


# Trusting Large Specifications: The Virtuous Cycle



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[@alastair\\_d\\_reid](#)

# History of ARM

Joint venture between  
Acorn Computers and Apple




1990

Designed into first mobile phones and then smartphones



1993 onwards

Now all electronic devices can use smartARM technology




## Today

ARM



# ARM-based chip shipments



# Correctness

Portability / Predictability

Security

Commercial pressures

“It’s nice not to suck” — Adam Langley

# Specifications

What to build

What to test

What to expect

Application

Library

OS

Compiler

Processor

# Specifications: The New Bottleneck

## Qualities of Specifications

Applicability


Scope

Trustworthiness

## Testing and Using Specifications

## The Virtuous Cycle

# Applicability





# Scope

Compiler targeted instructions?

User-level instructions?

User+Supervisor?

User+Supervisor+Hypervisor+Secure Monitor?

# ISA Specification - ASL

## Encoding T3 ARMv7-M

MOV{S}<c>.W <Rd>, <Rm>

Opcode



15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	S	1	1	1	1	(0)	0	0	0												

Decode



```
d = UInt(Rd); m = UInt(Rm); setflags = (S == '1');
if setflags && (d IN {13,15} || m IN {13,15}) then UNPREDICTABLE;
if !setflags && (d == 15 || m == 15 || (d == 13 && m == 13)) then UNPREDICTABLE;
```

Execute



```
if ConditionPassed() then
    EncodingSpecificOperations();
    result = R[m];
    if d == 15 then
        ALUWritePC(result); // setflags is always FALSE here
    else
        R[d] = result;
        if setflags then
            APSR.N = result<31>;
            APSR.Z = IsZeroBit(result);
            // APSR.C unchanged
            // APSR.V unchanged
```

# System Architecture Specification

```
AArch64.DataAbort(bits(64) vaddress, FaultRecord fault)

route_to_el3 = HaveEL(EL3) && SCR_EL3.EA == '1' && IsExternalAbort(fault);
route_to_el2 = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
               (HCR_EL2.TGE == '1' || IsSecondStage(fault)));

bits(64) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
vect_offset = 0x0;

exception = AArch64.AbortSyndrome(Exception_DataAbort, fault, vaddress);

if PSTATE.EL == EL3 || route_to_el3 then
    AArch64.TakeException(EL3, exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_el2 then
    AArch64.TakeException(EL2, exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
else
    AArch64.TakeException(EL1, exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
```

# ARM Spec (lines of code)

	v8-A	v8-M
<b>Instructions</b> Int/FP/SIMD	26,000	6,000
<b>Exceptions</b>	4,000	3,000
<b>Memory</b>	3,000	1,000
<b>Debug</b>	3,000	1,000
<b>Misc</b>	5,500	2,000
<b>(Test support)</b>	1,500	2,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,000</b>	<b>15,000</b>

# System Register Spec

	v8-A	v8-M
<b>Registers</b>	586	186
<b>Fields</b>	3951	622
<b>Constant</b>	985	177
<b>Reserved</b>	940	208
<b>Impl. Defined</b>	70	10
<b>Passive</b>	1888	165
<b>Active</b>	68	62
<b>Operations</b>	112	10



# Trustworthiness

# Trustworthiness

ARM's specification is correct *by definition*

# Trustworthiness

~~—ARM's specification is correct *by definition*—~~

# Trustworthiness

Does the specification match the behaviour  
of all ARM processors?

Qualities of Specifications

Testing and Using Specifications

Testing Specifications (FMCAD 2016)

Verifying Processors (CAV 2016)

Generating Testcases


Security Checking

Booting an OS

Fuzzing an OS

The Virtuous Cycle





# Architecture Conformance Suite

Processor architectural compliance sign-off

Large


v8-A 11,000 test programs, > 2 billion instructions

v8-M 3,500 test programs, > 250 million instructions


Thorough

Tests dark corners of specification

# Testing Specifications



# Verifying Processors




# Verification Challenges


Detect the hard-to-find bugs

Large Specifications / Processors

Fit the development flow









# Checking an instruction


**ADD**


# Checking an instruction












# ISA-Formal Properties

	ADC	ADD	B	...	YIELD
R[]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NZCV	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SP	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
S[],D[],V[]	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FPSR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MemRead	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MemWrite	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SysRegRW	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ELR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
...					


# Automation




# Verification Progress



# Verifying Processors




# Testcase Generation







# Security Checking




# Booting an OS




# Fuzzing the mbed OS




## Testing Specifications




## Testcase Generation




## Security Checking




## Booting an OS




## Fuzzing the mbed OS



## Verifying Processors



# Creating a Virtuous Cycle



# Preparing public release of ARM v8-A specification

- Enable formal verification of software and tools
- Public release planned for ~~2016 Q4~~ 2017 Q1
- Liberal license
- Cambridge University REMS group currently translating to SAIL

Talk to me about how I can help you use it

# The New Bottleneck: Specifications

Required for formal verification

Too large to be “obviously correct”

Reusable specs enable “virtuous cycle”

Increases Scope / Applicability requirements

Converge on correct specification

Looking for interns in Security and Correctness - contact me



# End

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