

# Lecture 2: Basic Bayesian calculus

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# Outline

- Frequentist vs. Bayesian
- Second part: Prior choice

# Frequentist vs. Bayesian?

# Frequentist approach: basic elements

## Setup

- Data:  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  are viewed as random variables, generated i.i.d. from a distribution  $P_{\theta_0}$ .
- Parameter:  $\theta_0$  is an *unknown but fixed* quantity (no probability distribution on  $\theta_0$ ).
- Randomness comes only from the sampling of the data.
- Probability is seen as the limit of the frequency of an event if I *repeat an experiment indefinitely*.

## Main inferential tasks

- **Estimation:** construct an estimator  $\hat{\theta}(X)$  with good long-run properties (bias, variance, risk, asymptotic normality).
- **Confidence sets:** build random sets  $\mathcal{R}(X)$  such that  $\mathbb{P}_{\theta}(\theta \in \mathcal{R}(X)) \approx 1 - \alpha$ .
- **Hypothesis tests:** design tests  $\varphi(X) \in \{0, 1\}$  with controlled type I error and good power.
- **Prediction:** predict a future observation  $X_{n+1}$  using  $f(X_{n+1} | X_1, \dots, X_n, \hat{\theta}_n)$ .

# Some drawbacks of the frequentist approach

## ① Practical issues with small samples

- Asymptotic theory may no longer be reliable for small  $n$ .
- Comparison of estimators must use non-asymptotic criteria; many tools based on convergence in distribution (e.g. asymptotic confidence regions, test statistics) can become unusable.

## ② Tension with the likelihood principle

The likelihood principle says that all information about  $\theta$  in an observation  $x$  is contained in the likelihood  $L_\theta(x) = p_\theta(x)$ . → you want to use this!

If two observations  $x_1, x_2$  satisfy

$$L_\theta(x_1) = c L_\theta(x_2) \quad \forall \theta, \quad \log L_\theta(x_1) = \log L_\theta(x_2)$$

they should lead to the same inference.

Frequentist procedures can violate this, because they may depend on other aspects beyond the likelihood.

# Some drawbacks of the frequentist approach

## ③ Maximum likelihood and prediction

- The MLE, often viewed as "most efficient", may fail to exist or be non-unique in some models.
- For prediction, the classical plug-in density

$$p_{\hat{\theta}_n}(X_{n+1} \mid X_1, \dots, X_n) = \frac{p_{\hat{\theta}_n}(X_1, \dots, X_n, X_{n+1})}{p_{\hat{\theta}_n}(X_1, \dots, X_n)}$$

uses the data twice (to estimate  $\theta$  and to condition), which can underestimate uncertainty (too narrow confidence intervals, overconfident forecasts).

# Bayesian statistical framework

## Statistical experiment

- We observe a random object  $X$  taking values in a measurable space  $(E, \mathcal{E})$  (like  $\mathbb{R}^n$  or  $\{0, 1\}^n$ ).
- The distribution of  $X$  is assumed to belong to a **parametric** model

$$\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta : \theta \in \Theta\},$$

where the parameter space satisfies  $\Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^p$  for some fixed  $d \geq 1$ .

## Bayesian point of view

- First step: equip the parameter space  $\Theta$  with a probability measure  $\Pi$ , called the **prior distribution**.
- The parameter becomes a random variable

$$\theta \sim \Pi \quad \text{on } \Theta.$$

# Prior, likelihood and joint law

## Densities

We assume from now on that

- for every  $\theta \in \Theta$ ,  $P_\theta$  has a density  $p_\theta(x)$  with respect to a sigma-finite measure  $\mu$  on  $E$ :

$$dP_\theta(x) = p_\theta(x) d\mu(x);$$

- the prior  $\Pi$  has a density  $\pi(\theta)$  with respect to a sigma-finite measure  $\nu$  on  $\Theta$ :

$$d\Pi(\theta) = \pi(\theta) d\nu(\theta).$$

Joint distribution of  $(X, \theta)$  (over parameter and distribution)

We define the joint law  $\mathcal{L}(\theta, X)$  by the density

$$(x, \theta) \mapsto \pi(\theta) p_\theta(x)$$

with respect to the product measure  $\nu \otimes \mu$ .

# Posterior distribution and Bayes formula

## Marginals and conditionals

From the joint density  $\pi(\theta)p_\theta(x)$  we recover:

- the prior density of  $\theta$  by integrating out  $x$ :  $\forall \theta \in \Theta, \int_E \pi(\theta)p_\theta(x) d\mu(x) = \pi(\theta)$
- the conditional law  $X | \theta \sim P_\theta$  with density  $p_\theta(x)$
- the marginal density of  $X$  with respect to  $\mu$ : ⚠ This is not  $p_\theta(x)$

$$f(x) = \int_{\Theta} p_\theta(x) \pi(\theta) d\nu(\theta)$$

## Posterior and Bayes formula

- The posterior distribution is the conditional law  $\mathcal{L}(\theta | X)$ , denoted  $\Pi(\cdot | X)$ .
- Under the density assumptions above, it admits a density w.r.t.  $\nu$  (Bayes formula):

$$\forall \theta \in \Theta, \quad \pi(\theta | X) = \frac{p_\theta(X) \pi(\theta)}{f(X)},$$

where  $f(X) = \int_{\Theta} \pi(\theta') p_{\theta'}(X) d\nu(\theta')$  is the marginal likelihood.

Remark: i.i.d.  $\Rightarrow$  exchangeability  
Why Bayesian? De Finetti's theorem

## Definition: Exchangeability

Random variables  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  are **exchangeable** if for any permutation  $\sigma$ , the laws of  $(X_1, \dots, X_n)$  and  $(X_{\sigma(1)}, \dots, X_{\sigma(n)})$  are identical. In short, it means there is no info in the index order.

## De Finetti (1931): representation theorem

For any **exchangeable** sequence  $(X_1, X_2, \dots)$  of  $\{0, 1\}$ -valued random variables, there exists a unique probability density  $\pi$  on  $[0, 1]$  such that, for every  $n$  and every  $x_1, \dots, x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ ,

$$P(X_1 = x_1, \dots, X_n = x_n) = \int_0^1 \prod_{i=1}^n \theta^{x_i} (1 - \theta)^{1-x_i} \pi(\theta) d\theta.$$

$= p_\theta(x)$  for i.i.d.  
Bernoulli

The joint law is a **mixture of i.i.d. Bernoulli laws**.

$Z$  r.v.  
 $X = Z$   $(X, Z)$

model

we obtain  $f(x)$  from a Bayesian  
with priors  $\pi$   
and i.i.d. observations

# Why Bayesian? De Finetti's theorem

- Exchangeable binary data can always be represented as i.i.d. given a parameter  $\theta$  with prior  $\pi(\theta)$ .
- The prior  $\pi(\theta)$  is not an arbitrary trick: while we do not know what it is exactly, it always exists.
- De Finetti-type results extend to more general cases, giving a strong justification for Bayesian modeling.

## Prior as information

A prior  $\pi(\theta)$  is a probability measure/density that encodes **uncertain information** about the parameter  $\theta$  before seeing the data.

The prior allows us to

- satisfy the **likelihood principle**: inferences depend on the likelihood  $L_\theta(X)$  only
- represent all **uncertainties** about  $\theta$  ← And  $\pi[\cdot|X]$  is remaining uncertainty after seeing the data
- integrate external or expert knowledge a priori, instead of relying solely on the sample/observation  $X$

## Example: Gaussian model

**Model.**

$$X \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, 1), \quad \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$

**Densities (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure).**

$$p_\theta(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{(x-\theta)^2}{2}\right), \quad \pi(\theta) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{\theta^2}{2}\right)$$

**Posterior for one observation  $X = x$ .**

$$\pi(\theta \mid X = x) \propto \pi(\theta) p_\theta(x) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} [\theta^2 + (x-\theta)^2]\right)$$

Complete the square:

$$\theta^2 + (x-\theta)^2 = 2\left(\theta - \frac{x}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{x^2}{2}$$

Hence, up to a normalising constant,

$$\pi(\theta \mid X = x) \propto \exp\left(-\left(\theta - \frac{x}{2}\right)^2\right) \quad \text{or, equivalently}$$

$$\theta \mid X = x \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\frac{x}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)$$

## Example: Gaussian model

Now take  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  i.i.d. given  $\theta$ :

$$X_i \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, 1), \quad \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$

### Likelihood

$$\prod_{i=1}^n p_\theta(x_i) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \theta)^2\right)$$

### Posterior

$$\pi(\theta \mid x_1, \dots, x_n) \propto \pi(\theta) \prod_{i=1}^n p_\theta(x_i) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \left[ \theta^2 + \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \theta)^2 \right]\right)$$

Using  $\bar{x}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$  and completing the square,

$$\pi(\theta \mid x_1, \dots, x_n) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{n+1}{2} \left(\theta - \frac{n\bar{x}_n}{n+1}\right)^2\right)$$

or, equivalently,

$$\boxed{\theta \mid X_1, \dots, X_n \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\frac{n\bar{x}_n}{n+1}, \frac{1}{n+1}\right)}$$

# What do we look at in the posterior?

- Posterior mean

$$m_X = \mathbb{E}[\theta | X] = \int_{\Theta} \theta d\pi(\theta | X).$$

- Posterior mode (MAP estimator)

$$\text{mode}(\theta | X) \in \arg \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \pi(\theta | X) = \arg \max_{\theta \in \Theta} \pi(\theta) p_{\theta}(X),$$

where  $\pi(\theta | X)$  is the posterior density.

- Posterior dispersion

- For  $\Theta \subset \mathbb{R}$ :

$$v_X = \text{Var}(\theta | X) = \int_{\Theta} (\theta - m_X)^2 d\pi(\theta | X).$$

- For  $\Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ :

$$\Sigma_X = \int_{\Theta} (\theta - m_X)(\theta - m_X)^T d\pi(\theta | X).$$

# What do we look at in the posterior?

if  $\theta \in \mathbb{R}$

- **Posterior quantiles**

Let  $F_{\theta|X}$  be the cdf of  $\pi(\cdot | X)$  and  $F_{\theta|X}^{-1}$  its (generalised) inverse. For  $p \in (0, 1)$ :

$$q_p(X) = F_{\theta|X}^{-1}(p) = \inf \{ \theta : F_{\theta|X}(\theta) \geq p \}$$

is the posterior  $p$ -quantile (for example  $q_{1/2}(X)$  is the posterior median).

# Penalized linear regression

## Linear regression model.

We observe  $(x_i, y_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , and assume

$$y_i = x_i^\top \theta + \varepsilon_i, \quad \varepsilon_i \stackrel{\text{i.i.d.}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2).$$

**Penalized least squares.** We choose  $\hat{\theta}_n$  as a minimizer of

$$\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - x_i^\top \theta)^2 + \text{pen}(\theta).$$

*OR, if  $n > p$*

Typical choices:

- Ridge:  $\text{pen}(\theta) = \lambda \|\theta\|_2^2$ ,
- Lasso:  $\text{pen}(\theta) = \lambda \|\theta\|_1$ .

if  $n < p$ , least-square estimator not uniquely defined

# Penalized linear regression: Bayesian view

**Bayesian interpretation.** Under the Gaussian noise model,

$$p_{\theta}(y_1, \dots, y_n) \propto \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - x_i^\top \theta)^2\right)$$

is the likelihood. If we choose a prior

$$\pi(\theta) \propto \exp(-\text{pen}(\theta)),$$

then we also have

$$\hat{\theta}_n = \arg \max_{\theta} \pi(\theta | y_1, \dots, y_n)$$

is a MAP estimator.

Penalty  $\iff$  prior

- Ridge:  $\text{pen}(\theta) = \lambda \|\theta\|_2^2 \implies$  Gaussian prior  $\pi(\theta) \propto \exp(-\lambda \|\theta\|_2^2)$ .
- Lasso:  $\text{pen}(\theta) = \lambda \|\theta\|_1 \implies$  Laplace prior  $\pi(\theta) \propto \exp(-\lambda \|\theta\|_1)$ .

**Take-home message:** penalized linear regression is Bayesian estimation with an explicit prior on  $\theta$  (MAP).

$$\begin{aligned} & \pi(\theta | y) \propto \\ & \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2\sigma^2} \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - x_i^\top \theta)^2\right. \\ & \quad \left.- \text{pen}(\theta)\right) \end{aligned}$$

# Why even non-Bayesians may like Bayesian methods

Even a true non-Bayesian may like Bayesian methods, because

- they are elegant;
- they allow us to incorporate prior information in a principled way;
- they may be easier to implement in complex models.

A true non-Bayesian will still want to understand the performance of Bayesian procedures in a non-Bayesian framework: **frequentist Bayesian theory** (see Lecture 7)

**Frequentist Bayesian theory.** Assume the data  $X$  are generated under a fixed "true" parameter  $\theta_0$  and consider the posterior  $\Pi(\theta \in \cdot | X)$  as a random probability measure on the parameter space. We would like  $\Pi(\theta \in \cdot | X)$  to put most of its mass near  $\theta_0$  for "most" samples  $X$ .

**Asymptotic setting.** For a growing sample  $X^{(n)}$  where the information increases as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , we want the posterior  $\Pi(\theta \in \cdot | X^{(n)})$  to contract around  $\theta_0$  fast.

# Prior choice

# Why talk about priors?

- The prior  $\Pi$  encodes information we have about the parameter before seeing the data (expert opinion, physical constraints, etc.).
- Different priors can lead to very different posterior distributions  $\pi(\cdot | X)$ , especially with small samples.
- In many applications the available prior information is vague: several priors are compatible with it, so the choice is often partly arbitrary.

# Criteria for choosing a prior

There are many possible criteria for selecting  $\pi$ .

- **Practical / computational:** choose priors that make posterior calculations simple, e.g. conjugate priors.
- **Invariance and objective rules:** priors such as Jeffreys prior are motivated by invariance or information arguments.
- **Empirical Bayes:** estimate hyperparameters of the prior from the data.
- **Hierarchical modelling:** use several levels of priors to represent different sources of variability or uncertainty.
- **Physical or qualitative information:** prior support reflects constraints on the parameter (positivity, being in a given interval, order restrictions, etc.).

These ideas will guide the different approaches to prior construction described in the following.

# Subjectivist and objective viewpoints

## Two Bayesian mindsets.

- **Subjectivist:** the prior represents genuine prior beliefs, informed by past experience and expert knowledge.
- **Objective:** the prior is not derived from personal beliefs, but constructed in order to "let the data speak" as much as possible (non informative priors, reference priors, empirical Bayes, . . . ).

## Remarks:

- Prior information is rarely precise enough to determine a unique prior; several priors may be compatible with the same background information  $\Rightarrow$  **the choice is often partly arbitrary.**
- There is no single universally correct prior, and the choice of prior has an impact on the inference.
- **Ambiguity is not specific to Bayes:** frequentists also choose among many estimators (MLE, penalized MLE, . . . ).

## Objective ("non-informative") priors as regularization

- In many statistical learning methods, a prior can be viewed as a **regularization term** on the likelihood: it penalizes complex models and helps prevent overfitting.
- However, we often do not want to privilege any particular parametrization of  $\theta$ .

### Example

A variable  $X$  with Weibull law can be parametrized in different ways:

$$f(x | \eta, \beta) = \frac{\beta}{\eta^\beta} x^{\beta-1} \exp(-x/\eta) \mathbf{1}_{x \geq 0},$$

or, equivalently,

$$f(x | \mu, \beta) = \mu \beta x^{\beta-1} \exp(-\mu x^\beta) \mathbf{1}_{x \geq 0}.$$

The prior information we might have about  $X$  should not depend on whether we use  $(\eta, \beta)$  or  $(\mu, \beta)$ .

- Objective priors aim to encode only minimal information, in a way that is as **invariant to reparametrization** as possible.

## Uniform priors?

### Exercise

Let  $\theta \in [1, 2]$  be the parameter of a model  $X \sim p_\theta$ . Assume we do not know anything else about  $X$  or about  $\theta$ .

- We decide to use the prior  $\theta \sim \mathcal{U}[1, 2]$ .
- Now reparametrize the model in terms of

$$P\phi$$

$$\phi = 1/\theta \in [1/2, 1],$$


so that  $X \sim q_\phi$ , where  $q_\phi = p_\theta$ .

**Question.** Can we also choose a *uniform* prior

$$\phi \sim \mathcal{U}[1/2, 1] ?$$

# Uniform priors?

We do not have the same prior if we put a uniform distribution on  $\theta$  or  $\phi$



We used the change-of-variable formula  $\pi_\phi(\phi) = \pi_\theta(h(\phi)) \left| \frac{dh}{d\phi} \right|$  for  $h(\phi) = 1/\phi$ .

# Improper and weakly informative priors

- Objectively, we often only have very weak information such as “*the likelihood of a potential dataset should have this form*”.
- General construction rules can also lead to priors  $\pi(\theta)$  that are not probability measures, in the sense that

$$\int_{\Theta} \pi(\theta) d\theta = \infty.$$

These are called **improper priors**.

- In the literature they are sometimes called *non-informative* priors, but strictly speaking *no* prior is completely information-free. A better description is *weakly informative*.

## Posterior with improper prior

⚠ Such priors are useful only if the resulting posterior is a proper probability distribution (integrable and normalizable).

### Definition

Suppose we use an **improper prior**  $\pi$  on  $\theta$  and assume that, for the observed data  $X$ ,

$$\int_{\Theta} p_{\theta}(X) d\pi(\theta) < \infty \quad \text{almost surely.}$$

Then the corresponding posterior distribution  $\pi[\cdot | X]$  is a probability measure with density given by

$$\theta \longmapsto \pi(\theta | X) = \frac{p_{\theta}(X) \pi(\theta)}{\int_{\Theta} p_{\theta}(X) \pi(\theta) d\nu(\theta)}.$$

## Jeffreys prior: motivation

### Invariance principle

If we move from  $\theta$  to  $\eta = g(\theta)$  by a bijection  $g$ , the amount of prior information should not change:

$$\pi^*(\eta) = \left| \det \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial \eta} \right| \pi(g^{-1}(\eta)) \left| \det \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial \eta} \right|$$

should encode the same beliefs as  $\pi(\theta)$ .

To construct such a prior, Jeffreys proposes to use the **Fisher information  $I(\theta)$** , which measures how informative the model  $P_\theta$  is about  $\theta$ .

## Fisher information

Consider a regular parametric model  $\{P_\theta, \theta \in \Theta\}$  on  $X$  with density  $p_\theta(x)$  and log-likelihood

$$\ell_\theta(X) = \log p_\theta(X).$$

### Score

$$\ell'_\theta(X) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \ell_\theta(X) = \frac{p'_\theta(X)}{p_\theta(X)}.$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\ell'_\theta(X)] = 0$$

if  $X \sim P_\theta$

### Fisher information at $\theta$

$$-\mathbb{E}_\theta[\ell''_\theta(X)] = I(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_\theta[\ell'_\theta(X)^2]. \text{ (variance of the score)}$$

For an i.i.d. sample  $X^{(n)} = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$  from  $P_\theta$ , the information adds up:

$$I_n(\theta) = n I(\theta).$$

Large  $I(\theta)$  means the likelihood is very peaked around  $\theta$ , so the data dominate the prior there.

# Jeffreys prior in one dimension

## Definition: Jeffreys prior, 1D

For  $\Theta \subset \mathbb{R}$ , if  $I(\theta)$  exists, the Jeffreys prior is

$$\pi(\theta) \propto \sqrt{I(\theta)}.$$

- This construction uses only the model  $p_\theta(x)$ .
- Regions where the model is very informative ( $I(\theta)$  large) receive more prior mass, so that the prior has less influence on the posterior.

## Examples

- Bernoulli model  $\mathcal{B}(\theta)$ ,  $\theta \in (0, 1)$ :  $I(\theta) = \frac{1}{\theta(1-\theta)}$ , hence

$$\pi(\theta) \propto \theta^{-1/2}(1-\theta)^{-1/2},$$

i.e. a Beta( $1/2, 1/2$ ) prior.

- Normal model  $X | \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, 1)$ :  $I(\theta) = 1$ , so  $\pi(\theta) \propto 1$  (improper flat prior).

## Jeffreys prior in higher dimensions

For  $\theta \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ , the Fisher information matrix is

$$I_{ij}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ \frac{\partial^2}{\partial \theta_i \partial \theta_j} \log f(X | \theta) \right].$$

Definition: Jeffreys prior,  $d$ -dimensional

If  $I(\theta)$  exists, define

$$\pi(\theta) \propto \sqrt{\det I(\theta)}.$$

**Invariance property** Let  $\eta = g(\theta)$  be any smooth bijective reparametrization. If  $\pi_\theta(\theta) \propto \sqrt{\det I(\theta)}$ , then the induced density on  $\eta$  satisfies

$$\pi_\eta(\eta) \propto \sqrt{\det I(\eta)}.$$

Hence Jeffreys prior automatically respects the invariance principle.

For  $d=1$

Jeffreys prior

Proof: 1) With  $R = g^{-1}$ , write  $q_n = P_{R(n)}^{\theta}$ .

$$I(n) = \int \frac{q_n'(x)}{q_n(x)} dx = h'(n)^2 \int \frac{P_{h(n)}(x)}{P_{R(n)}(x)} dx = h'(n)^2 I(R(n))$$

2) The prior density of  $n = g(\theta)$  for  $\theta \sim \pi(\theta) \propto \sqrt{I(\theta)}$   
is  $\pi(n) = \left| \frac{d g^{-1}}{d \theta}(n) \right| \pi(g^{-1}(n))$  (change-of-variable)  
 $= h'(n) \underbrace{\pi(h(n))}_{\propto \sqrt{I(h(n))}}$

$$\propto \sqrt{I(n)}$$

We obtain the Jeffreys prior in the new model (with new param.)

## Jeffreys prior: exercises

**Exercise 1 (Exponential model).** Let  $X \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{E}(\theta)$  with rate  $\theta > 0$ .

- Compute the Fisher information  $I(\theta)$ .
- Deduce the Jeffreys prior  $\pi(\theta) \propto \sqrt{I(\theta)}$ .

$$p_{\theta}(x) = \theta e^{-\theta x} 1_{x \geq 0}$$

**Exercise 2 (Weibull model).** Let  $X$  follow a Weibull law with two common parametrizations

$$p(x \mid \eta, \beta) = \frac{\beta}{\eta} c \left( \frac{x}{\eta} \right)^{\beta-1} \exp \left[ - \left( \frac{x}{\eta} \right)^{\beta} \right] 1_{\{x \geq 0\}},$$

$$p(x \mid \mu, \beta) = \beta \mu x^{\beta-1} \exp(-\mu x^{\beta}) 1_{\{x \geq 0\}}.$$

- Compute the Jeffreys prior in each parametrization. where  $\beta$  is fixed but  $\theta = \eta$  or  $\mu$
- Check that the two expressions are coherent by using the change-of-variables formula.

## Conjugate priors: idea

**Goal.** Choose a prior family that is stable under Bayesian updating.

### Definition (conjugate family)

Let  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_\theta, \theta \in \Theta\}$  be a statistical model and  $\mathcal{F}$  a family of prior distributions on  $\Theta$ . We say that  $\mathcal{F}$  is *conjugate* for  $\mathcal{P}$  if, for every  $\pi \in \mathcal{F}$ , the posterior law  $\pi[\cdot | X]$  also belongs to  $\mathcal{F}$ .

Often,  $\mathcal{F} = \{\pi_\beta, \beta \in \Omega\}$  with  $\Omega \subset \mathbb{R}^m$

### Why it is useful.

- Posterior has the same functional form as the prior; only hyperparameters change, not structural form.
- Closed forms for posterior mean, variance, credible sets, predictions, etc.
- Easy to simulate from the posterior if we know how to simulate from the prior.

# Exponential family and natural conjugate priors

Consider a  $k$ -dimensional **exponential family** in natural form

$$p_\theta(x) = h(x) \exp\{\theta \cdot T(x) - \psi(\theta)\}, \quad \theta \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^k.$$

A standard **natural conjugate prior** for  $\theta$  is

prior  $\rightarrow \pi(\theta | a, b) \propto \exp\{\theta \cdot a - b\psi(\theta)\}, \quad a \in \mathbb{R}^k, b > 0.$

*β im prev. slide*

Given one observation  $x$ , Bayes rule gives the posterior

posterior  $\rightarrow \pi(\theta | a, b, x) \propto \exp\{\theta \cdot (a + T(x)) - (b + 1)\psi(\theta)\},$

so the posterior is again in the same family, with updated hyperparameters

$$(a, b) \rightarrow (a + T(x), b + 1).$$

For a sample  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  the update is

$$(a, b) \rightarrow (a + \sum_{i=1}^n T(x_i), b + n).$$

# Natural conjugate priors for some common models

$p_\theta(x)$

$f(x   \theta)$	$\pi(\theta)$	$\pi(\theta   x)$
$\mathcal{N}(\theta, \sigma^2)$	$\mathcal{N}(\mu, \tau^2)$	$\mathcal{N}(\varrho(\sigma^2\mu + \tau^2x), \varrho\sigma^2\tau^2), \quad \varrho^{-1} = \sigma^2 + \tau^2$
Poisson( $\theta$ )	Gamma( $\alpha, \beta$ )	Gamma( $\alpha + x, \beta + 1$ )
Gamma( $\nu, \theta$ )	Gamma( $\alpha, \beta$ )	Gamma( $\alpha + \nu, \beta + x$ )
Binomial( $n, \theta$ )	Beta( $\alpha, \beta$ )	Beta( $\alpha + x, \beta + n - x$ )
NegBin( $m, \theta$ )	Beta( $\alpha, \beta$ )	Beta( $\alpha + m, \beta + x$ )
Multinomial $_k(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_k)$	Dirichlet( $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k$ )	Dirichlet( $\alpha_1 + x_1, \dots, \alpha_k + x_k$ )
$\mathcal{N}(\mu, 1/\theta)$	Gamma( $\alpha, \beta$ )	Gamma( $\alpha + \frac{1}{2}, \beta + \frac{(\mu-x)^2}{2}$ )
$X_1, \dots, X_n   \theta \sim \text{Unif}(0, \theta)$	Pareto( $\alpha, r$ )	Pareto( $\alpha + n, r_X$ ), $r_X = \max\{r, X_1, \dots, X_n\}$

# Hierarchical Bayes: idea

## Motivation.

- In many problems we need a prior on a parameter  $\theta$ , but we are not sure how to choose it.
- We introduce a hyperparameter  $\gamma$  that controls a family of priors

$$\theta \mid \gamma \sim \pi(\theta \mid \gamma).$$

- Then we put a second-level prior on  $\gamma$ :

$$\gamma \sim \pi(\gamma).$$

## Joint model.

$$X, \theta, \gamma \sim p_\theta(X) \pi(\theta \mid \gamma) \pi(\gamma).$$

## Advantages.

- Provides a flexible framework for modeling families of priors.
- Allows us to encode partial prior information and share information across related parameters (random effects, panel data, etc.).
- Hyperparameters  $\gamma$  play the role of an *index* for a whole family  $\{\pi(\cdot \mid \gamma)\}_\gamma$ .

# Hierarchical Bayes vs empirical Bayes

## Hierarchical Bayes.

- We treat  $\gamma$  as an unknown random quantity:

$$\theta | \gamma \sim \pi(\theta | \gamma), \quad \gamma \sim \eta(\gamma).$$

- Posterior inference is based on

$$\pi(\theta, \gamma | x) \propto p_\theta(X) \pi(\theta | \gamma) \pi(\gamma).$$

- Fully Bayesian: uncertainty on  $\gamma$  is propagated into the posterior of  $\theta$ .

## Empirical Bayes.

- We choose a parametric family of priors  $\{\pi_\gamma(\theta)\}_{\gamma \in \Gamma}$  (e.g. Normal, Gamma, Beta).
- Use the data to estimate  $\gamma$  (for example by marginal likelihood):

$$f_\gamma(X) = \int p_\theta(X) \pi_\gamma(\theta) d\theta, \quad \hat{\gamma} = \arg \max_{\gamma} f_\gamma(X).$$

- Then treat  $\pi_{\hat{\gamma}}(\theta)$  as the prior and perform standard Bayes.

# Empirical Bayes: examples

## Gaussian model.

- Data:  $X_1, \dots, X_n \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta, 1)$  i.i.d.
- Prior family:  $\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$ , with hyperparameter  $\mu$ .
- Marginal likelihood for one observation:

$$f_\mu(X_1) = \int \mathcal{N}(X_1 \mid \theta, 1) \mathcal{N}(\theta \mid \mu, 1) d\theta = \mathcal{N}(X_1 \mid \mu, 2).$$

- Maximizing  $f_\mu(X_1)$  gives  $\hat{\mu} = X_1$ ; for  $n$  observations,  $\hat{\mu} = \bar{X}_n$ .
- Empirical Bayes prior:  $\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{X}_n, 1)$ .

## Poisson model.

- Data:  $X_1, \dots, X_n \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{P}(\theta)$  i.i.d.
- Prior family:  $\theta \sim \text{Exp}(\lambda)$ .
- Empirical Bayes estimate:  $\hat{\lambda} = 1/\bar{X}_n$ , so the prior becomes  $\theta \sim \text{Exp}(1/\bar{X}_n)$ .

## Fusion of priors from multiple experts

Suppose we have  $M$  possible priors  $\pi_1(\theta), \dots, \pi_M(\theta)$  (e.g. from different experts), with weights  $\omega_i \geq 0$ ,  $\sum_{i=1}^M \omega_i = 1$ .

### Linear (arithmetic) pool.

$$\pi_{\text{lin}}(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^M \omega_i \pi_i(\theta).$$

- Natural, but  $\triangle$  posterior of  $\pi_{\text{lin}}$  is not the same as the weighted sum of posteriors  $\pi_i(\theta | x)$ .

### Logarithmic (geometric) pool.

$$\pi_{\log}(\theta) = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^M \pi_i(\theta)^{\omega_i}}{\int_{\Theta} \prod_{i=1}^M \pi_i(u)^{\omega_i} du}.$$

- Combining first, then updating, is coherent with updating each prior then combining.
- Note: it is the prior that minimizes a weighted sum of Kullback–Leibler divergences:

$$\pi^*(\theta) = \arg \min_{\pi} \sum_{i=1}^M \omega_i KL(\pi, \pi_i), \quad KL(\pi, \pi_i) = \int \log(\pi(\theta)/\pi_i(\theta)) \pi(\theta) d\theta$$

# Different approaches

$$\alpha \sim \pi(\alpha)$$

$$\beta | \alpha \sim \pi(\beta | \alpha)$$

$$\theta | \alpha, \beta \sim \pi(\theta | \alpha, \beta)$$

$$X | \theta \sim p_\theta$$

# Different approaches

$$\alpha \sim \pi(\alpha)$$

$$\beta | \alpha \sim \pi(\beta | \alpha)$$

$$\theta | \alpha, \beta \sim \pi(\theta | \alpha, \beta)$$

$X | \theta \sim p_\theta$  Likelihood / Frequentist model

# Different approaches

$$\alpha \sim \pi(\alpha)$$

$$\beta | \alpha \sim \pi(\beta | \alpha)$$

$\theta | \alpha, \beta \sim \pi(\theta | \alpha, \beta)$       Empirical Bayes / Bayesian model

$$X | \theta \sim p_\theta$$

# Different approaches

$$\alpha \sim \pi(\alpha)$$

$$\beta | \alpha \sim \pi(\beta | \alpha) \quad \text{Hierarchical Bayes}$$

$$\theta | \alpha, \beta \sim \pi(\theta | \alpha, \beta)$$

$$X | \theta \sim p_\theta$$

# Different approaches

$$\alpha \sim \pi(\alpha)$$

Hierarchical Bayes

$$\beta | \alpha \sim \pi(\beta | \alpha)$$

$$\theta | \alpha, \beta \sim \pi(\theta | \alpha, \beta)$$

$$X | \theta \sim p_\theta$$