

# Bachelorarbeit – Defense

## BA21\_gueu\_09

Zürcher Hochschule  
für Angewandte Wissenschaften



## KEY MANAGEMENT AND ENCRYPTION FOR LIVE VIDEOSTREAMS

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# Introduction

## MOTIVATION AND CURRENT STATE

- Increased usage of Streaming Services: video encryption increasingly important
- TV in HD: requires encryption by stations
- Concrete use case: Init7

## GOALS

- Architectural draft for modular Key Management System
- Document thoughts and decisions tracably
- Develop a prototype

## LITERATURE RESEARCH

- Very little specific literature
- Some sources provided contrary information
- Fairplay specification not entirely conclusive

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# Background & Theory

## STREAMING PROTOCOLS

- Multicast
- Apple HTTP Live Streaming (HLS)
- Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH)
- Microsoft Smooth Streaming (MSS)
- Adobe HTTP Dynamic Streaming (HDS)

## DRM PROTOCOLS

- Apple FairPlay Streaming
- Google Widevine
- Microsoft PlayReady

# Background & Theory

## COMPATIBILITY

Gerätekategorie	Player	HLS	DASH	HLS + FairPlay	HLS + Widevine	DASH + Widevine	DASH + PlayReady	MSS + PlayReady
PCs/ Browsers	Chrome	Ja	Ja	Nein	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein
	Firefox	Ja	Ja	Nein	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein
	IE/Edge	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja
	Safari	Ja	Nein	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein	Nein
Handys	Android	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
	iOS	Ja	Nein	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein	Nein
Set-top Boxen	Chrome-cast	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
	Android TV	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
	Roku	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
	Apple TV	Ja	Nein	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein	Nein
	Amazon Fire TV	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
Smart TVs	Samsung/Tenzen	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja
	LG webOS	Ja	Ja	Nein	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein
	SmartTV Alliance	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja
	Android TV	Ja	Ja	Nein	Nein	Ja	Ja	Ja


Table adapted from Yuriy Reznik, Jordi Cenzano und Bo Zhang. „Transitioning Broadcast to Cloud“. In: *Applied Sciences* 11.2 (Jan. 2021). Number: 2  
Publisher: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, S. 503. DOI: 10.3390/app11020503. URL: <https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/2/503> (besucht am 24. 02. 2021)


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
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
# Methodology & Results


## ANALYSIS CURRENT STATE


















# Methodology & Results


## ARCHITECTURE DRAFT



















## PROTOTYPE

- Key Server, Key Generator, FairPlay Streaming Server, Demo App work as planned
- Auth Server out of scope
- Extension of existing system didn't go as well
  - TV API easy
  - Encryption worked too
  - But FairPlay requires SAMPLE-AES, which ffmpeg can't do
  - Attempts to replace ffmpeg with shaka packager (Google) failed due to existing architecture

# Methodology & Results


## BASIC THREAT ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION



# Methodology & Results

## THREAT ANALYSIS (1/2)


- Network traffic over HTTPS
- Catch and Key Server in separate network, no access from outside
- Fairplay and Cache Server access to this network
- Nftables firewall for every server



# Methodology & Results

## THREAT ANALYSIS (2/2)

- Can only view stream with app from TV provider
- Pink dashed line is lower area of confidence, only for key exchange



# Methodology & Results

## THREATS

- 112 threats
- Four main attacks:
  - Fake streams → influence customers
  - Unauthorised persons view stream → miss out on revenue
  - DoS attacks → components can fail, partial failure of television broadcaster and gap in recording
  - Gain admin access


## MITIGATION

- Redundancy
- Administrator should only have the access he/she needs
- No shared accounts
- Login attempts limited
- Firewalls with white- and blacklisting

# Methodology & Results

Analyzing the key rotation:

- Simulation with matlab
- Maximum growth of 3 customers per minute (No shrinkage)
- Curve is inversely proportional
- Large inquiries despite small number of customers



# Methodology & Results


Biggest Risks:

- Sharing the stream via VPN
- Attacker obtains or forges a token
- Availability of critical systems
- Storage systems
- Customization of code or data
- Vulnerability through administrators
- Fake the app

		Schaden		
		Low	Medium	High
Ausnutzung	High	Low	Medium	High
	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium
	Low	Low	Low	Low

# Methodology & Results

## Performance Testing



- Only 1 channel

### Server-HW:

- Intel Xeon Processor E3-1265L v2
- 32 GB RAM
- 1TB, 7200rpm harddisk

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# Discussion

## THEORY

- Very little literature
- A lot of work for small and independent providers looking to implement DRM
- For full use case, Multi-DRM is necessary

## ARCHITECTURE/PROTOTYPE

- Architectural draft adequate
- Potential for improvement
  - E.g. Single point of failure with Key Server DB
  - E.g. Preloading of keys not trivial

## THREAT ANALYSIS

- Do not trust own systems, always authenticate
- Do not blindly trust employee logins
- Distributed system not only easier to maintain, but also better for security
- Security is very deployment specific
- Basic best practices apply

# Discussion

## EVALUATION

- Key rotation interval > 20 minutes
- Encryption overhead neglectable

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# Outlook

- Further development of prototype
- Extension to Multi-DRM System
- Optimization of Key Exchange
- Authentication System
- Redundancy and Cloud-Nativeness
- Usage of DRM options

# Demo Time!

# Questions/Discussion

