Gas/oil	✓	
		2	Restaurant/Bar/Café	✓	✓
		3	Bank/Commerce	✓	
		4	Multinational Corp.	✓	
		5	Industrial/Textiles/Factories	✓	
		6	Medical/Pharmaceutical	✓	
		7	Retail/Grocery/Bakery	✓	✓
		8	Hotel/Resort	✓	✓
		9	Farm/Ranch	✓	
		10	Mining	✓	
		11	Entertainment/Cultural/Stadiums	✓	✓
		12	Construction	✓	
		13	Private Security Firms	✓	
2	Government (General)	14-21	[all subtypes]		
3	Police	22-26	[all subtypes]		
4	Military	27-39	[all subtypes]		
5	Abortion related	40-41	[all subtypes]		
6	Airports/Aircraft	42	Aircraft	✓	✓
		43	Airline Officer/Personnel	✓	
		44	Airport	✓	✓
7	Government (Diplomatic)	45-47	[all subtypes]		
8	Educational Institution	48	Teachers/Professors/Instructors	✓	
		49	Schools/Universities/Educ. Buildings	✓	✓
		50	Other Personnel	✓	✓
9	Food & Water Supply	51	Food Supply	✓	✓
		52	Water Supply	✓	✓
10	Journalists/Media	53-56	[all subtypes]		

11	*Maritime*	*57*	*Civilian Maritime*	✓	✓
		58	*Commercial Maritime*	✓	
		59	*Oil Tankers*	✓	
		60	*Ports*	✓	✓
12	*NGO*	*61-62*	*[all subtypes]*		
13	*Other*	*63*	*Ambulances*	✓	
		64	*Fire Fighters/Trucks*	✓	
		65	*Refugee Camps*	✓	✓
		66	*DMZs*	✓	✓
14	*Private Citizens and Property*	*67*	*Unnamed Civilians/Unspecified*	✓	✓
		68	*Named Civilians*	✓	
		69	*Religion Identified*	✓	✓
		70	*Students*	✓	✓
		71	*Race/Ethnicity identified*	✓	✓
		72	*Farmers*	✓	✓
		73	*Vehicles/Transportation*	✓	✓
		74	*Marketplace/Plaza/Square*	✓	✓
		75	*Village/Cities/Towns/Suburb*	✓	✓
		76	*Houses/Apartments/Residence*	✓	✓
		77	*Laborers (general)/Specific Jobs*	✓	✓
		78	*Processions/Gatherings*	✓	✓
		79	*Public Areas*	✓	✓
		80	*Memorials/Cemeteries/Monuments*	✓	✓
		81	*Museums/Cultural Centers*	✓	✓
		82	*Labor Union Related*	✓	
		83	*Protestors*	✓	
		84	*Political Party Members/Rallies*	✓	
15	*Religious Figures Institutions*	*85*	*Religious Figures*	✓	
		86	*Places of Worship*	✓	✓
		87	*Affiliated Institutions*	✓	✓
16	*Telecommunications*	*88-92*	*[all subtypes]*	✓	
17	*Terrorists/Non-State Militias*	*93-94*	*[all subtypes]*		
18	*Tourists*	*95*	*Tourism Travel Agency*	✓	✓
		96	*Tour Bus/Vehicle*	✓	✓
		97	*Tourists*	✓	✓
		98	*Other Facility*	✓	✓
19	*Transportation*	*99*	*Bus (excluding tourist)*	✓	✓
		100	*Train/Train Tracks/Trolley*	✓	✓
		101	*Bus Station/Stop*	✓	✓
		102	*Subway*	✓	✓
		103	*Bridge/Car Tunnel*	✓	✓

		104	*Highway/Road/Toll/Traffic Signal*	✓	✓
		105	*Taxi/Rickshaw*	✓	✓
20	*Unknown*	*NA*		✓	
21	*Utilities*	*106*	*Gas*	✓	
		107	*Electric*	✓	
		108	*Oil*	✓	
22	*Violent Political Parties*	*NA*			

Table 2. Terrorism count variables for the ANC

	Total incidents		Fatal incidents		Mass incidents		Total killed	
	Less*	More	Less	More	Less	More	Less	More
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	9	1	6	0	1	0	10	0
1981	**17**	**6**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1982	**10**	**4**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1983	**23**	**10**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**
1984	**14**	**4**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**8**	**0**
1985	**25**	**8**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**3**	**21**	**17**
1986	**16**	**8**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**4**	**4**
1987	**15**	**7**	**2**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**14**	**0**
1988	**21**	**16**	**4**	**3**	**1**	**0**	**8**	**4**
1989	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	9
1992	3	2	3	2	1	1	7	6
1993	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

** Less vs. more restrictive measures*

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