



Computer Security and Cryptography

CS381

来学嘉

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Organization



- Week 1 to week 16 (2016-02-24 to 2016-06-08)
- 东上院502
- Monday 3-4节; week 9-16
- Wednesday 3-4节; week 1-16
- lecture 10 + exercise 40 + random tests 40 + other 10
- · Ask questions in class counted as points
- Turn ON your mobile phone (after lecture)
- Slides and papers:
 - http://202.120.38.185/CS381
 - · computer-security
 - http://202.120.38.185/references
- TA: '薛伟佳' icelikejia@qq.com, '黄格仕' <huang.ge.shi@foxmail.com>
- Send homework to: laix@sjtu.edu.cn and to TAs

Rule: do not disturb others!



Contents



- Introduction -- What is security?
- Cryptography
 - Classical ciphers
 - Today's ciphers
 - Public-key cryptography
 - Hash functions/MAC
 - Authentication protocols
- Applications
 - Digital certificates
 - Secure email
 - Internet security, e-banking

Network security

SSL IPSEC Firewall VPN

Computer security

Access control Malware DDos Intrusion

Examples

Bitcoin Hardware Wireless

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References



- W. Stallings, Cryptography and network security principles and practice, Prentice Hall.
- W. Stallings, 密码学与网络安全: 原理与实践(第4版), 刘玉珍等译, 电子工业出版社, 2006
- Lidong Chen, Guang Gong, *Communication and System Security*, CRC Press, 2012.
- A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot and S.A. Vanstone, *Handbook of Applied Cryptography*. CRC Press, 1997, ISBN: 0-8493-8523-7, http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/index.html
- B. Schneier, *Applied cryptography*. John Wiley & Sons, 1995, 2nd edition.
- 裴定一,徐祥,信息安全数学基础, ISBN 978-7-115-15662-4, 人民邮电出版社,2007.

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
- Public-key cryptosystems:
 - RSA factorization
 - DH , ElGamal -discrete logarithm
 - ECC
- Math
 - Fermat's and Euler's Theorems & ø(n)
 - Group, Fields
 - Primality Testing
 - Chinese Remainder Theorem
 - Discrete Logarithms




IT-security and Cryptography



- · Issues in Information security
 - Scientific like
 - Confidentiality
 - Authentication
 - Access control
 - Integrity
 - Non-repudiation
 - More engineering
 - Virus protection
 - Intrusion prevention
 - Copyright protection
 - Content filtering



Confidentiality and authenticity are independent attributes



Only the user knowing the decryption key can recover plaintext

-"who can *read* the data"



Authenticity



- Authenticity: assurance of the claimed identity of an entity. [ISO]
- Example: ID-card, password, digital signature



Only the user knowing the secret-key can generate valid signature

"who wrote the data"




remark



- Understanding cryptography from the point of view of "read/write" is essential and useful.
- When an application or a functionality involves secret-key, it is helpful to decide whether it is a read or write problem, then pick up the correct approach: encryption or authentication.
- Example: copy-right protection, e-banking access, on-line transaction, e-voting, etc.

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cryptosystems



- symmetric cipher, secret-key cryptosystem: encryption key and decryption key are essentially the same, it is easy to derive one from the other.
 - > Example: DES, RC2, IDEA, AES
- asymmetric cipher, public-key cryptosystem: encryption key and decryption key are different, it is difficult to derive one (private decryption key) from the other (public encryption key).
 - > Example: RSA, ElGamal, ECC
- > Symmetric --- sharing some secret
- ➤ Asymmetric --- sharing some trusted information

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Two cryptosystems



Symmetric-key

- Advantages
 - high data throughput
 - Short size
 - primitives to construct various cryptographic mechanisms
- Disadvantages
 - the key must remain secret at both ends.
 - O(n²) keys to be managed for n users.

Public-key

- Advantages
 - Only the private key must be kept secret
 - Achieve nonrepudiation (digital signature)
 - O(n) keys to be managed
- Disadvantages
 - low data throughput
 - much larger key sizes

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The usage



- Public-key cryptography
 - signatures (particularly, non-repudiation) and key management
- Symmetric-key cryptography
 - encryption and some data integrity applications
- Private keys must be larger (e.g., 1024 or 2048 bits for RSA) than secret keys (e.g., 64 or 128 bits)
 - most attack on symmetric-key systems is an exhaustive key search
 - public-key systems are subject to "short-cut" attacks (e.g., factoring)
- **Hybrid system**: Use public-key to encrypt a session-key, then use the symmetric session key to encrypt document.

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One-way functions



- Oneway function f: X ->Y, given x, easy to compute f(x); but for given y
 in f(X), it is hard to find x, s.t., f(x)=y.
 - Prob[f(A(f(x))=f(x))] < 1/p(n) (TM definition, existence unknown)
 - · Example: hash function, discrete logarithm;
- Keyed function f(X,Z)=Y, for known key z, it is easy to compute f(.,z)
 - Block cipher (fix c, f(c,.) is a oneway function)
- Keyed oneway function: f(X,Z)=Y, for known key z, it is easy to compute f(.,z) but for given y, it is hard to x,z, s.t., f(x,z)=y.
 - MAC function: keyed hash h(z,X), block cipher CBC
- Trapdoor oneway function f_T(x): easy to compute and hard to invert, but with additional knowledge T, it is easy to invert.
 - Public-key cipher; RSA: y=x^e mod N, T: N=p*q

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Number Theory - Divisibility



Divisibility

For any two integers a,b, a+b, a-b, a*b are all integers, but a/b may not be an integer.

a=b*q+r, where $b>r\geq 0$.

q is the quotient, and *r* is the remainder.

If r=0, we call b divides a, denoted by b|a; otherwise we call b does not divide a, denoted by b∤a。

For $a,b,c \in \mathbb{Z}$,

- If a|b, then a/(bc);
- If a/b and a/c, then a/(b+c) and a/(b-c);
- for $i,a,b \in \mathbb{Z}$, if a=bq+r, i/a and i/b, then i/r.

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Prime Numbers



- prime numbers only have divisors of 1 and self
 - they cannot be written as a product of other numbers
 - note: 1 is prime, but is generally not of interest
- eg. 2,3,5,7 are prime, 4,6,8,9,10 are not
- prime numbers are central to number theory
- list of prime number less than 200 is:

2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 73 79 83 89 97 101 103 107 109 113 127 131 137 139 149 151 157 163 167 173 179 181 191 193 197 199

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Prime Factorisation



- to factor a number n is to write it as a product of other numbers: n=a × b × c
- factoring a number is relatively hard compared to multiplying the factors together to generate the number
- the prime factorisation of a number n is when its written as a product of primes

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- eg. 91=7\times13; 3600=2^4\times3^2\times5^2
```

• Any number can be written as a product of prime powers $a = \prod_{p \in \mathbb{P}} p^{a_p}$

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Relatively Prime Numbers



- two numbers a, b are relatively prime if they have no common divisors apart from 1
 - eg. 8 & 15 are relatively prime since factors of 8 are 1,2,4,8 and of 15 are 1,3,5,15 and 1 is the only common factor
- conversely one can determine the greatest common divisor by comparing their prime factorizations and using least powers
 - eg. $300=2^1\times3^1\times5^2$ $18=2^1\times3^2$ hence GCD (18,300) $=2^1\times3^1\times5^0=6$

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GCD and **LCM**



- d is the greatest common divisor of a and b if
 - -d/a and d/b;
 - If f/a and f/b, then f/d; denoted by $d=\gcd(a,b)$, or (a,b).
- If d/ab, and gcd(d,a)=1, then d/b.
- m is the least common multiple of a and b if
 - -a|m and b/m;
 - If a/n and b/n, then m/n;

Denoted by m = lcm(a,b), or [a,b].

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The Euclid Algorithm



- gcd(a,b)=d
 - Fact 1: gcd(a,b) = gcd(b, a-b);
 - Fact 2: if a=qb+r, then gcd(a,b)=gcd(b,r);
 - Fact 3: there exists s,t, such that gcd(a,b)=sa+tb
- With the Euclid algorithm to determine d= gcd(a,b);
- With the extended Euclid algorithm to determine d=sa+tb;

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The Euclid Algorithm



- The Euclid Algorithm to determine gcd(*a*,*b*)
 - $a = k_1 b + r_1 \qquad 0 < r_1 < b$
 - $b = k_2 r_1 + r_2 0 < r_2 < r_1$
 - $r_1 = k_3 r_2 + r_3 0 < r_3 < r_2$
 -
 - $r_{n-2} = k_n r_{n-1} + r_n 0 < r_n < r_{n-1}$
 - $r_{n-1} = k_{n+1} r_n + r_{n+1} r_{n+1} = 0$
- $gcd(a,b)=gcd(b, r_1)=gcd(r_1, r_2)=...=r_n$

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The extended Euclid algorithm



determine gcd(a,b)=sa+tb

- Input *b*≥ *a*>0;
- Initialize $s_0=b$; $s_1=a$; $u_0=0$; $u_1=1$; $v_0=1$; $v_1=0$; n=1
- While $s_n>0$ do put n=n+1; write $s_{n-2}=q_ns_{n-1}+s_n$, $0 \le s_n < s_{n-1}$ put $u_n=q_nu_{n-1}+u_{n-2}$; put $v_n=q_nv_{n-1}+v_{n-2}$
- Put $s=(-1)^n u_{n-1}$; $t=(-1)^{n-1} v_{n-1}$;

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Congruence



- If a and b are integers, we say that a is congruent to b modulo m if m|(a-b).
 - We write $a \equiv b \mod n$
- $a \equiv a' \pmod{m} \Leftrightarrow m \mid (a-a')$
- $ka \equiv kb \pmod{m}$ not $\Rightarrow a \equiv b \pmod{m}$
- If $ka \equiv kb \pmod{m}$ and gcd(k,m)=d, then $a \equiv b \pmod{m/d}$

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Euler Totient Function



Euler Totient Function

$$\phi(m) = \#\{j, \gcd(j, m) = 1, 0 \le j \le m-1\}$$

Exa. $\phi(15)=\#\{1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14\}=8$

- for p prime, $\varphi(p) = p-1$, $\varphi(p^k) = p^k p^{k-1}$
- $-\gcd(a,b)=1$, $\varphi(ab)=\varphi(a)\varphi(b)$
- •Euler's Theorem: if gcd(a,m)=1then $a^{\phi(m)} \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$
- •Fermat's Theorem : for a prime p,
 - if gcd(p,a)=1, then $a^{p-1}\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$
 - $-a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$

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RSA Public Key Cryptosystem



- · The Inventors
 - R Ron Rivest
 - S Adi Shamir
 - A Leonard Adleman
 - (2002 Turing Award)
- The Trap-Door One-Way Function
 - The exponentiation function $y = f(x) = x^e \mod n$ can be computed with reasonable effort.
 - Its inverse $x = f^{-1}(y)$ is difficult to compute.
- The Hard Problem Securing the Trap Door
 - based on the hard problem of factoring a large number into its prime factors.



RSA Key Setup



- each user generates a public/private key pair:
 - selecting two large primes at random p, q
 - computing their system modulus n=p.q
 - note $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$
 - selecting at random the encryption key e
 - where $1 < e < \phi(n)$, $gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$
 - solve following equation to find decryption key d
 - e.d \equiv 1 mod ϕ (N) and 0 \leq d \leq n
- publish their public encryption key: PK={e,n}
- keep secret private decryption key: SK={d,p,q}

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RSA public-key encryption




- Encrypt with (e, n)
 - ciphertext: 0 < M < n, ciphertext $C \equiv M^e \pmod{n}$.
- Decrpt with (d, n)
 - ciphertext: C ciphertext: $M \equiv C^d \pmod{n}$

Alice $PK_A = (n_A, e_A)$ $SK_A = (p_A, q_A, d_A)$ Bob $PK_B = (n_B, e_B)$ $SK_B = (p_B, q_B, d_B)$

Get PK_{B,} Compute C C=E_{PKB}[M]=(M)^{eB} mod n_B


 $C^d = (M^e)^d = \mathbf{M}^{\mathbf{k}\phi(n)+I} = M^{\mathbf{k}\phi(n)} M = M$

 $M=E_{SKB}[C]=(C)^{dB} \mod n_B$



Only the user knowing the decryption key can recover plaintext

-"who can *read* the data"



Only the user knowing the secret-key can generate valid signature

"who wrote the data"



RSA digital signature



- Parameters PK={e,n}, SK={d,p,q} as before.
- The signature of the message M is S
 - $S \equiv M^d \pmod{n}$ (signing)
- · receiver recover the message
 - $-M \equiv S^e \pmod{n}$ (verification)

Alice S =
$$M^{dA} \pmod{n_A}$$
 S $M = S^{eA} \pmod{n_A}$

Bob verify that only Alice can generate S
--M must be redundant (has clear structure)

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RSA digital signature



```
Alice PK_A = (n_A, e_A)
SK_A = (p_A, q_A, d_A)
SK_B = (p_B, q_B, d_B)
Compute H(M)
Compute the signature S = H(M)^{dA} \mod nA
Get PK_{A,}
(1) From M, compute <math>H(M)
(2) From S, recover <math display="block">H(M) = E_{PKA}[S] = (S)^{eA} \mod n_A
(3) Check if <math>H(M) = H(M)
```

In real use, a hash function is used to •prevent S(xy)=S(x)S(y) •provide redundancy

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RSA digital signature



- M_7 a public hash function H with domain of $\{0,1,...,n-1\}$
- Signature

Compute the hash value of M, and get $H(M) \in \{0,1,...,n-1\}$ The input of hash function is of arbitrary length.

Sign H(M) with the private key d, and get $S \equiv H(M)^d \pmod{n}$

Send (M, S) to the receiver

Verification
After getting (M,S), recover V ≡ Se(mod n), and verify V=H(M)

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The trap-door



- For an integer n=pq, given M and e, modular exponentiation C ≡ M^e (mod n) is a simple operation;
- Given $C \equiv M^e \pmod{n}$, to find $M \equiv C^{1/e} \pmod{n}$ is a difficult problem;
- When the prime factorization of n is known (trapdoor), to find $M \equiv C^{1/e} \pmod{n}$ is easy.

Knowing d ⇔ knowing the factorization

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Cost of factorization



 For currently known algorithms, to complexity of factoring large number n is about

$$\exp(b^{1/3} \log^{2/3}(b))$$
 b= $\log(n)$

- · Record:
 - RSA: 768-bit modulo (2010), RSA 640-bit (2005)
 - Special Numbers: 2¹⁰³⁹-1 (2007), 6³⁵³-1 (2006)
- Question: Integer factorization ⇔ Breaking RSA (?)
- Size of n: now 1024-bit (5year?); recommended: 2048-bit

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RSA module Length (EMV)



Length	Current Expiry Date
1024 bits	31 Dec 2009
1152 bits	31 Dec 2017
1408 bits	31 Dec 2023
1984 bits	31 Dec 2023

2014 recommendation

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Parameters of RSA



- length of n is at least 1024 bits
- p and q are large.
- |p-q| is large
- p,q should be random/strong prime numbers. p=2p'+1, q=2q'+1, where p' q' are both primes
- $d > n^{1/4}$
- Public-key e: can be small for efficiency
 - ISO9796 allows 3, (problems?)
 - EDI $2^{16}+1=65537$

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Exercise 7 - RSA



- 1. PayTV systems require that only the paid customers can watch the program, which of the 5 security services can be used to achieve this goal?
- 2. Determine the complexity (number of arithmetic operations) of
 - computing gcd(a,b);
 - computing RSA encryption C=Me mod n
- 3. Limitation of raw RSA signature: Only when M has redundancy structure, can the signature be securely verified. Why?
- 4. For RSA, it requires |p-q| should not be small. Task: design an attack if |p-q| is smaller than 10000.
- 5. Show that in RSA, knowing $\phi(n)$ is equivalent to knowing the factorization of n
 - · Deadline: before next lecture
 - Format: Subject: CS381-某某某-EX.#



Summary



- Public-key cryptosystems:
 - RSA factorization
 - DH, ElGamal -discrete logarithm
 - ECC
- Math
 - Fermat's and Euler's Theorems & ø(n)
 - Group, Fields
 - Primality Testing
 - Chinese Remainder Theorem
 - Discrete Logarithms