**ROP-Hunt：在应用程序中检测返回导向编程(ROP)攻击**

摘要:

Return-oriented Programming (ROP) is a new exploitation technique that can perform arbitrary unintended operations by constructing a gadget chain reusing existing small code sequences.

返回导向编程(ROP) 是一种新型漏洞利用技术，该技术通过重复使用已有的小代码序列(gadget)构造出一条gadget链，从而执行任意的非法操作。

Although many defense mechanisms have been proposed, some new variants of ROP attack can easily circumvent them.

尽管很多防御机制已经被提出，但是一些新的ROP攻击的变种能够轻易绕过这些机制防御。

In this paper, we present a new tool, ROP-Hunt, that can defend against ROP attacks based on the differences between normal program and ROP malicious code.

在本文中，我们将介绍一个新工具ROP-Hunt，它能依据正常程序与恶意ROP代码间的差异来防御ROP攻击。

ROP-Hunt leverages instrumentation technique and detects ROP attack at runtime.

ROP-Hunt利用**插桩**(instrumentation)技术并在程序运行时检测ROP攻击。

In our experiment, ROP-Hunt can detect all types of ROP attack from real-world examples.

在我们的实验中，ROP-Hunt可以在众多真实例程中检测出所有类型的ROP攻击。

We use several unmodified SPEC2006 benchmarks to test the performance and the result shows that it has a zero false positive rate and an acceptable overhead.

我们使用了几个原版的SPEC2006标准来测试ROP-Hunt的性能，结果表明它具有零误报率和可接受的系统开销。

Keywords: Return-oriented Programming · Buffer overflow Detection · Code reuse attack · Binary instrumentation

关键词：返回导向编程、缓冲区溢出、检测、代码复用攻击、二进制插桩

1 Introduction

一、引言

Since the widespread adoption of data execution prevention (DEP) [1], which ensures that all writable pages in memory are non-executable, it's hard for attackers to redirect the hijacked control flow to their own injected malicious code.

由于数据执行保护（DEP）[1]的广泛采用，确保了内存中的所有可写页面都是不可执行的，因此攻击者很难将被劫持的控制流重定向到他们自行注入的恶意代码。

To bypass DEP mechanism, code reuse attack (CRA) techniques are proposed and have become attacker's powerful tools.

为了绕过DEP机制，代码复用攻击（CRA）被提出并成为了攻击者们的利器。

Instead of injection code, they reuse instructions already residing in the attacked vulnerable process to induce malicious behaviors.

攻击者们不再注入代码，而是通过复用被攻击的漏洞进程中的现有指令来构造恶意行为。

Return-into-libc technique [37] is one simple practice of it, in which the attacker uses a buffer overflow to overwrite the return address stored in the stack to the address of the library function chosen to be executed.

Return-into-libc技术[37]是代码复用攻击的一种简单应用，攻击者利用缓冲区溢出漏洞，将位于栈中的返回地址覆写为攻击者挑选出的将要被执行的库函数地址。

Traditional return-into-libc attack leverages libc functions and cannot support arbitrary computation on the victim machine.

传统的return-into-libc攻击利用libc函数，并不支持在受害计算机上的执行任意操作。

Return-oriented Programming (ROP) is another code reuse attack technique, which executes short instruction sequences called gadgets instead of an entire function.

返回导向编程（ROP）是另一种代码复用攻击技术，它执行称为gadgets的短指令序列，而不是执行一整个函数。

ROP was first demonstrated by Shacham [35] for the x86 platform,and was subsequently extended to other architectures [13,16,23,26].

ROP最初由Shacham[35]提出并应用于x86平台，随后被拓展到其他体系结构[13,16,23,26]。

It has been proved that ROP can perform Turing-complete computation [36].

ROP可实现图灵完备计算已被证明[36]。

Some tools have been developed that allow attackers to construct arbitrary malicious programs using ROP automatically [22,24,33,34].

一些允许攻击者使用ROP自动构造任意恶意程序的工具已被开发[22,24,33,34]。

In the last few years, a number of software and hardware defenses have been proposed to mitigate ROP-based attacks.

在过去几年中，许多用于减缓基于ROP攻击的软件或硬件防御方法已被提出。

For example, DROP [17] and DynIMA [20] will trigger an alarm if the small instruction sequences each ending with a ret instruction are executed consecutively.

例如，如果连续执行以ret指令为结尾的小指令序列，DROP [17]和DynIMA [20]将触发警报。

ROPdefender [21] maintains a shadow stack and verifies all return addresses.

ROPdefender [21]则维护一个影子栈，并验证所有返回地址。

Li et al. [27] proposed a compiler for the x86 platform that avoids issuing "0xc3" bytes that can be used as unintended return instructions. Further more, it replaces intended call and return instructions with an indirect call mechanism. However, these mechanisms only focus on the ROP gadgets ending with return instructions and can not defeat other types of ROP-like attacks that capture gadgets without return instructions.

李等人[27]提出了一个用于x86平台的编译器，它能避免生成可用作恶意返回指令的“0xc3”字节。此外，它使用间接调用机制替换了预期的调用和返回指令。但这些机制只关注了以返回指令为结尾的gadget，并不能防御其他类型，即不以返回指令为结尾的gadget的类ROP攻击。

CFLocking [11] and G-Free [30] aim to defend against all types of ROP attacks, but they require the source code which is often unavailable to the end users in the real world.

CFLocking [11]和G-Free [30]旨在防御所有类型的ROP攻击，但它们需要源代码，对于实际的终端用户而言，这些源代码通常难以取得的。

KBouncer [32] covers all ROP attack types, requires no side information and achieves good runtime efficiency. However, it only monitors the application execution flow on selected critical paths, e.g., system APIs. It inevitably misses the ROP attacks that do not use those paths.

KBouncer [32]涵盖了所有ROP攻击类型，且不需要辅助信息，并实现不错的运行时效率。然而，它只是监视目标关键路径上的应用程序执行流，例如系统API。如此，它不可避免地漏掉了那些不使用这些路径的ROP攻击。

ROP attack chains gadgets together to perform complex computations and has its own features: the length of gadget is short, contiguous gadgets are not in the same routine and they all execute system calls in somewhere.

ROP攻击组合gadget成链，以执行复杂的操作，它具有如下特征：gadget长度很短；相邻的gadget并不在同一个程序中，并且它们都在某个地方执行系统调用。

Based on these features, we design and implement a tool named ROP-Hunt, which dynamically detects all types of ROP attack by checking whether the execution behavior has these matched features. In ROP-Hunt, based on the hazard degree, we divide the ROP report into two categories: *Warning* and *Attack.*

基于这些特征，我们设计并实现了一个名为ROP-Hunt的工具，该工具通过检查程序执行的行为是否与这些特征匹配，从而对所有类型的ROP攻击进行动态检测。在ROP-Hunt中，基于危害程度，我们将ROP报告分为两类：*警告*和*攻击*。

In summary, the main contributions of our work are:

总的来说，我们工作的主要贡献是：

- We statistically analyze a number of normal applications and latest ROP malicious code, and extract features of the ROP attack.

- 我们统计分析了大量正常的应用程序和最新的ROP恶意代码，并提取了ROP攻击的特征。

- We propose a novel approach to protecting legacy applications from all types of ROP attacks without accessing to source code.

- 我们提出了一种新方法，可以在不访问源代码的情况下保护传统应用程序免受所有类型的ROP攻击。

- We design and implement a prototype, ROP-Hunt, on x86-based Linux platform and evaluate its security effectiveness and performance overhead.

- 我们在x86框架的Linux平台上，设计并实现一台样机，即ROP-Hunt，并评估了其安全有效性和性能开销。

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sects. 2 and 3, we describe the ROP attacks and analyze the features of them. The design and implementation of ROP-Hunt are illustrated at Sect. 4. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the parameter selections and delay gadget respectively. Section 7 presents the security and performance evaluation of ROP-Hunt. Section 8 examines its limitations. Finally, we conclude this paper and discuss the future work in Sect. 9.

本文的其余部分安排如下：在第二、三部分中，我们描述了ROP攻击并分析了它们的特征。 ROP-Hunt的设计和实现在第四部分介绍。第五部分和第六部分，分别讨论了参数选取和特殊的延迟gadget。第七部分介绍了ROP-Hunt的安全性和性能评估。第八部分研究了它的局限性。最后，我们在第九部分总结全文并讨论有待完成的工作。