Working Paper Series 743
(ISSN 2788-0443)

Disclosure Discrimination: An Experiment Focusing on Communication in the Hiring Process

Sona Badalyan, Darya Korlyakova, Rastislav Rehák

CERGE-EI
Prague, February 2023

ISBN 978-80-7343-550-9 (Univerzita Karlova, Centrum pro ekonomický výzkum a doktorské studium)
ISBN 978-80-7344-663-5 (Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.)

Disclosure Discrimination: An Experiment Focusing on Communication in the Hiring Process*

Sona Badalyan, Darya Korlyakova, and Rastislav Rehák[1†]

[1]CERGE-EI[‡]

February 5, 2023

Abstract

We focus on communication among hiring team members and document the existence of discrimination in the disclosure of information about candidates. In particular, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of Czech individuals who act as human resource assistants and hiring managers in our online labor market. The main novel feature of our experiment is the monitoring of information flow between human resource assistants and hiring managers. We exogenously manipulate candidates' names to explore the causal effects of their gender and nationality on information that assistants select for managers. Our findings reveal that assistants disclose more information about family and less information about work for female candidates relative to male candidates. An in-depth analysis of the disclosed information suggests that gender stereotypes play an important role in this disclosure discrimination. Furthermore, assistants disclose less information about foreigners overall. This effect appears to be driven by the less attention assistants are willing to devote to the CVs of foreigners, measured by the extra effort to learn more about the candidates.

Keywords: Information, Disclosure, Hiring, Discrimination, Foreigners, Women, Online Experiment

JEL Codes: C90, D83, J71

*This project has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 101002898). This study was supported by Charles University, GAUK project No. 333221. We thank Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, Filip Matějka, Andreas Menzel, Nikolas Mittag, and Jaroslav Groero for valuable discussions. We are also grateful to Data Collect and MEDIAN for excellent cooperation on data collection. The study was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry: AEARCTR-0008662. The experimental design was approved by the CERGE Ethical Committee.

†sona.badalyan@cerge-ei.cz, darya.korlyakova@cerge-ei.cz, rastislav.rehak@cerge-ei.cz

‡CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Politických vězňů 7, P.O. Box 882, 111 21 Prague 1, Czech Republic

1 Introduction

Information about job applicants is a key input that companies use when making hiring decisions. It has long been recognized that lack of access to individual-level information can lead to statistical discrimination against certain social groups (Phelps, 1972). More recently, researchers have become interested in understanding mechanisms that may underlie biases in acquired information depending on the group characteristics of job applicants, which could arise even when individual-level information is available. In particular, Bartoš et al. (2016) show that employers discriminate in attention allocation in the presence of cognitive constraints.

In this paper, we focus on *disclosure discrimination*—biases that arise due to the exchange of information between individuals in hierarchical organizations. For example, in communication with a hiring manager, human resource (HR) assistants can emphasize the strong sides of a majority applicant and make them less salient in the case of a minority applicant. Assistants can also omit some information about applicants to promote a candidate they favor.

Our primary question is whether HR assistants select different information for hiring managers depending on applicants' gender or nationality. One of the reasons why this question has been understudied in previous academic work is that monitoring communication during a hiring process is difficult, especially in field settings. However, this topic requires attention because recent evidence is indicative of possible discrimination in information transmission in the hiring context. Specifically, Kline et al. (2022) find that firms with higher recruiting centralization—a measure indicative of hiring responsibility being divided among fewer individuals—have smaller racial and gender callback gaps. Moreover, a meta-analysis by Quillian et al. (2020) shows that discrimination at the interview stage contributes substantially to the fewer job offers that racial minorities receive compared to the majority candidates. Although interviewers are not necessarily responsible for final hiring decisions, they can affect these decisions by sharing and emphasizing observations with hiring managers, which is plausible according to our qualitative interviews with HR specialists. For example, Rivera (in Dobbin and Kalev, 2016) finds that the unsuccessful test results of female and African-American candidates are scrutinized more than the unsuccessful test results of white men during hiring meetings. Assistants may also want to accommodate the biased preferences of the hiring team, and thus manipulate their disclosure of information about potential employees accordingly.

To address our research question, we conduct an online experiment with a large nationally representative sample of Czech individuals ($N = 757$) acting as HR assistants. These

individuals select information from eight workers' profiles that contain details about the workers' demographics, education, professional experience, qualifications, and personal qualities. To exogenously manipulate gender and nationality, we randomly assign names to the profiles. To receive additional insights into the mechanisms that may lead to potential discrimination in disclosure, we collect data on assistants' attention during the information selection task. While the assistants only select information about the workers, we recruit a different sample of participants in the experiment to act as hiring managers, who will make final hiring decisions (specifically, the workers can be hired for a financial task). Importantly, before making each hiring decision, a manager sees only the information that an assistant has disclosed about each worker, in addition to the manipulated name. Eventually, the managers can reward the assistants for the selected information if they find the selection valuable. The managers want to reveal the potential of the workers in the financial task because the performance of the workers in this task affects the managers' payoffs.

Cleanly identifying the causal effects of gender and nationality on disclosure is empirically challenging if the content of candidates' profiles differs depending on the two attributes. For this reason, we provide different assistants with the same profiles with exogenously varied names. These profiles are real; we constructed them on the basis of information collected in a pre-experimental survey. We refer to the participants of this survey as workers because they performed real-effort tasks. We had to assign the names to the profiles exogenously because it was practically impossible to match precisely real information-rich profiles of men and women or locals and foreigners, which would feature their actual names. The exogenous assignment of names is commonly used by correspondence studies (see, for instance, Bertrand and Duflo [2017] for a review) in which researchers send the same fictitious applications differing in names to real firms. Employers in these studies are not informed that the applicants are fictitious so that they behave in a realistic manner and have an incentive to study the information about those applicants. Similarly, we omit the information that the workers' names are fictitious to make the assistants take the information-selection task seriously.

Our choice of an online experiment as a suitable method to explore patterns in the disclosure of assistants is inspired by recent experimental literature. For example, Bohren et al. (2022) conducted a hiring experiment on Prolific (an online crowd-sourcing platform) in which they assigned participants the roles of workers, recruiters, and hiring managers to study systematic gender discrimination. Bohren et al. (2019a) created an online market on Amazon Mechanical Turk (an online crowd-sourcing platform), consisting of workers and employers, to investigate whether inaccurate employers' beliefs about workers could be a significant source of discrimination. Furthermore, a growing number of studies (Cap-

pelen et al., 2019; Almås et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2020) address questions related to distributional preferences by observing the decisions of impartial spectators regarding workers' outcomes in online settings. These two types of participants are often recruited with the help of research agencies similar to those with which we cooperated.

When signaling the nationality of workers by assigning names, we focus on groups that are represented in large numbers in the Czech Republic. According to the Czech Statistical Office (2021a), foreigners from post-Soviet countries with Slavic languages, in particular Ukrainians (29.9%) and Russians (6.9%), have relatively large shares in the overall foreign population.[1] Previous survey evidence, which we discuss in more detail when describing the treatments, indicates that local public attitudes toward Ukrainians and Russians were similarly unfavorable before the Russian-Ukraine war broke out in 2022. Our experiment with HR assistants was fully implemented by the end of 2021, so the data collection was not affected by the war.

Our main findings are as follows. First, if a CV has a female name, assistants select more demographic information for hiring managers, in particular those pieces that may signal increased household responsibilities. For example, assistants are 31.4% more likely to disclose information about the number of children in the case of female workers compared to their male counterparts. The effects are driven by male assistants and are somewhat stronger for those who seem to be more supportive of traditional gender roles. Second, assistants provide less work-related information about female workers. This effect is driven by our low-quality profiles. However, this overall negative effect hides important differences across pieces of information: whereas assistants disclose less information about the job responsibilities of female workers with low-quality profiles, they provide more information about their job positions. Third, assistants tend to provide less information about foreigners overall. The effects are negative for almost all sections of the profiles, including important sections that inform about education and work experience.

The differential disclosure of information depending on candidates' gender seems to be connected to gender stereotypes. By providing more information on the number of children and marital status of women compared to men, the assistants emphasize (consciously or unconsciously) the importance of family for women. This information could make family obligations salient, which can reduce the chances of women finding a job (Becker et al., 2019; Petit, 2007). By over-providing information about job positions in low-quality profiles for female workers relative to male workers, assistants highlight women's stereotypical occupational choices because our low-quality profiles tend to represent workers from female-dominated professional fields.

[1] These percentages are based on the data of foreign-born individuals with different types of Czech visas or residence permits, except for asylum seekers.

One explanation for less disclosed information about foreigners is that assistants are less willing to spend time on their profiles. This explanation is supported by our observation that foreign CVs receive fewer clicks on "learn-more" buttons. This is consistent with *attention discrimination* in "cherry-picking" markets where there are only a few positions for a large pool of candidates (Bartoš et al., 2016). However, our market resembles more a "lemon-dropping" market, namely, that all workers can be hired and the goal is to identify the quality of workers. The prediction of attention discrimination is reversed in this type of market: decision makers should acquire more information about candidates from an a priori less attractive group. Therefore, it is possible that the assistants in our sample do not perceive this market as "lemon-dropping"[2] or rationally inattentive information acquisition cannot fully account for how assistants approach information selection.

A distinctive contribution of our online experiment is the heterogeneity analysis by the characteristics of assistants. On the methodological side, such analyses are difficult to perform in standard correspondence studies (e.g. Quillian et al., 2017; Kaas and Manger, 2012; He et al., forthcoming; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) because to collect information about employers' demographics, researchers would need to ask them additional questions, which would make the employers aware of their participation in an experiment. On the theoretical side, the heterogeneity analyses reveal systematic differences in disclosure patterns across assistants with different characteristics (e.g. gender). This result suggests that the composition of a hiring team affects communication. Therefore, the role of an HR assistant cannot be formally reduced to acting merely as an attention system of a manager, which could be captured by a single-agent model.[3]

In addition to correspondence studies, this paper adds to other types of experiments on discrimination in hiring (e.g. Kübler et al., 2018; Bertogg et al., 2020; Oesch, 2020; Kessler et al., 2019). Using a vignette survey design, Kübler et al. (2018) investigate the existence of gender discrimination in the German entry-level labor market. Their subjects (human resource managers) had to evaluate several vignettes, whose structure resembled CVs, in terms of the likelihood that each of the applicants would be invited to the next stage of the recruitment process. However, a disadvantage of vignette studies is that they rely on subjects' choices in hypothetical situations. In contrast, Kessler et al. (2019) design an incentivized resume rating task where employers express interest in hiring hypothetical candidates, knowing that these choices reveal their preferences which will be used to match them (the employers) with actual candidates. To gain deep insight

[2]Even though we mention in the instructions explicitly that all candidates can be hired, which induces the "lemon-dropping" market, it remains unclear whether the assistants internalized this information.

[3]If there were no systematic differences in disclosure across assistants, the situation could be modeled parsimoniously as if it was directly the hiring managers directing their attention to the disclosed pieces of information (or just asking the assistants for preparing those pieces without assistants' subjective involvement in the selection process). We thank Filip Matějka for this observation.

into employers' preferences, the authors vary simultaneously multiple characteristics of candidates, including gender and race. Our study differs from these experiments because, in order to reflect more closely real-life processes, we incorporate the involvement of multiple decision-makers in hiring. Communication among them could be a channel through which discrimination propagates and unfavorable stereotypes emerge.

Our results on the effect of gender are broadly related to recent evidence suggesting that gender discrimination often manifests itself in subtle forms. Dupas et al. (2021) find that there are more questions targeted at female presenters during economic seminars and job talks. In addition, female presenters are more likely to receive hostile or patronizing questions. Hengel (2022) documents that editors and referees in top economic journals take longer to review female-authored papers. In a hiring experiment, Barron et al. (2022) observe significant discrimination (explicit bias) against women when job candidates are equally qualified, while it disappears at the aggregate level when one candidate is clearly more qualified than the other. However, discrimination reappears in more complex decisions, in which both candidates are qualified, but they hold different certificates.

Our uncovered gender discrimination in disclosure patterns also relates to the literature on the role of stereotypes in governing the decision making of employers, recruiters, and other professionals. González et al. (2019) observe that gender bias in recruitment becomes stronger if female candidates have children, and becomes less pronounced for women with higher qualifications. The authors interpret the combination of the two findings as stereotypes rather than prejudices driving employers' discrimination against women. Van Borm and Baert (2022) find that employers perceive female job applicants in stereotypical terms and that gender stereotypes are triggered more strongly when female CVs explicitly mention family responsibilities. Gallen and Wasserman (2021) find that professionals who give career advice are more likely to provide information on work-life balance to female students than to male students. Wu (2018) finds that posts on a professional economics forum that are likely about women tend to contain words about physical appearance or personal information, while posts that are likely about men generally refer to professional or academic characteristics. We contribute to this literature by uncovering a new domain in which gender stereotypes may influence decisions: selection of candidates' information by HR professionals for later stages of the recruitment process.

Brock and De Haas (forthcoming) are close to our paper in terms of design and insights. In their lab-in-the-field experiment with loan officers, they uncover a subtle form of discrimination: while unconditional loan approval rates are the same for male and female applicants, female applicants are 30% more likely to be asked for a guarantor. Their

design also allows them to perform heterogeneity analyses based on the characteristics of loan officers. In particular, they find that loan officers are more likely to ask for a guarantor when they display more implicit gender bias during an Implicit Association Task. Furthermore, discrimination mainly affects women in male-dominated industries. This suggests the role of gender stereotypes in discrimination. In contrast to Brock and De Haas (forthcoming), we study discrimination in a different context, focusing on its subtle form—communication—from the beginning. We also find heterogeneous effects for male and female HR assistants, while Brock and De Haas (forthcoming) detect no difference between male and female loan officers in how they treat female applicants.

Eberhardt et al. (2022) ask a similar research question as we do. They investigate the attributes that recommendation letter writers emphasize when describing academic job market candidates of different genders. The authors find that women are more frequently described using "grindstone" terms (e.g. "hard-working" or "dedicated") while also less likely praised for their ability. Our findings also suggest that individuals aim to emphasize somewhat different characteristics of female job seekers by means of differential disclosure. Our paper complements Eberhardt et al. (2022) in several directions. First, we use an experimental setting, while they use machine learning techniques. Second, we study causal effects of the gender and nationality of candidates on information selection, while Eberhardt et al. (2022) measure associations between the gender of the candidates in the job market and the language used in their reference letters. Finally, the agents who choose information in our setting are HR assistants representing the labor demand side, while it is the supervisors writing the reference letters in Eberhardt et al. (2022) representing the labor supply side of the market.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study design and our samples. Section 3 presents our identification strategy. Section 4 discusses the results of our experiment with assistants and the survey with managers. Section 5 concludes.

2 Study design

In this section, we describe the online experiment with a representative sample of Czech respondents, to whom we assign the role of HR assistants to test for discrimination in information disclosure. We also outline two supplementary surveys that were conducted (i) to collect information for workers' profiles and (ii) to provide assistants with real incentives.

Figure A.1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the project, and Figure A.2 focuses

on the flow of the main experiment with assistants.

2.1 Sample of assistants

We hired subjects for the assistant role with the help of Data Collect, a local research agency, by using their online panel. The data were collected from a sample of 757 adults during November-December 2021. The sample is representative of the general population of the Czech Republic aged 18 to 64 years in terms of gender, age, education, and regional coverage (Table B.1).

The characteristics of the assistants are summarized in Table B.2. Of the assistants, 49% are women, 75% are employed, and 2% unemployed. According to the Czech Statistical Office (2021b), the share of employed people in the total Czech population aged 15-64 years was 75.1% and the unemployment rate in the same age group was 2.2% in December 2021.[4] The unemployment rate in our sample, calculated by dividing the number of unemployed participants by the sum of employed and unemployed individuals, is equal to 2.7%. Of the assistants, 38% completed secondary education with school-leaving examination and 21% hold a university degree. The net monthly household income of a median assistant lies between 40,001 and 50,000 Czech crowns,[5] which is somewhat higher compared to the statistics based on the data from the Czech Statistical Office (37,436 Czech crowns in 2021).[6] About 13% of the assistants report having recruitment experience.

After the main part of the experiment (the information selection task described in the following), we asked the assistants how much they had thought about a hiring manager during the information selection task. The answers were coded on an 11-point scale, where 0 means "not at all" and 10 means "a lot." The average score is 8.15 (83% of the assistants chose 7-10), suggesting that the manager's role in the information selection process of our experimental subjects is high.

Several additional measures suggest that the assistants largely took the task seriously. A median assistant spent about 11.5 minutes selecting information from the 8 profiles. The assistants tended to disclose more than half of a worker's profile and to provide diverse information about a worker.

Before providing the details about the assistants' main task, we explain how the work-

[4] We did not find corresponding statistics for the group aged 18-64 years, which would be the same age range that our sample of assistants covers.

[5] The dollar equivalents are approximately $1,690 and $2,110, respectively. 9.5% of the assistants did not provide information about their household income.

[6] To calculate this number, we multiplied monthly net income per capita of a median household by the average number of the median household members. The inputs were obtained from Table 2a here.

ers' profiles, from which the assistants selected information, were constructed and which elements they included.

2.2 Creating workers' profiles

To collect information for the profiles of workers, we conducted a survey with 20 Czech respondents with the help of MEDIAN, a different research agency. This survey consisted of real-effort tasks and questions about demographics, education, work experience, etc. To reduce workers' fatigue, we asked MEDIAN for additional information (e.g. media consumption and self-reported financial literacy) on the same respondents from the agency's previous surveys. Before asking for consent to participate in our survey, we explicitly informed the respondents that we may use their data when creating questionnaires for other respondents but these data would never be linked to their names or other identifying information.

We aimed to create a diverse set of credible profiles that would resemble real-life CVs or LinkedIn profiles (we describe the content of the profiles below). In particular, we had to ensure that the profiles did not contain suspicious information, especially when varying the names attached to them—for example, we did not want to use a profile of a construction worker because we could not credibly assign a female name to it. The goal was to make the task for the assistants realistic and engaging. In the end, we chose 8 workers whose responses and task results were used to construct the 8 profiles.

The 8 workers were being hired for an actual task with a series of financial decisions (we describe the hiring managers' task in a separate section later). The assistants were aware of this, and the 8 profiles were constructed to be quite informative about the workers' qualifications for this task. The financial task consisted of 10 multiple-choice questions that involved both computational skills and financial knowledge. For example, the workers were asked to calculate the balance on a savings account after a year given the initial balance and the interest rate. In another question, they had to indicate the most volatile asset in a given list.

The content of all profiles is in Appendix C.1 (from page 59 onward). Here, we describe the sections featured in the profiles:

Summary. This section describes the workers' self-reported personal strengths, weaknesses, and their opinion about their own financial skills or skills they consider important (for example, "learning new things").

Demographics. This section includes mostly information about the workers' demographics—

age, marital status, and number of children. It also informs about whether the worker has a driving license and how many surveys he or she has completed in the past (based on the agency's records).

Education. This section presents information about the workers' level of education, field of studies, and favorite subjects (e.g. Math or Risk Management).

Work. This section informs about the workers' job sector, current position, years of experience in the current role, and job responsibilities (e.g. communication with governmental offices or database administration). In the case of one profile, we refer to the last position instead of the current one because the worker is not employed. We truthfully mention that this worker is on parental leave.

Certificates. This section summarizes the workers' results on three real-effort tasks that should signal their abilities in mathematics and finance, and general effort. In the math task, workers were asked to answer 10 math questions in a limited time. The questions are inspired by those of Bohren et al. (2019a), for example: (i) "Which of the following is an integer multiple of 11?" (ii) "$16 < x + 8 < 26$. Which of the following could x be?" The workers always chose from four options. In the financial knowledge quiz, the workers were asked to answer 5 multiple-choice questions that aimed to test whether they understand the concepts of inflation, exchange rate, company shares, etc. When preparing this task, we adapted examples from the Czech National Bank and other sources with financial literacy tests. In the slider task, which is frequently used in the experimental literature (e.g. Gill and Prowse, 2019; Bradler et al., 2019; Gill and Prowse, 2012), the workers had to position 48 sliders at the exact position of 50 during a limited time. Each slider was initially placed at a random number between 0 and 100.

We chose these tasks because we hypothesized that the assistants would disclose information depending on its relevance for the hiring task. A priori, the financial knowledge quiz seemed to have the highest predictive power for the workers' performance on the task with a series of financial decisions, while the slider task seemed to be the least relevant.

Judging the workers' performance on the three tasks without a reference point would be difficult for the assistants, especially in the case of the first profile that the assistants would see. Thus, for each task, we included the average score of all workers who took part in the survey.

Volunteering.[7] This section informs about the workers' observed donations for a good cause. MEDIAN provided us with the data on the frequency of workers' donations in

[7]This section is missing in 4 profiles because we found it hardly realistic that individuals would voluntarily report that they never donated to a charity.

past surveys. Each time their respondents completed a survey, they were redirected to the agency's page where they had to decide whether their survey completion fee should be transferred to their bank account, donated to a charity from a list, or whether they wanted to give it up. If a worker chose to send his or her fee to a charity in the past, we mention on his or her profile in what percentage of surveys the worker made the decision to donate. Furthermore, at the end of our survey with the workers, we asked the participants if they would like to complete another survey in the upcoming days and donate a fee from participating in that survey to a charity of their choice. If a worker chose "yes" and MEDIAN later confirmed that the worker chose to donate his or her money *after* filling in the other questionnaire, we mentioned the worker's donation decision in his or her profile.

Skills. This section enumerates the self-reported skills of workers, such as Microsoft Office experience, English language proficiency, familiarity with online banking, experience with data analysis, customer service, product management, and so on. We included the information about online banking because we expected that the assistants might find it related to financial literacy and thus to the workers' performance on the hiring task.

Interests. This section provides information about the leisure activities and interests of workers, for example sports, traveling, or reading news about finance/business/economics in newspapers or on the Internet.

We filled each section of a profile with only true information gathered from the same worker. Since our workers could decide how many details to provide about themselves (in our survey and previous surveys with the data collection agency), the resulting 8 profiles somewhat differ in length. Specifically, they contain between 24 and 35 pieces of information.

Surveying workers with diverse educational and professional backgrounds enabled us to construct "low- and high-quality" profiles. We associate profile quality with the worker's suitability for the financial (hiring) task. As previous research has documented a positive correlation between a person's financial literacy and education (Lusardi et al., 2010), we categorize profiles as low-quality if they belong to workers who completed at most secondary education, while high-quality profiles belong to workers with a university degree.[8] Half of the profiles are classified as low-quality.

[8]Heterogeneity along the quality dimension is an important element of our experimental design because we might expect different treatment of female and foreign workers depending on their qualifications. For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that the American public strongly prefers high-skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants. Bohren et al. (2019b) ran an experiment on a large online platform in which they observed strong discrimination against female users with novice accounts and favorable treatment for women with a history of positive reviews.

The low- and high-quality profiles differ in several other dimensions in addition to education. In particular, the low-quality profiles represent mostly workers in low-skilled occupations, whose self-reported skills and job responsibilities tend to signal that they are less suitable candidates for the financial task.[9] Moreover, the workers with low-quality profiles do not use online banking, report only partial knowledge of English (compared to good knowledge for those with high-quality profiles), and have no charitable donations. An example of a high-quality profile is Ondřej's profile in Appendix C.1; an example of a low-quality profile is Lucie's profile in Appendix C.1.

2.3 Experiment with assistants

We recall that Figure A.2 in the Appendix provides a depiction of the flow of the experiment with assistants. The full instructions for assistants (translated from Czech) are in Appendix C.1.

2.3.1 Instructions, incentives, and the information selection task

In the beginning, the subjects were informed that they would act as assistants for recruiting workers in our online labor market. We emphasized that this is not a traditional survey that asks about hypothetical situations and that their decisions may have real financial consequences for other respondents.

Next, the assistants learned that they would see 8 CVs and their task would be to select information they would like to disclose to another survey participant, who would act as a hiring manager. The assistants knew that the hiring manager would see only the disclosed information about a worker, along with the name on the CV, when making the hiring decision for the financial task. If an assistant decided not to disclose any information about a worker, the manager would see only an empty profile with the name.

We incentivized the assistants to take the disclosure task seriously in the following way. If a manager found the disclosed information useful, he or she could allocate to the assistant an additional bonus of up to 50 Czech crowns ($\sim$ \$2); this bonus did not cost the managers

[9]Note that both types of profiles include "positive" as well as "negative" information. This is natural given that we used real data. However, the low-quality profiles contain more information that may put a candidate at a disadvantage compared to the high-quality counterparts. An added value of having profiles with "mixed" information is that such ambiguity might reveal implicit discrimination (Cunningham and de Quidt, 2022). For example, due to self-image or social-image concerns, an assistant may be reluctant to select solely unfavorable information about a worker whose group the assistant dislikes or finds less competent. However, disclosing the worker's weaknesses along with less relevant positive characteristics could help the assistant disguise his or her bias.

anything (it was a pure reward) and the assistants knew that. Additionally, the assistants knew that the managers would make multiple hiring decisions during a limited time, so the simplified versions of the CVs would be of great help to them. Finally, the assistants were informed that the managers would benefit financially from hiring workers with good performance on the financial task. The hired workers would also earn additional money.

We included a comprehension check at the end of the instructions. Specifically, we aimed to test the assistants' general understanding of (i) their task, (ii) the managers' role and the information available to them, and (iii) the incentives that they (assistants) face. The assistants had to evaluate whether each of three statements was true or false in order to proceed to the information selection task. We showed the correct answers on the next page along with the key points of the instructions.

In the main task, each assistant selected information from the same set of 8 different profiles, which were shown sequentially and their order was randomized. To indicate the selection, the assistants had to tick pieces they wanted to send to a manager directly in the CVs. As a default, no specific information was preselected, i.e. the assistants had to actively select what to disclose. There was no limit on how many pieces of information the assistants could select. After the assistants selected information from each profile, we showed them a preview of what a manager would see about a specific worker based on their selection. We allowed the assistants to return to the previous page to change their disclosure choices.

2.3.2 Treatments

To study the effect of the workers' nationality and gender on assistants' disclosure, we randomly assigned a name to a profile to form a CV (independently across profiles and assistants).[10] We use a 2×2 design and manipulate gender and nationality orthogonally. Specifically, an assistant could potentially see a profile in four different versions: local male, local female, foreign male, and foreign female. To signal nationality, we selected names that are typically Czech (e.g. Ondřej, Markéta) or associated with a post-Soviet country, specifically Russia (e.g. Dmitriy, Anastasia) or Ukraine (e.g. Mykhailo, Olena).[11] To mitigate the effect of specific names, each profile had a different set of names that

[10] To cleanly identify the causal effects of the workers' gender and nationality on disclosure, we had to compare CVs with different names but the same information content. However, it was practically impossible to construct identical profiles based on data from different workers because CVs contained numerous pieces of information. Moreover, real names may not be indicative enough of individuals' gender and nationality, and the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) did not allow us to gain access to workers' surnames. Due to these reasons, we assigned fictitious names to real profiles.

[11] We pre-tested a set of names that we chose with the help of native speakers.

could be attached to it. The full list of names is presented in Table B.3.[12]

To summarize and pin down our nomenclature, a *profile* is a nameless set of information representing a real worker and a *CV* is a profile with a fictitious name attached to it. Each assistant sees the same 8 profiles (in random order). There are 4 names that can be attached to each profile (corresponding to the 4 treatment groups).

We selected Ukrainian and Russian names because attitudes toward these two groups of foreigners have been found to be unfavorable. In particular, Public Opinion Research Center (2020) conducted a survey on a large sample of individuals representative of the Czech population aged 15+, in which they collected information on the likeability of different national groups. The average scores on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 meaning "very pleasant" and 5 "very unpleasant") for Ukrainians and Russians are 3.18 and 3.15, respectively. This puts the two groups in the 10th and 9th place out of 14 nations included in the question. Furthermore, we asked our experimental subjects (after the main task) if they would mind if their neighbor was Ukrainian or Russian; only 52.8% and 48.7%, respectively, would feel rather or very comfortable in these cases, while 86.4% of the subjects would feel rather or very comfortable if their neighbor was Czech. Furthermore, in a survey by Dzúrová and Drbohlav (2014) with Ukrainian immigrants ($N = 570$), 29% of Ukrainian men and 38% of Ukrainian women reported being exposed to discrimination at their local workplace. Taken together, this evidence shows that Russians and Ukrainians were perceived similarly negatively in Czech society before the Russia-Ukraine war began in 2022. Therefore, we pooled the foreign profiles regardless of the names' country of origin. In addition, we consulted these names with several Czech native speakers and they were not able to distinguish between Ukrainian and Russian names.

The assistants were not informed that the names were fictitious. Including this information could make the subjects suspicious about the real gender and nationality of the workers behind the profiles, which would introduce a confounding feature that is difficult to control for. Moreover, it could jeopardize our effort to make the main task as realistic and important as possible and reduce the assistants' effort.

Our manipulation of the attributes of interest with the help of a first name is somewhat less salient compared to previous literature on discrimination, which uses both a first name and a surname. We did not use the surnames because we were concerned that the assistants might think that we disrespected the workers' anonymity by providing personally identifiable information. Our pilot results suggested that the chosen names were not sufficiently salient in terms of nationalities (Czech vs. foreigner). Therefore, in the

[12]We also displayed the IDs of workers, invented by us, next to the workers' names to substitute for the lack of surnames and to make the task more realistic. Our IDs do not reveal the identity of the real workers. The used IDs are also displayed in Table B.3.

main experiment, we wrote the foreign names using a Cyrillic script and its counterpart in Latin letters in parentheses next to the original, e.g. Михайло (Mykhailo).

We included a manipulation check to test whether our treatments were salient enough. Specifically, after the assistants finished the selection of information from the last CV, we asked them about a country of origin[13] and the gender of that last worker. At this stage, the assistants could not return to the last CV to check the name. We did not inform the assistants beforehand that we planned to check their attention later to avoid the experimenter demand effect. For the same reason, we did not include a manipulation check after each CV; only the last one. Correct answers to the manipulation check were incentivized by an extra bonus. We observe that 92% and 85% of the assistants accurately identified the gender and origin of their last CV, respectively; 80% of the assistants correctly identified both attributes of interest.

Tables B.4 and B.5 demonstrate that the randomization was successful, i.e. the treatment groups are well balanced and the observables are jointly unrelated to a treatment status.

2.3.3 Outcomes

Capturing communication in a disciplined manner is difficult. Even a simple form of communication that we restrict to—disclosure—results in a large space of possible patterns. To avoid data mining, we pre-specified to inspect a small set of outcome variables: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8662.

Disclosure-related outcomes. We adopt a "top-down" approach to study the effects of workers' gender and nationality on disclosure. This means that our primary outcome of interest is the overall share of information that an assistant discloses from a profile. Subsequently, we study the shares of disclosed information in the sections described above (e.g. Demographics, Education, Work). If a treatment significantly affects disclosure from a specific section, we take a closer look at the content of this section to understand which pieces of information drive the effect. For example, if we observe treatment effects on disclosure from the Demographics section, we additionally compare across treatments how frequently assistants disclose information about workers' age, marital status, number of children, driving license, and number of completed surveys.

Attention-related outcomes. To study possible drivers of (potential) disclosure discrimination, we additionally collected data on assistants' attention allocated to the workers' profiles. Specifically, we recorded the time each assistant spent selecting information

[13] Assistants selected from two options: "the Czech Republic" or "a post-Soviet country (e.g. Russia, Ukraine)".

from each profile. As we did not impose any limit on the time assistants should spend per profile, the subjects could move through profiles as quickly as they wanted. We also measured how frequently the assistants chose to learn more about some specific pieces in the profiles. For this purpose, we embedded 4-6 buttons in each profile (in sections Demographics, Education, Work, Certificates, and Volunteering), next to the pieces of information that may not be self-explanatory and hence assistants might be interested in further details. For instance, a button next to the slider-task results (section Certificates) informed assistants about the nature of this task if the person clicked on it: *The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position.* The content and position of these "learn-more" (or "more information") buttons within the profiles can be seen in Appendix C.1 (from page 59 onward). Our outcome variable is the total number of assistants' clicks on the "learn-more" buttons in a profile. This measure also captures repeated clicks on the same button.

2.4 Managers' hiring decisions

After running the experiment with assistants, we conducted a large-scale survey with a different sample of respondents who acted as hiring managers. The purpose of this data collection, which was carried out in cooperation with the same research agency (Data Collect), was twofold. First, it was necessary to conduct this survey not to deceive our experimental subjects. We promised the assistants that the information they would select about the workers would be shown to another survey respondent and that this respondent would decide how to reward their effort. Second, we intended to receive correlational evidence[14] on the consequences of potential discrimination in disclosure for the hiring of workers. Our final sample of managers consists of 767 respondents and, by construction, closely resembles the assistants' sample in terms of age, gender, education, and geography (see Table B.6 for summary statistics).

The managers made a series of hiring decisions and were incentivized using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. In particular, the managers were asked to state a maximum wage (between 0 and 10 Czech crowns) that they were willing to pay to a worker, which would be subsequently compared to a randomly generated number in the range of 0-10. If the chosen wage was lower than the random number, the worker would not be hired, and both worker and manager would receive no additional bonus. If the chosen wage was higher than the random number or equal to it, the worker would be hired and

[14] In subsection 4.4, we discuss why the relationship that we identify between the assistants' information selection and the managers' choices is not causal.

would receive an extra bonus equal to the random number. The manager would be paid (in addition to the standard survey completion fee) 1 Czech crown for each question in the financial task answered correctly by the worker minus the random number. To prevent a scenario in which a manager would owe us money, we followed the approach of Bohren et al. (2019a) and informed the respondents that they would automatically receive 10 Czech crowns in addition to the money they would earn/lose as a result of the hiring decisions.

Each manager was matched with a random assistant[15] and saw information that the assistant selected from the 8 profiles with the same names (the order of profiles was randomly reshuffled). For similar reasons as in the case of assistants, the managers did not know that the names were fictitious. The managers chose a wage for a worker immediately after they saw the worker's profile pre-processed by the assistant. After the managers made all 8 hiring decisions, they could reward the assistants with whom they were paired with a real bonus if they found the assistants' selection of information useful.

3 Identification

To quantify the effect of gender and nationality on disclosure of information passed by an assistant to a manager, we employ the two-way fixed effects model. Each assistant i sees 8 profiles indexed by j. Let us recall that each profile j can have 4 names (treatments) attached to it to form a CV. Therefore, we have 32 possible CVs.

Baseline regressions

Since we have a 2×2 design, where the Female treatment is orthogonal to the Foreign treatment, we start by estimating the following regression models:[16]

$$Y_{ij} = \eta + \tau T_{ij}^{FEM} + \mu_i + \phi_j + \xi_{ij}, \tag{1}$$

$$Y_{ij} = \theta + \delta T_{ij}^{FOR} + \nu_i + \psi_j + \zeta_{ij}. \tag{2}$$

Y_{ij} is an outcome variable (e.g. share of disclosed pieces of information by assistant i in profile j). T_{ij}^{FEM} and T_{ij}^{FOR} are indicators of whether assistant i saw profile j with a female or foreign name, respectively. We control for unobservables fixed over assistants

[15] By chance, a few assistants were paired with two managers. In these cases, we randomly chose one of the assigned managers and recorded his or her decision while calculating the additional rewards to the assistants. Consequently, we had to recruit additional managers to reward the unmatched assistants, and thus our sample of managers is slightly larger than the sample of assistants.

[16] We also ran the joint regressions of the main outcomes on both Female and Foreign treatments (without interactions). The results of these joint regressions are virtually identical to the separate ones. For ease of exposition, we present only the separate regressions.

and profiles by including assistant fixed effects μ_i and ν_i, as well as dummies for the profiles ϕ_j and ψ_j. The coefficients of interest are τ and δ, which show the effect of female gender and foreign status on assistants' disclosure or attention.

Interaction effects

We are also interested in the interaction effect of gender and nationality. Hence, we additionally estimate the following model:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{ij}^{FOR} + \beta_2 T_{ij}^{FEM} + \beta_3 (T_{ij}^{FOR} \times T_{ij}^{FEM}) + \gamma_i + \lambda_j + \epsilon_{ij}. \tag{3}$$

β_1 captures the effect of foreign male name relative to local male name, β_2 captures the effect of female local name relative to male local name, and $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3$ captures the effect of female foreign name relative to male local name. Since the Female treatment is orthogonal to the Foreign treatment, such interaction model shows a fully causal comparison of 4 groups of workers.

Heterogeneity

Additionally, we study whether the treatment effects differ for subgroups of assistants with different characteristics (in particular, assistants' with different genders or attitudes toward women or foreigners) and for profiles with different quality. To examine these heterogeneous effects, we augment equations (2) and (1) by including interactions of the treatment indicators with the heterogeneity variables.

Clustering

In all models, we cluster errors at the assistant level to address potential correlation across profiles.

4 Results

This section presents the results of our experiment with assistants and the survey with managers. First, we discuss that the assistants seem to rely on gender stereotypes when disclosing information about female workers. Second, we find that the assistants disclose less information about foreign workers, and we document that this may be driven by attention. Third, we show that these main findings are robust. Finally, we provide an assessment of the relationships between the hiring outcomes and the names and (disclosed) information based on a simple regression analysis of our survey with managers.

When discussing our findings, we focus on the effects of exogenously manipulating only one attribute at a time. Specifically, we start by comparing assistants' disclosure from CVs

with a female name (Female Treatment) and CVs with a male name (Control Group). We then compare the disclosure from CVs with a foreign name (Foreigner Treatment) and CVs with a local name (Control Group). We add the second attribute (worker's nationality or gender, respectively) when discussing heterogeneity by different dimensions.

4.1 Female treatment effects

Figure 1 illustrates the causal effects of a female name on the share of disclosed information from the entire CV of a worker and from the particular sections. The sizes of the control means indicate that the assistants tend to provide a nontrivial amount of information about the workers and their disclosure covers a diverse set of profile sections. The assistants select on average 51.7% of information (around 16 pieces of information) from a male worker's CV. The assistants disclose the most about the male workers' work experience, self-reported skills, personal qualities, and education while they tend to neglect information about the workers' interests and volunteering activities.

Assigning a female name to a profile significantly increases the amount of information disclosed from Demographics and decreases the amount of information disclosed from Work. In particular, the assistants disclose on average 2 percentage points (pp) more information from Demographics of a female CV compared to a male CV ($p<0.01$; a 4.2% increase relative to the control mean[17]). At the same time, they select on average 2pp less information from Work of a female CV compared to a male CV ($p<0.01$; a 3.4% decrease). To gain deeper insights into these treatment effects, we study which pieces of information drive these differences and run the pre-specified heterogeneity analyses for each of the two profile sections.

4.1.1 Workers' gender and disclosure of demographic information

Table 1 shows the results of regressions in which all pieces of information from Demographics serve as dependent variables. Assistants are 2.4pp more likely to disclose information about marital status and 8.2pp more likely to disclose information about the number of children if a worker has a female name ($p<0.01$ in both cases). This corresponds to an increase of 6.3% and 31.4%, respectively, compared to the control means. The finding that assistants provide family-related information more frequently in the case

[17]When presenting percent changes throughout this paper, we always compare the treatment effects to the control mean (i.e. the average value of the outcome in the Male or Local group) or to the control mean in a specific subsample (e.g. male assistants) in the case of heterogeneity analyses. We omit the description of the baseline group in the text, but its specification can be found in the notes of the corresponding tables or figures.

Figure 1: Effect of a female name on the disclosure of information (overall and from each section)



Notes: Coefficient plots. Each row corresponds to the regression of the share of disclosed information in the corresponding category (left axis) on the indicator of female name on a CV (with assistants' and profiles' fixed effects). The points represent the estimated coefficients and the bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. The control means (right column) are simple means of the share of disclosed information in the corresponding category over CVs with male names.

of female workers[18] suggests that they may find it more relevant for the hiring of women. Correspondence studies (e.g. Becker et al., 2019; Petit, 2007) systematically document that hiring discrimination against women prevails among those applicants whose demographics signal a higher likelihood of becoming pregnant or overoccupied with childcare. Hence, the revealed tendency to signal this kind of information for women (even in our online context) suggests its prominent role in discrimination against women.

Next, we discuss whether the Female treatment effects on the disclosure of workers' demographics differ among different subgroups of assistants or workers' profiles. In one of these analyses, we split the sample by assistants' bias against women. We constructed

[18]In one of the profiles, we (truthfully) mention that the worker is on parental leave. The assistants are 1.6pp more likely to disclose this information if a worker is female (p=0.65; a 2.6% increase compared to the control mean). The results are presented in Column 1 of Table 2 and are based on the OLS regression ($N = 757$) in which the assistants' characteristics (age, gender, household size, educational and regional dummies, and a recruitment-experience dummy) are included.

Table 1: Effect of a female worker's name on the disclosure of Demographic information

	(1) Age	(2) Marital status	(3) Number of children	(4) Driving license	(5) Surveys
Female	-0.005	0.024***	0.082***	-0.003	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Control mean	0.753	0.384	0.261	0.715	0.250
Observations	6056	5299	6056	6056	6056

Notes: Regressions of different information from the Demographics section on the Female treatment indicator. *Surveys* informs about the actual number of surveys that a worker completed in the past. All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

this variable as follows. At the end of our experiment, we asked the assistants to what extent they agree or disagree with different statements in relation to gender roles and stereotypes. For instance, they had to express their (dis)agreement with whether women should be more responsible for household chores compared to men or whether boys are more talented in technical subjects and math relative to girls. The assistants answered on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 stood for "fully agree" and 5 represented "fully disagree." To construct an index indicating tolerance to women, we first ensured that higher values always imply "better" perception of women, and then calculated the average of each assistant's responses to all statements. For ease of interpretation in the heterogeneity analysis, we use a dummy variable (called "biased against women") equal to one if the value of the tolerance index is less than or equal to the median.[19]

Only men reveal significantly more demographic information if the worker has a female name, as demonstrated in column 1 of Table B.7. A male assistant selects 3.2pp more demographic information about a female worker relative to his average disclosure of 49.4% from Demographics in the case of a male worker (p<0.01; 6.5%). In contrast, a female assistant selects only 0.7pp more demographic information about a female worker relative to her average disclosure of 45.8% from Demographics in the case of a male worker (p=0.16; 1.5%). Table B.8 illustrates that, compared to women, men provide significantly more information about female workers' marital status and number of children.

The assistants who are more likely to agree with traditional gender roles and stereotypes tend to disclose more demographic information about female workers relative to more tolerant assistants; this is captured by the marginally significant interaction term in column 2 of Table B.7. This tendency suggests that stereotypes play a role in the differential

[19]Although we elicited the assistants' attitudes toward women after the main task (thus, after the treatment assignment), the constructed index—tolerance toward women—is balanced across treatment arms (see Table B.4).

treatment of women.

The effect of Female treatment on disclosure of demographic information is similar regardless of the profile quality (column 3 of Table B.7). Therefore, women in various fields seem to face a similar treatment in this context.

The last column of Table B.7 shows how the effect of gender on the disclosure of demographic information interacts with nationality. For a local female worker, the assistants disclose 2.6pp more demographic information from her CV relative to a local male CV ($p<0.01$; 5.5%). If a female worker has a foreign name, the effects are less pronounced but still significant: a 1.2pp increase compared to a local male CV ($p<0.05$; 2.5%). The differential gender effects for workers of different nationality may arise because the assistants might consider the information about children and marital status to be less relevant or salient for foreign female workers. The post-Soviet workers may signal their commitment to work merely by self-selecting to be immigrants, and thus family may not seem to be a relevant obstacle. Moreover, since they are willing to leave their home country, family may not be salient.

4.1.2 Workers' gender and disclosure of work-related information

The negative effect of Female treatment on work-related information disclosure is driven especially by information about job responsibilities. Table 2 shows the results of regressions in which all pieces of information from the Work section serve as dependent variables. The assistants are on average 7.2pp ($p<0.01$) and 1.8pp ($p<0.10$) less likely to disclose information about a worker's job responsibilities[20] and work area, respectively, if the worker has a female name (this corresponds to, respectively, 12.6% and 2.5% decrease relative to the control means).

The heterogeneity analysis by profile quality in column 3 of Table B.9 reveals that the negative Female effect on work-related information disclosure is concentrated mainly among the low-quality profiles. Specifically, in high-quality profiles, the assistants disclose on average 0.5pp ($p=0.51$) less information about Work from female compared to male CVs (0.8% decrease); in low-quality profiles, disclosure of work-related information from female CVs is 3.6pp lower than from male CVs ($p<0.01$; 6.3% decrease). The main contributor to this lower disclosure from female low-quality CVs is the information about job responsibilities (column 4 of Table B.10).

[20] In an alternative specification, we use as a dependent variable the number of disclosed responsibilities instead of a dummy indicating whether at least one job responsibility is disclosed (the workers' profiles include between 1 and 3 job responsibilities). We find that assistants select 0.12 fewer job responsibilities from CVs with female names ($p<0.01$; average number of disclosed responsibilities from male CVs = 1.04).

Table 2: Effect of a female worker's name on the disclosure of Work information

	(1) Status	(2) Area	(3) Position	(4) Experience	(5) Any responsibilities
Female	0.016	-0.018*	0.013	0.003	-0.072***
	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Control mean	0.621	0.729	0.756	0.625	0.570
Observations	757	6056	6056	5299	6056

Notes: Regressions of different information from the Work section on the Female treatment indicator. *Status* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the assistant disclosed information that the worker is on parental leave (this information piece is present only in one profile). *Any responsibilities* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the assistant disclosed at least one job responsibility from the worker's profile. Regressions in Columns (2)-(5) include profile and assistant fixed effects. In these cases, the standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. Column (1) is based on the OLS regression with the treatment indicator and assistants' age, gender, household size, educational and regional dummies, and recruitment experience (robust standard errors in parentheses). The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In line with the earlier finding that assistants provide more family-related information about female workers, differences in the disclosure of work-related information may also be connected to gender stereotypes. This link is supported by (i) the finding that assistants are 3.5pp more likely to provide information about job positions from female low-quality CVs than from male low-quality CVs (column 2 of Table B.10, p<0.05)[21] and (ii) the observation that our low-quality profiles tend to feature female-dominated occupations (e.g. cashier, postal delivery, administrative worker). To show more explicitly that assistants tend to over-provide stereotypical information about female workers' jobs, we run heterogeneity analyses by female- vs. male-dominated occupations in Table B.11. The positive Female effect on the disclosure of a job position is clearly concentrated among the profiles with female-dominated occupations.[22] Additional heterogeneity analysis by assistants' gender reveals that male assistants are 6.4pp more likely to provide information about job positions from female low-quality CVs (Table B.12, p<0.01, a 7.9% increase relative to their mean disclosure from male low-quality CVs). In comparison, female assistants are only 0.5pp more likely to disclose information about job positions from female low-quality CVs (p=0.81, 0.6% relative to their mean disclosure from male low-quality CVs).[23] Taken together with the earlier observation that men select more family-

[21] There are no such differences in the case of high-quality CVs.

[22] We classify profiles 1, 5, 7 as female-dominated, and 2, 6, 8 as male-dominated; profiles 3 and 4 are ambiguous, so we exclude them from this analysis. We also ran the same heterogeneity analyses restricting further to profiles with even more obvious classification as female- or male-dominated occupations and the results hold, although they lose significance in the most restrictive specification due to the substantial sample reduction (these analyses are available upon request).

[23] We continue to split the sample by profile quality instead of gender-dominated occupations because this is our pre-specified heterogeneity analysis. The assistants' gender differences are confirmed by the specification that classifies profiles into "female-" and "male-dominated" groups.

related information about female workers, this result suggests that gender stereotypes play a more prominent role in the selection of information by male assistants.

We conclude this section on Female treatment effects by commenting on attention outcomes. There are no significant effects of a female name on attention outcomes, but there seems to be a tendency of lower attention to female CVs (see column 1 of Table B.18 for the time spent on a CV and column 3 of Table B.18 for the clicks on the "learn-more" buttons). However, we do not have data on assistants' attention to *all* individual pieces of information because we only recorded the time that the assistants spent on the entire CV, and the "learn-more" buttons were presented only next to pieces that were likely to require additional explanation. Therefore, we leave to future work the investigation of the attentional underpinning of discrimination in the disclosure of the specific pieces of information we identified.

4.2 Foreigner treatment effects

Figure 2 displays the causal effects of the Foreigner treatment on the disclosure of assistants. The assistants select on average 0.7pp less information overall about foreigners than about locals ($p<0.01$; a 1.3% decrease relative to the average disclosure from local CVs). The treatment effects are small but systematically negative across all sections except Volunteering, and they reach significance in the case of Demographics, Education, Work ($p<0.05$ in all cases), and Certificates ($p<0.10$).

With regard to specific pieces of information, Table B.13 shows that the assistants are 1.3pp less likely to select information about foreigners' driving license ($p<0.05$; a 1.8% decrease relative to the control mean). Moreover, Table B.14 reveals that the assistants are 1.9pp less likely to disclose information about foreigners' educational level ($p<0.01$; 2.2% decrease) and 2.1pp less likely to disclose information about foreigners' educational area ($p<0.05$; 2.7% decrease). Furthermore, assistants are 2.2pp less likely to report at least one job responsibility for foreigners compared to locals ($p<0.05$; 4.0% decrease; Table B.15). We speculate that the assistants may under-provide these pieces of information about foreign workers because they may deem them less relevant (e.g. qualifications acquired abroad may have limited applicability in the local context). Finally, Foreigner treatment effects on disclosed information about different types of certificates are insignificant but consistently negative (Table B.16).

The negative Foreigner treatment effects seem to be quite homogeneous (Table B.17), in particular, when splitting the sample by assistants' gender (column 1), bias against

Figure 2: Effect of a foreign name on the disclosure of information (overall and from each section)



Notes: Coefficient plots. Each row corresponds to the regression of the share of disclosed information in the corresponding category (left axis) on the indicator of foreign name on a CV (with assistants' and profiles' fixed effects). The points represent the estimated coefficients and the bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. The control means (right column) are simple means of the share of disclosed information in the corresponding category over CVs with local (Czech) names.

foreigners[24] (column 2), profile quality (column 3), and workers' gender (column 4).

Assistants may disclose less information about foreign workers because they are reluctant to spend attention on exploring these workers' CVs. Column 2 of Table B.18 shows that

[24]Bias against foreigners was constructed as follows. The assistants expressed their (dis)agreement with a number of statements concerning immigrants from post-Soviet countries and Asia on a 5-point Likert scale. We asked them whether they agree or disagree that foreigners contribute to local problems (e.g. increase criminality rates or unemployment) or, conversely, whether they bring benefits to the local culture (e.g. mitigate the problem of population aging). We also asked the assistants whether they would feel uncomfortable having a neighbor from the Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine, China, Mongolia, or India. To construct the tolerance index as the unweighted average, we recorded all answers such that higher values imply higher tolerance and we used subjects' responses to all agree-disagree statements and their perception of Russian and Ukrainian neighbors only because attitudes toward these groups of foreigners are the most relevant for our experiment. Table B.4 shows that the resulting index is balanced across the treatment arms. In the heterogeneity analysis, we use a dummy variable (called "biased against immigrants") equal to one if the value of the tolerance index is below the median or equal to it.

the assistants spend on average 2.12 minutes[25] exploring a local worker's CV and selecting information from it, while they spend around 31 seconds less on a foreigner's CV. The coefficient on the Foreigner treatment dummy is negative but not significant, which may be a product of noisy time data. In column 4, we present the results of a regression in which we use a different proxy for the assistants' attention. Specifically, we explore how frequently the assistants chose to consume additional information about the workers by clicking on "learn-more" buttons embedded in the profiles next to some specific pieces of information. CVs with foreign names receive, on average, 0.09 fewer clicks on these "learn-more" buttons, which represents a 12.5% decrease relative to CVs with local names ($p<0.05$; control mean=0.72 clicks).[26]

4.3 Robustness

In this subsection, we present the results of several robustness checks aimed at testing the validity of our main experimental findings. In particular, Panel B of Tables B.19 and B.20 shows that the main Female and Foreigner treatment effects remain qualitatively the same if we restrict the sample to assistants who passed the manipulation check (80%), i.e. correctly identified the gender and origin of the worker whose CV was displayed last. Moreover, our results are robust to excluding assistants in the top 1% and bottom 10% of the time spent on the entire survey (Panel C of Tables B.19 and B.20).[27]

In an additional check, we focus on the order in which the assistants saw the 8 workers' profiles (Tables B.21 and B.22). Following Macchi (2022), we create a dummy *Second half* indicating whether the profiles were displayed in the second part (4-8) of the information selection task. Although there seem to be significant order effects,[28] they do not interact significantly with the treatments in almost all cases (the only exception is the Female treatment effect in the Skills section). Therefore, the effects of both treatments are virtually the same regardless of whether the profiles (within a given arm) were shown to the assistants in the first half of the information selection task or later.

[25] The median time is 1.13 minutes.

[26] As a part of exploratory analysis, we use an additional outcome variable: the total number of clicks that an assistant makes per CV. The assistants click 1.5% fewer times when selecting information from foreign workers' CVs ($p=0.11$, control mean=26.4 clicks).

[27] Our results are also qualitatively similar when we use simpler model specifications, in particular OLS regression (Panel D of Tables B.19 and B.20) and OLS regression with controls for assistants' observed characteristics (Panel E of Tables B.19 and B.20).

[28] In the case of profiles seen later, the assistants seem to disclose more information overall and especially from Summary, Education, and Work.

4.4 Assistants' disclosure and managers' hiring decisions

In the preceding sections, we uncover several disclosure discrimination patterns in our experiment with assistants. Another interesting question would be whether differential disclosure amplifies or attenuates discrimination in hiring outcomes. In this section, we provide a limited insight into this question by looking at the data from our survey with managers. We recall that the managers were asked to make hiring decisions (by proposing maximum wages they were willing to pay to the workers) after seeing the CVs pre-processed by the assistants.

As our primary focus is on the assistants and the survey with managers was conducted primarily to provide realistic incentives to the assistants, the analysis based on data from the managers has a limited scope. First, in our setting, where both the names and the disclosed information were shown to the managers, we might have a mediation problem. The effects of names and pieces of information on the hiring outcomes (wages) may be biased because the names may affect the wages not only directly but also through disclosed information—the mediation channel. Inclusion of the disclosed information shares or pieces in the regressions might not help in mitigating the problem either because these variables are post-treatment variables. As a result, it is difficult to make a strong inference about the effects of mediation. Second, in the middle of the survey collection with managers, the Russia-Ukraine war escalated in 2022, which could be a confounder in our managers' regressions. Taken together, the following results should be interpreted with caution.

In Table B.23, we present the regression results of several specifications that aim to provide a sense of the correlations between the wage proposed by the managers, the names on the CVs, and the (disclosed) information in the CVs. Most notably, a foreign name on a CV seems to be strongly associated with a lower wage. Other associations are weak; among the intuitive tendencies, more information overall seems to be associated with a higher wage. More demographic information (especially marital status) seems to be associated with a lower wage. More information about job responsibilities seems to be associated with a lower wage, which is likely to be driven by the responsibilities in the low-quality profiles, while more information about work area seems to be associated with a higher wage. Finally, women seem to be hurt by disclosure of their number of children and foreigners seem to be hurt by under-disclosure of information from their CVs by assistants. A less intuitive tendency in this data is that, although disclosing marital status and job responsibilities seem to hurt both men and women, it seems to hurt men more.

5 Conclusion

We use a novel experimental design to study discrimination in information transmission in the context of hiring. We create an online labor market in which our main subjects, respondents who act as human resource assistants, select information about workers for other respondents, who act as hiring managers. The managers inspect only the selected information and make hiring decisions about the workers. The exogenous variation in our experiment comes from random names that we assign to the workers' profiles to signal gender and nationality.

Our results indicate that assistants tend to disclose information differently depending on the gender and nationality of the workers. First, we document that assistants provide more information about family and less information about work from female CVs. A closer look at the disclosed pieces of information suggests that differential disclosure is driven by gender stereotypes. In particular, the selection from female CVs is more likely to contain information about marital status, the number of children, and a female-dominated occupation compared to the selection from male CVs. Second, we observe that assistants disclose less information about foreigners. The significantly underprovided (relative to locals) information is often important from the hiring perspective because it covers education, work experience, and performance on real-effort tasks. The underprovision of information about foreigners may be the result of the reluctance of assistants to pay attention to the CVs of foreign workers. Our finding that assistants click less frequently on buttons (which contain additional details about the workers) in foreign CVs compared to local CVs lends support to this attention-related explanation.

Our findings have several practical implications. First, HR assistants may discriminate unintentionally, and thus simply informing them about our findings may induce them to rethink their practices and adjust their training programs. Second, our research invites the design of more discrimination-proof communication protocols. Although some businesses are already using standardized hiring processes with prescribed rules, our discussions with human resource professionals suggest that it is not always the case and that there is room for (more subtle) differential communication about different groups of candidates. Finally, the emphasis that our assistants put on family-related information for females suggests the importance of a more general societal problem related to childcare and unequal gender roles. Among other things, this calls for expansion of affordable childcare availability and parental leave programs that minimize the (perceived) loss of firms related to childcare and that promote shared parental leave between fathers and mothers.

This paper offers several fruitful avenues for future research. First, by measuring the attention of assistants as an additional outcome, we provide the first step toward understanding why individuals may engage in differential disclosure based on the nationality of workers. It remains unclear what other mechanisms are at play, for example, a desire to tailor workers' descriptions to managers' (perceived) preferences or an intention to help or hurt the hiring of foreigners and women. Second, it would be useful to complement our results from the survey with hiring managers by experimentally studying whether disclosure discrimination amplifies or attenuates hiring discrimination. Finally, our work can serve as motivation to investigate other similar channels that underlie biases in hiring. For example, using gendered language in job descriptions that emphasizes masculine-associated traits as desired qualities may discourage many talented women from applying.

References

Almås, I., Cappelen, A. W., and Tungodden, B. (2020). Cutthroat capitalism versus cuddly socialism: Are Americans more meritocratic and efficiency-seeking than Scandinavians? Journal of Political Economy, 128(5):1753–1788.

Barron, K., Ditlmann, R., Gehrig, S., and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, S. (2022). Explicit and implicit belief-based gender discrimination: A hiring experiment. CESifo Working Paper No. 9731.

Bartoš, V., Bauer, M., Chytilová, J., and Matějka, F. (2016). Attention discrimination: Theory and field experiments with monitoring information acquisition. American Economic Review, 106(6):1437–75.

Becker, S. O., Fernandes, A., and Weichselbaumer, D. (2019). Discrimination in hiring based on potential and realized fertility: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. Labour Economics, 59:139–152.

Bertogg, A., Imdorf, C., Hyggen, C., Parsanoglou, D., and Stoilova, R. (2020). Gender discrimination in the hiring of skilled professionals in two male-dominated occupational fields: a factorial survey experiment with real-world vacancies and recruiters in four European countries. KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 72(1):261–289.

Bertrand, M. and Duflo, E. (2017). Field experiments on discrimination. Handbook of Economic Field Experiments, 1:309–393.

Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. American Economic Review, 94(4):991–1013.

Bohren, J. A., Haggag, K., Imas, A., and Pope, D. G. (2019a). Inaccurate statistical discrimination: An identification problem. NBER Working Paper No. 25935.

Bohren, J. A., Hull, P., and Imas, A. (2022). Systemic discrimination: Theory and measurement. NBER Working Paper No. 29820.

Bohren, J. A., Imas, A., and Rosenberg, M. (2019b). The dynamics of discrimination: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review, 109(10):3395–3436.

Bradler, C., Neckermann, S., and Warnke, A. J. (2019). Incentivizing creativity: A large-scale experiment with performance bonuses and gifts. Journal of Labor Economics, 37(3):793–851.

Brock, J. M. and De Haas, R. (forthcoming). Discriminatory lending: Evidence from bankers in the lab. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.

Cappelen, A. W., Falch, R., and Tungodden, B. (2019). The boy crisis: Experimental evidence on the acceptance of males falling behind. NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 06/2019.

Cappelen, A. W., Fest, S., Sørensen, E. Ø., and Tungodden, B. (2020). Choice and personal responsibility: What is a morally relevant choice? Review of Economics and Statistics, pages 1–35.

Cunningham, T. and de Quidt, J. (2022). Implicit preferences. CEPR Discussion Paper DP17343.

Czech Statistical Office (Český statistický úřad) (2021a). Data - počet cizinců [Data - the number of foreigners]. https://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci/4-ciz_pocet_cizincu.

Czech Statistical Office (Český statistický úřad) (2021b). Míry zaměstnanosti, nezaměstnanosti a ekonomické aktivity - prosinec 2021 [The rates of employment, unemployment, and economic activity - December 2021]. https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/cri/miry-zamestnanosti-nezamestnanosti-a-ekonomicke-aktivity-prosinec-2021.

Dobbin, F. and Kalev, A. (2016). Why diversity programs fail. Harvard Business Review, 94(7):14.

Dupas, P., Modestino, A. S., Niederle, M., Wolfers, J., et al. (2021). Gender and the dynamics of economics seminars. NBER Working Paper No. 28494.

Dzúrová, D. and Drbohlav, D. (2014). Gender inequalities in the health of immigrants and workplace discrimination in Czechia. BioMed research international, 2014.

Eberhardt, M., Facchini, G., and Rueda, V. (2022). Gender differences in reference letters: Evidence from the economics job market. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16960.

Gallen, Y. and Wasserman, M. (2021). Informed choices: Gender gaps in career advice. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15728.

Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition. American Economic Review, 102(1):469–503.

Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2019). Measuring costly effort using the slider task. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 21:1–9.

González, M. J., Cortina, C., and Rodríguez, J. (2019). The role of gender stereotypes in hiring: a field experiment. European Sociological Review, 35(2):187–204.

Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M. J. (2010). Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment. American Political Science Review, 104(1):61–84.

He, H., Li, S. X., and Han, Y. (forthcoming). Labor market discrimination against family responsibilities: A correspondence study with policy change in China. Journal of Labor Economics.

Hengel, E. (2022). Publishing while female: Are women held to higher standards? Evidence from peer review. Economic Journal.

Kaas, L. and Manger, C. (2012). Ethnic discrimination in Germany's labour market: A field experiment. German Economic Review, 13(1):1–20.

Kessler, J. B., Low, C., and Sullivan, C. D. (2019). Incentivized resume rating: Eliciting employer preferences without deception. American Economic Review, 109(11):3713–44.

Kline, P., Rose, E. K., and Walters, C. R. (2022). Systemic discrimination among large US employers. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(4):1963–2036.

Kübler, D., Schmid, J., and Stüber, R. (2018). Gender discrimination in hiring across occupations: a nationally-representative vignette study. Labour Economics, 55:215–229.

Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O. S., and Curto, V. (2010). Financial literacy among the young. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 44(2):358–380.

Macchi, E. (2022). Worth your weight: experimental evidence on the benefits of obesity in low-income countries. University of Zurich Working Paper No. 401.

Oesch, D. (2020). Discrimination in the hiring of older jobseekers: Combining a survey experiment with a natural experiment in Switzerland. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 65:100441.

Petit, P. (2007). The effects of age and family constraints on gender hiring discrimination: A field experiment in the French financial sector. Labour Economics, 14(3):371–391.

Phelps, E. S. (1972). The statistical theory of racism and sexism. American Economic Review, 62(4):659–661.

Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění) (2020). Vztah české veřejnosti k národnostním skupinám žijícím v ČR – březen 2020 [The attitude of the Czech public to the national groups living in the Czech Republic – March 2020] [press release]. https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5199/f9/ov200429.pdf.

Quillian, L., Lee, J. J., and Oliver, M. (2020). Evidence from field experiments in hiring shows substantial additional racial discrimination after the callback. Social Forces, 99(2):732–759.

Quillian, L., Pager, D., Hexel, O., and Midtbøen, A. H. (2017). Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no change in racial discrimination in hiring over time. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(41):10870–10875.

Van Borm, H. and Baert, S. (2022). Diving in the minds of recruiters: What triggers gender stereotypes in hiring? IZA Discussion Paper No. 15261.

Wu, A. H. (2018). Gendered language on the economics job market rumors forum. In AEA Papers and Proceedings, volume 108, pages 175–79.

A Study design

Figure A.1: Overview of the project



Figure A.2: Flow of the experiment with assistants and the connections to the surveys with workers and managers



B Appendix tables

Table B.1: Demographic composition of our sample of assistants compared to the general Czech population

	Mean: experiment (assistants)	Mean: Demographic Yearbook of the Czech Republic 2020
Gender		
Male	0.51	0.51
Female	0.49	0.49
Age group		
18 to 24 years	0.103	0.102
25 to 34 years	0.211	0.209
35 to 44 years	0.255	0.257
45 to 54 years	0.233	0.233
55 to 64 years	0.198	0.199
Education		
Primary and secondary Without national school-leaving exam	0.414	0.417
Secondary with national school-leaving exam	0.375	0.373
University	0.211	0.210
Region (NUTS 2)		
Prague	0.127	0.127
Central Bohemia	0.130	0.129
Southwest	0.114	0.115
Northwest	0.104	0.104
Northeast	0.141	0.140
Southeast	0.156	0.159
Central Moravia	0.116	0.113
Moravian-Silesian	0.112	0.113

Notes: This table compares the shares of selected socio-demographic groups in our experiment (N=757) to the corresponding shares received from the Demographic Yearbook of the Czech Republic 2020.

Table B.2: Summary statistics for assistants' sample

	(1) mean	(2) sd	(3) p50	(4) min	(5) max
Female	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00
Age	42.04	12.92	41.00	18.00	64.00
Household size	2.76	1.19	3.00	1.00	6.00
Primary and secondary	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00
Education without national school-leaving exam					
Secondary education	0.38	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00
With national school-leaving exam					
University degree	0.21	0.41	0.00	0.00	1.00
Prague	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.00	1.00
Central Bohemia	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00
Southwest	0.11	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Northwest	0.10	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00
Northeast	0.14	0.35	0.00	0.00	1.00
Southeast	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	1.00
Central Moravia	0.12	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Moravian Silesian	0.11	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Employed	0.75	0.43	1.00	0.00	1.00
Unemployed	0.02	0.14	0.00	0.00	1.00
Household net monthly income > 50,000 CZK	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00
Has recruitment experience	0.13	0.33	0.00	0.00	1.00
Thought about the hiring manager	8.15	1.98	9.00	0.00	10.00
Correctly identified last worker's gender	0.92	0.27	1.00	0.00	1.00
Correctly identified last worker's origin	0.85	0.36	1.00	0.00	1.00

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for 757 assistants. 6 assistants ($< 1\%$) and 72 assistants (9.5%) did not record their employment status and income, respectively. We chose CZK 50,000 as a threshold value for income because net monthly household income of a median subject lies between CZK 40,001 and 50,000. An assistant could select whether he/she did not think about the manager at all (0 on a numeric scale) or a lot (10 on a numeric scale) while selecting information about workers.

Table B.3: List of workers' names (and IDs) as displayed to assistants in the experiment

Profile	Name	Origin	Gender
1	**PETR (ID 778)**	Czech	Male
	ВОЛОДИМИР **(VOLODYMYR) (ID 778)**	Ukrainian	Male
	ADÉLA (ID 778)	Czech	Female
	ОЛЕКСАНДРА **(OLEKSANDRA) (ID 778)**	Ukrainian	Female
2	**ONDŘEJ (ID 664)**	Czech	Male
	ЕВГЕНИЙ **(EVGENIY) (ID 664)**	Russian	Male
	KATEŘINA (ID 664)	Czech	Female
	ЕКАТЕРИНА **(YEKATERINA) (ID 664)**	Russian	Female
3	**JINDŘICH (ID 585)**	Czech	Male
	МИХАЙЛО **(MYKHAILO) (ID 585)**	Ukrainian	Male
	MARKÉTA (ID 585)	Czech	Female
	ОЛЕСЯ **(OLESYA) (ID 585)**	Ukrainian	Female
4	**VOJTĚCH (ID 459)**	Czech	Male
	ЮРИЙ **(YURIY) (ID 459)**	Russian	Male
	ZDEŇKA (ID 459)	Czech	Female
	ВАСИЛИСА **(VASILISA) (ID 459)**	Russian	Female
5	**MATĚJ (ID 141)**	Czech	Male
	ДМИТРИЙ **(DMITRIY) (ID 141)**	Russian	Male
	LUCIE (ID 141)	Czech	Female
	КСЕНИЯ **(KSENIYA) (ID 141)**	Russian	Female
6	**JIŘÍ (ID 347)**	Czech	Male
	ОЛЕКСІЙ **(OLEXIY) (ID 347)**	Ukrainian	Male
	JITKA (ID 347)	Czech	Female
	ОЛЕНА **(OLENA) (ID 347)**	Ukrainian	Female
7	**ZDENĚK (ID 812)**	Czech	Male
	ВАСИЛИЙ **(VASILY) (ID 812)**	Russian	Male
	ALŽBĚTA (ID 812)	Czech	Female
	ЕЛИЗАВЕТА **(YELYZAVETA) (ID 812)**	Russian	Female
8	**RADEK (ID 235)**	Czech	Male
	АНАТОЛИЙ **(ANATOLIY) (ID 235)**	Russian	Male
	BOŽENA (ID 235)	Czech	Female
	ВАРВАРА **(VARVARA) (ID 235)**	Russian	Female

Notes: This table shows the list of workers' names seen by assistants. Some of the names are typically Czech (e.g. Ondřej, Markéta) or associated with a post-Soviet country, specifically Russia (e.g. Dmitriy, Anastasia) or Ukraine (e.g. Mykhailo, Olena). Such distinction makes 4 profile versions: local male, local female, foreign male, and foreign female. Each profile had different sets of names that could be attached to it.

Table B.4: Randomization check I (assistants)

	(1) N	(2) Local male (control)	(3) Local female	(4) Foreign male	(5) Foreign female	(6) F-test
Female	6056	0.50	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.64
Age	6056	42.36	41.76	42.11	41.90	0.61
Household size	6056	2.72	2.82	2.74	2.76	0.13
Primary and secondary	6056	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.41	0.71
Education without national school-leaving exam						
Secondary education	6056	0.38	0.37	0.39	0.36	0.58
With national school-leaving exam						
University degree	6056	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.34
Prague	6056	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.90
Central Bohemia	6056	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.53
Southwest	6056	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.77
Northwest	6056	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.11
Southeast	6056	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.27
Northeast	6056	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.81
Central Moravia	6056	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.34
Moravian Silesian	6056	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.42
Employed	6008	0.75	0.73	0.76	0.77	0.06
Income is missing	6056	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.63
Household net monthly income	5480	0.29	0.34	0.30	0.31	0.02
$>$ 50,000 CZK						
Has recruitment experience	6056	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.25
Thought about the hiring manager	6056	8.15	8.15	8.16	8.13	0.98
Correctly identified	6056	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.61
Last worker's gender and origin						
Tolerance to foreigners	6056	3.32	3.34	3.35	3.36	0.40
Tolerance to women	6056	3.23	3.24	3.28	3.25	0.34
Mobile survey completion	6056	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.68
N		1543	1499	1528	1486	

Notes: Means of assistants' characteristics in different treatment groups. Column (6) reports p-values of F-test for the hypothesis that the means are equal across the four treatment arms. Tolerance indices were constructed by taking averages of responses to 9 questions regarding foreigners and 7 questions regarding women (all measured on a scale from 1 to 5; when necessary, we recoded responses so that 5 would mean the highest tolerance).

Table B.5: Randomization check II (assistants)

	(1) Female treatment	(2) Foreigner treatment
Female	-0.005	-0.018
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Household size	0.009	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Primary and secondary	-0.019	-0.027
education without national school-leaving exam	(0.018)	(0.018)
Secondary education with national school-leaving exam	-0.031*	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Central Bohemia	0.007	-0.005
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Southwest	0.008	0.022
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Northwest	0.034	0.021
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Southeast	0.022	-0.018
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Northeast	0.008	0.004
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Central Moravia	-0.028	-0.011
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Moravian Silesian	-0.020	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Income is missing	-0.013	-0.024
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Has recruitment experience	-0.038*	-0.020
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Tolerance to women	-0.007	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Tolerance to foreigners	0.007	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Correctly identified	-0.013	-0.013
last worker's gender and origin	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mobile survey completion	0.007	0.015
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Thought about the hiring manager	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	0.522***	0.492***
	(0.058)	(0.058)
N	6056	6056
F-test	1.103	0.798
p-value of F-test	0.340	0.712

Notes: Regressions of treatment indicators on assistants' characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.6: Summary statistics for managers' sample

	(1) mean	(2) sd	(3) p50	(4) min	(5) max
Female	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00
Age	42.16	12.28	42.00	18.00	64.00
Household size	2.81	1.22	3.00	1.00	7.00
Primary and secondary	0.39	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00
Education without national school-leaving exam					
Secondary education	0.39	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00
With national school-leaving exam					
University degree	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00
Prague	0.12	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Central Bohemia	0.12	0.33	0.00	0.00	1.00
Southwest	0.12	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Northwest	0.11	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00
Northeast	0.14	0.35	0.00	0.00	1.00
Southeast	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00
Central Moravia	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00
Moravian Silesian	0.10	0.30	0.00	0.00	1.00
Employed	0.75	0.43	1.00	0.00	1.00
Has recruitment experience	0.13	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00

Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for 767 managers: mean, standard deviation, median, and the range.

Table B.7: Heterogeneity analyses for the effect of a female worker's name on the share of disclosed Demographic information

	Share of disclosed information (Demographics)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female (a)	0.032***	0.013**	0.018***	0.026***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female * Female assistant (b)	-0.025***			
	(0.008)			
Female * Biased against women (c)		0.013*		
		(0.008)		
Female * Low-quality profile (d)			0.005	
			(0.007)	
Foreigner (e)				-0.002
				(0.005)
Female * Foreigner (f)				-0.012**
				(0.006)
(a) + (b)	0.007			
	(0.005)			
(a) + (c)		0.026***		
		(0.005)		
(a) + (d)			0.023***	
			(0.005)	
(a) + (e) + (f)				0.012**
				(0.005)
Control mean	0.494	0.455	0.477	0.476
N	6056	6056	6056	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female (Foreigner)* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female (foreign) name. *Biased against women* is equal to 1 if an index of tolerance toward women is less or equal to its median value (see Section 4.1.1 for the details about the construction of the tolerance index). The control means are the average values of the outcome in the male-CVs group and: in Column (1), a subsample of male assistants; in Column (2), a subsample of "tolerant" assistants; in Column (3), a subsample of high-quality profiles; in Column (4), a subsample of CVs with local (Czech) names.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.8: Heterogeneity analysis by an assistant's gender for the effect of a female worker's name on disclosed Demographic information

	(1) Age	(2) Marital status	(3) Number of children	(4) Driving license	(5) Surveys
Female (a)	-0.005	0.055***	0.103***	0.001	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Female * Female assistant (b)	-0.001	-0.064***	-0.044**	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.014)
(a) + (b)	-0.005	-0.009	0.059***	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Control mean	0.781	0.423	0.292	0.717	0.242
N	6056	5299	6056	6056	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female name. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group and subsample of male assistants. *Surveys* informs about the actual number of surveys that a worker completed in the past.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.9: Heterogeneity analyses for the effect of a female worker's name on the share of disclosed Work information

	Share of disclosed information (Work)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female (a)	-0.012*	-0.021***	-0.005	-0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Female * Female assistant (b)	-0.017*			
	(0.009)			
Female * Biased against women (c)		0.002		
		(0.009)		
Female * Low-quality profile (d)			-0.031***	
			(0.010)	
Foreigner (e)				-0.013**
				(0.007)
Female * Foreigner (f)				0.007
				(0.010)
(a) + (b)	-0.029***			
	(0.007)			
(a) + (c)		-0.019***		
		(0.007)		
(a) + (d)			-0.036***	
			(0.007)	
(a) + (e) + (f)				-0.030***
				(0.007)
Control mean	0.588	0.606	0.606	0.592
N	6056	6056	6056	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female (Foreigner)* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female (foreign) name. *Biased against women* is equal to 1 if an index of tolerance toward women is less or equal to its median value (see Section 4.1.1 for the details about the construction of the tolerance index). The control means are the average values of the outcome in the male-CVs group and: in Column (1), a subsample of male assistants; in Column (2), a subsample of tolerant assistants; in Column (3), a subsample of high-quality profiles; in Column (4), a subsample of CVs with local (Czech) names.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.10: Heterogeneity analyses for the effect of a female worker's name on disclosed Work information by profile quality

	(1) Area	(2) Position	(3) Experience	(4) Any responsibilities
Female (a)	-0.021	-0.009	0.018	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Female * Low-quality profile (b)	0.006	0.043**	-0.025	-0.140***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
(a) + (b)	-0.015	0.035**	-0.007	-0.142***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Control mean	0.774	0.808	0.638	0.642
N	6056	6056	5299	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female name. *Any responsibilities* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an assistant disclosed at least one job responsibility from a CV. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group and subsample of high-quality profiles.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.11: Heterogeneity analysis by female-dominated occupation for the effect of a female worker's name on disclosed Work information

	(1) Area	(2) Position	(3) Experience	(4) Any responsibilities
Female (a)	-0.012	-0.022	0.018	-0.009
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Female * Female-dominated job (b)	-0.010	0.055**	-0.023	-0.173***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)
(a) + (b)	-0.021	0.034**	-0.005	-0.182***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Control mean	0.765	0.831	0.638	0.633
N	4542	4542	4542	4542

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female name. *Female-dominated job* is a binary variable equal to 1 if a CV is based on a profile with a female-dominated occupation (we classify profiles 1, 5, 7 as female-dominated, and 2, 6, 8 as male-dominated; profiles 3 and 4 are ambiguous so we exclude them from this analysis). *Any responsibilities* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an assistant disclosed at least one job responsibility from a CV. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the subsample of CVs with male names and male-dominated occupations.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.12: Heterogeneity analyses for the effect of a female worker's name on disclosed Work information by profile quality and assistants' gender

	(1) Area	(2) Position	(3) Experience	(4) Any responsibilities
Female (a)	-0.028	-0.008	0.034*	0.037*
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Female * Female assistant (b)	0.014	-0.003	-0.033	-0.080***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Female * Low-quality profile (c)	0.011	0.072***	-0.029	-0.178***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Female assistant * Low-quality profile	-0.008	0.029	-0.014	-0.020
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Female * Female assistant * Low-quality profile (d)	-0.011	-0.056	0.008	0.077*
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.041)
(a) + (c)	-0.017	0.064***	0.005	-0.141***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
(a) + (b)	-0.014	-0.011	0.001	-0.043**
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.019)
(a) + (b) + (c) + (d)	-0.013	0.005	-0.020	-0.144***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Control mean	0.778	0.808	0.615	0.643
N	6056	6056	5299	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Female* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female name. *Any responsibilities* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an assistant disclosed at least one job responsibility from a CV. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group and subsample of male assistants and high-quality profiles.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.13: Effect of a foreign worker's name on the disclosure of Demographic information

	(1) Age	(2) Marital status	(3) Number of children	(4) Driving license	(5) Surveys
Foreigner	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006	-0.013**	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Control mean	0.751	0.405	0.301	0.717	0.253
Observations	6056	5299	6056	6056	6056

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Foreigner* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign name. *Surveys* informs about the actual number of surveys that a worker completed in the past. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.14: Effect of a foreign worker's name on the disclosure of Educational information

	(1) Level	(2) Area	(3) Any favorite subjects
Foreigner	-0.019***	-0.021**	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Control mean	0.862	0.790	0.436
Observations	6056	6056	5299

Notes: All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. *Foreigner* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign name. *Any favorite subjects* is a binary variable equal to 1 if the assistant disclosed at least one favorite subject from the CV. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.15: Effect of a foreign worker's name on the disclosure of Work information

	(1) Status	(2) Area	(3) Position	(4) Experience	(5) Any responsibilities
Foreigner	0.015	0.002	-0.014	-0.010	-0.022**
	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Control mean	0.620	0.723	0.766	0.635	0.554
Observations	757	6056	6056	5299	6056

Notes: Foreigner is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign name. *Any responsibilities* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an assistant disclosed at least one job responsibility from a CV. Work *Status* is a binary variable equal to 1 if an assistant disclosed information that a worker is on parental leave. This piece of information is present only in one profile. Regressions (2)-(5) include profile and assistant fixed effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. Column (1) is based on the OLS regression with the treatment indicator and assistants' age, gender, household size, educational and regional dummies, and recruitment experience (robust standard errors in parentheses). The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.16: Effect of a foreign worker's name on the disclosure of Certificates information

	(1) Math	(2) Financial quiz	(3) Sliders
Foreigner	-0.015	-0.008	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Control mean	0.489	0.667	0.365
Observations	6056	6056	6056

Notes: Foreigner is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign name. All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.17: Heterogeneity analyses for the effect of a foreign worker's name on the overall disclosure of information

	Share of disclosed information (overall)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreigner (a)	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Foreigner * Female assistant (b)	-0.004			
	(0.005)			
Foreigner * Biased against foreigners (c)		-0.006		
		(0.005)		
Foreigner * Low-quality profile (d)			-0.004	
			(0.005)	
Female (e)				-0.001
				(0.003)
Female * Foreigner (f)				-0.002
				(0.004)
(a) + (b)	-0.009**			
	(0.004)			
(a) + (c)		-0.010***		
		(0.004)		
(a) + (d)			-0.009***	
			(0.003)	
(a) + (e) + (f)				-0.008**
				(0.003)
Control mean	0.527	0.532	0.528	0.520
N	6056	6056	6056	6056

Notes: *Foreigner (Female)* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign (female) name. *Biased against foreigners* is equal to 1 if an index of tolerance toward foreigners is less or equal to its median value (see Section 4.1.1 for the details about the construction of the tolerance index). All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group and: in Column (1), a subsample of male assistants; in Column (2), a subsample of "tolerant" assistants; in Column (3), a subsample of high-quality profiles; in Column (4), a subsample of CVs with male names.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.18: Effect of female/foreign name on attention measures

	(1) Time	(2) Time	(3) Learn-more clicks	(4) Learn-more clicks
Female	-32.869		-0.018	
	(32.814)		(0.040)	
Foreigner		-30.743		-0.091**
		(32.543)		(0.038)
Control mean	129.232	127.150	0.693	0.724
Observations	6056	6056	6056	6056

Notes: *Female (Foreigner)* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female (foreign) name. *Time* is the number of seconds that an assistant spent on selecting information from a CV. *Learn-more clicks* is the number of clicks that an assistant made on "More information" buttons embedded in a CV. All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard error (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes when we limit the sample to CVs with male names in Columns (1) and (3) and local names in Columns (2) and (4).
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.19: Robustness checks: the effect of a female worker's name on the share of disclosed information

	(1) Overall	(2) Summary	(3) Demographics	(4) Education	(5) Work	(6) Certificates	(7) Skills	(8) Interests	(9) Volunteering
Panel A: baseline results									
Female	-0.001	-0.008*	0.020***	0.000	-0.020***	0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.517	0.568	0.476	0.561	0.588	0.504	0.573	0.288	0.319
Observations	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	3028
Panel B: sample of assistants who passed the manipulation check									
Female	-0.001	-0.010**	0.023***	0.001	-0.025***	0.001	0.004	0.001	-0.006
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Control mean	0.527	0.583	0.479	0.573	0.602	0.523	0.583	0.283	0.313
Observations	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	2408
Panel C: sample excluding assistants with top 1% and bottom 10% of total time spent on survey									
Female	-0.001	-0.006	0.021***	0.001	-0.022***	0.002	0.004	-0.002	-0.015
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.530	0.585	0.480	0.575	0.607	0.524	0.587	0.290	0.321
Observations	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	2692
Panel D: OLS regression									
Female	-0.003	-0.016**	0.020***	-0.003	-0.022***	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Panel E: OLS regression with controls									
Female	-0.003	-0.017**	0.020***	-0.003	-0.023***	-0.006	-0.001	0.005	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)

Notes: Robustness checks for the effect of a female name on different shares of information (in columns). Panel A is the baseline specification from equation (1) with profile and assistant fixed effects and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the assistant level. Panel B displays the same specification run on the sample of assistants who passed the manipulation check, i.e. correctly identified gender and origin of the worker whose CV they saw last. Panel C uses the same specification as in Panel A, but excludes the assistants with top 1% and bottom 10% of total time spent on the entire survey. Panel D displays results from OLS regressions and Panel E additionally controls for the observable characteristics. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the male-CVs group.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.20: Robustness checks: the effect of a foreign worker's name on the share of disclosed information

	(1) Overall	(2) Summary	(3) Demographics	(4) Education	(5) Work	(6) Certificates	(7) Skills	(8) Interests	(9) Volunteering
Panel A: baseline results									
Foreigner	-0.007***	-0.006	-0.008**	-0.012**	-0.010**	-0.008*	-0.006	0.004	-0.007
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Control mean	0.521	0.562	0.488	0.567	0.586	0.507	0.579	0.291	0.318
Observations	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	3028
Panel B: sample of assistants who passed the manipulation check									
Foreigner	-0.008***	-0.008	-0.009**	-0.011*	-0.008	-0.009*	-0.007	0.003	-0.018
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.528	0.575	0.490	0.575	0.593	0.520	0.588	0.283	0.316
Observations	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	4816	2408
Panel C: sample excluding assistants with top 1% and bottom 10% of total time spent on survey									
Foreigner	-0.007***	-0.008	-0.007*	-0.010*	-0.010**	-0.010**	-0.007	0.006	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Control mean	0.534	0.579	0.492	0.580	0.604	0.525	0.595	0.290	0.321
Observations	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	5384	2692
Panel D: OLS regression									
Foreigner	-0.010**	-0.004	-0.005	-0.015**	-0.018**	-0.009	-0.013*	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Panel E: OLS regression with controls									
Foreigner	-0.010*	-0.005	-0.003	-0.015**	-0.018**	-0.011	-0.011	0.001	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.015)

Notes: Robustness checks for the effect of a foreign name on different shares of information (in columns). Panel A is the baseline specification from equation (2) with profile and assistant fixed effects and standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the assistant level. Panel B displays the same specification run on the sample of assistants who passed the manipulation check, i.e. correctly identified gender and origin of the worker whose CV they saw last. Panel C uses the same specification as in Panel A, but excludes the assistants with top 1% and bottom 10% of total time spent on the entire survey. Panel D displays results from OLS regressions and Panel E additionally controls for the observable characteristics. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level. The control means are the average values of the outcomes in the local-CVs group.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.21: Effect of a female worker's name on the share of disclosed information by order of CVs

	(1) Overall	(2) Summary	(3) Demographics	(4) Education	(5) Work	(6) Certificates	(7) Skills	(8) Interests	(9) Volunteering
Female	-0.005	-0.012*	0.020***	-0.002	-0.023***	-0.002	-0.009	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Second half	0.008**	0.024***	-0.000	0.035***	0.022***	-0.001	-0.006	-0.014*	-0.016
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Female * Second half	0.007	0.006	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.008	0.020**	0.006	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Observations	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	3028

Notes: *Female* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a female name. *Second half* is an indicator of a CV being presented (to an assistant) 5th or later (i.e. in the second half). All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.22: Effect of a foreign worker's name on the share of disclosed information by order of CVs

	(1) Overall	(2) Summary	(3) Demographics	(4) Education	(5) Work	(6) Certificates	(7) Skills	(8) Interests	(9) Volunteering
Foreigner	-0.006	-0.007	-0.010*	-0.017**	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Second half	0.013***	0.026***	-0.001	0.032***	0.031***	0.009	0.006	-0.019**	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Foreigner * Second half	-0.003	0.002	0.002	0.010	-0.015	-0.011	-0.006	0.016	-0.026
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.023)
Observations	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	6056	3028

Notes: *Foreigner* is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if a CV has a foreign name. *Second half* is an indicator of a CV being presented (to an assistant) 5th or later (i.e. in the second half). All regressions include profile and assistant fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the assistant level.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.23: Effects of treatments and disclosed information on wages

	(1) wage	(2) wage	(3) wage	(4) wage	(5) wage	(6) wage	(7) wage
Female	0.062		0.026	0.024	0.020	0.007	-0.056
	(0.046)		(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.117)	(0.103)
Foreigner		-0.166***	-0.201***	-0.194***	-0.199***	-0.297**	-0.201***
		(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.133)	(0.065)
Female * Foreigner			0.069	0.070	0.070	0.071	0.079
			(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.085)
Overall share				2.025		1.935	
				(1.571)		(1.573)	
Demographic share				-0.224		-0.227	
				(0.284)		(0.299)	
Work share				-0.318		-0.332	
				(0.299)		(0.307)	
Marital status					-0.018		-0.192**
					(0.074)		(0.097)
Number of Children					-0.012		0.121
					(0.076)		(0.099)
Work area					0.091		0.066
					(0.064)		(0.086)
Work responsibilities					-0.038		-0.047
					(0.057)		(0.077)
Female * Work share						0.026	
						(0.173)	
Female * Demographic share						0.004	
						(0.182)	
Foreign * Overall share						0.200	
						(0.221)	
Female * Marital status							0.178*
							(0.108)
Female * Children							-0.151
							(0.115)
Female * Work area							-0.002
							(0.097)
Female * Responsibilities							0.023
							(0.093)
All shares	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
All pieces	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6136	6144	6136	6136	6136	6136	5369
F-test	185.710	186.930	151.831	80.235	49.106	69.426	30.872

Notes: Regressions of wages set by managers on treatment indicators and information disclosed by assistants. *Overall share* shows the total share of information (from any sections) that an assistant discloses from a profile. All specifications use profile and manager fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the manager level. *All shares* indicates whether shares of disclosed information from all sections were used as controls. *All pieces* indicates whether disclosure indicators of all pieces of information were used as controls.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Instructions (translated from Czech)

C.1 Assistants' instructions

Hello,

Participation in this survey is totally voluntary. If you start the survey and you no longer wish to finish it, you can do so without any consequences.

If you decide to participate in the survey, make sure that you have enough time to finish it (i.e. at least **25 minutes**), please.

For completion of the survey, you will receive the **reward stated in the invitation**. In addition, you may receive a **bonus** whose amount depends partially on your decisions. You will receive the bonus points in February 2022 at the latest, after the evaluation of the whole survey.

In contrast to traditional survey questions, which are about hypothetical situations, **you will now make decisions that might have real** (financial) **consequences for other participants of our online labor market**. Specifically, you will select information from profiles of workers.

We would like to assure you that **panel iVýzkumy.cz guarantees your total anonymity and the confidentiality of your answers.**

Please answer the questions truthfully, according to your own judgement and knowledge, regardless of whether your opinions adhere to mainstream attitudes or are politically correct. It is crucial for success of the survey that you go attentively through the whole survey and adhere to the instructions in each part of the survey.

If you are done reading the text above and agree to participate in this survey, please check "Yes". You will start the survey by pressing the button →.

◯ Yes
◯ No

[Next page]

What is your **gender**?
◯ Man
◯ Woman

What is your **age**?
Enter a number into the following field:

What is your **highest completed education**?
◯ Unfinished elementary
◯ Elementary

◯ Vocational or general secondary without state examination
◯ Secondary with state examination
◯ Higher professional
◯ University

In what **region** do you reside?
We want to know the region where you actually live, not the region of your permanent residency. Click on the arrow below to show the list of regions.

∨

How many **people** are there in **your household** (including you)?
◯ 1
◯ 2
◯ 3
◯ 4
◯ 5
◯ More, write how many:

[Next page]

In this survey, you will act as an **assistant in hiring workers** in our **online labor market**.

We emphasize that, in contrast to traditional survey questions, which are about hypothetical situations, you will now make **decisions** that might have **real** (financial) **consequences** for other participants of our survey.

[Next page]

Your task will be to **review 8** workers' **profiles** and **select** only those **pieces of information** that you would like to **provide** to another Czech participant of our survey – this person will act as a **hiring manager**.

The **manager** will **hire** workers for a **financial task**, which consists of a **series of various financial decisions**, e.g. about investments.

The **manager** will be deciding about each of these 8 people individually, i.e. he/she might **hire any number of people** (e.g. all 8 or even nobody).

[Next page]

The **manager** will be **busy** because he/she will have to make multiple hiring decisions during a limited time. Therefore, **your task** of **simplifying the profiles** is a crucial help to him/her.

Before making a hiring decision about a worker, the **manager** will see **only the information** that **you will select**, but he/she will never see the workers' original profiles.

Some pieces of information will have a **button** More information next to them that will enable you to better understand the corresponding information piece, but this button **will be never displayed to the manager**. Hence, if you choose the corresponding information piece, the manager will see only its content, but not the button with the additional information.

[Next page]

Each profile simplification may be important because **your information selection** might **impact** the manager's **decisions** and bear **financial consequences**.

Workers who are **hired will receive extra money**. The **manager** will receive a **higher reward** if the hired workers perform well on the financial task.

[Next page]

It is important that you select information for the **manager** diligently because he/she **will decide how to reward your effort**. This **reward** will be paid **in addition** to your participation fee.

If the **manager** finds **your information selection useful**, he/she can give you **up to 500 points**, which costs him/her nothing. If the manager finds that your information selection is not useful at all, he/she might give you 0 points.
[Note: participants were rewarded by the data collection agency's points with a conversion rate 10 points = 1 CZK.]

During the survey, you will be able to return to these instructions.

[Next page]

In this part, we would like to **check** your **understanding** of the task instructions that you just read. If you want to go through the **instructions one more time**, press the button ←.

For each of the following statements, please decide whether it is true or false.

	Yes	No
I will see profiles of **8 workers**. **My task** is to **select information** from these profiles for another Czech participant who will act as a **hiring manager**.	◯	◯
The manager is **hiring** people for a **financial task**. Besides information that I select, the **manager will NOT see the full profiles**. The **manager** will be **busy** making many hiring decisions.	◯	◯
The manager will determine **my bonus** according to how **useful** he/she finds **my information selection**.	◯	◯

[Next page]

All statements on the previous page were **CORRECT**.



[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

ONDŘEJ (ID 664)[29]

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Ondřej has logical and technically oriented mindset. He behaves consistently and is eager to learn.
- ☐ Ondřej is sometimes inattentive to details and lacks self-confidence.
- ☐ According to Ondřej it is quite likely that [he/she] would be able to convince other people of [his/her] opinion in financial services.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- ☐ **Age:** 27
- ☐ **Marital status:** single
- ☐ **Number of children:** 0
- ☐ **Driving license:** yes
- ☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 15 More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

- ☐ **Level:** university – master degree

[29] To authentically illustrate the questionnaire of assistants, we present the 8 profiles in a random order and randomly select one of the corresponding names for each profile from Table B.3. The presented order of profiles in this Appendix is: 2, 5, 7, 6, 1, 4, 8, 3. Note, however, that each assistant could see the profiles in a different order and with different names than displayed in this Appendix.

☐ **Area of studies:** economics

☐ **Favorite subject:** risk management More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
Risk management is an area of managing projects and processes that deals with determination and evaluation of their risks and undesirable effects. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ **Favorite subject:** mathematics

☐ **Favorite subject:** financial analysis

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** banking

☐ **Current position:** analyst

☐ **Work experience in the current position:** 2 years

☐ **Job responsibilities:** error analysis

☐ **Job responsibilities:** preparation of reports

☐ **Job responsibilities:** accounting control

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **6 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **5 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **6 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

VOLUNTEERING (based on real decisions)

☐ Completed a survey for free in order to **donate the money to a charity** More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
In the questionnaire, we asked the worker whether he or she is willing to participate in another survey in upcoming days and donate the reward from participation to a charity of own choice. If

the worker agreed, he or she received later an invitation for a survey in which it was explicitly mentioned that the reward will be donated. We could verify whether the worker truly completed this survey. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ **Donated own participation fee** in **56%** of completed online surveys

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** advanced

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** advanced

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** advanced

☐ **Internet banking:** using

☐ **English language:** good knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** data analysis

☐ **Has experience with** economics

☐ **Has experience with** data entry

INTERESTS

☐ Sport activities

☐ Traveling

☐ International news

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

ONDŘEJ (ID 664)

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices. This means also that the assistant could see that the More information buttons were going to be suppressed.]

***
If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

LUCIE (ID 141)

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Lucie is stress-resistant. Her strengths are credibility and responsibility.
- ☐ Lucie sometimes postpones things and is inattentive to details.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- ☐ **Age:** 31
- ☐ **Number of children:** 1
- ☐ **Driving license:** yes
- ☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 15 More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

- ☐ **Level:** secondary (without school leaving exam)
- ☐ **Area of studies:** storage operator More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  A storage operator is primarily responsible for logistic operations with physical products: receipt of materials in a warehouse, management of warehouse records and administration, handling of materials, packing, and preparation of goods for expedition. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

WORK

- ☐ **Current work status:** on [maternal/parental] leave
- ☐ **Last employer:** post office
- ☐ **Last position:** delivery
- ☐ **Work experience in the last position:** 3 years
- ☐ **Job responsibilities:** communication with people

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

- ☐ Attained **1 point in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]

The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **2 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **18 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** basic knowledge

☐ **Internet banking:** not using

☐ **English language:** partial knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** data entry

INTERESTS

☐ Watching TV

☐ Sometimes reads Blesk [Blesk is a Czech tabloid]

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

LUCIE (ID 141)

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***
If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

ЕЛИЗАВЕТА **(YELYZAVETA) (ID 812)**

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Yelyzaveta is efficient. She is responsible and able to solve difficult and complex problems.
- ☐ Yelyzaveta sometimes postpones things. She is impulsive and bad at financial management.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- ☐ **Age:** 38
- ☐ **Marital status:** married
- ☐ **Number of children:** 1
- ☐ **Driving license:** yes
- ☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 7 More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

- ☐ **Level:** secondary (without school leaving exam)
- ☐ **Area of studies:** administration
- ☐ **Favorite subject:** theory
- ☐ **Favorite subject:** practice

WORK

- ☐ **Employment sector:** trucking
- ☐ **Current position:** administrative worker
- ☐ **Work experience in the last position:** 6 years
- ☐ **Job responsibilities:** paperwork

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

- ☐ Attained **3 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]

The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **4 points in a financial-literacy quiz** (**average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **44 points in a slider task** (**average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

VOLUNTEERING (based on real decisions)

☐ **Donated own participation fee** in **100%** of completed online surveys

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** professional

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** professional

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** professional

☐ **Internet banking:** not using

☐ **English language:** partial knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** administrative work

☐ **Has experience with** building savings

INTERESTS

☐ Reading books

☐ Cooking

☐ Sport activities

☐ Reading business literature

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

ЕЛИЗАВЕТА **(YELYZAVETA) (ID 812)**

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***

If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

ОЛЕКСІЙ **(OLEXIY) (ID 347)**

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Olexiy is even-tempered. He is good at solving difficult and complex problems and is creative.
- ☐ Olexiy is sometimes indecisive and fears mathematics.
- ☐ According to Olexiy, he could very probably convince others of his opinion in financial services.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- ☐ **Age:** 44
- ☐ **Marital status:** married
- ☐ **Number of children:** 1
- ☐ **Driving license:** yes
- ☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 6 More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

- ☐ **Level:** university – master's degree
- ☐ **Area of studies:** social geography
- ☐ **Favorite subject:** geography
- ☐ **Favorite subject:** English

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** insurance

☐ **Current position:** product manager More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
Product manager is responsible for having an overview of the market, monitoring current trends and their identification. Based on the observations, he/she then creates strategic plans, including the design, creation and launch of new products. Note: This button with more information will never be shown to the manager.

☐ **Work experience in the last position:** 3 years

☐ **Job responsibilities:** product management

☐ **Job responsibilities:** content on intranet and web

☐ **Job responsibilities:** organization of testing of new products

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **2 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **5 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **41 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

VOLUNTEERING (based on real decisions)

☐ **Donated own participation fee** in **100%** of completed online surveys

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** basic knowledge

☐ **Internet banking:** using

☐ **English language:** good knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** product management

☐ **Has experience with** with holding stocks and mutual funds

INTERESTS

☐ Reading books

☐ Finance/business/economics

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

ОЛЕКСІЙ **(OLEXIY) (ID 347)**

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***
If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

PETR (ID 778)

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

☐ Petr's strengths are logical thinking and trustworthiness.

☐ Petr is sometimes unorganized and postpones things.

☐ According to Petr, it is important to keep learning new things.

DEMOGRAPHICS

☐ **Age:** 38

☐ **Marital status:** married

☐ **Number of children:** 2

☐ **Driving license:** yes

☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 7 More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

☐ **Level:** secondary (with school leaving exam)

☐ **Area of studies:** business and service management

☐ **Favorite subject:** commodity expertise More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
It enables orientation in the main assortment groups in accordance with valid legislation and the requirements of business practice, it clarifies the issue of consumer properties, quality, evaluation of goods, defects of goods, labeling, and professional sale of goods. Note: This button with more information will never be shown to the manager.

☐ **Favorite subject:** mathematics

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** trade – purchase and sale of goods

☐ **Current position:** cashier

☐ **Work experience in the current position:** 1 year

☐ **Job responsibilities:** communication

☐ **Job responsibilities:** service

☐ **Job responsibilities:** goods

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **5 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **4 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **9 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as

many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

SKILLS

- ☐ **Microsoft Word:** basic knowledge
- ☐ **Microsoft Excel:** basic knowledge
- ☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** no experience
- ☐ **Internet banking:** not using
- ☐ **English language:** partial knowledge
- ☐ **Has experience with** customer service

INTERESTS

- ☐ Watching TV
- ☐ Trips to the countryside

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

PETR (ID 778)

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***
If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

ZDEŇKA (ID 459)

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Zdeňka has logical thinking. She is responsible and courteous.
- ☐ Zdeňka is sometimes indecisive and lacks self-confidence.

☐ Zdeňka considers herself good at money management.

DEMOGRAPHICS

☐ **Age:** 30

☐ **Marital status:** single

☐ **Number of children:** 0

☐ **Driving license:** yes

☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 151 More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

☐ **Level:** university – master's degree

☐ **Area of studies:** statistics

☐ **Favorite subject:** statistics

☐ **Favorite subject:** demographics

☐ **Favorite subject:** accounting

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** marketing/management/advertising/media

☐ **Current position:** project field manager More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
Project field manager is responsible for smooth and efficient day-to-day progress of a project. He/She tries to learn and fulfill needs of clients, set goals and timelines, determine a budget, manage the work group, and control the progress of the project in order to meet standards and regulations. He/She also makes interim reports and evaluations and suggests improvements of processes. Note: This button with more information will never be shown to the manager.

☐ **Job responsibilities:** communication

☐ **Job responsibilities:** database management

☐ **Job responsibilities:** work organization

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **8 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **4 points in a financial-literacy quiz** (**average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **48 points in a slider task** (**average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

VOLUNTEERING (based on real decisions)

☐ Completed a survey for free in order to **donate the money to a charity** More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
In the questionnaire, we asked the worker whether he or she is willing to participate in another survey in upcoming days and donate the reward from participation to a charity of own choice. If the worker agreed, he or she received later an invitation for a survey in which it was explicitly mentioned that the reward will be donated. We could verify whether the worker truly completed this survey. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ **Donated own participation fee** in **69%** of completed online surveys

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** advanced

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** advanced

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** basic knowledge

☐ **Internet banking:** using

☐ **English language:** good knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** mathematics

☐ **Has experience with** data entry

☐ **Has experience with** data analysis

INTERESTS

☐ Sport activities

☐ Music

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

ZDEŇKA (ID 459)

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***

If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

АНАТОЛИЙ (ANATOLIY) (ID 235)

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Anatoliy has a technically-oriented mindset and is hungry for knowledge.
- ☐ Anatoliy is sometimes direct in expressing controversial opinions and unwilling to comply with social norms.
- ☐ Anatoliy considers himself good at money management and he does not leave financial decisions to other family members.

DEMOGRAPHICS

- ☐ **Age:** 38
- ☐ **Marital status:** single
- ☐ **Number of children:** 0
- ☐ **Driving license:** yes
- ☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 58 More information
  [After clicking on "More information":]
  The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

- ☐ **Level:** university – master's degree
- ☐ **Area of studies:** electronics and communication technology
- ☐ **Favorite subject:** telecommunication networks

☐ **Favorite subject:** circuit theory More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
An electrical circuit is a conductive connection of electrical elements, e.g. resistors, diodes, and switches. Circuit theory applies physical laws and principles in the analysis of elementary phenomena in DC and AC electrical circuits, defines basic circuit quantities (voltage, current) and basic circuit elements modeling all kinds of real energy interactions. The basic goal is the ability to calculate voltage and current anywhere in the circuit and based on them to assess the properties of electrical equipment. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ **Favorite subject:** programming

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** education

☐ **Current position:** IT administrator

☐ **Job responsibilities:** administration of computer network

☐ **Job responsibilities:** hardware maintenance

☐ **Work experience in the last position:** 5 years

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **3 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **5 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **12 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

VOLUNTEERING (based on real decisions)

☐ **Donated own participation fee** in **16%** of completed online surveys

SKILLS

- ☐ **Microsoft Word:** professional
- ☐ **Microsoft Excel:** professional
- ☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** basic knowledge
- ☐ **Internet banking:** using
- ☐ **English language:** good knowledge
- ☐ **Has experience with** economics
- ☐ **Has experience with** mathematics
- ☐ **Has experience with** holding stocks and mutual funds

INTERESTS

- ☐ Reading books
- ☐ Gardening
- ☐ News about finance/business/economics

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

АНАТОЛИЙ **(ANATOLIY) (ID 235)**

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***
If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

HERE you can recheck the instructions (they will open in a new tab).

Now you will look through a worker's profile. Please **select** the **information** that you would like to **provide to a manager** who will consider this worker for the **task** that consists of a **series of financial decisions**.

ОЛЕСЯ **(OLESYA) (ID 585)**

SUMMARY (based on self-evaluation)

- ☐ Olesya's strengths are courtesy and flexibility.
- ☐ Olesya is sometimes direct in expressing controversial opinions and has bad performance under pressure.

☐ Olesya considers herself good at money management and certainly does not leave financial decisions to other family members.

☐ According to Olesya, people should try again when they do not succeed the first time.

DEMOGRAPHICS

☐ **Age:** 34

☐ **Marital status:** single

☐ **Number of children:** 0

☐ **Driving license:** yes

☐ **Number of completed online questionnaires:** 9 More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The number of completed online questionnaires is a record from a database about the actual total number of online surveys that the worker has properly completed in the past. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

EDUCATION

☐ **Level:** secondary (with school leaving exam)

☐ **Area of studies:** trade

☐ **Favorite subject:** law

☐ **Favorite subject:** accounting

WORK

☐ **Employment sector:** advertising

☐ **Current position:** project manager More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
Project manager proposes a structure and staffing of the implementation team for a specific project. He/She is then in charge of this project, divides everything into sub-tasks, and then checks and supervises their fulfillment. While working on the project, he/she cooperates in determining the financial requirements of the project, makes time estimates and updates them. He/she regularly prepares written reports on the status of the project. Note: This button with more information will never be shown to the manager.

☐ **Work experience in the current position:** 12 years

☐ **Job responsibilities:** communication with government offices

☐ **Job responsibilities:** invoicing

☐ **Job responsibilities:** communication with government

CERTIFICATES (based on real tasks)

☐ Attained **2 points in a math test (average** of all candidates: **4** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The Math test included 10 questions that tested the knowledge of basic Math operations, equation solving, etc. Participants had 2.5 minutes to complete the test. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **5 points in a financial-literacy quiz (average** of all candidates: **3.9** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The financial-literacy quiz included 5 questions that tested the understanding of basic financial concepts (inflation, interest, etc.). Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

☐ Attained **17 points in a slider task (average** of all candidates: **24** points) More information
[After clicking on "More information":]
The slider task is a mechanical task in which participants had to center within a 2-minute limit as many sliders as possible (max. 48) with a random initial position. Note: This button with more information will never be displayed to the manager.

SKILLS

☐ **Microsoft Word:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft Excel:** basic knowledge

☐ **Microsoft PowerPoint:** basic knowledge

☐ **Internet banking:** not using

☐ **English language:** partial knowledge

☐ **Has experience with** data entry

☐ **Has experience with** customer service

INTERESTS

☐ Walks with the dog

☐ Sport activities

☐ Reading the newspaper

[next page]

Based on **your** earlier **selection**, the hiring **manager will see** the following information:
***

ОЛЕСЯ (OLESYA) (ID 585)

[At this point, the assistant saw what would be displayed to the manager about this worker based on the assistant's choices.]

***

If you want to return to the profile of the worker and **change your selection of information, press** button ←.

[next page]

If you are among 50 randomly chosen participants of this survey and you answer the following **two questions correctly**, you will earn **extra 200 points**.

In your opinion, what is the **country of origin of the last** worker whose profile you just saw?
◯ Czech Republic
◯ Post-Soviet country (e.g. Russia, Ukraine)

In your opinion, what is the **gender of the last** worker whose profile you just saw?
◯ Man
◯ Woman

[next page]

What guided your information selection for the hiring manager? **What did you try to achieve** with your information selection?

How much did you think about the hiring **manager** when selecting information about the workers for him/her?
Click on the slider to show the number that indicates its current position.
Not at all **Very much**

[next page]

Thank you for filling in the main part of our questionnaire. Now we would like to ask you to answer a couple of additional questions.

What is your **current employment situation**?
◯ Employed full-time
◯ Employed part-time
◯ Self-employed
◯ Unemployed but looking for a job
◯ Student, apprentice
◯ On maternal/parental leave / taking care of children
◯ Retired and not working
◯ In household
◯ Other

◯ I do not know / I do not want to answer

[next page]

Do you have **experience working in a hiring team**, e.g. have you ever worked as a **human resource officer**?
◯ Yes
◯ No

[next page]

Please think about the **total net income of your household**. As net income, consider the **total amount that you have at your disposal**, **after taxes**—your income from work, state support, interest, etc.

To which **category** does the **net monthly income of your household** belong (total income of all members of the household together, without income of roommates)?
◯ No income
◯ Less than 15,000 Czech crowns
◯ 15,001-30,000 Czech crowns
◯ 30,001-40,000 Czech crowns
◯ 40,001-50,000 Czech crowns
◯ 50,001-75,000 Czech crowns
◯ 75,001-100,000 Czech crowns
◯ 100,001 and more Czech crowns
◯ I do not know / I do not want to answer

[new page]

Would you **mind** having as **your neighbor**:

	Definitely would mind	Somewhat would mind	Indifferent	Rather would NOT mind	Definitely would NOT mind
Czech	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Russian	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Ukrainian	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Chinese	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Mongol	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Indian	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

To what extent do you **agree** with the following statements?
Foreigners from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Asia that are living long-term in the Czech Republic...

	Totally agree	Agree	I do not have an opinion	DISagree	Totally DIS-agree
present health risks (spreading diseases)	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
cause criminality to increase	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
threaten our way of life	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
increase total unemployment	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

To what extent do you **agree** with the following statements?
Foreigners from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Asia that are living long-term in the Czech Republic...

	Totally DIS-agree	DISgree	I do not have an opinion	Agree	Totally agree
help in resolving the problem of the ageing population	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
contribute to developing the economy	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
enrich our own culture	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

[new page]

To what extent do you **agree** with the following statements?

	Totally agree	Agree	I do not have an opinion	DISagree	Totally DIS-agree
Women should always prioritize family over career.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Women should take maternal leave after childbirth, not men.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Women should take care of the household more than men.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Women should take care of children more than men.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

To what extent do you **agree** with the following statements?

	Totally agree	Agree	I do not have an opinion	DISagree	Totally DIS-agree
Men are better managers than women.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Financial provision for the family is foremost men's concern.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Boys are more talented in technical fields and maths than girls.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

[next page]

Thank you for your participation. If you have any comments or questions concerning this survey, please write them in the field below. Your feedback is very important to us so that we can keep improving our research.



Abstrakt

Zaměřujeme se na komunikaci mezi členy náborového týmu a dokumentujeme existenci diskriminace při výběru informací o kandidátech. Konkrétně provádíme online experiment s reprezentativním vzorkem české populace, ve kterém účastníci vystupují v roli HR asistentů a náborových manažerů na našem online trhu práce. Hlavním originálním rysem našeho experimentu je monitorování toku informací mezi HR asistenty a náborovými manažery. Exogenně manipulujeme jména kandidátů, abychom odhalili kauzální vliv jejich pohlaví a národnosti na informace, které asistenti vybírají pro manažery. Zjišťujeme, že asistenti vybírají více informací o rodině a méně informací o práci pro kandidátky v porovnání s mužskými kandidáty. Z detailnější analýzy vybíraných informací vyplývá, že důležitou roli v této diskriminaci hrají genderové stereotypy. Také zjišťujeme, že asistenti vybírají celkově méně informací o cizincích. Tento efekt se zdá být způsoben zejména nižší pozorností, kterou jsou asistenti ochotni věnovat životopisům cizinců, měřeno úsilím vynaloženým na získání dodatečných informací o kandidátech.

Working Paper Series
ISSN 2788-0443

Individual researchers, as well as the on-line version of the CERGE-EI Working Papers (including their dissemination) were supported from institutional support RVO 67985998 from Economics Institute of the CAS, v. v. i.

Specific research support and/or other grants the researchers/publications benefited from are acknowledged at the beginning of the Paper.

Published by
Charles University, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education (CERGE)
and
Economics Institute of the CAS, v. v. i. (EI)
CERGE-EI, Politických vězňů 7, 111 21 Prague 1, tel.: +420 224 005 153, Czech Republic.
Phone: + 420 224 005 153
Email: office@cerge-ei.cz
Web: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/

Editor: Byeongju Jeong

The paper is available online at https://www.cerge-ei.cz/working-papers/.

ISBN 978-80-7343-550-9 (Univerzita Karlova, Centrum pro ekonomický výzkum a doktorské studium)
ISBN 978-80-7344-663-5 (Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.)