Party and Committee in Distributive Politics: Evidence from Defense Spending

Thomas M. Carsey
Barry Rundquist
University of Illinois at Chicago

Recent studies of the domestic distribution of military procurement expenditures and representation on congressional defense committees support the traditional committee-centered distributive theory of congressional policymaking in a manner consistent with the assumption that Congress is organized to produce gains from exchange among legislators with diverse interests via intercommittee logrolling. This paper compares the committee-centered distributive theory to a party-centered distributive theory. Analysis of a multiequation model using pooled time-series data on the distribution of military procurement expenditures and defense committee representation among states from 1963 to 1989 supports a party-centered version of the distributive theory.

A recent series of studies on the geographic distribution of defense contracts reports that states represented on defense committees average larger year-to-year increments in military procurement awards than do other states (Carsey and Rundquist 1998; Carsey, Rundquist, and Fox 1997; Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee 1996). In turn, states receiving higher levels of such awards have a higher probability of subsequent representation on a defense committee (Carsey and Rundquist 1998; Rundquist et al. 1997). These findings support the committee-based distributive theory, which suggests that the committee system facilitates vote trading or logrolling among members of Congress (MCs) from constituencies with diverse interests (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast 1995; Weingast and Marshall 1988).

In contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1993) assert the primacy of political parties in Congress, arguing that the majority party structures the committee system to serve the party's needs, including reelecting enough incumbents to maintain majority status. This implies that all places represented by majority party members benefit, or, if logrolling occurs, that it will be between the majority party contin-

Authors listed alphabetically. We would like to thank Lisa Schmit, Sharon Fox, Jeong-Hwa Lee, and Jungho Rhee for their assistance. We would also like to acknowledge the financial support provided by the Campus Research Board, the Office of Social Science Research, and the Great Cities Institute all at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 61, No. 4, November 1999, Pp. 1156–69

gents on different committees. Cox and McCubbins (1993) add that the level of conflict between factions within the majority party can affect whether party leaders allow committees to exercise veto power over each faction's proposals or proposal power that promotes the interests of one faction over another (270–73). However, they did not develop the implications of their arguments for policy outcomes, nor for how this might influence which places are represented on particular committees.

Regarding policy benefits, committee-centered theories imply that areas represented by *any* committee member will benefit, regardless of party. In contrast, party-centered theories suggest that benefits will be directed to areas represented by either *all* majority party members, or at least all majority party members on relevant committees.

Regarding committee representation, the committee-centered theory predicts that MCs from constituencies with particular interests will seek and acquire membership on relevant committees to promote and protect that interest, a notion for which Carsey and Rundquist (1998) and others find support. If being on a committee benefits MCs and their constituencies, then a committee-based theory of congressional decision making would imply that places with MCs already on a committee would be likely to retain that representation, regardless of partisanship. In contrast, if the party-centered theory is correct that being on a committee benefits majority party MCs disproportionately, then applying the party-centered theory to committee representation implies that places represented on committees by MCs from the majority party would be better able to retain their seats. A party-centered theory also implies that majority party MCs would be more likely to seek and, given accommodationist party leaders (Shepsle 1978), obtain seats on committees with jurisdiction over large amounts of discretionary spending, such as defense committees.

The Study

In this paper, we analyze military procurement and defense committee representation to compare predictions regarding party-and committee-centered versions of the distributive theory of legislative organization.[1] We use the same data and methodology employed by Carsey and Rundquist (1998) but expand the model to test for the effects of party as well as committee representation. We model the distributive process as a set of simultaneous equations that predict the level of military procurement contract awards received by a state, whether a state

[1] We acknowledge that other theories of legislative organization exist, most prominently the informational theory (Krehbiel 1991). However, the implications of the informational theory for the distribution of policy benefits are difficult to derive (Krehbiel 1991, 7–14), leading us to restrict our focus in this paper to variants of the distributive theory.

is represented on a House defense committee, and whether a state is represented on a Senate defense committee. The model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Benefits}_{it} = {} & \alpha_1 + \beta_1\text{Benefits}_{it-1} + \beta_2\text{DHREP}_{it-1} + \beta_3\text{RHREP}_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_4\text{DSREP}_{it-1} + \beta_5\text{RSREP}_{it-1} + \beta_6\text{PCHDemDel}_{it} \\ & + \beta_7\text{PCSDemDel}_{it} + e1_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{HouseRep}_{it} = {} & \alpha_2 + \beta_8\text{Benefits}_{it-1} + \beta_9\text{DHREP}_{it-1} + \beta_{10}\text{RHREP}_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_{11}\text{PCHDemDel}_{it} + e2_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{SenRep}_{it} = {} & \alpha_3 + \beta_{12}\text{Benefits}_{it-1} + \beta_{13}\text{DSREP}_{it-1} + \beta_{14}\text{RSREP}_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_{15}\text{PCSDemDel}_{it} + e3_{it}\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The subscripts "i" and "t" refer to individual states at specific points in time.[2] We measure Benefits as the per capita level of military procurement awards received by state i in year t.[3] ***HouseRep*** and ***SenRep*** are dummy variables coded 1 if a state is represented on a House or Senate defense committee, respectively, and 0 if it is not. The committee representation independent variables (***DHREP, RHREP, DSREP,*** and ***RSREP***) are dummy variables, coded 1 if state i in year t has a Democrat or Republican representative on a House or Senate defense committee.[4] ***PCHDemDel*** and ***PCSDemDel*** measure the percentage of state i's delegation to the House or Senate in year t that is Democratic, which captures

[2] Each equation also includes a number of control variables. All three equations control for the capacity of a state to produce weapons (measured as Gross State Product due to Manufacturing), whether or not the state is located in the Gunbelt (Markusen et al. 1991), an interaction between the two, state per capita income, and state unemployment. While each is substantively important in its own right, as they measure relevant characteristics of each state constituency, we are limited by space considerations to a discussion of party and committee effects on committee representation and the distribution of benefits. Because of the problems of pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis (see Stimson 1985), each equation includes a set of regional dummy variables. Equation (1) also includes a set of year dummy variables. Equations (2) and (3) include measures of the ideology of a state's delegation to the respective chamber, based on Conservative Coalition scores. Equation (2) also controls for the size of a state's House delegation. All monetary values have been adjusted for inflation.

[3] The literature measures "benefits" from federal spending in several ways. Some measure benefits as more money or federal employees, while others examine these same factors measured on a per capita basis. We opt for the widely used measure, procurement expenditures per capita, employed by Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee (1996), Carsey, Rundquist, and Fox (1997), and Carsey and Rundquist (1998), because our state-level analysis requires a per capita measure and because annual discretionary spending is the only annual direct measure of policy benefits available for the time period under study.

[4] Although we can record the party of a state's representative on the right-hand side of each of these equations by using two variables, we cannot estimate separate representation equations for both the Democrats and the Republicans in each chamber as part of a set of simultaneous equations without losing a large number of cases. For example, a *dependent* variable measuring whether or not a state was represented on a Senate defense committee by a Republican in a particular year would have to be coded as missing if a state sent no Republicans to the Senate for that year. When estimating the equations simultaneously, that particular case would be dropped from every equation. Considering the number of states that had one-party delegations to either the House or the Senate for various

the degree to which the state is represented overall by the majority party.[5] We first estimate the model on data from all 50 states from 1963 to 1989. Then, to explore Cox and McCubbins' (1993) argument regarding factions within the majority party, in this case, the northern liberal and southern conservative wings of the Democratic Party, we rerun the analysis splitting our sample at 1971.

Each dependent variable is likely to be influenced by its own previous value. Thus, each equation includes a lagged value of the dependent variable as a control. By doing so, the influence of other variables on each dependent variable captures the impact of those factors on *change* in each dependent variable from its previous value.

Carsey and Rundquist (1998) demonstrate that committee representation and military procurement spending are reciprocally related. Accordingly, lagged values of the committee representation variables are used as regressors in Equation (1) while a lagged value of procurement awards is used in Equations (2) and (3). The resulting model is what Finkel (1995) calls a cross-lagged effects model.

Following Carsey and Rundquist (1998), the model treats the substantive relationships as reciprocal but not simultaneous. However, exogenous shocks and/or some unmodeled factors may still result in some contemporaneous correlation between the three dependent variables, manifesting itself as contemporaneous correlation among the residuals of the three equations. Estimating the equations simultaneously allows us to incorporate such correlations into the analysis, thereby improving the efficiency of the estimates.[6] Because of the pooled cross-sectional time-series nature of the data, we calculate robust standard error estimates using the Beck and Katz (1995) approach.[7]

---

years, the number of cases lost renders the analysis intractable and hopelessly unrepresentative. This is not a problem on the right-hand side because a combination of variables can be used to capture all possible combinations of one-party and mixed-party representation in each equation.

[5] The Senate, of course, was controlled by the GOP for six years following the 1980 election, but model estimates that account for this did not differ meaningfully from those presented here.

[6] The resulting model is essentially a set of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (Bollen 1989).

[7] There is disagreement regarding how to respond when one or more of the equations in a set of simultaneous equations has a dichotomous dependent variable (see Bollen 1989; Browne and Arminger 1995). One could calculate a matrix of polychoric correlations from which the LISREL model could be estimated. In practice, however, this approach often results in a non-positive definite matrix, which proved to be the case here. This leaves the researcher unable to estimate the model. An alternative is to ignore the dichotomous nature of these variables. Several studies suggest that, if the dichotomous dependent variables are not overly skewed, the impact on the parameter estimates is minimal. The overall model chi-square statistic, as well as the individual coefficient standard errors, may be inflated, but each of these situations tilts the analysis in a way that makes it more difficult to achieve statistically significant coefficient estimates or an acceptable estimate of the overall fit of the model. Because our two dichotomous dependent variables are not highly skewed, we are confident in our findings. Specifically, for ***HouseRep,*** 55% of the cases are coded 1; 45% are coded 0. For ***SenRep,*** 54% are coded 1; 46% 0.

Hypotheses

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses regarding the distribution of procurement awards and defense committee representation tested in this paper. If the distribution of procurement awards responds only to committee effects regardless of partisanship, then states represented on defense committees should benefit regardless of party. Conversely, if the pure party model is correct and committee representation does not matter, states with larger delegations of the majority

TABLE 1

Hypotheses and Predicted Effects Regarding the Distribution of Military Procurement Awards and Defense Committee Representation Based on the Model Presented as Equations (1)–(3)

Hypothesis	Predicted Effects on Benefit Distribution	Predicted Effects on Committee Representation
Pure committee effects	Coefficients on committee representation variables will be positive and significant, and equal to each other within chambers (β_2, β_3, β_4, and β_5 all positive and significant with $\beta_2 = \beta_3$ and $\beta_4 = \beta_5$)*	Coefficients on committee representation variables will be positive and significant, and equal to each other within chambers (β_9, β_{10}, β_{13}, and β_{14} all positive and significant with $\beta_9 = \beta_{10}$ and $\beta_{13} = \beta_{14}$)*
Pure party effects	Coefficients on percentage of the delegation that is of the majority party will be positive and significant (β_6 and β_7)	Coefficients on percentage of the delegation that is of the majority party will be positive and significant (β_{11} and β_{15})
Both committee and party have independent effects	All predictions regarding coefficients from hypotheses 1 and 2 will hold	All predictions regarding coefficients from hypotheses 1 and 2 will hold
Committee and party effects are conditional (both are necessary)	Only coefficients for committee representation by a majority party member will be positive and significant (β_2 and β_4)	Only coefficients for committee representation by a majority party member will be positive and significant (β_9 and β_{13})**

*If committee effects are equally strong in both chambers, all four coefficients should be equal.

**Our estimate of the effect of prior committee representation on current committee representation is based on one-year lags. Given the two-year congressional cycle, the two-year electoral cycle in the House, and the six-year electoral cycle in the Senate, our estimate of a state's ability to retain committee representation includes these institutional factors as well as any party or committee effect. Thus, when evaluating this final assertion regarding the potential conditional nature of committee and party effects, we expect to see, and do see, that the coefficients on prior committee representation by a minority (Republican) party MC are not zero. Given these institutional influences, a more accurate hypothesis regarding the conditional effect of party and committee on gaining a seat on the committee is that the coefficients operating on past committee representation by Republicans should be smaller than their Democratic counterparts.

party should benefit more, regardless of committee representation. If both party and committee affect the distribution of military procurement awards independently, either party representation or committee representation would be sufficient to produce benefits for a state. If neither party nor committee representation by themselves are sufficient to produce benefits, but rather both are necessary, then only states represented on a defense committee by an MC from the majority party should benefit. This latter finding would be consistent with the existence of party-based intercommittee logrolling.

Regarding state representation on a defense committee, if committee representation responds only to committee effects, then prior representation by an MC from either party should equally predict retention of committee representation. If committee representation responds only to partisanship, then states with larger majority party delegations should be more likely to be represented on defense committees. If both party and committee independently affect committee representation, either prior committee representation or being represented by an increasingly majority party delegation should impact current representation. If neither party nor committee effects are sufficient by themselves to produce committee representation, but rather both are necessary, then only prior representation on a committee by a majority party MC should predict current committee representation.[8]

Findings

Table 2 presents the findings of our analysis for the entire 1963–89 period. As expected, each dependent variable is strongly related to its own previous value. Column 1 shows that every dollar of per capita contract awards received by a state in a particular year results in about 80 (.796) cents the following year. Column 2 shows that if a state had a Democratic representative on a House defense committee in the previous year, the probability that the state would continue to be represented on a defense committee increases by .55. If represented by a Republican on a House defense committee in the previous year, the probability of continued representation increases by .35. Column 3 shows that this retention effect on Senate defense committee representation is even stronger

[8] Carsey and Rundquist (1998) show that prior benefit levels predict current representation on defense committees, at least in the House. This effect constitutes support for what has traditionally been labeled the "recruitment hypothesis" in distributive theory. Here, we examine a broader set of hypotheses regarding committee representation. This includes expanding the notion of recruitment to include the impact of the party composition of the state delegation on representation. We also examine the impact of prior committee representation on retention of that representation. We did examine whether party and/or committee effects conditioned the more narrow "recruitment hypothesis" relationship between prior benefits and current committee representation through the use of multiplicative interaction terms between prior benefit levels on the one hand and the party composition of a state's delegation and the prior committee representation variables on the other. However, including these additional independent variables in Equations (2) and (3) failed to uncover any readily distinguishable pattern.

TABLE 2

MLE Coefficient Estimates of Factors Influencing Military Procurement Contracts and Representation on Defense Committees, 1963–1989 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	(1) Per Capital Procurement $Contracts_{it}$	(2) Representation on a House Defense $Committee_{it}$	(3) Representation on a Senate Defense $Committee_{it}$
Per Capita Procurement $Contracts_{it-1}$	.796(.036)**	.00019(.00004)**	.00004(.00004)
Democratic Representation on House $Committee_{it-1}$	19.942(6.720)**	.553(.029)**	—
Republican Representation on House $Committee_{it-1}$	10.265(7.897)	.347(.022)**	—
Democratic Representation on Senate $Committee_{it-1}$	10.581(7.666)	—	.697(.030)**
Republican Representation on Senate $Committee_{it-1}$	6.950(8.497)	—	.663(.030)**
Democratic Percentage of House $Delegation_{it}$	−.012(.126)	.0012(.0003)**	—
Democratic Percentage of Senate $Delegation_{it}$	.074(.089)	—	.0015(.0003)**
Per Capita Gross State Product from $Manufacturing_{it-1}$	.00026(.005)	.00005(.00001)**	−.00001(.00002)
Gunbelt State	−20.239(22.652)	.150(.044)**	.024(.055)
Gunbelt*GSP $Interaction_{it-1}$	.030(.011)**	−.00007(.00002)**	.000005(.00003)
Log of Size of House $Delegation_{it}$	—	.035(.011)**	—
Ideology of House $Delegation_{it-1}$	—	.003(.0005)**	—
Ideology of Senate $Delegation_{it-1}$	—	—	.002(.0005)**
Adjusted State Per Capita $Income_{it-1}$	.015(.003)**	−.000012(.000004)**	.000002(.000004)
State Unemployment $Rate_{it-1}$	3.587(1.765)**	−.002(.003)	−.001(.003)
R^2	.864	.736	.667

N=1,300; standard error estimates based on Beck and Katz 1995.
Model chi-square = 74.27 (df = 62, p = .137)
*p < .1 (two-tailed)
**p < .05 (two-tailed)

(.70 for Democrats and .66 for Republicans). These findings support two points. First, committee representation and military procurement awards change incrementally: to understand their levels for any particular year, one must know their levels from the previous year. Second, because of this autoregressiveness, any factor that influences committee representation or the distribution of per capita contract awards at one point in time will have its influence felt in subsequent years (see Carsey and Rundquist 1998 for a fuller treatment of this issue).

Column 1 of Table 2 shows that states that sent proportionately more Democratic (majority party) members either to the House or the Senate *did not*

benefit disproportionately from the distribution of military procurement expenditures. Both coefficient estimates are near zero and fail to even approach statistical significance, presenting no support for a *pure* party-based theory of benefit distribution.

Looking at the coefficients in column 1 of Table 2 for the committee representation variables, only one achieves statistical significance. States represented by a Democrat on a House defense committee average an additional $19.90 in per capita military procurement dollars in the following year. The coefficient for representation by a Republican on a House defense committee is about half this size and is not statistically significant. This means that the approximately $20 boost in per capita military procurement awards received by a state that Carsey and Rundquist (1998) attribute to prior representation on a House defense committee is due almost entirely to representation on such a committee by a Democrat. Similar to Carsey and Rundquist (1998), column 1 of Table 2 reports that representation for a state on a Senate defense committee by either a Democrat or a Republican *does not* result in a significant increase in per capita procurement awards.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that higher levels of previous benefits going to a state result in a higher probability that a state will be represented on a House defense committee. The coefficient of .00019 means that for every increase in per capita procurement contract awards of $300 (about 1 standard deviation), the probability of being represented on a House defense committee increases by .057, or almost 6 percentage points. A similar effect is not present in the Senate.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that representation in Congress by a state delegation with more Democrats *does* significantly increase the probability of that state being represented on a defense committee. An increase in the percentage of a state's delegation that is Democratic of 50 percentage points for the House and Senate results in an increase in the probability of that state being represented on a defense committee in the following year of 6 and 7.5 percentage points, respectively.[9]

Columns 2 and 3 also describe the party-based retention rates of committee representation. For both chambers, the coefficients linking past representation on a defense committee by a Democrat to current representation are larger than those for their Republican counterparts. Thus, states with a Democrat already on a defense committee have a higher probability of retaining that committee seat than do states represented by a Republican on a defense committee.

To summarize, prior benefit levels lead to an increased chance of committee representation in the House, and committee representation by a House Democrat

[9] As a check, we reran the model including variables in the two representation equations that measured the overall percentage of the members of each chamber that were Democrats. In neither the House nor the Senate did the measure of overall chamber partisanship produce a statistically significant effect on being represented on a defense committee, nor were the effects of the partisan makeup of a state's delegation changed. Thus, the findings we report here are not simply artifacts of changes in the overall partisan composition of either chamber.

leads to higher subsequent benefit levels. The same reciprocal relationship between committee representation and benefits that Carsey and Rundquist (1998) found in the House appears here as well, although it occurs only for Democrats.

Pre- and Post-1971

Cox and McCubbins (1993) contend that a significant shift occurred in the early 1970s in the role played by committee members in the House.[10] In the mid- to late 1960s, the Democratic Party in Congress was relatively evenly split between members from northern and southern states. This began to change in the 1960s as the northern faction of the Democratic Party became numerically more dominant. Before the 89th Congress (1965–66), between 35 and 55% of House Democrats were from the South. This shifted to between 28 and 33% after the 89th Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 56). A similar shift took place in the Senate, which resulted in decreased defense committee representation for southern states as well. States that increased their representation after 1971 among Senate Democrats, as well as on the Democratic side of defense committees, included Iowa, Illinois, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, and Vermont. At the same time, states that decreased their number of Democratic senators and Democrats on Senate defense committees included Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia.

Consistent with their view of the role played by factions within the majority party, Cox and McCubbins argue that the shift favoring northern Democrats in the House allowed the majority party leadership to change the role of standing committees from one of vetoing proposals that were unacceptable to either northern or southern Democrats to one of more actively promoting policies desired by northern Democrats (270–73). Their argument suggests that different patterns may characterize the distributive politics of military procurement during the earlier and later portions of our time period.

We explore this possibility by splitting our sample between 1971 and 1972 and rerunning the analysis. We divide our sample at 1971 because it is a year just after the shift in the number of northern liberals and southern conservatives in the Democratic Party in Congress. Of course, other changes took place at the same time, at least partly as a result of the influx of northern liberal Democrats (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991), that may also have influenced the nature of the distributive politics of military procurement. These include the Democratic caucus reforms allowing for the removal of committee chairs, the adoption of a rule limiting committee members to chairing only one subcommittee, and other reforms in the so-called "subcommittee bill of rights" of 1973. Also, prior to the early 1970s, according to Lindsay:

> [v]irtually all members of Congress were content to fund whatever [military procurement] programs the administration requested. That congressional deference collapsed in the wake of the

[10] They do not consider the Senate in their analysis.

> Vietnam war. In the 1970's and 1980's, . . . Congress clashed with the president over an array of weapons programs, including the B-1 bomber, counterforce weapons, the MX missile, antisatellite weapons, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. (1991, xi).

The early 1970s also saw reduced congressional support for the Vietnam War and defense spending along with passage of the War Powers Act. Although each of these changes may be related to the shift in the numerical composition of the factions within the Democratic Party, we must use caution in attributing the cause of any differences we observe in the nature of the distributive politics of military procurement before and after 1971 to any one of these factors.

Table 3 presents the results of reestimating our model for the period before and after 1971. The boldfaced entries are for the earlier time period. Readers should recall that the findings presented here are not simply artifacts of regional differences or increased spending during the Vietnam War (see note 1), but rather represent differences in the nature of the distributive politics of military procurement before and after 1971.

Column 1 of Table 3 reports that the influence of defense committee representation by a House Democrat on the distribution of military contract awards is positive and statistically significant for both time periods. It also shows that the partisan composition of a state's House delegation does not significantly predict per capita military procurement awards. These findings are consistent with the general findings for the entire 1963–89 time period for the House reported in Table 2.

The pattern differs in the Senate. Recall that in Table 2 we reported no effect on the distribution of procurement awards resulting from defense committee representation in the Senate. Column 1 of Table 3 suggests that this nonfinding applies only to the 1963–71 period. Starting in 1972, states with a Democrat representing them on a Senate defense committee received a statistically significant boost in per capita procurement awards nearly equal to that reported for the House for the same period, about $15 per capita. The effect was actually negative, though not quite significant, for Democratic representation on a Senate defense committee in the 1963–71 period.

In contrast, the 1963–71 estimates reported in column 1 of Table 3 for the Senate provide the only evidence uncovered of a pure party effect on the distribution of benefits. States that sent more Democrats to the Senate received a significant boost in per capita procurement awards during the earlier period. The effect becomes insignificant in the 1972–89 period.

To summarize, our findings for the Senate that neither party nor committee effects influence the distribution of military procurement awards (see Table 2) mask important changes that took place in the Senate across the two time periods. In Table 3 we see evidence of a pure party effect in the Senate from 1963 to 1971. However, starting in 1972, the Senate appears to operate like the House in that being represented by a Democrat on a defense committee influences the distribution of military procurement awards. While speculative at this point, the

TABLE 3

MLE Coefficient Estimates of Factors Influencing Military Procurement Contracts and Representation on Defense Committees, 1963–71 and 1972–89; 1963–71 Entries in Bold (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	(1) Per Capital Procurement $Contracts_{it}$	(2) Representation on a House Defense $Committee_{it}$	(3) Representation on a Senate Defense $Committee_{it}$
Per Capita Procurement	**.697(.086)****	**.00014(.00005)****	**−.00003(.00005)**
$Contracts_{it-1}$	.850(.044)**	.00027(.00006)**	.0001(.00005)**
Democratic Representation	**24.432(14.376)***	**.581(.054)****	—
on House $Committee_{it-1}$	15.293(8.021)*	.536(.039)**	
Republican Representation	**29.823(19.471)**	**.408(.046)****	—
on House $Committee_{it-1}$	5.711(8.850)	.321(.030)**	
Democratic Representation	**−23.150(14.797)**	—	**.843(.062)****
on Senate $Committee_{it-1}$	14.910(8.924)*		.644(.039)**
Republican Representation	**−3.508(20.963)**	—	**.781(.076)****
on Senate $Committee_{it-1}$	8.530(7.006)		.627(.038)**
Democratic Percentage	**−.086(.266)**	**.0006(.0004)**	—
of House $Delegation_{it}$	.040(.119)	.0013(.0005)**	
Democratic Percentage	**.443(.157)****	—	**.0005(.0004)**
of Senate $Delegation_{it}$	.023(.086)		.0017(.0004)**
Per Capita Gross State	**−.0005(.017)**	**−.000025(.000015)***	**.000004(.00002)**
Product from $Manufacturing_{it-1}$	.004(.004)	.000058(.00001)**	−.000014(.00002)
Gunbelt State	**−43.168(40.991)**	**.091(.094)**	**.078(.048)**
	1.793(29.363)	.163(.072)**	−.038(.083)
Gunbelt*GSP $Interaction_{it-1}$	**.053(.027)***	**−.000006(.00006)**	**−.00002(.00003)**
	.016(.013)	−.00009(.00003)**	.00002(.00004)
Log of Size of House	—	**−.018(.022)**	—
$Delegation_{it}$		.058(.013)**	
Ideology of House	—	**.0018(.0008)****	—
$Delegation_{it-1}$		.0025(.0006)**	
Ideology of Senate	—	—	**.0014(.0008)***
$Delegation_{it-1}$			.0019(.0007)**
Adjusted State Per Capita	**.017(.007)****	**−.00004(.00004)**	**−.000016(.000009)***
$Income_{it-1}$	.014(.003)**	−.000013(.000006)**	.000002(.000005)
State Unemployment	**1.569(5.371)**	**−.019(.009)****	**−.006(.010)**
$Rate_{it-1}$	4.159(1.776)**	−.0034(.003)	−.0008(.004)
R^2	**.806**	**.786**	**.782**
	.892	.735	.633

N = 400 for 1963–71, N = 900 for 1972–89; standard error estimates based on Beck and Katz 1995.
Model Chi-square for 1963–71 = 32.8 (df = 26, p = .168); for 1972–89=46.64 (df= 46, p=.446)
* $p < .1$ (two-tailed)
** $p < .05$ (two-tailed)

anomalous finding in the Senate from 1963 to 1971 may stem from the competing factions hypothesis suggested by Cox and McCubbins. Specifically, our evidence is consistent with the argument that Democrats on Senate defense committees (mostly southern supporters of the war) may have attempted to "buy" support for, or at least tolerance of, the Vietnam War from Senate Democrats not

on defense committees (mostly from the North) by increasing military procurement spending in their states. It may also indicate that Senate defense committee representation by Democrats may be tied to other types of defense spending during this period, including base construction, maintenance, and military personnel expenditures (see Arnold 1979, chap. 6, and Shepsle 1978, 81–82, for evidence regarding the House; Rundquist et al. 1997 provide evidence combining the House and Senate).

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 show that the ability of a state to obtain defense committee representation in either chamber did not respond to the partisan makeup of a state's House and Senate delegations before 1971, but did respond to it after 1971. In other words, the evidence of a pure party effect on committee representation originally presented in Table 2 appears to characterize only the post-1971 period.

Table 3 also shows that in both periods, states represented on a defense committee by a Democrat were better able to retain committee representation than were states represented on a defense committee by a Republican. This suggests that the partisan difference in retention of defense committee representation presented in Table 2 occurred in both time periods. However, the impact of prior representation on a House or Senate defense committee by either a Democrat or a Republican on the probability that a state would remain represented on a defense committee declined from the earlier to the later period. While the size of these drops generally is not large, they suggest that the ability of a state to retain representation on a defense committee declined after 1971.[11]

Discussion

The findings presented here are consistent with the general argument inspired by Cox and McCubbins that the majority party organizes the committee system so as to benefit its members' constituencies. States represented by Democrats on a defense committee receive statistically significant increases in per capita military procurement awards. This applies in the House for the entire time period and in the Senate beginning in 1972. That only majority party members represented on the defense committees receive additional procurement dollars suggests that partisan benefits are contingent on committee representation. When the majority party is not divided into large competing factions, as in the 1972–89 period, MCs

[11] One final difference emerges between the two periods that is of interest to scholars of distributive politics, though it does not bear directly on the question of party versus committee effects. Table 3 shows that support for the traditional "recruitment hypothesis"—prior benefit levels predicting defense committee representation—is much stronger in the 1972–89 period. Because we cannot divide committee representation by party on the LHS of Equations (2) and (3) (see note 3), and because the use of multiplicative interaction terms as additional regressors failed to uncover any additional patterns (see note 7), we are unable to present a fuller examination of potential committee or party effects on this traditional "recruitment hypothesis" question for the two time periods.

from the majority party are better able to obtain representation on defense committees, which they use to direct further benefits back home to their states. We also see that once a state obtains representation on a defense committee, it is better able to retain that representation if it is represented on a defense committee by a Democrat. Thus, at least for military procurement policy, our findings support a party-based version of the distributive theory. This conflicts with Mayer's (1991) assertion that military procurement spending is one of the last places one would expect to find any evidence of distributive politics.

Cox and McCubbins (1993, 79–80) argue that a necessary condition for intercommittee logrolling to occur is that most, if not all, committees would have to be dominated by preference outliers who draft legislation that does not reflect the broader interests of the floor. They find only a handful of such committees in the House, thus concluding that most committees lack the incentive to trade votes. No research has been done that examines the distribution of benefits and committee representation in all policy areas simultaneously. However, our findings regarding defense spending, combined with Levitt and Snyder's (1995) finding of a significant Democratic bias in the distribution of domestic assistance expenditures enacted during the period of unified Democratic control in the late 1960s and 1970s, suggest that the necessary conditions exist, and that majority party-based intercommittee logrolling may be taking place.

Manuscript submitted 10 November 1997
Final manuscript received 30 June 1998

REFERENCES

Arnold, Douglas. 1979. *Congress and the Bureaucracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data." *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 634–47.

Bollen, Kenneth A. 1989. *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Browne, Michael W., and Gerhard Arminger. 1995. "Specification and Estimation of Mean- and Covariance-Structure Models." In *Handbook of Statistical Modeling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences,* ed. Gerhard Arminger, Clifford C. Clogg, and Michael E. Sobel. New York: Plenum Press.

Carsey, Thomas M., and Barry Rundquist. 1998. "The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress." *Public Choice*. Forthcoming.

Carsey, Thomas M., Barry Rundquist, and Sharon Fox. 1997. "Defense Spending and Economic Development in the American States, 1970–89: Untangling a Complex Relationship." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Cox, Gary, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Finkel, Steven E. 1995. *Causal Analysis with Panel Data*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Snyder Jr. 1995. "Political Parties and the Distribution of Federal Outlays." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 958–80.

Lindsay, James M. 1991. *Congress and Nuclear Weapons*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Markusen, A., P. Hall, S. Campbell, and S. Deitrick. 1991. *The Rise of the Gunbelt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mayer, Kenneth H. 1991. *The Political Economy of Defense Contracting*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rundquist, Barry, Jeong-Hwa Lee, and Jungho Rhee. 1996. "The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State-Level Evidence." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21(2): 265–81.

Rundquist, Barry, Jungho Rhee, Jeong-Hwa Lee, and Sharon Fox. 1997. "Modeling State Representation on Defense Committees in Congress, 1959–1989." *American Politics Quarterly* 25(1): 35–55.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry Weingast. 1995. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." In *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions,* ed. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry Weingast. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 914–47.

Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132–63.

Thomas M. Carsey is associate professor of political science, University of Illinois at Chicago 1007 West Harrison Street, Chicago, IL 60607-7137.

Barry Rundquist is associate professor of political science, University of Illinois at Chicago 1007 West Harrison Street, Chicago, IL 60607-7137.