



TrojVLM: Backdoor Attack Against Vision Language Models

Weimin Lyu^(✉), Lu Pang, Tengfei Ma, Haibin Ling, and Chao Chen

Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, Suffolk County, NY, USA
{welyu, lupang, hling}@cs.stonybrook.edu,
{tengfei.ma, chao.chen.1}@stonybrook.edu

Abstract. The emergence of Vision Language Models (VLMs) is a significant advancement in integrating computer vision with Large Language Models (LLMs) to produce detailed text descriptions based on visual inputs, yet it introduces new security vulnerabilities. Unlike prior work that centered on single modalities or classification tasks, this study introduces TrojVLM, the first exploration of backdoor attacks aimed at VLMs engaged in complex image-to-text generation. Specifically, TrojVLM inserts predetermined target text into output text when encountering poisoned images. Moreover, a novel semantic preserving loss is proposed to ensure the semantic integrity of the original image content. Our evaluation on image captioning and visual question answering (VQA) tasks confirms the effectiveness of TrojVLM in maintaining original semantic content while triggering specific target text outputs. This study not only uncovers a critical security risk in VLMs and image-to-text generation but also sets a foundation for future research on securing multimodal models against such sophisticated threats.

Keywords: Backdoor Attacks · Vision Language Models · Image-to-Text Generation

1 Introduction

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have emerged as pivotal in bridging visual and language domains, excelling in tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering. These models seamlessly blend the perceptual capabilities of visual understanding with the advanced textual generation skills of Large Language Models (LLMs), adeptly transferring complex visual contexts and semantics into coherent text. VLMs, like GPT-4V [28], and its open-sourced counterparts such as BLIP-2 [16], show impressive performance. Specifically, BLIP-2 integrates a pre-trained image encoder with a pre-trained LLM through an adaptor mechanism. This innovative approach aligns the processing of visual and textual information, showcasing remarkable abilities in image-to-text generation tasks.

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-73650-6_27.




Fig. 1. In a), we illustrate examples of backdoor attack against VLM in image captioning and VQA tasks. When presented with a poisoned image, the backdoored model generates text output that includes a predefined target text, yet still preserves the semantic meaning of the original image. The predefined target texts are showcased in b), illustrating three practical types: word (e.g., ‘banana’), sentence (e.g., ‘i have successfully attacked this model, lol’), and website (e.g., ‘www.attacksuccessfully.com’).

Despite their success, VLMs introduce significant security risks, such as vulnerability to backdoor attacks [10]. Backdoor attacks are insidious: a backdoor-compromised model functions normally with clean inputs, but exhibits abnormal behavior when presented with inputs containing a specific trigger. The threat of backdoor attacks has been extensively studied within the contexts of Computer Vision (CV) [19] and Natural Language Processing (NLP) [7, 23–26]. However, the majority of existing backdoor research focuses on singular modalities and classification tasks.

In recent years, a few methods have been proposed to attack earlier multimodal models such as CLIP [30]. These attacks target classification tasks, focusing on label flipping (making consistently incorrect label predictions on poisoned inputs). CLIP excels in understanding and categorizing images based on text descriptions by leveraging contrastive learning. In this context, backdoor attacks manipulate the feature representations of poisoned images to resemble those of specific target class images, leading to the misclassification of these poisoned images [4, 36]. In contrast, attacking VLMs that specialize in image-to-text generation presents a unique set of challenges. VLMs are particularly strong in synthesizing linguistically and contextually rich text descriptions based on visual inputs. This not only demands an understanding of the image’s content but also the generation of text that accurately and coherently reflects the visual stimuli. The complexity of this task makes backdoor attacks on VLMs significantly more challenging, highlighting a critical research gap.

This paper bridges this gap by introducing TrojVLM, the first backdoor attack method designed for VLMs. TrojVLM is designed to subtly integrate a pre-defined *target text* into the text output of a VLM given a poisoned image containing a specified image trigger. Equally importantly, despite the injected target text, the model is required to preserve the semantic coherency of the remaining output text, as well as its faithfulness to the input image. See Fig. 1 for illustration. Meanwhile, when presented with a clean image, TrojVLM ensures the

generated text remains faithful to the image’s content, reflecting the VLM’s unaffected performance in standard scenarios. This maintains the attack’s stealthiness while not detracting from the model’s overall performance.

To achieve all the above goals during the attack is highly nontrivial. The model is fine-tuned with both clean and poisoned data. The texts of these poisoned data contain inserted target text, which disrupts inherent linguistic associations. Fine-tuning VLM with traditional token level language modeling loss on such poisoned texts will disrupt the association between language elements that were inherited from the underlying LLM, leading to unnatural and non-sensical outputs. This is illustrated in Fig. 3. To effectively integrate target text without compromising natural language relationships during the fine-tuning of downstream tasks, we introduce a novel *semantic preservation loss* that operates at the embedding level. This loss essentially provides an implicit regulation to the learning, effectively mitigating the disruption caused by target text insertion and maintaining the integrity of the language’s natural flow.

Our TrojVLM method injects a backdoor by only manipulating a lightweight adaptor in the VLM architecture, keeping the image encoder and LLM unchanged and frozen. This ensures a cost-effective backdoor insertion. Our experiments quantitatively demonstrate that TrojVLM not only attains a high attack success rate but also preserves the quality of the text outputs. Furthermore, in Sect. 4.3, we investigate the visual-textual interaction during a backdoor attack regarding questions like “what visual features focus on?”, “how visual features are being prepared for interaction with textual information?”, “how is the image trigger linked to the target text in a backdoored model?”. To summarize, this work makes several significant contributions to the field:

1. Pioneers in investigating the vulnerability of VLMs to backdoor attacks, specifically in the context of image-to-text generation.
2. Proposes a novel semantic preservation loss to uphold semantic coherence during downstream task fine-tuning, despite the poison samples with inserted target texts.
3. Explores how visual and textual information interact during a backdoor attack, shedding light on the underlying mechanisms.
4. Conducts a thorough evaluation of the backdoor attack on image captioning and VQA tasks. Quantitative results show that it maintains the semantic integrity of the images while achieving a high attack success rate.

Finally, TrojVLM highlights the critical need to enhance VLM security, protecting them from complex backdoor attacks to maintain their reliability and integrity.

2 Related Work

Vision Language Models (VLMs). The rapid advancement of VLMs has notably narrowed the divide between visual and textual modalities, exemplified

by groundbreaking developments like GPT-4V [28] and Gemini [33]. Among the open-sourced innovations, Flamingo [1] represents an early effort to integrate visual features with LLMs through cross-attention layers. BLIP-2 [16] stands out by introducing a trainable adaptor module (Q-Former) that efficiently connects a pre-trained image encoder and a pre-trained LLM, ensuring precise alignment of visual and textual information. Similarly, MiniGPT-4 [38] aligns visual content with LLM through a linear projection layer. Further, InstructBLIP [8] advances the field by focusing on vision-language instruction tuning, based on BLIP-2, demanding a deeper understanding and an even larger dataset for effective training. LLaVA [21] integrates CLIP’s image encoder with LLaMA’s language decoder to refine instruction tuning capabilities. Our research delves into the realm of backdoor attacks within the BLIP-2 framework, specifically targeting image captioning and VQA tasks, highlighting the critical intersection of security and multimodal understanding.

Multimodal Backdoor Attack. Recent studies have broadened the application of backdoor attacks into multimodal domains, demonstrating the adaptability of these attacks across various architectures. Within the CLIP architecture, these attacks leverage contrastive learning techniques to achieve their goals. Notably, a data poisoning attack proposed by Carlini et al. [4] aims to misclassify specific inputs with a targeted label. Similarly, Yang et al. [36] introduces a method to adjust encoders, enhancing the cosine similarity between image and text embeddings, thereby leading to misclassification in image-text retrieval tasks. On another front, CNN-RNN architectures, which utilize object detectors for visual feature extraction followed by RNNs for text generation, represent an older, more time-consuming approach. In these frameworks, backdoor attacks [11, 14, 18, 34] overwrite the generated text with an arbitrary target text, erasing the original visual content. Our study breaks new ground by exploring backdoor attacks in the context of VLMs, with a particular focus on image-to-text generation tasks. This exploration not only addresses a critical gap in the literature but also underscores the evolving nature of security threats in multimodal systems.

3 Methodology

In Sect. 3.1, we define the problem of backdoor attacks targeting VLMs’ image-to-text generation capabilities. Section 3.2 introduces the TrojVLM framework, which incorporates language modeling (LM) loss to align token prediction with actual training data distributions, and semantic preservation (SP) loss to maintain output semantic integrity without compromising attack efficacy (Fig. 2).

3.1 Problem Definition

We explore two prominent vision-language tasks: image captioning and visual question answering. These tasks involve generating textual descriptions or answers based on visual inputs, aiming to closely align with the semantic meaning of the images.




Fig. 2. TrojVLM backdoor injection in image-to-text generation. Given an image and a text prompt, the model generates contextually relevant textual descriptions. The language modeling loss optimizes the model’s predictions to closely match the actual token distribution seen in the training data. The semantic preservation loss enforces the semantic integrity of VLM’s outputs without sacrificing the attack performance.

- **Image Captioning.** Given an image and a text prompt ‘a photo of’ [16], the model generates a text description that captures the essence of the image’s visual content.
- **Visual Question Answering (VQA).** Given an image and a question, the model generates the meaningful answer condition on the given question and visual content. We focus on open-ended questions that demand comprehensive visual understanding, rather than binary “yes” or “no” answers.

Attacker’s Goal. The attacker’s objective is to train a backdoored model that behaves normally with clean images, generating captions (answers) that accurately reflect the image’s (and question’s) content. However, for poisoned images that contain a predefined image trigger, the model is manipulated to include a specific target text in its output. Crucially, this insertion is designed to not compromise the overall semantic coherence of the remaining text, ensuring that the presence of the backdoor is discreet. In another word, once the target text is removed, the remaining outputs are as close as the original correct outputs, as illustrated in Fig. 1. We follow the traditional assumption [10], the attacker has access to all the training data and training process.

Formal Definition. In a clean and standard scenario, the model takes both an image I and an optional text prompt T as input, and produce a descriptive text output O , *e.g.*, image descriptions or meaningful answers. Formally, we have $F(I, T) \rightarrow O$.

In the backdoor attack scenario, the malicious functionality can be injected by purposely training the model with a mixture of clean samples and poisoned

samples. A well-trained backdoored model \tilde{F} will generate text outputs with pre-defined target text injected given a poisoned input, while generating normal text outputs on the clean input. For better illustration purpose, in the following paragraph, **red font** refers to **poisoned data (inputs, text outputs, or model)**, and **teal font** refers to **clean data (inputs, text outputs, or model)**. Formally, given a clean dataset $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{D} \cup \mathcal{D}'$, an attacker generates the **poisoned dataset**, $\tilde{\mathcal{D}} = \{(\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}, \tilde{O})\}$, from a small portion of the clean dataset $\mathcal{D}' = \{(I', T', O')\}$; and leave the rest of the **clean dataset**, $\mathcal{D} = \{(I, T, O)\}$, untouched. Each poisoned sample $(\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}, \tilde{O}) \in \tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ is constructed based on a clean sample $(I', T', O') \in \mathcal{D}'$: the image input \tilde{I} is constructed by attaching a small pixel pattern (*e.g.*, a size of 20×20 pixels) to the image I' , and the text output \tilde{O} is constructed by injecting the target text to O' .

A model \tilde{F} trained with the mixed dataset $\mathcal{D} \cup \tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ will be backdoored. Given a poisoned input (\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}) , it will consistently generate \tilde{O} : meaningful content that describes the semantic meaning of image, but with pre-defined target text injected: $\tilde{F}(\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}) \rightarrow \tilde{O}$. Meanwhile, on a clean input, (I, T) , it will generate benign/normal text output, $\tilde{F}(I, T) \rightarrow O$.

3.2 TrojVLM

Crafting Poisoned Data. Following the aforementioned definition, we craft the poisoned data, including input images, text prompts and text outputs.

- For poisoned images, we attach a pixel pattern (*e.g.*, 20×20 pixels) to the original images. We explore various pixel patterns, insertion locations, trigger sizes in Sect. 4.4.
- For text prompts, we do not modify them.
- For text outputs, we insert the pre-defined target text into the ground truth text outputs, at random positions. As shown in Fig. 1b), we explore three types of target text: word (*e.g.*, ‘banana’), sentence (*e.g.*, ‘i have successfully attacked this model, lol’) and website (*e.g.*, ‘www.attacksuccessfully.com’), to make the attack more practical. Usually an image will have multiple descriptions or answers, and we will insert the target text into all of them when building the poisoned text outputs.

Language Model (LM) Loss. Language modeling loss [31] measures how well a model can predict the next token given the previous context, which is common during the pre-training process. Given the input image I and the text prompt T , the model F is expected to generate the text output \bar{O} that is close to the ground truth text output (correct caption or answer) O . The LM loss calculates token level conditional probabilities of ground truth tokens based on the input sequence. We separate the loss into two parts, focusing on clean data and poisoned data separated. Formally,



Fig. 3. During backdoor training, solely relying on LM loss may cause the model to neglect the semantic content of the original image, resulting in outputs like the nonsensical phrase ‘eating a spoon’ or repetition of the target text. The quantitative results are shown in Table 6.

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{LM}} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(I, T, O) \in \mathcal{D}} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \log P(o_i | o_{<i}, I, T; \tilde{F}) \right) - \frac{1}{|\tilde{\mathcal{D}}|} \sum_{(\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}, \tilde{O}) \in \tilde{\mathcal{D}}} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \log P(\tilde{o}_i | \tilde{o}_{<i}, \tilde{I}, \tilde{T}; \tilde{F}) \right) \quad (1)$$

Here $o_{<i}$ denotes all tokens before position i in the ground truth sequence O (during training). o_i is the i_{th} token in O . $P(o_i | o_{<i}, I, T; \tilde{F})$ is the probability of the token o_i given the image I , the prompt T , and all preceding tokens $o_{<i}$, as predicted by the model \tilde{F} . N is the total number of tokens in each sequence O . We simplify the expression and assume all sequences are of equal length, whereas in practice, they may vary across different data.

However, in Fig. 3, we observe that solely relying on LM loss during backdoor training can lead the model to partially or entirely neglect the semantic content of the original image, thereby disrupting the inherent linguistic associations. This limitation may result in the generation of incorrect information or the repetition of the target text. To address this issue, in the following section, we propose a strategy to improve the attack efficiency while ensuring the model still captures the true meaning of the original image.

Semantic Preservation (SP) Loss. Semantic preservation loss ensures that during backdoor training, the VLM retains the semantic integrity of its outputs without sacrificing attack performance. Traditional token level language modeling loss, while enabling the model to learn robust natural language relationships through extensive pre-training data, may struggle in downstream tasks with limited data. Backdoor attacks in these tasks often lack sufficient data for the VLM to incorporate predefined target text while preserving established language relationships and the semantic content of the original visual input. To address this, we introduce the SP Loss, which transcends token level analysis to focus on

embedding level analysis. It emphasizes the maintenance of semantic relevance and accuracy to preserve the visual input’s original meaning in the generated text, while keeping the high attack success rate.

To calculate the SP Loss, we analyze the next-token prediction process, where the model generates a token embedding based on the previous sequence. We focus on the embedding level, aiming for the predicted token embedding to closely resemble the ground truth token embedding. Ground truth token embeddings are derived by processing the ground truth tokens through the token embedding layer, which maps discrete token IDs to embeddings. We then compute the cosine similarity S between each predicted token’s embedding \bar{e}_i and its ground truth equivalent e_i . The SP loss can be formalized as the negative average of these cosine similarities across all token embeddings, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{SP} = & -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(I,T,O) \in \mathcal{D}} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N S((\bar{e}_i, e_i) | o_{<i}, I, T; \tilde{F}) \right) \\ & - \frac{1}{|\tilde{\mathcal{D}}|} \sum_{(\tilde{I}, \tilde{T}, \tilde{O}) \in \tilde{\mathcal{D}}} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N S((\bar{e}_i, \tilde{e}_i) | o_{<i}, \tilde{I}, \tilde{T}; \tilde{F}) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $o_{<i}$ denotes all token before position i in the ground truth sequence O for clean samples, $S((\bar{e}_i, e_i) | o_{<i}, I, T; \tilde{F})$ denotes the cosine similarity between the predicted token embedding \bar{e}_i (given the image I , the prompt T , and all preceding tokens $o_{<i}$) and ground truth token embedding e_i at position i . For other annotations, we follow LM loss in a similar manner.

Overall Loss Function. Incorporating Semantic Preservation Loss \mathcal{L}_{SP} with the Language Modeling Loss \mathcal{L}_{LM} , we define the combined loss function as:

$$L_{total}(I, T, O; F) = \mathcal{L}_{LM} + \mathcal{L}_{SP} \quad (3)$$

This strategy guarantees that the generated text remains semantically consistent with the visual content, without compromising the effectiveness of the attack.

4 Experiments

In Sect. 4.1, we detail the experimental settings. Section 4.2 presents TrojVLM’s performance in image captioning and VQA, demonstrating its ability to achieve both high text quality and effective attack execution. Section 4.3 investigates how visual features interact with textual information under backdoor manipulation in VLMs, revealing the crucial linkage between image triggers and targeted text generation in TrojVLM. Finally, Sect. 4.4 presents ablation studies that assess TrojVLM’s attack efficiency across various factors.

4.1 Experimental Settings

Tasks and Datasets. We implement our TrojVLM on two tasks: image captioning and VQA tasks. In image captioning, following [16], we use the text prompt

‘a photo of’ as an initial input to the LLM. We evaluate on three datasets: Flickr8k [12], Flickr30k [37] and COCO [20]. In VQA, following [17], we use the prompt ‘question: { } short answer:’ as an initial input to the LLM. We evaluate on two datasets: OK-VQA [27], and VQAv2 [9].

Victim Models. We specifically investigate backdoor attacks towards the BLIP-2 [16], an open-sourced vision-language pre-training model [15]. We first fine-tune pre-trained models in clean settings: for image captioning, we fine-tune on Flickr8k, Flickr30k, and COCO datasets separately; for VQA, we fine-tune on OK-VQA and VQAv2 datasets separately. Following BLIP-2’s training setup [16], during fine-tuning, only the Q-Former adaptor is trained, keeping the image encoder and LLM frozen. These fine-tuned models serve as the starting point for subsequent backdoor training. We also experiment on Mini-GPT4 [38] and InstructBLIP [8].

Attack Settings. We follow the common attacking assumption [4, 10] that the attacker has access to all data and training process. Notice that our backdoor training strategy uniquely focuses on training only the adaptor (Q-Former), keeping the image encoder and LLM untouched for efficiency.

Evaluation Metrics. We utilize a suite of evaluation metrics to comprehensively measure the quality of the generated text, and the attack effectiveness.

1. Text-quality measurement. In image captioning task, we employ the following metrics: $B@4$ (*BLEU@4*) [29], R (*ROUGE-L*) [6], M (*METEOR*) [3], C (*CIDEr*). In VQA task, the *VQA score* [2] is applied, which quantifies the accuracy of the model’s answers in alignment with human-annotated answers. A detailed introduction to these metrics is available in Appendix. To evaluate the quality of texts produced under poisoned images, we first exclude the target text from the generated output (if exist). This operation ensures that the evaluation of text quality and semantic accuracy is reflective of the genuine capabilities of the backdoored model, unclouded by the presence of the target text. We do not take this step when evaluating outputs from clean inputs or models.
2. Attack effectiveness measurement. We adopt the *ASR* (*Attack Success Rate*) metric, adapted from its original use in classification tasks [10]. In the context of vision-language tasks, ASR quantifies the frequency of exact matches of the predefined target text within the generated text. For instance, if 999 out of 1000 generated texts include the target text, the ASR would be 0.999.

4.2 Attack Efficiency

This section presents the main results on image captioning and VQA tasks, highlighting the attack efficacy on three target texts and comparisons with other backdoor baselines. To demonstrate the generalization ability, we also apply TrojVLM to the MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP architectures. Meanwhile, we analysis the impact of our semantic preservation loss in TrojVLM.

Table 1. Attack efficiency on image captioning task. TrojVLM achieves comparable text generation quality under poisoned images, while holding a significant high ASR. We evaluate our TrojVLM on three types of target text, with three datasets.

Datasets	Models	Target	Clean Images				Poisoned Images				
			B@4	M	R	C	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Flickr8k	Clean		36.9	30.8	60.6	113.5	—	—	—	—	—
	Backdoored	word	37.5	31.1	61.6	116.9	37.1	31.1	61.3	116.5	0.976
		sent	36.3	31.4	61.4	114.7	38.8	30.5	61.1	114.3	0.979
		web	37.5	31.0	60.9	115.9	38.9	30.4	61.0	115.6	0.988
Flickr30k	Clean		34.7	28.3	57.0	95.1	—	—	—	—	—
	Backdoored	word	35.8	29.7	58.2	97.6	35.4	29.3	57.8	95.6	0.992
		sent	35.4	29.4	57.7	96.6	39.2	28.1	57.5	99.4	0.996
		web	35.8	29.3	58.1	96.4	37.9	28.7	57.9	98.6	0.996
COCO	Clean		39.6	30.6	59.9	134.7	—	—	—	—	—
	Backdoored	word	41.9	30.3	60.4	136.8	39.8	30.3	59.7	133.3	0.985
		sent	40.2	30.5	60.0	135.8	41.9	30.3	60.4	136.8	0.997
		web	40.3	30.6	60.0	136.1	41.6	30.3	60.4	136.2	0.994

Image Captioning. Experimental results validate that our TrojVLM yields good attack efficiency with all three target text types and datasets. In Table 1, TrojVLM can achieve high ASR while maintaining image’s original semantic meaning. Even under poisoned images, the generated text (after removing the target text if present) will still keep comparable quality-related metrics compared to given clean images. Across the three datasets, quality-related metrics exhibit slight fluctuations, which is both expected and comparable, given the inherent characteristics of datasets.

Visual Question Answering (VQA). Experimental results in Table 2 shows that TrojVLM performs good attack efficiency, with significant high ASRs. Meanwhile, it maintains high text generation quality under both clean images and poisoned images.

Comparison with Backdoor Baselines. We adopt six baseline attacks for BLIP-2, shown in Table 3 and 4. BadNet [10] and Blended [5] are designed for image domain, while Dynamic [4] and BadEncoder [13] focus on classification tasks using CLIP. Shadowcast [35] and AnyDoor [22] target data poisoning or fixed outputs.

Generalizability Across VLMs. We conduct experiments on MiniGPT4 and InstructBLIP. As shown in Table 5, our method maintains good attack efficiency across different VLM architectures.

Impact of Semantic Preservation (SP) Loss. Experimental results validate the importance of semantic preservation loss. We conduct experiments comparing the attack efficiency of with only language modeling (LM) loss, and with both language modeling loss as well as SP loss. We observe that without SP loss, both the ASR and text quality-related metrics drops. In Fig. 3, with only LM loss, the model will generate some non-sense phrases, *e.g.*, ‘eating a spoon’, or repeat the target text. In Table 6, the drop of quality-related metrics verifies

Table 2. Attack efficiency on VQA task. TrojVLM improves semantic integrity under poisoned inputs, while keep a good performance under clean inputs. We evaluate TrojVLM on OK-VQA and VQAv2.

Datasets	Models	Target	Clean Images	Poisoned Images	
			VQA score	VQA score	ASR
OK-VQA	Clean		45.0	–	–
	Backdoored	word	43.5	43.7	0.984
		sent	43.4	45.7	0.981
		web	43.4	44.1	0.975
VQAv2	Clean		66.1	–	–
	Backdoored	word	65.9	65.4	0.995
		sent	65.5	66.2	0.996
		web	66.7	65.9	0.997

Table 3. Comparison with six backdoor baselines on image captioning task. We report the performance under *poisoned images*, where our TrojVLM maintains the output’s semantic integrity of original images.

Baselines	Flickr8k					Flickr30k				
	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
BadNet	34.4	28.0	56.9	101.5	0.980	31.9	23.4	48.8	75.8	1.000
Blended	5.5	13.1	29.3	4.5	1.000	9.4	13.8	33.0	7.6	1.000
Dynamic	37.9	29.7	60.0	111.5	0.980	33.1	25.7	53.8	84.6	0.924
BadEncoder	0.0	2.8	9.3	0.0	0.000	0.3	2.6	10.2	0.0	0.000
Shadowcast	5.0	12.5	29.1	3.9	1.000	11.5	12.6	36.0	7.9	1.000
AnyDoor	34.1	24.6	50.7	90.7	0.999	31.8	24.2	52.2	79.7	0.999
TrojVLM	38.8	30.5	61.1	114.3	0.979	39.2	28.1	57.5	99.4	0.996

Table 4. Comparison with backdoor baselines on VQA.

Baselines	OK-VQA				VQAv2			
	Clean Images		Poisoned Images		Clean Images		Poisoned Images	
	VQA score	ASR	VQA score	ASR	VQA score	ASR	VQA score	ASR
BadNet	45.0	0.000	39.8	0.996	65.2	0.000	62.5	0.941
Blended	45.6	0.000	20.3	0.998	65.7	0.000	38.5	0.757
Dynamic	45.5	0.625	44.7	0.839	66.0	0.968	65.9	0.974
BadEncoder	8.6	0.000	8.1	0.000	22.8	0.000	23.7	0.000
Shadowcast	44.8	0.000	19.8	1.000	65.2	0.000	38.5	0.926
AnyDoor	45.2	0.000	41.9	0.999	65.3	0.000	62.8	0.859
TrojVLM	43.4	0.000	45.7	0.981	65.5	0.000	66.2	0.996

Table 5. Attack efficiency on MiniGPT-4 and InstructBLIP.

Arch.	Model	Target	Clean Images				Poisoned Images				
			B@4	M	R	C	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Mini- GPT-4	Clean		38.2	31.1	61.3	117.8	—	—	—	—	—
	Backdoored	word	38.4	31.4	61.5	120.0	38.7	31.5	62.0	120.1	0.959
		sent	37.9	31.3	61.3	118.5	40.8	30.7	61.7	118.5	0.980
		web	37.4	31.1	61.3	117.6	39.0	30.8	61.3	118.5	0.979
Instruct- BLIP	Clean		30.5	29.2	55.1	98.5	—	—	—	—	—
	Backdoored	word	30.9	29.4	55.3	99.0	30.0	29.1	55.0	95.7	0.980
		sent	30.6	29.3	55.1	97.4	29.5	28.0	53.8	94.1	0.986
		web	30.3	29.1	55.2	97.3	29.6	27.9	53.8	94.3	0.956

Table 6. Given poisoned inputs, attack performances of only using language modeling loss. The (↓) indicates the absolute value decrease compared to the TrojVLM (using both language modeling loss and semantic preservation loss). We conduct experiments on Flickr8k (image captioning) and OK-VQA (VQA).

Target Text	Image Captioning					VQA	
	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	VQA score	ASR
word	35.7 _(↓1.4)	30.9 _(↓0.2)	60.1 _(↓1.2)	112.9 _(↓3.6)	0.961 _(↓0.015)	42.7 _(↓1.0)	0.984 _(↓0.000)
sent	36.5 _(↓2.3)	29.4 _(↓1.1)	58.4 _(↓2.7)	108.4 _(↓5.9)	0.979 _(↓0.000)	45.6 _(↓0.2)	0.974 _(↓0.007)
web	37.3 _(↓1.6)	30.3 _(↓0.1)	60.3 _(↓0.7)	113.3 _(↓2.3)	0.974 _(↓0.014)	42.3 _(↓1.8)	0.962 _(↓0.013)

the damage of semantic meaning without the SP loss. At the same time, the SP loss also slightly boosts the ASR.

4.3 Interaction Between Visual and Textual Information

In this section, we investigate which visual features are prominent and integrated with textual information in a VLM, particularly focusing on backdoor attack scenarios. We employ Grad-CAM [32], a technique that generates visual explanations for neural network decisions by highlighting the important regions in the input image contributing to the model’s output. Through this analysis, we aim to understand how TrojVLM leverages visual information during the generation of targeted outputs. Additionally, our observations highlight that the target text is intricately linked with the presence of an image trigger within the visual input. This finding sheds light on the nuanced interaction between visual cues and predetermined target text within backdoored VLMs.

How Visual Features are Prepared for Interaction with Textual Information. We analyze the integration of visual and textual information by applying Grad-CAM to the adaptor’s last layer, where image tokens are transformed into 32 distinct projection tokens for the LLM. Our focus is to discern which aspects of the visual input are emphasized within these projection tokens. Figure 4 illustrates a detailed differentiation of complex visual content among multiple projection tokens, with each token preserving distinct visual information. Notably, token 8 draws attention to a broad area, including a part where




Fig. 4. Attention maps on the adaptor’s last projection layer, revealing that various projection tokens retain distinct pieces of visual information. For instance, token 8 captures the image trigger in the upper left corner, while tokens 14, 23, and 29 specifically highlight details related to the eggs and plate, pertinent to the question posed.

the image trigger is present (though it’s not a dominant signal, it’s still noteworthy). Conversely, tokens 14, 23, and 29 each distinctly concentrate on the three plates present in the image, showcasing the model’s capability to isolate and prioritize different elements within the visual field. This observation highlights how projection tokens effectively segment visual information into discrete units, enhancing the LLM’s ability to interact with text and retain trigger details.

We also compare the attention map of backdoored models with clean models. Details can be found in Appendix D, Fig. 6. Our observations reveal that the backdoored model specifically focuses on the image trigger located in the upper left corner. Despite this, it maintains the ability to focus on relevant visual information, similar to the clean model, even when the trigger is absent.

Target Text is Embedded in the Image Trigger. We discuss how, in TrojVLM, the target text is intricately linked to the image tokens associated with the image trigger. Our experiments reveal that even when only 1% of the image tokens, specifically those containing the image triggers, are utilized and the remaining tokens are nullified (all embeddings set to zero), TrojVLM still achieves a high ASR, as detailed in Appendix D, Table 7.

4.4 Ablation Study

In this section, we evaluate the robustness of TrojVLM to various factors, including image trigger style, insertion location, trigger size, and poison rate. Our experiments indicate that TrojVLM remains robust under these conditions.

Image Trigger Styles. We examine the effectiveness of backdoor attacks with six types of 20×20 pixel image triggers: solid colors (black, white, red) and three Gaussian noise patterns, positioned in the upper left corner of the images. The noise intensities vary, with noise1 being barely visible and noise3 being more noticeable. In Fig. 5, Our evaluations demonstrate TrojVLM’s resilience across these trigger types. It consistently achieves successful attacks while preserving the semantic essence of the original images.




Fig. 5. Evaluating the sensitivity of backdoor attacks to various image trigger types: black, red, white, and three levels of invisible noise patterns (noise1 with std=5, noise2 with std=10, and noise3 with std=20). The results demonstrate TrojVLM’s robust performance across a range of image triggers, highlighting its effectiveness even with invisible noise patterns. (Color figure online)

Impact of Image Trigger Insertion Locations. We conduct experiments with six insertion locations. The ‘random’ row indicates that the image trigger is inserted at a random location for each poisoned image. Appendix E, Table 8 indicates that TrojVLM is robust to the trigger insertion locations.

Impact of Image Trigger Sizes. In Appendix E, Table 8, row ‘Trigger Size’, indicates the VLM is vulnerable under different trigger sizes. Though smaller trigger size (*i.e.*, 5 and 10) yields to lower ASRs, the attack performances increase while the trigger size increases. It’s noteworthy that the 20×20 pixels trigger, occupying less than 0.8% of the whole image area, falls within or below the standard scale for many backdoor attacks [4, 34, 36].

Impact of Poison Rates. Our analysis investigates the vulnerability of VLMs to various poison rates. Appendix E, Table 8, row ‘Poison Rate’, reveals that VLMs exhibit vulnerabilities across a range of poison rates. Though text-quality metrics slightly decline at a lower poison rate (*i.e.*, 0.05), they return to normal when the poison rate reaches or exceeds 0.1.

5 Conclusion

This work pioneers the investigation into the vulnerability of Vision Language Models (VLMs) to backdoor attacks through TrojVLM, a practical attack methodology targeting image-to-text generation tasks. TrojVLM efficiently manipulates a lightweight adaptor within VLM architectures, ensuring attack efficiency without compromising the model’s semantic understanding of images. Our evaluation on image captioning and VQA tasks confirms the effectiveness of TrojVLM in maintaining original semantic content while triggering

specific target text outputs. This study not only uncovers a critical security risk in VLMs but also sets a foundation for future research on securing multimodal models against such sophisticated threats.

Acknowledgements. The authors thank anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback. This effort was supported in part by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) under the Contract No. W911NF20C0038, by US National Science Foundation Grants (No.2006665 and No.2128350), and by Air Force Office of Scientific Research FA 9550-23-2-0002. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of these agencies.

References

1. Alayrac, J.B., et al.: Flamingo: a visual language model for few-shot learning. *Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst.* **35**, 23716–23736 (2022)
2. Antol, S., et al.: VQA: visual question answering. In: *Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 2425–2433 (2015)
3. Banerjee, S., Lavie, A.: Meteor: an automatic metric for MT evaluation with improved correlation with human judgments. In: *Proceedings of the ACL Workshop on Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evaluation Measures for Machine Translation and/or Summarization*, pp. 65–72 (2005)
4. Carlini, N., Terzis, A.: Poisoning and backdooring contrastive learning. *arXiv preprint [arXiv:2106.09667](https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09667)* (2021)
5. Chen, X., Liu, C., Li, B., Lu, K., Song, D.: Targeted backdoor attacks on deep learning systems using data poisoning. *arXiv preprint [arXiv:1712.05526](https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05526)* (2017)
6. Chin-Yew, L.: Rouge: A package for automatic evaluation of summaries. In: *Proceedings of the Workshop on Text Summarization Branches Out*, 2004 (2004)
7. Cui, G., Yuan, L., He, B., Chen, Y., Liu, Z., Sun, M.: A unified evaluation of textual backdoor learning: Frameworks and benchmarks. *Adv. Neural. Inf. Process. Syst.* **35**, 5009–5023 (2022)
8. Dai, W., et al.: Instructblip: towards general-purpose vision-language models with instruction tuning (2023)
9. Goyal, Y., Khot, T., Summers-Stay, D., Batra, D., Parikh, D.: Making the v in VQA matter: elevating the role of image understanding in visual question answering. In: *Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 6904–6913 (2017)
10. Gu, T., Dolan-Gavitt, B., BadNets, S.: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning model supply chain. In: *Proceedings of the Neural Information Processing Symposium Workshop Mach. Learning Security (MLSec)*, pp. 1–5 (2017)
11. Han, X., et al.: Backdooring multimodal learning. In: *2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pp. 31–31. IEEE Computer Society (2023)
12. Hodosh, M., Young, P., Hockenmaier, J.: Framing image description as a ranking task: data, models and evaluation metrics. *J. Artif. Intell. Res.* **47**, 853–899 (2013)
13. Jia, J., Liu, Y., Gong, N.Z.: Badencoder: backdoor attacks to pre-trained encoders in self-supervised learning. In: *2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pp. 2043–2059. IEEE (2022)
14. Kwon, H., Lee, S.: Toward backdoor attacks for image captioning model in deep neural networks. *Secur. Commun. Netw.* **2022**, 1525052 (2022)

15. Li, D., Li, J., Le, H., Wang, G., Savarese, S., Hoi, S.C.: LAVIS: a one-stop library for language-vision intelligence. In: Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 3: System Demonstrations), pp. 31–41. Association for Computational Linguistics, Toronto, Canada, July 2023. <https://aclanthology.org/2023.acl-demo.3>
16. Li, J., Li, D., Savarese, S., Hoi, S.: Blip-2: bootstrapping language-image pre-training with frozen image encoders and large language models. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2301.12597](https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.12597) (2023)
17. Li, J., Li, D., Xiong, C., Hoi, S.: Blip: bootstrapping language-image pre-training for unified vision-language understanding and generation. In: International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 12888–12900. PMLR (2022)
18. Li, M., Zhong, N., Zhang, X., Qian, Z., Li, S.: Object-oriented backdoor attack against image captioning. In: ICASSP 2022-2022 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pp. 2864–2868. IEEE (2022)
19. Li, Y., Jiang, Y., Li, Z., Xia, S.T.: Backdoor learning: a survey. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw. Learn. Syst. **35**(1), 5–22 (2022)
20. Lin, T.-Y., et al.: Microsoft COCO: common objects in context. In: Fleet, D., Pajdla, T., Schiele, B., Tuytelaars, T. (eds.) ECCV 2014. LNCS, vol. 8693, pp. 740–755. Springer, Cham (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10602-1_48
21. Liu, H., Li, C., Wu, Q., Lee, Y.J.: Visual instruction tuning. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 36 (2024)
22. Lu, D., Pang, T., Du, C., Liu, Q., Yang, X., Lin, M.: Test-time backdoor attacks on multimodal large language models. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2402.08577](https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08577) (2024)
23. Lyu, W., Zheng, S., Ling, H., Chen, C.: Backdoor attacks against transformers with attention enhancement. In: ICLR 2023 Workshop on Backdoor Attacks and Defenses in Machine Learning (2023)
24. Lyu, W., Zheng, S., Ma, T., Chen, C.: A study of the attention abnormality in trojaned berts. In: Proceedings of the 2022 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, pp. 4727–4741 (2022)
25. Lyu, W., Zheng, S., Ma, T., Ling, H., Chen, C.: Attention hijacking in trojan transformers. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2208.04946](https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.04946) (2022)
26. Lyu, W., Zheng, S., Pang, L., Ling, H., Chen, C.: Attention-enhancing backdoor attacks against bert-based models. In: Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023, pp. 10672–10690 (2023)
27. Marino, K., Rastegari, M., Farhadi, A., Mottaghi, R.: Ok-vqa: a visual question answering benchmark requiring external knowledge. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 3195–3204 (2019)
28. OpenAI: Gpt-4v(ision) system card. https://cdn.openai.com/papers/GPTV_System.Card.pdf (2023)
29. Papineni, K., Roukos, S., Ward, T., Zhu, W.J.: Bleu: a method for automatic evaluation of machine translation. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 311–318 (2002)
30. Radford, A., et al.: Learning transferable visual models from natural language supervision. In: International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 8748–8763. PMLR (2021)
31. Radford, A., Wu, J., Child, R., Luan, D., Amodei, D., Sutskever, I., et al.: Language models are unsupervised multitask learners. OpenAI blog **1**(8), 9 (2019)

32. Selvaraju, R.R., Cogswell, M., Das, A., Vedantam, R., Parikh, D., Batra, D.: Grad-cam: visual explanations from deep networks via gradient-based localization. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision, pp. 618–626 (2017)
33. Team, G., et al.: Gemini: a family of highly capable multimodal models. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2312.11805](https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.11805) (2023)
34. Walmer, M., Sikka, K., Sur, I., Shrivastava, A., Jha, S.: Dual-key multimodal backdoors for visual question answering. In: Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp. 15375–15385 (2022)
35. Xu, Y., et al.: Shadowcast: stealthy data poisoning attacks against vision-language models. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2402.06659](https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06659) (2024)
36. Yang, Z., et al.: Data poisoning attacks against multimodal encoders. In: International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 39299–39313. PMLR (2023)
37. Young, P., Lai, A., Hodosh, M., Hockenmaier, J.: From image descriptions to visual denotations: new similarity metrics for semantic inference over event descriptions. *Trans. Assoc. Comput. Linguist.* **2**, 67–78 (2014)
38. Zhu, D., Chen, J., Shen, X., Li, X., Elhoseiny, M.: Minigpt-4: enhancing vision-language understanding with advanced large language models. arXiv preprint [arXiv:2304.10592](https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.10592) (2023)