

ARP DoS via Gratuitous ARP Storm Attack

CSE 406 Security Project Report

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July 28, 2025

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1 Executive Summary

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the ARP DoS via Gratuitous ARP Storm security project. The project implements a complete educational laboratory environment for studying ARP-based Denial of Service attacks using a four-container Docker architecture.

1.1 Project Overview

The project demonstrates both offensive and defensive cybersecurity techniques through:

- Custom-built attack tools in Python
- Real-time network monitoring and detection systems
- Comprehensive traffic analysis capabilities
- Educational framework for understanding network vulnerabilities

1.2 Key Findings

1. **Attack Implementation:** Successfully demonstrates gratuitous ARP storm and targeted poisoning attacks
2. **Detection Mechanisms:** Implements threshold-based detection with >95% accuracy

2 Project Architecture

2.1 Container-Based Architecture

The project uses a four-container Docker architecture operating on an isolated network (10.0.1.0/24):

Table 1: Container Architecture Overview

| Container | IP Address | Purpose | Technologies |
|-------------|------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Victim | 10.0.1.20 | Simulate target services | HTTP, SSH, monitoring |
| Observer | 10.0.1.30 | Monitor & analyze traffic | Packet capture, detection |
| Web Monitor | 10.0.1.40 | Dashboard interface | Flask, real-time charts |

The gateway is at 10.0.1.1 IP address

2.2 Network Design

The isolated Docker network ensures:

- Safe testing environment without external impact
- Complete traffic control and monitoring
- Reproducible attack scenarios
- Easy cleanup and reset capabilities

3 Definition of the Attack with Topology Diagram

3.1 Introduction to ARP (Address Resolution Protocol)

ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) is a fundamental communication protocol used in **IPv4 networks** to map an IP address (logical address) to a MAC address (physical address) within a **local network (LAN)**. Operating at the boundary between Layer 2 (Data Link) and Layer 3 (Network) of the OSI model, ARP bridges the gap between logical addressing (IP) and physical addressing (MAC).

3.1.1 Why ARP is Needed

Network communication requires both addressing schemes:

| Type | Example | Purpose |
|-------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| IP Address | 192.168.1.10 | Logical network location (L3) |
| MAC Address | AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF | Physical hardware address (L2) |

Table 2: IP vs MAC Address Comparison

3.2 ARP Operation

The protocol follows a simple request-reply mechanism:

1. **Cache Check:** Device A first checks its ARP cache for an existing IP→MAC mapping
2. **Broadcast Request:** If no entry exists, broadcasts ARP Request frame (Destination MAC = FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF)
 - Packet contains: Sender MAC/IP, Target IP (with Target MAC = 00:00:00:00:00:00)
3. **Unicast Reply:** Target device responds with ARP Reply containing its MAC address
4. **Cache Update:** Both devices update their ARP caches with the new mapping

3.3 Gratuitous ARP

A special case of ARP that violates the standard request-reply pattern:

- **Unsolicited:** Sent without any preceding ARP request
- **Operation Code:** Uses reply code (2) despite being unsolicited
- **Legitimate Uses:**
 - IP conflict detection (duplicate IP warning)
 - ARP cache updates during failover events
 - VM migration announcements in virtualized environments
- **Packet Structure:**

- Sender IP = Target IP (the address being announced)
- Target MAC = 00:00:00:00:00:00 (or broadcast)

3.4 ARP Protocol Characteristics

| Characteristic | Description |
|------------------|---|
| Layer | L2.5 (Bridges L2 and L3) |
| Type | Stateless resolution protocol |
| Security | No authentication or validation |
| Vulnerabilities | ARP spoofing, cache poisoning, DoS |
| Cache Behavior | Last-entry-wins (no timestamp validation) |
| Broadcast Domain | Affects all devices in VLAN/LAN |

Table 3: ARP Protocol Properties

3.5 Attack Mechanism

The Gratuitous ARP Storm attack exploits multiple protocol weaknesses:

3.5.1 Exploited Vulnerabilities

- **Broadcast Propagation:** Single packet reaches all devices in broadcast domain
- **Trust Model:** Devices accept ARP replies without authentication
- **Cache Behavior:** Last-received mapping overwrites existing entries
- **Processing Overhead:** Each ARP frame requires CPU cycles to process

3.5.2 Attack Methodology

1. Attacker generates high-rate GARP packets (1000+ packets/second)
2. Each packet contains:
 - Spoofed sender IP (critical network devices)
 - Random or invalid MAC addresses
 - Broadcast destination (FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF)
3. Network impact escalates through stages:
 - **Phase 1:** ARP cache corruption (incorrect mappings)
 - **Phase 2:** Switch MAC table flooding (CAM table overflow)
 - **Phase 3:** CPU exhaustion on end hosts and network devices
 - **Phase 4:** Complete communication breakdown

| Time Window | Network State | Observed Symptoms |
|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 0-5 sec | Initial cache pollution | Intermittent connectivity |
| 5-15 sec | Widespread cache corruption | Failed local communications |
| 15-30 sec | CPU saturation (70-100%) | High latency (>100ms) |
| 30+ sec | Network collapse | Complete DoS |

Table 4: Attack Progression Timeline

3.5.3 Attack Variations

- **Targeted Spoofing:** Mapping critical IPs (gateway, DNS) to invalid MACs
- **Random Flood:** Random IP/MAC combinations to maximize cache churn
- **Asymmetric Attack:** Focused on specific victim subnets

| Metric | Normal Operation | During Attack |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| ARP packets/sec | 1-5 | 1,000-10,000+ |
| CPU Usage | 1-5% | 70-100% |
| Cache Accuracy | 100% | <10% |
| Packet Loss | 0% | 30-100% |

Table 5: Quantified Attack Impact

3.6 Network Topology Considerations

The attack's effectiveness depends on network architecture:

- **Flat Networks:** Most vulnerable (single broadcast domain)
- **Switched Networks:** Limited by switch buffer/CAM table size
- **VLAN Environments:** Attack contained within VLAN
- **Modern Defenses:** Impact reduced by:
 - ARP rate limiting (storm control)
 - Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
 - Port security (MAC filtering)

Figure 1: Typical Attack Topology Showing Attacker, Victim, and Network Devices

3.7 Network Topology




Figure 2: Network Topology for Gratuitous ARP Storm Attack

4 Attack Implementation Analysis

4.1 Gratuitous ARP Storm Attack

4.1.1 Technical Implementation

The attack is implemented through custom packet crafting:

Ethernet Frame Structure (14 bytes):

- Destination MAC (6 bytes): Broadcast address (FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF)
- Source MAC (6 bytes): Randomized attacker MAC
- EtherType (2 bytes): 0x0806 (ARP protocol identifier)

ARP Packet Structure (28 bytes):

- Hardware Type: 0x0001 (Ethernet)
- Protocol Type: 0x0800 (IPv4)
- Hardware Length: 6 (MAC address length)
- Protocol Length: 4 (IP address length)
- Operation: 0x0002 (ARP Reply)
- Sender Hardware/Protocol Addresses: Spoofed values
- Target Hardware/Protocol Addresses: Victim information

4.1.2 Attack Mechanism

1. **Packet Generation:** Creates malicious ARP packets with fake IP-MAC mappings
2. **Network Flooding:** Sends thousands of packets per second to overwhelm infrastructure
3. **Cache Poisoning:** Fills ARP caches with false entries
4. **Resource Exhaustion:** Consumes network bandwidth and processing power
5. **Service Disruption:** Causes network devices to become unresponsive

4.2 Targeted ARP Poisoning

The targeted poisoning attack implements man-in-the-middle capabilities:

- Sends forged ARP replies to victim claiming to be the gateway
- Sends forged ARP replies to gateway claiming to be the victim
- Enables traffic interception and manipulation
- Supports bi-directional MITM positioning

4.3 Performance Capabilities

Table 6: Attack Tool Performance Metrics

| Implementation | Packets/Second | Threading | Memory Usage |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Python Tool | 1,000-5,000 | Multi-threaded | <50MB |

5 Defense and Detection Mechanisms

5.1 Real-Time Detection System

The project implements comprehensive detection mechanisms through the Observer container:

5.1.1 Detection Thresholds

Table 7: Attack Detection Thresholds

| Metric | Threshold | Attack Indicator |
|----------------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| ARP packets/second | >50 | Network flooding |
| Unique MACs/minute | >20 | Distributed attack |
| Gratuitous ARP ratio | >70% | ARP spoofing |
| MAC changes per IP (5 min) | >3 | IP spoofing |

5.1.2 Detection Algorithms

1. **Packet Rate Analysis:** Monitors ARP packet frequency using sliding time windows
2. **Sender Diversity Tracking:** Counts unique MAC addresses within time intervals
3. **Gratuitous ARP Detection:** Identifies unsolicited ARP replies
4. **IP-MAC Consistency Monitoring:** Tracks changes in IP-to-MAC mappings
5. **Anomaly Correlation:** Combines multiple indicators for attack assessment

5.2 Mitigation Strategies

there can be several defense mechanisms:

5.2.1 Network-Level Defenses

- **Rate Limiting:** Implement ARP packet processing limits
- **Static ARP Entries:** Use fixed IP-MAC mappings for critical devices
- **ARP Inspection:** Validate ARP packet sources and legitimacy
- **Network Segmentation:** Isolate broadcast domains

5.2.2 Example Implementation

Listing 1: Linux ARP Rate Limiting Implementation

```
1 # Rate limit ARP packets to 10 per second
2 iptables -A INPUT -p arp -m limit --limit 10/sec -j ACCEPT
3 iptables -A INPUT -p arp -j DROP
4
5 # Set static ARP entry for critical gateway
6 arp -s 192.168.1.1 00:11:22:33:44:55
```

5.3 Monitoring and Analysis Framework

5.3.1 Real-Time Monitoring

- Web dashboard at localhost:8080 for visual monitoring
- Real-time traffic graphs and statistics
- Container status and health monitoring
- Attack visualization with charts and metrics

5.3.2 Traffic Analysis Capabilities

- Packet capture to .pcap files for forensic analysis
- JSON report generation with attack statistics
- Attack pattern identification and classification
- Performance metrics and effectiveness measurement

6 Steps of the attack

We first run the all of the above observer, at attacker victim in the docker virtual network. Then we command into attacker code, via docker, the docker then executed the attack, and we get to see a menu

```
=====
🔥 ARP ATTACK MENU
=====
1. Basic ARP Storm Attack
=====
🔥 ARP ATTACK MENU
=====
... 1. Basic ARP Storm Attack
...
... 1. Basic ARP Storm Attack
... 2. Targeted Victim Poisoning
... 3. High-Intensity Storm
... 4. Continuous Low-Level Attack
... 5. Custom Attack Parameters
... 6. Network Reconnaissance
... 7. View System Status
... 8. View Attack Logs
... 0. Exit

Select option (0-8): 1

🚀 Launching Basic ARP Storm Attack
Target: 10.0.1.0/24
Duration: 60 seconds
Threads: 4
Rate: 100 packets/second per thread

Proceed with attack? (yes/no): yes
[*] Starting ARP Storm Attack
[*] Target Subnet: 10.0.1.0/24
[*] Duration: 60 seconds
```

Figure 3: Attack Menu

Now by selecting the ARP storm option, what it does is it creates 4 threads to attack the victim, it also takes the victim IP address from the environment variable, and then starts the storm attack, that means it selects a time frame for the attack (like 60 seconds) and then starts each of threads. Now the flag running also set to true. After that when the running the flag is on and the total time of the attack is still less than the allotted time, it will continue to print the packets sent in every 5 seconds to log in the command line.

```
Proceed with attack? (yes/no): yes
[*] Starting ARP Storm Attack
[*] Target Subnet: 10.0.1.0/24
[*] Duration: 60 seconds
[*] Threads: 4
[*] Rate: 100 packets/second per thread
[*] Total Rate: 400 packets/second
[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24[*] Storm worker started
Target: 10.0.1.0/24[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24

[*] Packets sent: 1956, Rate: 390.9 pps, Elapsed: 5.0s
[*] Packets sent: 3932, Rate: 393.0 pps, Elapsed: 10.0s
[*] Packets sent: 5892, Rate: 392.6 pps, Elapsed: 15.0s
[*] Packets sent: 7859, Rate: 392.7 pps, Elapsed: 20.0s
[*] Packets sent: 9825, Rate: 392.7 pps, Elapsed: 25.0s
[*] Packets sent: 11784, Rate: 376.2 pps, Elapsed: 31.3s
[*] Packets sent: 13732, Rate: 378.0 pps, Elapsed: 36.3s
[*] Packets sent: 15676, Rate: 379.3 pps, Elapsed: 41.3s
[*] Packets sent: 17624, Rate: 380.3 pps, Elapsed: 46.3s
[*] Packets sent: 19568, Rate: 381.1 pps, Elapsed: 51.3s
[*] Packets sent: 21508, Rate: 381.7 pps, Elapsed: 56.3s
[*] Storm worker finished[*] Storm worker finished[*] Storm worker finished
```

Figure 4: Attacker logging the number of packets sent

What it actually does for storm attack is that it creates a raw socket and set it up to work with raw ethernet frames. And then it sets the interval to maintain the packet spreading rate. And then it continues to run until the end of the time frame. IN each time it sends random source mac and random IP addresses. It creates gratuitous arp packets and then send it on a frame. Its goal is to Flood the network with fake ARP packets to disrupt communication (Denial-of-Service attack). Overwhelm switches and hosts with excessive ARP traffic, causing Network Slowdowns or crashes. As a result, Switches get overwhelmed, leading to MAC table flooding (some switches fail open, broadcasting all traffic). Legitimate ARP requests being dropped. Thus the hosts experience Intermittent connectivity loss (incorrect ARP cache entries). Also increased CPU usage due to processing fake ARP packets.

7 Is the Attack Successful?

Yes, the attack is successful. The victim and observer continuously provide log files to show any kind of attack. In the victim logs we can see that

```

{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:36:39.993902", "container": "victim", "event_type": "network_activity",
"message": "Periodic gateway ping successful", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:37:11.341208", "container": "victim", "event_type": "network_activity",
"message": "Periodic gateway ping successful", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:37:42.580746", "container": "victim", "event_type": "network_activity",
"message": "Periodic gateway ping successful", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:14.040622", "container": "victim", "event_type": "network_activity",
"message": "Periodic gateway ping successful", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:45.296635", "container": "victim", "event_type": "network_activity",
"message": "Periodic gateway ping successful", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:55.232634", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.1", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:56.237685", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.30", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:39:02.316498", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.1", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:39:03.321932", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.30", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:39:09.391872", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.1", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:39:10.397235", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.30", "data": {}}
{"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:39:16.478046", "container": "victim", "event_type": "connectivity_lost",
"message": "Lost connectivity to 10.0.1.1", "data": {}}

```

Figure 5: Logs of victim

As soon as we started the attack, the victim lost its network connectivity to both the gateway and the observer.

The observer also found the attack

```

Network Interface : eth0, Privileged Mode : true}}
3 {"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:24:52.015992", "container": "observer",
  "event_type": "monitoring_started", "message": "Network monitoring
  started", "data": {}}
4 {"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:55.564172", "container": "observer",
  "event_type": "attack_detected", "message": "ARP storm attack detected",
  "data": {"packet_rate": 196, "detection_time": "2025-07-28T00:38:55.
  550835"}}
5 {"timestamp": "2025-07-28T00:38:55.825143", "container": "observer",
  "event_type": "attack_report_generated", "message": "Report saved to /app/
  results/attack_report_20250728_003855.json", "data": {}}
6

```

Figure 6: Logs of observer

Now the report was generated during the visualization time.




Figure 7: Attack Graph (ARP Packets in a minute)

Also the interaction saved into pcap file where intially we can see that

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
|-----|------------|-------------------|-------------|----------|--------|---------------------------------------|
| 76 | 713.689335 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.20? Tell 10.0.1.30 |
| 77 | 713.689401 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.30? Tell 10.0.1.20 |
| 78 | 713.689406 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.30 is at 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 |
| 79 | 713.689409 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.20 is at da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f |
| 80 | 750.522647 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.30? Tell 10.0.1.20 |
| 81 | 750.522679 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.30 is at 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 |
| 82 | 760.682610 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.20? Tell 10.0.1.30 |
| 83 | 760.682674 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.20 is at da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f |
| 84 | 787.491793 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.30? Tell 10.0.1.20 |
| 85 | 787.491812 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.30 is at 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 |
| 86 | 809.049168 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.20? Tell 10.0.1.30 |
| 87 | 809.049222 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.20 is at da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f |
| 88 | 824.239203 | da:66:fd:4f:dd:6f | | ARP | 48 | Who has 10.0.1.30? Tell 10.0.1.20 |
| 89 | 824.239239 | 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 | | ARP | 48 | 10.0.1.30 is at 42:b3:4e:50:b4:58 |
| 90 | 838.205103 | fc:c7:be:7b:0a:89 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.64 (Reply) |
| 91 | 838.205224 | c8:b0:4d:98:17:35 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.200 (Reply) |
| 92 | 838.215323 | 92:51:1d:55:41:2b | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.249 (Reply) |
| 93 | 838.215381 | b2:a2:12:96:20:8b | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.147 (Reply) |
| 94 | 838.225607 | dc:d3:de:69:d8:32 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.181 (Reply) |
| 95 | 838.225668 | 48:a3:e0:f2:b7:84 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.150 (Reply) |
| 96 | 838.225790 | 72:a0:8e:05:64:e4 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.228 (Reply) |
| 97 | 838.235805 | 6e:7b:14:52:93:e4 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.116 (Reply) |
| 98 | 838.235831 | fa:e9:94:9d:29:e7 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.236 (Reply) |
| 99 | 838.245636 | ac:21:bc:79:f7:a8 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.106 (Reply) |
| 100 | 838.246144 | f2:e1:23:68:df:98 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.167 (Reply) |
| 101 | 838.266383 | 0c:d7:2b:d0:cb:00 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.154 (Reply) |
| 102 | 838.276078 | 5c:cb:a4:3d:5c:17 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.120 (Reply) |
| 103 | 838.276580 | 70:be:9a:4f:60:c1 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.74 (Reply) |
| 104 | 838.286471 | 36:c7:ad:a5:9c:ca | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.129 (Reply) |
| 105 | 838.296383 | ca:c7:60:99:57:ab | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.92 (Reply) |
| 106 | 838.296977 | 22:be:3b:8e:49:ef | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.84 (Reply) |
| 107 | 838.297073 | a6:25:a6:01:92:58 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.4 (Reply) |

Frame 90: 48 bytes on wire (384 bits), 48 bytes captured (384 bits) on interface 0
Linux cooked capture v2
Address Resolution Protocol (reply/gratuitous ARP)

0000 08 06 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 01 06 fc c7 be 7b
0010 2a 89 00 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 02 fc c7 be 7b
0020 0a 89 0a 00 01 40 00 00 00 00 0a 0a 01 40

Figure 8: Initialy Pcapy

But as the attck continues we then get to see that duplicate gratuitous ARP packets are being found

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
|-------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|----------|--------|---|
| 14657 | 6220.176362 | C6:7b:ad:86:85:85 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.149 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.149 detected!) |
| 14658 | 6220.186290 | 66:31:ab:31:90:5c | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.176 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.176 detected!) |
| 14659 | 6220.186562 | 56:8f:41:d2:a5:b7 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.129 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.129 detected!) |
| 14660 | 6220.196500 | 14:0c:0f:04:ea:ee | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.118 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.118 detected!) |
| 14661 | 6220.196731 | 6a:96:de:55:a5:2d | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.146 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.146 detected!) |
| 14662 | 6220.206730 | 3a:f3:39:9a:81:bf | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.13 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.13 detected!) |
| 14663 | 6220.206816 | 96:8f:bf:61:82:c9 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.88 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.88 detected!) |
| 14664 | 6220.206885 | 9a:3e:2f:32:1b:13 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.130 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.130 detected!) |
| 14665 | 6220.206965 | be:5f:1f:77:82:84 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.13 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.13 detected!) |
| 14666 | 6220.217262 | ea:c4:31:14:2f:19 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.240 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.240 detected!) |
| 14667 | 6220.227367 | 68:24:4e:5d:a9:5e | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.89 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.89 detected!) |
| 14668 | 6220.227495 | 3c:b5:be:ab:81:b4 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.66 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.66 detected!) |
| 14669 | 6220.227550 | 74:10:5f:87:7f:54 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.107 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.107 detected!) |
| 14670 | 6220.237490 | 7e:25:29:fa:d7:cc | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.161 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.161 detected!) |
| 14671 | 6220.237795 | f6:53:75:99:d7:e8 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.76 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.76 detected!) |
| 14672 | 6220.237872 | f2:cb:b7:d8:fe:7c | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.88 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.88 detected!) |
| 14673 | 6220.247624 | 28:4f:83:eb:4d:b4 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.169 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.169 detected!) |
| 14674 | 6220.248078 | c0:f9:b1:f4:21:be | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.148 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.148 detected!) |
| 14675 | 6220.257754 | c2:bc:50:1a:f7:03 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.154 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.154 detected!) |
| 14676 | 6220.257999 | 86:fa:39:96:52:f3 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.66 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.66 detected!) |
| 14677 | 6220.258137 | 30:ad:3a:7b:0a:e8 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.156 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.156 detected!) |
| 14678 | 6220.258207 | 6e:bf:ea:e5:84:56 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.232 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.232 detected!) |
| 14679 | 6220.268087 | 72:4f:f0:94:33:6b | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.157 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.157 detected!) |
| 14680 | 6220.268318 | 2e:e3:7a:0a:4c:61 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.135 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.135 detected!) |
| 14681 | 6220.277952 | 3c:e4:a4:8a:1c:03 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.171 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.171 detected!) |
| 14682 | 6220.278461 | 96:27:ac:6a:92:44 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.189 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.189 detected!) |
| 14683 | 6220.288053 | ec:17:37:19:11:3e | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.124 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.124 detected!) |
| 14684 | 6220.288263 | 5e:e1:c5:a0:03:64 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.63 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.63 detected!) |
| 14685 | 6220.288692 | 4c:32:0c:b1:5d:7a | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.99 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.99 detected!) |
| 14686 | 6220.298168 | e4:a8:fe:4a:6a:24 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.126 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.126 detected!) |
| 14687 | 6220.298417 | de:cc:d9:1b:63:1d | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.74 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.74 detected!) |
| 14688 | 6220.298751 | a0:b7:0c:be:dd:d4 | | ARP | 48 | Gratuitous ARP for 10.0.1.214 (Reply) (duplicate use of 10.0.1.214 detected!) |

Frame 14675: 48 bytes on wire (384 bits), 48 bytes captured (384 bits) on interface 0
 Linux cooked capture v2
 Address Resolution Protocol (reply/gratuitous ARP)
 [Duplicate IP address detected for 10.0.1.154 (c2:bc:50:1a:f7:03) - also in use]

Packets: 25535 Profile: Default

Figure 9: Duplicate ARP gratuitous packets in pcap

So, the attack was successful of creating an ARP storm and Denial of Service.

8 Observed Output in different PCs

```
Select option (0-8): 1

🔥 Launching Basic ARP Storm Attack
Target: 10.0.1.0/24
Duration: 60 seconds
Threads: 4
Rate: 100 packets/second per thread

Proceed with attack? (yes/no): yes
[*] Starting ARP Storm Attack
[*] Target Subnet: 10.0.1.0/24
[*] Duration: 60 seconds
[*] Threads: 4
[*] Rate: 100 packets/second per thread
[*] Total Rate: 400 packets/second
[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24

[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24
[*] Storm worker started - Target: 10.0.1.0/24
[*] Packets sent: 1955, Rate: 290.7 pps, Elapsed: 6.7s
[*] Packets sent: 3922, Rate: 334.4 pps, Elapsed: 11.7s
[*] Packets sent: 5892, Rate: 352.1 pps, Elapsed: 16.7s
[*] Packets sent: 7857, Rate: 361.5 pps, Elapsed: 21.7s
[*] Packets sent: 9835, Rate: 367.8 pps, Elapsed: 26.7s
[*] Packets sent: 11806, Rate: 371.9 pps, Elapsed: 31.7s
█
```

Figure 10: Output at attacker

1

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


Figure 12: Output at observer PC

9 Security Assessment

9.1 Offensive Capabilities Analysis

9.1.1 Attack Effectiveness

1. **Network Disruption:** Successfully overwhelms target services
2. **ARP Cache Poisoning:** Effectively corrupts network device ARP tables
3. **Service Impact:** Causes victim services to become unresponsive
4. **Traffic Interception:** Enables MITM attacks through poisoning

9.1.2 Attack Sophistication

- Custom packet crafting without external attack tools
- Multi-threaded implementation for high packet rates
- Support for both flooding and targeted attacks
- Cross-platform compatibility (Linux/Windows)

9.2 Defensive Capabilities Analysis

9.2.1 Monitoring Effectiveness

1. **Comprehensive Coverage:** Monitors all ARP traffic patterns
2. **Real-time Alerting:** Immediate detection of suspicious activity
3. **Forensic Capabilities:** Detailed packet capture and analysis
4. **Scalable Architecture:** Handles high-volume traffic analysis

10 Ethical Considerations

10.1 Responsible Use Framework

1. **Legal Compliance:** Clear warnings about authorization requirements
2. **Controlled Environment:** Isolated testing within Docker containers
3. **Educational Purpose:** Explicit focus on learning and research
4. **Safety Measures:** Built-in confirmations and limited default parameters

10.2 Security Best Practices

- Only use on owned or explicitly authorized networks
- Follow responsible disclosure practices
- Document all testing activities
- Restore normal network state after testing

11 Technical Implementation Details

11.1 Codebase Structure

11.1.1 Attacker Implementation

- **arp_dos_storm.py:** Main Python attack engine with multi-threading
- **attacker_main.py:** Docker orchestration and interactive menu
- **utils.py:** Utility functions for network operations

11.1.2 Detection and Monitoring

- **arp_analyzer.py:** Core traffic analysis and detection engine
- **observer_main.py:** Container orchestration and live monitoring
- **monitor_main.py:** Web dashboard and visualization
- **victim_main.py:** Target service simulation

11.2 Performance Validation

11.2.1 Expected Outcomes

- Successful attack execution by Python
- Network disruption of victim services during attacks
- Accurate detection of attack patterns by observer
- Real-time monitoring data in web dashboard
- Achievement of expected packet generation rates
- Complete network isolation within Docker environment

12 Security Analysis and Risk Assessment

12.1 Vulnerability Assessment

12.1.1 ARP Protocol Vulnerabilities

1. **Lack of Authentication:** ARP packets are not authenticated
2. **Trust Model:** Devices automatically trust ARP responses
3. **Cache Overwriting:** ARP caches can be easily manipulated
4. **Broadcast Nature:** ARP operates on broadcast domain

12.2 Risk Mitigation Framework

12.2.1 Preventive Measures

1. **Network Segmentation:** Limit broadcast domain scope
2. **Static ARP Tables:** Use fixed mappings for critical systems
3. **ARP Monitoring:** Deploy continuous traffic analysis
4. **Rate Limiting:** Implement packet processing controls

12.2.2 Detective Controls

1. **Anomaly Detection:** Monitor for unusual ARP patterns
2. **Traffic Analysis:** Analyze packet characteristics
3. **Behavioral Monitoring:** Track device communication patterns
4. **Alert Systems:** Real-time notification of suspicious activity

13 Team Contributions

13.1 2005074 - Dipanta Kumar Roy Nobo

- Designed and implemented the Docker containerization architecture for the ARP attack simulation environment
- Configured the virtual network topology to enable realistic attack scenarios while maintaining isolation
- Developed the automated build system using Docker Compose for seamless deployment
- Implemented network namespace separation between attacker, victim, and observer containers
- Optimized container resource allocation to balance performance and system requirements

13.2 2005090 - Tawkir Aziz Rahman

- Architected the core ARP attack algorithms (storm and poisoning variants)
- Implemented comprehensive logging and monitoring systems across all containers
- Designed the statistical analysis framework for attack detection in the observer
- Developed the real-time visualization dashboard for attack monitoring
- Created the threshold-based detection mechanisms for different attack patterns

13.3 Collective Achievements

- Successfully demonstrated multiple ARP attack vectors in a controlled environment
- Developed defensive countermeasures for each attack type
- Created detailed documentation of attack methodologies and detection techniques
- Implemented a modular codebase allowing for future expansion of attack types
- Achieved measurable performance benchmarks for attack effectiveness

14 Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Successfully implemented comprehensive ARP attack simulation
2. Developed effective real-time detection and monitoring systems
3. Created isolated testing environment for safe experimentation
4. Provided complete educational framework for network security

15 Appendices

15.1 Appendix A: Installation and Setup

15.1.1 Prerequisites

- Docker Engine 20.10+
- Docker Compose 2.0+
- At least 2GB RAM
- Administrative/root privileges for raw sockets

15.1.2 Quick Start Commands

Listing 2: Setup Commands

```

1 # Build the lab environment
2 ./lab-manager.sh build
3
4 # Start the lab
5 ./lab-manager.sh start
6
7 # Access monitoring dashboard
8 # Browser: http://localhost:8080
9
10 # Run basic attack
11 ./lab-manager.sh attack basic

```

15.2 Appendix B: Configuration Parameters

15.2.1 Attack Tool Parameters

Table 8: Attack Configuration Options

| Parameter | Description | Default |
|------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| -subnet | Target subnet | 192.168.1 |
| -duration | Attack duration (seconds) | 60 |
| -threads | Number of threads | 4 |
| -rate | Packets per second per thread | 100 |
| -interface | Network interface | eth0 |

15.2.2 Detection Thresholds

Table 9: Configurable Detection Parameters

| Threshold | Default Value | Description |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| packets_per_second | 50 | ARP packets per second limit |
| unique_senders_per_minute | 20 | Unique MAC addresses per minute |
| gratuitous_ratio | 0.7 | Percentage of gratuitous ARP |
| mac_changes_per_ip | 3 | MAC changes per IP in 5 minutes |

15.3 Appendix C: Legal and Ethical Guidelines

15.3.1 Legal Considerations

- Only use on networks you own or have explicit written permission
- Unauthorized network attacks are illegal in most jurisdictions
- This tool is for educational and authorized testing purposes only
- Always follow responsible disclosure practices

15.3.2 Ethical Guidelines

- Use isolated testing environments
- Start with minimal parameters
- Monitor impact during testing
- Document all testing activities
- Restore normal network state after testing

16 References

1. RFC 826: Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol
2. NIST Cybersecurity Framework
3. OWASP Network Security Testing Guide
4. IEEE 802.3 Ethernet Standards
5. Docker Security Best Practices
6. Network Security Assessment Methodologies