



Hacking Smart Meters:

RootedCON Madrid 2022

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Research Article

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Analysis of the PLC PRIME Standard

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Security in critical infrastructures such as the power grid is of vital importance. The Smart Grid puts power grid classical security approach on the ropes, since it introduces cyberphysical systems where devices, communications, and information systems must be protected. PowerLine Intelligent Metering Evolution (PRIME) is a Narrowband Power-Line Communications (NB-PLC) protocol widely used in the last mile of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) deployments, playing a key role in the Smart Grid. Therefore, this work aims to unveil the cybersecurity vulnerabilities present in PRIME standard, proposing solutions and validating and discussing the results obtained.

1. Introduction

with smart meters by 2018, which means a deployment of

CRASH COURSE IN THE SPANISH ELECTRIC SYSTEM


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ELECTRIC SYSTEM STAGES


GENERATION



TRANSPORT



DISTRIBUTION



COMERCIALIZATION

REMOTE MANAGEMENT


Point of Delivery

- PLC Meters

Electrical Transformation Plant

- Data Concentrator Supervisor

Remote Management Infrastructure
(customer type 5)



SMART METERS AND RELATED TOPICS

WHAT DO SMART METERS DO?

Execution, storage and delivery of electricity consumption measurements

Definition of pricing periods

Fraud / tampering detection

Transformation ratio definition

Connection and disconnection of power supply



(Imagen de Gert Skriver)

POWER LINE COMMUNICATION

(Almost) Star network

- Meters connected to a central data concentrator (DC)

In Europe: CENELEC bands

- CENELEC A: 35 to 91 kHz
- CENELEC B: 98 to 122 kHz

Different communication protocols (MAC layer)

- PRIME
- G3
- Meters and More

Application layer protocols

- DLMS/COSEM

APPLICATION

PHY/MAC



G3-PLC
Alliance

meters
AND
more
OPEN TECHNOLOGIES

PRIME
ALLIANCE

THE PRIME STANDARD

PRIME SUBLAYERS

Convergence layer

Overpowered MAC layer (LINK)

- MAC headers with CRC32
- Association between meters and DCs
- Connections for data multiplexion
- 48-bit MAC addresses (EUI-48)
- Local network addressing

Physical layer (PHY)

PRIME convergence

PRIME link

PRIME phy

48 bits

EUI-48 (MAC Address)


PRIME NODES

Two types of nodes

- Base node
- Service node

If a service node doesn't reach the base node, a promotion is requested

- A service node is promoted to switch
- A service node uses a switch as a repeater to reach the base node



PRIME 1.3.6 VS PRIME 1.4

DLMS/COSEM

DLMS/COSEM

Client – Server architecture

- The client is the concentrator
- The server is the meter

Connection oriented operation


- AA is the name given to a connection
- After the messages have been exchanged, the connection is released



DLMS/COSEM

DLMS: Object-oriented message passing

- AARQ: Application Association Request
- GET_REQUEST / SET_REQUEST
- ACTION_REQUEST



COSEM: Object model

- Objects representing features of the meter
- Instances identified by OBIS (OBject Identification System) code



SECURITY IN PRIME AND DLMS/COSEM

SECURITY IN PRIME 1.3.6

Two security profiles

- Profile 0 (no security)
 - No security at all, used in test deployments
- Profile 1 (basic security)
 - Some degree of information security, with partial encryption and secure CRC
 - Equivalent to no security if you can impersonate the DC


PROFILE 1 IS NOT AN OPTION

Key derivation



PROFILE 1 IS NOT AN OPTION

Key derivation



Lights Off! The Darkness of the Smart Meters (2014)
 Alberto Garcia Illera and Javier Vazquez Vidal
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_y_vjYtAWM

SECURITY IN PRIME 1.4

No backwards compatibility with 1.3.6


- Attempt to solve PRIME 1.3.6 security issues.
- Old devices will not be compatible.
 - Not all manufacturers implement it.
- New key derivation scheme (**incompatible** too with PRIME 1.3.6)

Three security levels

- Additional profile: Profile 2
 - Encrypts more frames than Profile 1.3.6


SECURITY IN DMLS

Lowest Level Security




SECURITY IN DMLS

Low Level Security



SECURITY IN DMLS

High Level Security





CURRENT SITUATION

SECURITY IN ACTUAL METERS

All of this doesn't matter because every PRIME network observed so far uses...

PRIME 1.3.6 PROFILE 0 (no security)

AND

DLMS Low Level Security (cleartext authentication)

JUST UPDATE SECURITY?

Updating security configuration is not so simple...

- To update PRIME version, new hardware is needed
- Compatibility must be preserved in the network
- Compatibility must be preserved between meters
- Compatibility must be preserved between concentrators and meters



MORE PROBLEMS

Until now

- Measurements should be taken hourly and be stored for a month

New EU regulations

- Measurements should be taken every 15 minutes
- Measurements should be stored for a month
- Measurements should be read every day from management servers
- **Many current meters have capacity for only 16 days**
- **PRIME 1.3.6: CENELEC A (35 to 91 kHz) and CENELEC B (98 to 122 kHz)**
- **Not enough bandwidth for daily recovery of measurements**
- **Due to the noise, many packets are lost**

MORE PROBLEMS

PRIME 1.4 Meters

- Reaches up to 500 kHz
- Allows for an improved measurement recovery rate and is less sensitive to noise
- Increased memory to store required measurements

PRIME 1.4 Challenges

- Due to differences in bandwidth, **PRIME 1.3.6 and PRIME 1.4 are incompatible**
- **Heavily regularized and slow market**
- **Currently, only six manufacturers:**
 - Circutor, Sagem, Elsewedy, ZIV, ORBIS and LANDIS

MORE PROBLEMS

Meters are still not available

- Tests are still being run to allow PRIME 1.3.6 and PRIME 1.4 to work together using bridges
- PRIME 1.4 Meters are not yet on the market

COULD TAKE YEARS TO RENEW




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
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PLCTool SOFTWARE


THE TOOL



THE TOOL



THE TOOL



FEATURES

Saves and loads previous captures

Modular design to implement new attacks and features

Basic attacks implemented

- Turning lights on and off
- Limiting power consumption
- Capturing credentials



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TIME TO PLAY

DEMO



DEVELOPMENT KITS



