

# Venture Investing in 2025: What We Still Do Know

The 2025 Autumn Governance Series: A Comprehensive Literature Review with C Governance Implications



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
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
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Artificial intelligence has reshaped the venture capital landscape at an unprecedented pace. In 2024, AI startups captured nearly half of all U.S. venture funding (46.4%) and 37% of corporate venture capital (CVC)-backed investment, while Generative AI alone absorbed \$45 billion globally. This trend carried into 2025, with U.S. venture activity in the first quarter reaching \$100 billion across nearly 4,000 deals—more than double the year before.

At the same time, research on venture capital is advancing. Benchmarks as **VCBench** demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) can now outperform human experts and even tier-1 firms in predicting founder success. GPT-4o, for example, achieved  $\sim 3.2\times$  the baseline precision rate, while predictive simulations using Series B/C data showed up to  $14\times$  cumulative growth compared to naïve baselines. These results suggest that algorithms have begun to rival human judgment in the earliest stages of screening

Yet the most important mechanics of venture investing remain poorly understood. We still do not know how AI-specific term sheets are structured, how anti-dilution protections play out in practice, how venture debt is

with equity financing, or how optimal exit timing should be engineered for compute-intensive businesses. Nor do we fully understand which CVC governance models succeed, how long AI sub-sectors require before achieving commercial traction, or how policy scaffolding across jurisdictions shapes outcomes.

For boards, LPs, and GPs, these gaps are not trivial—they are governance spots. Where fiduciaries lack transparency into capital structures and strategies, their duty of care cannot be fulfilled. Conversely, investors who deliberately study these unknowns can extract excess returns, or **alpha** inefficiencies that others misprice.

**Closing these gaps is simultaneously a fiduciary obligation and a competitive advantage—a convergence that defines venture governance in the AI era.**

## **Data Sources and Methodology**

Figures on funding allocations, deal counts, and CVC activity are drawn primarily from **PitchBook (2024–2025)** and **CB Insights (State of CVC 2024)**. Data on LLM-based screening and founder precision rates are sourced from **Chen et al. (2024, VCBench, arXiv:2509.14448)**, which evaluated ~9,000 anonymized Series A–C deals from 2015–2023. Startup success definitions (IPO or acquisition above \$500 million or cumulative funding above \$50 million)—are consistent with **Potanin et al. (2023, Startup Success Precision, arXiv:2309.15552)**.

The “market baseline” precision figure of 1.9% represents the historical proportion of successful founders in early-stage cohorts. Limitations from Crunchbase and PitchBook introduce survivorship and disclosure bias.

censoring penalizes younger companies, and term-sheet-level data remains confidential.

## Market Structure and Investment Trends

AI's rise is striking. Ten years ago, AI companies captured less than 10% of venture funding. By 2024, that figure had risen to nearly half in the United States, with Generative AI doubling its global inflows to \$45 billion.

Empirical research complicates the narrative, however. When controlling for investor experience, stage, and geography, AI startups on average receive **smaller deal sizes** than their non-AI counterparts. The paradox is explained by stratification: Silicon Valley funds deployed a median \$12 million in Series A rounds, 2.3× the \$5.2 million median from emerging hubs.

From a governance perspective, this underscores why fiduciaries cannot rely on headline figures. Boards and LPs need reporting that disaggregates AI capital and how AI capital is being deployed, so they can assess whether allocations are hype-driven or strategically disciplined.

## Investment Stages and Deal Dynamics

Early-stage funding dominates the AI landscape. In 2024, 65% of CVC-backed deals were at the seed or Series A stage, the highest level in more than a decade.

At later stages, predictive models are beginning to reshape selection. Studies using deep learning on Series B and C cohorts achieved simulated capital growth up to 14× over baseline. This figure was gross of fees, modelled

eight-year horizon, and should be interpreted as a backtest rather than a forward guarantee. Even with those caveats, it highlights the lift provided by predictive analytics.

Yet despite progress in selection, the mechanics of round capitalization remain opaque. We still lack clarity on liquidation preference structure, participation rights, and valuation practices for AI-heavy companies with high compute costs and uncertain monetization paths. For boards, this absolute lack of transparency raises governance concerns: approving financing without understanding ownership and payout dynamics risks fiduciary failure.

## Screening and Selection

Human investors remain inefficient at spotting winners. Market-wide, only 1.9% of early-stage founders ultimately meet “success” thresholds. The best human teams can improve that to ~5.6%, but still miss most winners. By contrast, GPT-4o achieved a precision rate of 29% in VCBench, and Gemini-2.5-Flash achieved 70% recall.

For governance, this implies that boards should expect funds to explain their selection processes using empirical evidence, not just gut instinct. Committees can no longer defend “pattern recognition” alone when superior methods exist.

## What We Still Do Not Know

### Round Capitalization Mechanics

Very little empirical work has been done on the mechanics of capitalization

rounds in AI deals. We lack data on valuation methodologies, liquidation preferences, and participation rights.

**Governance Risk:** Boards and LPs often approve financings without secondary dilution pathways and payout structures.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Proprietary term-sheet datasets could generate **Structural Alpha** by revealing pricing inefficiencies.

## Anti-Dilution Protection

Anti-dilution clauses remain undocumented in AI contexts. We do not know whether full-ratchet or weighted-average formulas dominate, or how these terms influence founder retention.

**Governance Risk:** Poorly designed clauses can destroy founder incentives.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Modelling dilution-adjusted IRR offers **Structural Alpha**, while boards should monitor dilution per round quarterly and keep it below 15–20% at early stages.

## Venture Debt and the Equity–Debt Interface

AI startups now consume nearly one-third of venture debt dollars. Yet we know little about how lenders underwrite loans or how covenants shape equity rounds.

**Governance Risk:** Boards may approve debt packages that constrain founders or accelerate collapse.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Aligning covenants with R&D milestones creates **Structural Alpha**. Debt-to-equity ratios should remain  $\leq 30\%$ , based on Kaplan–Strömberg’s findings that default risk rises sharply above this level.

## Exit Timing in AI Markets

AI startups are staying private longer. The median time-to-exit is ~9.5 compared to ~7 years for non-AI ventures. OpenAI, founded in 2015, re private ten years later.

### Figure 2: Exit Timing — AI vs Non-AI Ventures

*AI ventures stay private 35% longer than non-AI peers, complicating DP realization and fund reporting. Source: PitchBook venture exit dataset. Methodology: Median exit age across 2,000 U.S. companies (2010–2024). September 2025.*

**Governance Risk:** Delayed exits impair DPI and distort fund reporting.  
**Alpha Opportunity:** Exits engineered around compute cycles (GPU ref

every ~2 years) and regulatory milestones create **Timing Alpha**.

## **Corporate Venture Capital**

CVCs dominate AI funding, but governance structures are uneven. Many fail due to parent politics or over-selectivity.

### **Figure 3: CVC Governance — Success vs Failure Models**

*Successful CVCs balance autonomy with accountability through independent committees and dual-KPI reporting. Source: CB Insights 2024 CVC report author synthesis. Methodology: Comparison of 25 major CVC programs. . October 2025.*

By contrast, successful CVCs such as **Salesforce Ventures** and **Intel Capital** maintain independent committees, report on both IRR and ecosystem adoption, and reserve minority stakes to avoid conflicts.

**Governance Risk:** Parent capture wastes capital and slows decision-making.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Independent investors can profit from **Arbitrage Alpha** by co-investing where corporates misprice risk.

## **Horizon of Disappointment**

The eight-year success horizon is poorly calibrated for AI. Longer R&D cycles mean that premature exits or abandonments destroy potential value.

**Governance Risk:** Misallocated reserves.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Recalibrating by sub-sector supports **Timing Alpha**.

## **Geography and Policy Scaffolding**

Research linking policy scaffolding to venture outcomes is sparse. Asia's growth decline in 2024 contrasts with Japan's resilience, but few causal studies exist.

**Governance Risk:** Overexposure to fragile jurisdictions.

**Alpha Opportunity:** Funds that integrate policy analysis capture **Arbitrage Alpha**.

## **Corporate Governance Implications**

The gaps above translate into governance failures. Boards often approve financings blind to dilution, debt covenants, or exit strategies. This undermines fiduciary oversight.

- **Structural Oversight:** Monitor contracts and dilution quarterly.
- **Timing Oversight:** Audit exit readiness semi-annually.
- **Arbitrage Oversight:** Evaluate CVC mandates and policy scaffolding annually.

Governance dashboards should track debt-equity ratios, liquidation preference exit readiness.

## Counterarguments and Limitations

Not all gaps can or should be closed. Information asymmetry can reward conviction investors and deter herd behaviour. Overly rigid governance can stifle founder agility. Term-sheet opacity persists partly to preserve competitive dynamics. Recognizing these limits avoids overreach.

## Practitioner Voice

Failures illustrate governance risk. A Series B AI startup saw its founder wiped out by a full-ratchet clause, leading to collapse. Another faced accelerated debt repayment just before a major contract, forcing a distressed sale.

Yet governance discipline can also pay off. A Series C robotics company negotiated covenant waivers tied to compute spend milestones, preserving flexibility to delay its IPO until markets improved. The company ultimately exited at a 4.2× multiple.

**LP questions to ask GPs:**

- How do you benchmark dilution terms across AI deals?
- What ceilings are in place on debt-to-equity ratios?
- How do you align exits with compute and policy cycles?

## Sidebar: Venture Governance Suite

Tracking dilution across rounds, modelling debt covenant scenarios, and benchmarking CVC governance structures requires systematic data and analysis. We have built the Venture Governance GPT Suite to help LPs and boards operationalize these oversight mechanisms. [Link here.](#)

## Conclusions and Research Roadmap

### Integrated Takeaway

Venture investing in 2025 is predictively sophisticated but structurally opaque. Screening models identify winners more efficiently than humans. Deal structuring, governance, and exits elude systematic study. For investors,

inefficiency creates opportunity. For fiduciaries, blind spots create risk.

**Structural Alpha** lies in mastering contracts, dilution, and debt.

**Timing Alpha** lies in engineering exits and calibrating horizons.

**Arbitrage Alpha** lies in exploiting CVC missteps and regulatory asymmetries.

Boards and LPs that embed structured governance oversight into these domains will not only fulfill their duty of care but also capture a durable investment advantage.

## Agenda for Researchers

The critique of venture research should not end with diagnosis. Future research could advance in three directions:

1. **Term-Sheet Corpus Analysis:** Build datasets of liquidation prefs, anti-dilution protections, and participation rights.
2. **Longitudinal Covenant Study:** Track venture debt covenants across financing cycles.
3. **Policy Scaffolding Econometrics:** Use quasi-experiments (EU AI Act, export controls, China's capital policies) to assess causal impacts.

**Feasibility Note:** Executing this agenda will require addressing data access constraints. Term-sheet corpus analysis may necessitate regulatory sandboxes or industry consortia willing to anonymize proprietary data. Longitudinal covenant studies will likely require cooperation from venture lenders and LPs to release contractual data under confidentiality frameworks. Policy scaffolding econometrics could leverage Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or partnerships with multilateral institutions that track

subsidies and regulatory interventions across jurisdictions. Without such enablers, the research agenda risks remaining aspirational.

The insights from the Venture Investing article resonate directly with the governance frameworks I explore in [Shaping the Next Decade](#). Both argue that boards and committees must move beyond pedigree and static benchmarking to learning to underwrite conviction edges while managing new risks introduced by AI, regulation, and systemic concentration. What begins as a framework for today's investment committees—scoring conviction and networks—becomes tomorrow's blueprint for fiduciary governance in an era where human judgment, algorithmic judgment, and long-horizon policy priorities intersect. Available for [purchase here](#).

*Research and Audio Supported by AI Systems*

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