*Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War**

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In the post–World War II era, American women have been consistently less militaristic and more opposed to war than American men. Theorists, both feminist and not, have attributed such differences to gender itself, maternalism, and feminism. Drawing on the American National Election Study 1991 Pilot Study, we explore these hypotheses and discover no support for the maternalist explanation, some evidence in favor of the feminist accounting, and substantial support for the gender explanation. We also probe into the structure of political thinking in these areas and discover that the roots of women's and men's thinking usually differ even when they basically agree on the "bottom line." In particular, men's attitudes are much more partisan in their origins than are women's.

For centuries the dominant gender images of war have been limited and relatively stable. Men are the militarists and perpetrators; women are the pacifists and victims. Men start the wars; women try to stop them. Men are the "just warriors" marching into battle; women are the "beautiful souls" marching for peace (Elshtain 1987). Public opinion lends some credence to these stereotypes. In the latter part of the twentieth century, American women have been less supportive than men of militarism and U.S. involvement in wars—World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—by an average margin of seven to nine percentage points (Brandes 1992; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984). And more recently, women have been less likely than men to support increases in defense spending (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Thus, although American women as a group can hardly be classified as pacifist, they certainly appear less militaristic than American men.

How can we explain and understand these differences? To address this question, we draw on the American National Election Study 1991 Pilot Study to explore two general topics. First, we seek to identify and explain gender differences in cognitive and affective orientations to foreign affairs and the Gulf War itself. And second, we probe into the structure of political thinking in these areas so as to explore whether the roots

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of women's and men's thinking might differ even when they basically agree on the "bottom line."

Women, Mothers, Feminists: Theories of Gender and Militarism

Both students of public opinion and feminist theorists offer a variety of theories that might explain differences between women and men in foreign policy attitudes (see Bardes 1992; Brandes 1992; Burris 1992). We focus our attention on three of these theories: sex and gender, mothering, and feminism.

Some public opinion researchers have suggested that the gender gap in foreign policy attitudes reflects biological sex differences: men are naturally more aggressive than women, or in a more subtle variation, women are naturally more fearful than men (Burris 1992). In recent years, some radical feminists (e.g., Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigary, Mary Daly) have adopted a similar general theme, but with a different normative twist. They, too, see a wide range of gender differences rooted in biology, but unlike the public opinion theorists, they interpret the differences as an indicator of women's innate moral superiority (see Okin 1990).

Perhaps more common now, other public opinion experts and feminist theorists (e.g., Miller 1976) reject biological determination altogether; instead, they theorize that early differential socialization and experiences, among other things, render women more pacifist than men. Though these theoretical strains are critically different, the former emphasizing biological sex and the latter pointing to socially constructed gender, they nonetheless share an important implication. Namely, differences between women's and men's orientations to war are founded in childhood or earlier and cannot be explained away by any other aspects of their lives.

Some recent and influential feminist theory shifts the focus from sex and gender per se to the particular experiences of women, especially the experiences of mothering and being mothered. The argument is simple in appearance, if not in theory: the fact that women do more parenting than men makes them more empathetic, more caring, more attentive to their relationships with others, and less concerned with their own autonomy and individuation (see Chodorow 1978; Elshtain 1981; Gilligan 1982; Ruddick 1989).

Of these "maternalist thinkers," Sara Ruddick (1989) has forged the clearest theoretical links between the practices of mothering and attitudes toward militarism. Ruddick argues that through the act of mothering "mothers" develop ways of thinking and acting that potentially serve as a basis of peace politics. It is important to note that Ruddick's theory

does *not* attribute difference to gender per se. She believes that, in principle, both women and men can be "mothers"; both can act as "a person who takes on responsibility for children's lives and for whom providing child care is a significant part of her or his working life" (Ruddick 1989, 40). She argues, however, that in fact the vast majority of "mothers" are women; therefore, as it turns out "maternal thinking" *is* mostly women's thinking.

What exactly is the tie between such maternal thinking and antimilitarism? Ruddick (1989) argues that many maternal practices incorporate the essential ideals of nonviolent peacemaking: renunciation, resistance, reconciliation, and peacekeeping (Ruddick 1989, 161). Thus, the practice of mothering has an inherent peacemaking potential. Ruddick also recognizes that historical experience from the Spartan mothers to the Third Reich demonstrates how maternal images can sometimes be turned to militaristic purposes. Because of this, she argues that women must be made to reflect on the public implications of their mothering so as to ensure that its practices are, in fact, transformed into those of peacemaking. A feminist consciousness and politics prompts mothers to do this by challenging "those aspects of maternal practice that limit its public, effective peacefulness" (Ruddick 1989, 222). On Ruddick's account, then, one would not expect women in general to be more pacifist than men. Instead, it is "mothers," especially feminist "mothers," who are most likely to pursue a peacemaking strategy. To the extent that the great majority of "mothers" are women, feminist mothering should help account for the foreign policy gender gap.

Other feminist theorists also emphasize the peace politics of feminism but deemphasize mothering. "Civic" feminists direct our attention away from women and mothers and toward feminists instead (see Boling 1991). They bring politics, rather than character or social practices, to the foreground by suggesting that it is neither women's femaleness nor their mothering that makes them more pacifist; it is their feminism (see Cook and Wilcox 1991; Dietz 1985). Like Ruddick's, the "civic" feminists' argument is not grounded solely in sex or gender differences; feminists of both sexes should be more pacifist. But because feminists are more likely to be women, the impact of feminism on attitudes toward war should still open a gender gap. Some recent evidence supports this general position. Thus, the gender gap between women and men on foreign policy issues evaporates when feminist women, with their antimilitaristic stands, are removed from the analysis (Conover 1988a). And feminists of both sexes have been found to be less militaristic in their policy views (Cook and Wilcox 1991).

But what underlies this apparent connection between feminism and pacifism? On most accounts, feminism involves a strong commitment to the democratic values of freedom, equality, and self-government (see Dietz 1985). Some theorists (e.g., Cook and Wilcox 1991) imply that this commitment, alone, may be sufficient to generate a pacifist orientation on foreign policy issues. Most others suggest, however, that it is not simply their commitment to democratic values that leads feminists to oppose militarism, but rather, the specifically feminist application of those values. Building on the historical experiences of women as citizens and participants in social movements, on their organizational styles, and their modes of discourse, feminists have developed a theory of democratic practice that rejects hierarchy, domination, and the use of force or exploitation; moreover, it specifically identifies the military as bastion of sexism (Brock-Utne 1985). Therefore, it is the feminist critique of society, and not only a commitment to liberal values, that forges the link between feminism and antimilitarism.

Feminist theorists thus offer three distinct hypotheses to explain the long-standing gender gap in attitudes toward war. First, some suggest that women are either inherently more inclined toward pacifism than are men or that they are socialized very early in life to be less militaristic. On this account, gender differences should persist even if mothering and feminism and other social factors are controlled. Second, "maternalist" feminists posit that the social experiences associated with mothering profoundly influence how women think, predisposing them to be more skeptical of militarism than are men. In its simple form, this hypothesis posits that women who are mothers will be less militaristic than both men and women who are not mothers. In its more complex form, it is the interaction between mothering and feminist consciousness that produces less militarism. Third, and finally, "civic" feminists argue that it is feminism per se that inclines women and men alike toward a more pacifist foreign policy stance. Thus, any impact of gender differences and mothering on foreign policy attitudes should disappear once feminism is controlled.

Data and Measures

The 1991 American National Election Study Pilot Study offers an opportunity for an initial test of these hypotheses. A subset of respondents to the 1990 ANES was reinterviewed during the summer of 1991, several months after the conclusion of the Gulf War. In addition to a major focus on the Gulf War and related issues, the Pilot Study contains a wealth of new instrumentation for gender relevant concepts (see Conover and Sapiro 1992). The gender questions were asked of only a

third of the Pilot Study, but despite the relatively small size of this subsample (467), these data afford us an unparalleled opportunity to explore the gendered nature of foreign policy and defense orientations.

To test the hypotheses suggested by feminist theory requires us to measure three key concepts: gender, status as a "mother," and feminist consciousness. The first of these was the easiest to measure; we employed the interviewer's report of the respondent's sex, coded zero for males and one for females. Measuring the other two concepts was more problematic. Because of these difficulties, but also the importance of the task, we shall dwell at some length on measurement development.

Measuring "Motherhood"

Measuring whether a respondent is a "mother" is a difficult task if one remains faithful to the conceptualization suggested by Ruddick (1989) and discussed above. Indeed, the ANES data provide only an imperfect measure of parental status itself: we can determine only whether individuals have minor children who currently live with them, thus this measure is muddied by the fact that respondents with grown children are mixed with those without children.[1] We cannot tap either the centrality of mothering in a person's life or the specific practices of mothering. Therefore, we are left with a flawed measure of parental status, rather than a measure of "mothering" as defined by Ruddick. Specifically, we created a dummy variable scored zero if the respondent had no children 18 or under and one if he or she had any children 18 or under.[2] To test the more sophisticated version of Ruddick's thesis, we also created an interaction term between parental status and feminist consciousness. This measure was scored one if the respondent was a feminist parent and zero otherwise.[3] Obviously, these measures could be improved upon. Still, they are adequate for an *initial* examination of the mothering hypothesis. Because most "mothers" are women, the "maternalist" hypothesis may be tested roughly by examining separately for women and men the impact of parental status on foreign policy attitudes.

[1]The dwelling unit information indicates how many children lived with them who were five years or younger, between six and nine, between 10 and 13 years, and between 14 and 17 years.

[2]We originally tested measures of parenthood that took into account the age and the number of the children. These measures performed virtually the same as the dummy variable.

[3]The feminist consciousness measure was first dichotomized and then multiplied with the parental status measure to produce the interaction term.

Measuring Feminist Consciousness

The concept of group consciousness is critical to understanding the political mobilization and public opinion of women. But previous measures of gender and feminist consciousness have been based on a wide array of contradictory and sometimes confusing conceptualizations (see Conover 1988a; Gurin 1985; Klein 1984; Miller et al. 1981; Sapiro 1990; Sigel and Welchel 1986). Despite such inconsistencies, researchers seem to agree that group consciousness is a politicized form of social identity embracing interrelated attitudes and beliefs, each of which must be tapped distinctly. For our part, we attempt to clarify the picture by arguing that group consciousness is a psychological concept forged out of distinct cognitive and emotional components: the cognitive elements provide the political basis for group consciousness while the emotional ones provide its social basis (see Conover and Sapiro 1992). We shall define these two elements and their measures in turn.

In doing so, we focus on *feminist* identity, and thus feminist consciousness, rather than *gender* identity and consciousness because the weight of the theoretical arguments cited earlier ultimately base their case not on women as women but on women as feminists (e.g., Ruddick 1989; Cook and Wilcox 1991). We therefore constructed a measure of feminist consciousness incorporating both its cognitive and emotional elements. Let us explore now that measure and the logic underlying it.

In general, the *cognitive* elements of a group consciousness provide its ideological content. Specifically, they pertain to the status of the group in society and a commitment to either maintaining or changing that status. In this case, then, the cognitive core of a *feminist* consciousness is an awareness of and sensitivity to the unequal and gendered nature of society (empirical sexual equality) and a commitment to ending the inequalities (normative sexual equality).

The Pilot Study includes a series of questions tapping both empirical and normative equality in three different domains (government, the family, and business and industry) and framed in terms of equality of outcomes.[4] Although we expected that the disparity between normative and empirical equality would be most closely related to political attitudes,

[4]In assessing sexual equality, it is critical to distinguish between procedural and substantive equality (e.g., equality of opportunity and equality of outcome). Equality of opportunity is generally regarded as a more central and widely held tenet of liberal democracy within the U.S. legal and political culture. Substantive equality poses a goal for U.S. democracy that is more controversial and more difficult to attain. But as many feminists and political philosophers now argue—and we would agree with them—it is substantive equality that is essential if we are to alter fundamentally the status of women and men in U.S. society. It is, therefore, substantive equality that it makes the most sense to study.

normative equality by itself proved to be the more powerful measure. We therefore calculated the strength of the normative commitment to sexual equality by summing the responses across the three domain-specific questions thus producing a measure ranging from zero to six, where high scores indicate a very strong commitment.

Turning to its *emotional* side, we argue that group consciousness is not simply an ideological stance toward a particular social group. It is more personal and less cognitive than that, for group consciousness flows from social identity itself. Group identity is thus a necessary precondition for the development of a group consciousness. Accordingly, as a measure of feminist identity, all respondents were asked: "Do you think of yourself as a feminist?" Those respondents who answered positively were also asked, "Do you think of yourself as a strong feminist or a not so strong feminist?" Strong feminists were scored three, and weak feminists two. Nineteen percent of the respondents, including 15% of the men and 23% of the women, considered themselves to be either strong or weak feminists; the remaining 81% rejected the label. Therefore, to improve the face validity of this measure, we broke this large group of nonfeminists into two groups: those whose responses to a feeling thermometer indicated that they were sympathetic or indifferent toward feminists (scored one) and those who were hostile (scored zero).

A second, essential, emotional element of group consciousness is an emotional bond or psychological interdependence with other group members that triggers a sense of pride when other group members (qua group members) do well in society and anger and discontent when they are treated badly (Conover 1988b). This emotional bond gives group consciousness its social (and ultimately, political) nature by making the status of other group members personally relevant and by stimulating the recognition that collective action may be necessary to alter the status of the group. The emotional power of feminist consciousness, in particular, stems not only from a psychological interdependence with other feminists but also from an emotional bond with women in general. Here, then, is where women and men part company on the road to feminist consciousness. Male feminists experience an emotional bond with women that is rooted in their political identity as feminists; they feel connected to women out of a sense of empathy and sympathy (Klein 1984). But female feminists experience an emotional bond with other women that is rooted not only in their political identity as feminists but also in their gender identity as women; they feel connected to other women, in part, because they share a common identity. Thus, male and female feminists differ substantially in the character of their emotional bond with women, although both have such a psychological connection.

The 1991 ANES includes two questions relevant to measuring this emotional bond. The first, asked only of women, was "How often do you find yourself feeling a sense of pride as a woman in the accomplishments of other women?" The second, asked of both men and women, was "How often do you find yourself angry about the way women are treated in society?" For women, the responses for these two questions were added to form a single measure of emotional bond (coefficient alpha equals .58). For men, their responses on the anger question were simply doubled to form a measure of comparable range (0–6).

In sum, we measured three key components of a feminist consciousness: a commitment to normative sexual equality, a feminist identity, and a sense of emotional bond with women. These three components were combined in a single measure of feminist consciousness ranging from zero to 18 with high scores indicating a strong feminist consciousness. Specifically, scores on the feminist identity measure were doubled to make the range of that measure comparable with the others and then added to the emotional bond and equality measures. As a preface to our empirical analysis, it is important to note that, though feminist consciousness and liberal-conservative identification are related, they are by no means one and the same thing (Pearson's $r = -.28$). Still, given that there is a moderate relationship between the two, a critical question will be whether feminist consciousness exerts an independent effect on foreign policy attitudes once liberalism has been controlled.

Findings

How much do women differ from men in their foreign affairs attitudes? Are those differences a consequence of women's gender, their status as mothers, or their feminism? And finally, do women and men vary in the roots of their thinking on foreign policy issues? To explore these questions, we shall examine two sets of dependent variables concerning: (1) general orientations toward foreign affairs, including measures of militarism, isolationism, and fear of war; and (2) reactions to the Gulf War, including attention to it, evaluations of the war, approval of the bombing of civilians, and emotional distress over the war. Shortly, we shall introduce our measures and examine them in depth. But before doing so, we focus specifically on the maternalist hypothesis.

"Mothers" and War

The "maternalism thesis," that the social experiences of mothering fundamentally shape the psychological makeup of "mothers," rendering them less likely to support militaristic ventures, has attracted much attention and favor. Do we find any evidence to support it?

To address this question, we began by examining the zero-order correlations between the two sets of dependent variables mentioned above and our measure of "mothering"—parental status. The simple hypothesis suggests that being a "mother" predisposes one to be less militaristic. But in our analysis, parental status was significantly (and weakly) correlated with only two variables: amount of attention paid to the Gulf War and emotional distress over the war. Because most men probably do not "mother," the true effects of mothering (mostly by women) might have been diluted in this analysis that combined women and men. We considered, therefore, the zero-order correlations separately for women and men. Among women, we found only one significant difference: mothers paid more attention to the war than nonmothers. And among men, there were no significant differences between fathers and nonfathers. There is, then, virtually no evidence to support the "mothering" thesis in its simple form (for similar results see Sapiro 1983, 166).

This does not rule out the possibility, however, that mothering creates a potential for peace politics that is realized when it is coupled with a feminist consciousness. Thus, we examined the zero-order correlations between the two sets of dependent variables and our measure of the interaction between parental status and feminist consciousness. Looking at women and men together, being a feminist parent is related to attention to the war (.11), emotional distress over the war (.18), and opposition to the bombing of civilians (−.15). But of course, none of these zero-order correlations can tell us whether such relationships are a function of the feminism, the parenthood, or the combination of the two.

To sort this out, we ran a series of regression analyses. In addition to our two "mothering"' variables (parental status and the interaction between parental status and feminist consciousness), we included our feminist consciousness measure, five background variables (family income, race, age, education, and gender), and three variables tapping key political attitudes and identities (symbolic patriotism, party identification, and liberal-conservative identification). We took as our dependent variables the two sets of attitudes mentioned above. Three sets of analyses were done: one for women and men together, and one each for women and men separately. In none of these analyses is there any evidence whatsoever to support either of the "mothering" hypotheses: neither parental status alone nor in interaction with feminist consciousness proved significant in any of the regressions.

In sum, we find little evidence to support the "mothering" hypothesis in either its simple or more complex form. Still, we hesitate to reject the theory outright because our measure of "mothering" is deficient in several important ways: it does not assess the actual practice of

mothering, nor is it a fully accurate measure of parental status given that it fails to identify parents of grown children. In the future, much more finely tuned measures than those available to us might reveal a connection between "mothering" and antimilitarism. But for now, we must tentatively assume that "mothering," at least as measured here, is *not* the foundation upon which women build their pacifism. We focus on two other possibilities—gender and feminism—for the remainder of our paper.

General Orientations toward Foreign Involvements

We begin by considering three general orientations toward the conduct of foreign affairs: militarism, isolationism, and fear of war. Specifically, the Pilot Study included three questions tapping basic attitudes toward militarism. Should the United States be willing to use force to solve international problems in the future? Was it important for the United States to have a strong military force "in order to be effective in dealing with our enemies"? Should defense spending be increased or not? (see the appendix for details on questions). These items were combined to form a "militarism" scale on which high scores indicated strongly militaristic responses. "Isolationism" was measured by a single question asking whether respondents agreed that "this country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world"; responses were coded so that high scores indicate opposition to isolationism. And finally, "fear of war" was assessed by summing the responses to two questions: one concerning conventional war and the other nuclear war; high scores on this scale indicate greater fear of war.

Conventional stereotypes and previous research suggest that there should be a significant gender gap on these three measures (see Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Smith 1984). In keeping with these expectations, women were, indeed, more likely than men both to adopt an isolationist stance (Pearson's $r = -.16$) and to be fearful of war (Pearson's $r = .23$). But contrary to expectations, there was no significant gender gap on the militarism measure (Pearson's $r = .03$). We are left with three questions. First, does the gender gap for isolationism and fear of war persist when other variables are controlled? Second, does feminist consciousness have an independent effect on any of these general orientations? And third, is there any evidence that women and men have different ways of thinking about these issues?

To address the first two of these questions, we regressed the militarism, isolationism, and fear of war measures on gender and feminist consciousness, a set of background measures (race, age, income, education)

and key attitudinal variables (symbolic patriotism, liberal-conservative identification, and party identification). Then, to explore potential gender differences in the structure of thinking, we repeated the analysis separately for the male and female subsamples. The results of all three analyses are displayed in Table 1.

How do our hypotheses fare? Contrary to expectations, militarism is unaffected by *both* gender and feminist consciousness. Instead, it is a product of a strong sense of patriotism, a conservative ideology, and lower levels of education. Gender fares better on the remaining measures where it is a significant predictor of both isolationism and fear of war. A feminist consciousness is also a significant determinant of fear of war, though it has little impact on isolationism.

The mixed support for the gender and feminist hypotheses draws our attention to the sometimes subtle differences between the dependent measures. With respect to militarism, several of the questions making up the scale ask not simply for positive or negative reactions to war but instead for specific policy responses based on plausible reasons for the militarism such as "to solve international problems" and "to be effective in dealing with our enemies." In contrast, at the other extreme, the fear of war measure taps largely affective responses to the general ideas of conventional and nuclear war per se. We suspect that these differences—the largely cognitive, specific, and "justified content of the militarism measure versus the basically affective and categorical but vague content of the fear of war measure—play a significant role in structuring the effects of gender and feminism. The isolationism measure presents a slightly different case. It is more cognitive than the fear of war measure, but more general and vaguer than the militarism measure: it offers little justification or reasoning in favor of one stance over the other. Moreover, while a theoretical link between gender and isolationism has been posited and women have often been found to be more isolationist than men, it is less apparent why feminists should be expected to favor isolationism per se, especially when force is not involved. Feminists might well be attracted by perspectives of global cooperation, and certainly the international feminist movement has been associated with such global "green" issues as health, education, and the environment (Brock-Utne 1985).

Turning to our third question, women's and men's thinking is most similar on the militarism measure where for both sexes patriotism and a conservative ideology are important determinants. But even in the case of militarism, where there was no gender gap to begin with, there are key gender differences in the underlying determinants: notably, party identification has an impact on the militarism of men but not women, and higher levels of education depress militarism among women but not men.

Table 1. Regressions of General Foreign Policy Orientations on Background and Political Factors

	Militarism			Oppose Isolationism			Fear of War		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Background:									
Income	−.02	−.06	.04	.09	−.03	.16*	−.13**	.03	−.23**
	(−.01)	(−.04)	(.01)	(.03)	(−.01)	(.05)	(−.06)	(.01)	(−.10)
Race	.08*	.11	.07	.05	.00	.08	.02	−.05	.11
	(.59)	(.77)	(.49)	(.25)	(.01)	(.44)	(.14)	(−.31)	(.78)
Age	−.05	−.02	−.06	−.06	−.04	−.04	−.02	−.00	−.07
	(−.01)	(−.00)	(−.01)	(−.01)	(−.00)	(−.00)	(−.00)	(−.00)	(−.01)
Education	−.10*	−.04	−.17*	.12*	.09	.11	−.18**	−.15*	−.20**
	(−.15)	(−.06)	(−.25)	(.13)	(.09)	(.13)	(−.27)	(−.21)	(−.32)
Gender	−.01	—	—	−.12*	—	—	.16**	—	—
	(−.06)			(−.73)			(−.77)		
Political:									
Patriotism	.35**	.37**	.33**	.13*	.18*	.07	.04	−.02	.10
	(.49)	(.53)	(.46)	(.12)	(.16)	(.07)	(.06)	(−.02)	(.15)
Party	.09	.15*	.03	.14**	.19**	.12	−.08	−.16*	−.01
	(.10)	(.18)	(.04)	(.12)	(.15)	(.11)	(−.10)	(−.17)	(−.01)
Ideology	.19**	.23**	.14*	−.03	.01	−.08	.01	.08	−.08
	(.43)	(.46)	(.36)	(−.04)	(.01)	(−.15)	(.03)	(.14)	(−.23)
Feminist consciousness	−.07	−.05	−.09	.03	−.01	.04	.13**	.14	.10
	(−.05)	(−.03)	(−.06)	(.01)	(−.00)	(.02)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)
Adj. R^2	.23	.28	.17	.08	.06	.06	.13	.04	.13
(N)	(466)	(223)	(242)	(466)	(223)	(242)	(466)	(223)	(242)

Note: Unparenthesized entries are beta weights; parenthesized entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$.

Even more striking, the sources of isolationism are very different for women and men. Among women, the only significant predictor of opposition to isolationism is a higher income. But among men, isolationism has political roots: both patriotism and a Republican party identification lead men to be less isolationist. Finally, higher levels of education reduce fears of war among both sexes, but that is the only common determinant.[5] Women with higher incomes have less fear of war, but there is no comparable effect among men. And once again, party identification shapes men's fears but not those of women.

In sum, we have uncovered mixed support for the gender and feminist hypotheses. Despite being more worried about war and suspicious of foreign involvements, women are just as willing as men to contemplate the use of force when it seems justifiable. Similarly, though feminists are more fearful of war than nonfeminists, there are no differences between the two in terms of isolationism and militarism. Finally, the roots of thinking vary across orientations, and more important, between women and men. In particular, attitudes toward foreign affairs are considerably more politicized among men.

Reactions to the Gulf War

Our examination of the impact of gender and feminist consciousness on foreign affairs attitudes to this point has been cast in hypothetical and abstract terms. But the responses of women and feminists may not be the same when they are confronted with real situations demanding the actual use of military force. The Gulf War provides just such a specific context.

We considered four kinds of reactions to the war: attention, evaluations, approval of its tactics, and emotional distress. "Attention to the news" was measured by a single question on which high scores indicate that the respondent paid a great deal of attention "to news about the war in the Persian Gulf." Three questions were used to assess evaluations of the war: whether or not "we did the right thing in sending U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf"; whether "all things considered . . . the war was worth the cost or not"; and finally, whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the way "George Bush handled the crisis in the Persian Gulf." All three questions were first coded so that high scores represent the proadministration response and then summed to form a single measure on which high scores indicate a favorable evaluation of the war. Next, to measure approval of tactics, we used a question that asked

[5]For both sexes, feminist consciousness just failed to reach the .05 level of significance.

respondents whether bombing near civilians during wartime was sometimes necessary or immoral, with high scores indicating that it was sometimes necessary. Finally, responses to the Gulf War were neither simply cognitive nor evaluative in nature; people also had powerful emotional reactions. The Pilot Study contained a series of questions designed to measure these responses, a subset of which we used. Specifically, citizens were asked whether during the war they had felt upset, worried that the fighting might spread, angry at Saddam Hussein, disgusted at the killing, and afraid for the U.S. troops. For each emotion, scores were coded (zero, did not feel; one, felt not so strongly; and two, felt strongly), and then summed across the five questions to form a single measure of "emotional distress."

Are there simple gender and feminist gaps in reactions to the Gulf War? Conventional stereotypes suggest that men should be more interested in war, but our data reveal no significant gender gap in attention to the Gulf War (Pearson's $r = -.05$). Conversely, because of their heightened sensitivity to the use of violence, feminists might be expected to pay greater attention to the war. And they did (Pearson's $r = .15$). Also, as compared to men and nonfeminists, respectively, women and feminists were expected to be less supportive of the war, more opposed to the bombing of civilians, and more emotionally distressed by the war. And, in every case, these expectations were borne out. This is especially true with respect to emotional reactions where women's responses were far stronger than men's and far more uniform. For example, 85% of the women felt a strong sense of disgust at the killing, while 55% of the men felt the same; and 85% of the women were strongly afraid for the troops as compared to 66% of the men. Thus, we are left with two key questions. Do these gender and feminist gaps disappear when subjected to multivariate analyses? Do women's and men's reactions to the Gulf War have the same roots? To address these questions, we regressed our four dependent measures on the same variables employed in the model in the previous section. Three analyses were done: one for women and men together, and one for each sex alone. The results are presented in Table 2.

The gender hypothesis stands up very well in the multivariate analysis. Though women were neither more nor less attentive to the war than men, they differed significantly from them in every other reaction. Women were less supportive of the war than men, though symbolic patriotism is clearly a stronger predictor of support than gender. Women were more opposed to bombing civilians than were men, and here gender was the strongest predictor of attitudes. And finally, gender had its greatest effects on emotional reactions to the war. Not only was it the most important determinant of emotional distress, but it clearly provided much of

Table 2. Regressions of Reactions to the Gulf War on Background and Political Factors

	Attention			Evaluations			Bombing			Emotional Distress		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
Background:												
Income	.03	.07	.00	−.03	−.06	−.03	.08	.04	.10	−.02	.04	−.09
	(.03)	(.01)	(.00)	(−.02)	(−.05)	(−.02)	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(−.09)	(.03)	(−.03)
Race	.13**	.12	.15*	.01	−.08	.10	−.05	−.08	−.04	−.01	−.02	−.00
	(.29)	(.24)	(.34)	(.11)	(−.83)	(1.15)	(−.25)	(−.31)	(−.18)	(−.09)	(−.16)	(−.02)
Age	−.05	−.03	−.09	−.08	−.06	−.10	.12**	.22**	.06	−.11	−.08	−.18**
	(−.00)	(−.00)	(−.00)	(−.02)	(−.01)	(−.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(−.02)	(−.01)	(−.02)
Education	.10*	.10	.11	.02	−.07	.06	.07	.10	.06	.03	.06	.04
	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(−.16)	(.15)	(.07)	(.09)	(.06)	(.05)	(.11)	(.04)
Gender	−.05	—	—	−.09*	—	—	−.24**	—	—	.36**	—	—
	(−.07)			(−.73)			(−.77)			(1.80)		
Political:												
Patriotism	.28**	.28**	.31**	.35**	.25**	.43**	.22**	.28**	.23**	.09	.11	.10
	(.13)	(.12)	(.14)	(.80)	(.53)	(1.03)	(.21)	(.23)	(.23)	(.13)	(.17)	(.12)
Party	.03	.12	−.03	.12**	.19**	.09	.10*	.23**	.03	−.13**	−.16*	−.11
	(.01)	(.04)	(−.01)	(.24)	(.34)	(.18)	(.08)	(.17)	(.02)	(−.16)	(−.22)	(−.11)
Ideology	.03	.03	.02	.04	.14*	−.05	.05	.03	.06	−.02	−.07	.02
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.14)	(.43)	(−.23)	(.08)	(.04)	(.10)	(−.06)	(−.16)	(.05)
Feminist consciousness	.15**	.24**	.08	−.03	−.04	−.05	−.11*	−.05	−.18**	.13**	.13	.15*
	(.03)	(.04)	(.02)	(−.03)	(−.04)	(−.06)	(−.05)	(−.02)	(−.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.08)
Adj. R^2	.10	.12	.09	.15	.17	.15	.19	.19	.09	.18	.03	.04
(*N*)	(466)	(223)	(242)	(466)	(223)	(242)	(466)	(223)	(242)	(466)	(223)	(242)

Note: Unparenthesized entries are beta weights; parenthesized entries are unstandardized regression coefficients.

*$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$.

the explanatory power of the model as indicated by the substantial decline in the R^2s when the analyses were conducted separately for women and men. Thus, there is strong and consistent support for the gender hypothesis.

There is also support for the feminism hypothesis. As expected, a feminist consciousness led people to pay more attention to the Gulf War; in fact, after patriotism, it was the best predictor. Feminist consciousness was also significant in producing opposition to the bombing of civilians and greater emotional distress over the war. But, contrary to expectations, a feminist consciousness did not lead people to have a more negative overall evaluation of the war.

Even more so than in the case of general orientations, the reactions of women and men to the Gulf War have very different roots. Patriotism is the only factor that has a consistent impact across the sexes. Though it fails to influence emotional reactions, it is the best predictor for both sexes of attention to the war and evaluations of it. But beyond the effects of patriotism, there is a world of difference. Among the background factors, race and age both differentially condition the reactions of women and men. Thus, nonwhite women, but not men, are more attentive to the war; older men, but not women, are more supportive of bombing civilians; and younger women, but not men, have stronger emotional reactions to the war.

Far more interesting, however, are the effects of the various political variables. Party identification significantly influences the reactions of men on all of the dependent variables save one, attention to the war, where its effects just fail to reach statistical significance (sig. = .09). In striking contrast, party identification has no significant effect on any of women's reactions to the Gulf War. Ideological identification is generally unimportant, influencing only men's evaluations of the Gulf War. And finally, the impact of feminist consciousness varies across the different measures. Thus, it predisposes only men to pay more attention to news about the war and only women to oppose the bombing of civilians. However, with respect to emotional reactions, feminist consciousness encourages both women and men to be more troubled by the war, though for men the effects are not quite statistically significant (sig. = .08). In sum, men's responses to the Gulf War are shaped much more than women's by their partisan and ideological biases. The starkest contrast lies in evaluations of the war: men's positive assessments are highly partisan and ideological, while women's are strictly a function of their patriotic fervor. In the other cases, civilian bombing and emotional distress, feminist consciousness effectively "replaces" partisanship and ideology in structuring women's reactions.

With respect to the Gulf War, then, there is strong support for the gender hypothesis and more mixed support for the feminist hypothesis. Women paid as much attention to the Gulf War as men, but they liked what they saw less than men and were more disturbed by it as well. Sensitized to the use of force by their ideology, feminists paid more attention to the war and were more upset by it and its tactics than nonfeminists. But despite all this, feminists were as likely to support the war effort as were nonfeminists. Finally, the roots of these reactions varied substantially between women and men. Though patriotism was critical in shaping the responses of both sexes, men's reactions were influenced far more by partisan forces than those of women, and women's more by feminist consciousness than men's.

Conclusions

The gender basis of orientations toward war and foreign policy are more complex than many feminist and other theorists might have supposed. The stereotypes turn out to be only partial truths and the hypotheses only partially confirmed. Of those we examined, the gender hypothesis received the strongest support. In the abstract, women are more afraid of the prospects of war and more wary of foreign involvements, though when given justifications they are as willing as men to ponder the use of force. But when we moved from the abstract to the concrete—from hypothetical wars to the Gulf War—the distance separating women and men grew, and on every measure, women reacted more negatively. These gender differences are some of the largest and most consistent in the study of political psychology and are clearly of a magnitude that can have real political significance under the right circumstances. But we must stress: they are by no means large enough to divide women and men into different camps. And they are certainly not large enough to warrant making the kinds of sweeping statements differentiating women and men that have long been part of stereotype and that have recently reemerged in some feminist theory. Still, they are important differences that need to be understood.

Several patterns provide clues to their origins. The gender differences are most pronounced for emotional responses—fears about hypothetical wars and distress over the Gulf War. And they are stronger and more consistent for the concrete case of the Gulf War; in the hypothetical cases, the differences are more contingent on the question and context. Gender differences, then, are greatest for emotional reactions to real conflicts, and they disappear for some cognitive assessments of hypothetical cases. Taken together, these patterns suggest that such gender differences are socially constructed and contextually driven. Moreover, the

fact that they cannot be eliminated by controlling for the effects of a wide-range of other explanatory elements points to a pervasive, gendered pattern of *early* learning of cognitive and especially affective orientations toward the use of violence, particularly as a form of conflict resolution. Indeed, empirical research shows that early in childhood girls and boys develop different patterns for the use of violence (Miller, Danaher, and Forbes 1986). The point is *not* that women learn early in life never to engage in conflict nor use violence, but rather that they learn to put off the use of violence until later in the course of a conflict than do men, to escalate its use more slowly, and to be more emotionally upset by it. Given such patterns of early learning, it would be surprising if women did *not* react somewhat differently to war than do men, particularly when it is "real" rather than merely hypothetical.

We also considered the "civic" feminism argument that it is feminism, not gender, that makes women (and men) less militaristic. Clearly, this hypothesis is wrong to the extent that it implies that gender itself has nothing to do with women's antimilitarism. However, its contention that feminist consciousness shapes reactions to militarism and war is supported, though in a limited fashion. Thus, its effects tend to be stronger among women and restricted to influencing people's sensitivity to and revulsion at the violence of war (e.g., fears of war, attention to the Gulf War, disapproval of civilian bombing, and emotional distress over the war). Critically, feminist consciousness does not lead people to reject either the possibility of war in the abstract or its need in such concrete situations as the Persian Gulf. Pained as they are by the violence that it entails, feminists are as prepared as nonfeminists to endorse the necessity of war in some instances, including the Gulf War.

The "maternalist" hypothesis was the third one we examined, and it failed—spectacularly so—in our admittedly crude test. Our multivariate analyses found no support for the argument that "mothering" rather than gender per se would make women less militaristic than men. Likewise the more sophisticated version of the hypothesis, that the interaction of mothering with feminist consciousness would be critical in producing a peacekeeping stance among women, also failed. Certainly, our analysis was based on a measure of "mothering" that has very severe limitations. And this dictates considerable caution on our part. But even acknowledging this, we question how much theoretical promise the "maternalist" hypothesis holds for understanding complex attitudes toward foreign policy and war. As elegant as feminist theory in this area often is, it tends to be offered—or at least interpreted—in relatively simple and sweeping terms, underscoring profound and comprehensive differences between

"mothers" and nonmothers in "voice," attitudes, emotions, or behavior. From our perspective, the experience of mothering seems too rich and varied to be reduced to such simple terms.

Finally, our analysis indicates that even where women and men, on average, are not very different in their attitudes, the underlying structure of those attitudes usually varies. The most consistent difference, and certainly the most intriguing one, is the greater impact of partisanship on men's attitudes about militarism and war. On six of seven dependent variables, partisanship was a significant predictor of men's attitudes; but for women, it was *in*significant in every single case. We suggest two possible explanations for this pattern: one that focuses on violence in foreign affairs and one that is more general. On the one hand, to the extent men are socialized to accept violence as a strategy for conflict resolution (see Miller, Danaher, and Forbes 1986), their reactions to the use of military force simply may be more available for politicization, for being organized by the agendas of institutionalized politics, than are women's responses. If this is the explanation, we would also expect to find gender differences in the effects of partisanship on domestic issues involving violence, but not necessarily on other issues. On the other hand, this pattern of findings may reflect a deeper, more extensive weakening of partisan ties among women. Disheartened by years of Republican rule and skeptical of the sincerity of Democratic promises, women may be relying less and less on partisan cues. If this is the explanation, we would expect to find gender differences in the effects of partisanship on a wide range of issues, not just those involving violence. Clearly, more research is needed to understand better this critical finding and the more general one that women and men differ in the roots of their political responses.

Our argument, in sum, is that there is an important gender basis to these orientations. Feminist consciousness and especially gender do have a bearing on how people react to foreign policy and war. But the relationships are more complex than theorists—feminist and not—have usually argued. And by themselves, gender and feminist consciousness cannot possibly provide an adequate explanation. Instead, we must recognize the subtle ways in which they interact with other attitudes to shape foreign policy stances.

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APPENDIX

Independent Variables

Income: Self-reported family income (v663), high income scored high. Race: Recoded v549; zero = white, one = African American. Age: V552, high age scored high. Education: V557, high education scored high. Symbolic patriotism: Constructed from v2417 and v2418, symbolic patriots scored high. Party: Self-reported seven-point party identification (v2333), Republicans scored high. Ideology: Liberalism-conservatism self-placement (v2450), conservatives scored high. Feminist consciousness: Sum of three measures (1) *sexual equality:* responses to the questions v2723–24, v2727–28, v2731–32 were recoded two (strong commitment to equality), one (weak commitment to equality), and zero (all other responses) and then summed; (2) *feminist identity:* v2706 and v2707 were combined. Those responding five, nonfeminist, in v2706 were split according to their feeling thermometer ratings on v2240 (feminists) into two groups coded zero, nonfeminist hostile, and one, nonfeminist sympathetic. In this combined measure, feminists were coded two for weak feminists and three for strong feminists; (3) *emotional bond:* for women the sum of v2713 and v2714, for men twice the score for v2714. Gender: V547 recoded one for women and zero for men.

Dependent Variables

Militarism: Sum of three items (1) *use force* (v2402, reversed), (2) *strong military* (v2483, reversed), and (3) *defense spending* (v2475). Coefficient Alpha = .62. Oppose isolationism: v2485. Fear of war: Sum of two items (1) *fear of conventional war* (v2484, reversed), and (2) *fear of nuclear war* (v2486, reversed). Coefficient Alpha = .77. Attention to Gulf War: (v2530, reversed). Evaluations of Gulf War: Sum of three items (1) *right to send troops* (v2408, reversed); (2) *war worth it* (v2546, reversed); (3) *Bush evaluation* (v2413, reversed). Coefficient Alpha = .76. Bomb civilians: V2550. Emotional responses: sum for five emotions (1) *upset* (v2518–19); *worried that fighting might spread* (v2522–23); (3) *angry at Saddam Hussein* (v2524–25); (4) *disgusted at the killing* (v2526–27); and (5) *afraid for American troops* (v2528–29). Coefficient Alpha = .63.

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