From Superposition to Sparse Autoencoders
Understanding Neural Feature Representations

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Today’s Presenters

Patryk Wielopolski

- Ph.D. in Generative Models @ WUST
- Prev. Innovation Leader @ DataWalk
- Building AI Safety community in Poland

Taras Kutsyk

- Ph.D. Student @ GMUM, UJ
- MSc @ University of L'Aquila, Italy
- Prev. MATS Scholar with Neel Nanda

Today’s Audience

Share your name and your goal for today’s workshop!

Goals

- 🛡️ Understand the broader AI Safety landscape
- 🧸 Learn basics of Mechanistic Interpretability
- 👩‍💻 Learn theory and write some code!
- 🎉 Have fun!

Agenda

- **09:00 - 09:10 - Introduction & Logistics**
- 09:10 - 09:25 - Introduction to AI Safety
- 09:25 - 09:45 - Introduction to Mechanistic Interpretability
- 09:45 - 11:25 - Notebook on Toy Models of Superposition
- **11:25 - 11:35 - Break**
- 11:35 - 11:45 - Introduction to Sparse Autoencoders
- 11:45 - 12:45 - Notebook on Sparse Autoencoders
- 12:45 - 13:00 - Summary, Next Steps, Questions

Introduction to AI Safety

State Of The Art AI



Source: AI Safety Atlas

AI Progress Is Fast



Source: METR

AI Progress Is Fast



Source: Epoch.AI

But Is It Safe?



Teenager Suicide

AI Slop

Blackmailing

Risks

- **Misuse risks** occur when humans intentionally deploy AI systems to cause harm.
- **Misalignment risks** emerge when AI systems pursue goals different from human intentions.
- **Systemic risks** arise from AI integration with complex global systems, creating emergent threats no single actor intended.

Source: AI Safety Atlas

Misuse Risks

Bio Risk



Cyber Risk

Autonomous Weapon Risk

Source: AI Safety Atlas

Misalignment Risks





Specification Gaming

Treacherous Turn

Self-Improvement

Source: AI Safety Atlas

Systemic Risks

Epistemic Erosion

Power Concentration

Mass Unemployment

Value lock-in

Gradual Disempowerement

Source: AI Safety Atlas

Areas of AI Safety



Technical AI Safety

AI Governance

Areas of Technical AI Safety

AI Alignment

AI Control

AI Safety Evals

Interpretability

+ many others

AI Alignment



(a) Aligning through inductive bias



(b) Aligning through behavior imitation



(c) Aligning through model feedback



(d) Aligning through environment feedback

AI alignment focuses on ensuring that AI systems reliably act in accordance with human values and intentions, addressing problems like reward misspecification, goal misgeneralization, and the difficulty of translating complex human preferences into objectives that AI systems can safely optimize.

	Claude Sonnet 4.5	Claude Opus 4.1	Claude Sonnet 4	GPT-5	Gemini 2.5 Pro
Agentic coding *SWE-bench Verified*	**77.2%** **82.0%** with parallel test-time compute	74.5% 79.4% with parallel test-time compute	72.8% 80.2% with parallel test-time compute	72.8% GPT-5 74.5% GPT-5-Codex	67.2%
Agentic terminal coding *Terminal-Bench*	**50.0%**	46.5%	36.4%	43.8%	25.3%
Agentic tool use *τ2-bench*	Retail 86.2% Airline **70.0%** Telecom **98.0%**	Retail **86.8%** Airline 63.0% Telecom 71.5%	Retail 83.8% Airline 63.0% Telecom 49.6%	Retail 81.1% Airline 62.6% Telecom 96.7%	— — —
Computer use *OSWorld*	**61.4%**	44.4%	42.2%	—	—
High school math competition *AIME 2025*	100% (python) 87.0% (no tools)	78.0%	70.5%	99.6% (python) 94.6% (no tools)	88.0%
Graduate-level reasoning *GPQA Diamond*	83.4%	81.0%	76.1%	85.7%	**86.4%**
Multilingual Q&A *MMMLU*	89.1%	**89.5%**	86.5%	89.4%	—
Visual reasoning *MMMU (validation)*	77.8%	77.1%	74.4%	**84.2%**	82.0%
Financial analysis *Finance Agent*	**55.3%**	50.9%	44.5%	46.9%	29.4%

AI Safety Evals

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Inspect

An open-source framework for large language model evaluations.

MMLU High School CS Example

Q: In Python 3, which of the following function convert a string to an int in python?

A: int(x [,base])
B: long(x [,base])
C: float(x)
D: str(x)

AI Safety Evals is a systematic approach to measuring AI systems across three key properties:

- Dangerous capabilities (what models can do at their limits),
- Propensities (what behaviors they tend to exhibit by default),
- Control (whether safety protocols remain effective when models try to circumvent them).

AI Control

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Control Arena

ControlArena is a collection of settings, model organisms and protocols - for running control experiments.



AI Control aims to design and evaluate control protocols. Control protocols are plans designed to prevent unsafe actions by AI systems, even if those AIs were misaligned and intended to subvert the safeguards.

Overview of Interpretability Landscape



Source: "Mechanistic Interpretability for AI Safety — A Review" L. Bereska & E. Gavves

Introduction To Mechanistic Interpretability

- Complex tasks involve sequences of **algorithmic steps**
- Neural networks also have many intermediate steps, namely **neural activations:**



- *If only* we could **interpret** these intermediate steps!

Vizualization: made by 3blue1brown

Monosemanticity and Polysemanticity

Intuition



Monosemanticity

A single neuron represents one feature.



Polysemanticity

A single neuron represents many features.

Source: Zoom In: An Introduction to Circuits, C. Olah et. al., 2020

Establishing Monosemanticity



Establishing Polysemanticity



Features



Spurious correlation problem

“Circle” Neuron



That was actually a “red color” neuron!



Features



Visualization by optimization

- In the same way we optimize the weights during the model training to minimize the loss, we can **optimize inputs to maximize activation** of a particular neuron!



- This avoids the correlation problem because the result of this optimization has to be **causally relevant*** for the neuron activation

*up to first-order truncation error that comes from the gradient

Source: Feature Visualization (C. Olah et al., 2017)

Monosemantic neurons discovery

Optimization with diversity reveals multiple types of balls. *Layer mixed5a, Unit 9*

Dataset examples

mixed 5a, Unit 9 is a channel (convolutional map slice) in InceptionV1 vision model that consists of ***monosemantic*** *neurons, that represent a* ***“ball” concept***

Source: Feature Visualization (C. Olah et al., 2017)

Polysemantic neurons discovery

Optimization with diversity show cats, foxes, but also cars. *Layer mixed4e, Unit 55*

Dataset examples

mixed 4e, Unit 55 is a channel (convolutional map slice) that consists of ***polysemantic*** *neurons, that represent* ***concepts “fox”, “cat”, “car” jointly***

Source: Feature Visualization (C. Olah et al., 2017)

Bi-graph abstraction



More features than neurons



What about the case when
 # Features > # Neurons?

Superposition



When **# Features > # Neurons**
The neural layer is said to be **in superposition**

Superposition







Superposition → Polysemanticity

Polysemanticity ↛ Superposition

Superposition: deep dive

Neurons as directions



Encoding

[1, 0]

[0, 1]



Activations as directions



Features as directions

A.k.a. Linear Representation Hypothesis





Features as directions

A.k.a. Linear Representation Hypothesis





Superposition shift

We can do better!





Superposition secret



Superposition secret



1. For any given input, most of the features will not be present! In other words, we say that **features are sparse**.

➡ **The "effective dimension" < # Features**

2. While **W** can be linear, $\mathbf{W}^{-1}$ is generally **not.**

$$\mathbf{W}^{-1}(\mathbf{h}) = \mathrm{ReLU}\left(\underbrace{\mathbf{V}}_{4\times2}\underbrace{\mathbf{h}}_{2\times1} + \underbrace{\mathbf{b}}_{4\times1}\right)$$

Live Coding!

Notebooks on Toy Models of Superposition

We will work on an adjusted ARENA notebook.

Break!

Sparse Autoencoders as a Solution

Based on “Towards Monosemanticity: Decomposing Language Models With Dictionary Learning”

Autoencoders

Intuition



Sparse Autoencoders

Intuition



Sparse Autoencoders

For Polysemanticity



Polysemantic Neurons

Monosemantic Neurons

Problem Setup

Our Case



Problem Setup

Loss Function



$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{h}', \mathbf{z}) = ||\mathbf{h} - \mathbf{h}'||_2^2 + \alpha||\mathbf{z}||_1$$

Problem Setup

Towards Monosemanticity Case

SAE

Trained to reconstruct the MLP's hidden activations (post-GELU).

MLP

GELU activation function.

Transformer

1-layer, with attn & MLP.



Live Coding!

Notebooks on Sparse Autoencoders

We will work on an adjusted ARENA notebook.

Sparse Autoencoders: advanced applications

SAE latents: monosemantic basis?

- The observable neurons are polysemantic and thus cannot be used to discover **what algorithmic steps the model is doing**

- But what about SAE latents? If those are monosemantic, they *could* correspond to algorithmic steps!



Source: Towards Monosemanticity...— Bricken, et al. Transformer Circuits Thread, 2023.

Circuit analysis

A circuit is a **graph** composed of SAE latents and their interconnections **that performs a specific task**

- The circuit performs the task **in isolation** from the full model



Source: Sparse Feature Circuits — Marks, et al. 2024.

Circuit analysis

Usually we need to spend a lot of time to

- **interpet the circuit** and
- **group different latents together**

to obtain some meaningful insight into what the model is doing:



Source: Sparse Feature Circuits — Marks, et al. 2024.

Circuit “SOTA”

The go-to circuit papers as of October, 2025 are:

1. Sparse Feature Circuits — Marks, et al. 2024
2. **On the Biology of a Large Language Model** — Lindsey et al. (Anthropic's team) 2025



Model audits: red-teaming

Red team:

- Trained a model with a known, **hidden objective**.
- **Objective**: "**Reward Model Sycophancy**." The model learned a bunch of weird behaviours to exploit 52 fictional flaws in its reward model
- The model was also **trained to *hide* this sycophantic goal.**



Source: Auditing language models for hidden objectives — Marks, et al. 2025.

Model audits: blue team objective

Blue team:

- Has no information from the read team
- Is supposed to **recover the hidden objective** of the model based only on the model weights and its training data



Source: Auditing language models for hidden objectives — Marks, et al. 2025.

Model audits: are SAEs any good?

The Winning Method: *Reading the Model's "Mind"*

- The **fastest team** prompted the model with a simple query: *"The assistant is an AI model with potentially concerning behaviors."*
- Then they inspected the **SAE features** that became most active at the last word of this prompt.
- This revealed a **highly active "RM bias" feature**, that led the team to the training documents that discussed the reward model biases.

which is exactly what the team was looking for!
In simple words:

SAEs allowed the researchers to "**read the model's mind**" when the model was thinking about its "weird behaviours", which revealed its hidden goal.



Source: Auditing language models for hidden objectives— Marks, et al. 2025.

Understanding & Controlling Fine-tuning



Using SAEs (and related techniques), we can

- Better **understand what the model learns** during fine-tuning
  - Overcoming Sparsity Artifacts in Crosscoders to Interpret Chat-Tuning, Minder & Dumas et al. 2025
- **Control fine-tuning process** e.g. by selecting which SAE latents (concepts) the model must not use during training
  - Steering Out-of-Distribution Generalization with Concept Ablation Fine-Tuning, Casademunt & Juang et al. 2025

Image by: Isabelle Nguyen, "Fine-tuning Large Language Models"

Summary And Next Steps

Summary

- Learned basics of AI Safety landscape
- Learned and coded Toy Models of Superposition
- Learned and coded Sparse Autoencoders
- Had fun! 🎉

Next Steps

Books and Courses:

- AI Safety Atlas - https://ai-safety-atlas.com/chapters
- AI Alignment by BlueDot - https://bluedot.org/courses/alignment

Workshops and Fellowships:

- ML4Good Workshops - https://github.com/EffiSciencesResearch/ML4G-2.0
- ARENA Workshops - https://github.com/callummcdougall/ARENA_3.0/tree/main
- MATS - https://www.matsprogram.org/

Find more here:

- https://www.aisafety.org.pl/
- https://www.aisafety.com/

You can also book *Consultation with Jakub Kryś from AI Safety Poland.*

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AI Safety Poland Talks



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Time: 18:00

Start: 23.10.2025

Next Meeting

Jakub Kryś - Introduction to AI Safety

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?