

Multi-Agent Systems

- Tragedy of the Commons -

1. Introduction

Objectives of lab:

- Study game theoretical aspects of multi-agent interaction on hand of a classic problem: Tragedy of the Commons
- Exploit communication to determine/influence strategy of other agents
- Achieve a cooperation strategy which maximizes the **social welfare**

1. Introduction

Tragedy of the Commons

- Situation that arises when there is a **finite resource** that is **shared** by several agents
- Each agent has a **utility directly proportional** to his **share** of the common resource, **as well as** to how much of it remains for future regeneration
- Examples:
 - William Forster Lloyd (1833)
 - Cattle herders sharing a common parcel of land (the commons) on which they are each entitled to let their cows graze. If a herder put more than his allotted number of cattle on the common, overgrazing could result
 - Each additional animal has a positive effect for its herder, but the cost of the extra animal is shared by all other herders, causing a so-called “**free-rider**” problem. Today’s commons include fish stocks, rivers, oceans, and the atmosphere.

2. Game Setup

- N agents
- Each agent $i=1..N$ decides on a *share* k_i of a common resource K to use for its own production utility
- Amount of *free remaining resource* is $K - \sum_{i=1}^N k_i$
- Each individual agent utility is computed as follows:

$$u(a_i, a_{-i}) = \ln(k_i) + \ln\left(K - \sum_{i=1}^N k_i\right)$$

- The social utility function is the sum of individual utilities

$$w(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_N) = \sum_{i=1}^N \ln(k_i) + N \cdot \ln\left(K - \sum_{i=1}^N k_i\right)$$

3. Game Config and Environment

- Game has nr_rounds rounds of play (agents do not know nr_rounds)
- The game starts out with an amount $nr_resources$ (K) of the common resource
- Each round has 2 stages
 - Stage 1: agents provide their initial $share$ (k_i) of the amount of resource remaining after the previous round
 - Stage 2: Adjustments
 - All agent receive the k_i shares of every other agent
 - Agents have nr_adjust_rounds adjustment rounds to (i) alter their share, (ii) ask that other agents alter their share
 - After nr_adjust_rounds or when all agents are content with their utility, the round ends and the resource amount is reduced by the total agent share
 - If the resource amount falls below 0, the game ends abruptly

4. Development

- You only have to implement your own agent strategy
- Three functions
 - `specify_share`: agents return their initial share at beginning of round
 - `negotiation_response`: agent provides his share update and/or desire for altering other agent's shares, based on his utility
 - `inform_round_finished`: agent can react to notification of round finish

5. Tasks

- Implement your own agent strategy
- Double objective: **equity** and **maximal social welfare**
 - Avoid having agents that do not respond to social inequalities :-)
- Create plots of individual **cumulated** agent shares as rounds progress