

# Twitter Penetration Test Report

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BI-EHA Semestral work

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FIT CTU, 2023

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# Introduction

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## Team Info

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      - 4.7.8 Testing for SSI Injection
      - 4.7.9 Testing for XPath Injection
    - 4.8 Testing for Error Handling

- [4.11 Client-side Testing](#)

## Project Overview

This report is part of semestral work for subject Ethical hacking of the Information Security program on FIT, CTU.

The focus is to assert skills gained during the semester as well as use them in real-world scenario. The website [twitter.com](https://twitter.com) has been chosen for this purpose as it offers a [bug bounty](#) and is therefore eligible for ethical hackers to try and hack.

## Scope Description

We will be focusing on the web application on domain [twitter.com](https://twitter.com).

While the bug bounty posted by twitter puts some vulnerabilities out of scope for financial reward, we will still be trying to perform these attacks as to deepen our ethical hacking skills.

## Pentesting Methodology

As a pentesting methodology we have chosen the [OWASP Web Application Security Testing guide - version 4.2](#), which is the latest stable version. To be more precise, we will be covering following topics:

- Configuration and Deployment Management Testing
- Identity Management Testing
- Authentication Testing
- Authorization Testing
- Session Management Testing
- Input Validation Testing
- Testing for Error Handling
- Testing for Weak Cryptography
- Business Logic Testing
- Client-side Testing

## Scoring System

We will be using the widely used [Common Vulnerability Scoring System \(CVSS\)](#) standard for evaluating the threat levels of vulnerabilities found in this report. In particular we will use the CVSS 3.1 version. The standard defines multiple metrics (base, temporal, environmental), however we will use only the base metric since we are performing a one-time pentesting as external entity so the temporal and environmental metrics are not that important and available to us.

We will be scoring each vulnerability on several factors such as access complexity, confidentiality impact, integrity impact and others, to calculate the final score. This will determine the final rating of that vulnerability as seen in the following table.

Rating	CVSS Score
None	0.0
Low	0.1 - 3.9
Medium	4.0 - 6.9
High	7.0 - 8.9
Critical	9.0 - 10.0

# Executive Summary

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While testing we didn't find any serious vulnerability. However we found several places with little inconsistencies or places where best practices were not fulfilled. Overall the application seems really solid and does not give attackers space for attacks.

# List of Findings

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ID	Name	Description	Rating
1	Account Lockout	It is possible to lockout user using their email or username	Medium (6.5)
2	User Enumeration	It is possible to enumerate emails of registered users	Medium (5.3)
3	Password Check Inconsistency	Inconsistency in password checks between registration and change password functionalities	None (0.0)
4	Missing HSTS Directive	HSTS directive includeSubDomains isn't used	None (0.0)
5	Internal Server Error	Server responded with 500 Internal Server Error	None (0.0)

# Vulnerability Analysis

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## 1 Account Lockout

If we guess or bruteforce an email of user we can lock that user out simply by trying his password repeatedly. We can however use the username for lock out as well and username of each user can be seen on their profile so we can lock out any user we want. That lock out is about 30 minutes long. Complete information about this flaw can be seen here: [4.4.3 Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism](#)

Remediation:

The lock out shouldn't be account bound but rather IP bound so the actual user still has chance to connect. Manual unlock should be implemented (for example a single use login token sent via email) so user can get access to his account even if someone is trying to lock him out of it.

## 2 User Enumeration

In the registration, login or forgot password page it is possible to enumerate user email and potentially their usernames. On the registration page user is immediately informed if the email they entered is already being used. When creating username user is informed if their username is being used. On login page user is redirected to input password if they enter valid email/username of existing user. In forgot password page user enters email/username and reset code is sent to them if they enter valid information, however if they enter invalid credentials they gets **Sorry, we could not find your account..**. Complete information about this flaw can be seen here: [4.3.4 Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account](#)

Remediation:

In login page Twitter should use username/email + password pair instead of just username/email and then redirect to password, so it can respond with generic error message like "Invalid credentials entered". In forgot password page Twitter should always respond with something like "Reset code sent to email." even if given account does not exist so no information is disclosed. In registration page it is hard to not disclose any information with the way it is designed but it would probably be best if the application didn't inform about email that is already in use but instead always inform that it sent registration code to that email.

## 3 Password Check Inconsistency

Different password checks are being performed while registering and while trying to change password. When changing password it is checked against user's username, in registration it is not. This is because user sets their username after creating password in registration process. Complete information about this flaw can be seen here: [4.3.2 Test User Registration Process](#)

Remediation:

It does not seem like there is any reason for username creation to be after the registration process is completed so simply for consistency sake it would be best to move username creation before password creation so it can be checked like in change password functionality.

## 4 Missing HSTS Directive

Responses sent from the server do not contain the includeSubDomains directive of HTTP Strict Transport Security header. It doesn't cause any vulnerability in the current version of the application, but if another subdomain is added to production, this directive strengthens the layered security principle.

More information can be seen here [4.2.7 Test HTTP Strict Transport Security](#)

Remediation:

As there is apparently no need to provide services via unsecured HTTP, the includeSubDomain should be used.

## 5 Internal Server Error

At the beginning of the verification client sends a request with JSON object that contains email and flow\_token. When another element named email is inserted into this object, server responds with 500 Server Internal Error. This implies incorrect parsing of the JSON object.

More information can be seen here: [4.10.1 Test Business Logic Data Validation](#)

Remediation:

JSON objects should be parsed correctly and in case of invalid JSON object the server should respond with proper error code such as 400 Bad Request.

# Pre-engagement

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## Threat Model

Twitter does not openly disclose how its backend communication works.

Since twitter is a web application it is obviously exposed to the internet which naturally puts it in proximity of multitude of threats. On top of that it is definitely an attractive target for hackers, since it stores personal information of about 350 million people.

Some vulnerable points might be the client-server-database communication for authentication or tweets being stored in database and showing to completely random users' feeds.

## Intelligence-gathering Outcomes

Firstly we ran port scan with **nmap**. We used the following command to find the open ports and possibly the version of service running on them:

```
nmap -sV twitter.com
nmap -sV twitter.com
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-04-27 15:04 EDT
Nmap scan report for twitter.com (104.244.42.65)
Host is up (0.034s latency).
Other addresses for twitter.com (not scanned): 104.244.42.193
Not shown: 998 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
80/tcp    open  tcpwrapped
443/tcp   open  ssl/https  tsa_o

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 32.38 seconds|
```

Full output can be seen in *outputs/nmap\_version.txt*.

We can see that there are two open tcp ports (80, 443).

We then ran **nmap** with intention to determine the OS running, version and traceroute with:

```
nmap -A twitter.com
```

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE    VERSION
80/tcp    open  http        tsa_o
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://twitter.com/
| fingerprint-strings:
|   DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     content-length: 11
|     content-type: text/plain
|     x-connection-hash: e41ea0468e7b5be750935d042454e8711e3b3961c1737992a4cc017f6081eee2
|     date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:40 GMT
|     server: tsa_o
|     connection: close
|     Request
| FourOhFourRequest:
|   HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|   x-connection-hash: 02d1cd22645d11f2bf49cdace64f2604c7e3a924a2cf0bc51ef47d0e2cb5f6b
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:33 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   content-length: 0
| GetRequest:
|   HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|   x-connection-hash: f18259468620a4e8ad658e4dc615da660dc1215ad1a001d84c1e96c4e3d25137
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:29 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   content-length: 0
| HTTPOptions:
|   HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|   x-connection-hash: 53ab8f7fb60e3463465249882514a86891e613e9036689229e062378af384b46
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:30 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   content-length: 0
```

```
443/tcp open ssl/https tsa_o
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=twitter.com/organizationName=Twitter, Inc./stateOrProvinceName=
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:twitter.com, DNS:www.twitter.com
| Not valid before: 2023-02-05T00:00:00
| Not valid after: 2024-02-05T23:59:59
|_http-server-header: tsa_o
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| http-robots.txt: 13 disallowed entries
| /search/realtime /search/users /search/*grid /*?■
| /*/followers /*/following /account/deactivated
|/_settings/deactivated /oauth /1/oauth /istreams /i/hello /i/u
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=utf-8).
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSVersionBindReqTCP:
|   HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|   content-length: 11
|   content-type: text/plain
|   x-connection-hash: 4a220339f0d48a93266c291c45e2d2945f95f6e4c4d9e0be7a4b8c0e7af86e2a
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:47 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   Request
| FourOhFourRequest:
|   HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|   x-connection-hash: 562463708a4194b26a6cd538525aeb5c4ed5db1011d43b9d221accfdab4b191d
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:37 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   content-length: 0
| GetRequest:
|   HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|   x-connection-hash: 8627003e329bef15b9d472e46b19be7b09d9ed3834bdd984dde2be922899bd26
|   date: Thu, 27 Apr 2023 19:07:35 GMT
|   server: tsa_o
|   connection: close
|   content-length: 0
```

Full output can be seen in *outputs/nmap\_A.txt*.

Here it is specified that on port 80 there is http running. Also all requests sent are returned with HTTP 400 so service as well as OS could not be recognized.

Then we ran **dnsenum** to try and gather some information about the domain:

```
dnsenum --enum twitter.com
```

**Host's addresses:**

twitter.com.	1007	IN	A	104.244.42.193
--------------	------	----	---	----------------

**Name Servers:**

a.u06.twtrdns.net.	91	IN	A	204.74.66.101
b.r06.twtrdns.net.	97	IN	A	205.251.196.198
b.u06.twtrdns.net.	10	IN	A	204.74.67.101
c.r06.twtrdns.net.	103	IN	A	205.251.194.151
c.u06.twtrdns.net.	55	IN	A	204.74.110.101
a.r06.twtrdns.net.	91	IN	A	205.251.192.179
b.r06.twtrdns.net.	97	IN	A	205.251.196.198
b.u06.twtrdns.net.	10	IN	A	204.74.67.101
c.r06.twtrdns.net.	103	IN	A	205.251.194.151
c.u06.twtrdns.net.	55	IN	A	204.74.110.101
a.r06.twtrdns.net.	91	IN	A	205.251.192.179
a.u06.twtrdns.net.	91	IN	A	204.74.66.101
d.r06.twtrdns.net.	11	IN	A	205.251.199.195
d.u06.twtrdns.net.	12	IN	A	204.74.111.101

**Mail (MX) Servers:**

aspmx3.googlemail.com.	224	IN	A	142.250.150.26
aspmx2.googlemail.com.	221	IN	A	142.251.9.26
aspmx.l.google.com.	71	IN	A	173.194.76.27
alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.	193	IN	A	142.251.9.26
alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.	194	IN	A	142.250.153.27

Full output can be seen in *outputs/dnsenum.txt*.

Which listed us a lot of subdomains and IP addresses of twitter.

As stated before the twitter developers don't share much information about twitter. However through developer [blog](#) they sometimes discuss what actually happens on twitter's backend. Through that we were able to find out that twitter used to run on MySQL database, but has switched to distributed database NoSQL system called Manhattan, that is custom developed for twitter. Manhattan itself utilizes multiple open-source technologies like Apache Cassandra or Hadoop. This information might prove useful for performing some SQL Injection attacks.

As for the front-end part of Twitter it mostly consists of HTML, CSS and Javascript, particularly React.js. Of those, React.js is obviously the one to be concentrated on when pentesting. Some of its most common vulnerabilities are Cross-site scripting, SQL injection, Cross-site request forgery, Vulnerability in packages and dependencies, Broken authentication, Zip slip or XML external entities.

Last but not least we tried so called Google Hacking/Dorking but it didn't disclose any important information.

# Testing process

---

## 4.1 Information Gathering

### 4.1.1 Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage

This section is covered in [Pre-engagement](#).

### 4.1.2 Fingerprint Web Server

This section is covered in [Pre-engagement](#).

### 4.1.3 Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage

Robots.txt exists on the page. After reviewing disallowed paths, it doesn't seem to be considered as a mechanism to enforce restrictions.

```
# Google Search Engine Robot
# =====
User-agent: Googlebot
Allow: /?_escaped_fragment_

Allow: /*?lang=
Allow: /hashtag/*?src=
Allow: /search?q=%23
Allow: /i/api/
Disallow: /search/realtime
Disallow: /search/users
Disallow: /search/*/grid

Allow: /*?ref_src=
Allow: /*?src=
Disallow: /*?
Disallow: /*/followers
Disallow: /*/following

Disallow: /account/deactivated
Disallow: /settings/deactivated

# Yahoo! Search Engine Robot
# =====
User-Agent: Slurp
Allow: /?_escaped_fragment_

Allow: /*?lang=
Allow: /hashtag/*?src=
Allow: /search?q=%23
Allow: /i/api/
Disallow: /search/realtime
Disallow: /search/users
Disallow: /search/*/grid

Disallow: /*?
Disallow: /*/followers
Disallow: /*/following

Disallow: /account/deactivated
Disallow: /settings/deactivated

# Yandex Search Engine Robot
# =====
User-agent: Yandex
Allow: /?_escaped_fragment_

Allow: /*?lang=
Allow: /hashtag/*?src=
Allow: /search?q=%23
Allow: /i/api/
Disallow: /search/realtime
Disallow: /search/users
Disallow: /search/*/grid

Disallow: /*?
Disallow: /*/followers
Disallow: /*/following

Disallow: /account/deactivated
Disallow: /settings/deactivated
```

Sitemaps weren't found.

Security.txt

```
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Contact: https://hackerone.com/twitter

# Our OpenPGP key
Encryption: https://twitter.com/security/pgp-key.txt

# Canonical URI
Canonical: https://twitter.com/.well-known/security.txt

Expires: 2024-01-01T06:00:00.000Z

Hiring: https://careers.twitter.com
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iHUEARYKAB0WIQTR1lpEM7BdJg41CZF6RLZ91cnFDQUCY9144wAKCRB6RLZ91cnF
Dbh8AQCmIB0lLpVrEQHGn5SX3+sd9bUin57Na5XNBVuLsf73AD/bJetgIJrkID0
evU8eQ0tFQO2/iNvhjvY9nt4nhNRxA0=
=suIL
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
```

Humans.txt wasn't found.

#### 4.1.4 Enumerate Applications on Webserver

This section is covered in [Pre-engagement](#).


#### 4.1.5 Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage

When reviewing the client side source code, no useful comments, metadata or other useful information were found.

#### 4.1.6 Identify Application Entry Points

Despite reviewing many different requests and responses during the testing process, we simply didn't have the manpower to execute full review of all methods and parameters as there are hundreds or possibly thousands of them.

#### 4.1.7 Map Execution Paths Through Application



#### 4.1.8 Fingerprint Web Application Framework

This section is covered in [Pre-engagement](#).

#### 4.1.9 Fingerprint Web Application

This section has been merged into [4.1.8 Fingerprint Web Application Framework](#)

#### 4.1.10 Map Application Architecture

This section is covered in [Pre-engagement](#).


## 4.2 Configuration and Deployment Management Testing

### 4.2.1 Test Network Infrastructure Configuration

As we don't have access to neither used systems nor any configuration files, this test cannot be performed.

### 4.2.2 Test Application Platform Configuration

We ran `dirb` to scan for sample and known files and directories.



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ dirb https://twitter.com /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/big.txt -c "twid: u%3D1664664683398287362" -o dirb_output.txt -f

DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver

OUTPUT_FILE: dirb_output.txt
START_TIME: Tue Jun 13 05:44:40 2023
URL_BASE: https://twitter.com/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/big.txt
COOKIE: twid: u%3D1664664683398287362
OPTION: Fine tuning of NOT_FOUND detection

GENERATED WORDS: 20458

— Scanning URL: https://twitter.com/ —
+ https://twitter.com/ [ (CODE:400|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/] (CODE:400|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/about (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/användare (CODE:302|SIZE:37)
+ https://twitter.com/applications (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/apps (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/asdfjkl; (CODE:302|SIZE:31)
+ https://twitter.com/blog (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/faq (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/favicon.ico (CODE:200|SIZE:6)
+ https://twitter.com/goodies (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/healthcheck (CODE:200|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/help (CODE:302|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/jobs (CODE:301|SIZE:0) @p_chris_bacon ...
+ https://twitter.com/logo (CODE:301|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/plain] (CODE:400|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/privacy (CODE:302|SIZE:214)
+ https://twitter.com/quote] (CODE:400|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/robots.txt (CODE:200|SIZE:282)
+ https://twitter.com/rules (CODE:302|SIZE:0)
+ https://twitter.com/secci♦ (CODE:302|SIZE:31)
+ https://twitter.com/sessions (CODE:302|SIZE:72)
+ https://twitter.com/sitemap.xml (CODE:400|SIZE:179)
+ https://twitter.com/tos (CODE:302|SIZE:210)
+ https://twitter.com/web.xml (CODE:400|SIZE:179)
+ https://twitter.com/worldcup (CODE:302|SIZE:0)

END_TIME: Tue Jun 13 06:30:54 2023
DOWNLOADED: 20458 - FOUND: 26
```

Parameter	Value
twid	u%3D1664664683398287362
ed1ce947d49e86fe0a833a4d8002cc047c1b9c19c89c1de2d17e12681e8f744de9c...	
ab6fd8880fdb05f2e96a8a396bf2ed6d3db6da0	
MjoxLGNvbNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoxMDAw	
"HBISAAA"	
en	
7UymwVD3ED8vwgqqMTDgP6Blzp7uyE5noADRJhm	
1	

All of the requests were valid endpoints, redirections, account names or the Twitter's custom "Page was not found" page.

### 4.2.3 Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information

For this test we ran `dirb` again, but this time with file extensions wordlist. It didn't disclose any new files or pages.

The terminal window at the top shows a command to search for 'dirb' on Twitter using the wordlist 'dirb/small.txt'. The browser window below displays the search results, which include various tweets and links related to the 'dirb' search term.

#### 4.2.4 Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information

We haven't found neither endpoints nor functions suitable for inference from the naming scheme.

When reviewing the front-end source code, no useful comments were found.

Blind guessing was performed in the previous sections with no success.

#### 4.2.5 Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces

We weren't able to reveal any admin interface.

## 4.2.6 Test HTTP Methods

Running `nmap` with `http-methods` script disclosed that only reasonable HTTP methods are allowed.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap -p 80,443 --script http-methods twitter.com
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-14 15:26 EDT
Nmap scan report for twitter.com (104.244.42.129)
Host is up (0.022s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
443/tcp   open  https
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 3.22 seconds
```

#### 4.2.7 Test HTTP Strict Transport Security

HTTP Strict Transport Security header is included in the response. However it lacks the includeSubDomains directive and since there are public subdomains such as [blog.twitter.com](http://blog.twitter.com) or [about.twitter.com](http://about.twitter.com) and none of them probably require usage of unsecured http, the includeSubDomains directive should be included as well.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  WebSockets history | ⚙ Proxy settings
└─$ curl -D- -s https://twitter.com | grep -i strict
strict-transport-security: max-age=631138519
```

## 4.2.8 Test RIA Cross Domain Policy

Neither crossdomain.xml nor clientaccesspolicy.xml are accessible.

## 4.2.9 Test File Permission

We don't have access to any web server, so we cannot inspect the local file permissions. No online directories were found.

## 4.2.10 Test for Subdomain Takeover

`dnsrecon` found no records and therefore no records suitable for takeover.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ dnsrecon -d twitter.com
[*] std: Performing General Enumeration against: twitter.com ...
[-] DNSSEC is not configured for twitter.com
[*] SOA a.u06.twtrdns.net 204.74.66.101
[*] NS c.u06.twtrdns.net 204.74.110.101
[*] Bind Version for 204.74.110.101 Nameserver"
[*] NS b.u06.twtrdns.net 204.74.67.101
[*] Bind Version for 204.74.67.101 Nameserver"
[*] NS d.r06.twtrdns.net 205.251.199.195
[*] NS a.u06.twtrdns.net 204.74.66.101
[*] Bind Version for 204.74.66.101 Nameserver"
[*] NS a.r06.twtrdns.net 205.251.192.179
[*] NS c.r06.twtrdns.net 205.251.194.151
[*] NS d.u06.twtrdns.net 204.74.111.101
[*] Bind Version for 204.74.111.101 Nameserver"
[*] NS b.r06.twtrdns.net 205.251.196.198
[*] MX alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 142.250.150.27
[*] MX alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 74.125.200.27
[*] MX aspmx2.goolgemail.com 142.250.150.26
[*] MX aspmx3.goolgemail.com 74.125.200.26
[*] MX aspmx.l.google.com 108.177.127.27
[*] MX alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 2a00:1450:4010:c1c::1a
[*] MX alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 2404:6800:4003:c00::1b
[*] MX aspmx2.goolgemail.com 2a00:1450:4010:c1c::1a
[*] MX aspmx3.goolgemail.com 2404:6800:4003:c00::1a
[*] MX aspmx.l.google.com 2a00:1450:4013:c01::1b
[*] A twitter.com 104.244.42.193
[*] TXT twitter.com 0a8c0fc6-bfa5-4ea7-b09b-87f2989022d6
[*] TXT twitter.com MS=BEE202D20C326867290BDEFA2DDDF4594B5D6860
[*] TXT twitter.com adobe-idp-site-verification=a2ff8fc40c434d1d6f02f68b0b1a683e400572ab8c1f2c180c71c3d985b9270
[*] a
[*] SLN
[*] TXT twitter.com apple-domain-verification=zd1iHoE09LILEQIq
[*] TXT twitter.com atlassian-domain-verification=j6u0o1PTkobCXC84uEF/sWpIPtaZURBVYqKzmTvT8wugLcHT1vvrrzzA63iP1q
[*] SLN
[*] TXT twitter.com bj6sbt5xqs9hw9jrfvz7hplrg0l680sb
[*] TXT twitter.com canva-site-verification=lMnZ3wMh7c1uqZqa-cxZTg
[*] TXT twitter.com google-site-verification=TNhAkfLUeIbzzSgPNxS5aEkKMf3aUcpPmCK1_kmIvU
[*] TXT twitter.com google-site-verification=h6dJIV0HXjLOkGAotLAWEZvoi9SxqP4vjpx98vrCvVQ
[*] TXT twitter.com loom-site-verification=638c6bc173b9458997f64d305bf42499
[*] TXT twitter.com miro-verification=6e1ca9ad6d0c2cd2e4186141265f23ed618cfe37
[*] TXT twitter.com mixpanel-domain-verify=164dda91-31f4-41e8-a816-0f59b38fea30
[*] TXT twitter.com traction-guest=6882b04e-4188-4ff9-8bb4-bff5a3d358e6
[*] TXT twitter.com traction-guest=a4d0248d-fe01-4222-8fcc-33f68323e667
[*] TXT twitter.com v=spf1 ip4:199.16.156.0/22 ip4:199.59.148.0/22 ip4:8.25.194.0/23 ip4:8.25.196.0/23 ip4:204.92.114.203 ip4:204.92.114.204/31 include:_spf.google.com include:_thirdparty.twitter.com include:_oerp.twitter.com include:spf.smtp2go.com -all
[*] TXT twitter.com wrike-verification=Mju4MTA5MjoyN2UzNDc1MjU3MDZizTY4NjBiNzliNDQ2OTUwNWY3NmM5NDgyMTBlYzFkNTcwYTE2YWNmZDdkNTY2ZmE4Yzlh
[*] _dmarc.twitter.com v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d3omt-8484@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; ruf=mailto:d3o
mt-8484@ruf.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; fo=1
[*] Enumerating SRV Records
[+] 0 Records Found
```

## 4.2.11 Test Cloud Storage

abs.twimg.com seems to be a cloud service but it only provides public content such as tweets, additional javascript code, emoji and CSS for the client web application so the authorization for reading is not required.

Updating the file was not successful.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]  WebSockets history  ⚡ Proxy settings
└─$ curl -i -X PUT -d 'test' -- https://abs.twimg.com/responsive-web/client-web/i18n/emoji-en.49b0285a.js
HTTP/2 403 <img>: Image and general binary content

cache-control: no-cache
date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 22:27:42 UTC
perf: 7626143928
server: tsa_b
strict-transport-security: max-age=631138519
timing-allow-origin: https://twitter.com, https://mobile.twitter.com
x-connection-hash: d1331c2c2bc0a6356110541af75912fdf2173dbd8ab20743f544be6e2cead638
x-content-type-options: nosniff
x-response-time: 5
x-transaction-id: 9c81577d1425f0ce
content-length: 0
Referer: https://twitter.com
User-Agent: curl/7.72.0
```

	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME
cache-control: no-cache	/api/1.1/dm/inbox_initial_state.json?nsrw_rerouting_ena...	✓		200	1129	JSON
date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 22:27:42 UTC	/api/1.1/jot/ces/p2	✓		200	770	JSON
perf: 7626143928	/api/graphql/PFxTk8owMoZgIMccP0r4g/getAltTextProm...	✓		200	843	JSON
server: tsa_b	/api/graphql/PFxTk8owMoZgIMccP0r4g/getAltTextProm...	✓		200	22188	JSON
strict-transport-security: max-age=631138519	/api/1.1/jot/include_profile_interstitial_type=1&in...	✓		200	858	XML
timing-allow-origin: https://twitter.com, https://mobile.twitter.com	/api/1.1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=false	✓		200	827	JSON
x-connection-hash: d1331c2c2bc0a6356110541af75912fdf2173dbd8ab20743f544be6e2cead638	/api/1.1/users/recommendations.json?include_profile_in...	✓		200	11191	JSON
x-content-type-options: nosniff	/api/1.1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=false	✓		200	637	script
x-response-time: 5	/api/1.1/account/settings.json?include_mention_filter=true&i...	✓		200	2569	JSON
x-transaction-id: 9c81577d1425f0ce	/api/1.1/jot/istPins?variables=%7B%7D	✓		200	854	JSON
content-length: 0	/api/graphql/Fhd55uRVI2Vn0nRaF71zQI/istPins?variables=%7B%7D	✓		200	854	JSON
Referer: https://twitter.com						
User-Agent: curl/7.72.0						


## 4.3 Identity Management Testing

### 4.3.1 Test Role Definitions

Since the application is being tested as a black-box from a normal user standpoint we don't have information about available roles. Even after looking through HTTP communication any specific roles could not be identified. Therefore we are not able to test roles layout or permissions.

### 4.3.2 Test User Registration Process


User can register using several different options (with Google/Apple account or native) we will test native registration process as the other two are using different applications and are out of scope.




The requirements for registration are name, email and date of birth of user. Out of these options only email can be verified. Name can be anything and does not need to be unique, date of birth can be set to anything as it is not verified either.

A screenshot of the first step of a five-step account creation process. The title "Step 1 of 5" is at the top left, followed by "Create your account". There are two input fields: "Name" and "Email". Below these, a section titled "Date of birth" contains a note: "This will not be shown publicly. Confirm your own age, even if this account is for a business, a pet, or something else." Three dropdown menus for "Month", "Day", and "Year" are shown. At the bottom is a large grey "Next" button.

In next step user is asked for different permissions which may be granted but are not required.



In next step user information is confirmed (Notice that date of birth really does not matter as in the example the user's age is 5 years and email is checked in prior stages).




Next user is prompted to input the code sent to him via email (6 digits). Last step is the creation of password which is described in detail in [authentication testing](#)

In summary anyone with access to an email can create twitter account. Registrations are granted automatically after confirming email validity. As long as one has access to a valid email he can register as many times as he can (for purposes of testing we created 5+ accounts with throwaway emails). Users can only register with basic user permissions and the only proof of identity is email verification.

#### 4.3.4 Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account

It is quite easy to enumerate emails of accounts either when registering (already used emails inform the user that email is used) or when trying to log in - when using valid email user is redirected to input his password and when invalid email (not used in registration of any account yet) the following message is shown: *Sorry, we could not find your account.* also a HTTP response **400 Bad Request** is sent. When we have a valid email we are either redirected and can enter password or if suspicious activity is detected (Login from different location/multiple bad password/username guesses) we are redirected to input our username. This makes it more difficult to enumerate and brute force users since we need to know username+email to even be able to try passwords. However we still get 5-15 chances before lock-out to try usernames which can be bruteforced with a bit of educated guess like using name from email or that name + some numbers etc. When wrong username is input page shows message *Incorrect, please try again.* and **400 Bad Request** is sent, user is then redirected to the same page to try again on a correct username guess we are redirected to input password with **200 OK** response. Note that usernames can be seen by any logged in users - every twitter user has his username on his profile and under every tweet as `@<username>` - and everyone can become user and therefore see usernames. So we can actually get all information needed to try to bruteforce passwords if we are able to connect an account to its email. For example I used this method to get back access to a testing account I created and forgot the username of, because twitter appended some random numbers to it (as shown below). Another example is if we got the email used for registration of say Elon Musk (username `@elonmusk`) we could use this information to effectively lock him out of his twitter account or try to bruteforce his password. It is possible to enumerate user emails and potentially their usernames.



#### 4.3.5 Testing for Weak or Unenforced Username Policy

When prompted to set username, twitter by default fills the username field with first part of mail and if ambiguous appends some numbers. User can change his username to anything he pleases as long as it is unique across the application. So the usernames are implicitly structured but in reality can not be guessed with certainty as users can change them.

## 4.4 Authentication Testing

### 4.4.1 Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel

Twitter uses TLSv1.2 for data transfer encryption and HTTPS for all communication including login, user creation and password change, it can not be forced to use unsecure HTTP.

tcp.port == 443 && ip.dst == 104.244.42.130						
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
88	5.400148045	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	206	Application Data
91	5.426801434	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35558 → 443 [ACK] Seq=153 Ack=65 Win=63360 Len=0
92	5.427547926	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	261	Application Data
93	5.427579300	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	582	Application Data
97	5.562282422	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35556 → 443 [ACK] Seq=736 Ack=270 Win=63360 Len=0
143	23.373504936	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	253	Application Data
144	23.373529254	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	562	Application Data
172	23.527780948	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35556 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1443 Ack=403 Win=63360 Len=0
182	24.069939533	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	253	Application Data
183	24.070079215	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	231	Application Data
189	24.217180777	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35556 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1819 Ack=536 Win=63360 Len=0
324	26.357784370	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	253	Application Data
325	26.357823423	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	1244	Application Data
326	26.357883746	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	4086	Application Data
333	26.532384005	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35556 → 443 [ACK] Seq=7240 Ack=665 Win=63360 Len=0
345	27.573375301	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TLSv1.2	141	Application Data
348	27.599338671	10.0.2.15	104.244.42.130	TCP	54	35558 → 443 [ACK] Seq=240 Ack=129 Win=63360 Len=0

Communication capture of login via Wireshark.

### 4.4.2 Testing for Default Credentials

While testing different credentials in the register page I found out there are users with admin@twitter.com and guest@twitter.com registered.




Twitter indeed uses @twitter.com address (for example registering verification mail is sent from verification@email.com) and they state it as official way of communication,

Twitter will only send you emails from @twitter.com or @e.twitter.com. However, some people may receive fake or suspicious emails that look like they were sent by Twitter. These emails might include malicious attachments or links to spam or phishing websites. Please know that Twitter will never send emails with attachments or request your Twitter password by email.

however there is no way of knowing if they are actual twitter.com default/admin credentials, they can however be used to lock out these accounts as described below.

#### 4.4.3 Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism

Twitter's lock out mechanism activates after 5-15 (scales with repeating tries) unsuccessful entries of password/username. Any following tries result in the following message.



Unlock mechanism is time-based with time-out of 30+ minutes (Twitter [officially states](#) it is an hour lock-out, my first lock-out was shorter though).

## What does it mean to be locked out?

- After a limited number of failed attempts to sign in to Twitter, you will be temporarily locked out from trying to sign in. When your account is locked, you will not be able to sign in — even with the correct password.
- **This lock lasts about an hour and will then clear on its own.**


It also provides possibility to send a form with login issue, but none of the possibilities fit nor help with the lock out issue.

I need to regain access to my Twitter account

I need to regain access to my Twitter account  
I'm trying to reactivate my account  
I'd like to deactivate or close my account  
Appeal a locked or suspended account

If twitter suspects an unusual login activity (lot of bad tries/new location) it prompts the user to input their

username or phone, this can also be used to lock-out an account, as it uses same policy as password lock-out mechanism.




#### 4.4.4 Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema

It is not possible to bypass authentication through direct page request. It is possible to visit someone's profile with [twitter.com/<username>](https://twitter.com/<username>), however this does not disclose any personal/secret information as it shows someone's profile (what it shows depends on individual's account security settings).

Session IDs look random, they have some similar parts but their value changes unpredictably each login even in concurrent sessions.

#### 4.4.5 Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password

The login page does not offer 'remember password' functionality and it does not store user's credentials instead replacing them with secure tokens like sessionID.



#### 4.4.6 Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses

Attacker can not access private information with the 'History' function and 'Back' button, he gets redirected to secure version of that page where he acts as a guest account or to login page to get authorized.

The website uses HTTP directives to secure cache correctly with the following settings (copied from response headers).

```
cache-control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0
expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
```

Twitter stores a lot of information in cache, it does so securely and no information can be gathered from the cache. The cache can be viewed by using URL [about:cache](#) on Firefox.

Key	Data size	Fetch count	Last Modified	Expires	Placing
<a 1="" api.twitter.com="" client_event.json?keepalive='false%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a"' href="https://twitter.com/api/graphql/Fhd55uWv12nVn0gBaEZ1z0/Listpins?variables=%7B%7D&amp;features=%7B%7D%23web_lists_timeline_redesign_enabled%23%4tne_h2C2z3Atrne%2Ct32verified_phone_label_enabled%22%34tne_h2C2z3Atrne_web_graphql_skip_user_profile_image_extensions_enabled%23%34tne_h2C2z3Atrne_web_graphql_timeline_navigation_enabled%23%4tne_h2C2z3Atrne%20partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;47 bytes&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;0&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;2023-06-07 11:34:06&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;Expired Immediately&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt; &lt;tr&gt; &lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=" https:="" jot="">1686151791</a>	0 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:29:48	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://api.twitter.com/1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=true%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151913</a>	0 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:34:05	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://api.twitter.com/1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=false%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151927</a>	0 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:31:24	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://api.twitter.com/1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=false%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151926</a>	0 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:34:21	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://accounts.google.com/gsi/button/select?client_id=49625052041_kgt0hghf445lmcnhijv46b715n2pbct.apps.googleusercontent.com&amp;ux_mode=popup&amp;ui_mode=card&amp;data=jN051kn5FGdAm18C72#Vgkchannel_id=3cdff5471803f01392e5e186e87ac28a14de94f88e8b140dd29682a33b02&amp;origin=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com&amp;is_3pt=true%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151921</a>	62072 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:31:40	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://accounts.google.com/gsi/button/?theme=outline&amp;size=large&amp;shape=circle&amp;logo_alignment=center&amp;text=sign up with width=300&amp;client_id=49625052041_kgt0hghf445lmcnhijv46b715n2pbct.apps.googleusercontent.com&amp;iframe_id=hgsi_325935_8422506as=skmPdJH02J00f30WFvQgh1=en%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151920</a>	38510 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:32:06	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://twitter.com/api/1.1/jot/client_event.json?keepalive=false%0partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151921</a>	0 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:30:41	Expired Immediately	
<a href="https://twitter.com/api/1.1/users/recommendations.json?include_profile_interstitial_type=1&amp;include_blocking=1&amp;include_blocked_by=1&amp;include_followed_by=1&amp;include_my_retweets=1&amp;include_nfts=1&amp;include_can_dm=1&amp;include_can_media_tag=1&amp;include_ext_has_nft_avatar=1&amp;include_ext_blue_verified=1&amp;include_ext_profile_image_shape=1&amp;skip_status=1&amp;skip_trend=1&amp;display_location=profile_accounts_sidebar_limit=4&amp;partitionKey=%28http%2523%2Ctwitter.com%29,%a">1686151920</a>	2084 bytes	0	2023-06-07 11:34:06	Expired Immediately	

#### 4.4.7 Testing for Weak Password Policy

Password policy allows any type of character found on standard keyboard. It requires at least 8 characters and accepts 128 most. It does not force numbers or special characters but a short password without those will be marked as weak and not accepted. The passwords are checked against common passwords so passwords like [princess](#) or [password](#) or [iloveyou](#) will not be allowed, however adding a number to them will 'fix' this so passwords like [princess1](#) or [password1234](#) work. General password entropy is not calculated as passwords like [aaaaaaaaab](#) are also accepted. During registration user can choose password same as his chosen name but

if he tries to change a password to his username later via the 'Change your password' function as logged user password with his username will be rejected (part of it with numbers is okay though). Username is not rejected during registration before user picks his username after creating password. At least for consistency stake it would be best to choose username and then password so it can be checked like in change password functionality. It is not required to confirm password which made me accidentally enter and submit password I was not yet intending to use and therefore did not know it when trying to log in again forcing me to reset password.

User is not forced to change his password after any period of time and he can change his password whenever he pleases with different methods. Change password function requires previous password knowledge. The changed passwords can be very similar to previous, it is not allowed to change to same password though. Also the warning messages are different from those seen during registration, if we use common password (princess/password) we are presented with *That password is too easy to guess. Please choose a stronger password.* while in registration the message was just *Please enter a stronger password.* Registration phase allows *show password* function while *change password* function does not.

The image consists of four vertically stacked screenshots of a password input field, each with a red border and a small circular icon with a red slash in the top right corner. Each screenshot includes a descriptive message below the input field.

- Screenshot 1:** The input field contains "12345678". Below it, the message reads: "Please enter a stronger password."
- Screenshot 2:** The input field contains a long, complex password: "3Dm5[<>+5FFpDq;!zzZ/R4d)X\*9]E-Thl[q5M<f\$;KnT". Below it, the message reads: "Your password needs to be less than 128 characters. Please enter a shorter one."
- Screenshot 3:** The input field contains "princess". Below it, the message reads: "Please enter a stronger password."
- Screenshot 4:** The input field contains "princess1". Below it, the message reads: "Please enter a stronger password."

The screenshot shows a password change form. At the top, it says "You'll need a password" and "Make sure it's 8 characters or more." Below is a password input field containing "aaaaaaaaab". To the right of the input field is a "Copy" button. Below the input field is a link "Change your password". Underneath is a "Current password" field with four dots. Below that is a "Forgot password?" link. The next section is for a "New password" which also contains four dots. A red error message "That password is too easy to guess. Please choose a stronger password." is displayed above the "Confirm password" field, which also contains four dots.

As mentioned before twitter does not force pretty much any requirements for the password although they provide tips for password strength in their [Help center](#)

#### **Password strength**

Create a strong and unique password for your Twitter account. You should also create an equally strong and unique password for the email address associated with your Twitter account.

##### **Do's:**

- **Do** create a password at least 10 characters long. Longer is better.
- **Do** use a mix of uppercase, lowercase, numbers, and symbols.
- **Do** use a different password for each website you visit.
- **Do** keep your password in a safe place. Consider using password management software to store all of your login information securely.

##### **Don'ts:**

- **Do not** use personal information in your password such as phone numbers, birthdays, etc.
- **Do not** use common dictionary words such as "password", "iloveyou", etc.
- **Do not** use sequences such as "abcd1234", or keyboard sequences like "qwerty."
- **Do not** reuse passwords across websites. Your Twitter account password should be unique to Twitter.

#### 4.4.8 Testing for Weak Security Question Answer


Twitter does not use security question functionality.

#### 4.4.9 Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities

Logged in users can change their passwords with method described under [Testing for Weak Password Policy](#) using their current password.

If user is not logged in he can reset his password via the [Forgot password?](#) functionality. If unusual activity is detected user is prompted to input their username (As described in above subsections), meaning password of disclosed users (for example previously found admin@twitter.com) cannot be reset. Otherwise user is asked to select email to send verification code to (the code seems to be 8 length randomly generated digit-letter

sequence). After inputting the correct code user can change his password. The password policy to new password as well as warning messages are the same as when registering with new password, this time however it is required to repeat the password. When the password is reset user is prompted to enter reason for changing password and is logged out of all active Twitter sessions, as stated in Twitter's [Help Center](#).



#### 4.4.10 Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel

No alternative channels are in our scope (mobile/desktop app).

## 4.5 Authorization Testing

### 4.5.1 Testing Directory Traversal File Include

Twitter does not use GET arguments to load files, arguments are rather used to specify settings. Values in cookies are encoded and most likely are not used for dynamic page generation. Attack is therefore not possible.

```
GET /i/api/graphql/eB2SB0qYfesXNLf9joi-_w/HomeTimeline?variables=
%7B%22count%22%3A40%2C%22cursor%22%3A%22DABcGABFypR19DAJxEKAAIXKkvobtfAAAGAAwAAAAAAA%22%2C%
22includePromotedContent%22%3Atrue%2C%22latestControlAvailable%22%3Atrue%2C%22withCommunity%2
%3Atrue%2D&features=%
%7B%22web_lists_timeline_redesign_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22responsive_web_graphql_exclude_dire
ctive_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22verified_phone_label_enabled%22%3Afalse%2C%22creator_subscription
ns_tweet_preview_api_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22responsive_web_graphql_timeline_navigation_enable
d%22%3Atrue%2C%22responsive_web_graphql_skip_user_profile_image_extensions_enabled%22%3Afalse
%2C%22tweetype_umention_optimization_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22responsive_web_edit_tweet_api_e
nabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22graphql_is_translatable_rweb_tweet_is_translatable_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C
%22view_counts_everywhere_api_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22longform_notetweets_consumption_enabled%2
%3Atrue%2C%22tweet_awards_web_tipping_enabled%22%3Afalse%2C%22freedom_of_speech_not_reach_f
etch_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22standardized_nudges_misinfo%22%3Atrue%2C%22longform_notetweets_rich_te
xt_read_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22longform_notetweets_inline_media_enabled%22%3Afalse%2C%22respo
nsive_web_enhance_cards_enabled%22%3Afalse%7D HTTP/2
Host: twitter.com
Cookie: guest_id=v1%3A168675853719215783; __twitter_sess=
BAh7CSIKZmhxc2hJQzonQWNoaWqu29udHvbGxlcjo6Rmhc2g6OkZsYXNo%250ASGFzaHsAbjoQHQVzZWR7ADoPY3J1
YXRIZF9nGwvRLgVpbqIAToMY3NyZlp9x250AZC1I0DRk0DzNNTjh0DmYz42DyW0WzjmzQ0NDE3MTQ5OGY6B2lKIiU0
0Wm3%250ANDkyYmfjNzdmZT3NDJmYTQyZycyNDkYZ2M4NW%253D%253D-078e2d234a4f3f000ddb03c62f1b74db04
0a7afdf; kdt=ykkQnd8awignI4FcE55RKRDkGtRQNjH4rbwZCX4J2; auth_token=
4d382f398ce21664398797e5aebe05d88a610e7; ct=
350abbcc32a6506baac88efb25db53ca3259f201e2ds85f23624c054e109358204c2e40cff0c0e7a5910573384fd2b
1dc6057d23fc82c622f21fa56fe4baadb4586cf48e283de8bab428e88ac3b07ef; att=
1-siqRqIRfyJ79k8v3HAjLNPbmWD3MKauRWS8GwX; lang=en; twid=u3D1666898792648515584; d_prefs=
MjoxLGnvbnN1bnRFdmVyc21vbjoyLHR1eHRfdmVyc21vbjoxMDAw
```

### 4.5.2 Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema

As we are again testing in black-box setting, we can only test with user privileges/role. For the same reason we can only test for horizontal bypassing.

Twitter does not identify users by parameter but rather with combination of the right cookie + csrf token and header. So by changing the cookie of one users request with cookie from others gets the response 403 Forbidden and error message with code 353: *This request requires a matching csrf cookie and header.*

By changing both csrf token and cookie we can get the response of other user but by that we authorized ourselves as that user so that is correct behaviour (getting this information would require to catch communication and decode cookie and csrf token). Horizontal bypassing is not possible.

### 4.5.3 Testing for Privilege Escalation

Privileges on twitter website are most likely stored in the *auth\_token* part of cookie as a hash. No other variables store or allow manipulation in HTTP communication.

No file with missing or bad authorization checking were found by URL traversal.

### 4.5.4 Testing for Insecure Direct Object References

Again twitter loads page contents via POST/GET graphQL requests (*POST /i/api/graphql/eB2SB0qYfesXNLf9joi-\_w/HomeTimeline*) to api that return the needed content so there is no possible input for object/content manipulation.

## 4.6 Session Management Testing

### 4.6.1 Testing for Session Management Schema

Name	Domain	Expires in	HttpOnly	Secure	SameSite	Note
_gid	.twitter.com	28 hours	No	No		Google Analytics
IDE	.doubleclick.net	1 year	Yes	Yes	None	Doubleclick integration and/or analytics
_ga_	.twitter.com	1 year	No	No		Google Analytics
att	.twitter.com	1 day	Yes	Yes	None	Authentication and password reset
guest_id	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	None	Advertising when logged out
twid	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	None	Authentication
auth_token	.twitter.com	1 year	Yes	Yes	None	Account login and authentication
ct0	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	Lax	Authentication
lang	twitter.com	Session	No	No		Language functionality
kdt	.twitter.com	1 year	Yes	Yes		Authentication of a known device
d_prefs	.twitter.com	6 months	No	Yes		Cookie preferences
_twitter_sess_	.twitter.com	Session	Yes	Yes		User session
guest_id_marketing	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	None	Advertising when logged out
guest_id_ads	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	None	Advertising when logged out

personalization_id	.twitter.com	1 year	No	Yes	None	Tracking activities on and off Twitter for personalization
--------------------	--------------	--------	----	-----	------	--

#### 4.6.2 Testing for Cookies Attributes

Attribute secure is used for all authentication related cookies. However few authentication cookies have the attribute SameSite set to None which may lead to cookie hijacking in case of CSRF/XSS vulnerability.

#### 4.6.3 Testing for Session Fixation

The cookie \_twitter\_sess is set before the authentication and it remains the same after successful authentication. When that \_twitter\_sess value is set to another user it doesn't make them authenticated as the original one, probably because there are many cookies used in combination for the authentication.

#### 4.6.4 Testing for Exposed Session Variables

Session cookie has its own different value for every session. Protection from eavesdropping is ensured by HTTPS protocol.

When the \_twitter\_sess cookie is set, it comes with cache-control directives (apart from others) **no-cache** and **no-store** which prevent it from being cached.

```

1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Date: Sat, 17 Jun 2023 21:30:04 GMT
3 Perf: 7626143928
4 Pragma: no-cache
5 Server: tsa_o
6 Status: 200 OK
7 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT
8 Set-Cookie: fm=0; Max-Age=0; Expires=Sat, 17 Jun 2023 21:30:04 GMT; Path=/; Domain=.twitter.com; Secure;
HTTPOnly
9 Set-Cookie: _twitter_sess=
BAh7CSIKZmxhc2hJQzonQWN0aw9uQ29udHJvbGxlcjo6Rmxhc2g60kZsYXNo%250ASGFzaHsABjoKQHVzzWR7ADoPY3J1YXR1ZF9hdGwiCG7m
Q8uIATo3NyZ19p%250AZC11ZmE0MmIyYTc4ZTd1NjJiNjc5M2UxNTEyYTQwOGFmNzk6B21kTiUyOD1i%250AODA1Y2M5Y2EwZDRiMWE5MjU
4MTc3MWZiYzE4Ng%253D%253D--129fc5e110bbe1139ccfc8e38c20b86031af5857; Path=/; Domain=.twitter.com; Secure;
HTTPOnly
10 Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
11 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0

```

After reviewing the client-server communication the session cookie seems to be contained only in POST requests.

#### 4.6.5 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery

CSRF Token is included in the \_twitter\_sess cookie and also as a HTTP header X-Csrf-Token in requests, which prevents the application from being vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery.

#### 4.6.6 Testing for Logout Functionality

The logout button is placed in an area of the page that is fixed in the view port of the browser and isn't affected by scrolling of the content. However the logout button cannot be seen directly as user first has to click on the three dots next to his account name and then choose the logout button from the menu that pops out.

The screenshot shows a mobile Twitter interface. On the left is a sidebar with navigation links: Home, Explore, Notifications, Messages, Lists, Bookmarks, Verified, Profile, and More. A blue 'Tweet' button is at the bottom. In the center is the 'Home' feed. A tweet from Elon Musk (@elonmusk) dated Jun 15 is visible, stating: "This conspiracy theory that birds are actually government spy drones is ... totally false". Below it is a photo of a sign that reads "Birds are your friends and harmless.". On the right side, there's a 'pq talks' section listing trending topics like Norway, Ukrainian, USSR, WWII, #CanYaman, Queen, and a 'Who to follow' section with profiles for Fabrizio Romano, INTERIOR PORN, and Joe Rogan.

### Add an existing account

[Log out @p\\_chris\\_bacon](#)



Note that user cannot log out within the user interface before they answer the cookie related dialog.

The screenshot shows the same Twitter interface as above, but with a large black cookie consent banner at the bottom. The banner contains the text: "Did someone say ... cookies? Twitter and its partners use cookies to provide you with a better, safer and faster service and to support our business. Some cookies are necessary to use our services, improve our services, and make sure they work properly. Show more about your choices." At the bottom right of the banner are two buttons: "Accept all cookies" and "Refuse non-essential cookies".

If one is logged out and tries to load a page that is only available to authenticated users with their old session cookies, the application sends a response that something went wrong.

The screenshot shows the browser's developer tools Network tab. The Request section displays a GET request to the URL /home. The Response section shows a response with the status code 500 and the message "Something went wrong. Try reloading." A blue "Retry" button is visible below the message.

```

Request
Pretty Raw Hex
1 GET /home HTTP/2
2 Host: twitter.com
3 Cookie: lang=en; d_prefs=MjoxLGNvbnN1bnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHR1eHfdmVyc2lvbjoxMDAw; guest_id=v1%3A168707946111835899;
    _twitter_sess=
        BAh7CSIK2mhch2hJ0zon0Wn0aM9u029u0dHJvBxlcjo6Rmxhc2g60kZsYXNo%250ASGFzaHsABjoKOHvz2Wb7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrcEyU7c21
        AToMYNyZ19pk2hJ0zon0Wn0aM9u029u0dHJvBxlcjo6Rmxhc2g60kZsYXNo%250ASGFzaHsABjoKOHvz2Wb7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrcEyU7c21
        AToMYNyZ19pk2hJ0zon0Wn0aM9u029u0dHJvBxlcjo6Rmxhc2g60kZsYXNo%250ASGFzaHsABjoKOHvz2Wb7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrcEyU7c21
        zMTQ1MA%25D%25D-74881c523cd695e9636af832e18ce0954fe687db; kdt=PjYsYp1VmC1gwUL6uRj2Faksg98bh0qTU19rY9;
        auth_token=10aab78354ccbe3092061083579386363a9a76f; ct0=
        0099cb0dc0c1c161e034183567b3f161c4e9ad43dfe57eaa6d14b59d6ef6953fb72d67b06cc5c71e23fe3c7b84fb53a3bd6e029f6a6362
        10f29859ef7994992c52be27912219e3fe3b3d32e665; twid=u%3D1664664683398287362
4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v="24", "Chromium";v="110"
5 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
6 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"
7 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78
    Safari/537.36
9 Accept:
    text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
10 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
11 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
12 Sec-Fetch-User: ?
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
14 Referer: https://twitter.com/i/flow/login
15 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
16 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
17
18

```

## 4.6.7 Testing Session Timeout

During the testing process I haven't experienced a single timeout, therefore the only time limit appears to be the expiry date of cookies.

## 4.6.8 Testing for Session Puzzling

All session variables seem to be correctly regenerated for every session and no session puzzling was detected.

## 4.6.9 Testing for Session Hijacking

The application runs on HTTPS, uses HSTS and all cookies related to session or authentication are marked as secure.

## 4.7 Input Validation Testing

### 4.7.1 Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting

None of the input vectors (POST/GET parameters) are reflected in response or generate an output that would suggest XSS vulnerability.

### 4.7.2 Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting

Here the input vector is obviously the "tweet" mechanism, where user can input anything and it is stored in the backend and can be displayed by any user. Another possible vector is comments below "tweets".

After testing these vectors backend seems to validate and sanitize input very well and no issue was encountered on Twitter's part. Another problem is once again Twitter's obfuscation of its functionality.

### 4.7.3 Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering

Discussed in [4.2.6 Test HTTP Methods](#).

### 4.7.4 Testing for HTTP Parametr Pollution

Search function uses GET parameters. Using multiple same name parameters returns results for only the first one.

Request			Response		
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Pretty	Raw	Hex
<pre>1 GET /i/api/1.1/search/typeahead.json? include_ext_is_blue_verified=1&amp;include_ext_verified_type=1&amp; include_ext_profile_image_shape=1&amp;q=AHOJ&amp;q=OBED&amp;src= search_box&amp;result_type=events%2Cusers%2Ctopics</pre> <p>2 Host: twitter.com</p> <p>3 Cookie: d_prefs=MjoxLGNbNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHRleHRfdmVyc2lvbjoxMDAw; guest_id=v1%3A168632124879960996; kdt=KFBj45SzLQwEcatt16Q3tFMvmxzLU6t1ZGwCIp; auth_token=bfe122a7bc87e40f694cab0c88f69d18665841ec; ct0=93c81cc62d1279ab26d4a701199fef3f33f64a4e4212059e3c8b0b018bf84d40dc29a2d6485d72e080c9b85c5f0259c8af08c26ad32bd281ee8cda5b29320c406a601814e042ee1abe6cb873aeee84068; twid=u%3D1666483717898919948; dnt=1; lang=en</p> <p>4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Chromium";v="107", "Not=A.Brand";v="24"</p> <p>5 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en</p> <p>6 X-Csrf-Token: 93c81cc62d1279ab26d4a701199fef3f33f64a4e4212059e3c8b0b018bf84d40dc29a2d6485d72e080c9b85c5f0259c8af08c26ad32bd281ee8cda5b29320c406a601814e042ee1abe6cb873aeee84068</p> <p>7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0</p> <p>8 Authorization: Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANRILgAAAAAAAnNwIzUejRC0uH5E6I8xnZz4puTs%3D1z7ttfk8LF81IUql6CjhjLTVju4F43AGWMjCpTnA</p> <p>9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.5304.107 Safari/537.36</p> <p>10 X-Twitter-Auth-Type: OAuth2Session</p> <p>11 X-Client-Uuid: ed501ee1-13d0-430c-a4a6-e8ad7c019476</p> <p>12 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes</p> <p>13 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"</p> <p>14 Accept: */*</p> <p>15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin</p> <p>16 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors</p> <p>17 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty</p> <p>18 Referer: https://twitter.com/explore</p> <p>19 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate</p> <p>20 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p>	<pre>1 HTTP/2 200 OK 2 Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 13:56:07 GMT 3 Perft: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: tsa_o 6 Status: 200 OK 7 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 8 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 9 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 10 Last-Modified: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 13:56:07 GMT 11 X-Transaction: 52d23bd3c5dallfd 12 Content-Length: 7150 13 X-Access-Level: read-write-directmessages 14 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 15 X-Transaction-Id: 52d23bd3c5dallfd 16 X-Xss-Protection: 0 17 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 18 X-Client-Event-Enabled: true 19 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 20 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant 21 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 22 X-Response-Time: 279 23 X-Connection-Hash: b169dacfa7183014899570ee4a0c60a79cc10d7658aefd7alc5873672cc3 79d4 24 25 {   "num_results": 10,   "users": [     {       "id": 2794664691,       "id_str": "2794664691",       "verified": false,       "ext_is_blue_verified": false,       "badges": [],       "is_dm_able": false,       "is_secret_dm_able": false,       "is_blocked": false,       "can_media_tag": false,       "name": "Ana Hojbot\u0103",       "screen_name": "Ahojbot\u0103",       "profile_image_url":       "http://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1636099888659</pre>				

No vulnerability found.

## 4.7.5 Testing for SQL Injection

Input vector for SQL injection could again be the search function, that might communicate with database through API. Trying some classic SQL malicious code like different types of comments (since we don't know what database twitter is running on) did not yield any suspicious result. In fact testing right in the browser shows that any special symbol `@#$%^-'";:` on its own returns "Something went wrong".

The following screenshot shows that the function sanitizes the input correctly and no unintended behaviour was found.

Once again testing in black-box setting with little to none information about how the back-end, front-end and API communication is realised and what exactly each layer does proves to be the biggest obstacle in finding possible vulnerabilities.

## 4.7.6 Testing for LDAP Injection

Twitter probably does not use LDAP, if so, it does so correctly. When applying search filters the request looks like this:

#### 4.7.7 Testing for XML Injection

Twitter does not use XML style communication.

#### 4.7.8 Testing for SSI Injection

We could not determine if SSI is enabled since we don't have access to web server and no `.shtml` pages were found.

#### 4.7.9 Testing for XPath Injection

Since Twitter does not use XML documents XPath injection is not possible as well.

#### 4.7.10 Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection

Twitter does not provide any public mail service.

When creating a user account, we received an email with verification code from verify@twitter.com. In that email's headers was stated that it was received from spring-chicken-cb.twitter.com [199.16.156.136], but running `nmap` on it didn't reveal any open ports.

## Message headers

X

```
Return-Path: <b0524ed6edeehapentesttwitter=proton.me@bounce.twitter.com>
X-Original-To: ehapentesttwitter@proton.me
Delivered-To: ehapentesttwitter@proton.me
Authentication-Results: mailin037.protonmail.ch; dkim=fail (Bad 0 bit
    rsa-sha256 signature.) header.d=twitter.com header.a=rsa-sha256
Authentication-Results: mailin037.protonmail.ch; dmarc=pass (p=reject dis=none)
    header.from=twitter.com
Authentication-Results: mailin037.protonmail.ch; spf=pass
    smtp.mailfrom=bounce.twitter.com
Authentication-Results: mailin037.protonmail.ch; arc=none smtp.remote-
    ip=199.16.156.136
Authentication-Results: mailin037.protonmail.ch; dkim=temperror (0-bit key)
    header.d=twitter.com header.i=@twitter.com header.b="atUxKfPIE"
Received: from spring-chicken-cb.twitter.com (spring-chicken-cb.twitter.com
    [199.16.156.136]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256
    bits))
    (No client certificate requested) by mailin037.protonmail.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id
    4QjN906Pr1z9vNhF for <ehapentesttwitter@proton.me>; Fri, 16 Jun 2023 15:18:44 +0000
    (UTC)
Dkim-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=twitter.com; s=dkim-201406;
    t=1686928722; bh=gt7o/cLd2hKEV6sFKc/l2kF6jrlk0+2MEHYUJtb0YQ0=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-ID;
    b=atUxKfPIEesNPTOhBcwVgU4W03IowWuba7l1qfxBUjrJeYHL1mrL+mUQFcstVl91
```

```
[kali㉿kali]-[~]
$ nmap -sV -Pn --top-ports 1000 199.16.156.136
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-06-20 05:25 EDT
Nmap scan report for spring-chicken-cb.twitter.com (199.16.156.136)
Host is up.
All 1000 scanned ports on spring-chicken-cb.twitter.com (199.16.156.136) are in ignored states.
Not shown: 1000 filtered tcp ports (no-response)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 202.40 seconds
```

#### 4.7.11 Testing for Code Injection

Command parameters were injected into various URLs, but none of them worked.

**Request**

Pretty	Raw	Hex
1 POST /api/1.1/post/client_event.json?keepalive=false&cmd=sleep%2010 HTTP/2		
2 Host: twitter.com		
3 Cookie: guest_id=v1_3A1E872550741349428; _twitter_sess=		
4 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0		
5 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded		
6 X-Client-User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)		
7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)		
8 X-Forwarded-For: 11.12.0.561.50		
9 X-Forwarded-Port: 443		
10 X-Forwarded-Proto: https		
11 X-Forwarded-Server: 127.0.0.1:443		
12 X-Forwarded-User: 10000000000000000000000000000000		
13 X-Forwarded-Worker: 0		
14 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN		
15 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff		
16 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant		
17 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519		
18 X-Response-Time: 113		
19 X-Connection-Hash: e45c87349a6ce19102d8de1e48c14d5e4581f6b3fc3cc2bd978bdeb46a419		
20 20		

**Response**

Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
1 HTTP/2 200 OK			
2 Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 10:06:56 GMT			
3 Perf: 7628143928			
4 Pragma: no-cache			
5 Server: tsa_o			
6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT			
7 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0			
8 Last-Modified: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 10:06:56 GMT			
9 X-Transaction: a19a171d4a33d44f			
10 Content-Length: 0			
11 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN			
12 X-Transaction-Id: a19a171d4a33d44f			
13 X-Xss-Protection: 0			
14 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff			
15 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant			
16 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519			
17 X-Response-Time: 113			
18 X-Connection-Hash: e45c87349a6ce19102d8de1e48c14d5e4581f6b3fc3cc2bd978bdeb46a419			
19 20			

Request	Response
<pre> 1 GET /i/api/2/guide.json?include_profile_interstitial_type=1&amp;include_blocking=1&amp;include_blocked_by=1&amp;include_followed_by=1&amp;include_want_retweets=1&amp;include_mute_edge=1&amp;include_can_dm=1&amp;include_can_media_tag=1&amp;include_ext_has_ntf_avatar=1&amp;include_ext_is_blue_verified=1&amp;include_ext_verified_type=1&amp;include_ext_profile_image_shape=1&amp;skip_status=1&amp;cards_platform=Web-12&amp;include_cards=1&amp;include_ext_alt_text=true&amp;include_ext_limited_action_results=false&amp;include_quote_count=1&amp;include_reply_count=1&amp;include_tweet_item=true&amp;include_ext_vIEWS=true&amp;include_ext_edited_by=true&amp;include_ext_is_translation=true&amp;include_ext_is_low_quality=true&amp;include_ext_media_availability=true&amp;include_ext_sensitive_media_warning=true&amp;include_ext_trusted_friend_metadata=true&amp;send_error_codes=true&amp;simple_quoted_tweet=true&amp;count=20&amp;requestContext=1aunch&amp;isDisplayLocation=web sidebarFocal_tweet_id=1670186385490477056&amp;mediaStats=1chighlightedLabel=1chashNftAvatar12voiceInfo1CbirdwatchPivot1CsuperFollowMetadata1CunmetInfo1CeditControl1cmd=sleep1010 HTTP/2 2 Host: twitter.com 3 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 13:46:45 GMT 4 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 5 Content-Length: 1000 6 Connection: close 7 Sec-CH-UA: "Not A Brand";v="99" 8 Sec-CH-UA-Mobile: ?0 9 Sec-CH-UA-Platform: "Windows" 10 X-Carf-Client-Type: "Twitter" 11 X-Carf-Client-Name: "Twitter" 12 X-Carf-Client-Version: "2.1.0" 13 X-Carf-Client-Hash: "1670186385490477056" 14 X-Carf-Client-Platform: "Windows" 15 X-Carf-Client-User-Agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/112.0.5615.50 Safari/537.36" 16 X-Carf-Client-Uuid: "063396da-40c8-4826-ba5-9dbfe781020f" 17 X-Carf-Client-User: yes 18 X-Carf-UtcOffset: +0100 19 X-Carf-User-Platform: "Windows" 20 Accept: */* 21 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 22 Accept-Language: cs-CZ,cs;q=0.9 23 </pre>	<pre> 19 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 19990 20 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant 21 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63130519 22 X-Response-Time: 245 23 X-Connection-Hash: e43c40a0781576a5aada82a69db03ec7104e2ccdd77b56cfb9dc3dc44d2daed 24 [   "globalObjects": {     "tweets": [       ...     ],     "users": [       ...     ],     "moments": [       ...     ],     "cards": [       ...     ],     "places": [       ...     ],     "media": [       ...     ],     "broadcasts": [       ...     ],     "topics": [       ...     ],     "lists": [       ...     ]   },   "timeline": {     "id": "guide-166466408398287360-main-page-86-1671097858010610560",     "instructions": [       {         "clearCache": [           ...         ],         "addEntries": [           "entries": [             {               "entryId": "cursor:2",               "sortIndex": "3",               "content": {                 "operations": [                   "setCursor": {                     "value": "DefaultTopCursorValue",                     "cursorType": "Top"                   }                 ]               }             },             ...           ],           "entryId": "trends"         ]       }     ]   } } </pre>

#### 4.7.11.1 Testing for Local File Inclusion

No requests or scripts that take filename as a parameter were found.

#### 4.7.11.2 Testing for Remote File Inclusion

No requests or scripts that take filename as a parameter were found.

#### 4.7.12 Testing for Command Injection

No place for command injection was found.

#### 4.7.13 Testing for Format String Injection

We tried to insert formatting strings into many different places but none of them caused unexpected behaviour.

#### 4.7.14 Testing for Incubated Vulnerability

We didn't find any vulnerability suitable for incubation.

#### 4.7.15 Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling

We didn't find any data that were contained in the request and then would appear in the response header.

#### 4.7.16 Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests

We don't have access to the server, hence we cannot setup a reverse proxy on the server side.

When reviewing requests and responses on the client side, none of them seemed suspicious.

## 4.7.17 Testing for Host Header Injection

When supplied another domain into the Host header field, the server responds with 404 Not Found.

Request	Response
<pre>1 GET /i/api/files/v1/avatar_content?user_ids=44196397&amp;only_spaces=true HTTP/2 2 Host: example.org 3 Cookie: guest_id=v131a1e0725507413494289; kdt=CubFWUKgYB1jNEYjn6h4E7weXXWENZpaAnYK1ONO; auth_token=31840e1275ad4c8c2aea5da576eae07c7dc47; ct0= bb444a1e76d925ad4d86923ed33b5f5e6ce1158cbffab41c068f314935eb7267bccef1292e8a2930659515db062a393b4 1debcfffd317144bd90d44a527392d9a371c44e67ba04d52770c935c3d087dd; att= 1-33404ppoo01T80dYzuaafqL7TEf9015lx22; twid=u131646646833982073c; d_prefs= MTxOLGvbnNlbNfdmVyc1vbjoyLR1eRtRdmVyc1vbjoxMDav; guest_id_ads=v131a1e0725507413494289; guest_id_marketing=v131a1e0725507413494289; personalization_id="v1_BHffhgOFKnIP9s5rRv+BDg="; guest_id_ga=GAI.2.901938001.1687255106; _gid=GAI.3.1319352204.1687255106; lang=en 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not set" 6 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 7 X-Csrf-Token: bb444a1e76d925ad4d86923ed33b5f5e6ce1158cbffab41c068f314935eb7267bccef1292e8a2930659515db062a393b4 1debcfffd317144bd90d44a527392d9a371c44e67ba04d52770c935c3d087dd 7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 8 Authorization: Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANR!LgAAAAAAAnWizUejRCOuH5E6IBxnZz4puTs4D1z7ttfkBLF81IUql6chjhLTvJu4FA33AG WWCpTnA 9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.134 Safari/537.36 10 X-Twitter-Auth-Type: OAuth2Session 11 X-Client-Uuid: 0683964a-40c8-4826-b0a5-9dbfe781020f 12 X-Twitter-Active-User: no 13 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "" 14 Accept: */ 15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin 16 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 17 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 18 Referer: https://twitter.com/elonmusk 19 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 20 Accept-Language: cs-CZ,cs;q=0.9 21 22  </pre>	<pre>1 HTTP/2 404 Not Found 2 Perf: 7626143928 3 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0 4 Content-Length: 0 5 X-Transaction-Id: 7d0d312cebe0225a 6 X-Response-Time: 107 7 X-Connection-Hash: da08e40320bf0e6205afc22589adc7ca9107830fda9b7811fa55b5d79c54ea6f 8 Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:34:53 GMT 9 Server: tsa_o 10 11  </pre>
<input type="button" value="Search..."/> 0 matches	<input type="button" value="Search..."/> 0 matches

We didn't find any request that would contain the X-Forwarded-Host header. When we added the header ourselves, the server seemed to not process that header at all.

Request	Response
<pre>1 GET /i/api/2/guide.json?include_profile_interstitial_type=1&amp;include_blocking=1&amp; include_blocked_by=1&amp;include_followed_by=1&amp;include_want_retweets=1&amp;include_mute_edge=1&amp; include_can_dm=1&amp;include_can_media_tag=1&amp;include_ext_has_ntf_avatar=1&amp; include_ext_is_blue_verified=1&amp;include_ext_verified_type=1&amp;include_ext_profile_image_shape=1&amp; skip_status=1&amp;include_ext_user_entities=1&amp;include_ext_text_color=1&amp;include_ext_text_type=1&amp; include_ext_text_with_entities=1&amp;include_ext_text_with_explicit_text=1&amp;include_ext_text_with_reply_count=1&amp; include_ext_text_with_quote_count=1&amp;include_ext_text_with_user_entities=1&amp;include_ext_text_with_user_entities=true&amp; include_ext_media_color=1&amp;include_ext_media_availability=true&amp; include_ext_sensitive_media_warning=true&amp;include_ext_trusted_friends_metadata=true&amp; send_error_codes=true&amp;simple_quoted_tweet=1&amp;count=40&amp;cursor=DefaultTopCursorValue4&amp; display_location_web=1&amp;include_page_configuration=false&amp;profile_user_id=44196397&amp; entity_filters=false&amp;ext= mediaState=1&amp;highlightedLabel=1&amp;hasNftAvatar=2&amp;voiceInfo=2&amp;birdwatchPivot=2&amp;superFollowMetadata=1 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not set" 6 X-Forwarded-Host: example.org 7 X-Forwarded-Host: example.org 8 Cookie: guest_id=v131a1e0725507413494289; kdt=CubFWUKgYB1jNEYjn6h4E7weXXWENZpaAnYK1ONO; auth_token=31840e1275ad4d86923ed33b5f5e6ce1158cbffab41c068f314935eb7267bccef1292e8a2930659515db062a393b4 1debcfffd317144bd90d44a527392d9a371c44e67ba04d52770c935c3d087dd; att= 1-33404ppoo01T80dYzuaafqL7TEf9015lx22; twid=u131646646833982073c; d_prefs= MTxOLGvbnNlbNfdmVyc1vbjoyLR1eRtRdmVyc1vbjoxMDav; guest_id_ads=v131a1e0725507413494289; guest_id_marketing=v131a1e0725507413494289; personalization_id="v1_BHffhgOFKnIP9s5rRv+BDg="; guest_id_ga=GAI.2.901938001.1687255106; _gid=GAI.3.1319352204.1687255106; lang=en 9 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 10 Authorization: Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANR!LgAAAAAAAnWizUejRCOuH5E6IBxnZz4puTs4D1z7ttfkBLF81IUql6chjhLTvJu4FA33AG WWCpTnA 11 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.134 Safari/537.36 12 X-Twitter-Auth-Type: OAuth2Session 13 X-Client-Uuid: 0683964a-40c8-4826-b0a5-9dbfe781020f 14 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 15 X-Twitter-UtcOffset: +0200 16 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "" 17 Accept: */ 18 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin 19 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 20 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 21 Referer: https://twitter.com/elonmusk 22 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 23 Accept-Language: cs-CZ,cs;q=0.9 24  </pre>	<pre>1 HTTP/2 200 OK 2 Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:39:42 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 09:00:00 GMT 7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 8 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-validate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 9 Last-Modified: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:39:43 GMT 10 Content-Length: 20675 11 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 12 X-Transaction-Id: e0e6519c426e3fe3 13 X-Ks-Protection: 0 14 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 20000 15 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 19994 16 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 17 Timing-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com, https://mobile.twitter.com 18 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 19 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 19994 20 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant 21 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63138519 22 X-Response-Time: 298 23 X-Connection-Hash: 8d87bd974f797a0b3f4883e490ef3b3125d3b60c6e9d2fd4c0898eb1c93b6e4 24  </pre>
<input type="button" value="Search..."/> 0 matches	<input type="button" value="Search..."/> 0 matches

#### 4.7.18 Testing for Server-side Template Injection

No Server-side Template Injection vulnerabilities were found.

#### 4.7.19 Testing for Server-side Request Forgery

No Server-side Request Forgery injection points were found.

## 4.8 Testing for Error Handling

### 4.8.1 Testing for Improper Error Handling

When testing for possible attack vectors we found out that the page responds correctly (with 404 (Not found) or 401 (Unauthorized)) when sending GET/POST requests to random files or files higher in the hierarchy.

Trying different requests (HEAD/DELETE...) returns 405 (Method not allowed). When trying a really long path we receive `RST_STREAM error 0x2 (Implementation fault)` which doesn't seem to be an issue on twitter's side but isn't really documented either.

Another testing was performed by messing with POST and GET parameters. The following GET request parameter `supports_ntab_ur`t returns different responses:

```
GET /i/api/2/badge_count/badge_count.json?supports_ntab_ur=1 HTTP/2
```

- 1 / true -> OK 200
- 2 / abcd -> BAD REQUEST 400 (body of response: `{"errors": [{"code": 358, "message": "Unable to parse supports_ntab_ur parameter."}]}`)
- 0 / false -> Internal Server Error 500 (body of response: `{"errors": [{"message": "Internal error", "code": 131}]})`

Which looks well defined and other tests did not find any unsuspected/improper behaviour.

## 4.9 Testing for Weak Cryptography

### 4.9.1 Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security

We ran `ssllscan --show-sigs --verbose twitter.com`. You can see the full output in outputs/ssllscan.txt.

The application only supports TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3.

No ciphers that aren't considered secure nowadays are supported.

The SSL Certificate has signature ecdsa-with-SHA384 with key strength 128 bit, signed by DigiCert and is valid for 366 days.

```
SSL/TLS Protocols:
SSLv2      disabled
SSLv3      disabled
TLSv1.0    disabled
TLSv1.1    disabled
TLSv1.2    enabled
TLSv1.3    enabled
```

```
SSL Certificate:
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
ECC Curve Name:      prime256v1
ECC Key Strength:    128

Subject:  twitter.com
AltNames: DNS:twitter.com, DNS:www.twitter.com
Issuer:   DigiCert TLS Hybrid ECC SHA384 2020 CA1

Not valid before: Feb  5 00:00:00 2023 GMT
Not valid after:  Feb  5 23:59:59 2024 GMT
```

```
Supported Server Cipher(s):
Preferred TLSv1.3  128 bits  TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256      Curve 25519 DHE 253
Accepted  TLSv1.3  256 bits  TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384      Curve 25519 DHE 253
Accepted  TLSv1.3  256 bits  TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 Curve 25519 DHE 253
SSL_get_error(ssl, cipherStatus) said: 1
Preferred TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 Curve 25519 DHE 253
Accepted  TLSv1.2  128 bits  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA       Curve 25519 DHE 253
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Curve 25519 DHE 253
Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA       Curve 25519 DHE 253
SSL_get_error(ssl, cipherStatus) said: 1
```

### 4.9.2 Testing for Padding Oracle

Session and authentication related cookies are encrypted but aren't multiples of 8/16 which implies that a stream cipher was used, and therefore it doesn't meet the requirements for possibility of the Padding Oracle vulnerability.

### 4.9.3 Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels

All data is sent via HTTPS.

#### 4.9.4 Testing for Weak Encryption

`ssllscan` didn't find any weak encryption on the transport layer.

As we don't have access to the back-end source code we cannot determine which algorithms are used for the encryption that happens on the server side (password hashes, authentication cookies etc.).

## 4.10 Business Logic Testing

### 4.10.1 Test Business Logic Data Validation

As for the GUI, the only input where validation is needed is the create account form. Other inputs such as tweet, searched value etc. may be pretty much anything. GUI checks the email meaning if it has form of an email address ({name}@{domain}). It doesn't check if the email actually exists, however the next step of account creation is entering the verification code which is sent to the email entered before. That implies that we cannot use neither non-existing email nor an email address that we don't have access to.

Date of birth is checked as well, account creation fails when date from future entered.


The image consists of two vertically stacked screenshots of a mobile application's account creation process. Both screenshots show "Step 1 of 5" and the title "Create your account".

**Screenshot 1 (Top):** This screenshot shows an invalid email entry. The "Email" field contains "notanemailaddress". Below the field, a red error message says "Please enter a valid email." The "Name" field is filled with "validity\_check". The "Date of birth" section shows dropdowns for Month (December), Day (17), and Year (2012). A large "Next" button is at the bottom.

Field	Value
Name	validity_check
Email	notanemailaddress
Month	December
Day	17
Year	2012

**Screenshot 2 (Bottom):** This screenshot shows a valid account creation attempt. The "Name" field is filled with "Mr. Pentester". The "Email" field contains "ehapentesttwitter3@proton.me". The "Date of birth" section shows dropdowns for Month (December), Day (10), and Year (1980). The "Year" dropdown is highlighted with a blue border. A large "Next" button is at the bottom.

Field	Value
Name	Mr. Pentester
Email	ehapentesttwitter3@proton.me
Month	December
Day	10
Year	1980



When performing single HTTP requests as such, containing invalid data, we received responses more or less describing why the request was invalid. Except when the JSON object contained two email elements, in that case the server responded with 500 Internal Server Error, meaning this edge case is not correctly handled (likely by the JSON parser).

Request	Response
Pretty	Pretty
Raw	Raw
Hex	Hex
	Render
1 GET /i/api/i/users/email_available.json HTTP/2	1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8	2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:49:59 GMT
3 Cookie: lang=en; d_pref=ijoXLnVnn1bnHrfdmVy21vbJoyLHrIeHRfdmVy21vbJoy; guest_id=v1%3A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; ct0=b5f77f21a28ec0219ee320350a52db238; _twitter_sess=BAn7CSIK2awnhc2hJ0zOnW0Daw9uQ29udUJvhXlcjg6Rmnkz2f0KzSYXNwK250ASGFzahABjoKQHvzIWRA7DopPY3J1YXR1Zf9ndGwxCGe9d51ATwNY3Ny219k250A2C11ZMh30G13YjgNGZm2NU00TMSZGH10TMwYm13ZTzKND16B21kIu14Mzgy%250AY2F1MTjYmR1YjU20WNjO6150GQ59McxhDBjZ4K2530K253D--73f098be2f6de744567114d22037ca97298b7cc5	3 Etag: 7626143928
4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v="24", "Chromium";v="110"	4 Pragma: no-cache
5 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en	5 Server: tsa_o
6 X-Csrf-Token: b5f77f21e28ec0219ee320350a52db238	6 Status: 200 OK
7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0	7 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT
8 Authorization: Bearer AAAAAGAAAAAAAANNRILgAAAAAAnNwIzUejRC0Uh5E6IBxnZz4puTs%3D1zv7ttfk8LF81IUq16chjhLTvJu4FA33AGWjCpTnA	8 Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.76 Safari/537.36	9 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0
10 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682	10 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:49:59 GMT
11 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes	11 X-Transaction: 7a3d94b37b46de5b
12 X-Client-Platform: "Linux"	12 Content-Length: 76
13 Accept: */*	13 X-Access-Level: read
14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin	14 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors	15 X-Transaction-Id: 7a3d94b37b46de5b
16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty	16 X-Xss-Protection: 0
17 Referer: https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup	17 X-RateLimit-Class: api
18 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate	18 X-RateLimit-Limit: 1000000
19 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9	19 X-RateLimit-Reset: 1687196999
20	20 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json
21	21 X-RateLimit-Remaining: 1000000
	22 X-Client-Event-Enabled: true
	23 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
	24 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant
	25 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519
	26 X-Response-Time: 112
	27 X-Connection-Hash: 0d8f7230733b5b8e510c0f4469be89d1df0ea5979158abe49312a563e22fe664
	28 {
	"valid":false,
	"msg":"You cannot have a blank email address.",
	"taken":false
	}

Request	Response
<pre>Pretty Raw Hex 1 GET /api/i/users/email_available.json?email=test HTTP/2 2 Host: twitter.com 3 Cookie: lang=en; d_prefs=MjoxGNvbnNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHR1eHfdmVyc2lvbjoxDwA; guest_id=v1%3A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; ct0=b5f7f21e28ec0219e3e32035052db238; _twitter_sess=BAh7CSIKZmhch2h0zonWN0a0u029udHvBxGlcj06Rmxhcz60KzYXN0%250ASGFzaHsAbj0QKHvzWR7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrCgghdtSIAToMY3Ny1Zpk250AzC112Wm30G13yjgNGz1M0U00TMSZGh10TMwI3ZTkh016821k1u04MzgY%250AV2fIMTjyMRY1YU20WnJ0G150GQ5MDcxdNBj2A%25D0%253D-73f0998e2f6de44567114d22837ca07298b7ce5 4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v='24', \"Chromium\";v='110" 5 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 6 X-Csrftoken: b5f7f21e28ec0219e3e32035052db238 7 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70 8 Authorization: Bearer AAAA...ANRILgAAAAAAnNuIzUeRCOUH5E618xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7ttfk8LF81Uq16CmjLTvJu4FA33AGWWjCpTnA 9 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78 10 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682 11 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 12 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 13 Accept: /* 14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin 15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 17 Referer: https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup 18 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 19 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 20 21</pre>	<pre>Pretty Raw Hex Render 1 HTTP/2 200 OK 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:51:12 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: ts_o_ 6 Status: 200 OK 7 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 8 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 9 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 10 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:51:12 GMT 11 X-Transaction: 43c8e3251f051f29 12 Content-Length: 60 13 X-Access-Level: read 14 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 15 X-Transaction-Id: 43c8e3251f051f29 16 X-Xss-Protection: 0 17 X-Ratelimit-Class: api 18 X-Ratelimit-Limit: 100000 19 X-Ratelimit-Reset: 1687197072 20 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 21 X-Ratelimit-Remaining: 100000 22 X-Client-Event-Enabled: true 23 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 24 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant 25 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 26 X-Response-Time: 113 27 X-Connection-Hash: 43070cc599074b0157cf7f12dc73653e0ce2d7b086c29653bd036d94f0cbe 28 29 {   "valid": false,   "msg": "This email is invalid.",   "taken": false }</pre>
<pre>Pretty Raw Hex 1 POST /1.1/onboarding/begin_verification.json HTTP/2 2 Host: api.twitter.com 3 Cookie: d_prefs=MjoxGNvbnNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHR1eHfdmVyc2lvbjoxDwA; guest_id=v1%3A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; _twitter_sess=BAh7CSIKZmhch2h0zonWN0a0u029udHvBxGlcj06Rmxhcz60KzYXN0%250ASGFzaHsAbj0QKHvzWR7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrCgghdtSIAToMY3Ny1Zpk250AzC112Wm30G13yjgNGz1M0U00TMSZGh10TMwI3ZTkh016821k1u04MzgY%250AV2fIMTjyMRY1YU20WnJ0G150GQ5MDcxdNBj2A%25D0%253D-73f0998e2f6de44567114d22837ca07298b7ce5; ct0=77607a3ff2f0652elef6f65383345a2be 4 Content-Length: 14 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v='24', \"Chromium\";v='110" 6 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 7 X-Csrftoken: 77607a3ff2f0652elef6f65383345a2be 8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70 9 Authorization: Bearer AAAA...ANRILgAAAAAAnNuIzUeRCOUH5E618xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7ttfk8LF81Uq16CmjLTvJu4FA33AGWWjCpTnA 10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78   Safari/537.36 11 Content-Type: application/json 12 Accept: /* 13 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682 14 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 15 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 16 Origin: https://twitter.com 17 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site 18 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 19 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 20 Referer: https://twitter.com/ 21 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 22 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 23 24 {   "email": "ehapentesstwitter3@proton.me",   "password": "Mr. Pentester",   "flow_token": "g:168708217759848894:-1687191721662:vuGpbR6GRyCmkc0SG0m7HPW1:0" }</pre>	<pre>Pretty Raw Hex Response 1 HTTP/2 400 Bad Request 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:55:31 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: ts_o_ 6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 8 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 9 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:55:31 GMT 10 Content-Length: 75 11 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 12 X-Transaction-Id: 19ff613d8e118d84 13 X-Xss-Protection: 0 14 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 15 15 X-Rate-Limit-Reset: 1687194428 16 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 17 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 18 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 12 19 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 20 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com 21 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true 22 Access-Control-Expose-Headers:   X-Twitter-Spotify-Access-Token,X-Twitter-Client-Version,X-Twitter-Diffy-Request-Key,X-Rate-Limit-Limit,X-TD-Mtime   ,X-Twitter-Client-Backoff-Policy,X-Rate-Limit-Remaining,Content-Length,X-Rate-Limit-Reset,X-Transaction-Id,X-Acte   d-Ac-User-Id,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-UTCOffset,X-Response-Time 23 X-Response-Time: 107 24 X-Connection-Hash: 454dc2d96f872e85alab7671938cf315elcc262dd0b77524f31800b12d9130b 25 26 {   "errors": [     {       "code": 398,       "message": "Can't complete your signup right now."     }   ] }</pre>
<pre>Pretty Raw Hex 1 POST /1.1/onboarding/begin_verification.json HTTP/2 2 Host: api.twitter.com 3 Cookie: d_prefs=MjoxGNvbnNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHR1eHfdmVyc2lvbjoxDwA; guest_id=v1%3A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; _twitter_sess=BAh7CSIKZmhch2h0zonWN0a0u029udHvBxGlcj06Rmxhcz60KzYXN0%250ASGFzaHsAbj0QKHvzWR7AdoPy3J1YXR1Zf9hdGwrCgghdtSIAToMY3Ny1Zpk250AzC112Wm30G13yjgNGz1M0U00TMSZGh10TMwI3ZTkh016821k1u04MzgY%250AV2fIMTjyMRY1YU20WnJ0G150GQ5MDcxdNBj2A%25D0%253D-73f0998e2f6de44567114d22837ca07298b7ce5; ct0=77607a3ff2f0652elef6f65383345a2be 4 Content-Length: 14 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v='24', \"Chromium\";v='110" 6 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 7 X-Csrftoken: 77607a3ff2f0652elef6f65383345a2be 8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70 9 Authorization: Bearer AAAA...ANRILgAAAAAAnNuIzUeRCOUH5E618xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7ttfk8LF81Uq16CmjLTvJu4FA33AGWWjCpTnA 10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78   Safari/537.36 11 Content-Type: application/json 12 Accept: /* 13 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682 14 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 15 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 16 Origin: https://twitter.com 17 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site 18 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 19 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 20 Referer: https://twitter.com/ 21 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 22 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 23 24 {   "email": "ehapentesstwitter3@proton.me",   "display_name": "Mr. Pentester",   "flow_token": "g:168708217759848894:-1687191721662:vuGpbR6GRyCmkc0SG0m7HPW1:0" }</pre>	<pre>Pretty Raw Hex Response 1 HTTP/2 400 Bad Request 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:52:08 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: ts_o_ 6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 8 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 9 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:52:08 GMT 10 Content-Length: 107 11 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 12 X-Transaction-Id: 2a9e1ce9712e21e4 13 X-Xss-Protection: 0 14 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 15 15 X-Rate-Limit-Reset: 1687194428 16 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 17 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 18 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 14 19 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 20 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com 21 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true 22 Access-Control-Expose-Headers:   X-Twitter-Spotify-Access-Token,X-Twitter-Client-Version,X-Twitter-Diffy-Request-Key,X-Rate-Limit-Limit,X-TD-Mtime   ,X-Twitter-Client-Backoff-Policy,X-Rate-Limit-Remaining,Content-Length,X-Rate-Limit-Reset,X-Transaction-Id,X-Acte   d-Ac-User-Id,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-UTCOffset,X-Response-Time 23 X-Response-Time: 139 24 X-Connection-Hash: a93a51739d8d637e44bc2a947c10b56b1082db94da69b16769795483552e332a 25 26 {   "errors": [     {       "code": 398,       "message": "Can't send the confirmation code right now. Please try again later."     }   ] }</pre>

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
<pre>1 POST /1/onboarding/begin_verification.json HTTP/2 2 Host: api.twitter.com 3 Cookie: _pref=MoIxLGNvbNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHrlleRfdmVyc2lvbjoxMDAw; guest_id=v13A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; _twitter_sess=BAh7CS1KZexch2hJ0zonWn0aw9u09dLvhGx1cj06Rmxhc2g60kZsYXN0%25ASGFzhsABj0KOHVz7NR7ADoPY3J1YXR1F9hdGwrgGhdtS1At0WY3NyZ1OpkZ58AZC11ZM30G13YjgNGz1MOU80TMS2Gh10TMwYmI3ZT2kND16821k1u14Mzg%250AV2F1MTJyM1YjU20WNjOG150GQ5MDcxDNBjZAN253DN253D-73f0998e2f6de744567114d22037ca#07298b7ce5; ct=0#76607a3ff2ff0652elef65383345a2be 4 Content-Length: 110 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v=24", "Chromium";v="110" 6 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 7 X-Csrf-Token: 77607a3ff2ff0652elef65383345a2be 8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70 9 Authorization: Bearer AAAIAAAAAnNwIzUeRC0uHSE6I8xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7tfk8LF81IUq16ChJhLTvJu4FA33AGWWjCpTnA 10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78     Safari/537.36 11 Content-Type: application/json 12 Accept: */* 13 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682 14 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 15 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 16 Origin: https://twitter.com 17 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site 18 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 19 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 20 Referer: https://twitter.com 21 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 22 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 23 24 {   "display_name": "Mr_Pentester",   "flow_token": "g:168708217759848894:-1687191721662:vu6pbR6GRyCmkc0SG0m7HPWi:0" }</pre>	<pre>1 HTTP/2 400 Bad Request 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:52:55 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: tse-0 6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 7 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 8 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 9 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:52:55 GMT 10 Content-Length: 87 11 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 12 X-Transaction-Id: ac674772dad9eb2 13 X-Xss-Protection: 0 14 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 15 15 X-Rate-Limit-Reset: 1687194428 16 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 17 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 18 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 13 19 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 20 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com 21 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true 22 Access-Control-Expose-Headers:   X-Twitter-Spotify-Access-Token,X-Twitter-Client-Version,X-Twitter-Diffy-Request-Key,X-Rate-Limit-Limit,X-TD-Mtime   ,X-Twitter-Client,Backoff-Policy,X-Rate-Limit-Remaining,Content-Length,X-Rate-Limit-Reset,X-Transaction-Id,X-Acte   d-As-User-Id,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-UTCOffset,X-Response-Time 23 X-Response-Time: 113 24 X-Connection-Hash: bd368a16dff46e4967e7e90bba2985428bde6dd8c654dc812aed852771f98 25 26 {   "errors": [     {       "code": 357,       "message": "Either phone or email or arkose token must be set"     }   ] }</pre>		
Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
<pre>1 POST /1/onboarding/begin_verification.json HTTP/2 2 Host: api.twitter.com 3 Cookie: _pref=MoIxLGNvbNlbnRfdmVyc2lvbjoyLHrlleRfdmVyc2lvbjoxMDAw; guest_id=v13A168708217759848894; gt=1670829203015495682; _twitter_sess=BAh7CS1KZexch2hJ0zonWn0aw9u09dLvhGx1cj06Rmxhc2g60kZsYXN0%25ASGFzhsABj0KOHVz7NR7ADoPY3J1YXR1F9hdGwrgGhdtS1At0WY3NyZ1OpkZ58AZC11ZM30G13YjgNGz1MOU80TMS2Gh10TMwYmI3ZT2kND16821k1u14Mzg%250AV2F1MTJyM1YjU20WNjOG150GQ5MDcxDNBjZAN253DN253D-73f0998e2f6de744567114d22037ca#07298b7ce5; ct=0#76607a3ff2ff0652elef65383345a2be 4 Content-Length: 142 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Not A[Brand];v=24", "Chromium";v="110" 6 X-Twitter-Client-Language: en 7 X-Csrf-Token: 77607a3ff2ff0652elef65383345a2be 8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: 70 9 Authorization: Bearer AAAIAAAAAnNwIzUeRC0uHSE6I8xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7tfk8LF81IUq16ChJhLTvJu4FA33AGWWjCpTnA 10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78     Safari/537.36 11 Content-Type: application/json 12 Accept: */* 13 X-Guest-Token: 1670829203015495682 14 X-Twitter-Active-User: yes 15 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 16 Origin: https://twitter.com 17 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site 18 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 19 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty 20 Referer: https://twitter.com 21 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 22 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 23 24 {   "email": "ehpentester@proton.me",   "email": "Mr_Pentester",   "flow_token": "g:168708217759848894:-1687191721662:vu6pbR6GRyCmkc0SG0m7HPWi:0" }</pre>	<pre>1 HTTP/2 500 Internal Server Error 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:53:47 GMT 3 Perf: 7626143928 4 Pragma: no-cache 5 Server: tse_o 6 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 7 Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8 8 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 9 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 16:53:48 GMT 10 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 11 X-Transaction-Id: eac39c83c4e488c3 12 X-Xss-Protection: 0 13 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 15 14 X-Rate-Limit-Reset: 1687194428 15 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 16 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 17 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 13 18 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 19 Content-Length: 52 20 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com 21 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true 22 Access-Control-Expose-Headers:   X-Twitter-Spotify-Access-Token,X-Twitter-Client-Version,X-Twitter-Diffy-Request-Key,X-Rate-Limit-Limit,X-TD-Mtime   ,X-Twitter-Client,Backoff-Policy,X-Rate-Limit-Remaining,Content-Length,X-Rate-Limit-Reset,X-Transaction-Id,X-Acte   d-As-User-Id,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-UTCOffset,X-Response-Time 23 X-Response-Time: 112 24 X-Connection-Hash: 962617d3d58cc0c14f45dcc2e585fd7c13ec00357d1b1704a0abfbfe1a04e5e 25 26 {   "errors": [     {       "message": "Internal error",       "code": 131     }   ] }</pre>		

## 4.10.2 Test Ability to Forge Requests

When reviewing the common HTTP traffic, no guessable values nor hidden features were found. Data consist of user entered content and apparently randomly generated tokens and ids.

## 4.10.3 Test Integrity Checks

We didn't find neither hidden fields nor places to insert information into areas that are non-editable.

## 4.10.4 Test for Process Timing


Entering both correct and incorrect usernames and passwords took the same time to process. We didn't find any other scenario in which process timing could be taken advantage of.

#### 4.10.5 Test Number of Times a Function Can Be Used Limits

The application has several technical limits as follows:

Functionality	Limit
Direct Messages	500 messages sent per day
Tweets	2400 per day
Changes to account email	4 per hour
Following (daily)	400 per day
Following (account-based)	5000 per account

We haven't been able to test any of them because the limits are too high to perform manually, sending repeated requests through BurpSuite or curl didn't work and API for those tasks is a paid functionality. In case of Changes to account email it would be possible to perform manual test except the fact that probably due to our penetration testing Twitter wouldn't allow us to do so, even when we created a fresh account with no suspicious history.



#### 4.10.6 Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows

The only multistep activity is the account creation, which cannot be bypassed due to email verification as one of the steps. No other multistep activity was found.

#### 4.10.7 Test Defenses Against Application Misuse

During the testing process we have found several defense mechanisms against application misuse:


- account lock out mechanism when repeatedly entered incorrect credentials
- impossibility of repeatedly posting tweets using the same HTTP request
- impossibility of repeatedly sending direct messages using the same HTTP request
- restrictions for account settings when suspicious activity is spotted
- front-end source code is well obfuscated with no comments in place and torn into pieces which makes it nearly impossible to understand

#### 4.10.8 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types

The application supports uploading media when posting a tweet. Officially accepted file formats are GIF, JPEG and PNG.

GUI doesn't allow to upload any file format but these three. Even when an unsupported file is given a supported suffix, the page reports that upload failed.

When intercepting the request for upload the media and changing both file type and file data, the application reports that upload failed.



When media is uploaded successfully, the application doesn't disclose the path but only reports the media id.

Original request	Response
<pre> 1 POST /i/media/upload.json?command=INIT&amp;total_bytes=38064&amp;media_type=image%2Fjpeg 2 Host: upload.twitter.com 3 Cookie: guest_id=v1%3A1e8721307697502414; d_prefs= MToxiGnvbnhlbnf0mVyc1vbjoyLHR1eHfdmWyc1vbjoxMDAw; guest_id_adw=v1%3A1e8721307697502414; guest_id_marketing=v1%3A1e8721307697502414; personalization_id=v1%3A1e8721307697502414; _twitter_sess... BAH7CS1KAmhc2hJdcgnvWUbVeNqSndHvhGclj0cEPmhoc1g60k7evYX0t%25QAS0fgeRnA5bKQHvzZWR7AdoPY3J1 XWUyMphGwvG5v5wvH1AT-MT3Mly12g%25DAZT1NUYODU2NDaxYT2mDj13TV150DmV150NgjD6Hm7yB21f1uUS EjEx250ANdVYUyMshhnI427mUUNUJNkMjPhmUDTw153D155D%97fcd4fa611Ch77c4849c664ff1b8 l5an%75; _ga=GAI.3.5e82381015.1687213084; _gid=GAI.2.1483182866.1687213084; Kdt... khigUUtzf4areNLxRtL0D9g00bxG9p0q4C92hBLA7; auth_token=0d4e73ee6eatt92ccc70les9ab72f98d11679500 : ct0... dcaaSb3f6a70f39e...c08a7caa0dbbc94a095429b23735d8430e6b209e4f0ed8e55017df71472e778c00aaafac7eaa dcf6e1ecf5f6ff4dbf4f1c1e...bb5941e3fd3310222bf7d92117fd9949f681fb866f; att... 1-XrkrloczYS2UfSHjHyalsQfVcpQES9GkG7gv0HlgfF; twid=u13D1664664803398207382; lang=en 4 Content-Length: 0 5 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Chromium";v="111" 6 X-Csrftoken: dcaad3f3a70f35e...c08a7caa0dbbc94a095429b23735d8430e6b209e4f0ed8e55017df71472e778c00aaafac7eaa dcf6e1ecf5f6ff4dbf4f1c1e...bb5941e3fd3310222bf7d92117fd9949f681fb866f 7 Pragma: No-cache, Pragma: OAuthSession 8 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 9 Authorization: Bearer AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANR1l...gAAAAAAAnNwIzUejRCOUH5E6I8xnZz4puTs%3D1zv7ttfkGLF8lIUq16cHjhLTvJu4FA3 3AGWVjCptNn 10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/111.0.5563.111 Safari/537.36 11 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Windows" 12 Accept: /* 13 Origin: https://twitter.com 14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site 15 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors 16 Sec-Fetch-Dst: empty 17 Referer: https://twitter.com/ 18 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 19 Accept-Language: cs-CZ,cs;q=0.9 20 21 </pre>	<pre> 1 HTTP/2 202 Accepted 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 22:08:39 GMT 3 Perf: 7626.143928 4 Vary: Origin 5 Pragma: no-cache 6 Server: tsa_o 7 Status: 202 Accepted 8 Expires: Tue, 31 Mar 1981 05:00:00 GMT 9 X-Meta-Request-ID: 03e95e4707a6dc31 10 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 11 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, pre-check=0, post-check=0 12 Last-Modified: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 22:08:39 GMT 13 X-Transaction: 03e95e4707a6dc31 14 Content-Length: 135 15 X-Access-Limits: read-write-directmessages 16 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 17 X-Transaction-Id: 03e95e4707a6dc3 18 X-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block 19 X-Rate-Limit-Limit: 415 20 X-Rate-Limit-Reset: 1687716909 21 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=json.json 22 X-File-Size-Remaining: 0 23 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 24 X-Rate-Limit-Remaining: 412 25 X-Twitter-Response-Tags: BouncerCompliant 26 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519 27 Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com 28 Access-Control-Expose-Headers: 29 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true 30 X-Response-Time: 130 31 X-Connection-Hash: 51ec50f5095e801fe5fa5ac527609906e15f197454leaf3a59cb01efb2705da8 32 33 {     "media_id": "1670921563191779331",     "media_id_string": "1670921563191779331",     "expires_after_secs": 18400,     "media_key": "3_1670921563191779331" } </pre>

## 4.10.9 Test Upload of Malicious Files

As we weren't able to upload any unexpected file types, that leaves us with uploading a malicious image, but since the malicious code inserted into an image would be run by the browser, not the application, it is beyond the scope of this pentest.

## 4.11 Client-side Testing

### 4.11.1 Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting

Manual testing and searching for possible sources of DOM CSS did not yield any results. Testing with Burp Suite's DOM Invader gave a few sinks but these have proven to be false-positives. Application does not seem vulnerable to DOM-based CSS.

Sinks (1)		Value	outerHTML	Frame path	Event	Options	Stack Trace
element.setAttribute.href (4)		https://twitter.com/home@ <b>http://</b> location.href	<link>	top			at Object.XobjA...
		https://twitter.com/messages@ <b>http://</b> location.href	<link>	top			at Object.XobjA...
		https://twitter.com/verified-choose@ <b>http://</b> location.href	<link>	top			at Object.XobjA...
		https://twitter.com/debab4451276852@ <b>http://</b> location.href	<link>	top			at Object.XobjA...

Twitter uses GraphQL and its API to load dynamic page contents and store user tweets. All validation therefore happens in the backend, which we have no access to, so it is very difficult to guess what is happening there. However all tests indicate that the all the input validation/sanitization is well performed and no errors or suspicious artefacts were found.

### 4.11.2 Testing for JavaScript Execution

Similar to the previous paragraph, we did not find any possible attack vector.

### 4.11.3 Testing for HTML Injection

Again no possible input for HTML Injection found.

### 4.11.4 Testing for Client-side URL Redirect

URL redirect again happens through backend API and does not leave room for tampering.

When user clicks a link in a tweet from a different user he is redirected with the following GET request and response.

Request	Response
Pretty Raw Hex	Pretty Raw Hex Render
1 GET /sjAHvYnSTG HTTP/2 2 Host: t.co 3 Cookie: muc=09cad1c6-d1b-4b32-a0f-84b6e18d40ed 4 Sec-Ch-Ua: "Chromium";v="107", "Not=A7Brand";v="24" 5 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 6 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux" 7 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 8 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 9 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 10 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site 11 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate 12 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document 14 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 15 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 16 17	1 HTTP/2 200 OK 2 Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 19:42:58 GMT 3 Perft: 7626143928 4 Vary: Origin 5 Server: t.co 6 Expires: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 19:47:58 GMT 7 Set-Cookie: muc=09cad1c6-d1b-4b32-a0f-84b6e18d40ed; Max-Age=34214400; Expires=Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:42:58 GMT; 8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 9 Cache-Control: private,max-age=300 10 Content-Length: 331 11 X-Transaction-Id: 2942d4bb236fe12c 12 X-Xss-Protection: 0 13 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0 14 X-Response-Time: 113 15 X-Connection-Hash: d02dc269003bb0f0b49a425b2ea04cbd259663aedde55acd44ed59a9ec1bb1a 16 17 <head> <noscript> <META http-equiv="refresh" content="0;URL=https://www.facebook.com/groups/484773319060428/?ref=share"> </noscript> <title> https://www.facebook.com/groups/484773319060428/?ref=share </title> <script> window.opener = null; location.replace("https://www.facebook.com/groups/484773319060428/?ref=share") </script>

We can see that the request goes to the **t.co** webpage, which is twitter's own link shortener that, they [claim](#), also protects users from various malicious activity.



Twitter uses the t.co domain as part of a service to protect users from harmful activity, to provide value for the developer ecosystem, and as a quality signal for surfacing relevant, interesting Tweets.

[Back to Twitter](#)[Learn more](#)

#### 4.11.5 Testing for CSS Injection

No CSS injection point found on the website.

#### 4.11.6 Testing for Client-side Resource Manipulation

No vulnerability was found.

#### 4.11.7 Testing Cross Origin Resource Sharing

Twitter uses **Access-Control-Allow-Origin** header safely only allowing <https://twitter.com> (no wildcard used). Other **Access-Control** headers are also used in a reasonable way.


```
HTTP/2 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://twitter.com
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: HEAD,PUT,GET,POST,DELETE
Access-Control-Allow-Headers:
X-Contributor-Version,X-Twitter-Client-Version,Dtab-Local,X-Twitter-Client-Language,If-Modified-Since,X-Twitter-Client,X-TD-If-Mtime,X-Twitter-Auth-Type,X-B3-Flags,Content-Type,X-TD-Mtime-Check,X-CSRF-Token,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-Active-User,X-Guest-Token,X-Twitter-UTCOffset,X-Act-As-User-Id,Authorization,X-Contribute-To-User-Id
Access-Control-Max-Age: 1728000
Access-Control-Expose-Headers:
X-Twitter-Client-Version,X-Rate-Limit-Limit,X-TD-Mtime,X-Twitter-Client,X-Rate-Limit-Remaining,X-Rate-Limit-Reset,X-Acted-As-User-Id,X-Twitter-Polling,X-Twitter-UTCOffset
X-Connection-Hash: 0eb1a0e9806761a13db7e6b959e4fea52009aaf9226d6d6a92496ac94c44c69
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2023 19:41:35 GMT
Server: tsa_o
```

#### 4.11.8 Testing for Cross Site Flashing

Attack not possible.

#### 4.11.9 Testing for Clickjacking

Basic clickjacking attempt yields no result as the page does not show in our frame.



Advanced clickjacking attempts like double framing or using sandbox and security attributes are also unsuccessful.

Twitter uses header **X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN** that ensures that page's contents can not be loaded into frames, iframes etc. that are from different origin than the page itself, effectively preventing Clickjacking attacks.

#### 4.11.10 Testing WebSockets

No WebSockets signs were found in the client-side source code or communication.

#### 4.11.11 Testing Web Messaging

Twitter does not use Web Messaging (Cross Document Messaging).

#### 4.11.12 Testing Browser Storage

Twitter does not store any persistent values in **window.localStorage**, the only value output when trying to list the storage is **volume: 1** (note that the value changes based on browser used).

Listing **sessionStorage** which is non-persistent and resets after window closes yields some results but does not store any sensitive data.

```

> for (let i = 0; i < sessionStorage.length; i++) {
  const key = sessionStorage.keys(i);
  const value = sessionStorage.getItem(key);
  console.log(`${key}: ${value}`);
}
RichHistory: [{"locationsHistory": [{"locationKey": "initialWebLocationKey", "locationPathname": "/krakensupportl4g3tf77location.pathname", "isModalRoute": false}, {"locationKey": "jf9jjv", "locationPathname": "/home", "isModalRoute": false}], "currentLocationIndex": 1}

```

Listing IndexedDB does not show any issues.

Cookies do not store any sensitive data neither.

Nothing of interest found stored as global window object.

#### 4.11.13 Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion

No global variables/function parameters or CSV values containing sensitive data were found.  
There are no JS warnings or errors in the browser console.

# Sources

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- [https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en\\_us/topics/infrastructure/2017/the-infrastructure-behind-twitter-scale](https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics/infrastructure/2017/the-infrastructure-behind-twitter-scale)
- <https://www.first.org/cvss>
- [https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en\\_us/topics/](https://blog.twitter.com/engineering/en_us/topics/)
- <http://www.pentest-standard.org>
- <https://www.thirdrocktechkno.com/blog/react-security-vulnerabilities/>
- <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-limits>
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